In the Senate of the United States,
November 16, 2006.
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representa-
tives (H.R. 5682) entitled ‘‘An Act to exempt from certain
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed
nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.’’, do pass with
the following
AMENDMENT:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:
TITLE I—UNITED STATES-INDIA
PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY
COOPERATION
SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act’’.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) strong bilateral relations with India are in
the national interest of the United States;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(2) the United States and India share common
democratic values and the potential for increasing
and sustained economic engagement;
(3) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India
by the United States and other countries has the po-
tential to benefit the people of all countries;
(4) such commerce also represents a significant
change in United States policy regarding commerce
with countries not parties to the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty, which remains the foundation of the
international non-proliferation regime;
(5) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with
India by the United States and other countries must
be achieved in a manner that minimizes the risk of
nuclear proliferation or regional arms races and
maximizes India’s adherence to international non-
proliferation regimes, including, in particular, the
Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG);
and
(6) the United States should not seek to facilitate
or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to
India by any other party if such exports are termi-
nated under United States law.
†
HR 5682 EAS
SEC. 103. DECLARATION OF POLICY CONCERNING UNITED
STATES-INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY
COOPERATION.
It shall be the policy of the United States with respect
to any peaceful atomic energy cooperation between the
United States and India—
(1) to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation
of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear ex-
plosive devices;
(2) to achieve as quickly as possible the Govern-
ment of India’s adherence to, and cooperation in, the
full range of international non-proliferation regimes
and activities, including India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
Interdiction Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to
conform its export control laws, regulations, and
policies with the Australia Group and with the
Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls
List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress
toward implementing the decision described in
subparagraph (C);
†
HR 5682 EAS
(3) to ensure that India remains in full compli-
ance with its non-proliferation, arms control, and
disarmament agreements, obligations, and commit-
ments;
(4) to ensure that any safeguards agreement or
Additional Protocol thereto to which India is a party
with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) can reliably safeguard any export or reexport
to India of any nuclear materials and equipment;
(5) to meet the requirements set forth in sub-
sections a.(1) and a.(3)–a.(9) of section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153);
(6) to act in a manner fully consistent with the
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines
for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equip-
ment, Materials, Software and Related Technology de-
veloped by the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group
and the rules and practices regarding NSG decision-
making;
(7) given the special sensitivity of equipment
and technologies related to the enrichment of ura-
nium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the
production of heavy water, to work with members of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, individually and collec-
†
HR 5682 EAS
tively, to further restrict the transfers of such equip-
ment and technologies, including to India;
(8) to maintain the fullest possible international
support for, adherence to, and compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
(9) that exports of nuclear fuel to India should
not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases
in the production by India of fissile material for non-
civilian purposes.
SEC. 104. WAIVERS FOR COOPERATION WITH INDIA.
(a) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—If the President submits a
determination under section 105 to the appropriate congres-
sional committees and makes available to such committees
the text of the agreement described in paragraph (3) of such
section, the President may—
(1) subject to subsection (b), exempt a proposed
agreement for cooperation with India arranged pur-
suant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of sub-
section a.(2) of such section;
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with re-
spect to exports to India; and
(3) waive the application of any sanction with
respect to India under—
†
HR 5682 EAS
(A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2158) regarding any actions that occurred before
July 18, 2005.
(b) JOINT
RESOLUTION
OF
APPROVAL
REQUIRE-
MENT.—An agreement for cooperation exempted by the
President pursuant to subsection (a)(1) shall be subject to
the second proviso in subsection d. of section 123 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) applicable
to agreements exempted by the President pursuant to sub-
section (a) of such section.
SEC. 105. DETERMINATION REGARDING UNITED STATES-
INDIA PEACEFUL ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERA-
TION.
The determination referred to in section 104 is a writ-
ten determination by the President, which shall be accom-
panied by a report to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, that—
(1) India has provided to the IAEA and the
United States a credible plan to separate its civil nu-
clear facilities, materials, and programs from its
military facilities, materials, and programs;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(2) India has filed a complete declaration re-
garding its civil nuclear facilities and materials with
the IAEA;
(3) an agreement between India and the IAEA
requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity
in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and
practices to civil nuclear facilities, programs, and
materials described in paragraph (2) has entered into
force;
(4) India and the IAEA are making substantial
progress toward implementing an Additional Pro-
tocol;
(5) India is working with the United States to
conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the
production of fissile materials for use in nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
(6) India is supporting international efforts to
prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technology to any state that does not already possess
full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing
plants;
(7) India has secured nuclear and other sensitive
materials and technology through the application of
comprehensive export control legislation and regula-
tions, including through effective enforcement actions,
†
HR 5682 EAS
and through harmonization of its control lists with,
and adherence to, the guidelines of the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group;
(8) India is fully and actively participating in
United States and international efforts to dissuade,
sanction, and contain Iran for its nuclear program
consistent with United Nations Security Council reso-
lutions; and
(9) the Nuclear Suppliers Group has decided to
permit civil nuclear commerce with India pursuant
to a decision taken by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
that—
(A) was made by consensus; and
(B) does not permit nuclear commerce with
any non-nuclear weapon state other than India
that does not have IAEA safeguards on all nu-
clear materials and all peaceful nuclear activi-
ties within the territory of such state, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere.
SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EXPORTS AND REEX-
PORTS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—
†
HR 5682 EAS
(1) NUCLEAR
REGULATORY
COMMISSION.—Ex-
cept as provided in subsection (b), the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission may not authorize pursuant to
part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, li-
censes for the export or reexport to India of any
equipment, materials, or technology related to the en-
richment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nu-
clear fuel, or the production of heavy water.
(2) SECRETARY
OF
ENERGY.—Except as pro-
vided in subsection (b), the Secretary of Energy may
not authorize pursuant to part 810 of title 10, Code
of Federal Regulations, licenses for the export or reex-
port to India of any equipment, materials, or tech-
nology to be used for the enrichment of uranium, the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production
of heavy water.
(b) EXCEPTIONS.—Exports or reexports otherwise pro-
hibited under subsection (a) may be approved if—
(1) the end user—
(A) is a multinational facility partici-
pating in an IAEA-approved program to provide
alternatives to national fuel cycle capabilities; or
(B) is a facility participating in, and the
export or reexport is associated with, a bilateral
†
HR 5682 EAS
or multinational program to develop a prolifera-
tion-resistant fuel cycle; and
(2) the President determines that the export or
reexport will not improve India’s ability to produce
nuclear weapons or fissile material for military uses.
SEC. 107. END-USE MONITORING PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ensure that all
appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability
with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and tech-
nology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India and to
ensure United States compliance with Article I of the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(b) MEASURES.—The measures taken pursuant to sub-
section (a) shall include the following:
(1) Obtaining and implementing assurances and
conditions pursuant to the export licensing authori-
ties of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Department of Commerce and the authorizing au-
thorities of the Department of Energy, including, as
appropriate, conditions regarding end-use moni-
toring.
(2) A detailed system of reporting and account-
ing for technology transfers, including any retransfers
in India, authorized by the Department of Energy
pursuant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act
†
HR 5682 EAS
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be ca-
pable of providing assurances that—
(A) the identified recipients of the nuclear
technology are authorized to receive the nuclear
technology;
(B) the nuclear technology identified for
transfer will be used only for peaceful safe-
guarded nuclear activities and will not be used
for any military or nuclear explosive purpose;
and
(C) the nuclear technology identified for
transfer will not be retransferred without the
prior consent of the United States, and facilities,
equipment, or materials derived through the use
of transferred technology will not be transferred
without the prior consent of the United States.
(3) In the event the IAEA is unable to imple-
ment safeguards as required by an agreement between
the United States and India arranged pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2153), arrangements that conform with IAEA
safeguards standards, principles, and practices that
provide assurances equivalent to that intended to be
secured by the system they replace, including—
†
HR 5682 EAS
(A) review in a timely fashion of the design
of any equipment transferred pursuant to the
agreement for cooperation, or of any facility that
is to use, fabricate, process, or store any material
so transferred or any special nuclear material
used in or produced through the use of such ma-
terial and equipment;
(B) maintenance and disclosure of records
and of relevant reports for the purpose of assist-
ing in ensuring accountability for material
transferred pursuant to the agreement and any
source or special nuclear material used in or
produced through the use of any material and
equipment so transferred; and
(C) access to places and data necessary to
account for the material referred to in subpara-
graph (B) and to inspect any equipment or fa-
cility referred to in subparagraph (A).
(c) IMPLEMENTATION.—The measures described in
subsection (b) shall be implemented to provide reasonable
assurances that the recipient is complying with the relevant
requirements, terms, and conditions of any licenses issued
by the United States regarding such exports, including those
relating to the use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit,
and storage of such exports.
†
HR 5682 EAS
SEC. 108. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE.
