A166 in 1045 and 1946” (speech, Norwich Univer- aity, June 12, 1960). “The sole purpoge of all loyalty investiga- tion must be to ferret out disloyal persons. Mistakes have been made in the past and they must be ruthlessly corrected. Ameri- cans must stand together before the world menace of communism. The public is ever- lastingly right in its determination relent- lessly to ferret out all disloyal persons and it 1s up to us who are in public office to work out an effective method” (CoNnaREssSIONAL Recorp). “Those behind the iron curtain have been trained in a hard school. They understand only strength. America is going down a dark road strewn with dynamite. We must be in a position to show strength” (I Am an Amer- ican Day speech, Boston, June 21, 1950, 4 days before Korean attack). “Yhe whole trend of events * * * forces upon us the necessity of being im- mediately ready. * * * Nations no long- er take the trouble to declare war and give advance notice of an attack. * * * It seems to me that we are in one of those fateful moments in history when we have it within our power to make a decision whether we shall have World War III or whether we shall not” (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 22, 1950, 3 days before Korean attack). PART TI. VOTING RECORD Lovee voted for: The 1947 Military Unification Act The Greek-Turkish assistance program The 70-group Air Force (1948) The Selective Service Act of 1948 Increase of funds for Voice of America and related programs (1949) Ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949) One hundred million dollar assistance program for Spain (1950) Lover voted against: An amendment cutting down the dura- tion of selective service from 5 to 2 years (10948) Lopaxz personally was the author of leg!is- lation to: Provide for 9 70-group Alr Force (1947) Allow enlistment of selected qualified aliens in the United States Army (1947) (1848) Receive strategic materials for United States stockpile in return for ECA ald (1949) Establish a coordinated civil defense pro- gram (1950) Give congressional consent to interstate civil defense pacts (1950) Require Armed Forces to stockpile fabri- cated wool (1950) Clean out disloyal persons in the State Department (1950) Prevent shipment of strategic materials to the Communists (1950) LODGE ATTACKED BY COMMUNISTS The Daily Worker (oficial organ of the Communist Party), of February 23, 1950, com- mented as follows on Lopez's belief that dis- armament talks between the United States and the Soviet Government would but falsely raise the hopes of the American people: “genator Lopes insults the intelligence of the United States by arguing that any Soviet- American peace negotiations would only bring war that much closer.” The Daily Worker of February 22, 1950, said: “The trouble with the Lodge resolution is that it proposes to erect a beautiful build- ing on a completely rotten base.” William E, Mullins, writing in the Boston Herald of December 6, 1960, observed: “One of the pleasures of a visit to the United Nations is a first hand discovery of the ardent dislike the Russians have for Senator Loncr. The Bay State Senator in- furlates them. They do not speak to him.” And Mr. Mullins wrote on December 7: “The Russians dislike Lopce deeply.” Congress and Strategy in Crisis EXTENSION OF REMARKS ir HON. DANIEL J. FLOOD OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 15, 1951 Mr.FLOOD, Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Recorp, I include the following editorial from the San Francisco Chronicle of January 5, 1951, and also an editorial from the Washington Post of January 7, 1951: [From the San Francisco Chronicle of Janu- ary 5, 1951] CONGRESS AND STRATEGY IN CRISIS A resolution has been submitted in Con- gress by Representative Couper, Republican, of New York, calling on the President to send ho more American troops overseas without the prior consent of Congress. There may be anticipated a strenuous effort to get this, or some resolution expressing the same idea, adopted and made binding. Some soul searching by individual Congressmen, not related to political considerations, is in order. This newspaper has long advocated that Congress be alert to its responsibilities as a check upon the executive branch of the Government. Such responsibilities by Con- gress are imbedded in the American tradi- tion; planted there by the founding fathers, who wanted to make sure that popular gov- ernment prevailed and survived. Part of such responsibility 1s the careful examina- tion of any delegation of powers to the Ex- ecutive; care in this respect is imperative for the successful carrying out of the people's will. The President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, but Congress, through its lawmaking prerogatives, has ultimate con- trol of the over-all employment of such forces, except when it voluntarily and tem- porarily relinquishes such control. It has rclinquished a great deal of such control, traditionally, in wartime. It voted the Pres- ident extraordinary — indeed, dictatorial— powers over the military in the Civil War, again in World War I, and again in World War Il. The present proposal is, ohviously, a step away from the centralization of military power. As such, it should be debated with utmost care, with maximum