currently submit to the congressional defense committees 
a report that clearly identifies the amounts requested for 
each of the program elements referred to in subsection (b). 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a re-
port outlining the long-term sustainment and moderniza-
tion plan of the Department of Defense for the ground- 
based midcourse defense system. 
SEC. 223. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR AC-
QUISITION OR DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DE-
FENSES IN EUROPE. 
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
or otherwise made available for the Department of De-
fense for fiscal year 2010 or any fiscal year thereafter may 
be obligated or expended for the acquisition (other than 
initial long-lead procurement) or deployment of oper-
ational missiles of a long-range missile defense system in 
Europe until the Secretary of Defense, after receiving the 
views of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 
submits to the congressional defense committees a report 
certifying that the proposed interceptor and the proposed 
radars to be deployed as part of such missile defense sys-
tem has demonstrated, through successful, operationally 
realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an
operationally effective manner and the ability to accom-
plish the mission. 
SEC. 224. SENSE OF CONGRESS REAFFIRMING CONTINUED 
SUPPORT FOR PROTECTING THE UNITED 
STATES AGAINST LIMITED BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE ATTACKS WHETHER ACCIDENTAL, UN-
AUTHORIZED, OR DELIBERATE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) Congress passed and the President signed 
the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (Public 
Law 106–38), which stated: ‘‘It is the policy of the 
United States to deploy as soon as is technologically 
possible an effective National Missile Defense system 
capable of defending the territory of the United 
States against limited ballistic missile attack (wheth-
er accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). 
(2) The United States has thus far deployed 26 
long-range, 
Ground-based, 
Midcourse 
Defense 
(GMD) interceptors in Alaska and California to de-
fend against potential long-range missiles from 
rogue states such as North Korea. 
(3) Congress has fully funded the President’s 
budget request for the GMD sites in Alaska and 
California in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, as well as
continued development of the Standard Missile-3 
Block IIA missile with Japan, which will provide the 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system the capability 
to engage long-range ballistic missiles like the North 
Korean Taepo Dong-2. 
(4) Senior defense and intelligence officials have 
indicated that the threat to the United States from 
long-range missiles from rogue states is limited. 
(5) Senior military officials have testified that 
the original threat assessments of the long-range 
missile threat made by the Missile Defense Agency 
in 2002 were ‘‘off by a factor of 10 or 20’’. 
(6) It is imperative that missile defense force 
structure and inventory be linked to the most likely 
threats and validated military requirements. 
(7) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs, the Commander of the United 
States Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Com-
ponent Command for Integrated Missile Defense, 
and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency have 
either testified or stated that 30 operationally de-
ployed GMD interceptors would be adequate to de-
fend against any rogue missile threat to the United 
States in the near- to mid-term.
(8) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency 
testified that, for the first time since the establish-
ment of the Missile Defense Agency in 2002, key 
elements of the Department of Defense, such as the 
combatant commanders and the military services, 
played a major role in shaping the missile defense 
budget for fiscal year 2010. 
(9) There is currently no existing military re-
quirement justifying the need to deploy 44 GMD 
interceptors, nor has that number been validated by 
the Department of Defense’s requirements process. 
(10) In testimony before Congress this year, the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency indicated 
that a number of GMD interceptors were removed 
from their silos for unscheduled maintenance and re-
furbishment because of unanticipated problems with 
the interceptors were discovered. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States— 
(1) reaffirms the principles articulated in the 
National Missile Defense Act of 1999; 
(2) should continue to fund robust research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation of the current GMD 
system deployed in Alaska in California to ensure 
that the system will work in an operationally effec-
tive, suitable, maintainable, and survivable manner 
to defend the territory of the United States against 
limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, 
unauthorized, or deliberate); 
(3) should continue the development of the 
Standard Missile-3 Block IIA missile with Japan, 
which will provide the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
system a capability to counter long-range ballistic 
missiles like the North Korean Taepo Dong-2; and 
(4) should set future missile defense force 
structure and inventory requirements based on a 
clear linkage to the threat and the military require-
ments process that takes into account the views of 
key Department of Defense stakeholders such as the 
combatant commanders and the military services. 
SEC. 225. ASCENT PHASE MISSILE DEFENSE STRATEGY. 
(a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR AS-
CENT PHASE MISSILE DEFENSE.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a strategy for ascent phase missile defense. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The strategy required by 
subsection (a) shall include each of the following: 
(1) A description of the programs and activities 
contained, as of the date of the submission of the
strategy, in the program of record of the Missile De-
fense Agency that provide or are planned to provide 
a capability to intercept ballistic missiles in their as-
cent phase. 
