U.S. currency, narcotics trafficking and use of 
accounts worldwide to conduct proliferation-re-
lated transactions, the line between illicit and 
licit North Korean money is nearly invisible’’ 
and urged financial institutions worldwide to 
‘‘think carefully about the risks of doing any 
North Korea-related business.’’. 
(B) In 2011, the Undersecretary stated 
that ‘‘North Korea remains intent on engaging 
in proliferation, selling arms as well as bringing 
in material,’’ and was ‘‘aggressively pursuing 
the effort to establish front companies.’’. 
(C) In 2013, the Undersecretary stated, in 
reference to North Korea’s distribution of high- 
quality counterfeit United States currency, that 
‘‘North Korea is continuing to try to pass a 
supernote into the international financial sys-
tem,’’ and that the Department of the Treasury 
would soon introduce new currency with im-
proved security features to protect against 
counterfeiting by the Government of North 
Korea. 
(2) The Financial Action Task Force, an inter-
governmental body whose purpose is to develop and 
promote national and international policies to com-
bat money laundering and terrorist financing, has 
repeatedly— 
(A) expressed concern at deficiencies in 
North Korea’s regimes to combat money laun-
dering and terrorist financing; 
(B) urged North Korea to adopt a plan of 
action to address significant deficiencies in 
these regimes and the serious threat they pose 
to the integrity of the international financial 
system; 
(C) urged all jurisdictions to apply coun-
termeasures to protect the international finan-
cial system from ongoing and substantial money 
laundering and terrorist financing risks ema-
nating from North Korea; 
(D) urged all jurisdictions to advise their 
financial institutions to give special attention to 
business relationships and transactions with 
North Korea, including North Korean compa-
nies and financial institutions; and 
(E) called on all jurisdictions to protect 
against correspondent relationships being used 
to bypass or evade countermeasures and risk 
mitigation practices, and take into account 
money laundering and terrorist financing risks
when considering requests by North Korean fi-
nancial institutions to open branches and sub-
sidiaries in their jurisdiction. 
(3) On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Se-
curity Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
2094, which— 
(A) welcomed the Financial Action Task 
Force’s recommendation on financial sanctions 
related to proliferation, and its guidance on the 
implementation of sanctions; 
(B) decided that Member States should 
apply enhanced monitoring and other legal 
measures to prevent the provision of financial 
services or the transfer of property that could 
contribute to activities prohibited by applicable 
United Nations Security Council resolutions; 
and 
(C) called on Member States to prohibit 
North Korean banks from establishing or main-
taining correspondent relationships with banks 
in their jurisdictions, to prevent the provision of 
financial services, if they have information that 
provides reasonable grounds to believe that 
these activities could contribute to activities 
prohibited by an applicable United Nations Se-
curity Council resolution, or to the evasion of 
such prohibitions. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE DESIGNA-
TION OF NORTH KOREA AS A JURISDICTION OF PRIMARY 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.—Congress— 
(1) acknowledges the efforts of the United Na-
tions Security Council to impose limitations on, and 
require enhanced monitoring of, transactions involv-
ing North Korean financial institutions that could 
contribute to sanctioned activities; 
(2) urges the President, in the strongest terms, 
to immediately designate North Korea as a jurisdic-
tion of primary money laundering concern, and to 
adopt stringent special measures to safeguard the fi-
nancial system against the risks posed by North Ko-
rea’s willful evasion of sanctions and its illicit activi-
ties; and 
(3) urges the President to seek the prompt im-
plementation by other states of enhanced monitoring 
and due diligence to prevent North Korea’s misuse 
of the international financial system, including by 
sharing information about activities, transactions, 
and property that could contribute to activities sanc-
tioned by applicable United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, or to the evasion of sanctions.
(c) DETERMINATIONS REGARDING NORTH KOREA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treas-
ury shall, not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, determine, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and Attorney General, 
and in accordance with section 5318A of title 31, 
United States Code, whether reasonable grounds 
exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdic-
tion of primary money laundering concern. 
(2) SPECIAL MEASURES.—If the Secretary of 
the Treasury determines under this subsection that 
reasonable grounds exist for finding that North 
Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering 
concern, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consulta-
tion with the Federal functional regulators, shall im-
pose one or more of the special measures described 
in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 5318A(b) 
of title 31, United States Code, with respect to the 
jurisdiction of North Korea. 
