H. R. 3127
One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 
the third day of January, two thousand and six 
An Act 
To impose sanctions against individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, to support measures for the protection of civilians 
and humanitarian operations, and to support peace efforts in the Darfur region 
of Sudan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Darfur Peace 
and Accountability Act of 2006’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act 
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Definitions. 
Sec. 3. Findings. 
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 5. Sanctions in support of peace in Darfur. 
Sec. 6. Additional authorities to deter and suppress genocide in Darfur. 
Sec. 7. Continuation of restrictions. 
Sec. 8. Assistance efforts in Sudan. 
Sec. 9. Reporting requirements.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) AMIS.—The term ‘‘AMIS’’ means the African Union 
Mission in Sudan. 
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives. 
(3) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT FOR SUDAN.—The 
term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan’’ means the 
peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005. 
(4) DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘Darfur Peace 
Agreement’’ means the peace agreement signed by the Govern-
ment of Sudan and by Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army Faction, in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 
5, 2006. 
(5) GOVERNMENT
OF
SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Government of 
Sudan’’— 
(A) means— 
(i) the government in Khartoum, Sudan, which 
is led by the National Congress Party (formerly known 
as the National Islamic Front); or
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(ii) any successor government formed on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act (including the 
coalition National Unity Government agreed upon in 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan); and 
(B) does not include the regional government of 
Southern Sudan. 
(6) OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term 
‘‘official of the Government of Sudan’’ does not include any 
individual— 
(A) who was not a member of such government before 
July 1, 2005; or 
(B) who is a member of the regional government of 
Southern Sudan. 
(7) SPLM/A.—The term ‘‘SPLM/A’’ means the Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement/Army. 
SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) On July 23, 2004, Congress declared, ‘‘the atrocities 
unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide’’. 
(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. 
Powell stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, ‘‘genocide has occurred and may still be occurring 
in Darfur’’, and ‘‘the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed 
bear responsibility’’. 
(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United 
Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed 
the Secretary of State’s finding and stated,‘‘[a]t this hour, the 
world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in 
the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has con-
cluded are genocide’’. 
(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling upon 
the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias 
and to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and 
their associates who have incited and carried out violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law, and 
establishing a ban on the sale or supply of arms and related 
materiel of all types, including the provision of related technical 
training or assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and 
individuals, including the Janjaweed. 
(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004), deter-
mining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its 
obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), 
calling for a military flight ban in and over the Darfur region, 
demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and 
arrested for verification, establishing an International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of inter-
national humanitarian and human rights laws, and threatening 
sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply 
with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), 
including such actions as to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector 
or individual members of the Government of Sudan. 
(6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General 
on January 25, 2005, established that the ‘‘Government of
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the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious viola-
tions of international human rights and humanitarian law 
amounting to crimes under international law,’’ that ‘‘these acts 
were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and 
therefore may amount to crimes against humanity,’’ and that 
officials of the Government of Sudan and other individuals 
may have acted with ‘‘genocidal intent’’. 
(7) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), establishing 
the United Nations Mission in Sudan (referred to in this section 
as the ‘‘UNMIS’’), consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel 
and 715 civilian police tasked with supporting the implementa-
tion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and 
to ‘‘closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels 
with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)’’, which had 
been established by the African Union on May 24, 2004, to 
monitor the implementation of the N’Djamena Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement, signed on April 8, 2004, ‘‘with a view 
towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in 
Darfur’’. 
(8) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), extending the 
military embargo established by Security Council Resolution 
1556 (2004) to all the parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agree-
ment of April 8, 2004, and any other belligerents in the states 
of North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for 
an asset freeze and travel ban against those individuals who 
impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in 
Darfur and the region, commit violations of international 
humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are 
responsible for offensive military overflights, or violate the mili-
tary embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security 
Council and a panel of experts to assist in monitoring compli-
ance with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 
(2005). 
(9) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), referring the 
situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court and calling on the Govern-
ment of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate 
fully with the Court. 
(10) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the 
newly appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of 
the SPLM/A for the past 21 years, was killed in a tragic 
helicopter crash in Southern Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum 
and challenging the commitment of all Sudanese to the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan. 
