124 
features that resembled those of an undeclared nu-
clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro-
vided the requested documentation in support of its 
declarations concerning the nature or function of the 
destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 
other locations which the IAEA has requested to 
visit.’’. 
(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 
to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 
that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 
Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter-
mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 
Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 
in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 
that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 
not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 
material.’’. 
(30) Commercial satellite photos published on 
February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the Govern-
ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi-
tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 
to the Dair Alzour facility. 
(31) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 
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125 
2011, that ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the 
[IAEA] since June 2008 in connection with the un-
resolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and 
the other three locations allegedly functionally re-
lated to it. As a consequence, the [IAEA] has not 
been able to make progress towards resolving the 
outstanding issues related to those sites.’’. 
(b) PROHIBITION.—No funds from any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 
used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 
through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun-
try, including North Korea that— 
(1) is a country the government of which has 
been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur-
poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
Act, or other provision of law, is a government that 
has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter-
national terrorism; 
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 
obligations regarding— 
(A) its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA; 
(B) the Additional Protocol; 
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126 
(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 
(D) any relevant United Nations Security 
Council Resolution; or 
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with the obligations specified in para-
graph (2). 
(c) WITHHOLDING
OF
VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBU-
TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 
from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 
in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 
its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 
in subsection (b). 
(d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not 
been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist-
ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 
to the countries described in subsection (b), an amount 
equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld 
from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 
(e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and 
(d) may be waived if— 
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127 
(1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro-
vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 
the countries described in subsection (b); or 
(2) the President certifies that the countries de-
scribed in subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to 
the national security, interests, and allies of the 
United States. 
(f) UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.—The Presi-
dent shall direct the United States Permanent Represent-
ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation 
of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through 
its Technical Cooperation Program to any country de-
scribed in subsection (b). 
(g) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the implementation of this section. 
SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA. 
(a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 
(1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 
(A) 
ESTABLISHMENT.—The 
President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
resentative to International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influ-
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128 
ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab-
lish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat 
of the IAEA. 
(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compli-
ance shall— 
(i) function as an independent body 
composed of technical experts who shall 
work in consultation with IAEA inspectors 
to assess compliance by IAEA Member 
States and provide recommendations to the 
IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen-
alties to be imposed on IAEA Member 
States that fail to fulfill their obligations 
under IAEA Board resolutions; 
(ii) base its assessments and rec-
ommendations on IAEA inspection reports; 
and 
(iii) take into consideration informa-
tion provided by IAEA Board Members 
that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states 
as recognized by the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 
U.S.T. 483) (commonly referred to as the 
‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the 
‘‘NPT’’). 
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129 
(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 
shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 
Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 
the IAEA. 
(2) 
COMMITTEE
ON
SAFEGUARDS
AND 
VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the 
IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Com-
mittee on Safeguards and Verification established in 
2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a 
workplan of concrete measures that will— 
(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to 
monitor and enforce compliance by Member 
States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency; and 
(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, be-
yond the verification mechanisms and authori-
ties contained in the Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and 
Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a 
high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear 
activities by a Member State. 
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130 
(3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall di-
rect the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in-
fluence of the United States at the IAEA to en-
sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is 
under investigation for a breach of or non-
compliance with its IAEA obligations or the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations has its privileges suspended, in-
cluding— 
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
case; 
(ii) being prevented from receiving 
any technical assistance; and 
(iii) being prevented from hosting 
meetings. 
(B) TERMINATION
OF
PENALTIES.—The 
penalties specified under subparagraph (A) 
shall be terminated when such investigation is 
concluded and such Member State is no longer 
in such breach or noncompliance. 
(4) PENALTIES
WITH
RESPECT
TO
THE
NU-
CLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY.—The Presi-
dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
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131 
resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the IAEA to en-
sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found 
to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has 
withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and 
technology received from the IAEA, any Member 
State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
(b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
(1) VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 
contributions of the United States to the IAEA 
should primarily be used to fund activities relating 
to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating 
to Nuclear Verification. 
(2) LIMITATION
ON
USE
OF
FUNDS.—The 
President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the IAEA to— 
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards in-
spections are prioritized for countries that have 
newly established nuclear programs or are initi-
ating nuclear programs; and 
(B) block the allocation of funds for any 
other IAEA development, environmental, or nu-
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132 
clear science assistance or activity to a coun-
try— 
(i) the government of which the Sec-
retary of State has determined, for pur-
poses of section 6(j) of the Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979, section 620A of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 
of the Arms Export Control Act, or other 
provision of law, is a government that has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism and the government 
of which the Secretary has determined has 
not dismantled and surrendered its weap-
ons of mass destruction programs under 
international verification; 
(ii) that is under investigation for a 
breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
(3) DETAIL
OF
EXPENDITURES.—The Presi-
dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
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133 
influence of the United States at the IAEA to se-
cure, as part of the regular budget presentation of 
the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed 
breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA 
for safeguards inspections and nuclear security ac-
tivities. 