(2) A description of the capabilities that are 
needed to accomplish the intercept of ballistic mis-
siles in their ascent phase, including— 
(A) the key technologies and associated 
technology readiness levels, plans for maturing 
such technologies, and any technology dem-
onstrations for such capabilities; 
(B) concepts of operation for how ascent 
phase capabilities would be employed, including 
the dependence of such capabilities on, and in-
tegration with, other functions, capabilities, and 
information, including those provided by other 
elements of the ballistic missile defense system; 
(C) the criteria to be used to assess the 
technical progress, suitability, and effectiveness 
of such capabilities; 
(D) a comprehensive plan for development 
and investment in such capabilities, including 
an identification of specific program and tech-
nology investments to be made in such capabili-
ties;
(E) a description of how, and to what ex-
tent, ascent phase missile defense can leverage 
the capabilities and investments made in boost 
phase, midcourse, and any other layer or ele-
ments of the ballistic missile defense system; 
(F) a description of any other challenges 
or limitations associated with ascent phase mis-
sile defense; and 
(G) any other information the Secretary 
determines is necessary. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy shall be submitted in un-
classified form, but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 226. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR A MISSILE DE-
FENSE 
SYSTEM 
FOR 
EUROPE 
AND 
THE 
UNITED STATES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) Missile defense promotes the collective secu-
rity of the United States and NATO and improves 
linkages among member nations of NATO by de-
fending all members of NATO against the full range 
of missile threats. 
(2) The Islamic Republic of Iran possesses the 
largest inventory of short-and medium-range ballistic 
missiles in the Middle East and these missiles rep-
resent a threat to Europe and United States inter-
ests and deployed forces in the region. Neither 
NATO nor the United States currently possesses 
sufficient theater missile defense capability to 
counter this threat from Iran. 
(3) Iran does not currently possess a long-range 
ballistic missile capable of reaching the United 
States and, if it were to develop such a capability in 
the near future, the long-range Ground-based Mid-
course Defense (GMD) interceptors currently de-
ployed in Alaska have sufficient range to protect the 
United States against an emerging threat. 
(4) It is in the interest of the United States to 
work cooperatively with NATO to counter these 
threats consistent with the direction provided in the 
statement by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Strasbourg/Kehl on April 4, 2009, that: 
‘‘we judge that missile threats should be addressed 
in a prioritized manner that includes consideration 
of the level of imminence of the threat and the level 
of acceptable risk.’’. 
(5) The Director of Operational Test and Eval-
uation for the Department of Defense has raised 
concerns about the operational effectiveness, suit-
ability, and survivability of the current GMD sys-
tem, and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency 
testified before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee on May 21, 2009, that health and status indi-
cators forced the agency to remove several long- 
range interceptors for unscheduled maintenance and 
refurbishment. 
(6) The Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Report to 
Congress by the Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) stated: ‘‘The inherent BDMS 
defensive capability against theater threats increased 
during the last fiscal year and DOT&E expects this 
trend to continue’’ largely due to the continued 
progress of the AEGIS and Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) systems in operational test-
ing. 
(7) The proposed European locations of the 
long-range missile defense system allow for the de-
fense of both Europe and the United States against 
long-range threats launched from the Middle East, 
but a limited deployment of GMD interceptors on 
the east coast of the United States would provide 
comparable defense of our homeland and the most 
pressing threat to Europe is from medium-range bal-
listic missiles.
(b) RESERVATION OF FUNDS.—Of the funds made 
available for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for the Missile 
Defense Agency for the purpose of developing missile de-
fenses in Europe, $353,100,000 shall be available only for 
a missile defense system for Europe and the United States 
as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c). 
(c) USE OF FUNDS.—Funds reserved under sub-
section (b) may be obligated and expended by the Sec-
retary of Defense— 
(1) on the research, development, test, and eval-
uation of— 
(A) the proposed midcourse radar element 
of the ground-based midcourse defense system 
in the Czech Republic; and 
(B) the proposed long-range missile de-
fense interceptor site element of such defense 
system in Poland; or 
(2) on the research, development, test, and eval-
uation, procurement, site activation, construction, 
preparation of, equipment for, or deployment of an 
alternative integrated missile defense system that 
would protect Europe and the United States from 
the threats posed by all types of ballistic missiles, if 
the Secretary submits to the congressional defense
committees a report certifying that the alternative 
missile defense system is expected to be— 
(A) consistent with the direction of the 
North Atlantic Council to address ballistic mis-
sile threats to Europe and the United States in 
a prioritized manner that includes consideration 
of the level of imminence of the threat and the 
level of acceptable risk; 
(B) at least as cost-effective, technically re-
liable, and operationally available in protecting 
Europe and the United States from missile 
threats as the ground-based midcourse defense 
system described in paragraph (1); 
(C) deployable in a sufficient amount of 
time to counter current and emerging ballistic 
missile threats (as determined by the intel-
ligence community) launched from the Middle 
East that could threaten Europe and the 
United States; and 
(D) interoperable with other components of 
missile defense and compliments NATO’s mis-
sile defense strategy.
SEC. 227. STUDY ON DISCRIMINATION CAPABILITIES OF 
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) STUDY.—The Secretary of Defense shall enter 
into an arrangement with the JASON Defense Advisory 
Panel under which JASON shall carry out a study on the 
technical and scientific feasibility of the discrimination ca-
pabilities of the missile defense system of the United 
States, as such system is designed and conceived as of the 
date of the study. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the study. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The Committees on Armed Services, Appro-
priations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
the House of Representatives. 
(2) The Committees on Armed Services, Appro-
priations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate.