291 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC 
CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 
an interagency Working Group, which shall include 
representatives of the Department of State, the De-
partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, and such other agencies of the 
United States Government as the President considers 
appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggres-
sion with respect to Africa. 
(2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established 
pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a set of 
recommendations, such as for— 
(A) bolstering the capacity of governments 
in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data 
networks and critical infrastructure, where ap-
plicable; 
(B) providing alternatives to Huawei; 
(C) an action plan for United States embas-
sies in Africa to provide assistance to host-coun-
try governments with respect to protecting their 
vital digital networks and infrastructure from 
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PRC espionage, including an assessment of staff-
ing resources needed to implement the action 
plan in embassies in Africa; 
(D) 
utilizing 
interagency 
resources 
to 
counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in 
traditional and digital media targeted to Afri-
can audiences; and 
(E) helping civil society in Africa counter 
digital authoritarianism and identifying tools 
and assistance to enhance and promote digital 
democracy. 
SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, 
launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in the 
next generation of African leaders; 
(2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance 
and it is vital for the United States to support strong 
and enduring partnerships with the next generation 
of African leaders; and 
(3) the United States Government should 
prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerg-
ing young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, in-
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cluding through efforts to enhance leadership skills, 
encourage entrepreneurship, strengthen public admin-
istration and the role of civil society, and connect 
young African leaders continentally and globally 
across the private, civic, and public sectors. 
(b) YOUNG
AFRICAN
LEADERS
INITIATIVE
PRO-
GRAM.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the De-
partment of State the Young African Leaders Initia-
tive (‘‘YALI’’) program. 
(2) PURPOSE.—The YALI program shall seek to 
build the capacity of young African leaders in sub- 
Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engage-
ment, or public administration, including through ef-
forts to— 
(A) support young African leaders by offer-
ing professional development, training, and net-
working opportunities, particularly in the areas 
of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elec-
tions, human rights, entrepreneurship, good gov-
ernance, and public administration; and 
(B) provide increased economic and tech-
nical assistance to young African leaders to pro-
mote economic growth and strengthen ties be-
tween United States and African businesses. 
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(3) FELLOWSHIPS.—The YALI program shall 
award fellowships under the Mandela Washington 
Fellowship for Young African Leaders program to 
young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem-
onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in-
novation, public service, and leadership, and who 
have had a positive impact in their communities, or-
ganizations, or institutions. 
(4) 
REGIONAL
LEADERSHIP
CENTERS.—The 
YALI program shall seek to establish regional leader-
ship centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer training 
to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem-
onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in-
novation, public service and leadership, and who have 
had a positive impact in their communities, organi-
zations, or institutions. 
(5) ACTIVITIES.— 
(A) UNITED
STATES-BASED
ACTIVITIES.— 
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator for the United States Agency for 
International Development and the heads of 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, 
shall oversee all United States-based activities 
carried out under the YALI program, including 
the following: 
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(i) The participation of Mandela 
Washington fellows in a six-week Leader-
ship Institute at a United States university 
or college in business, civic engagement, or 
public management, including academic 
sessions, site visits, professional networking 
opportunities, leadership training, commu-
nity service, and organized cultural activi-
ties. 
(ii) The participation by Mandela 
Washington fellows in an annual Mandela 
Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide 
such Fellows the opportunity to meet with 
United States leaders from the private, pub-
lic, and non-profit sectors. 
(B) AFRICA-BASED
ACTIVITIES.—The Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Admin-
istrator for the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the heads of other rel-
evant Federal departments and agencies, should 
continue to support YALI programs in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, including the following: 
(i) Access to continued leadership 
training and other professional development 
opportunities for Mandela Washington Fel-
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lowship for Young African Leaders alumni 
upon their return to their home countries, 
including online courses, technical assist-
ance, and access to funding. 
(ii) Training for young African leaders 
at regional leadership centers established in 
accordance 
with 
paragraph 
(4), 
and 
through online and in-person courses offered 
by such centers. 
(iii) Opportunities for networking and 
engagement with— 
(I) other alumni of the Mandela 
Washington Fellowship for Young Afri-
can Leaders; 
(II) alumni of programs at re-
gional leadership centers established in 
accordance with paragraph (4); and 
(III) United States and like- 
minded diplomatic missions, business 
leaders, and others as appropriate. 
(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 
paragraph, the Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development and the 
heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
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agencies shall seek to partner with the private 
sector to pursue public-private partnerships, le-
verage private sector expertise, expand net-
working opportunities, and identify funding op-
portunities as well as fellowship and employment 
opportunities for participants in the YALI pro-
gram. 
(6) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development and the heads of other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a plan for imple-
menting the YALI program, including the following: 
(A) A description of clearly defined pro-
gram goals, targets, and planned outcomes for 
each year and for the duration of implementa-
tion of the program. 
(B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the 
program and progress made toward achieving 
such goals, targets, and planned outcomes. 
(C) A strategy to ensure the program is pro-
moting United States foreign policy goals in Af-
rica, including ensuring that the program is 
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clearly branded and paired with robust public 
diplomacy efforts. 
(7) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
after for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees and pub-
lish in a publicly accessible, internet–based form, a 
report on the following: 
(A) The progress made toward achieving the 
goals, targets, and planned outcomes described in 
paragraph (6)(A), including an overview of the 
program implemented in the previous year and 
an estimated number of beneficiaries. 
(B) An assessment of how the YALI pro-
gram is contributing to and promoting United 
States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of 
increased private sector investment, trade pro-
motion, support to civil society, improved public 
administration, and fostering entrepreneurship 
and youth empowerment. 
(C) Recommendations for improvements or 
changes to the program and implementation 
plan, if any, that would improve their effective-
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ness during subsequent years of implementation 
of the program. 
(8) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate. 
(9) SUNSET.—The requirements of this section 
shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the resources and 
timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organiza-
tion the mission of which shall be to promote democratic 
values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, ac-
curate, and relevant news and information to the people 
of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors, 
especially in countries in which a free press is banned by 
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the government or not fully established, about the region, 
the world, and the United States through uncensored news, 
responsible discussion, and open debate. 
SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA-
TION. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to support increased access to energy in Afri-
ca and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on countries that 
use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Lack of access to energy remains a signifi-
cant barrier to economic advancement and oppor-
tunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 
789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in sub- 
Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern elec-
tricity. Even in the region’s most advanced econo-
mies, average annual per capita electricity consump-
tion is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than what 
is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a 
small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Africans who 
enter the job market each year find employment; and 
the cost and reliability of electricity remain top con-
straints to job creation and economic competitiveness. 
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(2) The United States’ global strategic competi-
tors have stepped in to address this disparity and fi-
nance energy sector development across Africa. China 
is the single largest trading partner for African coun-
tries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral lender for 
public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65 
percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infra-
structure, and between 2013–2020, the energy sector 
consistently accounted for the largest share of all in-
vestment under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
(3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is 
the foundation for all modern economies and nec-
essary for increasing growth and employment. 
(4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower 
middle-income countries is necessary in the next dec-
ades in order to meet human, social, security, and 
economic needs. 
(5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclu-
sive economies, and making energy systems resilient 
in low- and lower middle-income countries will re-
quire diversified power systems and a mix of tech-
nologies that align with local conditions, resources, 
and needs. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that countries in Africa continue to be important partners 
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to the United States and the DFC should continue to make 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate technologies 
that contribute to energy security and reliable, affordable, 
and sustainable power in low and lower middle-income 
countries. 
(d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa 
Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) 
is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 
end; 
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and 
inserting a semicolon; and 
(3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(10) advance United States foreign policy and 
development goals by assisting African countries to 
reduce their dependence on energy resources from 
countries that use energy dependence for undue polit-
ical influence, such as the Russian Federation or the 
People’s Republic of China, which have used energy 
and financial resources to influence other countries; 
‘‘(11) promote the energy security of allies and 
partners of the United States by encouraging the de-
velopment of accessible, transparent, and competitive 
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energy markets that provide diversified sources and 
reliable, affordable, and sustainable power; 
‘‘(12) encourage United States public and pri-
vate sector investment in African energy infrastruc-
ture projects to bridge the gap between energy security 
requirements and commercial demand in a way that 
is consistent with the region’s capacity; and 
‘‘(13) help facilitate the export of United States 
energy resources, technology, and expertise to global 
markets in a way that benefits the energy security of 
allies and partners of the United States, including in 
Africa.’’. 
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, 
AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading 
its influence in the Middle East and North Africa 
through its energy and infrastructure investments, 
technology transfer, and arms sales; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to estab-
lish military or dual use facilities in geographically 
strategic locations in the Middle East and North Afri-
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ca to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the ex-
pense of United States national security interests; 
and 
(3) the export of certain communications infra-
structure from the People’s Republic of China de-
grades the security of partner networks, exposes intel-
lectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the 
United States to conduct security cooperation with 
compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s 
authoritarian surveillance model. 
(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, and the heads of other ap-
propriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives a strategy for coun-
tering and limiting the People’s Republic of China’s 
influence in, and access to, the Middle East and 
North Africa. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
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(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s intent with regards to increased co-
operation with Middle East and North African 
countries and how such cooperation fits into its 
broader global strategic objectives; 
(B) an assessment of how governments 
across the region are responding to the People’s 
Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili-
tary presence in their countries; 
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation 
through foreign military sales, financing, and ef-
forts to build partner capacity and increase 
interoperability with the United States; 
(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s joint research and development with 
the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
the United States’ national security interests, 
and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s 
Republic of China’s influence in such area; 
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
ons technology transfers from the People’s Repub-
lic of China to the Middle East and North Afri-
ca, impacts on United States’ national security 
interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the 
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People’s Republic of China’s influence in such 
area; 
(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s military sales to the region, including 
lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems; 
(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of 
China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
tiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, 
impacts on United States’ national security in-
terests, and recommended steps to mitigate the 
People’s Republic of China’s influence in such 
area; 
(H) efforts to improve regional security co-
operation with United States allies and partners 
with a focus on— 
(i) maritime security in the Arabian 
Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
terranean; 
(ii) integrated air and missile defense; 
(iii) cyber security; 
(iv) border security; and 
(v) critical infrastructure security, to 
include energy security; 
(I) increased support for government-to-gov-
ernment engagement on critical infrastructure 
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development projects, including ports and water 
infrastructure; 
(J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
vate sector and public-private partnerships in 
healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
ment in non-energy sectors; 
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
professional education exchanges with key part-
ner countries; 
(L) specific steps to counter increased in-
vestment from the People’s Republic of China in 
telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-
matic efforts to stress the political, economic, and 
social benefits of a free and open internet; 
(M) efforts to promote United States private 
sector engagement in and public-private partner-
ships on renewable energy development; 
(N) the expansion of public-private partner-
ship efforts on water, desalination, and irriga-
tion projects; and 
(O) efforts to warn United States partners 
in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks 
associated with the People’s Republic of China’s 
telecommunications infrastructure and provide 
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alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the People’s Repub-
lic of China’s technology. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made 
available to the public, but may include a classified annex 
as necessary. 
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States and the international 
community have long-term interests in the stability, 
security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
(2) In addition to and apart from military and 
security efforts, the United States should harness a 
whole of government approach, including bilateral 
and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, 
and public diplomacy to compete with and counter 
PRC influence. 
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 
United States engagement, transparent governance 
structures, and active civil society engagement help 
counter predatory foreign investment and influence 
efforts. 
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(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States that the United States and the international 
community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-
forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that sup-
port reform efforts to— 
(1) promote greater economic opportunity; 
(2) foster private sector development; 
(3) strengthen civil society; 
(4) promote transparent and democratic govern-
ance and the rule of law; and 
(5) promote greater regional integration and 
intraregional cooperation, including with Israel. 
SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP. 
It is the sense of Congress that the People’s Republic 
of China’s economic relationship with Iran, including oil 
purchases in violation of United States sanctions, under-
mines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon its 
malign activities. 
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—It 
is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment— 
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(A) creates new national and regional secu-
rity challenges due to increased military activity 
in the Arctic; 
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging 
as a major theater of conflict in ongoing stra-
tegic competition; 
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
toral countries have inadequate capacity to pa-
trol the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
els of sea ice; 
(D) impacts public safety due to increased 
human activity in the Arctic region where search 
and rescue capacity remains very limited; and 
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s frag-
ile and pristine environment and the unique and 
highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s ma-
rine and terrestrial ecosystems; and 
(2) the United States should reduce the con-
sequences described in paragraph (1) by— 
(A) evaluating the wide variety and dy-
namic set of security and safety risks developing 
in the Arctic; 
(B) developing policies and making prep-
arations to mitigate and respond to threats and 
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risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to 
work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
gion to deter potential aggressive activities and 
build Arctic competencies; 
(C) adequately funding the National Earth 
System Prediction Capability to substantively 
improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on 
the time scales necessary to ensure regional secu-
rity and trans-Arctic shipping; 
(D) investing in resources, including a sig-
nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure 
that the United States has adequate capacity to 
prevent and respond to security threats in the 
Arctic region; and 
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 
all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-
ment for— 
(i) maintaining peace and stability in 
the Arctic region; 
(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
gion; 
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
agement of commercial maritime traffic in 
the Arctic; 
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(iv) promoting responsible natural re-
source management and economic develop-
ment; and 
(v) countering China’s Polar Silk 
Road initiative; 
(vi) examining the possibility of recon-
vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; 
and 
(vii) reducing black carbon and meth-
ane emissions in the Arctic Region, includ-
ing by working with observers of the Arctic 
Council, including India and the People’s 
Republic of China, to adopt mitigation 
plans consistent with the findings and rec-
ommendations 
of 
the 
Arctic 
Council’s 
Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 
Methane. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to recognize only the states specified in sub-
section (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other 
claims to such status; and 
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 
serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the 
interests of United States allies and partners. 
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(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ 
means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, 
and Iceland. 
(2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Region’’ 
means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 
parallel latitude north of the equator. 
(d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR 
ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the Depart-
ment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs 
(referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), appointed 
in accordance with paragraph (1). 
(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
(2) DUTIES.— 
(A) DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATION.—Sub-
ject to the direction of the President and the Sec-
retary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to 
represent the United States in matters and cases 
relevant to the Arctic Region in— 
(i) contacts with foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and spe-
cialized agencies of the United Nations, the 
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Arctic Council, and other international or-
ganizations of which the United States is a 
member; and 
(ii) multilateral conferences and meet-
ings relating to Arctic affairs. 
(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The 
Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic 
Council when the United States holds the Chair-
manship of the Arctic Council. 
(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambas-
sador shall coordinate United States policies related 
to the Arctic Region, including— 
(A) meeting national security, economic, 
and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af-
fairs; 
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and 
conserving its biological resources; 
(C) promoting environmentally sustainable 
natural resource management and economic de-
velopment; 
(D) strengthening institutions for coopera-
tion among the Arctic states; 
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 
decisions that affect them; 
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(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
search on local, regional, and global environ-
mental issues; 
(G) integrating scientific data on the cur-
rent and projected effects of climate change in 
the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 
applied to the development of security strategies 
for the Arctic Region; 
(H) making available the methods and ap-
proaches on the integration of climate science to 
other regional security planning programs in the 
Department of State to better ensure that broad-
er decision-making processes may more ade-
quately account for the effects of climate change; 
and 
(I) reducing black carbon and methane 
emissions in the Arctic Region. 
(e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Ambas-
sador shall develop a policy, to be known as the ‘‘Arctic 
Region Security Policy’’, to assess, develop, budget for, and 
implement plans, policies, and actions— 
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 
United States in Arctic states, including through en-
hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, 
participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
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lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United 
States initiatives and assistance programs across 
agencies to protect the national security of the United 
States and its allies and partners; 
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 
states to the effects of environmental change and in-
creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states 
and other states that may result from increased acces-
sibility of the Arctic Region; 
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Re-
gion and Arctic states that— 
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
environment; and 
(B) are strategically significant to the 
United States; 
(4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
mental change and national security risk and vulner-
ability assessments into the decision making process 
on foreign assistance awards with Greenland; 
(5) to advance principles of good governance by 
encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on 
collaborative approaches— 
(A) to responsibly manage natural resources 
in the Arctic Region; 
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(B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
time safety in the Arctic Region; 
(C) to prevent the escalation of security ten-
sions by mitigating against the militarization of 
the Arctic Region; 
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon multi-
lateral policies among Arctic states on the man-
agement of maritime transit routes through the 
Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the 
transit policies for access to and transit in the 
Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and 
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic 
Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability 
and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
mane and responsible fashion; 
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
vivability, and resiliency of United States interests 
and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and 
(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
sions in the Arctic. 
SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER 
STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARCTIC COUN-
CIL. 
It is the policy of the United States to urge that Tai-
wan be given observer status on the Arctic Council. 
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PART VII—OCEANIA 
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA. 
It shall be the policy of the United States— 
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a stra-
tegic national security and economic priority of the 
United States Government; 
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region; 
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the 
Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated 
States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplo-
matic, economic, and development exchanges that pro-
mote the goals of individual countries and the entire 
region; 
(4) to work with the Governments of Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance 
goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing, maritime security, and economic development; 
(5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
national structures to promote the national security 
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and economic goals of the United States and countries 
of Oceania; 
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 
States strategy that will enhance youth engagement 
and advance long-term growth and development 
throughout the region, especially as such relates to 
protecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
hoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries 
of Oceania against current and future threats result-
ing from extreme weather and severe changes in the 
environment; 
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 
influence and corruption aimed at undermining the 
political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
bility of the people and governments of the countries 
of Oceania; 
(8) to improve the local capacity of the countries 
of Oceania to address public health challenges and 
improve global health security; 
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
ket-based private sector investments that adhere to 
best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
ability, and environmental and social safeguards as 
an alternative to state-directed investments by author-
itarian governments; 
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(10) to ensure the people and communities of 
Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrad-
ing munitions hazards and other debris that threaten 
health and livelihoods; 
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering 
United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic partners in Oceania; and 
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments 
in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
mains of members of the United States Armed Forces 
who are missing in action from previous conflicts in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP. 
(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening 
United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared con-
cerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and 
resiliency in the countries of Oceania. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by 
subsection (a) shall include the following: 
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(1) A description of United States regional goals 
and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing 
engagement with the countries of Oceania. 
(2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of 
United States regional goals and concerns that are 
shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
cluding a review of issues related to anti-corruption 
efforts, maritime and other security issues, environ-
mental protection, fisheries management, economic 
growth and development, and disaster resilience and 
preparedness. 
(3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 
by the Governments of the United States, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared re-
gional goals and concerns. 
(4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 
by regional organizations and other related intergov-
ernmental structures aimed at addressing shared re-
gional goals and concerns. 
(5) A plan for aligning United States programs 
and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and 
concerns, as appropriate. 
(6) Recommendations for additional United 
States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources 
necessary to execute the strategic roadmap. 
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(7) Any other elements the Secretary of State 
considers appropriate. 
SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States- 
based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be 
known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring 
and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, 
and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
ania. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by 
subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following: 
(1) A review of the ability of the Department of 
State to participate in a public-private sponsored se-
curity dialogue. 
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for 
conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-
risdiction of the United States. 
(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an 
Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-
ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific 
countries of Oceania. 
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Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the 
lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies 
of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility 
and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dia-
logue. 
SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace 
Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely ex-
pand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, 
with the goals of— 
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to 
all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 
(2) working with regional and international 
partners of the United States to expand the presence 
of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
communities in support of climate resilience initia-
tives. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall— 
(1) assess the factors contributing to the current 
absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oce-
ania; 
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(2) examine potential remedies that include 
working with United States Government agencies and 
regional governments, including governments of 
United States allies— 
(A) to increase the health infrastructure and 
medical evacuation capabilities of the countries 
of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace 
Corps volunteers while in such countries; 
(B) to address physical safety concerns that 
have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to 
operate in Oceania; and 
(C) to increase transportation infrastruc-
ture in the countries of Oceania to better support 
the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their ac-
cess to necessary facilities; 
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-
ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the 
countries of Oceania address social, economic, and de-
velopment needs of their communities that require 
specific professional expertise; and 
(4) explore potential new operational models to 
address safety and security needs of Peace Corps vol-
unteers in the countries of Oceania, including— 
(A) changes to volunteer deployment dura-
tions; and 
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