107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 2052
AN ACT
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a
comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.
107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 2052
AN ACT
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive
solution to the war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified
its prosecution of the war against areas outside of
its control, which has already cost more than
2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than
4,000,000 people.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally
sponsored peace process, protected from manipula-
tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso-
lution of the war, protection of human rights, and
a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu-
manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential
element in the effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States
is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of
the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov-
ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au-
thority and institutions is a major impediment to
achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
process.
(6) Through the manipulation of traditional ri-
valries among peoples in areas outside of its full con-
trol, the Government of Sudan has used divide-and-
conquer techniques effectively to subjugate its popu-
lation. However, internationally sponsored reconcili-
ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
human suffering and the effectiveness of this tactic.
(7) The Government of Sudan utilizes and or-
ganizes militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other
irregular units for raiding and enslaving parties in
areas outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan in an effort to disrupt severely the ability of
the populations in those areas to sustain themselves.
The tactic helps minimize the Government of Su-
dan’s accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly
stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
lethality of the war against the areas outside of its
control.
(9) By regularly banning air transport relief
flights by the United Nations relief operation, Oper-
ation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of
Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of
food aid by the Sudanese people from the United
States and other donor countries as a devastating
weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Govern-
ment of Sudan to starve targeted groups and subdue
areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.
(10) The acts of the Government of Sudan, in-
cluding the acts described in this section, constitute
genocide as defined by the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(78 U.N.T.S. 277).
(11) The efforts of the United States and other
donors in delivering relief and assistance through
means outside of OLS have played a critical role in
addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the
Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food dona-
tions to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(12) While the immediate needs of selected
areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-
dressed in the near term, the population in areas of
Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of
their ability to sustain themselves.
(13) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in
Bahr al Ghazal and the Upper Nile and the Blue
Nile regions have been excluded completely from re-
lief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their
populations at increased risk of famine.
(14) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded
$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on
providing only for the immediate food needs of the
recipients, the current international relief operations
are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
term.
(15) The ability of populations to defend them-
selves against attack in areas outside of the control
of the Government of Sudan has been severely com-
promised by the disengagement of the front-line
states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fostering
the belief among officials of the Government of
Sudan that success on the battlefield can be
achieved.
(16) The United States should use all means of
pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-
tion to the war in Sudan, including—
(A) the multilateralization of economic and
diplomatic tools to compel the Government of
Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable demo-
cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
Sudan outside of government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-
people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in
areas outside of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms
to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;
and
(E) cooperation among the trading part-
ners of the United States and within multilat-
eral institutions toward those ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov-
ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic
Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United
Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the
World Food Program, and participating relief orga-
nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF SUDAN.
The Congress hereby—
(1) condemns—
(A) violations of human rights on all sides
of the conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall
human rights record, with regard to both the
prosecution of the war and the denial of basic
human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-
ting and tolerating the practice;
(D) the Government of Sudan’s use and
organization 
of 
‘‘murahalliin’’ 
or
‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),
and regular Sudanese Army units into orga-
nized and coordinated raiding and slaving par-
ties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,
and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions;
and
(E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets
that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan;
and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on
air transport relief flights by the Government of
Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a
tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys-
tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and
economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in
a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS.
The Congress urges the President to promptly make
available to the National Democratic Alliance the
$10,000,000 in funds appropriated for assistance to such
group under the heading ‘‘OTHER BILATERAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE, ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND’’ in title I of H.R.
5526 of the 106th Congress, as enacted into law by section
101(a) of Public Law 106–429.
SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED
PEACE PROCESS.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress hereby recognizes
that—
(1) a single viable, internationally and region-
ally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest op-
portunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settle-
ment to the war in Sudan; and
(2) resolution of the conflict in Sudan is best
made through a peace process based on the Declara-
tion of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July
20, 1994.