(a) INFORMATION
ON
NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES
OF
INDIA.—The President shall keep the appropriate congres-
sional committees fully and currently informed of the facts
and implications of any significant nuclear activities of
India, including—
(1) any material non-compliance on the part of
the Government of India with—
(A) the non-proliferation commitments un-
dertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18,
2005, between the President of the United States
and the Prime Minister of India;
(B) the separation plan presented in the na-
tional parliament of India on March 7, 2006,
and in greater detail on May 11, 2006;
(C) a safeguards agreement between the
Government of India and the IAEA;
(D) an Additional Protocol between the
Government of India and the IAEA;
(E) a peaceful nuclear cooperation agree-
ment between the Government of India and the
United States Government pursuant to section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2153) or any subsequent arrangement under sec-
tion 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
†
HR 5682 EAS
(F) the terms and conditions of any ap-
proved licenses; and
(G) United States laws and regulations re-
garding the export or reexport of nuclear mate-
rial or dual-use material, equipment, or tech-
nology;
(2) the construction of a nuclear facility in
India after the date of the enactment of this Act;
(3) significant changes in the production by
India of nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts
of fissile material produced; and
(4) changes in the purpose or operational status
of any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in
India.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORT.—
Not later than 180 days after the date on which an agree-
ment between the Government of India and the United
States Government pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and
annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report including—
(1) a description of any additional nuclear fa-
cilities and nuclear materials that the Government of
India has placed or intends to place under IAEA
safeguards;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(2) a comprehensive listing of—
(A) all licenses that have been approved by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Sec-
retary of Energy for exports and reexports to
India under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code
of Federal Regulations;
(B) any licenses approved by the Depart-
ment of Commerce for the export or reexport to
India of commodities, related technology, and
software which are controlled for nuclear non-
proliferation reasons on the Nuclear Referral
List of the Commerce Control List maintained
under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regu-
lations;
(C) any other United States authorizations
for the export or reexport to India of nuclear
materials and equipment; and
(D) with respect to each such license or
other form of authorization described in subpara-
graphs (A), (B), and (C)—
(i) the number or other identifying in-
formation of each license or authorization;
(ii) the name or names of the author-
ized end user or end users;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(iii) the name of the site, facility, or
location in India to which the export or re-
export was made;
(iv) the terms and conditions included
on such licenses and authorizations;
(v) any post-shipment verification pro-
cedures that will be applied to such exports
or reexports; and
(vi) the term of validity of each such
license or authorization;
(3) any significant nuclear commerce between
India and other countries, including any such trade
that—
(A) does not comply with applicable guide-
lines or decisions of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group; or
(B) would not meet the standards applied to
exports or reexports of such material, equipment,
or technology of United States origin;
(4) either—
(A) a certification that India is in full com-
pliance with the commitments and obligations
contained in the agreements and other documents
referenced in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of
subsection (a)(1); or
†
HR 5682 EAS
(B) if the President cannot make such cer-
tification, an identification and assessment of all
compliance issues arising with regard to the ad-
herence by India to its commitments and obliga-
tions, including—
(i) the steps the United States Govern-
ment has taken to remedy or otherwise re-
spond to such compliance issues;
(ii) the responses of the Government of
India to such steps; and
(iii) an assessment of the implications
of any continued noncompliance, including
whether nuclear commerce with India, if
not already terminated under section 129 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2158), remains in the national security in-
terest of the United States;
(5) a detailed description of—
(A) United States efforts to promote na-
tional or regional progress by India and Paki-
stan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reduc-
ing their fissile material stockpiles, pending cre-
ation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off re-
gime, including the institution of a Fissile Mate-
rial Cut-off Treaty;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(B) the reactions of India and Pakistan to
such efforts; and
(C) assistance that the United States is pro-
viding, or would be able to provide, to India and
Pakistan to promote the objectives in subpara-
graph (A), consistent with its obligations under
international law and existing agreements;
(6) an estimate of—
(A) the amount of uranium mined in India
during the previous year;
(B) the amount of such uranium that has
likely been used or allocated for the production
of nuclear explosive devices; and
(C) the rate of production in India of—
(i) fissile material for nuclear explosive
devices; and
(ii) nuclear explosive devices;
(7) an analysis as to whether imported uranium
has affected the rate of production in India of nuclear
explosive devices; and
(8) a detailed description of efforts and progress
made toward the achievement of India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of
Interdiction Principles;
(C) public announcement of its decision to
conform its export control laws, regulations, and
policies with the Australia Group and with the
Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Controls
List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; and
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress
toward implementing the decision described in
subparagraph (C).
(c) SUBMITTAL WITH OTHER ANNUAL REPORTS.—
(1) REPORT ON PROLIFERATION PREVENTION.—
Each annual report submitted under subsection (b)
after the initial report may be submitted together
with the annual report on proliferation prevention re-
quired under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
(2) REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD REGIONAL
NON-PROLIFERATION.—The information required to be
submitted under subsection (b)(5) after the initial re-
port may be submitted together with the annual re-
port on progress toward regional non-proliferation re-
quired under section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
†
HR 5682 EAS
(d) FORM.—Each report submitted under this section
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
a classified annex.
SEC. 109. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
This title shall not be deemed to constitute authority
for any action in violation of any obligation of the United
States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
SEC. 110. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIV-
ERS.
A determination under section 105 and any waiver
under section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President
determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive de-
vice after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 111. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.
Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent
for the purposes of Section 73 of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).
SEC. 112. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Non-
proliferation Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James
W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal
Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted into law by section
1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106–113 and contained in appen-
dix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A–486)) is amended—
†
HR 5682 EAS
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ after
the semicolon at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as sub-
paragraph (D); and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the fol-
lowing new subparagraph:
‘‘(C) so much of the reports required under
section 108 of the United States-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act as relates to
verification or compliance matters; and’’.
SEC. 113. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) The term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means a
protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the
IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set
forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
(2) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives.
(3) The term ‘‘atomic energy’’ has the meaning
given the term in section 11 c. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(c)).
†
HR 5682 EAS
(4) The term ‘‘dual-use material, equipment, or
technology’’ means those items controlled by the De-
partment of Commerce pursuant to section 309(c) of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
(5) The term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ has the mean-
ing given the term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C.
6305(3)).
(6) The term ‘‘nuclear materials and equipment’’
has the meaning given the term in section 4(5) of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C.
3203(3)).
(7) The term ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty’’ means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and
Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March
5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
(8) The terms ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ and ‘‘nuclear
explosive device’’ have the meaning given the term
‘‘nuclear explosive device’’ in section 830(4) of the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 (22
U.S.C. 6305(4)).
