1318 
international visitor leadership programs and 
the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative, 
as well as professional capacity building pro-
grams that prioritize building skills in entrepre-
neurship, promoting transparency, and tech-
nology; 
(2) to ensure that exchange programs for 
Americans abroad and international visitors attract 
a diverse pool of participants, including from under-
represented, marginalized, and low-income commu-
nities; and 
(3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing 
programs, and, as necessary, design and implement 
new basic and higher education programs in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the 
United States Strategy on International Basic Edu-
cation and the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development Education Policy, to enable all 
young adults, youth, and children to acquire the 
quality education and skills needed to be productive 
members in society, which will lead to better indi-
vidual and societal outcomes. 
(d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination
1319 
with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees (including the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate) a report that assesses the nature and im-
pact of the People’s Republic of China’s educational and 
cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Carib-
bean, its impact on United States’ strategic interests, and 
recommendations for the United States Government to ex-
pand people-to-people ties. 
SEC. 30253. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a se-
curity threat to the countries and peoples of Latin 
America and the Caribbean; 
(2) other forms of transnational organized 
crime, including arms trafficking, human smuggling, 
money laundering, and illicit financing, are drivers 
of irregular migration; 
(3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by govern-
ments that fail to curb the illicit drug trade by ade-
quately regulating the legal trade of non-fentanyl 
opioids and precursor chemicals used to produce
1320 
fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic 
drugs; 
(4) further, governments that do not cooperate 
sufficiently on financial investigations and prosecu-
tions, withhold information with respect to money 
laundering crimes, or are determined to facilitate il-
licit activities, particularly by transnational orga-
nized criminal organizations, should be held account-
able; 
(5) as noted in the International Narcotics Con-
trol Strategy Report 2020, China ‘‘has not cooper-
ated sufficiently on financial investigations and does 
not provide adequate responses to requests for finan-
cial investigation information’’; 
(6) the United States should apply economic 
and other targeted financial sanctions with respect 
to individuals engaged in financial crimes and money 
laundering that fosters narcotics trafficking in the 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and 
(7) the United States should look to policies to 
hold accountable countries that fail to sufficiently in-
vestigate financial crimes and money laundering that 
foster narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
1321 
SEC. 30254. REPORT ON MAJOR CHINESE INFRASTRUC-
TURE INVESTMENTS. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
Congress a report on major Chinese infrastructure invest-
ments in Latin America and the Caribbean and the extent 
to which the countries that host these investments are able 
to meet the interest and principal payments associated 
with any outstanding loans. 
PART 2—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
SEC. 30255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RE-
LATIONSHIPS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and other European countries are 
close partners, sharing values grounded in democ-
racy, human rights, transparency, and the rules- 
based international order established after World 
War II; 
(2) without a common approach by the United 
States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
and other European countries on connectivity, 
transnational challenges, and support for democracy 
and human rights, the People’s Republic of China 
will continue to increase its economic, political, and 
security leverage in Europe and globally;
1322 
(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment 
of assistance to European countries following the 
COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach 
to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep eco-
nomic ties to the People’s Republic of China; 
(4) as European countries seek to recover from 
the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the 
United States must stand in partnership with Eu-
rope to support our collective economic recovery, re-
inforce our collective national security, and defend 
shared values; 
(5) the United States, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and other European countries 
should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reli-
ance on supply chains away from the People’s Re-
public of China, especially in the medical and phar-
maceutical sectors; 
(6) the United States, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and other European countries 
should leverage their respective economic innovation 
capabilities to support the global economic recovery 
from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast 
with the centralized economy of the People’s Repub-
lic of China;
1323 
(7) the United States, the European Union, 
Japan, and other like-minded countries should con-
tinue efforts to address the security, economic, de-
mocracy, and human rights challenges posed by the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(8) the United States, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and other European countries 
should enhance cooperation to counter People’s Re-
public of China disinformation, influence operations, 
and propaganda efforts; 
(9) the United States and Europe share serious 
concerns with the repressions being supported and 
executed by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China, and should continue implementing meas-
ures to address the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mecha-
nisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s 
authoritarian governance model to countries around 
the world; 
(10) the United States and Europe should re-
main united in their shared values against attempts 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China at the United Nations and other multilateral 
organizations to promote efforts that erode the Uni-
1324 
versal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ‘‘com-
munity of a shared future for mankind’’ and ‘‘de-
mocratization of international relations’’; 
(11) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
structure investments around the world, particularly 
in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
structure, could threaten democracy across Europe 
and the national security of key countries; 
(12) as appropriate, the United States should 
share intelligence with European allies and partners 
on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
with respect to 5G expansion in Europe; 
(13) the European Union’s Investment Screen-
ing Regulation, which came into force in October 
2020, is a welcome development, and member states 
should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their 
countries through their own national investment 
screening measures; 
(14) the President should actively engage the 
European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
port Control Reform Act regulations and to better 
harmonize United States and European Union poli-
cies with respect to export controls;
1325 
(15) the President should strongly advocate for 
the listing of more items and technologies to restrict 
dual use exports controlled at the National Security 
and above level to the People’s Republic of China 
under the Wassenaar Arrangement; 
(16) the United States should explore the value 
of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating 
Committee 
for 
Multilateral 
Export 
Controls 
(CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United 
States and European Union export control policies 
with respect to limiting exports of sensitive tech-
nologies to the People’s Republic of China; and 
(17) the United States should work with coun-
terparts in Europe to— 
(A) evaluate United States and European 
overreliance on goods originating in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, including in the med-
ical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop 
joint strategies to diversify supply chains; 
(B) develop a common strategy for pro-
moting energy security and economic growth in 
eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses 
shared concerns related to China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative in these regions, including com-
plementary investments in the Three Seas Ini-
1326 
tiative Fund for clean energy and digital 
connectivity projects; 
(C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID– 
19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pres-
sure developing countries by offering relevant 
United States and European expertise and as-
sistance; and 
(D) leverage the United States and Euro-
pean private sectors to advance the post- 
COVID–19 economic recovery. 
SEC. 30256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-
OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief 
the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives on a 
strategy for how the United States will enhance coopera-
tion with the European Union, NATO, and European 
partner countries with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements with re-
spect to the strategy referred to in such subsection:
1327 
(1) An identification of the senior Senate-con-
firmed Department of State official who leads 
United States efforts to cooperate with the Euro-
pean Union, NATO, and European partner countries 
to advance a shared approach with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(2) An identification of key policy points of con-
vergence and divergence between the United States 
and European allies and partners with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China in the areas of tech-
nology and economic practices. 
(3) A description of efforts to advance shared 
interests with European counterparts on— 
(A) security and economic challenges with 
respect to the People’s Republic of China; 
(B) democracy and human rights chal-
lenges with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(C) technology issues with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; and 
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 
respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
1328 
established by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(4) A description of the coordination mecha-
nisms among key regional and functional bureaus 
within the Department of State and Department of 
Defense tasked with engaging with European allies 
and partners on the People’s Republic of China. 
(5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the 
date of the briefing and future plans to work with 
European allies and partners to counter the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China’s advance-
ment of an authoritarian governance model around 
the world. 
(6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made 
up to the date of the briefing and future plans to 
support European efforts to identify cost-effective al-
ternatives to Huawei’s 5G technology. 
(7) A detailing of how United States public di-
plomacy tools, including the Global Engagement 
Center of the Department of State, will coordinate 
efforts with counterpart entities within the Euro-
pean Union to counter Chinese propaganda. 
(8) A description of the staffing and budget re-
sources the Department of State dedicates to en-
gagement between the United States and the Euro-
1329 
pean Union on the People’s Republic of China and 
provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to 
execute such strategy. 
(9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work 
with European allies and partners to track and 
counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across 
multilateral fora, including at the World Health Or-
ganization. 
(c) FORM.—The briefing required under section (a) 
shall be classified. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and annually there-
after for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult 
with the appropriate congressional committees, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
regarding the development and implementation of the ele-
ments described in subsection (b). 
SEC. 30257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION 
ON PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 
transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among 
the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, 
and the European Development Finance Institutions (re-
ferred to as the ‘‘DFI Alliance’’) to enhance coordination
1330 
on shared objectives to foster private sector-led develop-
ment and provide market-based alternatives to state-di-
rected financing in emerging markets, particularly as re-
lated to the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such 
as— 
(1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
necting Europe and Asia; 
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas 
Initiative Fund; 
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United 
States, Japan, and Australia; and 
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 
leveraged 
$65,000,000,000 
for 
infrastructure 
projects and emphasizes transparency standards. 
(b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to 
enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 
Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for 
Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
oping countries.
1331 
SEC. 30258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-
TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN 
CHINA AND RUSSIA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
1332 
fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress a report and brief such commit-
tees on cooperation between— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran; and 
(B) the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report and briefing under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 
(A) An identification of major areas of dip-
lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
tion— 
(i) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
and 
(ii) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation. 
(B) An assessment of the effect of the 
COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation. 
(C) An assessment of the effect that 
United States compliance with the Joint Com-
1333 
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in 
January 14, 2016, and United States with-
drawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had 
on the cooperation described in subparagraph 
(A)(i). 
(D) An assessment of the effect on the co-
operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that 
would be had by the United States reentering 
compliance with the JCPOA or a successor 
agreement and the effect of the United States 
not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 
reaching a successor agreement. 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES 
AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
propriate Federal departments and agencies should share 
with important allies and partners of the United States, 
as appropriate, the findings of the report required under 
subsection (b).
1334 
SEC. 30259. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON CHINA’S ELECTION 
INTERFERENCE. 
The Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments 
and agencies, shall submit to Congress a report on the 
existence of any security risks and threats posed by China 
to upcoming United States elections for Federal office. 
SEC. 30259A. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Represent-
atives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a classified 
report, with an unclassified annex if appropriate, that as-
sesses the degree to which, if any, the Russian Federation 
has coordinated with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) regarding a potential further invasion of Ukraine. 
Such assessment shall also examine ways in which the 
PRC may have promised to help the Russian Federation 
offset the costs of prospective economic sanctions, espe-
cially in the financial, technological, and energy sectors.
1335 
PART 3—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 
SEC. 30261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL 
ASIA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States should continue to stand 
with friends and partners, while also working to es-
tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as 
they contend with efforts by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China to interfere in their re-
spective political systems and encroach upon their 
sovereign territory; and 
(2) the United States should reaffirm its com-
mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic 
Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral 
defense consultations and collaboration with India 
commensurate with its status as a major defense 
partner. 
SEC. 30262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
a strategy for how the United States will engage with the 
countries of South and Central Asia, including through
1336 
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Repub-
lic of China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements: 
(1) A detailed description of the security and 
economic challenges that the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and 
Central Asia, including border disputes with South 
and Central Asian countries that border the People’s 
Republic of China, and PRC investments in land 
and sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and en-
ergy projects across the region. 
(2) A detailed description of United States ef-
forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in 
infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
tral Asia. 
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia 
on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts 
to interfere in their political systems and economies. 
(4) A detailed description of the challenges 
posed by PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sec-
tor. 
(5) A detailed description of United States dip-
lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan
1337 
with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Re-
public of China, including investments by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt 
and Road Initiative. 
(6) In close consultation with the Government 
of India, identification of areas with respect to which 
the United States Government can provide diplo-
matic and other support as appropriate for India’s 
efforts to address economic and security challenges 
posed by the People’s Republic of China in the re-
gion. 
(7) A description of the coordination mecha-
nisms among key regional and functional bureaus 
within the Department of State and Department of 
Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of 
South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(8) A detailed description of United States dip-
lomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, 
and any other countries with significant populations 
of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-
cution in the People’s Republic of China to press 
those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-
norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect 
ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Gov-
1338 
ernment authorities, and protect the right to the 
freedoms of assembly and expression. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex as necessary. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less often 
than annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of 
State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
ate, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives regarding the development and imple-
mentation of the strategy required under subsection (a). 
SEC. 30263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor-
tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United 
States has political, economic, and security interests. 
(2) The United States has an interest in work-
ing with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including 
India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional gov-
ernance, economic connectivity, and security chal-
lenges including threats to freedom of navigation.
1339 
(b) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—As a part of the 
United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be 
the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement 
with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including 
with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such 
countries to— 
(1) promote United States political engagement 
with such region, including through active participa-
tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip-
lomatic relations with United States partners in 
such region; 
(2) 
enhance 
United 
States 
economic 
connectivity and commercial exchange with such re-
gion; 
(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region 
from security challenges, including related to piracy; 
(4) support the ability of governments and or-
ganizations in such region to respond to natural dis-
asters; 
(5) support and facilitate the role of regional al-
lies and partners as net providers of security to such 
region and as partners to the United States in ad-
dressing security challenges in such region, including 
through assistance to such allies and partners to
1340 
build capacity in maritime security and maritime do-
main awareness; 
(6) continue to build the United States-India 
relationship in order to regularize security coopera-
tion through the negotiation of agreements con-
cerning access, communication, and navigation, in-
cluding through foundational agreements; and 
(7) promote cooperation with United States al-
lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus-
tralia, and major defense partners, including India, 
and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and 
France, to support a rules-based order in such re-
gion. 
(c) STRATEGY.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a multi-year strategy for United States en-
gagement to support United States interests in the 
Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall—
1341 
(A) define United States political, eco-
nomic, and security interests in the Indian 
Ocean region; 
(B) outline challenges to the interests of 
the United States in such region; 
(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation 
between the United States and members of the 
Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, 
through coordination in diplomacy and develop-
ment priorities, joint military exercises and op-
erations, and other activities that promote 
United States political, economic, and security 
interests; 
(D) outline efforts to support economic 
connectivity in such region, including through 
the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra-
structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa 
Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand 
and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pa-
cific, including with the countries of Southeast 
Asia, that maintain high standards of invest-
ment and support for civil society and people- 
to-people connectivity; 
(E) describe how the United States can en-
gage with regional intergovernmental organiza-
1342 
tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association, to promote United States po-
litical, economic, and security interests in such 
region; 
(F) review the United States diplomatic 
posture in such region, including an assessment 
of United States diplomatic engagement in 
countries without a permanent United States 
embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assess-
ment of ways to improve the cooperation with 
the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros; 
(G) review United States diplomatic agree-
ments with countries in such region that facili-
tate United States military operations in such 
region, including bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, and describe efforts to expand 
United States cooperation with such countries 
through the negotiation of additional agree-
ments; and 
(H) include a security assistance strategy 
for such region that outlines priorities, objec-
tives, and actions for United States security as-
sistance efforts to governments of countries in 
such region to promote United States political, 
economic, and security interests in such region.
