H. R. 3009—68
or (b), including any trade agreement entered into under section
2103(a) or (b) that provides for accession to a trade agreement
to which the United States is already a party, such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement and the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement.
(11) LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT.—The principal negoti-
ating objectives of the United States with respect to labor
and the environment are—
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with
the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its
environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recur-
ring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting
trade between the United States and that party after entry
into force of a trade agreement between those countries;
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement
retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to inves-
tigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance matters
and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources
to enforcement with respect to other labor or environmental
matters determined to have higher priorities, and to recog-
nize that a country is effectively enforcing its laws if a
course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise
of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision
regarding the allocation of resources, and no retaliation
may be authorized based on the exercise of these rights
or the right to establish domestic labor standards and
levels of environmental protection;
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to promote respect for core labor standards (as
defined in section 2113(6));
(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading
partners to protect the environment through the promotion
of sustainable development;
(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or
policies that unduly threaten sustainable development;
(F) to seek market access, through the elimination
of tariffs and nontariff barriers, for United States environ-
mental technologies, goods, and services; and
(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or
safety policies and practices of the parties to trade agree-
ments with the United States do not arbitrarily or
unjustifiably discriminate against United States exports
or serve as disguised barriers to trade.
(12) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT.—The prin-
cipal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect
to dispute settlement and enforcement of trade agreements
are—
(A) to seek provisions in trade agreements providing
for resolution of disputes between governments under those
trade agreements in an effective, timely, transparent, equi-
table, and reasoned manner, requiring determinations
based on facts and the principles of the agreements, with
the goal of increasing compliance with the agreements;
(B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism of the World Trade Organization
to review compliance with commitments;
H. R. 3009—69
(C) to seek adherence by panels convened under the
Dispute Settlement Understanding and by the Appellate
Body to the standard of review applicable under the Uru-
guay Round Agreement involved in the dispute, including
greater deference, where appropriate, to the fact-finding
and technical expertise of national investigating authori-
ties;
(D) to seek provisions encouraging the early identifica-
tion and settlement of disputes through consultation;
(E) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of
trade-expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under
the agreement does not come into compliance with its
obligations under the agreement;
(F) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a
party to a dispute under the agreement that—
(i) encourages compliance with the obligations of
the agreement;
(ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject
matter, and scope of the violation; and
(iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties
or interests not party to the dispute while maintaining
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and
(G) to seek provisions that treat United States prin-
cipal negotiating objectives equally with respect to—
(i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under
the applicable agreement;
(ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement
procedures; and
(iii) the availability of equivalent remedies.
(13) WTO EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS.—The principal negoti-
ating objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil
aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules
of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in section
132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552).
(14) TRADE REMEDY LAWS.—The principal negotiating objec-
tives of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws
are—
(A) to preserve the ability of the United States to
enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and
avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic
and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially
dumping and subsidies, or that lessen the effectiveness
of domestic and international safeguard provisions, in order
to ensure that United States workers, agricultural pro-
ducers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms and
enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions; and
(B) to address and remedy market distortions that
lead to dumping and subsidization, including overcapacity,
cartelization, and market-access barriers.
(15) BORDER TAXES.—The principal negotiating objective
of the United States regarding border taxes is to obtain a
revision of the WTO rules with respect to the treatment of
border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvan-
tage to countries relying primarily on direct taxes for revenue
rather than indirect taxes.
H. R. 3009—70
(16) TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS.—The principal negotiating
objectives of the United States with respect to trade in textiles
and apparel articles are to obtain competitive opportunities
for United States exports of textiles and apparel in foreign
markets substantially equivalent to the competitive opportuni-
ties afforded foreign exports in United States markets and
to achieve fairer and more open conditions of trade in textiles
and apparel.
(17) WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR.—The principal negoti-
ating objective of the United States with respect to the trade-
related aspects of the worst forms of child labor are to seek
commitments by parties to trade agreements to vigorously
enforce their own laws prohibiting the worst forms of child
labor.
(c) PROMOTION OF CERTAIN PRIORITIES.—In order to address
and maintain United States competitiveness in the global economy,
the President shall—
(1) seek greater cooperation between the WTO and the
ILO;
(2) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among par-
ties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to promote respect for core labor stand-
ards (as defined in section 2113(6)) and to promote compliance
with ILO Convention No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor, and report to the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance
of the Senate on the content and operation of such mechanisms;
(3) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among par-
ties to trade agreements to strengthen the capacity of United
States trading partners to develop and implement standards
for the protection of the environment and human health based
on sound science, and report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance of the Senate on the content and operation of
such mechanisms;
(4) conduct environmental reviews of future trade and
investment agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141
of November 16, 1999, and its relevant guidelines, and report
to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate on
such reviews;
(5) review the impact of future trade agreements on United
States employment, including labor markets, modeled after
Executive Order 13141 to the extent appropriate in establishing
procedures and criteria, report to the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Finance of the Senate on such review, and make that report
available to the public;
(6) take into account other legitimate United States
domestic objectives including, but not limited to, the protection
of legitimate health or safety, essential security, and consumer
interests and the law and regulations related thereto;
(7) direct the Secretary of Labor to consult with any country
seeking a trade agreement with the United States concerning
that country’s labor laws and provide technical assistance to
that country if needed;
H. R. 3009—71
(8) in connection with any trade negotiations entered into
under this Act, submit to the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance
of the Senate a meaningful labor rights report of the country,
or countries, with respect to which the President is negotiating,
on a time frame determined in accordance with section
2107(b)(2)(E);
(9) with respect to any trade agreement which the President
seeks to implement under trade authorities procedures, submit
to the Congress a report describing the extent to which the
country or countries that are parties to the agreement have
in effect laws governing exploitative child labor;
(10) continue to promote consideration of multilateral
environmental agreements and consult with parties to such
agreements regarding the consistency of any such agreement
that includes trade measures with existing environmental
exceptions under Article XX of the GATT 1994;
(11) report to the Committee on Ways and Means of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of
the Senate, not later than 12 months after the imposition
of a penalty or remedy by the United States permitted by
a trade agreement to which this title applies, on the effective-
ness of the penalty or remedy applied under United States
law in enforcing United States rights under the trade agree-
ment; and
(12) seek to establish consultative mechanisms among par-
ties to trade agreements to examine the trade consequences
of significant and unanticipated currency movements and to
scrutinize whether a foreign government engaged in a pattern
of manipulating its currency to promote a competitive advan-
tage in international trade.
The report under paragraph (11) shall address whether the penalty
or remedy was effective in changing the behavior of the targeted
party and whether the penalty or remedy had any adverse impact
on parties or interests not party to the dispute.
(d) CONSULTATIONS.—
(1) CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL ADVISERS.—In the
course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United
States Trade Representative shall consult closely and on a
timely basis with, and keep fully apprised of the negotiations,
the Congressional Oversight Group convened under section
2107 and all committees of the House of Representatives and
the Senate with jurisdiction over laws that would be affected
by a trade agreement resulting from the negotiations.
(2) CONSULTATION BEFORE AGREEMENT INITIALED.—In the
course of negotiations conducted under this title, the United
States Trade Representative shall—
(A) consult closely and on a timely basis (including
immediately before initialing an agreement) with, and keep
fully apprised of the negotiations, the congressional
advisers for trade policy and negotiations appointed under
section 161 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2211),
the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and
the Congressional Oversight Group convened under section
2107; and