(9) The terms ‘‘reprocessing’’ and ‘‘reprocess’’
refer to the separation of nuclear materials from fis-
sion products in spent nuclear fuel.
†
HR 5682 EAS
(10) The term ‘‘source material’’ has the mean-
ing given the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(z)).
(11) The term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the
meaning given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atom-
ic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
(12) The term ‘‘unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle
activity’’ means research on, or development, design,
manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance
of—
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical
facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, re-
processing plant, plant for the separation of iso-
topes of source or special fissionable material, or
separate storage installation with respect to
which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safe-
guards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or
installation that contains source or special fis-
sionable material; or
(B) any existing or future heavy water pro-
duction plant with respect to which there is no
obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on any nu-
clear material produced by or used in connection
with any heavy water produced therefrom.
†
HR 5682 EAS
SEC. 114. UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING THE PROVI-
SION OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR FUEL
RESERVE TO INDIA.
It is the policy of the United States that any nuclear
power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of
India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities
should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.
SEC. 115. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE
THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Energy, act-
ing through the Administrator of the National Nuclear Se-
curity Administration, shall establish a cooperative threat
reduction program to pursue jointly with scientists from
the United States and India a program to further common
nonproliferation goals, including scientific research and de-
velopment efforts related to nuclear nonproliferation, with
an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred
to as the ‘‘program’’).
(b) CONSULTATION.—The program shall be carried out
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Sec-
retary of Defense.
(c) NATIONAL ACADEMIES RECOMMENDATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy shall
enter into an agreement with the National Academies
†
HR 5682 EAS
to develop recommendations for the implementation of
the program.
(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The agreement entered
into under paragraph (1) shall provide for the prepa-
ration by qualified individuals with relevant expertise
and knowledge and the communication to the Sec-
retary of Energy each fiscal year of—
(A) recommendations for research and re-
lated programs designed to overcome existing
technological barriers to nuclear nonprolifera-
tion; and
(B) an assessment of whether activities and
programs funded under this section are achiev-
ing the goals of the activities and programs.
(3) PUBLIC
AVAILABILITY.—The recommenda-
tions and assessments prepared under this subsection
shall be made publicly available.
(d) CONSISTENCY WITH NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY.—All United States activities related to the
program shall be consistent with United States obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec-
essary to carry out this section for each of fiscal years 2007
through 2011.
†
HR 5682 EAS
TITLE II—UNITED STATES ADDI-
TIONAL 
PROTOCOL 
IMPLE-
MENTATION
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘United States Addi-
tional Protocol Implementation Act’’.
SEC. 202. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings—
(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other nuclear explosive devices poses a grave threat to
the national security of the United States and its
vital national interests.
(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has
proven critical to limiting such proliferation.
(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to
be effective, each of the non-nuclear-weapon State
Parties must conclude a comprehensive safeguards
agreement with the IAEA, and such agreements must
be honored and enforced.
(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the effi-
ciency of the safeguards system. This can best be ac-
complished by providing IAEA inspectors with more
information about, and broader access to, nuclear ac-
†
HR 5682 EAS
tivities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon
State Parties.
(5) The proposed scope of such expanded infor-
mation and access has been negotiated by the member
states of the IAEA in the form of a Model Additional
Protocol to its existing safeguards agreements, and
universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-
nuclear weapons states is essential to enhancing the
effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a
nuclear-weapon State Party, signed an Additional
Protocol that is based on the Model Additional Pro-
tocol, but which also contains measures, consistent
with its existing safeguards agreements with its mem-
bers, that protect the right of the United States to ex-
clude the application of IAEA safeguards to locations
and activities with direct national security signifi-
cance or to locations or information associated with
such activities.
(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in
the United States in a manner consistent with United
States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty may encourage other parties to the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nu-
clear-weapon State Parties, to conclude Additional
†
HR 5682 EAS
Protocols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty safeguards system and help re-
duce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of
direct and substantial benefit to the United States.
(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by
the United States is not required and is completely
voluntary given its status as a nuclear-weapon State
Party, but the United States has acceded to the Addi-
tional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime and to make United
States civil nuclear activities available to the same
IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-
nuclear-weapon State Parties.
(9) In accordance with the national security ex-
clusion contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Pro-
tocol, the United States will not allow any inspection
activities, nor make any declaration of any informa-
tion with respect to, locations, information, and ac-
tivities of direct national security significance to the
United States.
(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol
will conform to the principles set forth in the letter
of April 30, 2002, from the United States Permanent
Representative to the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations
†
HR 5682 EAS
to the Director General of the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.
In this title:
(1) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.—The term ‘‘Addi-
tional Protocol’’, when used in the singular form,
means the Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the United States of America and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application
of Safeguards in the United States of America, with
Annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc.
107–7).
(2) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means the Committee on Armed Services, the
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee
on Armed Services, the Committee on International
Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives.
(3) COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.—The term ‘‘com-
plementary access’’ means the exercise of the IAEA’s
access rights as set forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Ad-
ditional Protocol.
†
HR 5682 EAS
(4) EXECUTIVE
AGENCY.—The term ‘‘executive
agency’’ has the meaning given such term in section
105 of title 5, United States Code.