1343 
(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under 
paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any 
other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific. 
(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later 
than one year after the submission of the strategy 
required under paragraph (1) and one year there-
after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on 
progress made toward implementing such strategy. 
(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECU-
RITY REVIEW COMMISSION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 
1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 
7002(c)(2)) is amended— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘, including in the Indian 
Ocean region’’ after ‘‘deployments of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China military’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following new 
sentence: ‘‘In this subparagraph, the term ‘In-
dian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in-
cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, 
and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian 
Ocean.’’.
1344 
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 
by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the 
enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the 
first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd 
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) 
that is submitted after such date. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate. 
(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term ‘‘Indian 
Ocean region’’ means the Indian Ocean, including 
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the lit-
toral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean.
1345 
PART 4—AFRICA 
SEC. 30271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
SECURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and 
impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, eco-
nomic, socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Afri-
ca, and its impact on United States strategic interests, 
including information relating to— 
(1) the amount and impact of direct invest-
ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans 
deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;
1346 
(2) the involvement of People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) state-owned enterprises in Africa; 
(3) the amount of African debt held by the 
PRC; 
(4) the involvement of PRC private security, 
technology and media companies in Africa; 
(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to 
African countries; 
(6) the scope of PRC investment in and control 
of African energy resources and minerals critical for 
emerging and foundational technologies; 
(7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC’s 
aid and assistance to African countries and African 
countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in inter-
national fora; 
(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in 
counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-
tractive resources and wildlife products, between Af-
rica and the PRC; 
(9) the methods and techniques that the PRC 
uses to exert undue influence on African govern-
ments and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, in-
cluding through the CCP’s party-to-party training
1347 
program, and to influence African multilateral orga-
nizations; and 
(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
educational activities undertaken by the PRC and 
CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa. 
SEC. 30272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN AFRICA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 
(b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 
General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting
1348 
forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States 
economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through sup-
port for— 
(1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, 
including property rights; and 
(2) improved transparency, anti-corruption ef-
forts, and good governance. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall include— 
(1) a description and assessment of barriers to 
United States investment in Africa for United States 
businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized 
businesses, and an assessment of whether existing 
programs effectively address such barriers; 
(2) a description and assessment of barriers to 
African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-
ommendations to overcome such barriers; 
(3) an identification of the economic sectors in 
the United States that have a comparative advan-
tage in African markets; 
(4) an assessment of additional foreign assist-
ance needs, including democracy and governance and
1349 
rule of law support, to promote a conducive oper-
ating environment in priority countries; 
(5) establishing a dialogue on security, develop-
ment, and environmental issues of mutual interest; 
and 
(6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-
rica Leaders Summit to promote strategic engage-
ment and security in Africa. 
(d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States shall— 
(1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign 
Commercial Service Officers and Department of 
State Economic Officers at United States embassies 
in sub-Saharan Africa; and 
(2) develop and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees an assessment of whether 
human resource capacity in such embassies is ade-
quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco-
nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros-
per Africa.
1350 
SEC. 30273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RE-
SPECT TO AFRICA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
Oversight and Reform of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER 
PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 
an interagency Working Group, which shall include 
the National Cyber Director and representatives of 
the Department of State, the Department of De-
fense, the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and such other agencies of the United States 
Government as the President considers appropriate, 
on means to counter PRC cyber aggression with re-
spect to Africa.
1351 
(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established 
pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a set of 
recommendations, such as for— 
(A) bolstering the capacity of governments 
in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data 
networks and critical infrastructure, where ap-
plicable; 
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei; 
(C) an action plan for United States em-
bassies in Africa to provide assistance to host- 
country governments with respect to protecting 
their vital digital networks and infrastructure 
from PRC espionage, including an assessment 
of staffing resources needed to implement the 
action plan in embassies in Africa; 
(D) utilizing interagency resources to 
counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in 
traditional and digital media targeted to Afri-
can audiences; and 
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter 
digital authoritarianism and identifying tools 
and assistance to enhance and promote digital 
democracy.
1352 
SEC. 30274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INI-
TIATIVE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, 
launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in 
the next generation of African leaders; 
(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance 
and it is vital for the United States to support 
strong and enduring partnerships with the next gen-
eration of African leaders; 
(3) the United States Government should 
prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerg-
ing young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, in-
cluding through efforts to— 
(A) enhance leadership skills; 
(B) encourage entrepreneurship; 
(C) strengthen public administration and 
the role of civil society; 
(D) enhance peace and security in their re-
spective countries of origin and across Africa; 
and 
(E) connect young African leaders con-
tinentally and globally across the private, civic, 
and public sectors;
1353 
(4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on 
efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 
sector transparency and governance, and counter ex-
tremism, and should be an area of focus for United 
States outreach on the African continent; and 
(5) the Secretary of State should— 
(A) increase the number of fellows from 
Africa participating in the Mandela Washington 
Fellowship above the estimated 700 fellows who 
participated during fiscal year 2021; and 
(B) identify additional ways to connect 
YALI alumni to United States public and pri-
vate resources and institutions. 
(b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE PRO-
GRAM.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—There is established the 
Young African Leaders Initiative (‘‘YALI’’), which 
shall be carried out by the Secretary of State. 
(2) PURPOSE.—YALI shall seek to build the ca-
pacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca in the areas of business, civic engagement, or 
public administration, including through efforts to— 
(A) support young African leaders by of-
fering professional development, training, and 
networking opportunities, particularly in the
1354 
areas of leadership, innovation, civic engage-
ment, elections, human rights, entrepreneur-
ship, good governance, peace and security, and 
public administration; and 
(B) provide increased economic and tech-
nical assistance to young African leaders to pro-
mote economic growth, strengthen ties between 
United States and African businesses, build re-
silience to predatory lending practices, and im-
prove capacity in key economic areas such as 
tendering, bidding, and contract negotiations, 
budget management and oversight, anti-corrup-
tion, and establishment of clear policy and reg-
ulatory practices. 
(3) FELLOWSHIPS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—YALI shall support the 
participation in the United States in the 
Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young Af-
rican Leaders of fellows from Africa who— 
(i) are between 25 and 35 years of 
age; 
(ii) have demonstrated strong capa-
bilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, 
public service, and leadership; and
1355 
(iii) have had a positive impact in 
their communities, organizations, or insti-
tutions. 
(B) 
OVERSIGHT.—The 
fellowships 
de-
scribed in paragraph (1) shall be overseen by 
the Secretary of State through the Bureau of 
Education and Cultural Affairs. 
(C) ELIGIBILITY.—The Secretary of State 
shall establish and publish— 
(i) eligibility criteria for participation 
as a fellow under paragraph (1); and 
(ii) criteria for determining which eli-
gible applicants will be selected. 
(4) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of State, United States 
citizens may— 
(A) engage in reciprocal exchanges in con-
nection with alumni of the fellowship described 
in subsection (c); and 
(B) collaborate on projects with such fel-
lowship alumni. 
(5) REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS AND NET-
WORKS.—The Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development shall estab-
lish—
1356 
(A) not fewer than 4 regional leadership 
centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person 
and online training throughout the year on 
business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, 
and public management to young African lead-
ers between 18 and 35 years of age who have 
demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepre-
neurship, innovation, public service and leader-
ship, and peace-building and conflict resolution, 
and who have had a positive impact in their 
communities, organizations, or institutions; and 
(B) an online network that provides infor-
mation and courses on, and connections with 
leaders in, the private and public sectors of Af-
rica. 
(6) ACTIVITIES.— 
(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of relevant Federal departments and 
agencies, shall oversee all United States-based 
activities carried out under YALI, including— 
(i) 
the 
participation 
of 
Mandela 
Washington Fellows in a six-week Leader-
ship Institute at a United States edu-
cational institution in business, civic en-
1357 
gagement, or public management, includ-
ing academic sessions, site visits, profes-
sional networking opportunities, leadership 
training, community service, and organized 
cultural activities; and 
(ii) the participation by Mandela 
Washington fellows in an annual Mandela 
Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide 
such Fellows the opportunity to meet with 
United States leaders from the private, 
public, and non-profit sectors. 
(B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Admin-
istrator for the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the heads of other 
relevant Federal departments and agencies, 
should continue to support YALI activities in 
sub-Saharan Africa, including— 
(i) continued leadership training and 
other professional development opportuni-
ties for Mandela Washington Fellowship 
for Young African Leaders alumni upon 
their return to their home countries, in-
cluding online courses, technical assistance, 
and access to funding;
1358 
(ii) training for young African leaders 
at regional leadership centers established 
in accordance with subsection (e), and 
through online and in-person courses of-
fered by such centers; and 
(iii) opportunities for networking and 
engagement with— 
(I) alumni of the Mandela Wash-
ington Fellowship for Young African 
Leaders; 
(II) alumni of programs at re-
gional leadership centers established 
in accordance with subsection (e); 
(III) United States and like- 
minded diplomatic missions, business 
leaders, and others as appropriate; 
and 
(IV) where practicable and ap-
propriate, other United States-funded 
regional leadership programs, includ-
ing the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
ers Initiative (YSEALI), the Young 
Leaders of the Americas Initiative 
(YLAI), the Young Pacific Leaders 
(YPL), and the Young Transatlantic
1359 
Innovation 
Leaders 
Initiative 
(YTILI), and through Department of 
State programs such as the Commu-
nity Engagement Exchange Program 
and other initiatives. 
(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 
subsection, the Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development 
and the heads of other relevant Federal depart-
ments and agencies shall seek to partner with 
the private sector to pursue public-private part-
nerships, leverage private sector expertise, ex-
pand networking opportunities, and identify 
funding opportunities as well as fellowship and 
employment opportunities for YALI. 
(7) IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the heads of other rel-
evant Federal departments and agencies, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
plan for implementing YALI, including—
1360 
(A) a description of clearly defined pro-
gram goals, targets, and planned outcomes for 
each year and for the duration of implementa-
tion of the program; 
(B) a strategy to monitor and evaluate the 
program and progress made toward achieving 
such goals, targets, and planned outcomes; and 
(C) a strategy to ensure the program is 
promoting United States foreign policy goals in 
Africa, including ensuring that the program is 
clearly branded, paired with robust public diplo-
macy efforts, and incorporates diversity among 
participants as practicable, including countries 
and communities in Africa facing economic dis-
tress, civil conflict, marginalization, and other 
challenges. 
(8) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in co-
ordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
and publish in a publicly accessible, internet–based 
form, a report that includes—
1361 
(A) a description of the progress made to-
ward achieving the goals, targets, and planned 
outcomes described in subsection (g)(1), includ-
ing an overview of the program implemented in 
the previous year and an estimated number of 
beneficiaries; 
(B) an assessment of how YALI is contrib-
uting to and promoting United States-Africa re-
lations, particularly in areas of increased pri-
vate sector investment, trade promotion, sup-
port to civil society, improved public adminis-
tration, promoting peace and security, and fos-
tering entrepreneurship and youth empower-
ment; 
(C) recommendations for improvements or 
changes to YALI and the implementation plan, 
if any, that would improve their effectiveness 
during subsequent years of YALI’s implementa-
tion; and 
(D) for the first report submitted under 
this subsection, an assessment of the feasibility 
of expanding YALI to Morocco, Algeria, Tuni-
sia, Libya, and Egypt.
1362 
(9) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
(10) SUNSET.—The requirements of this sec-
tion shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 30275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
States Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report on the resources 
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an or-
ganization the mission of which shall be to promote demo-
cratic values and institutions in Africa by providing objec-
tive, accurate, and relevant news and information to the 
people of Africa and counter disinformation from malign 
actors, especially in countries in which a free press is
1363 
banned by the government or not fully established, about 
the region, the world, and the United States through un-
censored news, responsible discussion, and open debate. 
SEC. 30276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA-
TION. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to support increased access to energy in Af-
rica and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on countries 
that use energy reliance for undue political influence such 
as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Lack of access to energy remains a signifi-
cant barrier to economic advancement and oppor-
tunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 
789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in 
sub-Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern 
electricity. Even in the region’s most advanced 
economies, average annual per capita electricity con-
sumption is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less 
than what is needed to power a typical refrigerator. 
Only a small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Afri-
cans who enter the job market each year find em-
ployment; and the cost and reliability of electricity
1364 
remain top constraints to job creation and economic 
competitiveness. 
(2) The United States’ global strategic competi-
tors have stepped in to address this disparity and fi-
nance energy sector development across Africa. 
China is the single largest trading partner for Afri-
can countries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral 
lender for public sector loans across Africa. Approxi-
mately 65 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes 
to infrastructure, and between 2013–2020, the en-
ergy sector consistently accounted for the largest 
share of all investment under China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power 
is the foundation for all modern economies and nec-
essary for increasing growth and employment. 
(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower 
middle-income countries is necessary in the next dec-
ades in order to meet human, social, security, and 
economic needs. 
(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclu-
sive economies, and making energy systems resilient 
in low- and lower middle-income countries will re-
quire diversified power systems and a mix of tech-
1365 
nologies that align with local conditions, resources, 
and needs. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that countries in Africa continue to be important 
partners to the United States and the DFC should con-
tinue to make investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facili-
tate technologies that contribute to energy security and 
reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in low and 
lower middle-income countries. 
(d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa 
Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) 
is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 
end; 
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and 
inserting a semicolon; and 
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(10) advance United States foreign policy and 
development goals by assisting African countries to 
reduce their dependence on energy resources from 
countries that use energy dependence for undue po-
litical influence, such as the Russian Federation or 
the People’s Republic of China, which have used en-
1366 
ergy and financial resources to influence other coun-
tries; 
‘‘(11) promote the energy security of allies and 
partners of the United States by encouraging the de-
velopment of accessible, transparent, and competitive 
energy markets that provide diversified sources and 
reliable, affordable, and sustainable power; 
‘‘(12) encourage United States public and pri-
vate sector investment in African energy infrastruc-
ture projects to bridge the gap between energy secu-
rity requirements and commercial demand in a way 
that is consistent with the region’s capacity; and 
‘‘(13) help facilitate the export of United States 
energy resources, technology, and expertise to global 
markets in a way that benefits the energy security 
of allies and partners of the United States, including 
in Africa.’’. 