(11) On January 12, 2006, the African Union Peace and 
Security Council issued a communique endorsing, in principle, 
a transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ation and requested the Chairperson of the Council to initiate 
consultations with the United Nations and other stakeholders 
toward this end. 
(12) On February 3, 2006, the United Nations Security 
Council issued a Presidential Statement authorizing the initi-
ation of contingency planning for a transition from AMIS to 
a United Nations peacekeeping operation.
H. R. 3127—4
(13) On March 10, 2006, the African Union Peace and 
Security Council extended the mandate of AMIS, which had 
reached a force size of 7,000, to September 30, 2006, while 
simultaneously endorsing the transition of AMIS to a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation and setting April 30, 2006 as 
the deadline for reaching an agreement to resolve the crisis 
in Darfur. 
(14) On March 24, 2006, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Security Council Resolution 1663 (2006), 
which— 
(A) welcomes the African Peace and Security Council’s 
March 10, 2006 communique; and 
(B) requests that the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral, jointly with the African Union and in consultation 
with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, expedite plan-
ning for the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peace-
keeping operation. 
(15) On March 29, 2006, during a speech at Freedom House, 
President Bush called for a transition to a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation and ‘‘additional forces with a NATO 
overlay . . . to provide logistical and command-and-control and 
airlift capacity, but also to send a clear signal to parties 
involved that the west is determined to help effect a settle-
ment.’’. 
(16) On April 25, 2006, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Security Council Resolution 1672 (2006), unanimously 
imposing targeted financial sanctions and travel restrictions 
on 4 individuals who had been identified as those who, among 
other acts, ‘‘impede the peace process, constitute a threat to 
stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of inter-
national humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities’’, 
including the Commander of the Western Military Region for 
the armed forces of Sudan, the Paramount Chief of the Jalul 
Tribe in North Darfur, the Commander of the Sudan Liberation 
Army, and the Field Commander of the National Movement 
for Reform and Development. 
(17) On May 5, 2006, under the auspices of African Union 
mediation and the direct engagement of the international 
community, including the United States, the Government of 
Sudan and the largest rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Lib-
eration Movement, led by Minni Minnawi, signed the Darfur 
Peace Agreement, which addresses security, power sharing, 
and wealth sharing issues between the parties. 
(18) In August 2006, the Sudanese government began to 
amass military forces and equipment in the Darfur region 
in contravention of the Darfur Peace Agreement to which they 
are signatories in what appears to be preliminary to full scale 
war. 
(19) On August 30, 2006, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), with-
out dissent and with abstentions by China, Russian Federation, 
and Qatar, thereby asserting that the existing United Nations 
Mission in Sudan ‘‘shall take over from AMIS responsibility 
for supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agree-
ment upon the expiration of AMIS’ mandate but in any event 
no later than 31 December 2006’’, and that UNMIS ‘‘shall 
be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel . . . 3,300
H. R. 3127—5
civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units’’, 
which ‘‘shall begin to be deployed [to Darfur] no later than 
1 October 2006’’. 
(20) Between August 30 and September 3, 2006, President 
Bashir and other senior members of his administration have 
publicly rejected United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1706 (2006), calling it illegal and a western invasion of his 
country, despite the current presence of 10,000 United Nations 
peacekeepers under the UNMIS peacekeeping force. 
(21) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined, 
pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 App. U.S.C. 2405(j)), that Sudan is a country, the 
government of which has repeatedly provided support for acts 
of international terrorism, thereby restricting United States 
assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other 
transactions with the Government of Sudan. 
