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109TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 88
Remembering the victims of the genocide that occurred in 1994 in Rwanda 
and pledging to work to ensure that such an atrocity does not take 
place again. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 9, 2005
Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. GRIJALVA, 
Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, 
Mrs. JONES of Ohio, Ms. CARSON, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. JACKSON of Illinois, 
Ms. KILPATRICK of Michigan, Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD, Ms. NOR-
TON, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. OWENS, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. LEWIS of 
Georgia, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida, Ms. WATSON, Mr. LANTOS, 
Ms. LEE, Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. MCCOLLUM of Minnesota, Mr. MEEKS 
of New York, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. WYNN, 
Mr. PITTS, Mr. EVANS, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, and Mr. 
BROWN of Ohio) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on International Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Remembering the victims of the genocide that occurred in 
1994 in Rwanda and pledging to work to ensure that 
such an atrocity does not take place again.
Whereas in August 1993, the government of President Juve-
nal Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) signed a peace agreement, paving the way for a 
power-sharing arrangement and the return of Rwandan 
refugees to their country;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
Whereas shortly after signing the peace agreement, President 
Habyarimana deliberately and systematically delayed the 
setting up of the coalition government as agreed to by 
the parties, expanded the training of extremist groups, 
and intensified hate radio through Radio Mille Collines; 
Whereas as part of the Arusha Accords the United Nations 
agreed to deploy 2,500 peacekeeping troops, known as 
the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR); 
Whereas according to a UNAMIR report, on November 5, 
1993, at a meeting chaired by President Habyarimana, 
the government decided to provide the Interhamwe and 
other youth militia weapons, including grenades and ma-
chetes with a directive to kill Tutsis, and according to the 
same report, distribution of the weapons began that same 
month; 
Whereas on December 3, 1993, senior officers in the Rwan-
dan Armed Forces warned General Romeo Dallaire, com-
mander of United Nations forces in Rwanda, of increas-
ing and systematic killings of civilians by the militia, and 
planned assassinations of senior officials in the coalition 
government, 
including 
the 
fact 
that 
President 
Habyarimana himself had authorized this bloody cam-
paign; 
Whereas throughout December 1993, a number of reports, 
including reports from the Ambassador of Belgium in 
Rwanda, UNAMIR officials, and human rights groups, 
confirmed widespread killings of civilians by pro-govern-
ment militia and confirmed training of pro-government 
militia in government-run camps; 
Whereas on January 6, 1994, General Dallaire reported to 
the United Nations that the killings of civilians by militia
•HCON 88 IH1S 
groups were well-organized and indicated that these 
killings would continue for the foreseeable future; 
Whereas on January 10, 1994, UNAMIR officers met with 
an informant named Jean-Pierre, a commander in the 
Interhamwe militia, who told them of a large weapons 
cache intended for members of the Interhamwe militia; 
Whereas on January 11, 1994, General Dallaire sent a con-
fidential cable to United Nations headquarters informing 
United Nations officials about militia training and arms 
cache; 
Whereas General Dallaire wrote to his superiors that the mi-
litias intended to kill a large number of Tutsi and mod-
erate Hutu civilians, and he informed the United Nations 
peacekeeping department that he intended to seize the 
arms and asked for United Nations protection for the in-
formant who provided the information; 
Whereas on January 12, 1994, General Dallaire was told by 
United Nations headquarters that the United Nations 
mandate did not give him the authority to seize the arms 
cache and the United Nations would not provide protec-
tion to the informant, and instead, General Dallaire was 
ordered to provide the information to President 
Habyarimana and the ambassadors of Belgium, France, 
and the United States; 
Whereas on February 21, 1994, extremists assassinated the 
Minister of Public Works, Felicien Gatabazi, and on Feb-
ruary 20, 1994, Prime Minister-designate Twagiramungu 
escaped an assassination attempt; 
Whereas the security situation in Rwanda deteriorated rap-
idly in late February 1994, with the slaughter of 70 civil-
ians in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
Whereas on March 10, 1994, the National Republican Move-
ment for Democracy (MRND) party leaders expressed 
frustration and anger that President Habyarimana did 
not consult them before he left for a meeting with Presi-
dent Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and described his deci-
sion to go as ‘‘a serious political error’’; 
Whereas on April 6, 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Bu-
rundi, along with several senior government officials, 
were killed when their plane was shot down as it ap-
proached the capital of Rwanda; 
Whereas on April 7, 1994, the Rwandan Armed Forces and 
the Interhamwe militia unleashed genocide against Tutsi 
civilians and moderate Hutu politicians when tens of 
thousands of innocent civilians, including women and 
children, were massacred; 
Whereas ten Belgian peacekeeping troops assigned to protect 
the Rwandan Hutu Prime Minister were brutally mur-
dered along with the Prime Minister; 
Whereas on April 8, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
launched an offensive to stop the ongoing genocide and 
to rescue 600 RPF troops trapped in Kigali, who were 
sent to protect RPF officials as agreed to in the Arusha 
Accords; 
Whereas on April 8, 1994, France, Belgium, and the United 
States evacuated their citizens from Rwanda; 
Whereas on April 11, 1994, an estimated 2,000 civilians were 
slaughtered at the Don Bosco school in Kigali where they 
sought shelter and briefly were protected by UNAMIR 
troops;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
Whereas the civilians at the school were killed after the 
United Nations ordered UNAMIR troops to abandon the 
civilians and withdraw to the airport; 
Whereas on April 14, 1994, Belgium withdrew its troops 
from Rwanda and a week later the United Nations Secu-
rity Council voted unanimously to withdraw UNAMIR 