PART 5—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
SEC. 30281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE 
IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading 
its influence in the Middle East and North Africa
1367 
through its energy and infrastructure investments, 
technology transfer, and arms sales; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to es-
tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
cally strategic locations in the Middle East and 
North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative 
at the expense of United States national security in-
terests; and 
(3) the export of certain communications infra-
structure from the People’s Republic of China de-
grades the security of partner networks, exposes in-
tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of 
the United States to conduct security cooperation 
with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
China’s authoritarian surveillance model. 
(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall 
jointly develop and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-
1368 
tives a strategy for countering and limiting the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China’s influence in, and access to, 
the Middle East and North Africa. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s intent with regards to increased co-
operation with Middle East and North African 
countries and how such cooperation fits into its 
broader global strategic objectives; 
(B) an assessment of how governments 
across the region are responding to the People’s 
Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili-
tary presence in their countries; 
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation 
through foreign military sales, financing, and 
efforts to build partner capacity and increase 
interoperability with the United States; 
(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s joint research and development with 
the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
the United States’ national security interests, 
and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s 
Republic of China’s influence in such area;
1369 
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
ons technology transfers from the People’s Re-
public of China to the Middle East and North 
Africa, impacts on United States’ national secu-
rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
gate the People’s Republic of China’s influence 
in such area; 
(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s military sales to the region, including 
lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems; 
(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of 
China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
ca, impacts on United States’ national security 
interests, and recommended steps to mitigate 
the People’s Republic of China’s influence in 
such area; 
(H) efforts to improve regional security co-
operation with United States allies and partners 
with a focus on— 
(i) maritime security in the Arabian 
Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
terranean; 
(ii) integrated air and missile defense; 
(iii) cyber security;
1370 
(iv) border security; and 
(v) critical infrastructure security, to 
include energy security; 
(I) increased support for government-to- 
government engagement on critical infrastruc-
ture development projects, including ports and 
water infrastructure; 
(J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
vate sector and public-private partnerships in 
healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
ment in non-energy sectors; 
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement 
and professional education exchanges with key 
partner countries; 
(L) specific steps to counter increased in-
vestment from the People’s Republic of China 
in telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-
matic efforts to stress the political, economic, 
and social benefits of a free and open internet; 
(M) efforts to promote United States pri-
vate sector engagement in and public-private 
partnerships on renewable energy development; 
(N) the expansion of public-private part-
nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
gation projects;
1371 
(O) efforts to warn United States partners 
in the Middle East and North Africa of the 
risks associated with the People’s Republic of 
China’s telecommunications infrastructure and 
provide alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China’s technology; and 
(P) opportunities of potential partnership 
with Israel and other regional nations in areas 
such as technological cooperation in areas crit-
ical to national security. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex as necessary. 
SEC. 30282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The United States and the international 
community have long-term interests in the stability, 
security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
(2) In addition to and apart from military and 
security efforts, the United States should harness a 
whole of government approach, including bilateral
1372 
and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, 
and public diplomacy to compete with and counter 
PRC influence. 
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 
United States engagement, transparent governance 
structures, and active civil society engagement help 
counter predatory foreign investment and influence 
efforts. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States that the United States and the international 
community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-
forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that 
support reform efforts to— 
(1) promote greater economic opportunity; 
(2) foster private sector development; 
(3) strengthen civil society; 
(4) promote transparent and democratic gov-
ernance and the rule of law; and 
(5) promote greater regional integration and 
intraregional cooperation, including with Israel. 
SEC. 30283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP. 
It is the sense of Congress that the People’s Republic 
of China’s economic relationship with Iran, including oil 
purchases in violation of United States sanctions, under-
1373 
mines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon 
its malign activities. 
PART 6—ARCTIC REGION 
SEC. 30285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.— 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment— 
(A) creates new national and regional secu-
rity challenges due to increased military activity 
in the Arctic; 
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing 
strategic competition; 
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
toral countries have inadequate capacity to pa-
trol the increased vessel traffic in this remote 
region, which is a result of diminished annual 
levels of sea ice; 
(D) impacts public safety due to increased 
human activity in the Arctic region where 
search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
ited; and 
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s 
fragile and pristine environment and the unique
1374 
and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
tic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and 
(2) the United States should reduce the con-
sequences described in paragraph (1) by— 
(A) evaluating the wide variety and dy-
namic set of security and safety risks devel-
oping in the Arctic; 
(B) developing policies and making prep-
arations to mitigate and respond to threats and 
risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to 
work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
gion to deter potential aggressive activities and 
build Arctic competencies; 
(C) adequately funding the National Earth 
System Prediction Capability to substantively 
improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on 
the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
curity and trans-Arctic shipping; 
(D) investing in resources, including a sig-
nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure 
that the United States has adequate capacity to 
prevent and respond to security threats in the 
Arctic region; and
1375 
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 
all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-
ment for— 
(i) maintaining peace and stability in 
the Arctic region; 
(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
gion; 
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
agement of commercial maritime traffic in 
the Arctic; 
(iv) promoting responsible natural re-
source management and economic develop-
ment; and 
(v) countering China’s Polar Silk 
Road initiative; 
(vi) examining the possibility of recon-
vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense 
Forum; and 
(vii) reducing black carbon and meth-
ane emissions in the Arctic Region, includ-
ing by working with observers of the Arctic 
Council, including India and the People’s 
Republic of China, to adopt mitigation 
plans consistent with the findings and rec-
1376 
ommendations of the Arctic Council’s 
Framework for Action on Black Carbon 
and Methane. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to recognize only the states specified in sub-
section (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other 
claims to such status; and 
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 
serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the 
interests of United States allies and partners. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ 
means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, 
and Iceland. 
(2) ARCTIC
REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Re-
gion’’ means the geographic region north of the 
66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator. 
(d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR 
ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the De-
partment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Af-
fairs (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), 
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1).
1377 
(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
(2) DUTIES.— 
(A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Sub-
ject to the direction of the President and the 
Secretary of State, the Ambassador is author-
ized to represent the United States in matters 
and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in— 
(i) contacts with foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and spe-
cialized agencies of the United Nations, 
the Arctic Council, and other international 
organizations of which the United States is 
a member; and 
(ii) multilateral conferences and meet-
ings relating to Arctic affairs. 
(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The 
Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arc-
tic Council when the United States holds the 
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 
(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambas-
sador shall coordinate United States policies related 
to the Arctic Region, including—
1378 
(A) meeting national security, economic, 
and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af-
fairs; 
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and 
conserving its biological resources; 
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable 
natural resource management and economic de-
velopment; 
(D) strengthening institutions for coopera-
tion among the Arctic states; 
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 
decisions that affect them; 
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
search on local, regional, and global environ-
mental issues; 
(G) integrating scientific data on the cur-
rent and projected effects of climate change in 
the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 
applied to the development of security strategies 
for the Arctic Region; 
(H) making available the methods and ap-
proaches on the integration of climate science 
to other regional security planning programs in 
the Department of State to better ensure that 
broader decision-making processes may more
1379 
adequately account for the effects of climate 
change; and 
(I) reducing black carbon and methane 
emissions in the Arctic Region. 
(e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Am-
bassador shall develop a policy, to be known as the ‘‘Arctic 
Region Security Policy’’, to assess, develop, budget for, 
and implement plans, policies, and actions— 
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 
United States in Arctic states, including through en-
hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, 
participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United 
States initiatives and assistance programs across 
agencies to protect the national security of the 
United States and its allies and partners; 
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 
states to the effects of environmental change and in-
creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states 
and other states that may result from increased ac-
cessibility of the Arctic Region; 
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic 
Region and Arctic states that— 
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
environment; and
1380 
(B) are strategically significant to the 
United States; 
(4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
mental change and national security risk and vulner-
ability assessments into the decision making process 
on foreign assistance awards with Greenland; 
(5) to advance principles of good governance by 
encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on 
collaborative approaches— 
(A) to responsibly manage natural re-
sources in the Arctic Region; 
(B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
time safety in the Arctic Region; 
(C) to prevent the escalation of security 
tensions by mitigating against the militarization 
of the Arctic Region; 
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
tilateral policies among Arctic states on the 
management of maritime transit routes through 
the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the 
transit policies for access to and transit in the 
Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and 
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic 
Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
1381 
and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
mane and responsible fashion; 
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
vivability, and resiliency of United States interests 
and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and 
(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
sions in the Arctic. 
SEC. 30286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER 
STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARCTIC COUN-
CIL. 
It is the policy of the United States to urge that Tai-
wan be given observer status on the Arctic Council. 
PART 7—OCEANIA 
SEC. 30291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA. 
It shall be the policy of the United States— 
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a 
strategic national security and economic priority of 
the United States Government; 
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region; 
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with 
the Freely Associated States of the Republic of 
Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
1382 
Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
changes that promote the goals of individual coun-
tries and the entire region; 
(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance 
goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing, maritime security, and economic development; 
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
national structures to promote the national security 
and economic goals of the United States and coun-
tries of Oceania; 
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 
States strategy that will enhance youth engagement 
and advance long-term growth and development 
throughout the region, especially as such relates to 
protecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
tries of Oceania against current and future threats 
resulting from extreme weather and severe changes 
in the environment;
1383 
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 
influence and corruption aimed at undermining the 
political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
bility of the people and governments of the countries 
of Oceania; 
(8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
tries of Oceania to address public health challenges 
and improve global health security; 
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
ket-based private sector investments that adhere to 
best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
ability, and environmental and social safeguards as 
an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
thoritarian governments; 
(10) to ensure the people and communities of 
Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
grading munitions hazards and other debris that 
threaten health and livelihoods; 
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering 
United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic partners in Oceania; and 
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments 
in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
mains of members of the United States Armed
1384 
Forces who are missing in action from previous con-
flicts in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 30292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP. 
(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening 
United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared 
concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security 
and resiliency in the countries of Oceania. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by 
subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A description of United States regional 
goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in-
creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania. 
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of 
United States regional goals and concerns that are 
shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
cluding a review of issues related to anti-corruption 
efforts, maritime and other security issues, environ-
mental protection, fisheries management, economic 
growth and development, and disaster resilience and 
preparedness.
1385 
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
tives by the Governments of the United States, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared 
regional goals and concerns. 
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
tives by regional organizations and other related 
intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing 
shared regional goals and concerns. 
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs 
and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals 
and concerns, as appropriate. 
(6) Recommendations for additional United 
States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources 
necessary to execute the strategic roadmap. 
(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State 
considers appropriate. 
SEC. 30293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States- 
based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be 
known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring 
and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic,
1386 
and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
ania. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by 
subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following: 
(1) A review of the ability of the Department 
of State to participate in a public-private sponsored 
security dialogue. 
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for 
conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-
risdiction of the United States. 
(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an 
Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-
ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific 
countries of Oceania. 
(4) A review of the funding modalities available 
to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-
ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-
thorities available to the Department of State. 
(5) An assessment of any administrative, statu-
tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent 
the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue 
with participation and support of the Department of 
State. 
(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration
1387 
on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the 
changing environment as the greatest existential 
threat to countries of Oceania. 
(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of 
existing regional structures and organizations dedi-
cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as 
the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental 
Security Forum. 
(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue would help with implementation of the 
strategic roadmap required by section 30292 and 
advance the National Security Strategy of the 
United States. 
(c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent 
practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the 
Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the 
lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Stud-
ies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasi-
bility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 
Dialogue. 
SEC. 30294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
Peace Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional
1388 
committees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely 
expand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, 
with the goals of— 
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps 
to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 
(2) working with regional and international 
partners of the United States to expand the presence 
of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
communities in support of climate resilience initia-
tives. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall— 
(1) assess the factors contributing to the cur-
rent absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers 
in Oceania; 
(2) examine potential remedies that include 
working with United States Government agencies 
and regional governments, including governments of 
United States allies— 
(A) to increase the health infrastructure 
and medical evacuation capabilities of the coun-
tries of Oceania to better support the safety of 
Peace Corps volunteers while in such countries;
1389 
(B) to address physical safety concerns 
that have decreased the ability of the Peace 
Corps to operate in Oceania; and 
(C) to increase transportation infrastruc-
ture in the countries of Oceania to better sup-
port the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and 
their access to necessary facilities; 
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-
ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the 
countries of Oceania address social, economic, and 
development needs of their communities that require 
specific professional expertise; and 
(4) explore potential new operational models to 
address safety and security needs of Peace Corps 
volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including— 
(A) changes to volunteer deployment dura-
tions; and 
(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers 
to regional or United States-based healthcare 
facilities for routine physical and behavioral 
health evaluation. 
(c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-
NITIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential 
to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in
1390 
low-income Oceania communities under subsection 
(a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall con-
sider the development of initiatives described in 
paragraph (2). 
(2) INITIATIVES
DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-
scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives 
that help the countries of Oceania address social, 
economic, and development needs of their commu-
nities, including by— 
(A) addressing, through appropriate resil-
ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that 
communities in Oceania face as result of ex-
treme weather, severe environmental change, 
and other climate related trends; and 
(B) improving, through smart infrastruc-
ture principles, access to transportation and 
connectivity infrastructure that will help ad-
dress the economic and social challenges that 
communities in Oceania confront as a result of 
poor or nonexistent infrastructure. 
(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘Oceania’’ includes the following: 
(1) Easter Island of Chile. 
(2) Fiji. 
(3) French Polynesia of France.
1391 
(4) Kiribati. 
(5) New Caledonia of France. 
(6) Nieu of New Zealand. 
(7) Papua New Guinea. 
(8) Samoa. 
(9) Vanuatu. 
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-
tralia. 
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand. 
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia. 
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia. 
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia. 
(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-
dom. 
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands. 
(17) The Republic of Palau. 
(18) The Solomon Islands. 
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand. 
(20) Tonga. 
(21) Tuvalu. 
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France.
1392 
PART 8—PACIFIC ISLANDS 
SEC. 30295. SHORT TITLE. 