(3) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary of the 
Treasury determines that North Korea is a ju-
risdiction of primary money laundering concern, 
the Secretary of the Treasury shall, not later 
than 90 days after the date on which the Sec-
retary makes such determination, submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the determination made under paragraph (1) 
together with the reasons for that determina-
tion. 
(B) FORM.—A report or copy of any re-
port submitted under this paragraph shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 202. ENSURING THE CONSISTENT ENFORCEMENT OF 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESO-
LUTIONS AND FINANCIAL RESTRICTIONS ON 
NORTH KOREA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) all states and jurisdictions are obligated to 
implement and enforce applicable United Nations 
Security Council resolutions fully and promptly, in-
cluding by— 
(A) blocking the property of, and ensuring 
that any property is prevented from being made 
available to, persons designated by the Security 
Council under applicable United Nations Secu-
rity Council resolutions;
(B) blocking any property associated with 
an activity prohibited by applicable United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions; and 
(C) preventing any transfer of property 
and any provision of financial services that 
could contribute to an activity prohibited by ap-
plicable United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, or to the evasion of sanctions under such 
resolutions; 
(2) all states and jurisdictions share a common 
interest in protecting the international financial sys-
tem from the risks of money laundering and illicit 
transactions emanating from North Korea; 
(3) the United States Dollar and the Euro are 
the world’s principal reserve currencies, and the 
United States and the European Union are pri-
marily responsible for the protection of the inter-
national financial system from these risks; 
(4) the cooperation of the People’s Republic of 
China, as North Korea’s principal trading partner, 
is essential to the enforcement of applicable United 
Nations Security Council resolutions and to the pro-
tection of the international financial system; 
(5) the report of the Panel of Experts estab-
lished pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1874, dated June 11, 2013, expressed 
concern about the ability of banks in states with less 
effective regulators and those unable to afford effec-
tive compliance to detect and prevent illicit transfers 
involving North Korea; 
(6) North Korea has historically exploited in-
consistencies between jurisdictions in the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of financial regulations and 
applicable United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions to circumvent sanctions and launder the pro-
ceeds of illicit activities; 
(7) Amroggang Development Bank, Bank of 
East Land, and Tanchon Commercial Bank have 
been designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the United Nations Security Council, and the Euro-
pean Union; 
(8) Korea Daesong Bank and Korea Kwangson 
Banking Corporation have been designated by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the European Union; 
(9) the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea 
has been designated by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury for facilitating transactions on behalf of persons 
linked to its proliferation network, and for serving as 
‘‘a key financial node’’; and
(10) Daedong Credit Bank has been designated 
by the Secretary of the Treasury for activities pro-
hibited by applicable United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions, including the use of deceptive finan-
cial practices to facilitate transactions on behalf of 
persons linked to North Korea’s proliferation net-
work. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President should intensify diplomatic ef-
forts, both in appropriate international fora such as the 
United Nations and bilaterally, to develop and implement 
a coordinated, consistent, multilateral strategy for pro-
tecting the global financial system against risks emanating 
from North Korea, including— 
(1) the cessation of any financial services whose 
continuation is inconsistent with applicable United 
Nations Security Council resolutions; 
(2) the cessation of any financial services to 
persons, including financial institutions, that present 
unacceptable risks of facilitating money laundering 
and illicit activity by the Government of North 
Korea; 
(3) the blocking by all states and jurisdictions, 
in accordance with the legal process of the state or 
jurisdiction in which the property is held, of any
property required to be blocked under applicable 
United Nations Security Council resolutions; 
(4) the blocking of any property derived from il-
licit activity, from significant activities undermining 
cyber security, from the misappropriation, theft, or 
embezzlement of public funds by, or for the benefit 
of, officials of the Government of North Korea; 
(5) the blocking of any property involved in sig-
nificant activities undermining cyber security by the 
Government of North Korea, directly or indirectly, 
against United States persons, or the theft of intel-
lectual property by the Government of North Korea, 
directly or indirectly from United States persons; 
and 
(6) the blocking of any property of persons di-
rectly or indirectly involved in censorship or human 
rights abuses by the Government of North Korea. 