regard for con- sequences in the current world military-po- Utical situation. It seems clear to us that the Executive must have considerable leeway in the present emergency, in respect to the deployment of manpower at the various outposts of Amer- ican military strength. The American zone of Germany 1s clearly one of the most im- portant of these outposts. The Executive, for these purposes, must be considered ag embracing the whole hierarchy of military command, including not only the President but Secretary of Defense Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within the limits of general policy as established by the people, the executive department has the responsi- bility for strategic and tactical operations concerned with the defense of the Nation, the waging of war, or preparing to meet threatened war. At the present time those responsibilities are great and grave. We are doubtful of any procedure of Con- gress that would force the Executive to dis- close before a congressional committee the military’s secret plans for coping with the military situation facing the Nation, And we are doubtful of any blanket resolution that would cripple the Nation's capacity to move swiftly in its own defense. APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD We suggest, therefore, that this resolu. tion—which is bound to be pivotal in Amer- ican foreign policy—should be debated so- berly and we urge particularly that no punt- tive partisanship should enter into the de- bate. A personal or political grudge against the President would be a weak and dangerous ground upon which to base judgment on a proposition as vital as this. If the pro- ponents have a sincere case, they ought to be heard and their counsel weighed. But polit- ical guns should be checked in the ante- room for this debate. — [From the Washington Post of January 1, 1951] We Art Not THRouGH It is a vast oversimplification of war to pronounce judgment upon every military ac- tion in terms of ground gained, cities occu- pied, flelds won and losses inflicted, or even as engagements in themselves, Winner does not necessarily take all in a single victory in what is a global struggle that may last a decade. Britain in the heyday of its empire got accustomed to losing every campaign till the last. In the Crimean War a series of disasters made the country demand a scape- goat. Cardinal Newman’s great pen gave the people one—themselves. This was not un- kind, but was part of a larger explanation, viz, that Britain was a nation, not a state; therefore it was always unready in the initial stages of a military campaign. This is the case with our country in relation to the Soviet Union. Moscow 1s the capital of a state, not a nation, and it is a garrison state, always prepared for warfare, anc thus having a preliminary edge on non-Communist nations. Korea is the warning signal that after the recent war we were told we wouldn't get. Fortunately we are not as weak as we were in 1941 when we were compelled to stand by and see our Pacific strongpoints wrested from us, one by one, Our power upon the sea and in the air is such that no calamity of this kind portends. The enemy can strike no mortal blow across the water bar- rlers. If behind these barriers which Provi- dence has provided we proceed to build up the power the world situation requires, there will come a day when it will be possible to reassert the power of the right in quarters of the globe where it may now be defiled with impunity. In an interval bound to be marked with rebuff and reverse, it will be wise to remem- ber the high purpose that led us to under- take the Korean operation. Whatever rough handling we get in this uncomfortable inter- lude, there will come a day when we, and those allied with us, will say of Korea, as Byron said of Waterloo: Millions of tongues record thee, and anew Their children’s lips shall echo them, and say— “Here, where the sword united nations drew, “Our countrymen were warring on that day!" And this is much, and all which will not pass away. The Stockpiling and Rationing of Scientific Manpower EXTENSION OF REMARKS or HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 15, 1951 Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, under permission granted me, I include an interesting and informative address
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Commissioner Henry DeWolf Smyth, United States Atomic Energy Commis- sion, at the ane hundred and seventeenth annual meeting of the American Asso- ciation for the Advancement of Science, Municipal Auditorium, Cleveland, Ohio, on Thursday, December 28, 1950: THE STOCKPILING AND RATIONING OF SCIENTIFIC ManNrower Nine days ago the President declared a state cf national emergency. Such a declaration, and the facts behind it, naturally influence all our present thoughts and plans. Some of us are filled with emotion and can think only in terms of immediate action. This is not good enough. Regardless of the outcome of the situation in Korea, this country now faces the necessity of planning not only for the coming months but for the coming decade and the decade after that. We may not have to fight a full-scale war. We profoundly hope that we shall not. But we know now that we must prepare to resist aggression with all our strength