This part may be cited as the ‘‘Boosting Long-term 
U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act’’ or the ‘‘BLUE Pa-
cific Act’’. 
SEC. 30296. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Pacific Islands— 
(A) are home to roughly 10 million resi-
dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New 
Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul-
tures and peoples; 
(B) are spread across an expanse of the 
Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the 
Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions 
of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and 
(C) face shared challenges in development 
that have distinct local contexts, including cli-
mate change and rising sea levels, geographic 
distances from major markets, and vulnerability 
to external shocks such as natural disasters. 
(2) The United States is a Pacific country with 
longstanding ties and shared values and interests 
with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com-
pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated 
States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the
1393 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 
Palau. 
(3) The United States has vital national secu-
rity interests in the Pacific Islands, including— 
(A) protecting regional peace and security 
that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations; 
(B) advancing economic prosperity free 
from coercion through sustainable development; 
and 
(C) supporting democracy, good govern-
ance, the rule of law, and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
(4) Successive United States administrations 
have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, 
including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic 
documents, including the following: 
(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, 
which first declared the rebalance to Asia and 
the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa-
cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent 
United States engagement with the Pacific Is-
lands, including several new policies focused on 
conservation and resilience to climate change 
announced in September 2016.
1394 
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, 
which includes a commitment to ‘‘shore up 
fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands re-
gion to reduce their vulnerability to economic 
fluctuations and natural disasters’’. 
(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-
port, which identified the Pacific Islands as 
‘‘critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared 
values, interests, and commitments’’ and com-
mitted the United States to ‘‘building capacity 
and resilience to address maritime security; Ille-
gal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug 
trafficking; and resilience to address climate 
change and disaster response’’. 
(5) The United States has deepened its diplo-
matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through 
several recent initiatives, including— 
(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 
additional 
$100,000,000 
in 
2019 
and 
$200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approxi-
mately $350,000,000 that the United States 
provides annually to the region to support 
shared priorities in economic and human devel-
opment, climate change, and more; and
1395 
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island 
Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in 
March 2021 to strengthen United States col-
laboration with island countries and territories, 
including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–19 
economic challenges, long-term economic devel-
opment, climate change, and other shared inter-
ests. 
(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 
2018, affirmed that climate change ‘‘remains the 
single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and 
wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’’ and asserted 
‘‘the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its 
national affairs free of external interference and co-
ercion’’. 
(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated 
that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of 
$2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 
2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate 
mitigation and adaptation over the same period. 
(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective 
policies to prevent and contain the spread of the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as 
‘‘COVID–19’’) pandemic to their populations. The
1396 
United States has provided over $130,000,000 in as-
sistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 
response. However, priorities must be met to ensure 
continued success in preventing the spread of the 
COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and wide-
spread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term eco-
nomic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including 
through— 
(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi-
tion of needed medical supplies, including avail-
able COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vac-
cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain; 
(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and 
reopening of economic and social activities; and 
(C) mitigating and recovering from the im-
pacts of the COVID–19 pandemic on the health 
system and the reliance on food and energy im-
ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other 
economic and food security damages caused by 
the pandemic. 
(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps vol-
unteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, 
building strong people-to-people relationships and 
demonstrating the United States commitment to 
peace and development in the region. Prior to the
1397 
COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained 
presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. 
Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high de-
mand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested 
across the region. 
SEC. 30297. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy in 
the Pacific Islands that— 
(A) promotes peace, security, and pros-
perity for all countries through a rules-based 
regional order that respects the sovereignty and 
political independence of all nations; 
(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open 
and vibrant corridor for international maritime 
trade and sustainable development that sup-
ports inclusive economic growth and autonomy 
for all nations and addresses socioeconomic 
challenges related to public health, education, 
renewable energy, digital connectivity, and 
more; 
(C) supports regional efforts to address the 
challenges posed by climate change, including 
by strengthening resilience to natural disasters
1398 
and through responsible stewardship of natural 
resources; 
(D) improves civil society, strengthens 
democratic governance and the rule of law, and 
promotes human rights and the preservation of 
the region’s unique cultural heritages; 
(E) assists the Pacific Islands in pre-
venting and containing the spread of the 
COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long- 
term economic recovery; and 
(F) supports existing regional architecture 
and international norms; 
(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives 
of existing regional multilateral institutions and 
frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 
the Pacific Community, including— 
(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Re-
gionalism; 
(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional 
Security; and 
(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan; 
(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the 
Compacts of Free Association and related United 
States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of
1399 
Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau 
unless they are extended and renewed; and 
(4) to work closely with United States allies 
and partners with existing relationships and inter-
ests in the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common 
goals. 
SEC. 30298. DEFINITION. 
In this part, the terms ‘‘Pacific Islands’’ means the 
Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of 
Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, 
the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Sol-
omon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Re-
public of Vanuatu. 
SEC. 30299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM 
OF REPORTS. 
(a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any 
reports required to be submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees under this part that are subject to 
deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of 
time may be consolidated into a single report that is sub-
mitted to the appropriate congressional committees pursu-
1400 
ant to such deadlines and that contains all information 
required under such reports. 
(b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by 
this part shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
contain a classified annex. 
SEC. 30299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS-
LANDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Is-
lands necessitates an examination of whether United 
States diplomatic, economic, and development en-
gagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region 
is sufficient to effectively support United States ob-
jectives and meaningful participation in regional 
fora; 
(2) improving shared understanding of and 
jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti-
nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of 
the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi-
tally important to our shared long-term interests of 
stability, security, and prosperity; 
(3) the United States should seek to participate 
in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re-
1401 
sponse toward maritime security, including through 
continued United States and Pacific Islands partici-
pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and 
Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust 
cooperation with regional allies and partners; and 
(4) the United States Government should com-
mit to sending appropriate levels of representation to 
regional events. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and an-
nually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Com-
merce and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the diplomatic and development presence of the 
United States in the Pacific Islands. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the Department of 
State, United States Agency for International 
Development, United States International De-
velopment Finance Corporation, Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, and United States Com-
1402 
mercial Service presence, staffing, program-
ming, and resourcing of operations in the Pa-
cific 
Islands, 
including 
programming 
and 
resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pa-
cific Islands. 
(B) A description of gaps in such presence, 
including unfilled full-time equivalent positions. 
(C) A description of limitations and chal-
lenges such gaps pose to United States stra-
tegic objectives, including— 
(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is-
lands due to operations being conducted 
from the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development offices in Manila and 
Suva; and 
(ii) 
gaps 
in 
programming 
and 
resourcing. 
(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such 
presence to fill such gaps, including by estab-
lishing new missions, expanding participation in 
regional forums, and elevating United States 
representation in regional forums. 
(c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO-
NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em-
1403 
ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of pro-
moting increased diplomatic engagement and economic 
and commercial engagement between the United States 
and the Pacific Islands. 
(d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT-
EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a regional development cooperation strategy 
for the Pacific Islands. 
SEC. 30299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND 
PARTNERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall con-
sult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, such 
as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional 
institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pa-
cific Community, with respect to programs to provide as-
sistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs estab-
lished by this Act, including for purposes of— 
(1) deconflicting programming; 
(2) ensuring that any programming does not 
adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pa-
cific Islands; and
1404 
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit 
the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac-
ticable. 
(b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Sec-
retary of State shall establish a formal consultative proc-
ess with such regional allies and partners to coordinate 
with respect to such programs and future-years program-
ming. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees and the Armed Services Committees of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that 
includes— 
(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 
programs undertaken by regional allies and part-
ners, including multilateral organizations, to advance 
priorities identified in this Act; 
(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 
programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors 
that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in 
any way detrimental to one or more countries of the 
Pacific Islands; 
(3) an assessment of United States programs in 
the Pacific Islands and their alignment and
1405 
complementarity with the efforts of regional allies 
and partners identified in paragraph (1); and 
(4) a review of the formal consultative process 
required in subsection (b) to summarize engage-
ments held and identify opportunities to improve co-
ordination with regional allies and partners. 
SEC. 30299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States Government should lever-
age the full range of authorities and programs avail-
able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their 
development goals; 
(2) United States development assistance 
should seek to build on existing public and private 
sector investments while creating new opportunities 
toward a favorable environment for additional such 
investments; and 
(3) United States development efforts should be 
coordinated with and seek to build on existing ef-
forts by like-minded partners and allies and regional 
and international multilateral organizations. 
(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
1406 
for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall de-
velop and implement a strategy to— 
(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 
including transport connectivity, information and 
communications technology, food security, coastal 
zone management, marine and water resource man-
agement, and energy security and access to elec-
tricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on 
climate resiliency and sustainable development; 
(2) provide technical assistance to assist local 
government and civil society leaders assess risks to 
local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate 
change, consider and implement risk mitigation ef-
forts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evalu-
ate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy 
and sustainability; and 
(3) support investment and improvement in eco-
system conservation and protection for the long-term 
sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially 
those that mitigate effects of climate change and 
those that support food security and livelihoods. 
(c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy devel-
oped under this section shall be coordinated with like-
1407 
minded partners and allies, regional and international 
multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for 
development in the Pacific Islands. 
(d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 
The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representa-
tives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development 
Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 
support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pa-
cific Islands. 
(e) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment this Act and annu-
ally thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees, the 
Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources of the Senate a report on foreign 
infrastructure developments in the Pacific Islands. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required by paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) a review of foreign infrastructure de-
velopments in the Pacific Islands by non-United 
States allies and partners;
1408 
(B) assessments of the environmental im-
pact and sustainability of such developments; 
and 
(C) an analysis of the financial sustain-
ability of such developments and their impacts 
on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Is-
lands. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 30299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACAD-
EMY FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall de-
velop and implement a plan to expand coverage of the 
International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) pro-
gram for the Pacific Islands, including by— 
(1) expanding coverage of the regional program 
located in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; 
or 
(2) establishing a new regional program for the 
Pacific Islands. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required 
by subsection (a) shall include consultation and coordina-
tion with existing regional law enforcement entities, in-
1409 
cluding the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and civil soci-
ety, including those focused on human rights and special-
izing in victim-centered approaches, and take into consid-
eration costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capac-
ity of the Pacific Islands to participate in the ILEA pro-
gram. 
(c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State shall provide the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a briefing on the plan developed under this section. 
SEC. 30299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC IS-
LANDS. 
(a) STRATEGY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with 
the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, shall develop and implement a comprehensive 
strategy to provide assistance to and build the ca-
pacity of local civilian and national security institu-
tions of the Pacific Islands for purposes of— 
(A) enhancing maritime security and mari-
time domain awareness to address challenges 
such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing;
1410 
(B) assisting local law enforcement in de-
tecting, preventing, and combatting human and 
drug 
trafficking 
and 
other 
forms 
of 
transnational crime; 
(C) participating in efforts by regional in-
stitutions and frameworks to coordinate and fa-
cilitate cooperation on shared security chal-
lenges; and 
(D) expanding information sharing and to 
work toward operational coordination and inter-
operability among Pacific Island maritime secu-
rity forces, including through regional fusion 
centers. 
(2) 
PROGRAMS
AND
AUTHORITIES
DE-
SCRIBED.—The strategy required by this subsection 
shall build on but not be limited to the following 
programs and authorities: 
(A) The International Military Education 
and Training program. 
(B) The Foreign Military Financing pro-
gram. 
(C) The authority to build the capacity of 
foreign security forces under section 333 of title 
10, United States Code.
1411 
(D) The authority to provide excess de-
fense articles under section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j). 
(E) The Department of Defense State 
Partnership Program. 
(3) NATIONAL
POLICE
FORCES
AND
COAST 
GUARDS.—The national police forces and coast 
guards of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive 
assistance under the programs and authorities de-
scribed in paragraph (2) (other than the programs 
and authorities described in subparagraphs (A), (D), 
and (F) of paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strat-
egy required by this subsection. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
quired by subsection (a) shall seek to preserve peace and 
regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into con-
sideration and seek to build upon but not duplicate exist-
ing assistance provided by United States allies and part-
ners. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains the strategy devel-
oped under this section.
1412 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required by paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of security challenges to 
the Pacific Islands; 
(B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of 
the Pacific Islands for assistance; 
(C) a review of existing security assistance 
programs in the Pacific Islands, including pro-
grams and efforts provided by United States al-
lies and partners; 
(D) a plan for programs for training, 
equipping, and sustainment, including excess 
defense equipment and related materials; 
(E) a list of militaries, national police 
forces, coast guards, and other national security 
forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance 
under the strategy; 
(F) a review of existing cross-border mari-
time law enforcement operations (commonly 
known as ‘‘shiprider agreements’’) with the Pa-
cific Islands, an assessment of additional 
resourcing needs to enhance operational capac-
ity, and a plan to improve on these programs 
and operations;
1413 
(G) a review of existing Department of De-
fense State Partnership Programs with the Pa-
cific Islands and an assessment of additional 
opportunities to leverage Department of De-
fense State Partnership Programs to address 
national security, law enforcement, disaster re-
lief and emergency management, and related 
priorities; 
(H) a review of current efforts and 
progress in removing unexploded ordnance in 
the Pacific Islands and an assessment of addi-
tional resourcing needed to ensure continued 
progress, including to support coordination with 
regional efforts and those of United States al-
lies and partners; 
(I) a review of existing regional fusion cen-
ters and other cooperative intelligence sharing 
efforts in the Pacific Islands to address mari-
time security, transnational crime, natural dis-
asters, and other security challenges and an as-
sessment of opportunities for the United States 
to participate in such efforts, including by allo-
cating staff and supplying resourcing; 
(J) measures to evaluate success for the 
strategy;
1414 
(K) a detailed assessment of appropria-
tions required to achieve the objectives for the 
strategy in future years; and 
(L) an analysis of national security threats 
posed to the Pacific Islands by climate change. 
(3) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
mittee on Transportation and Infrastructure of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation of the Senate. 
SEC. 30299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME. 
(a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IN-
STRUMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
prioritize efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in rati-
fying and implementing international legal conven-
tions related to transnational crime, such as—
1415 
(A) the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and 
Flora; 
(B) the Agreement on Port State Meas-
ures; and 
(C) relevant protocols supplementing the 
United 
Nations 
Convention 
Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, such as— 
(i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, 
and Punish Trafficking in Person, Espe-
cially Women and Children; and 
(ii) the Protocol Against the Smug-
gling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. 