(b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The
Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel
of the Department of State for the support of—
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov-
ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts sup-
porting a peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool
to facilitate peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, should seek to—
(A) revise the terms of OLS to end the
veto power of the Government of Sudan over
the plans by OLS for air transport relief flights
and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of
the delivery of relief supplies to the advantage
of the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;
(B) investigate the practice of slavery in
Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimi-
nation; and
(C) sponsor a condemnation of the Govern-
ment of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to
aerial bombardment.
SEC. 8. DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN SUDAN.
(a) DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.—No entity that is
engaged in any commercial activity in Sudan may trade
any of its securities (or depository receipts with respect
to its securities) in any capital market in the United
States unless that entity has disclosed, in such form as
the Securities and Exchange Commission shall prescribe—
(1) the nature and extent of that commercial
activity in Sudan, including any plans for expansion
or diversification;
(2) the identity of all agencies of the Sudanese
Government with which the entity is doing business;
(3) the relationship of the commercial activity
to any violations of religious freedom and other
human rights in Sudan; and
(4) the contribution that the proceeds raised in
the capital markets in the United States will make
to the entity’s commercial activity in Sudan.
(b) DISCLOSURE TO THE PUBLIC.—The Securities
and Exchange Commission shall take the necessary steps
to ensure that disclosures under subsection (a) are pub-
lished or otherwise made available to the public.
(c) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY.—The President may
exercise the authorities he has under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act to assist the Securities
and Exchange Commission in carrying out this section.
SEC. 9. PROHIBITION ON TRADING IN UNITED STATES CAP-
ITAL MARKETS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—The President shall exercise the
authorities he has under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act to prohibit any entity engaged in
the development of oil or gas in Sudan—
(1) from raising capital in the United States; or
(2) from trading its securities (or depository re-
ceipts with respect to its securities) in any capital
market in the United States.
(b) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, an
entity is ‘‘engaged in the development of oil or gas in
Sudan’’ if that entity is directly engaged in the explo-
ration, production, transportation (by pipeline or other-
wise), or refining of petroleum, natural gas, or petroleum
products in Sudan.
SEC. 10. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Not later than six months after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State shall prepare and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report regarding the conflict in
Sudan. Such report shall include—
(1) a description of the sources and current sta-
tus of Sudan’s financing and construction of infra-
structure and pipelines for oil exploitation, the ef-
fects of such financing and construction on the in-
habitants of the regions in which the oil fields are
located, and the ability of the Government of Sudan
to finance the war in Sudan with the proceeds of the
oil exploitation;
(2) a description of the extent to which that fi-
nancing was secured in the United States or with in-
volvement of United States citizens;
(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan, includ-
ing targets, frequency, and best estimates of dam-
age; and
(4) a description of the extent to which humani-
tarian relief has been obstructed or manipulated by
the Government of Sudan or other forces.
SEC. 11. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS
FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that the President should continue to increase the
use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-
plies in southern Sudan.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report
describing the progress made toward carrying out sub-
section (a).
SEC. 12. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-
PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin-
gency plan to provide, outside the auspices of the United
Nations if necessary, the greatest possible amount of
United States Government and privately donated relief to
all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains
and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event
that the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial,
or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
(b) 
REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the
plan developed under subsection (a), the President may
reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for
the purposes of the plan.
SEC. 13. INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall col-
lect information about incidents which may constitute
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and other
violations of international humanitarian law by all parties
to the conflict in Sudan, including slavery, rape, and aerial
bombardment of civilian targets.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the
date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
the Secretary of State shall prepare and submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a detailed report on
the information that the Secretary of State has collected
under subsection (a) and any findings or determinations
made by the Secretary on the basis of that information.
The report under this subsection may be submitted as part
of the report required under section 9.
(c) CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS.—
In preparing the report required by this section, the Sec-
retary of State shall consult and coordinate with all other
Government officials who have information necessary to
complete the report. Nothing contained in this section
shall require the disclosure, on a classified or unclassified
basis, of information that would jeopardize sensitive
sources and methods or other vital national security inter-
ests.
Passed the House of Representatives June 13, 2001.
Attest:
Clerk.