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be utilized in the delivery of NBC weapons, whose primary
use is the delivery of NBC weapons, or that the Secretary
or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be
used to deliver NBC weapons.
(2) The status of NBC weapons development, acquisition,
manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment programs in any such
country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational
group to acquire essential test equipment, manufacturing equip-
ment and technology, weaponization equipment and technology,
and radioactive material, feedstocks or components of feed-
stocks, and biological cultures and toxins.
(3) A description of assistance provided by any person
or government, after the date of the enactment of this Act,
to any such country or subnational group in the acquisition
or development of—
(A) NBC weapons;
(B) missile systems, as defined in the MTCR or that
the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to
believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and
(C) aircraft and other delivery systems and weapons
that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason
to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons.
(4) A listing of those persons and countries that continue
to provide such equipment or technology described in paragraph
(3) to any country or subnational group as of the date of
submission of the report, including the extent to which foreign
persons and countries were found to have knowingly and mate-
rially assisted such programs.
(5) A description of the use of, or substantial preparations
to use, the equipment of technology described in paragraph
(3) by any foreign country or subnational group.
(6) A description of the diplomatic measures that the
United States, and that other adherents to the MTCR and
other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of
NBC weapons, have made with respect to activities and private
persons and governments suspected of violating the MTCR
and such other arrangements.
(7) An analysis of the effectiveness of the regulatory and
enforcement regimes of the United States and other countries
that adhere to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting
the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons in controlling
the export of MTCR and other NBC weapons and delivery
system equipment or technology.
(8) A summary of advisory opinions issued under section
11B(b)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
App. 2401b(b)(4)) and under section 73(d) of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(d)).
(9) An explanation of United States policy regarding the
transfer of MTCR equipment or technology to foreign missile
programs, including programs involving launches of space
vehicles.
(10) A description of each transfer by any person or govern-
ment during the preceding 12-month period which is subject
to sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act
of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102–484).
(d) EXCLUSIONS.—The countries excluded under subsection (a)
are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
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France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
(e) CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT.—The Secretary shall make
every effort to submit all of the information required by this section
in unclassified form. Whenever the Secretary submits any such
information in classified form, the Secretary shall submit such
classified information in an addendum and shall also submit concur-
rently a detailed summary, in unclassified form, of that classified
information.
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) DESIGNATED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term
‘‘designated congressional committees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate.
(2) MISSILE; MTCR; MTCR EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY.—
The terms ‘‘missile’’, ‘‘MTCR’’, and ‘‘MTCR equipment or tech-
nology’’ have the meanings given those terms in section 74
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(3) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means any United States
or foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other form
of association, or any of its successor entities, parents, or
subsidiaries.
(4) WEAPONIZE; WEAPONIZATION.—The term ‘‘weaponize’’ or
‘‘weaponization’’ means to incorporate into, or the incorporation
into, usable ordnance or other militarily useful means of
delivery.
(g) REPEALS.—
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The following provisions of law are
repealed:
(A) Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note).
(B) Section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C.
5606).
(C) Section 1607(a) of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–484).
(D) Paragraph (d) of section 585 of the Foreign Oper-
ations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tions Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of title I
of division A of Public Law 104–208; 110 Stat. 3009–171).
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 585 of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act, 1997, is amended—
(A) in paragraph (b), by adding ‘‘and’’ at the end;
and
(B) in paragraph (c), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting
a period.
SEC. 1309. THREE-YEAR INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND NON-
PROLIFERATION STRATEGY.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of State shall prepare and submit to the
H. R. 1646—93
appropriate congressional committees a 3-year international arms
control and nonproliferation strategy. The strategy shall contain
the following:
(1) A 3-year plan for the reduction of existing nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missiles and
for controlling the proliferation of these weapons.
(2) Identification of the goals and objectives of the United
States with respect to arms control and nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
(3) A description of the programs, projects, and activities
of the Department of State intended to accomplish goals and
objectives described in paragraph (2).