(2) BIENNIAL
REPORT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
every two years thereafter as appropriate, the Sec-
retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report on— 
(A) the status of the progress of each 
country of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying 
and implementing international legal conven-
tions related to transnational crime; and 
(B) United States plans for assisting those 
countries that have yet to fully ratify such con-
1416 
ventions with their respective ratification ef-
forts. 
(b) UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.—The Secretary 
of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies as 
appropriate, shall identify and update existing reports to 
include forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific 
Islands, such as— 
(1) the International Narcotics Control Strat-
egy report; 
(2) the Improving International Fisheries Man-
agement report; and 
(3) the Trafficking in Persons report. 
(c) ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and an-
nually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordi-
nation with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, 
shall submit to appropriate congressional committees 
a report that identifies countries of the Pacific Is-
lands that are countries of concern with respect to 
illegal logging and associated trade. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the impact illegal log-
ging and associated trade have had on local
1417 
communities, good governance, and biodiversity, 
including an identification of those foreign 
countries that may be financing or in any other 
manner supporting illegal logging activities. 
(B) A description of efforts taken by coun-
tries identified under paragraph (1) to comply 
and take appropriate corrective action to miti-
gate illegal logging, and an evaluation of the 
progress of those efforts. 
(C) A description of steps taken by the 
heads of relevant Federal agencies to assist the 
Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing 
international measures comparable to those of 
the United States, such as the Lacey Act, to re-
duce impacts of illicit logging. 
(3) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate. 
(d) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED 
FISHING.—Section 3553 of the National Defense Author-
1418 
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is 
amended— 
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 
end; 
(2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para-
graph (9); and 
(3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amend-
ed) the following: 
‘‘(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the 
ability of the United States to effectively assist pri-
ority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU 
fishing due to resource constraints and the addi-
tional resources necessary to overcome those con-
straints; and’’. 
SEC. 30299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR 
THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development shall develop 
and implement an initiative to assist the Pacific Islands 
in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to nat-
ural disasters and other emergencies. 
(b) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program devel-
oped under this section shall include— 
(1) education and training programs on natural 
disaster prevention and preparedness for emergency
1419 
management professionals in the Pacific Islands, in-
cluding by leveraging the expertise of nonprofit orga-
nizations and institutions of higher education in the 
United States; 
(2) technical assistance, including through 
grants and cooperative agreements for qualified 
United States and local nongovernmental organiza-
tions, to enhance early warning systems, emergency 
management and preparedness procedures, and post- 
disaster relief and recovery; and 
(3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation 
and response plans in the region, including by 
United States allies and partners in the region. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ad-
ministrator shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on the program developed 
under this section. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required by paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of disaster risks in the 
Pacific Islands and existing local and regional 
capacity to respond to such risks;
1420 
(B) a review of existing efforts by United 
States allies and partners to provide assistance 
and training for natural disaster preparedness 
and emergency management; and 
(C) objectives, means of implementation, 
and measures of success for the initiative. 
(3) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Natural Resources of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the Senate. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 30299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pa-
cific Islands should be expanded and the Peace 
Corps should reopen its programs in as many of the
1421 
Pacific Islands as possible, including where it has 
previously operated but has suspended operations; 
(2) consulting like-minded regional allies and 
partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 
and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming 
challenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the 
Pacific Islands; 
(3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to pro-
mote world peace and friendship in part by helping 
the people of interested countries in meeting their 
need for trained men and women, provides an in-
valuable opportunity to connect the American people 
with the people of the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the 
Republic of Palau; and 
(4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its 
programs in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Repub-
lic of Palau. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace 
Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that includes— 
(1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps 
presence in the Pacific Islands region to other re-
1422 
gions of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis 
of placement in the region versus elsewhere globally; 
(2) analysis of current impediments to Peace 
Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region; 
(3) outcomes of consultations among United 
States agencies, and with regional allies and part-
ners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce fac-
tors limiting Peace Corps expansion, particularly 
those related to medical transportation and personal 
safety; and 
(4) a plan and timeline for implementing out-
comes identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expan-
sion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where 
appropriate. 
SEC. 30299I. PACIFIC ISLANDS LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
INITIATIVE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that routinized people-to-people exchange programs 
to bring Pacific Islands religious leaders, journalists, civil 
society members, politicians, and others to the United 
States strengthens existing relationships and advances 
United States interests and shared values in the region. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall de-
velop and implement a program to promote educational 
and professional development for young adult leaders and
1423 
professionals in the Pacific Islands with a demonstrated 
passion to contribute to the continued development of the 
Pacific Islands. 
(c) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program developed 
under this section shall be implemented on a routine basis 
and may be carried out through— 
(1) grants provided on a competitive basis to 
qualified organizations with demonstrated expertise 
relating to the Pacific Islands; 
(2) grants in amounts not to exceed $50,000 
provided on a competitive basis to qualified young 
leaders from the Pacific Islands for the purpose of 
carrying out projects dedicated to the improvement 
of their communities in the Pacific Islands; 
(3) regional workshops and professional and 
academic fellowships; and 
(4) people-to-people exchanges. 
(d) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, acting through the Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on exchange programs for the Pa-
cific Islands region.
1424 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of factors constraining 
the number and frequency of International Vis-
itor Leadership Program participants from 
countries of the Pacific Islands; 
(B) an identification of resources that are 
necessary to address the factors described in 
subparagraph (A); and 
(C) a strategy for connecting alumni and 
participants of the Department of State’s pro-
fessional development exchange programs in 
East Asia, such as the Young Southeast Asian 
Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) and the Young 
Pacific Leaders programs, to enhance inter and 
intra region people-to-people ties. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section.
1425 
TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR 
VALUES 
SEC. 30301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIO-
LATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE 
PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Despite international condemnation, the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(‘‘PRC’’) continues to disregard its international 
legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong (‘‘Joint Declaration’’), in which the PRC com-
mitted that— 
(A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy; 
(B) for at least 50 years the ‘‘social and 
economic systems in Hong Kong’’ would remain 
unchanged; and 
(C) the personal rights and freedoms of 
the people of Hong Kong would be protected by 
law. 
(2) As part of its continued efforts to under-
mine the established rights of the Hong Kong peo-
1426 
ple, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee (‘‘Standing Committee’’) passed and im-
posed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally 
vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, 
that grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts 
of ‘‘separating the country, subverting state power, 
and organizing terroristic activities’’. 
(3) The legislative process by which the Stand-
ing Committee imposed the national security law on 
Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government 
in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China (‘‘Basic Law’’), and in-
volved unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact 
that the legislation was only the second law since 
2008 that the Standing Committee has passed with-
out releasing a draft for public comment. 
(4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the 
Hong 
Kong 
Special 
Administrative 
Region 
(HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy can-
didates from participating in the September 6 Legis-
lative Council elections, which were subsequently 
postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by 
citing the public health risk of holding elections dur-
ing the COVID–19 pandemic.
1427 
(5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Govern-
ment announced indictments of and arrest warrants 
for six Hong Kong activists living overseas, includ-
ing United States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged 
violations of the national security law. 
(6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Gov-
ernment removed four lawmakers from office for al-
legedly violating the law after the Standing Com-
mittee passed additional legislation barring those 
who promoted or supported Hong Kong independ-
ence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty 
over Hong Kong, or otherwise violates the national 
security law, from running for or serving in the Leg-
islative Council. 
(7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activ-
ists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were 
sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 pro-
tests. 
(8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents 
(also known as ‘‘the Hong Kong 12’’) who sought to 
flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 
23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and sen-
tenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms rang-
1428 
ing from seven months to three years for illegal bor-
der crossing. 
(9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s high-
est court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a 
pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was 
charged on December 12 with colluding with foreign 
forces and endangering national security under the 
national security legislation. 
(10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of 
Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened 
to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help 
the Hong Kong 12. 
(11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Po-
lice Force arrested more than fifty opposition fig-
ures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and 
an American lawyer, for their involvement in an in-
formal July 2020 primary to select candidates for 
the general election originally scheduled for Sep-
tember 2020, despite other political parties having 
held similar primaries without retribution. 
(12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court 
convicted Choy Yuk-ling, a video producer with 
Radio Television Hong Kong, in relation to her in-
vestigative reporting on the Hong Kong police.
1429 
(13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong 
Kong’s only surviving pro-democracy newspaper, 
published its final edition following months of intimi-
dation and repression by the HKSAR Government, 
including through the arrest of its senior editors, po-
lice raids on its offices, and the freezing of its finan-
cial assets. 
(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) condemns the actions taken by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) 
and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region (‘‘HKSAR’’), including the 
adoption and implementation of national security 
legislation for Hong Kong through irregular proce-
dures, that violate the rights and freedoms of the 
people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the 
Joint Declaration and its implementing document, 
the Basic Law; 
(2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong 
Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and 
freedoms; 
(3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and 
HKSAR to— 
(A) respect and uphold—
1430 
(i) commitments made to the inter-
national community and the people of 
Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration; 
and 
(ii) the judicial independence of the 
Hong Kong legal system; and 
(B) release pro-democracy activists and 
politicians arrested under the national security 
law; and 
(4) encourages the President, the Secretary of 
State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordi-
nate with allies and partners and continue United 
States efforts to respond to developments in Hong 
Kong, including by— 
(A) providing protection for Hong Kong 
residents who fear persecution; 
(B) supporting those who may seek to file 
a case before the International Court of Justice 
to hold the Government of the PRC accountable 
for violating its binding legal commitments 
under the Joint Declaration; 
(C) encouraging allies and partner coun-
tries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective 
representatives to the United Nations to use 
their voice, vote, and influence to press for the
1431 
appointment of a United Nations special man-
date holder to monitor and report on human 
rights developments in Hong Kong; 
(D) ensuring the private sector, particu-
larly United States companies with economic in-
terests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the na-
tional security legislation poses to the security 
of United States citizens and to the medium 
and long-term interest of United States busi-
nesses in Hong Kong; 
(E) continuing to implement sanctions au-
thorities, especially authorities recently enacted 
to address actions undermining the rights and 
freedoms of the Hong Kong people, such as the 
Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116– 
149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76), 
with respect to officials of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, the Government of the PRC, or 
the Government of the HKSAR who are respon-
sible for undermining such rights and freedoms; 
and 
(F) coordinating with allies and partners 
to ensure that such implementation of sanctions 
is multilateral.
1432 
SEC. 30302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy 
in Hong Kong. 
(b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall 
designate an office with the Department of State to ad-
minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State 
and across the United States Government. 
SEC. 30303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 
(1) JOINT
DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint 
Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered 
into force on May 27, 1985. 
(2) PRIORITY
HONG
KONG
RESIDENT.—The 
term ‘‘Priority Hong Kong resident’’ means— 
(A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong 
who—
1433 
(i) holds no right to citizenship in any 
country or jurisdiction other than the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this 
section as the ‘‘PRC’’), Hong Kong, or 
Macau as of the date of enactment of this 
Act; 
(ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not 
less than the last ten years as of the date 
of enactment of this Act; and 
(iii) has been designated by the Sec-
retary of State or Secretary of Homeland 
Security as having met the requirements of 
this subparagraph, in accordance with the 
procedures described in subsection (f) of 
this section; or 
(B) the spouse of a person described in 
subparagraph (A), or the child of such person 
as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un-
married person under twenty-seven years of 
age. 
(3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.— 
The term ‘‘Hong Kong National Security Law’’ 
means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
1434 
Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region that was passed 
unanimously by the National People’s Congress and 
signed by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, 
and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region (referred to in this section as 
‘‘Hong Kong SAR’’) on July 1, 2020. 
(4) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
ate. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro-
mulgated on July 1, 2020— 
(A) contravenes the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (re-
ferred to in this Act as ‘‘the Basic Law’’) that 
provides in Article 23 that the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation re-
lated to national security;
1435 
(B) violates the PRC’s commitments under 
international law, as defined by the Joint Dec-
laration; and 
(C) causes severe and irreparable damage 
to the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle and 
further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s 
commitment to international law. 
(2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the pro-
mulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, 
President Trump signed an Executive order on 
Hong Kong normalization that, among other policy 
actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong 
Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the 
issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. 
(3) The United States has a long and proud 
history as a destination for refugees and asylees flee-
ing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular so-
cial group. 
(4) The United States also shares deep social, 
cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong 
Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, 
to the rule of law, and to the protection of human 
rights.
1436 
(5) The United States has sheltered, protected, 
and welcomed individuals who have fled authori-
tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol-
lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in 
Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the peo-
ple of the United States and those individuals seek-
ing to contribute to a free, open society founded on 
democracy, human rights, and the respect for the 
rule of law. 
(6) The United States has reaped enormous 
economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel-
coming successive generations of scientists, doctors, 
entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free-
dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio-
lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive 
ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, 
the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu-
rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran. 
(7) A major asymmetric advantage of the 
United States in its long-term strategic competition 
with the Communist Party of China is the ability of 
people from every country in the world, irrespective 
of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to 
the United States and become American citizens.
1437 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set 
forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 
1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that— 
(A) the United States has ‘‘a strong inter-
est in the continued vitality, prosperity, and 
stability of Hong Kong’’; 
(B) ‘‘support for democratization is a fun-
damental principle of United States foreign pol-
icy’’, and therefore ‘‘naturally applies to United 
States policy toward Hong Kong’’; 
(C) ‘‘the human rights of the people of 
Hong Kong are of great importance to the 
United States and are directly relevant to 
United States interests in Hong Kong and 
serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued eco-
nomic prosperity’’; and 
(D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently 
autonomous from the PRC to ‘‘justify treat-
ment under a particular law of the United 
States, or any provision thereof, different from 
that accorded the People’s Republic of China’’;
1438 
(2) to continue to support the high degree of 
autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by— 
(A) the Joint Declaration; 
(B) the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, done at New York, De-
cember 19, 1966; and 
(C) the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, done at Paris, December 10, 1948; 
(3) to continue to support the democratic aspi-
rations of the people of Hong Kong, including the 
‘‘ultimate aim’’ of the selection of the Chief Execu-
tive and all members of the Legislative Council by 
universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law; 
(4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite 
its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to 
Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong 
Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of 
autonomy and without undue interference, and en-
suring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right 
to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suf-
frage; 
(5) to support the establishment of a genuine 
democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and
1439 
elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the es-
tablishment of open and direct democratic elections 
for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Coun-
cil; 
(6) to support the robust exercise by residents 
of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, 
and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the 
Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw-
ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong 
Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the 
Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; 
(8) to draw international attention to any viola-
tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda-
mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as pro-
vided by the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and any encroachment upon the au-
tonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law 
and the Joint Declaration; 
(9) to protect United States citizens and long- 
term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as 
well as people visiting and transiting through Hong 
Kong;
1440 
(10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties 
that provide significant benefits to both the United 
States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement 
of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to 
Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity; 
(11) to coordinate with allies, including the 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and 
human rights in Hong Kong; and 
(12) to welcome and protect in the United 
States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or 
otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by 
the Government of the PRC of the fundamental 
rights of the people of Hong Kong. 
