IV 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 291
Recognizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and calling on the Presi-
dent to engage in nonproliferation strategies designed to eliminate these 
weapons of mass destruction from United States and worldwide arsenals. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 19, 2003
Ms. WOOLSEY (for herself, Ms. LEE, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. 
GRIJALVA, Mr. FARR, Mr. OLVER, Mr. OWENS, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. 
STARK, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, and Mr. KUCINICH) sub-
mitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed 
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee concerned 
RESOLUTION 
Recognizing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and call-
ing on the President to engage in nonproliferation strate-
gies designed to eliminate these weapons of mass destruc-
tion from United States and worldwide arsenals.
Whereas nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and 
represent a disproportionate use of force; 
Whereas, since the end of the Cold War, the United States 
has squandered a superb opportunity to diminish the role 
of nuclear weapons in foreign and military affairs and 
failed to verifiably eliminate existing stocks of nuclear
•HRES 291 IH 
weapons as well as prevent new nuclear dangers from 
arising, and consequently the threat of nuclear disaster 
remains unacceptably high; 
Whereas United States foreign policy is eroding the network 
of security treaties that have helped to stem the spread 
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, thus de-
creasing security for Americans and non-Americans alike; 
Whereas the United States has a vital security interest in 
promoting the nonproliferation and disarmament of nu-
clear weapons, since the only genuine and permanent se-
curity from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is 
their elimination under strict and effective international 
control; 
Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) (21 UST 483) entered into force and 
became part of United States law on March 5, 1970; 
Whereas more states (a total of 188) have ratified the NPT 
than any other arms limitation and disarmament agree-
ment, a testament to the Treaty’s significance; 
Whereas the United States has undertaken, in accordance 
with Article VI of the NPT, to ‘‘pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament’’; 
Whereas the long-term viability of the nonproliferation goal 
is at risk if the United States fails to implement its Arti-
cle VI obligations; 
Whereas the United States agreed, in connection with the in-
definite extension of the NPT in 1995, to the ‘‘deter-
mined pursuit’’ of ‘‘systematic and progressive efforts to 
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal
•HRES 291 IH 
listic Missile Treaty (23 UST 3435; entered into force on 
October 3, 1972); 
(4) taking concrete measures to reduce the oper-
ational status of nuclear weapons; 
(5) taking irreversible measures toward total nuclear 
disarmament; 
(6) increasing transparency regarding nuclear weap-
ons capabilities; and 
(7) diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in secu-
rity policies;
Whereas the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 
signed on May 24, 2002, (ratified on March 6, 2003), by 
President George W. Bush, fails to incorporate key ele-
ments of the START II and START III agreements re-
garding the destruction of delivery vehicles and the dis-
mantlement of warheads, and it fails to provide new 
verification procedures necessary to effect transparent, 
meaningful, and permanent reductions crucial to the de-
nuclearization process; 
Whereas the SORT called for a decrease in the number of 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads, but projected stor-
age of thousands of strategic warheads, including many 
capable of quick redeployment; 
Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 
under the NPT, the January 9, 2002, Department of De-
fense Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for a New 
Strategic Triad consisting of nuclear and conventional of-
fensive strike systems integrated with active and passive 
defenses and a revitalized defense infrastructure with new 
capabilities; 
Whereas the NPR—
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(1) projected indefinite retention of a large, modern, 
and diverse nuclear force totalling many thousands of 
weapons; 
(2) maintains and expands the role of nuclear weap-
ons in United States national security policy, including 
the use of nuclear weapons in ‘‘immediate, potential, or 
unexpected contingencies’’; 
(3) reiterated Administration plans not to support 
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; 
(4) pledged to increase readiness to resume nuclear 
testing and proceed with development of a Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense; and 
(5) called for the development of new nuclear weap-
ons capabilities for a wide range of missions, including 
nuclear earth-penetrating weapons to strike hardened and 
deeply buried targets, and low-yield nuclear warheads;
Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 
under the NPT, the September 2002 National Security 
Strategy of the United States set forth an aggressive pol-
icy of preventive self-defense in which ‘‘America will act 
against...emerging threats before they are fully formed’’; 