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan 
is characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed 
against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual 
violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias 
with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-
led faction of the Government of Sudan; 
(2) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have 
continued to violate the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 
April 8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, 
and violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and 
personnel of AMIS is increasing; 
(3) the African Union should immediately make all nec-
essary preparations for an orderly transition to a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation, which will maintain an appro-
priate level of African participation, with a mandate to protect 
civilians 
and 
humanitarian 
operations, 
assist 
in 
the 
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and deter 
violence in the Darfur region; 
(4) the international community, including the United 
States and the European Union, should immediately act to 
mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources 
through the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, to support the transition of AMIS to a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation with the size, strength, and 
capacity necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian oper-
ations, to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, and to end the continued violence in the Darfur 
region; 
(5) if an expanded and reinforced AMIS or subsequent 
United Nations peacekeeping operation fails to stop genocide 
in the Darfur region, the international community should take 
additional measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide 
in the Darfur region; 
(6) acting under article 5 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for 
suspension of the Government of Sudan’s rights and privileges 
of membership by the General Assembly until such time as 
the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks
H. R. 3127—6
upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and 
associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for 
deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region; 
(7) the President should use all necessary and appropriate 
diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the responsibil-
ities of the Committee of the United Nations Security Council 
and the panel of experts established pursuant to section 3(a) 
of Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005); 
(8) the President should direct the United States Perma-
nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States to urge the adoption 
of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that— 
(A) extends the military embargo established by United 
Nations Security Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005) 
to include a total ban on the sale or supply of offensive 
military equipment to the Government of Sudan, except 
for use in an internationally recognized demobilization pro-
gram or for nonlethal assistance necessary to carry out 
elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan 
or the Darfur Peace Agreement; and 
(B) calls upon those member states of the United 
Nations that continue to undermine efforts to foster peace 
in Sudan by providing military assistance to the Govern-
ment of Sudan, government supported militias, or any rebel 
group operating in Darfur in violation of the embargo on 
such assistance and equipment, as called for in United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 
(2005), to immediately cease and desist. 
(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the 
Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for 
Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement, the support of the 
regional Government of Southern Sudan, the Transitional 
Darfur Regional Authority, and marginalized areas in Northern 
Sudan (including the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, 
Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), Darfur, and Nubia), or for 
humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until the Government of 
Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, 
demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated mili-
tias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humani-
tarian assistance in the Darfur region, and allow for the safe 
and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons; 
(10) the President should seek to assist members of the 
Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a stu-
dent loan forgiveness program for those individuals who commit 
to return to Southern Sudan for a period of not less than 
5 years for the purpose of contributing professional skills 
needed for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan; 
(11) the Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan should be 
provided with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to— 
(A) provide stewardship of efforts to implement the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur 
Peace Agreement; 
(B) seek ways to bring stability and peace to the Darfur 
region;
H. R. 3127—7
(C) address instability elsewhere in Sudan, Chad, and 
northern Uganda; and 
(D) pursue a truly comprehensive peace throughout 
the region; 
(12) the international community should strongly condemn 
attacks against humanitarian workers and African Union per-
sonnel, and the forcible recruitment of refugees and internally 
displaced persons from camps in Chad and Sudan, and demand 
that all armed groups in the region, including the forces of 
the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, 
the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, the Justice and Equality 
Movement, the National Movement for Reform and Develop-
ment (NMRD), and all other armed groups refrain from such 
activities; 
(13) the United States should fully support the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agree-
ment and urge rapid implementation of their terms; 
(14) the May 5, 2006 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation 
Movement was a positive development in a situation that has 
seen little political progress in 2 years and should be seized 
upon by all sides to begin the arduous process of post-conflict 
reconstruction, restitution, justice, and reconciliation; and 
(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (referred to in this paragraph as ‘‘SPLM’’) should— 
(A) seek to transform SPLM into an inclusive, trans-
parent, and democratic body; 
(B) reaffirm the commitment of SPLM to— 
(i) bring peace to Southern Sudan, the Darfur 
region, and Eastern Sudan; and 
(ii) eliminate safe haven for regional rebel move-
ments, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army; and 
(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine 
SPLM. 
SEC. 5. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR. 
(a) BLOCKING OF ASSETS AND RESTRICTION ON VISAS.—Section 
6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 
108–497; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended— 
(1) in the heading of subsection (b), by inserting ‘‘OF APPRO-
PRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN’’ after 
‘‘ASSETS’’; 
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as sub-
sections (d) through (f), respectively; and 
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following: 
‘‘(c) BLOCKING OF ASSETS AND RESTRICTION ON VISAS OF CER-
TAIN INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT.— 
‘‘(1) BLOCKING
OF
ASSETS.—Beginning on the date that 
is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace 
and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contrib-
uting to peace in Sudan, the President shall, consistent with 
the authorities granted under the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets 
of any individual who the President determines is complicit 
in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity in Darfur, including the family members
H. R. 3127—8
or any associates of such individual to whom assets or property 
of such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002. 