(d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS
FOR HONG 
KONG RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.— 
(1) DESIGNATION.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 
244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as 
if it had been designated under subsection 
(b)(1)(C) of such section, subject to the provi-
sions of this section. 
(B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial 
period of the designation referred to in sub-
1441 
paragraph (A) shall be for the 18-month period 
beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. 
(2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the des-
ignation made under subsection (a), an alien is 
deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph 
(1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph 
(3) of such section, if the alien— 
(A) was a permanent resident of Hong 
Kong at the time such individual arrived into 
the United States and is a national of the PRC 
(or in the case of an individual having no na-
tionality, is a person who last habitually resided 
in Hong Kong); 
(B) has been continuously physically 
present in the United States since the date of 
the enactment of this Act; 
(C) is admissible as an immigrant, except 
as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of 
such section, and is not ineligible for temporary 
protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of 
such section; and 
(D) registers for temporary protected sta-
tus in a manner established by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security.
1442 
(3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.— 
(A) 
IN
GENERAL.—The 
Secretary 
of 
Homeland Security shall give prior consent to 
travel abroad, in accordance with section 
244(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is 
granted temporary protected status pursuant to 
the designation made under paragraph (1) if 
the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the 
Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency 
and extenuating circumstances beyond the con-
trol of the alien require the alien to depart for 
a brief, temporary trip abroad. 
(B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien 
returning to the United States in accordance 
with an authorization described in subpara-
graph (A) shall be treated as any other return-
ing alien provided temporary protected status 
under section 244 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a). 
(e) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR 
IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, during the five fiscal year period begin-
ning on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the 
date of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue
1443 
to be considered a foreign state separate and apart from 
the PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) 
for purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant 
visas under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153). 
(f) VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESI-
DENTS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal 
Register, an interim final rule establishing proce-
dures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Resi-
dents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United 
States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an in-
terim basis, immediately upon publication, but may 
be subject to change and revision after public notice 
and opportunity for comment. The Secretary of 
State shall finalize such rule not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such 
rule shall establish procedures— 
(A) for individuals to register with any 
United States embassy or consulate outside of 
the United States, or with the Department of
1444 
Homeland Security in the United States, and 
request designation as a Priority Hong Kong 
Resident; and 
(B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify 
the residency of registered individuals and des-
ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong 
Residents. 
(2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures de-
scribed in paragraph (1) shall include the collection 
of— 
(A) biometric data; 
(B) copies of birth certificates, residency 
cards, and other documentation establishing 
residency; and 
(C) other personal information, data, and 
records deemed appropriate by the Secretary. 
(3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en-
hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send 
and receive information to and from the United 
Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners 
for purposes of rapid verification of permanent resi-
dency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals 
as Priority Hong Kong Residents.
1445 
(4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representatives, and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to 
implement the requirements described in this sub-
section. 
(5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in 
this section may be construed to prevent a Priority 
Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status 
under section 207 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum 
under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158). 
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Sec-
retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as 
appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary 
of the House of Representatives, and the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for 
the previous fiscal year— 
(A) the number of Hong Kong SAR resi-
dents who have applied for United States visas
1446 
or immigration benefits, disaggregated by visa 
type or immigration benefit, including asylum, 
refugee status, temporary protected status, and 
lawful permanent residence; 
(B) the number of approvals, denials, or 
rejections of applicants for visas or immigration 
benefits 
described 
in 
subparagraph 
(A), 
disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben-
efit and basis for denial; 
(C) the number of pending refugee and 
asylum applications for Hong Kong SAR resi-
dents, and the length of time and reason for 
which such applications have been pending; and 
(D) other matters determined relevant by 
the Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and 
facilitate the resettlement of refugees and vic-
tims of persecution in Hong Kong. 
(2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and pub-
lished on a text-searchable, publicly available website 
of the Department of State and the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
(h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
ON HONG KONG.—
1447 
(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
(A) to support the people of Hong Kong by 
providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR resi-
dents who are nationals of the PRC following 
the enactment of the Hong Kong National Se-
curity Law that places certain Hong Kong per-
sons at risk of persecution; and 
(B) to encourage like-minded nations to 
make similar accommodations for Hong Kong 
people fleeing persecution by the Government of 
the PRC. 
(2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consulta-
tion with the heads of other Federal agencies, as ap-
propriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other 
countries, including the United Kingdom, on cooper-
ative efforts to— 
(A) provide refugee and asylum protections 
for victims of, and individuals with a fear of, 
persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong 
Kong authorities or other authorities acting on 
behalf of the PRC; 
(B) enhance protocols to facilitate the re-
settlement of refugees and displaced persons 
from Hong Kong;
1448 
(C) identify and prevent the exploitation of 
immigration and visa policies and procedures by 
corrupt officials; and 
(D) expedite the sharing of information, as 
appropriate, related to the refusal of individual 
applications for visas or other travel documents 
submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR 
based on— 
(i) 
national 
security 
or 
related 
grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1182(a)(3)); or 
(ii) fraud or misrepresentation under 
section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration 
and 
Nationality 
Act 
(8 
U.S.C. 
1182(a)(6)(C)). 
(3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the heads of other Fed-
eral agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees, the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate 
a report on the plan described in paragraph (2).
1449 
(i) REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF 
HONG KONG.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Aliens described in para-
graph (2) may establish, for purposes of admission 
as a refugee under sections 207 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum 
under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that 
such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion by as-
serting such a fear and a credible basis for concern 
about the possibility of such persecution. 
(2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in 
this subsection if such alien— 
(i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 
and— 
(I) had a significant role in a 
civil society organization supportive of 
the protests in 2019 and 2020 related 
to the Hong Kong National Security 
Law and the encroachment on the au-
tonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC; 
(II) was arrested, charged, de-
tained, or convicted of an offense aris-
1450 
ing from their participation in an ac-
tion as described in section 206(b)(2) 
of the United States-Hong Kong Pol-
icy 
Act 
of 
1992 
(22 
U.S.C. 
5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in 
nature; or 
(III) has had their citizenship, 
nationality, or residency revoked for 
having submitted to any United 
States Government agency a nonfrivo-
lous application for refugee status, 
asylum, or any other immigration ben-
efit under the immigration laws (as 
defined in section 101(a) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101(a))); 
(ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 
spouse or child of an alien described in 
clause (i); or 
(iii) is the parent of an alien described 
in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of 
the PRC and no other foreign state. 
(B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary 
of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, may designate other cat-
1451 
egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a 
well-founded fear of persecution under para-
graph (1) if such aliens share common charac-
teristics that identify them as targets of perse-
cution in the PRC on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
(C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of 
subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a signifi-
cant role shall include, with respect to the pro-
tests described in such clause— 
(i) an organizing role; 
(ii) a first aid responder; 
(iii) a journalist or member of the 
media covering or offering public com-
mentary; 
(iv) a provider of legal services to one 
or more individuals arrested for partici-
pating in such protests; or 
(v) a participant who during the pe-
riod beginning on June 9, 2019, and end-
ing on June 30, 2020, was arrested, 
charged, detained, or convicted as a result 
of such participation.
1452 
(3) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of 
this subsection, a determination of whether an alien 
is a child shall be made using the age of the alien 
on the date an application for refugee or asylum sta-
tus in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
(4) EXCLUSION
FROM
NUMERICAL
LIMITA-
TIONS.—Aliens provided refugee status under this 
subsection shall not be counted against the numer-
ical limitation on refugees established in accordance 
with the procedures described in section 207 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157). 
(5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representatives, and the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the 
matters described in subparagraph (B). 
(B) MATTERS
TO
BE
INCLUDED.—Each 
report required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
1453 
clude, with respect to applications submitted 
under this section— 
(i) the total number of refugee and 
asylum applications that are pending at 
the end of the reporting period; 
(ii) the average wait-times for all ap-
plicants for refugee status or asylum pend-
ing— 
(I) a prescreening interview with 
a resettlement support center; 
(II) an interview with United 
States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services; and 
(III) the completion of security 
checks; 
(iii) the number of approvals, referrals 
including the source of the referral, denials 
of applications for refugee status or asy-
lum, disaggregated by the reason for each 
such denial; and 
(iv) the number of refugee circuit 
rides to interview populations that would 
include Hong Kong SAR completed in the 
last 90 days, and the number planned for 
the subsequent 90-day period.
1454 
(C) FORM.—Each report required by sub-
paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may include a classified annex. 
(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 
State shall make each report submitted under 
this paragraph available to the public on the 
internet website of the Department of State. 
(j) ADMISSION
FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED 
HONG KONG RESIDENTS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c), 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the Secretary of 
State in consultation with the Secretary of Home-
land Security, may provide an alien described in sub-
section (b) with the status of a special immigrant 
under section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the 
alien— 
(A) or an agent acting on behalf of the 
alien, submits a petition for classification under 
section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 
1153(b)(4)); 
(B) is otherwise eligible to receive an im-
migrant visa;
1455 
(C) is otherwise admissible to the United 
States for permanent residence (excluding the 
grounds for inadmissibility specified in section 
212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and 
(D) clears a background check and appro-
priate screening, as determined by the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security. 
(2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 
(A) PRINCIPAL ALIENS.—An alien is de-
scribed in this subsection if— 
(i) the alien— 
(I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resi-
dent; and 
(II) has earned a bachelor’s or 
higher degree from an institution of 
higher education; and 
(ii) the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity determines that such alien’s relocation 
to the United States would provide a sig-
nificant benefit to the United States. 
(B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is 
described in this subsection if the alien is the 
spouse or child of a principal alien described in 
paragraph (1). 
(3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.—
1456 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The total number of 
principal aliens who may be provided special 
immigrant status under this section may not 
exceed 5,000 per year for each of the five fiscal 
years beginning after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity may, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individ-
uals with a bachelor’s or higher degree in 
science, technology, engineering, mathematics, 
medicine, or health care. 
(B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA-
TIONS.—Aliens 
provided 
immigrant 
status 
under this section shall not be counted against 
any numerical limitation under section 201, 
202, 203, or 207 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 
1157). 
(4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER 
CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the op-
portunity to apply for admission under this section 
solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate 
relative or is eligible for any other immigrant classi-
fication.
1457 
(5) TIMELINE
FOR
PROCESSING
APPLICA-
TIONS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
ensure that all steps under the control of the 
United States Government incidental to the ap-
proval of such applications, including required 
screenings and background checks, are com-
pleted not later than one year after the date on 
which an eligible applicant submits an applica-
tion under subsection (a). 
(B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding para-
graph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may 
take additional time to process applications de-
scribed in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of na-
tional security concerns requires such additional 
time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has 
determined that the applicant meets the re-
quirements for status as a special immigrant 
under this section and has so notified the appli-
cant. 
(k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 
30300(f) of this Act, this section shall cease to have effect
1458 
on the date that is five years after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act. 
SEC. 30304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO 
THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE. 
Section 3 of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to prohibit the 
commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong 
Kong Police Force’’, approved November 27, 2019 (Public 
Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking ‘‘on 
December 31, 2021.’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘on the 
date on which the President certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees that— 
‘‘(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the 
date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified 
under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong 
Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treat-
ment under United States law in the same manner 
as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong 
before July 1, 1997; 
‘‘(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in 
gross violations of human rights during the 1-year 
period ending on the date of such certification; and 
‘‘(3) there has been an independent examina-
tion of human rights concerns related to the crowd 
control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
1459 
tive Region has adequately addressed those con-
cerns.’’. 
SEC. 30305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF 
UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES 
IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE-
GION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The Uyghurs are one of several predomi-
nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north-
west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
(2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and un-
rest in 2009 and clashes with government security 
personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent 
years, PRC leaders sought to ‘‘stabilize’’ the XUAR 
through large-scale arrests and extreme security 
measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged 
terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic sepa-
ratism. 
(3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ‘‘Strike 
Hard Against Violent Extremism’’ campaign, which 
placed further restrictions on and facilitated addi-
tional human rights violations against minorities in 
the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
1460 
(4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, 
known for overseeing intensifying security operations 
and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed 
as Party Secretary of the XUAR. 
(5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have 
sought to forcibly ‘‘assimilate’’ Uyghurs and other 
Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol-
icy of cultural erasure known as ‘‘Sinicization’’. 
(6) Since 2018, credible reporting including 
from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times 
has shown that the Government of the PRC has 
built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it 
calls ‘‘vocational training’’ centers, and detained 
Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facili-
ties. 
(7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi-
trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs— 
12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu-
lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of 
other ethnic minorities in the ‘‘vocational training’’ 
centers and other detention and pre-detention facili-
ties.
1461 
(8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than 
two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 
percent of all arrests in China. 
(9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other 
sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re-
nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs 
and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and iden-
tity. 
(10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch 
and other human rights organizations have docu-
mented how detainees are subject to political indoc-
trination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary con-
ditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both 
medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, 
food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, 
and torture. 
(11) Research by the Australian Strategic Pol-
icy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many 
detainees have been placed in higher security facili-
ties and convicted of formal crimes. 
(12) Human Rights Watch has reported that 
the PRC uses data collection programs, including fa-
cial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the 
XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities 
may detain.
1462 
(13) PRC authorities have placed countless 
children whose parents are detained or in exile in 
state-run institutions and boarding schools without 
the consent of their parents. 
(14) New York Times reporting revealed that 
numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with 
the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired 
and imprisoned. 