for the fore- seeable future. We shall have to increase greatly the Armed Forces of this country, using our material resources and our man- power in the wisest possible way. In every aspect of civilian life the first concern of each citizen must be the long-range value to the country of what he is doing. In the period ahcad of us, no citizen can be de- ferred from national service in this sense. It is not good enough to boast that we will fight for freedom. We must think for freedom, and this Js much harder. As we prepare for possible war, we shall inevitably have to delegate increasing authority over our lives and actions to the National Govern- ment. At the same time we must be vigilant to miintain our fundamental rights of inde- pendent thinking, criticism, and free discussion. THE DANGERS WE FACE It has become clear that our survival is at stake. Not just our material survival, but our survival as a society of free men and women. If our cities are destroyed we can rebuild them. Our spiritual destruction would be still more fearful. It is not num- bers, nor buildings, nor wealth that make a people great. It is their freedom and their vigor. We might lose our freedom, we might even lose our passion for it. This could happen through armed attack and con- quest by our enemies, or it could happen from our own etupidity and short-sighted- ness. If we are forced into a major war we must remember that armed victory is only a means to an end and that the years after the war gage the reality of victory. If the means we use to win a military vic- tory should destroy our moral position in the world, or our own self-respect, or change our free society into a totalitarian one, we shall not have won the war. On the other hand, if our hatred of war and our desire for peace lead us into the acceptance of an alien and barbaric conqueror we shall have Jost more completely. We shall then have given up our freedom and be the serfs of a police state imposed by men who neither understand nor respect the ideals that have made us great. A third danger remains, We may be drawn into a war for which we are not adequately prepared, and we may fight it less skillfully than it needs to be fought. It is to one phase of this specific danger that I want to address myself today. SCTENTISTS AG TOOLS OF WAR Men of science, traditionally peaceful, in- ternationally minded, and nonpolitical have become » major war asset. It 1s important that they be used to the greatest advantage. Therefore, I am asking you as representa- tives of science to consider carefully how you and your fellows can be most useful to our country in the years to come. I be- Meve that we are facing dangers so great as to make the comfort and convenience of any group trivial in comparison to the contribution such a group can make to our survival. For that reason I have chosen a somewhat grim title for this epeech, “The Stockpiling and Rationing of Scientific Man- power.” For that reason I am speaking of scientists not as men who enrich our cul- ture but as tools of war needed for the preservation of our freedom. I hope you will understand why I am willing to con- sider the group to which I belong in this objective and impersonal way. TWENTY YEARS OF TENSION To plan the stockpiling and rationing of any war commodity requires some assump- tion about timing. If we are discussing how scientists can be used most effectively as tools of war, we must ask when such a war will be fought. This is a question Ameri- cans cannot answer with any exactness, for we will not be the aggressors. But it ls now clear that if the free society of the west is to survive, we must be prepared to meet at any time a large-scale attack upon us or our Allies. It may come soon or it may not come for years. In considering scientific man- power as a major war asset of this country, I assume a 20-year period of tension with the possibility of major or minor wars occur- ring at any time in that period. This is indeed long-range planning, but the events of the last 5 years have forced It upon us. We must now face these realities with coure age and intelligence. NATURE OF TOTAL WAR The forces involved in a future war will be as important as timing. In every war this country has fought for the last hundred years, we have been able to crush our ene- mies by sheer weight of numbers and ma- tériel. It is unlikely that we can do so xgain. In any future war we shall probably be outnumbered, and by men who are physi- cally tougher than we are, Our natural resources may be no greater than those of ourenemies. We may be fighting with much longer and more vulnerable lines of com- munication. We shall win only by being cooler, cleverer, and more skillful than our enemies, and by using the resources at our command with foresight and judgment. We must understand the nature of modern total war. Every citizen will be involved in it, whether he is in or out of uniform. We must get over the idea that men in unlform are automatically more valuble than the same men in civilian clothes. The men in uniform may be in greater danger, though even this is doubtful in view of the large number who are never in combat and the probable dangers to a civilian population in a future war. Each man's usefulness should be the sole criterion of his value to his