(5) FACILITY.—The term ‘‘facility’’ has the
meaning set forth in Article 18i. of the Additional
Protocol.
(6) IAEA.—The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency.
(7) JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term
‘‘judge of the United States’’ means a United States
district judge, or a United States magistrate judge
appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of title
28, United States Code.
(8) LOCATION.—The term ‘‘location’’ means any
geographic point or area declared or identified by the
United States or specified by the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency.
(9) NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY.—
The term ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ means
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21
UST 483).
(10) NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY AND NON-
NUCLEAR-WEAPON
STATE
PARTY.—The terms ‘‘nu-
†
HR 5682 EAS
clear-weapon State Party’’ and ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon
State Party’’ have the meanings given such terms in
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(11) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’, except as
otherwise provided, means any individual, corpora-
tion, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, pub-
lic or private institution, any State or any political
subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a
State, any foreign government or nation or any agen-
cy, instrumentality or political subdivision of any
such government or nation, or other entity located in
the United States.
(12) SITE.—The term ‘‘site’’ has the meaning set
forth in Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
(13) 
UNITED
STATES.—The 
term 
‘‘United
States’’, when used as a geographic reference, means
the several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and
possessions of the United States and includes all
places under the jurisdiction or control of the United
States, including—
(A) the territorial sea and the overlying air-
space;
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States
or public aircraft, as such terms are defined in
†
HR 5682 EAS
paragraphs (17) and (41), respectively, of section
40102(a) of title 49, United States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such
term is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App.
1903(b)).
(14) WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.—
The term ‘‘wide-area environmental sampling’’ has
the meaning set forth in Article 18g. of the Additional
Protocol.
SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this title, or the application of such
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of this title, or the application of such provi-
sion to persons or circumstances other than those as to
which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Subtitle A—General Provisions
SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to im-
plement and carry out the provisions of this title and the
Additional Protocol and shall designate through Executive
order which executive agency or agencies of the United
States, which may include but are not limited to the De-
partment of State, the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Depart-
†
HR 5682 EAS
ment of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
shall issue or amend and enforce regulations in order to
implement this title and the provisions of the Additional
Protocol.
(b) INCLUDED AUTHORITY.—For any executive agency
designated under subsection (a) that does not currently pos-
sess the authority to conduct site vulnerability assessments
and related activities, the authority provided in subsection
(a) includes such authority.
(c) EXCEPTION.—The authority described in sub-
section (b) does not supersede or otherwise modify any exist-
ing authority of any Federal department or agency already
having such authority.
Subtitle B—Complementary Access
SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT
COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—No complementary access to any
location in the United States shall take place pursuant to
the Additional Protocol without the authorization of the
United States Government in accordance with the require-
ments of this title.
(b) AUTHORITY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Complementary access to any
location in the United States subject to access under
†
HR 5682 EAS
the Additional Protocol is authorized in accordance
with this title.
(2) UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES.—
(A) RESTRICTIONS.—In the event of com-
plementary access to a privately owned or oper-
ated location, no employee of the Environmental
Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration or the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration of the Department
of Labor may participate in the access.
(B) NUMBER.—The number of designated
United States representatives accompanying
IAEA inspectors shall be kept to the minimum
necessary.
SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Each instance of complementary
access to a location in the United States under the Addi-
tional Protocol shall be conducted in accordance with this
subtitle.
(b) NOTICE.—
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Complementary access re-
ferred to in subsection (a) may occur only upon the
issuance of an actual written notice by the United
States Government to the owner, operator, occupant,
†
HR 5682 EAS
or agent in charge of the location to be subject to com-
plementary access.
(2) TIME OF NOTIFICATION.—The notice under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted to such owner, oper-
ator, occupant, or agent as soon as possible after the
United States Government has received notification
that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices
may be posted prominently at the location if the
United States Government is unable to provide actual
written notice to such owner, operator, occupant, or
agent.
(3) CONTENT OF NOTICE.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The notice required by
paragraph (1) shall specify—
(i) the purpose for the complementary
access;
(ii) the basis for the selection of the fa-
cility, site, or other location for the com-
plementary access sought;
(iii) the activities that will be carried
out during the complementary access;
(iv) the time and date that the com-
plementary access is expected to begin, and
the anticipated period covered by the com-
plementary access; and
†
HR 5682 EAS
(v) the names and titles of the inspec-
tors.
(4) SEPARATE NOTICES REQUIRED.—A separate
notice shall be provided each time that complemen-
tary access is sought by the IAEA.
(c) CREDENTIALS.—The complementary access team of
the IAEA and representatives or designees of the United
States Government shall display appropriate identifying
credentials to the owner, operator, occupant, or agent in
charge of the location before gaining entry in connection
with complementary access.
(d) SCOPE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in a war-
rant issued under section 223, and subject to the
United States Government’s rights under the Addi-
tional Protocol to limit complementary access, com-
plementary access to a location pursuant to this title
may extend to all activities specifically permitted for
such locations under Article 6 of the Additional Pro-
tocol.