(15) Associated Press reporting documented 
widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities 
to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to 
subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening 
to detain those who do not comply. 
(16) PRC authorities prohibit family members 
and advocates inside and outside China from having 
regular communications with relatives and friends 
imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en-
trepreneur Ekpar Asat. 
(17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive 
restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the 
XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as-
serts the PRC ‘‘has effectively outlawed the practice 
of Islam’’. 
(18) Individuals who are not detained in camps 
have been forced to attend political indoctrination
1463 
sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass 
surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data col-
lection, and other human rights abuses. 
(19) International media, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have 
reported on the systemic nature of many of these 
abuses. 
(20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde-
pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed 
alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights 
record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and 
called on the international community ‘‘to act collec-
tively and decisively to ensure China respects human 
rights and abides by its international obligations’’. 
(21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations 
member countries issued a public statement con-
demning human rights violations by PRC authorities 
and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered 
access to Xinjiang. 
(22) The United States Congress passed the 
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public 
Law 116–145). 
(23) The United States Congress passed the 
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act
1464 
(subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 
U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction 
PRC officials and entities for their activities in the 
XUAR. 
(24) The United States Government has imple-
mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with 
Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions 
on PRC officials and entities for their activities in 
the XUAR. 
(25) The United States Government has docu-
mented human rights abuses and violations of indi-
vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 
Department of State Report on International Reli-
gious Freedom. 
(26) On January 19, 2021, during his con-
firmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony 
Blinken testified that ‘‘forcing men, women, and 
children into concentration camps, trying to in effect 
reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Com-
munist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to 
commit genocide’’. 
(27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the 
Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation 
hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of ‘‘hor-
rendous human rights abuses’’.
1465 
(28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a 
question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Sec-
retary Blinken stated that his ‘‘judgement remains 
that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs’’. 
(29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques-
tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, ‘‘We’ve 
been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno-
cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and 
we’ll continue to make that clear.’’. 
(30) The 2020 Department of State Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states 
that ‘‘[g]enocide and crimes against humanity oc-
curred during the year against the predominantly 
Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious mi-
nority groups in Xinjiang’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the atrocities committed by the PRC 
against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim 
Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, 
sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 in-
dividuals, and other horrific abuses must be con-
demned;
1466 
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and 
the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
tions should speak publicly about the ongoing 
human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in for-
mal speeches at the United Nations and other inter-
national fora; 
(3) the President, the Secretary of State, and 
the United States Ambassador to the United Na-
tions should appeal to the United Nations Secretary- 
General to take a more proactive and public stance 
on the situation in the XUAR, including by sup-
porting calls for an investigation and accountability 
for individuals and entities involved in abuses 
against the people of the XUAR; 
(4) the United States should continue to use 
targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available 
to hold those responsible for the atrocities in 
Xinjiang to account; 
(5) United States agencies engaged with China 
on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues 
should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as 
a consideration in developing United States policy; 
(6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia 
Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in
1467 
the world independent of Chinese government influ-
ence; and 
(7) the United States recognizes the repeated 
requests from the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights for unfettered access to 
the XUAR and the PRC’s refusal to comply, and 
therefore— 
(A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered 
access by the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR; 
(B) the United States should urge collabo-
rative action between the United States Govern-
ment and international partners to pressure 
PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to 
the XUAR; 
(C) the President, the Secretary of State, 
and the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations should simultaneously outline a 
strategy to investigate the human rights abuses 
and crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, 
collect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a 
competent court; and 
(D) United States partners and allies 
should undertake similar strategies in an effort 
to build an international investigation outside of
1468 
the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with 
a United Nations investigation in the XUAR. 
SEC. 30306. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act’’. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic 
Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particu-
larly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (commonly referred to as ‘‘Xinjiang’’ or 
‘‘XUAR’’), also known as East Turkestan. Central 
and regional PRC government policies have system-
atically discriminated against these minority groups 
by denying them a range of civil and political rights, 
particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) officials bear direct respon-
sibility for these gross human rights violations. 
(2) PRC government abuses include the arbi-
trary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, 
ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Mus-
lim minority groups, separation of working age 
adults from their children and elderly parents, and 
the integration of forced labor into supply chains.
1469 
Those held in detention facilities and internment 
camps in the XUAR have described forced political 
indoctrination, torture, beatings, food deprivation, 
sexual assault, coordinated campaigns to reduce 
birth rates among Uyghurs and other Turkic Mus-
lims through forced sterilization, and denial of reli-
gious, cultural, and linguistic freedoms. Recent 
media reports indicate that since 2019, the PRC 
government has newly constructed, expanded, or for-
tified at least 60 detention facilities with higher se-
curity or prison-like features in Xinjiang. 
(3) The PRC government’s actions against 
Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 
other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR violate 
international human rights laws and norms, includ-
ing— 
(A) the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, to which the PRC has acceded; 
(B) the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, which the PRC has signed and 
ratified;
1470 
(C) the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which 
the PRC has signed and ratified; 
(D) the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; 
and 
(E) the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Labor Organiza-
tion’s Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the 
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 
105). 
(c) REFUGEE PROTECTIONS
FOR CERTAIN RESI-
DENTS OF THE XUAR.— 
(1) POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN 
CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall des-
ignate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humani-
tarian concern— 
(A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC 
and residents of the XUAR on January 1, 
2021; 
(B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 
30, 2009, and reside in other provinces of the 
PRC or in a third country where such alien is 
not firmly resettled; and
1471 
(C) the spouses, children, and parents (as 
such terms are defined in subsections (a) and 
(b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except 
that a child shall be an unmarried person under 
27 years of age. 
(2) PROCESSING
OF
XUAR
REFUGEES.—The 
processing of individuals described in paragraph (1) 
for classification as refugees may occur in the PRC 
or a third country. 
(3) ELIGIBILITY
FOR
ADMISSION
AS
A
REF-
UGEE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in sub-
paragraph (B) may establish, for purposes of 
admission as a refugee under section 207 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well- 
founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion by asserting 
such a fear and asserting a credible basis for 
concern about the possibility of such persecu-
tion.
1472 
(B) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is de-
scribed in this subsection if such alien has been 
identified as a person of special humanitarian 
concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and— 
(i) has experienced persecution in the 
XUAR by the PRC government, includ-
ing— 
(I) forced and arbitrary detention 
including in an internment or re-edu-
cation camp; 
(II) forced political indoctrina-
tion, torture, beatings, food depriva-
tion, and denial of religious, cultural, 
and linguistic freedoms; 
(III) forced labor; 
(IV) forced separation from fam-
ily members; 
(V) other forms of systemic 
threats, harassment, and gross human 
rights violations; or 
(VI) has been formally charged, 
detained, or convicted on account of 
their peaceful actions as described in 
the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 
of 2020 (Public Law 116–145);
1473 
(ii) is currently a national of the PRC 
whose residency in the XUAR, or any 
other area within the jurisdiction of the 
PRC, was revoked for having submitted to 
any United States Government agency a 
nonfrivolous application for refugee status, 
asylum, or any other immigration benefit 
under United States law. 
(C) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER 
OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be 
denied the opportunity to apply for admission 
as a refugee or asylum under this section solely 
because such alien qualifies as an immediate 
relative of a national of the United States or is 
eligible for admission to the United States 
under any other immigrant classification. 
(4) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall 
prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries 
hosting former residents of the XUAR and who face 
significant diplomatic pressures from the PRC gov-
ernment. 
(5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act 
and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of
1474 
State and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the House of Representatives, and the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
on the matters described in subparagraph (B). 
(B) MATTERS
TO
BE
INCLUDED.—Each 
report required by subparagraph (A) shall in-
clude, with respect to applications submitted 
under this section— 
(i) the total number of applications 
that are pending at the end of the report-
ing period; 
(ii) the average wait-times and num-
ber of applicants who are currently pend-
ing— 
(I) a pre-screening interview with 
a resettlement support center; 
(II) an interview with United 
States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services; 
(III) the completion of security 
checks; 
(IV) receipt of a final decision 
after completion of an interview with
1475 
United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services; and 
(iii) the number of denials of applica-
tions for refugee status, disaggregated by 
the reason for each such denial. 
(C) FORM.—Each report required by para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex. 
(D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 
State shall make each report submitted under 
this subsection available to the public on the 
internet website of the Department of State. 
(6) EXEMPTION
FROM
NUMERICAL
LIMITA-
TIONS.—The numerical limitations established in ac-
cordance with section 207 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) in any fiscal year 
shall not apply to aliens seeking refugee status pur-
suant to such section who are nationals of the PRC 
and residents of the XUAR. 
(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING AL-
LIES AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODA-
TIONS.—It is the policy of the United States to encourage 
United States allies and partners to make accommoda-
tions similar to the accommodations made in this section
1476 
for residents of the XUAR who are fleeing oppression by 
the PRC Government. 
(e) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on 
the date that is ten years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
SEC. 30307. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COM-
MIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 
The President shall direct the Permanent Represent-
ative of the United States to the United Nations to use 
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to— 
(1) reform the process for removing Member 
States of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
that commit gross and systemic violations of human 
rights, including— 
(A) lowering the threshold vote at the 
United Nations General Assembly for removal 
to a simple majority; 
(B) ensuring information detailing the 
Member State’s human rights record is publicly 
available before the vote on removal; and 
(C) making the vote of each country on the 
removal from the United Nations Human 
Rights Council publicly available;
1477 
(2) remove Israel as a permanent agenda item 
and to bring an end to the ‘‘Commission of Inquiry’’ 
to investigate the State of Israel; 
(3) reform the rules on electing members to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure 
United Nations Member States that have committed 
gross and systemic violations of human rights are 
not elected to the Human Rights Council; and 
(4) oppose the election to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council of any United Nations Mem-
ber State— 
(A) currently designated as a country en-
gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of internationally recognized human rights pur-
suant to section 116 or section 502B of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151n or 2304); 
(B) the government of which the Secretary 
of State currently determines has repeatedly 
provided support for international terrorism 
pursuant to— 
(i) section 1754(c) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019;
1478 
(ii) section 620A of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371); 
(iii) section 40 of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or 
(iv) any other provision of law; 
(C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun-
try under the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 
(D) the government of which is identified 
on the list published by the Secretary of State 
pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers 
Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) 
as a government that recruits and uses child 
soldiers; or 
(E) the government of which the United 
States determines to have committed genocide 
or crimes against humanity. 
SEC. 30308. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET. 
(a) RANK
OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI-
NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Ti-
betan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amend-
ed— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), 
and (e), as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respec-
tively; and
1479 
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
lowing new subsection: 
‘‘(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be 
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank 
of Under Secretary of State or higher.’’. 
(b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN 
BEIJING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the 
United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic 
of China (PRC). 
(2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established 
under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as 
the Government of the PRC permits— 
(A) the United States Consulate General 
in Chengdu, PRC, to reopen; or 
(B) a United States Consulate General in 
Lhasa, Tibet, to open. 
(3) STAFF.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall— 
(i) assign not fewer than two United 
States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet 
Unit established under paragraph (1); and
1480 
(ii) hire not fewer than one locally en-
gaged staff member for such unit. 
(B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary 
shall make Tibetan language training available 
to the personnel assigned under subparagraph 
(A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 
2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note). 
SEC. 30309. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN-
CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS. 
(a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 
the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di-
vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 
(Public Law 116–260), that any ‘‘interference by the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China or any other 
government in the process of recognizing a successor or 
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future 
Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right 
to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan 
people’’. 
(b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec-
retary of State should engage with United States allies 
and partners to—
1481 
(1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ 
sole religious authority to identify and install the 
15th Dalai Lama; 
(2) oppose claims by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has 
the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 
15th Dalai Lama; and 
(3) reject interference by the Government of the 
PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists. 
SEC. 30310. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTER-
NET FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR-
CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF 
HONG KONG. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint 
Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and free-
doms of the people of Hong Kong. 
(2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s 
Congress passed a ‘‘National Security Law’’ that 
further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables 
authorities to suppress dissent. 
(3) The Government of the PRC continues to 
utilize the National Security Law to undermine the
1482 
fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people 
through suppression of the freedom of speech, as-
sembly, religion, and the press. 
(4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au-
thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of 
internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded 
police powers to force internet service providers to 
censor content, hand over user information, and 
block access to platforms. 
(5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong 
Broadband Network blocked public access to HK 
Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view-
points, under the authorities of the National Secu-
rity Law. 
(6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro-
viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional 
Justice Commission website in Hong Kong. 
(7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, 
Twitter, WhatsApp and Google, have stopped review-
ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori-
ties. 
(8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy 
activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged 
under the National Security Law on the charge of 
‘‘conspiracy to commit subversion’’.
1483 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should— 
(1) support the ability of the people of Hong 
Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa-
tion online; and 
(2) focus on investments in technologies that 
facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in 
Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the 
Chinese Communist Party— 
(A) to suppress internet access; 
(B) to increase online censorship; or 
(C) to inhibit online communication and 
content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong. 
(c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.— 
(1) WORKING GROUP.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 
is authorized to establish a working group to 
develop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency 
and online access in Hong Kong. 
(B) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group 
under subparagraph (A) shall consist of— 
(i) the Under Secretary of State for 
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human 
Rights;
1484 
(ii) the Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 
(iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media 
and the President of the Open Technology 
Fund of the Agency; and 
(iv) the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Develop-
ment. 
(2) HONG
KONG
INTERNET
FREEDOM
PRO-
GRAMS.— 
(A) DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE.—The Sec-
retary of State shall establish a Hong Kong 
Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the 
Department of State. 
(B) 
OPEN
TECHNOLOGY
FUND.—The 
President of the Open Technology Fund of the 
United States Agency for Global Media is au-
thorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet 
Freedom Program. 
(C) OPERATION.—The Programs referred 
to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate 
independently, but in strategic coordination 
with other entities in the working group under
1485 
paragraph (1). The Open Technology Fund 
shall remain independent from Department of 
State direction in its implementation of the 
Program of such Fund, and any other internet 
freedom programs. 
(3) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin-
ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 
ending on September 30, 2023, the Hong Kong 
Internet Freedom Programs described in paragraph 
(2) shall be carried out independently from any 
other internet freedom programs relating to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China carried out by the Depart-
ment of State or the Open Technology Fund of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, as the case 
may be, in order that such Hong Kong Internet 
Freedom Programs may focus on supporting lib-
erties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong. 