country. USE OF SCIENTISTS IN PREPARATION FOR WAR On these assumptions as to the timing and nature of a possible war, how shall we best use our scientific manpower? First of all, let me say what I mean by scientists. For purpoees of this discussion, I mean men who have had at least some graduate study (or equivalent experience) in the physical or natural sclences. This definition arbitrarily excludes most medical men and engineers, although much of this discussion applies to them also. Of course their value is com- parable, but the problem of their use differs enough in detail to require separate treat- ment which I will not attempt at this time. Based upon our experiences in World War Ii, I believe we can say that science con- tributes to our effectiveness in war and prep- aration for war at six levels. Firat of all, scientists are needed to provide fundamental knowledge, adding to our basic understand- ing of the laws of nature. In World War I, for the first time in history, we pushed our development of weapons close to the limit A167, of our basic knowledge. Discoveries in science less than & years old were put to use im the atomic bomb and in other weapons, This may happen again, but only if there is new knowledge to put to use. Basic research is so near the forefront of knowledge that no specific use can be foreseen for atiy part of it, nor can it be specifically directed. But if there is doubt tn anyone’s mind about the military value of work of thie sort, it could be set at rest by the Atomic Energy Com- mission. If secrecy permitved, I could cite examples of postwar research in basic science that have already been put to use in our weapons program. The second level where science is essential is intermediate between what is clearly basic research and what is clearly development. At this level possible utility is borne in mind in a general way and may dictate a choice of field but not a choice of problem. An example of this level is the study of certain areas of organic chemistry by chemists work- ing for a plastica company or the study of ferro-magnetism by the physicista of the telephone company. A third level of scientific usefulness is in applied research where a specific question ts posed and an enswer sought. The develop- ment Involved may be that of a new cheml- cal process, a new material, or a new weapon, but always to meet a specific need. The last stage in development work and a fourth scientific level is testing of prototypes under field conditions and getting into pro- duction. The amount of labor and ingenuity required in this last stage is often very great and the cost correspondingly 80. Once new weapons are produced, they must have operators. Generally speaking, scien- tists are rarely required as operators, but experience in World War II proved that they were needed to instruct operators. They were also needed to inapect the actual use being made of weapons in the field so as to understand weaknesses which should be cor- rected and to explain the capacities of the weapons to their military users. This work constitutes the fifth level where scientists are valuable. Finally, but of great significance for a prolonged crisis, we must have new scientists educated. The education of a new genera- tion of scientists cannot be done quickly. They must have a minimum of 4 years’ special training, and in many cases 10 to 15 years of training and experience. To pro- duce such men, we must continue to have teachers and universities. NEITHER BUSINESS AB USUAL NOR WAR AS USUAL These are the jobs we have to do—all of them necessary if the country is to excel in the techniques and weapons of modern war over the next 20 years. All these levels of work have been carried on during the last 5 years of peace. In the period now facing us, we can expect only to shift the emphasis or increase the effort, or both. Some peacetime activities can perhaps be cur- tailed. These are most likely to be found in the middle of the spectrum that ranges from basic research to weapons development. For example, work on improvements of non- essential industrial products or processes certainly could be curtailed. On the other hand, applied research on Weapons oF on industrial processes bearing on weapon pro- duction needs to be accelerated. Vast sums of money will be available to the services for research and development. I hope this money will not be squandered on doing things in triplicate or on hiring able scien- tista for pet projects that have little bear~ ing on either acience or war. Money does not create brains, nor the expenditure of millions of dollars alter the laws of nature. Our ignorance of these laws is still so great even in advanced fields like nuclear physics that basic research must go on. On the time scale I have suggested, our success in basic research is necessary to our survival.