(2) EXCEPTION.—Unless required by the Addi-
tional Protocol, no inspection under this title shall ex-
tend to—
(A) financial data (other than production
data);
†
HR 5682 EAS
(B) sales and marketing data (other than
shipment data);
(C) pricing data;
(D) personnel data;
(E) patent data;
(F) data maintained for compliance with
environmental or occupational health and safety
regulations; or
(G) research data.
(e) ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, SAFETY, AND SECU-
RITY.—In carrying out their activities, members of the
IAEA complementary access team and representatives or
designees of the United States Government shall observe ap-
plicable environmental, health, safety, and security regula-
tions established at the location subject to complementary
access, including those for protection of controlled environ-
ments within a facility and for personal safety.
SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY
ACCESS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—
(1) PROCEDURE.—
(A) CONSENT.—Except as provided in
paragraph (2), an appropriate official of the
United States Government shall seek or have the
consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or
†
HR 5682 EAS
agent in charge of a location prior to entering
that location in connection with complementary
access pursuant to sections 221 and 222. The
owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of
the location may withhold consent for any reason
or no reason.
(B) ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANT.—
In the absence of consent, the United States Gov-
ernment may seek an administrative search war-
rant from a judge of the United States under
subsection 
(b). 
Proceedings 
regarding 
the
issuance of an administrative search warrant
shall be conducted ex parte, unless otherwise re-
quested by the United States Government.
(2) EXPEDITED ACCESS.—For purposes of ob-
taining access to a location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii)
of the Additional Protocol in order to satisfy United
States obligations under the Additional Protocol when
notice of two hours or less is required, the United
States Government may gain entry to such location
in connection with complementary access, to the ex-
tent such access is consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, without ob-
taining either a warrant or consent.
†
HR 5682 EAS
(b) ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS FOR COM-
PLEMENTARY ACCESS.—
(1) OBTAINING ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WAR-
RANTS.—For complementary access conducted in the
United States pursuant to the Additional Protocol,
and for which the acquisition of a warrant is re-
quired, the United States Government shall first ob-
tain an administrative search warrant from a judge
of the United States. The United States Government
shall provide to such judge all appropriate informa-
tion regarding the basis for the selection of the facil-
ity, site, or other location to which complementary ac-
cess is sought.
(2) CONTENT OF AFFIDAVITS FOR ADMINISTRA-
TIVE
SEARCH
WARRANTS.—A judge of the United
States shall promptly issue an administrative search
warrant authorizing the requested complementary ac-
cess upon an affidavit submitted by the United States
Government—
(A) stating that the Additional Protocol is
in force;
(B) stating that the designated facility, site,
or other location is subject to complementary ac-
cess under the Additional Protocol;
†
HR 5682 EAS
(C) stating that the purpose of the com-
plementary access is consistent with Article 4 of
the Additional Protocol;
(D) stating that the requested complemen-
tary access is in accordance with Article 4 of the
Additional Protocol;
(E) containing assurances that the scope of
the IAEA’s complementary access, as well as
what it may collect, shall be limited to the access
provided for in Article 6 of the Additional Pro-
tocol;
(F) listing the items, documents, and areas
to be searched and seized;
(G) stating the earliest commencement and
the anticipated duration of the complementary
access period, as well as the expected times of
day during which such complementary access
will take place; and
(H) stating that the location to which entry
in connection with complementary access is
sought was selected either—
(i) because there is probable cause, on
the basis of specific evidence, to believe that
information required to be reported regard-
ing a location pursuant to regulations pro-
†
HR 5682 EAS
mulgated under this title is incorrect or in-
complete, and that the location to be
accessed contains evidence regarding that
violation; or
(ii) pursuant to a reasonable general
administrative plan based upon specific
neutral criteria.
(3) CONTENT OF WARRANTS.—A warrant issued
under paragraph (2) shall specify the same matters
required of an affidavit under that paragraph. In ad-
dition, each warrant shall contain the identities of the
representatives of the IAEA on the complementary ac-
cess team and the identities of the representatives or
designees of the United States Government required to
display identifying credentials under section 222(c).
SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMEN-
TARY ACCESS.
It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail
or refuse to permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise im-
pede, a complementary access authorized by this subtitle or
an entry in connection with such access.
†
HR 5682 EAS
Subtitle C—Confidentiality of
Information
SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMA-
TION.
Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the
United States Government under this title or under the Ad-
ditional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under sec-
tions 552 of title 5, United States Code.
Subtitle D—Enforcement
SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.
It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail
or refuse—
(1) to establish or maintain any record required
by any regulation prescribed under this title;
(2) to submit any report, notice, or other infor-
mation to the United States Government in accord-
ance with any regulation prescribed under this title;
or
(3) to permit access to or copying of any record
by the United States Government in accordance with
any regulation prescribed under this title.
SEC. 242. PENALTIES.
(a) CIVIL.—
(1) PENALTY AMOUNTS.—Any person that is de-
termined, in accordance with paragraph (2), to have
†
HR 5682 EAS
violated section 224 or section 241 shall be required
by order to pay a civil penalty in an amount not to
exceed $25,000 for each violation. For the purposes of
this paragraph, each day during which a violation of
section 224 continues shall constitute a separate vio-
lation of that section.