troops at the height of the Rwandan genocide; 
Whereas almost a month into the Rwandan genocide, the 
Clinton Administration refused to use the word genocide 
with respect to the situation in Rwanda and on April 28, 
1994, the United Nations Security Council deliberately 
omitted the word genocide from a Council resolution in 
order to avoid its legal and international obligations to 
intervene; 
Whereas on May 13, 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council began deliberation on a resolution to authorize a 
robust peacekeeping force for Rwanda; 
Whereas the United States ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, forced a delay on 
the United Nations Security Council vote because of 
funding issues; 
Whereas on May 17, 1994, Ambassador Albright defended 
her position by saying ‘‘sending a U.N. force into a mael-
strom in Rwanda without a sound plan of operations 
would be folly’’; 
Whereas on May 17, 1994, five weeks after the Rwandan 
genocide began, the United Nations Security Council au-
thorized the deployment of 6,800 United Nations peace-
keeping troops with a mandate to protect civilians;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council resolution au-
thorizing such deployment stated that ‘‘acts of genocide 
may have been committed’’; 
Whereas on June 22, 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council authorized the deployment of French forces to 
south-west Rwanda to create a ‘‘safe area’’ for fleeing ci-
vilians and subsequently fleeing militia and government 
leaders were given safe haven and protection by the 
French forces most of whom eventually fled to Zaire; 
Whereas on July 4, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front cap-
tured Kigali, the Hutu-led government fled to Zaire, the 
French ended their mission and were replaced by a 
United Nations peacekeeping force from Ethiopia, and 
the RPF formed an interim national unity government; 
Whereas on August 17, 1994, Rwandan Defense Minister, 
Paul Kagame, warned the Government of Zaire not to 
allow members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces 
and the Interhamwe militia to train and launch attacks 
from Zaire; 
Whereas in August 1994, the United States deployed troops 
to the Central Africa region to assist in the relief oper-
ation; 
Whereas an estimated 2,000 United States troops partici-
pated in Operation Support Hope, however, the United 
States was criticized by some observers for not respond-
ing quickly to the Rwandan crisis and for its role in the 
United Nations Security Council; 
Whereas, Rwanda having joined the United Nations Security 
Council in early 1994, the United Nations representative 
of the new Rwandan Government took his seat at the Se-
curity Council on September 1, 1994, after months of de-
•HCON 88 IH1S 
bate as to who should represent Rwanda in the United 
Nations; 
Whereas on September 4, 1994, the commander of Ethiopia’s 
United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda stated that 
French troops provided protection and allowed former 
soldiers of the Rwandan Government to flee to Zaire; 
Whereas in a newspaper interview, the commander stated 
that he saw French troops transporting former soldiers 
to Zaire, although French officials had said earlier that 
officials of the former Rwandan government would not be 
allowed to enter the safety zone; 
Whereas in 1996 most of the refugees who fled to Zaire re-
turned home; 
Whereas in November 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council established an international tribunal to prosecute 
major suspects in the Rwanda genocide; 
Whereas the new Government of Rwanda voted against the 
resolution because the resolution did not allow the death 
penalty; 
Whereas, despite Rwanda’s objections to the exclusion of the 
death penalty, the international tribunal was established 
in Arusha, Tanzania, and took its first case against a 
genocide suspect on January 10, 1997, in which it pros-
ecuted Jean Paul Akayesu, a local government official; 
Whereas the Gacaca courts, a community-based system of 
participatory justice, were created in Rwanda to address 
lower level offenders who remained in custody in Rwan-
dan jails without trial, and to alleviate the burden that 
was placed on the judiciary system in Rwanda as a result 
of the sheer number of persons accused of participating 
in the genocide;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
Whereas in March 1998, during his first visit to Africa, 
President Clinton stated in Kigali that ‘‘the international 
community must bear its share of responsibility for this 
tragedy’’, and in a speech at the Kigali airport, President 
Clinton stated that ‘‘[a]ll over the world there were peo-
ple like me sitting in offices who did not fully appreciate 
the depth and the speed with which you were being en-
gulfed by this unimaginable terror’’; and 
Whereas as of January 2004, 23 genocide suspects were on 
trial, eighteen senior officials were convicted, twenty sus-
pects were awaiting trial, and six convicted officials were 
serving their sentences in Mali: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), That Congress—
(1) remembers the victims of the genocide that 
occurred in 1994 in Rwanda and pledges to work to 
ensure that such an atrocity does not take place 
again; 
(2) acknowledges that the international commu-
nity, including the United States Government, failed 
the people of Rwanda and watched with indifference 
while hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians 
were being killed; 
(3) strongly supports assistance to the survivors 
of the Rwandan genocide; 
(4) urges political and financial support for the 
Gacaca courts;
•HCON 88 IH1S 
(5) acknowledges the heroic work of many indi-
viduals and human rights organizations for their 
campaign to help stop the genocide of Rwanda; 
(6) expresses deep appreciation to General 
Romeo Dallaire for his tireless efforts to stop the 
genocide from occurring and for helping many 
Rwandese civilians in their time of need; 
(7) accepts the fact that General Dallaire 
warned the United Nations on a number of occa-
sions of an impending genocide and was ordered by 
his superiors not to take action; 
(8) calls for an investigation of the role played 
by the United States Government prior to and dur-
ing the Rwandan genocide, noting that the par-
liaments of Belgium and France both created com-
missions of inquiry to investigate the roles played by 
their respective governments and issued their find-
ings; and 
(9) strongly urges the creation of a bi-partisan 
Commission of Inquiry for Rwanda to investigate all 
aspects of the role played by the United States Gov-
ernment prior to and during the Rwandan genocide, 
with a strong mandate and subpoena power to ac-
cess relevant documents and witnesses, a definite