A168 All this adds up to slight curtailment and considerable expansion. It may sound as if J were recommending business as usual. I am suggesting that we cannot have war as usual, We cannot win another war by a@ mere outpouring of men and resources. We can only beat our enemies by being much brighter, much shrewder, much cooler, and more farsighted than they are. We must use ovr weapons and men more skillfully than they. In particular, scientific men are im- portant because the novelty and effectiveness of our weapons depends on them. If we are to expand our scientific efforts, we must examine closely our stockpile of scientific manpower. PRESENT SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER Have we the scientific men we need? If not, can we get them, and how can we best use them? I could quote to you statistics that have been gathered by many painstak- ing studies in the last few years. These statistics show we do not have the men we need. But the lack is obvious even without statistics. We trained almost no scientists between 1941 and 1946; and since 1941 needs have developed, like that of the Atomic Energy Commission, which now employs di- rectly or through contractors as many physt- cists as there were in the whole country in 1920, The lack is also obvious to anyone who has recently been trying to hire first- Class senior scientists. Therefore, I will omit statistics at the risk of being considered un- scientific by those who consider numbers less fallible than words. Can we do anything in this period of emer- gency about the shortage of ecientific person- nel for war work? As I have suggested, some diversion from present industry is possible. For example, I will venture to single out two areas that might supply scientists. I sug- gest that most of the chemists from the cos- metics industry and most of the physicists from the television industry could have their abilities used in ways that would be more likely to insure the survival of this Republic. In such industries as these, a fair number of qualified senior scientists could be found and &@ considerably larger number of men who could work under direction. Yet it is clear that taking men from in- dustry will do Httle or nothing to strengthen the basic research which will continue to be vital, Nor will it furnish very many senior men capable of directing bold and imagina- tive work in weapons research itself. Evie dently there is such a shortage that each man must be used wisely and more men must be trained in science by holding many stu- dents and teachers in universities. The problem then is clear and has two parts. First, to use the scientists we have as effectively as possible; second, to train more. Before making some suggestions for the solution of these problems, it may be well to review how we tried to meet them between 1940 and 1945. EXPERIENCE IN WORLD WAR It Dealing first with the question of use, let us recall what happened during World War I. It is easy to say that we misused our scientific talent in that war. I hardly think that is a fatr statement but certainly better use could have been made of them. Among the older men, recruitment for various proj~- ects was usually carried out by a kind of chain-letter system. The initial group brought in men they knew. These new men brought in their friends, their former stu- dents, or other scientific acquaintances, and soon. Had the supply been unlimited, this would have been an excellent system. In practice, however, different projects soon came into collision so that individuals had to choose between offers from different lab- oratories without having the necessary in- formation to make the choice wisely. Not infrequently the advice of the top people in the Office of Scientific Research and Develop- ment had to be sought. Except insofar as it was counteracted by OSRD, this system tended to strengthen projects that had started early and were already strong. Vested interests were built up and it was difficult to man new projects or to deflate projects when they had essentially completed their missions. This system also had the disadvantage of stripping men from universities and stop- ping basic research almost completely. Quite apart from the removal of students by the draft, it was psychologically almost tmpos- gible for a man to continue basic research, since-there was no one to tell him it was ime portant and the recruiting officers of every war-research project were continually tell- ing him it was not. In the scientific com- munity, the last war began in the summer or fall of 1940, but full mobilization was not reached until sometime in 1942 and lasted about 3 years. Nevertheless, its effects on training and basic research were very serious, In the period of sustained tension that may now be facing us, effects of the kind I have mentioned could be disastrous. I have been referring to the scientists who were used as civiliane in various war labora- tories of the OSRD or the services, men who were above draft age or whose deferment was relatively easy to obtain. For the younger men, the situation was much more unsatis- factory. Either they were deferred by a process often painful and temporary or they went into the services, When young scientific men were drafted or volunteered, they became enmeshed in a system designed to train and use men for combat. This is no place for me to discuss the wisdom of using military uniforms and ranks for the many jobs a modern war organ- ization has, in which the work to be done is much more like civilian work than it 1s like fighting. I can only say that a research laboratory {s probably the most {nappro- priate place in the world to have military organization. Fortunately, ordinary com- mon sense usually came