SEC. 203. PROLIFERATION PREVENTION SANCTIONS. 
(a) EXPORT OF CERTAIN GOODS OR TECHNOLOGY.— 
(1) 
IN
GENERAL.—Subject 
to 
section 
207(a)(2)(C) of this Act, a license shall be required 
for the export to North Korea of any goods or tech-
nology subject to the Export Administration Regula-
tions (part 730 of title 15, Code of Federal Regula-
tions) without regard to whether the Secretary of
State has designated North Korea as a country the 
government of which has provided support for acts 
of international terrorism, as determined by the Sec-
retary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2045), as 
continued in effect under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act. 
(2) PRESUMPTION OF DENIAL.—A license for 
the export to North Korea of any goods or tech-
nology as described in paragraph (1) shall be subject 
to a presumption of denial. 
(b) TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES SUPPORTING 
ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.— 
(1) ARMS
EXPORT
CONTROL
ACT
PROHIBI-
TIONS.—The prohibitions and restrictions described 
in section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2780), and other provisions provided for in 
that Act, shall also apply to exporting or otherwise 
providing (by sale, lease or loan, grant, or other 
means), directly or indirectly, any munitions item to 
the Government of North Korea without regard to 
whether or not North Korea is a country with re-
spect to which subsection (d) of such section (relat-
ing to designation of state sponsors of terrorism) ap-
plies.
(2) FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS.—Except as pro-
vided in section 207 of this Act and the North Ko-
rean Human Rights Act of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7801 
et seq.), the penalties provided for in section 2332d 
of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to a 
United States person that engages in a financial 
transaction with the Government of North Korea on 
or after the date of the enactment of this Act to the 
same extent that such penalties apply to a United 
States citizen that commits an unlawful act de-
scribed in section 2332d of title 18, United States 
Code. 
(c) TRANSACTIONS
IN LETHAL MILITARY EQUIP-
MENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall withhold 
assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) to any country that pro-
vides lethal military equipment to, or receives lethal 
military equipment from, the Government of North 
Korea. 
(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibition under 
this subsection with respect to a country shall termi-
nate on the date that is 1 year after the date on 
which such country ceases to provide lethal military 
equipment to the Government of North Korea.
(3) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case- 
by-case basis, waive the prohibition under this sub-
section with respect to a country for a period of not 
more than 180 days, and may renew the waiver for 
additional periods of not more than 180 days, if the 
President determines and so reports to the appro-
priate congressional committees that it is vital to the 
national security interests of the United States to 
exercise such waiver authority. 
SEC. 204. PROCUREMENT SANCTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in this section, 
the United States Government may not procure, or enter 
into any contract for the procurement of, any goods or 
services from any designated person. 
(b) FAR.—The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
issued pursuant to section 1303 of title 41, United States 
Code, shall be revised to require a certification from each 
person that is a prospective contractor that such person 
does not engage in any of the conduct described in sub-
section (a) or (b) of section 104. Such revision shall apply 
with respect to contracts in an amount greater than the 
simplified acquisition threshold (as defined in section 134 
of title 41, United States Code) for which solicitations are 
issued on or after the date that is 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act.
barment, the agency shall ensure that such person 
is entered into the Governmentwide database con-
taining the list of all excluded parties ineligible for 
Federal programs pursuant to Executive Order No. 
12549 (31 U.S.C. 6101 note; relating to debarment 
and suspension) and Executive Order No. 12689 (31 
U.S.C. 6101 note; relating to debarment and sus-
pension). 
(d) CLARIFICATION REGARDING CERTAIN PROD-
UCTS.—The remedies specified in subsections (a) through 
(c) shall not apply with respect to the procurement of eligi-
ble products, as defined in section 308(4) of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any for-
eign country or instrumentality designated under section 
301(b) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)). 
(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sub-
section may be construed to limit the use of other remedies 
available to the head of an executive agency or any other 
official of the Federal Government on the basis of a deter-
mination of a false certification under subsection (b). 
(f) EXECUTIVE AGENCY DEFINED.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘executive agency’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 133 of title 41, United States Code.