(4) CONSOLIDATION
OF
DEPARTMENT
OF 
STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, 
the Secretary of State may— 
(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet 
Freedom Program of the Department of State 
with any other internet freedom programs relat-
ing to the People’s Republic of China carried
1486 
out by the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor; or 
(B) continue to carry out the Program in 
accordance with paragraph (3). 
(5) CONSOLIDATION
OF
OPEN
TECHNOLOGY 
FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, 
the President of the Open Technology Fund of the 
United States Agency for Global Media may— 
(A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet 
Freedom Program of the Fund with any other 
internet freedom programs relating to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China carried out by the 
Fund; or 
(B) continue to carry out the Program in 
accordance with paragraph (3). 
(d) SUPPORT
FOR
INTERNET
FREEDOM
TECH-
NOLOGY PROGRAMS.— 
(1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, 
working through the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor, and President of 
the Open Technology Fund of the United 
States Agency for Global Media, are each sepa-
rately and independently authorized to award 
grants and contracts to private organizations to
1487 
support and develop programs in Hong Kong 
that promote or expand— 
(i) an open, interoperable, reliable and 
secure internet; and 
(ii) the online exercise of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indi-
vidual citizens, activists, human rights de-
fenders, independent journalists, civil soci-
ety organizations, and marginalized popu-
lations in Hong Kong. 
(B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs 
developed pursuant to grants awarded pursuant 
to subparagraph (A) should be— 
(i) to make the internet available in 
Hong Kong; 
(ii) to increase the number of the 
tools in the technology portfolio; 
(iii) to promote the availability of such 
technologies and tools in Hong Kong; 
(iv) to encourage the adoption of such 
technologies and tools by the people of 
Hong Kong; 
(v) to scale up the distribution of such 
technologies and tools throughout Hong 
Kong;
1488 
(vi) to prioritize the development of 
tools, components, code, and technologies 
that are fully open-source, to the extent 
practicable; 
(vii) to conduct research on repressive 
tactics that undermine internet freedom in 
Hong Kong; 
(viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 
and support is available to repressed indi-
vidual citizens, human rights defenders, 
independent journalists, civil society orga-
nizations and marginalized populations in 
Hong Kong; and 
(ix) to engage United States private 
industry, including e-commerce firms and 
social networking companies, on the impor-
tance of preserving internet access in Hong 
Kong. 
(C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants awarded 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be distrib-
uted to multiple vendors and suppliers through 
an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based 
decision process— 
(i) to diversify the technical base; and
1489 
(ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by 
bad actors. 
(D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies 
developed using grants awarded pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall undergo comprehensive 
security audits to ensure such technologies are 
secure and have not been compromised in a 
manner detrimental to the interests of the 
United States or to individuals or organizations 
benefitting from programs supported by the 
Open Technology Fund. 
(2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State 
is authorized to expend funds made available to the 
Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the De-
partment of State for each of fiscal years 2022 and 
2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by 
any entity in the working group established under 
subsection (c)(1). 
(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addi-
tion to the funds authorized to be expended 
pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized 
to be appropriated to the Open Technology 
Fund of the United States Agency for Global
1490 
Media $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
and 2023 for grants to carry out this sub-
section. Such amounts are in addition to any 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the 
Open Technology Fund under section 1299P of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283). 
(B) BUREAU
OF
DEMOCRACY, 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds 
authorized to be expended pursuant to para-
graph (2), there are authorized to be appro-
priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro-
grams of the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor of the Department of State 
$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 
2023 to carry out this subsection. 
(C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts authorized 
to be appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs 
(A) and (B) shall remain available until ex-
pended. 
(e) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State and the working group under sub-
section (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a classified report that—
1491 
(1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to 
bolster and increase the availability of Great Fire-
wall circumvention and internet freedom technology 
in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022; 
(2) outlines a plan for— 
(A) supporting the preservation of an 
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet 
in Hong Kong; 
(B) increasing the supply of the technology 
referred to in paragraph (1); 
(C) accelerating the dissemination of such 
technology; 
(D) promoting the availability of internet 
freedom in Hong Kong; 
(E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 
existing relevant portfolios for further use in 
the unique context of Hong Kong; 
(F) expanding the portfolio of tools in 
order to diversify and strengthen the effective-
ness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts; 
(G) providing training for high-risk groups 
and individuals in Hong Kong; and 
(H) detecting analyzing, and responding to 
new and evolving censorship threats;
1492 
(3) includes a detailed description of the tech-
nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement 
the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in-
cluding an analysis of the market conditions in 
Hong Kong; 
(4) describes the Federal Government’s plans 
for awarding grants to private organizations for the 
purposes described in subsection (d)(1)(A); 
(5) outlines the working group’s consultations 
regarding the implementation of this section to en-
sure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well co-
ordinated; and 
(6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy 
to influence global internet legal standards at inter-
national organizations and multilateral fora. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Appropriations, and the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Perma-
1493 
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
(2) JOINT
DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint 
Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. 
SEC. 30311. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appro-
priated or otherwise made available to carry out section 
409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public 
Law 115–409) should include programs that prioritize the 
protection and advancement of the freedoms of associa-
tion, assembly, religion, and expression for women, human 
rights activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
(b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursu-
ant to section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
of 2019 (Public Law 115–409) may be used to fund non-
governmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that 
are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
1494 
(c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out 
this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, 
Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appro-
priate congressional committees and representatives of 
civil society regarding— 
(1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza-
tions referred to in subsection (b); 
(2) protecting members of the groups referred 
to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for ar-
rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor-
tions, forced labor, or intimidation, including mem-
bers residing outside of the PRC; and 
(3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos-
sible audiences within the PRC about United States 
Government efforts to protect freedom of associa-
tion, expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic 
minorities. 
SEC. 30312. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF 
SANCTIONS 
WITH 
RESPECT 
TO 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 1262 of the Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F 
of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 
is amended by striking paragraph (2).
1495 
(b) 
SENSE
OF
CONGRESS.—(1) 
The 
Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F 
of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 
is amended by inserting after section 1262 the following 
new section: 
‘‘SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
‘‘It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
establish and regularize information sharing and sanc-
tions-related decision making with like-minded govern-
ments possessing human rights and anti-corruption sanc-
tions programs similar in nature to those authorized under 
this subtitle.’’; and 
(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title 
XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each 
amended by inserting after the items relating to section 
1262 the following: 
‘‘Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.’’. 
(c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 
1263 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Ac-
countability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public 
Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to 
read as follows: 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the 
sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
1496 
foreign person that the President determines, based on 
credible information— 
‘‘(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has di-
rectly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights 
abuse or any violation of internationally recognized 
human rights; 
‘‘(2) is a current or former government official, 
or a person acting for or on behalf of such an offi-
cial, who is responsible for or complicit in, or has di-
rectly or indirectly engaged in— 
‘‘(A) corruption; or 
‘‘(B) the transfer or facilitation of the 
transfer of the proceeds of corruption; 
‘‘(3) is or has been a leader or official of— 
‘‘(A) an entity, including a government en-
tity, that has engaged in, or whose members 
have engaged in, any of the activities described 
in subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the ten-
ure of the leader or official; or 
‘‘(B) an entity whose property and inter-
ests in property are blocked pursuant to this 
section as a result of activities related to the 
tenure of the leader or official;
1497 
‘‘(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-
vided financial, material, or technological support 
for, or goods or services to or in support of— 
‘‘(A) an activity described in subparagraph 
(A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign per-
son; 
‘‘(B) a person whose property and inter-
ests in property are blocked pursuant to this 
section; or 
‘‘(C) an entity, including a government en-
tity, that has engaged in, or whose members 
have engaged in, an activity described in sub-
paragraph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign 
person; or 
‘‘(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is 
purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indi-
rectly, a person whose property and interests in 
property are blocked pursuant to this section.’’. 
(2) CONSIDERATION
OF
CERTAIN
INFORMA-
TION.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended 
by inserting ‘‘corruption and’’ after ‘‘monitor’’. 
(3) REQUESTS BY CONGRESS.—Subsection (d) 
of such section is amended—
1498 
(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter pre-
ceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘sub-
section (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a)(1)’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2)— 
(i) in subparagraph (A)— 
(I) in the subparagraph heading, 
by striking ‘‘HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA-
TIONS’’ 
and 
inserting 
‘‘SERIOUS 
HUMAN
RIGHTS
ABUSE
OR
VIOLA-
TIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOG-
NIZED HUMAN RIGHTS’’; and 
(II) by striking ‘‘described in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection 
(a)’’ and inserting ‘‘described in sub-
section (a)(1) relating to serious 
human rights abuse or any violation 
of internationally recognized human 
rights’’; and 
(ii) in subparagraph (B)— 
(I) in the matter preceding clause 
(i), by striking ‘‘described in para-
graph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)’’ 
and inserting ‘‘described in subsection 
(a)(1) relating to corruption or the
1499 
transfer or facilitation of the transfer 
of the proceeds of corruption’’; and 
(II) by striking ‘‘ranking member 
of’’ and all that follows through the 
period at the end and inserting ‘‘rank-
ing member of one of the appropriate 
congressional committees.’’. 
(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 1264(a) of the 
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub-
title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 
2656 note) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and 
inserting a semicolon; 
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ‘‘;’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(7) a description of additional steps taken by 
the President through diplomacy, international en-
gagement, and assistance to foreign or security sec-
tors to address persistent underlying causes of seri-
ous human rights abuse, violations of internationally 
recognized human rights, and corruption in each 
country in which foreign persons with respect to 
which sanctions have been imposed under section 
1263 are located; and
1500 
‘‘(8) a description of additional steps taken by 
the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial ac-
countability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect 
to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under 
section 1263 for serious human rights abuse, viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights, 
and corruption.’’. 
(e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—(1) Section 1265 of the 
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub-
title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 
2656 note) is repealed. 
(2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title 
XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each 
amended by striking the items relating to section 1265. 
SEC. 30313. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN 
RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pan-
demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and 
those of Asian descent have risen dramatically 
worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary 
General Antonio Guterres said ‘‘the pandemic con-
tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
1501 
scapegoating and scare-mongering’’ and urged gov-
ernments to ‘‘act now to strengthen the immunity of 
our societies against the virus of hate’’. 
(2) Over 2 million Asian Americans and Pacific 
Islanders are working on the front lines of the 
COVID–19 pandemic in healthcare, law enforce-
ment, 
first 
responders, 
transportation, 
super-
markets, and other service industries. AAPI workers 
also make up a large share—between 6 percent and 
12 percent based on sector—of the bio medical field. 
(3) The United States Census Bureau notes 
that Americans of Asian descent made up 7.2 per-
cent of the population according to the 2020 decen-
nial census, and that Asian Americans are the fast-
est-growing racial group in the United States, pro-
jected to represent 14 percent of the United States 
population by 2065. 
(4) Since January 2020, there has been a dra-
matic increase in reports of hate crimes and inci-
dents against those of Asian descent. 
(5) According to reports, there are over 10,000 
reported cases of anti-Asian American hate incidents 
and discrimination related to COVID–19 between 
March 19, 2020 and September 30, 2021.
1502 
(6) Local police departments are reporting an 
exponential increase in anti-Asian hate incidents and 
crimes. The New York Police Department reported 
a 343 percent spike in anti-Asian crime in 2021 
from 2020, and the San Francisco Police Depart-
ment reported anti-AAPI hate crimes increased by 
567 percent from 2020 to 2021. 
(7) Multiple incidents of anti-Asian violence oc-
curred since March 2020, including a woman wear-
ing a mask who was kicked and punched at a New 
York City subway station, two children and two 
adults were stabbed at a wholesale grocery store in 
Midland, Texas, a couple was assaulted and robbed 
by a group of attackers in Philadelphia, and a 16- 
year-old boy was sent to the hospital after being at-
tacked by bullies in Los Angeles, California. 
(8) Anti-Asian discrimination and hate since 
the start of the COVID–19 outbreak has continued 
throughout the pandemic. 
(9) Since the start of 2021, there has been a 
surge in anti-Asian attacks targeting predominately 
elderly Asian Americans. 
(10) On January 30, 2021, an 84-year-old Thai 
man, Vicha Ratanapakdee, died from injuries sus-
1503 
tained from an unprovoked assault while on his rou-
tine morning walk in San Francisco, California. 
(11) In January 2021, a series of attacks oc-
curred in Oakland’s Chinatown targeting Asian 
American seniors, the victims included a 91-year-old 
man, a 60-year-old man, and a 55-year-old woman, 
who were all violently shoved to the ground in three 
separate incidents. 
(12) In February 2021, victims of anti-Asian 
violence included a 61-year-old Filipino man who 
was attacked and slashed across his face on a New 
York City subway, a Filipino woman in her 80s who 
was punched in an unprovoked attack while riding a 
trolley in San Diego, and a 52-year-old Asian 
woman who was attacked and forcefully shoved while 
waiting in line outside of a bakery in Flushing, New 
York. 
(13) In December 2021, a 61-year-old Chinese 
man, Yao Pan Ma, died from injuries sustained from 
an unprovoked assault in April of 2021 in New York 
City. 
(14) Anti-Asian racism has also resulted in 
Asian American businesses being targeted for van-
dalism.
1504 
(15) There are approximately 2 million Asian 
American-owned businesses that generate over $700 
billion in annual revenue and employ millions of 
workers. 
(16) More than 1,900,000 Asian American and 
Pacific Islander older adults, particularly those older 
adults who are recent immigrants or have limited 
English proficiency, may face even greater chal-
lenges in dealing with the COVID–19 pandemic, in-
cluding discrimination, economic insecurity, and lan-
guage isolation. 
(17) The World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) recognize that naming COVID–19 by its geo-
graphic location or linking it to a specific ethnicity 
perpetuates stigma. 
(18) In 2015, the WHO issued guidance calling 
on media outlets, scientists, and national authorities 
to avoid naming infectious diseases for locations to 
avoid stigmatizing groups of people. 
(19) On February 27, 2020, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services stated, ‘‘ethnicity is not 
what causes the novel coronavirus’’ and that it is in-
appropriate and inaccurate to call COVID–19 the 
‘‘Chinese virus’’.