into play in labora- tories such as Los Alamos where there was a large detachment of soldiers who were more familiar with slide rules than guns. The men were given positions and respon- sibilities determined by their scientific qualifications regardiess of their scale of pay, or the color of their suits, or buttons. This is one reason our war laboratories pro- duced results. In general, the services did try to use men of scientific background in places where their training was appropriate, but there were many cases where such men were entirely wasted and many more where they could have been used more effectively. The Se- lective Service System was not designed with this objective in mind and could hardly be expected to function successfully. On the whole, we can find little satisfac. tion in the methods of using scientists of any age in World War Il. As for stockpil- ing, it practically stopped. Almost no new scientific men were trained between 1940 and 1945. In preparing for a possible future war, we must do better. DANGER OF REGIMENTATION When one tries to work out solutions of this scientific manpower problem, one imme- diately runs into a contradiction. It is a contradiction inherent in the nature of a free society and perhaps accentuated in the particular section of society made up of scientific men, Freemen cannot be treated ike inanimate tools. They will do their best work if they retain initiative and re- sponsibility, and this ts above all true of men doing scientific research, We cannot have completely centralized Government control of science without losing much of the strength we are trying to preserve. At APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the same time, the country has a right to expect that young scientists of military age will be as much at the command of their Government as other young men of the same age. If we are to avoid the mistakes of the last war, we must propose a positive kind of service to replace the policy of deferment for young men in scientific work. No course of action to accomplish this will seem at- tractive to men used to complete freedom of choice, for science—like other fruitful products of men's minds—has known its best fulfilment in the free atmosphere of peace, But today we face a possible struggle for survival and so our first concern as scientists must be to ask how we can serve this coun- try, and to accept whatever plan seems to fulfill that purpose. I urge you to listen carefully to the suggestions I shall put for- ward, and to improve upon them. They are not original with me, but Iam responsible for the form in which I present them. PROPOSAL FOR A SCIENTIFIC SERVICE CORPS I propose the establishment of a Scientific Service Corps directed by a Scientific Man- power Board and based on a national roster of scientists. These organizations would be concerned only with scientists who have completed their education, not with stu- dents. Nevertheless, two categories are con- cerned; men of military age, normally sub- ject to call for military service, and older scientists. Both categories would be under the general supervision of the Scientific Manpower Board and both would be listed in the roster. At present, only the scientists of military age would be required to join the Scientific Service Corps, and only the mem- bers of this corps would be subject to orders from the Scientific Manpower Board. For older scientists the Board would act in an advisory capacity only, This Scientific Service Corps would be a civillan organization without ranks or uni- forms. I believe it would be most effective df it were guided by that curious mixture of cooperation and discipline that character- izes most civilian organizations in this coun- try. The principal function of the Board in charge would be to get the right man in the right Job and often this man‘s own judg- ment should carry great weight. The Sci- entific Manpower Board, although a civilian organization, would need to have real au- thority over the members of the Service Corps. It would need power to keep them out of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, or to put them in, It should have power to re- turn men from military to civilian service or vice versa, or to shift them from one proj- ect to another, or to return them to unli- versities. But I hope that most of the orders issued by this Board would be merely formal endorsements of voluntary agreements. Co- operation will serve us better than force, For scientists not in the Service Corps, the Scientific Manpower Board would act only in an advisory capacity. With information on the full scope of national defense re- search projects, it could he an invaluable guide for men who wanted to be sure they were making the best use of their abilities, The Scientific Manpower Board should be responsible to the President, not to the De- partment of Defense. The quality, wisdom, and powers of this Board would be the key to the success or failure of the whole scheme. Their ideal should be guided cooperation with the scientists, not rigidly organized di- rection of them. The Board members and staff would require access to complete infor- mation on all technical and scientific phases of our military activities and of the sup- porting civillan economy. They would also have to know the scientific community—not just the names and numbers in a card file, but the men themselves. This suggests the need for regional branches of the Board.