(c) MEMBERSHIP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct 
the United States Permanent Representative to the 
IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the IAEA to block the membership 
on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Mem-
ber State of the IAEA that has not signed and rati-
fied the Additional Protocol and— 
(A) is under investigation for a breach of 
or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations; or 
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga-
tions or the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort 
to modify the criteria for Board membership to re-
flect the principles described in paragraph (1). 
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134 
(d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 
to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure 
that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 
Quantities Protocol in order to— 
(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities 
Protocol; 
(2) require that any IAEA Member State that 
has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to 
sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, 
provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its 
nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest 
inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 
(3) require that any IAEA Member State that 
does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible 
to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, 
or assistance from any IAEA Member State and 
subject to the penalties described in subsection 
(a)(3). 
(e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN AND SYRIA.— 
(1) UNITED
STATES
ACTION.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Represent-
ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influ-
ence of the United States at the IAEA to make 
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135 
every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by 
the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to 
the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran and 
Syria ineligible to receive any nuclear material, tech-
nology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assist-
ance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear 
security until the IAEA Board of Governors deter-
mines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be— 
(A) is providing full access to IAEA in-
spectors to its nuclear-related facilities; 
(B) has fully implemented and is in com-
pliance with the Additional Protocol; and 
(C) has permanently ceased and disman-
tled all activities and programs related to nu-
clear-enrichment and reprocessing. 
(2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is 
determined to have violated the prohibition on as-
sistance to Iran or Syria described in paragraph (1) 
before the IAEA Board of Governors determines 
that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has satisfied 
the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) 
through (C) of such paragraph, such Member State 
shall be subject to the penalties described in sub-
section (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear 
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136 
material, technology, equipment, or assistance from 
any IAEA Member State, and shall be ineligible to 
receive any IAEA assistance not related to safe-
guards inspections or nuclear security until such 
time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such 
determination with respect to Iran or Syria, as the 
case may be. 
(f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years 
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the implementation 
of this section. 
SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 
SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 
It is the sense of Congress that the national security 
interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov-
ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 
should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu-
rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 
TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 
SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
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137 
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations have contributed greatly toward the pro-
motion of peace and stability for over 6 decades and 
the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have 
served under the United Nations flag have done so 
with honor and courage, the record of United Na-
tions peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by 
operational failures and unconscionable acts of mis-
conduct; 
(2) in response to such failures, successive Sec-
retaries General of the United Nations have 
launched numerous reform efforts, including the 
high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Oper-
ations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria 
Lakhdar Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special 
Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad 
Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New Part-
nership Agenda, known as the ‘‘New Horizon’’ re-
ports; 
(3) despite the fact that the United Nations has 
had over a decade to implement many of these re-
forms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in 
the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the 
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138 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations re-
peatedly have expressed their commitment ‘‘to imple-
menting fundamental, systematic changes as a mat-
ter of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms con-
tinue to be blocked or delayed by Members States 
who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status 
quo; 
(4) further, audits of procurement practices in 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, con-
ducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
and the now-defunct United Nations Procurement 
Task Force have uncovered ‘‘significant’’ corruption 
schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peace-
keeping personnel; and 
(5) if the reputation of and confidence in 
United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be re-
stored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, par-
ticularly in the areas of planning, management, pro-
curement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 
implemented without further delay. 
SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA-
TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 
reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 
following areas: 
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139 
(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 
(A) GLOBAL
AUDIT.—As the size, cost, 
and number of United Nations peacekeeping 
operations have increased substantially over the 
past decade, independent audits of each such 
operation should be conducted annually, with a 
view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and en-
suring that all operations are efficient and cost 
effective. 
(B) 
PROCUREMENT
AND
TRANS-
PARENCY.—The logistics established within the 
United Nations Department of Field Support 
should be streamlined and strengthened to en-
sure 
that 
all 
peacekeeping 
missions 
are 
resourced appropriately, transparently, and in a 
timely fashion while individual accountability 
for waste, fraud and abuse within United Na-
tions peacekeeping missions is uniformly en-
forced. 
(C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING 
OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit 
described in subparagraph (A), the United Na-
tions Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
United Nations peacekeeping operation man-
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140 
dates, with a view toward identifying objectives 
that are practical and achievable, and report its 
findings to the Security Council. In particular, 
the review should consider the following: 
(i) Except in extraordinary cases, in-
cluding genocide, the United Nations De-
partment 
of 
Peacekeeping 
Operations 
should not be tasked with activities that 
are impractical or unachievable without the 
cooperation 
of 
the 
Member 
State(s) 
hosting a United Nations peacekeeping op-
eration, or which amount to de-facto 
Trusteeship outside of the procedures es-
tablished for such under Chapter XII of 
the United Nations Charter, thereby cre-
ating unrealistic expectations and obfus-
cating the primary responsibility of the 
Member States themselves in creating and 
maintaining conditions for peace. 
(ii) Long-standing operations that are 
static and cannot fulfill their mandate 
should be downsized or closed. 
(iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
that the withdrawal from a country of an 
otherwise static United Nations peace-
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