Subtitle B—Russian Federation Debt
Reduction for Nonproliferation
SEC. 1311. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Russian Federation Debt
for Nonproliferation Act of 2002’’.
SEC. 1312. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) It is in the vital security interests of the United States
to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to addi-
tional states or to terrorist organizations, and to ensure that
other nations’ obligations to modify their stockpiles of such
arms in accordance with treaties, executive agreements, or
political commitments are fulfilled.
(2) In particular, it is in the vital national security interests
of the United States to ensure that—
(A) all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear material in the Russian Federation are secure and
accounted for;
(B) stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear material that are excess to military needs in the
Russian Federation are monitored and reduced;
(C) any chemical or biological weapons, related mate-
rials, and facilities in the Russian Federation are destroyed;
(D) the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons complex
is reduced to a size appropriate to its post-Cold War mis-
sions, and its experts in weapons of mass destruction tech-
nologies are shifted to gainful and sustainable civilian
employment;
(E) the Russian Federation’s export control system
blocks any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
the means of delivering such weapons, and materials,
equipment, know-how, or technology that would be used
to develop, produce, or deliver such weapons; and
(F) these objectives are accomplished with sufficient
monitoring and transparency to provide confidence that
they have in fact been accomplished and that the funds
provided to accomplish these objectives have been spent
efficiently and effectively.
(3) United States programs should be designed to accom-
plish these vital objectives in the Russian Federation as rapidly
H. R. 1646—94
as possible, and the President should develop and present to
Congress a plan for doing so.
(4) Substantial progress has been made in United States-
Russian Federation cooperative programs to achieve these
objectives, but much more remains to be done to reduce the
urgent risks to United States national security posed by the
current state of the Russian Federation’s weapons of mass
destruction stockpiles and complexes.
(5) The threats posed by inadequate management of
weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and complexes in the
Russian Federation remain urgent. Incidents in years imme-
diately preceding 2001, which have been cited by the Russia
Task Force of the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, include—
(A) a conspiracy at one of the Russian Federation’s
largest nuclear weapons facilities to steal nearly enough
highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb;
(B) an attempt by an employee of the Russian Federa-
tion’s premier nuclear weapons facility to sell nuclear
weapons designs to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan; and
(C) the theft of radioactive material from a Russian
Federation submarine base.
(6) Addressing these threats to United States and world
security will ultimately consume billions of dollars, a burden
that will have to be shared by the Russian Federation, the
United States, and other governments, if these threats are
to be neutralized.
(7) The creation of new funding streams could accelerate
progress in reducing these threats to United States security
and help the government of the Russian Federation to fulfill
its responsibility for secure management of its weapons stock-
piles and complexes as United States assistance phases out.
(8) The Russian Federation has a significant foreign debt,
a substantial proportion of which it inherited from the Soviet
Union.
(9) Past debt-for-environment exchanges, in which a portion
of a country’s foreign debt is canceled in return for certain
environmental commitments or payments by that country, sug-
gest that a debt-for-nonproliferation exchange with the Russian
Federation could be designed to provide additional funding
for nonproliferation and arms reduction initiatives.
(10) Most of the Russian Federation’s official bilateral debt
is held by United States allies that are advanced industrial
democracies. Since the issues described pose threats to United
States allies as well, United States leadership that results
in a larger contribution from United States allies to cooperative
threat reduction activities will be needed.
(11) At the June 2002 meeting of the G–8 countries, agree-
ment was achieved on a G–8 Global Partnership against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, under
which the advanced industrial democracies committed to con-
tribute $20,000,000,000 to nonproliferation programs in the
Russian Federation during a 10-year period, with each contrib-
uting country having the option to fund some or all of its
contribution through reduction in the Russian Federation’s offi-
cial debt to that country.
(12) The Russian Federation’s Soviet-era official debt to
the United States is estimated to be $480,000,000 in Lend-