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD STUDENTS Turning to the question of stockpiling, that is, the training of new scientists, we have quite a different problem. Various schemes have been proposed for the defer- ment of students. Most such schemes do not make it clear that we are aiming at a positive goal, not a negative one. We are not intereated in helping individuals escape the duty of military service just because they are bright boys or happen to have played with chemistry sets as children. We are interested in developing a group of men, with trained minds and disciplined imaginations who can strengthen the country over the next 20 years. That some of them will be doing very nearly what they would choose to do in peacetime is irrelevant except insofar as it may make them more effective. Can we not have something more positive than draft deferment for brilliant students of science, medicine, and engineering? The continuance of their education in such times as these, implies obligation, not privilege. I propose a student scientific corps with en- rollment beginning in the freshman year and continuing through graduate training. The requirements of native intelligence and industry in such a student corps would be high and the requirements of sustained per- formance higher still. Students who did not keep up would be continually weeded out. Men of excellent technical competence but lacking in imagination and originality would be carried only through their undergraduate training and then released to the armed services or to industry. Others would be continued through graduate training. Some recruits should occasionally be added to the student corps from the services or industry or project research to receive more education. Administration of this student science corps should be, it seems to me, decentralized as much as possible. Professors in the uni- versities would be best fitted to take the re- sponsibility of making Judgments within the established criteria. No amount of statisti- cal data, intelligence tests, or examinations can replace the intimate knowledge a uni- versity professor should have of his good students. The student science corps or training program or whatever it is called should perhaps be under the general juris- diction of the National Science Foundation. Cooperation with the Scientific Manpower Board and with Selective Service would be essential but the problems are sufficiently great and sufficiently different to suggest sep- arate authorities. EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE Although the programs I have discussed are intended to meet both short-range and long-range requirements for scientific man- power and are not meant to be dependent on the’ present system of recruiting under the Selective Service Act, they may appear in confitct with other proposed systems of recruiting for the armed services. One such system is the plan to put all 18-year-old men into military service. It ia estimated that if these men were kept in service for 2 years, the country would have a total of 3,000.000 men constantly under arms and would shortly build up a large trained reserve. Once their period of service was over, these men could feel confident that they could pursue their education and begin their pro- fessional careers without interruption unless large-scale war broke out. The first effect of this proposal on the training of young scientists appears to be bad. All men now 18 would defer their edu- cation 2 years with a corresponding inter- ruption in the supply of engineers and scien- tists 4 to 8 years later. To some degree these effects could be counteracted by acceleration or by special training of men still in service or by reduction of the length of service for obviously talented men. On the good side would be the smaller probability of inter- ruption for men already started on their professions) careers. In the long run, that is, the 10- or 20-year period I have been talk- ing about, these effects would largely dis- appear, with one exception—the dozen or s0 students of really outstanding brilliance who appear each year—and there are seldom more—might be lost to science or have their early and most productive years spoiled. There {s another danger. The young men who had been in service might be kept in some sort of reserve; in fact, they should be, or much of the point of their military service would be lost, However, they constitute a whole generation of manpower, the man- power that ts needed for the innumerable civillan activities as easential to success in total war as the Army or Navy or Air Force. It would be wise to put the control of this reserve manpower in civilian hands at the highest level. As to the use of mature scientific man- power, this 18-20 service proposal seems to have only secondary effects. It might relieve the pressure for direct military service on some of the younger scientists. In the long run, it might help stabilize the universities. It does not remove the need of a scientific Manpower Board, a Scientific Service Corps, or @ student corps. While I believe the Bcientific Manpower Board should be vested with great authority from the first, the pro- posed military service for 18-year olds might lessen the danger of too hasty and too arbi- trary exercise of that authority. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Ihave tried to put before you the problems of stockpiling scientific manpower and ra- tioning it, in the best interest of the coun- try, just as we would any other essential resource. I have proposed for this purpose a student scientific corps to insure a continu- ing supply of scientists. For men of military age, I have proposed a Scientific Service Corps to be directed by a scientific manpower board. For men above the age of military service, I have suggested widespread volun- tary cooperation with the Scientific Man- power Board. These may not be the best solutions to this problem, but they are possible ones. Any system to be established must obviously be flexible and subject to change with ex- perience and with changing international conditions. Either the organization I have suggested, or a better one, should be set up now before we repeat the errors of the last war. I believe there is real danger that nothing will be done or that a system will be set up and will fail. Scientists can best understand the nature of this danger. They know very well that a thoughtless bureaucracy with centralized control can threaten the inde- pendence, imagination, and clarity of mind needed for creative work. Scientists know also that a haphazard system of recruitment can lessen thetr value to the country. I sug- gest that the members of this audience and their associates throughout the country have a peculiar duty to work for the adoption of a sensible system for the wise use of scien- tific manpower, to talk to their friends of the need for such a system, and to make such a system work. You know what needs to be done. Give the foresight and leader~ ship to achieve it. Such questions as these cannot be left en- tirely to the Government. They are every- body's business. What John Curran sald in 1790 1s still true: “It is the common fate of the indolent to see their rights become a prey to the active. The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal vigilance; which condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of his crime and the punishment of his guilt.” A169 The Fair Deal, 1951 Version eee EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. H. R. GROSS or Iowa IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 15, 1951 Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to cause to be reprinted in the Recorp an editorial from the Waterloo (Iowa) Daily Courier which analyzes what was purported to be a state of the Union message delivered by Presi- dent Truman a few days ago. Without detracting in the slightest from the excellence of this editorial, I would like to amplify with respect to one sentence. The writer says: It seems that from now on every Fair Deal spending scheme will be disguised as a Vital expenditure in the defense effort. I would like to point out that in the last 2 years, whenever objection was raised to any free-spending measure, ad- ministration mouthpieces raised the hue and cry that it was necessary because of crisis, emergency, security, or defense effort. Those who have been doing their best to spend this country into bank. | ruptcy and oblivion can well be expected | to continue using their specious argu-' ments in the Eighty-second Congress. Pollowing is the editorial: President Truman trotted out his 10951 version of the Fair Deal before Congress,’ dressing it this time in a uniform and car- rying @ placard which read; “Let us have unity.” The President’s task in this period is, in- deed, difficult. It is easier to rally a people to fight a war than to cajole them into the sacrifices necessary for full-scale defense to prevent a conflict. But the President did not give answers to some of the questions the American people are asking and his answers to others were so vague as to be meaningless. He declared, for instance, that American troops are fighting in Korea because aggres- sion in that country “is part of the attempt of the Russian communistic leadership to take over the world, step by step.” Yet, if we are not proposing to drive the Communists from Korea, what is the use of fighting the present costly delaying action? Does defeat after defeat, withdrawal after withdrawal, salvage our pride and prestige more than & complete evacuation? The President gave no satisfactory answer to that. Discussing the charge that Western Europe is not showing sufficient determination in planning its own defense, the President de- clared: “Their actions are answering this question.” Are they? How many divisions does France have now compared to those she had in 1914 or 1989? “Our North Atlantic Treaty partners, together, are building armies bigger than our own,” Truman declared. They should butid armies much bigger, since they have the manpower and the resources, They, moreover, are the ones directly endan- gered by the threat of Soviet aggression. And in his 10-point legislative program the President spoke in such broad generali- ties that no one can know what he means, He wants “improvement of our agricultural laws.” Does that mean he will again seek