SEC. 205. ENHANCED INSPECTIONS AUTHORITIES. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 
days thereafter, the President, acting through the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees, the Committee on Home-
land Security of the House of Representatives, and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs of the Senate, a report identifying foreign sea ports 
and airports whose inspections of ships, aircraft, and con-
veyances originating in North Korea, carrying North Ko-
rean property, or operated by the Government of North 
Korea are deficient to effectively prevent the facilitation 
of any of the activities described in section 104(a). 
(b) ENHANCED SECURITY TARGETING REQUIRE-
MENTS.—Not later than 180 days after the identification 
of any sea port or airport pursuant to subsection (a), the 
Secretary of Homeland Security shall, utilizing the Auto-
mated Targeting System operated by the National Tar-
geting Center in U.S. Customs and Border Protection, re-
quire enhanced screening procedures to determine if phys-
ical inspections are warranted of any cargo bound for or 
landed in the United States that has been transported 
through such sea port or airport if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that such cargo contains goods prohib-
ited under this Act.
(c) SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE.—A vessel, aircraft, 
or conveyance used to facilitate any of the activities de-
scribed in section 104(a) that comes within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States may be seized and forfeited 
under chapter 46 of title 18, United States Code, or under 
the Tariff Act of 1930. 
SEC. 206. TRAVEL SANCTIONS. 
(a) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR 
PAROLE.— 
(1) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An alien 
(or an alien who is a corporate officer of a person) 
who the Secretary of State or the Secretary of 
Homeland Security (or a designee of one of such 
Secretaries) knows, or has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve, is described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of 
section 104 is— 
(A) inadmissible to the United States; 
(B) ineligible to receive a visa or other doc-
umentation to enter the United States; and 
(C) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or 
paroled into the United States or to receive any 
other benefit under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). 
(2) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The issuing consular 
officer, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary 
of Homeland Security (or a designee of one of 
such Secretaries) shall revoke any visa or other 
entry documentation issued to an alien who is 
described in subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1) of sec-
tion 104 regardless of when issued. 
(B) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revoca-
tion under subparagraph (A)— 
(i) shall take effect immediately; and 
(ii) shall automatically cancel any 
other valid visa or entry documentation 
that is in the alien’s possession. 
(b) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS 
HEADQUARTERS
AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under sub-
section (a)(1)(B) shall not apply to an alien if admitting 
the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the 
United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the 
Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Suc-
cess June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 
1947, between the United Nations and the United States, 
or other applicable international obligations. 
SEC. 207. EXEMPTIONS, WAIVERS, AND REMOVALS OF DES-
IGNATION. 
(a) EXEMPTIONS.—
(1) MANDATORY EXEMPTIONS.—The following 
activities shall be exempt from sanctions under sec-
tion 104: 
(A) Activities subject to the reporting re-
quirements of title V of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), or to any 
authorized intelligence activities of the United 
States. 
(B) Any transaction necessary to comply 
with United States obligations under the Agree-
ment between the United Nations and the 
United States of America regarding the Head-
quarters of the United Nations, signed June 
26, 1947, and entered into force on November 
21, 1947, or under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, signed April 24, 1963, and 
entered into force on March 19, 1967, or under 
other international agreements. 
(2) DISCRETIONARY
EXEMPTIONS.—The fol-
lowing activities may be exempt from sanctions 
under section 104 as determined by the President: 
(A) Any financial transaction the exclusive 
purpose for which is to provide humanitarian 
assistance to the people of North Korea.
(B) Any financial transaction the exclusive 
purpose for which is to import food products 
into North Korea, if such food items are not de-
fined as luxury goods. 
(C) Any transaction the exclusive purpose 
for which is to import agricultural products, 
medicine, or medical devices into North Korea, 
provided that such supplies or equipment are 
classified as designated ‘‘EAR 99’’ under the 
Export Administration Regulations (part 730 of 
title 15, Code of Federal Regulations) and not 
controlled under— 
(i) the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), as 
continued in effect under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); 
(ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); 
(iii) part B of title VIII of the Nu-
clear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 
(22 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.); or 
(iv) the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
be, and has given assurances that it will abide by the re-
quirements of this Act. 
(d) FINANCIAL SERVICES
FOR CERTAIN ACTIVI-
TIES.—The President may promulgate regulations, rules, 
and policies as may be necessary to facilitate the provision 
of financial services by a foreign financial institution that 
is not controlled by the Government of North Korea in 
support of the activities subject to exemption under this 
section. 
SEC. 208. REPORT ON THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR KNOW-
INGLY ENGAGING IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIVI-
TIES UNDERMINING CYBER SECURITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on signifi-
cant activities undermining cyber security conducted, or 
otherwise ordered or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
the Government of North Korea, including— 
(1) the identity and nationality of persons that 
have knowingly engaged in, directed, or provided 
material support to significant activities under-
mining cyber security by the Government of North 
Korea; 
(2) the conduct engaged in by each person iden-
tified;
(3) the extent to which a foreign government 
has provided material support to significant activi-
ties undermining cyber security conducted, or other-
wise ordered or controlled by, the Government of 
North Korea; and 
(4) the efforts made by the United States to en-
gage foreign governments to halt the capability of 
North Korea to conduct significant activities under-
mining cyber security. 
(b) SUBMISSION AND FORM.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 90 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, and 
every 180 days thereafter for a period not to exceed 
3 years. 
(2) FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified 
form, but may contain a classified annex. 
SEC. 209. SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT TRILATERAL CO-
OPERATION AMONG THE UNITED STATES, 
JAPAN, AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS 
CRUCIAL TO THE STABILITY OF THE ASIA-PA-
CIFIC REGION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea) share the values of democ-
racy, free and open markets, the rule of law, and re-
spect for human rights. 
(2) The alliance relationship between the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea are critical 
to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. 
(3) The United States, Japan, and South Korea 
are committed to continuing diplomatic efforts to en-
sure continued peace and stability in the Asia-Pa-
cific region. 
(4) On December 28, 2014, the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea finalized a trilateral mili-
tary intelligence-sharing arrangement concerning the 
nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea. 
(5) The trilateral military intelligence-sharing 
arrangement reinforces and strengthens the commit-
ment between the United States, Japan, and South 
Korea toward a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear 
weapons. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro-
grams are of mutual concern to the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea and a trilateral military intelligence-
sharing arrangement is essential to the security of each 
nation and the Asia-Pacific region. 
SEC. 210. REPORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM COOPERATION 
BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND IRAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate a report on cooperation between North Korea and Iran 
on their nuclear programs, including the identity of Ira-
nian and North Korean persons that have knowingly en-
gaged in or directed the provision of material support or 
the exchange of information between North Korea and 
Iran on their respective nuclear programs. 
(b) SUBMISSION AND FORM.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall be submitted not later than 90 
days after the date of enactment of this Act. 
(2) FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified 
form, but may contain a classified annex. 
TITLE III—PROMOTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
SEC. 301. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. 
Section 104 of the North Korean Human Rights Act 
of 2004 (22 U.S.C. 7814) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘radios capa-
ble of receiving broadcasting’’ and inserting ‘‘radio, 
Internet, and electronic mass communications capa-
ble of receiving content’’; and 
(2) by adding after subsection (c) the following 
new subsection: 
‘‘(d) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STUDY.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this subsection, 
the President shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report setting forth a de-
tailed plan for making unrestricted, unmonitored, 
and inexpensive, radio, Internet, and electronic mass 
communications available to the people of North 
Korea. 
‘‘(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
contain a classified annex.’’. 
SEC. 302. REPORT ON NORTH KOREAN PRISON CAMPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
describing, with respect to each political prison camp in 
North Korea to the extent information is available— 
(1) the camp’s estimated prisoner population; 
(2) the camp’s geographical coordinates;
(3) the reasons for confinement of the pris-
oners; 
(4) the camp’s primary industries and products, 
and the end users of any goods produced in such 
camp; 
(5) the natural persons and agencies respon-
sible for conditions in the camp; 
(6) the conditions under which prisoners are 
confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shel-
ter, medical care, working conditions, and reports of 
ill-treatment of prisoners; and 
(7) imagery, to include satellite imagery of each 
such camp, in a format that, if published, would not 
compromise the sources and methods used by the in-
telligence agencies of the United States to capture 
geospatial imagery. 
(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 
may be included in the first report required to be sub-
mitted to Congress after the date of the enactment of this 
Act under sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n(d) and 2304(b)) 
(relating to the annual human rights report).