•HRES 545 IH 
over time, and resulted in the Senate routinely being un-
able to reach a fair, up or down vote on important mat-
ters, even when a majority of the body wishes to do so; 
Whereas in the present day, the Senate has become debili-
tated by its rules, practices, and the operation of cloture; 
Whereas nearly all legislation today that cannot obtain unani-
mous consent faces a multistep procedural process gaunt-
let, before ever having a chance for a ‘‘real’’ up or down 
vote; 
Whereas most significant legislation in the Senate is called 
up and made pending before the Senate only after cloture 
is invoked on a ‘‘motion to proceed to consider’’ it, and 
subsequently, another cloture motion must be filed to end 
debate on the legislation itself, which means most legisla-
tion in the Senate is subject to not one, but at least two, 
filibusters; 
Whereas the Senate no longer only filibusters publicly (by 
‘‘holding the floor’’ in a traditional filibuster), but it also 
does so, privately, by Senators noticing with their leader-
ship threats to filibuster, which in effect invokes a secret 
or ‘‘anonymous hold’’ out of sight of the American peo-
ple; 
Whereas it has become an increasingly common practice for 
Senators to place ‘‘anonymous holds’’ on important busi-
ness and threaten to filibuster without being required to 
physically and openly do so on the Senate floor; 
Whereas even if a secret hold is resolved, Senate business can 
still be further delayed by a single Senator openly object-
ing to a request to consider business on the Senate floor 
in addition to other dilatory tactics or subsequent fili-
buster; 
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•HRES 545 IH 
Whereas in the early years of the Senate there was no cloture 
rule or the concept of an ‘‘anonymous hold’’, as it con-
ducted legislative business through serious consideration 
and accommodation for all Senators, before putting any 
matter to a vote; 
Whereas delaying legislative matters by use of the traditional 
‘‘hold the floor’’—standing Senate filibuster—and other 
dilatory tactics—were not routinely used during the early 
years, but eventually became common features used by 
Senators to delay or prevent a vote on consequential leg-
islation; 
Whereas in 1917, after a long series of deliberations in the 
Senate by a group of Senators that killed a bill that 
would have allowed President Woodrow Wilson to defend 
against German submarine warfare, in the period leading 
up to United States involvement in World War I, the 
Democrat-controlled Senate adopted the ‘‘Martin Resolu-
tion’’, the original cloture rule (paragraph 2 of rule 
XXII), permitting two-thirds of Senators voting (with a 
quorum present) to bring debate to a close and proceed 
to a vote; 
Whereas in the lead-up to the establishment of the rule in 
1917, President Woodrow Wilson responded and in his 
statement said, ‘‘. . . The Senate of the United States 
is the only legislative body in the world which cannot act 
when its majority is ready for action. A little group of 
willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have 
rendered the great Government of the United States 
helpless and contemptible. The remedy? There is but one 
remedy. The only remedy is that the rules of the Senate 
shall be so altered that it can act. The country can be 
relied upon to draw the moral. I believe that the Senate 
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•HRES 545 IH 
can be relied on to supply the means of action and save 
the country from disaster.’’ (55 Congressional Record 
20); 
Whereas from 1917–1963, totaling a span of 46 years, the 
Senate managed to invoke cloture on only five occasions, 
consequently during such time the Senate filibuster and 
cloture rules were used to prevent the Senate from pass-
ing critical bills that pertained to civil rights, such as 
prohibiting lynching and poll taxes; 
Whereas in 1946, the Senate failed to invoke cloture to abol-
ish the poll tax—which maliciously required a tax to be 
paid in order to vote—when a large group of Senate 
Democrats (26), joined by 7 Senate Republicans, opposed 
ending debate; 
Whereas if the cloture rule had a threshold of simple majority 
for those Senators voting and present, the 1946 bill to 
end the poll tax would have been considered for a vote; 
Whereas in 1922, 1935, and 1938, the Senate filibuster was 
used by a group of Southern Senators to defeat anti- 
lynching bills that centered on stopping horrific 
extrajudicial executions; 
Whereas in 1949, the Democrat-controlled Senate revised the 
cloture rule, allowing the Senate to invoke cloture on any 
measure or motion only if two-thirds of Senators chosen 
and sworn voted in favor; 
Whereas the 1949 amendment meant that 2⁄3 or 64 Senators 
affirming would be required to invoke cloture, since there 
were a total of 96 Senators; 
Whereas while filibustering to deny rights to minority groups, 
Southern Democrat Senators used the Senate filibuster, 
arguing that it was a tool to protect minority rights; 
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•HRES 545 IH 
Whereas in 1959, the Democrat Majority Leader, Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, sponsored an amendment 
to paragraphs 2 and 3 of rule XXII that reimplemented 
the requirement for two-thirds of Senators voting (with 
a quorum present) to close debate; 
Whereas in 1975, the Democrat-controlled Senate adopted 
the current cloture threshold, lowering the 2⁄3 vote to a 
3⁄5 vote of the full Senate, normally 60, to end debate; 
Whereas in 1976, the Democrat-controlled Senate amended 
the second sentence of the final paragraph of section 2 
of rule XXII that regulated post-cloture consideration of 
amendments; 
Whereas in 1979, the Democrat Majority Leader, Robert C. 
Byrd, secured adoption of an amendment to paragraph 2 
of Senate rule XXII that further regulated post-cloture 
consideration of matters; 
Whereas in 1986, for the first time, the Republican-controlled 
Senate adopted a resolution to govern the public broad-
cast of the chamber floor proceedings that reduced the 
time permitted for post cloture consideration of a meas-
ure or matter from 100 hours to 30 hours; 
Whereas in the 113th Congress, the Democratic-controlled 
Senate used the so-called ‘‘nuclear option’’, voting 52–48, 
with all Republicans and 3 Democrats voting against, to 
reinterpret Senate rule XXII to provide for majority clo-
ture on executive branch and judicial nominees other 
than to the Supreme Court; 
Whereas the 1917 cloture rule adoption, its amendments in 
1949, 1959, 1975, and the new precedent, ‘‘the nuclear 
option’’ in 2013, were engineered by Senate Democrats 
when they held the Senate majority; 
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Whereas in the 114th Congress, the failure to invoke cloture 
and the Senate’s informal practice related to debate have 
stalemated the legislative process, tabling the consider-
ation of critical issues affecting the constitutional and na-
tional security of the Nation; 
Whereas this year the failure to invoke cloture has delayed 
measures in the Senate from reaching a fair, up or down 
vote on matters of economic development and job growth, 
securing the United States border, protecting innocent 
life, national security bills, and the most important na-
tional security issue of our time, the Iranian Nuclear 
Deal; 
Whereas if the cloture rule had a threshold of a simple ma-
jority to start or end debate—51 votes of the total Sen-
ate—for those Senators duly sworn and chosen, legisla-
tion of the 114th Congress that passed the House of 
Representatives, which is supported by a majority of Con-
gress and an overwhelming majority of the American peo-
ple, would have reached a final vote in the Senate; 
Whereas the American people are largely unaware of the eso-
teric practice of requiring the supermajority to allow a 
vote and therefore are unable to ascertain which parties 
or individuals are responsible for the actions or inactions 
of the Senate and consequently accountability becomes 
dramatically reduced; 
Whereas the Senate’s cloture rule and practices related to de-
bate have been the culpable restraints on any significant 
actions by this Congress even when the majority wishes 
to act; 
Whereas the overall effect of the required supermajority for 
cloture is to shield from voter accountability actions or 
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