IA
103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. J. RES. 292
To approve and encourage the use by the President of any means necessary
and appropriate, including diplomacy, economic sanctions, a blockade,
and military force, to prevent the development, acquisition, or use by
North Korea of a nuclear explosive device.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 15, 1993
Mr. GILMAN (for himself, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. HYDE) intro-
duced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs
JOINT RESOLUTION
To approve and encourage the use by the President of any
means necessary and appropriate, including diplomacy,
economic sanctions, a blockade, and military force, to
prevent the development, acquisition, or use by North
Korea of a nuclear explosive device.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear
Nonproliferation in Korea Resolution’’.
SEC. 2. NORTH KOREA’S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NU-
CLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(in this joint resolution referred to as ‘‘North
Korea’’) has for over a decade pursued a program
aimed at the development of a nuclear explosive de-
vice.
(2) Director of Central Intelligence R. James
Woolsey has testified before the Congress that North
Korea is the most urgent threat to United States
national security in East Asia, that there is a real
possibility that North Korea has produced enough
nuclear material to build at least 1 nuclear explosive
device, and that possession by North Korea of such
a device would threaten United States allies in all of
Asia as well as United States forces in the region.
(3) On December 12, 1985, North Korea be-
came a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
(4) On December 30, 1991, North Korea and
the 
Republic 
of 
Korea 
reached 
a 
bilateral
denuclearization agreement forbidding the produc-
•HJ 292 IH
tion, possession, or deployment of nuclear weapons,
reprocessing facilities, and uranium enrichment fa-
cilities on the Korean Peninsula.
(5) Although the bilateral denuclearization
agreement between North Korea and the Republic of
Korea provided for bilateral inspections of nuclear
facilities, North Korea has refused to permit any in-
spections pursuant to that agreement.
(6) In belated compliance with its obligations
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, North Korea concluded a Fullscope
Safeguards Agreement with the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency on January 30, 1992. This agree-
ment permits the International Atomic Energy
Agency to conduct both regular and special inspec-
tions of nuclear sites in North Korea in order to ver-
ify compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons.
(7) While conducting inspections pursuant to
the Fullscope Safeguards Agreement in 1992, the
International Atomic Energy Agency uncovered evi-
dence that North Korea has produced more weap-
ons-grade nuclear material than it has reported to
the International Atomic Energy Agency.
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(8) As part of its investigation of this matter,
the International Atomic Energy Agency requested
special inspections of two suspected nuclear sites on
February 16, 1993.
(9) In order to avoid International Atomic En-
ergy Agency inspection of these sites, North Korea
on March 12, 1993, announced its intention to with-
draw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons.
(10) The United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 825 on May 11, 1993, which
called upon North Korea to retract its decision to
withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and fully honor its obligations
under that treaty and the Fullscope Safeguards
Agreement. Resolution 825 also urged all member
states of the United Nations to encourage North
Korea to respond positively to the Security Council’s
action and to take all appropriate steps vis-a-vis the
North Korean government to facilitate resolution of
the matter.
(11) As urged by Resolution 825, the United
States has held a series of meetings with representa-
tives of the North Korean government.
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(12) In the context of these meetings, North
Korea agreed on June 11, 1993, to suspend its an-
nouncement of withdrawal from the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to hold
‘‘serious discussions’’ with the International Atomic
Energy Agency regarding the resumption of inspec-
tions pursuant to the Fullscope Safeguards Agree-
ment, and with the Republic of Korea regarding im-
plementation of the bilateral denuclearization agree-
ment.
(13) North Korea’s discussions with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency since June 11,
1993, have not resulted in agreement regarding the
resumption of inspections, and discussions with the
Republic of Korea have not resulted in agreement
regarding 
implementation 
of 
the 
bilateral
denuclearization agreement.
(14) In the absence of agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, no inspections
are taking place at the two North Korean nuclear
facilities that were the subject of the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s special inspections request
of February 16, 1993, and North Korea is, as a
practical matter, free to pursue the development of
a nuclear explosive device.
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(15) The current leadership of North Korea
has, during the more than 45 years that it has been
in power, compiled a record of aggression and law-
lessness, including not only its invasion of the Re-
public of Korea in 1950 triggering the Korean War,
but also countless acts of infiltration and subversion
in the Republic of Korea and international terrorism
beyond the Korean Peninsula.
(16) Particularly in view of this history, the de-
velopment or acquisition by North Korea of a nu-
clear explosive device would threaten international
peace and security in Asia, not least by requiring
Japan and the Republic of Korea to consider devel-
oping or acquiring nuclear devices of their own.
(17) The United States is committed to the de-
fense of the Republic of Korea pursuant to the Unit-
ed States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1954, and continues to station approximately
37,000 members of the United States Armed Forces
in the Republic of Korea.
(18) In view of the risks that would be associ-
ated with development or acquisition by North
Korea of a nuclear explosive device, President Clin-
ton on July 11, 1993, warned that any use by North
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Korea of such a device would be met by decisive
United States retaliation.
SEC. 3. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The Congress finds and declares the following:
(1) Self-defense is an inherent right of nations
under international law. This right was reaffirmed
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
which states ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.’’.
(2) President Kennedy’s statement on October
22, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, succinctly
explains why the term ‘‘armed attack’’ must be con-
strued broadly with respect to nuclear weapons:
‘‘We no longer live in a world where only the
actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient
challenge to a nation’s security to constitute
maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so de-
structive and ballistic missiles are so swift that
any substantially increased possibility of their
use or any sudden change in their deployment