‘‘(2) RESTRICTION ON VISAS.—Beginning on the date that 
is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace 
and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contrib-
uting to peace in Sudan, the President shall deny a visa and 
entry to any individual who the President determines to be 
complicit in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, 
or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family 
members or any associates of such individual to whom assets 
or property of such individual was transferred on or after 
July 1, 2002.’’. 
(b) WAIVER.—Section 6(d) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan 
Act of 2004, as redesignated by subsection (a), is amended by 
adding at the end the following: ‘‘The President may waive the 
application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) with respect 
to any individual if the President determines that such a waiver 
is in the national interests of the United States and, before exer-
cising the waiver, notifies the appropriate congressional committees 
of the name of the individual and the reasons for the waiver.’’. 
(c) 
SANCTIONS
AGAINST
JANJAWEED
COMMANDERS
AND 
COORDINATORS OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS.—It is the sense of Congress, 
that the President should immediately impose the sanctions 
described in section 6(c) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan 
Act of 2004, as added by subsection (a), against any individual, 
including the Janjaweed commanders and coordinators, identified 
as those who, among other acts, ‘‘impede the peace process, con-
stitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit viola-
tions of international humanitarian or human rights law or other 
atrocities’’. 
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DETER AND SUPPRESS GENO-
CIDE IN DARFUR. 
(a) PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT AMIS.—Subject to 
subsection (b) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the President is authorized to provide AMIS with— 
(1) assistance for any expansion of the mandate, size, 
strength, and capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian 
operations in order to help stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan 
and dissuade and deter air attacks directed against civilians 
and humanitarian workers; and 
(2) assistance in the areas of logistics, transport, commu-
nications, material support, technical assistance, training, com-
mand and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence. 
(b) CONDITIONS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Assistance provided under subsection 
(a)— 
(A) shall be used only in the Darfur region; and 
(B) shall not be provided until AMIS has agreed not 
to transfer title to, or possession of, any such assistance 
to anyone not an officer, employee or agent of AMIS (or 
subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation), and 
not to use or to permit the use of such assistance for 
any purposes other than those for which such assistance 
was furnished, unless the consent of the President has 
first been obtained, and written assurances reflecting all
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of the forgoing have been obtained from AMIS by the 
President. 
(2) CONSENT.—If the President consents to the transfer 
of such assistance to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent 
of AMIS (or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ation), or agrees to permit the use of such assistance for any 
purposes other than those for which such assistance was fur-
nished, the President shall immediately notify the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives in 
accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming 
notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). 
(c) NATO ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT AMIS.—It is the sense 
of Congress that the President should continue to instruct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as ‘‘NATO’’) to 
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at NATO 
to— 
(1) advocate NATO reinforcement of the AMIS and its 
orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, 
as appropriate; 
(2) provide assets to help dissuade and deter air strikes 
directed against civilians and humanitarian workers in the 
Darfur region of Sudan; and 
(3) provide other logistical, transportation, communications, 
training, technical assistance, command and control, aerial 
surveillance, and intelligence support. 
(d) RULE
OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act, or any 
amendment made by this Act, shall be construed as a provision 
described in section 5(b)(1) or 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution 
(Public Law 93–148; 50 U.S.C. 1544(b), 1546(a)(1)). 
(e) DENIAL OF ENTRY AT UNITED STATES PORTS TO CERTAIN 
CARGO SHIPS OR OIL TANKERS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President should take all necessary 
and appropriate steps to deny the Government of Sudan access 
to oil revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States 
ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or 
trade activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the 
shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan until 
such time as the Government of Sudan has honored its commit-
ments to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize and demilitarize 
the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfet-
tered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and allow 
for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons. 
(2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect 
to cargo ships or oil tankers involved in— 
(A) an internationally-recognized demobilization pro-
gram; 
(B) the shipment of non-lethal assistance necessary 
to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; or 
(C) the shipment of military assistance necessary to 
carry out elements of an agreement referred to in subpara-
graph (B) if the President has made the determination 
set forth in section 8(c)(2).