(2) NOTICE AND HEARING.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Before imposing a pen-
alty against a person under paragraph (1), the
head of an executive agency designated under
section 211(a) shall provide the person with no-
tice of the order. If, within 15 days after receiv-
ing the notice, the person requests a hearing, the
head of the designated executive agency shall ini-
tiate a hearing on the violation.
(B) CONDUCT OF HEARING.—Any hearing
so requested shall be conducted before an admin-
istrative judge. The hearing shall be conducted in
accordance with the requirements of section 554
of title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is
so requested, the order imposed by the head of the
designated agency shall constitute a final agency
action.
(C) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.—If the adminis-
trative judge determines, upon the preponderance
†
HR 5682 EAS
of the evidence received, that a person named in
the complaint has violated section 224 or section
241, the administrative judge shall state his
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue
and serve on such person an order described in
paragraph (1).
(D) FACTORS FOR DETERMINATION OF PEN-
ALTY AMOUNTS.—In determining the amount of
any civil penalty, the administrative judge or
the head of the designated agency shall take into
account the nature, circumstances, extent, and
gravity of the violation or violations and, with
respect to the violator, the ability to pay, effect
on ability to continue to do business, any history
of such violations, the degree of culpability, the
existence of an internal compliance program,
and such other matters as justice may require.
(E) CONTENT
OF
NOTICE.—For the pur-
poses of this paragraph, notice shall be in writ-
ing and shall be verifiably served upon the per-
son or persons subject to an order described in
paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall—
(i) set forth the time, date, and specific
nature of the alleged violation or violations;
and
†
HR 5682 EAS
(ii) specify the administrative and ju-
dicial remedies available to the person or
persons subject to the order, including the
availability of a hearing and subsequent
appeal.
(3) ADMINISTRATIVE APPELLATE REVIEW.—The
decision and order of an administrative judge shall be
the recommended decision and order and shall be re-
ferred to the head of the designated executive agency
for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the
head of the designated executive agency does not mod-
ify or vacate the decision and order, it shall become
a final agency action under this subsection.
(4) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—A person adversely af-
fected by a final order may, within 30 days after the
date the final order is issued, file a petition in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
or in the Court of Appeals for the district in which
the violation occurred.
(5) ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL ORDERS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—If a person fails to com-
ply with a final order issued against such person
under this subsection and—
†
HR 5682 EAS
(i) the person has not filed a petition
for judicial review of the order in accord-
ance with paragraph (4), or
(ii) a court in an action brought under
paragraph (4) has entered a final judgment
in favor of the designated executive agency,
the head of the designated executive agency shall
commence a civil action to seek compliance with
the final order in any appropriate district court
of the United States.
(B) NO REVIEW.—In any such civil action,
the validity and appropriateness of the final
order shall not be subject to review.
(C) INTEREST.—Payment of penalties as-
sessed in a final order under this section shall
include interest at currently prevailing rates cal-
culated from the date of expiration of the 60-day
period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date
of such final order, as the case may be.
(b) CRIMINAL.—Any person who violates section 224
or section 241 may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil
penalty which may be imposed under subsection (a) for such
violation, be fined under title 18, United States Code, im-
prisoned for not more than five years, or both.
†
HR 5682 EAS
SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.
(a) JURISDICTION.—The district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by
the head of an executive agency designated under section
211(a)—
(1) to restrain any conduct in violation of sec-
tion 224 or section 241; or
(2) to compel the taking of any action required
by or under this title or the Additional Protocol.
(b) CIVIL ACTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—A civil action described in
subsection (a) may be brought—
(A) in the case of a civil action described in
paragraph (1) of such subsection, in the United
States district court for the judicial district in
which any act, omission, or transaction consti-
tuting a violation of section 224 or section 241
occurred or in which the defendant is found or
transacts business; or
(B) in the case of a civil action described in
paragraph (2) of such subsection, in the United
States district court for the judicial district in
which the defendant is found or transacts busi-
ness.
†
HR 5682 EAS
(2) SERVICE OF PROCESS.—In any such civil ac-
tion, process shall be served on a defendant wherever
the defendant may reside or may be found.
Subtitle E—Environmental
Sampling
SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD AP-
PROVAL 
OF 
WIDE-AREA 
ENVIRONMENTAL
SAMPLING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Board of Governors of the IAEA approves
wide-area environmental sampling for use as a safeguards
verification tool, the President shall notify the appropriate
congressional committees.
(b) CONTENT.—The notification under subsection (a)
shall contain—
(1) a description of the specific methods and
sampling techniques approved by the Board of Gov-
ernors that are to be employed for purposes of wide-
area sampling;
(2) a statement as to whether or not such sam-
pling may be conducted in the United States under
the Additional Protocol; and
(3) an assessment of the ability of the approved
methods and sampling techniques to detect, identify,
†
HR 5682 EAS
and determine the conduct, type, and nature of nu-
clear activities.
SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLU-
SION TO WIDE-AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAM-
PLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro-
tocol, the United States shall not permit any wide-area en-
vironmental sampling proposed by the IAEA to be con-
ducted at a specified location in the United States under
Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to that proposed use of environ-
mental sampling that—
(1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental
sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the
IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party;
(2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental
sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to lo-
cations, activities, or information of direct national
security significance; and
(3) the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity
for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has
†
HR 5682 EAS
requested complementary access involving wide-
area environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Ad-
ditional Protocol that the IAEA engage in com-
plementary access in the United States that in-
volves the use of wide-area environmental sam-
pling.
SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLU-
SION 
TO 
LOCATION-SPECIFIC 
ENVIRON-
MENTAL SAMPLING.
In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Pro-
tocol, the United States shall not permit any location-spe-
cific environmental sampling in the United States under
Article 5 of the Additional Protocol unless the President has
determined and reported to the appropriate congressional
committees with respect to that proposed use of environ-
mental sampling that—
(1) the proposed use of location-specific environ-
mental sampling is necessary to increase the capa-
bility of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activi-
ties in a non-nuclear weapons state;
(2) the proposed use of location-specific environ-
mental sampling will not result in access by the
IAEA to locations, activities, or information of direct
national security significance; and
†
HR 5682 EAS
(3) with respect to the proposed use of environ-
mental sampling, the United States—
(A) has been provided sufficient opportunity
for consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has
requested complementary access involving loca-
tion-specific environmental sampling; or
(B) has requested under Article 8 of the Ad-
ditional Protocol that the IAEA engage in com-
plementary access in the United States that in-
volves the use of location-specific environmental
sampling.
SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
As used in this subtitle, the term ‘‘necessary to increase
the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear ac-
tivities in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State
Party’’ shall not be construed to encompass proposed uses
of environmental sampling that might assist the IAEA in
detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of
a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by—
(1) setting a good example of cooperation in the
conduct of such sampling; or
(2) facilitating the formation of a political con-
sensus or political support for such sampling in the
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party.
†
HR 5682 EAS
Subtitle F—Protection of National
Security Information and Activities
SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.
(a) LOCATIONS AND FACILITIES OF DIRECT NATIONAL
SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE.—No current or former Depart-
ment of Defense or Department of Energy location, site, or
facility of direct national security significance shall be de-
clared or be subject to IAEA inspection under the Addi-
tional Protocol.
(b) INFORMATION OF DIRECT NATIONAL SECURITY
SIGNIFICANCE.—No information of direct national security
significance regarding any location, site, or facility associ-
ated with activities of the Department of Defense or the De-
partment of Energy shall be provided under the Additional
Protocol.
(c) RESTRICTED DATA.—Nothing in this title shall be
construed to permit the communication or disclosure to the
IAEA or IAEA employees of restricted data controlled by
the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
2011 et seq.), including in particular ‘‘Restricted Data’’ as
defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2014(y)).
(d) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to permit the communication or disclo-
†
HR 5682 EAS
sure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of national security
information and other classified information.
SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.
(a) CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS PROHIBITED FROM OB-
TAINING ACCESS.—No national of a country designated by
the Secretary of State under section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as a government
supporting acts of international terrorism shall be per-
mitted access to the United States to carry out an inspec-
tion activity under the Additional Protocol or a related
safeguards agreement.
(b) PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PER-
SONNEL.—IAEA inspectors shall be accompanied at all
times by United States Government personnel when inspect-
ing sites, locations, facilities, or activities in the United
States under the Additional Protocol.
(c) VULNERABILITY AND RELATED ASSESSMENTS.—
The President shall conduct vulnerability, counterintel-
ligence, and related assessments not less than every 5 years
to ensure that information of direct national security sig-
nificance remains protected at all sites, locations, facilities,
and activities in the United States that are subject to IAEA
inspection under the Additional Protocol.
†
HR 5682 EAS
Subtitle G—Reports
SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARA-
TION.
Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial
United States declaration to the IAEA under the Additional
Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of
the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United
States that the President intends to declare to the IAEA.
SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED
STATES DECLARATION.
Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA
any revisions to the United States declaration submitted
under the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit
to Congress a list of any sites, locations, facilities, or activi-
ties in the United States that the President intends to add
to or remove from the declaration.
SEC. 273. CERTIFICATION REGARDING VULNERABILITY AND
RELATED ASSESSMENTS.
Concurrently with the submission to Congress of the
initial declaration list under section 271 and each list up-
date under section 272, the President shall submit to Con-
gress a report certifying that—
(1) each site, location, facility, and activity in-
cluded in the list has been examined by each agency
†
HR 5682 EAS
with national security equities with respect to such
site, location, facility, or activity; and
(2) appropriate measures have been taken to en-
sure that information of direct national security sig-
nificance will not be compromised at any such site,
location, facility, or activity in connection with an
IAEA inspection.
SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS.
Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of
the Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on—
(1) measures that have been or should be taken
to achieve the adoption of additional protocols to ex-
isting safeguards agreements signed by non-nuclear-
weapon State Parties; and
(2) assistance provided by the United States to
the IAEA in order to promote the effective implemen-
tation of additional protocols to existing safeguards
agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Par-
ties and the verification of the compliance of such
parties with IAEA obligations.
†
HR 5682 EAS
SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.
The President shall notify Congress of any notifica-
tions issued by the IAEA to the United States under Article
10 of the Additional Protocol.
Subtitle H—Authorization of
Appropriations
SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as
may be necessary to carry out this title.
Attest:
Secretary.