Whereas rather than affirming the United States obligations 
under the NPT, the December 2002 National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) stated 
that ‘‘The United States...reserves the right to respond 
with overwhelming force—including through resort to all 
of our options—to the use of WMD against the United 
States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies,’’ with 
both ‘‘conventional and nuclear response’’ capabilities; 
Whereas the current annual funding for the United States 
nuclear weapons activities account stands at $6 billion,
•HRES 291 IH 
representing a 45 percent increase over the Cold War av-
erage of approximately $4 billion per year; 
Whereas the above-detailed policies and programs of the 
United States are—
(1) antithetical to United States obligations under 
the NPT; 
(2) contrary to fundamental requirements of inter-
national law, because the United Nations Charter does 
not permit preventive war; 
(3) counterproductive, because United States reli-
ance on nuclear weapons encourages other states to ac-
quire them, ultimately increasing the likelihood that a 
nuclear weapon will be used against the United States; 
(4) dangerous, because the assertion of the United 
States of a right to engage in preventive war encourages 
other states to assert the same right; and 
(5) immoral, because they place a threat of mass de-
struction, and the assertion of a right to initiate war, at 
the core of United States foreign policy;
Whereas nonproliferation strategies based on internationally 
accepted standards of behavior, ranging from treaties to 
enforcement mechanisms such as on-site inspections, 
technical surveillance, intelligence sharing, and the de-
struction of all such weapons of mass destruction, are de-
signed to prevent the proliferation and development of all 
forms of WMD, so that hostile states and entities either 
are unable to procure WMD or are required not to use 
WMD; and 
Whereas nonproliferation strategies emphasizing reciprocity 
and cooperation that are consistent with international law 
have been used successfully for the last 50 years, while 
counterproliferation strategies based primarily on the
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unilateral use of force, outside the framework of inter-
national organizations and agreements, are likely to lead 
to the disintegration of existing arms control and non-
proliferation mechanisms and a renewed, more complex 
arms race: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives—
(1) requests the President to inform Congress 
and the Secretary General of the United Nations re-
garding the efforts and measures the United States 
has taken with respect to—
(A) implementation and observance of Ar-
ticle VI of the NPT; 
(B) implementation and observance of 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
52/38O and subsequent resolutions related to 
the July 1996 advisory opinion of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, which called upon all 
states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obli-
gation by commencing multilateral negotiations 
leading to the early conclusion of a nuclear 
weapons convention; 
(C) implementation and observance of 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
55/33C and subsequent resolutions welcoming 
the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Con-
ference, and affirming that ‘‘a nuclear weapon
•HRES 291 IH 
free world will ultimately require the underpin-
ning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated 
legally binding instrument’’; and 
(D) nuclear disarmament; 
(2) calls on the President to implement and ob-
serve all NPT obligations and commitments and to 
revise national policies on nuclear weapons accord-
ingly; and 
(3) urges the President, in the interests of pro-
tecting and advancing human, national, and global 
security, to—
(A) declare unconditionally that the United 
States will not use nuclear weapons first, and 
that pending their elimination, nuclear weapons 
serve only to deter a nuclear attack by a hostile 
state or other entity; 
(B) initiate and conclude multilateral nego-
tiations on sweeping, verifiable, and irreversible 
steps nuclear states shall take to reduce and 
eventually eliminate strategic and tactical nu-
clear weapons and their delivery systems; 
(C) begin verifiable and irreversible reduc-
tions in the United States strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems;
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(D) cooperate with the Russian Federation 
to remove from deployment nuclear weapons 
that presently are operational and ready to be 
launched on short notice; 
(E) reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear 
testing and work for ratification of the Com-
prehensive Test Ban Treaty at the earliest pos-
sible date; 
(F) terminate all efforts aimed at enhanc-
ing the military capabilities of the United 
States nuclear arsenal, including research and 
development for both low-yield nuclear weapons 
and the ‘‘robust nuclear earth penetrator’’ 
(commonly referred to as ‘‘bunker-busters’’); 
(G) terminate all plans for upgrades to ex-
isting weapons research and production facili-
ties, and construction of new facilities, includ-
ing those for plutonium pit manufacturing and 
tritium production; 
(H) terminate the declared United States 
policy of preventive warfare as a response to 
WMD threats; 
(I) obtain the approval of the Senate or 
the entire Congress as a condition for with-