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begin withdrawing United States forces 
from Iraq. 
(B) With respect to the training and perform-
ance of security forces in Iraq, the following: 
(i) The training provided Iraqi mili-
tary and other Ministry of Defense forces 
and the equipment used by such forces. 
(ii) Key criteria for assessing the capa-
bilities and readiness of the Iraqi military 
and other Ministry of Defense forces, goals 
for achieving certain capability and readi-
ness levels (as well as for recruiting, train-
ing, and equipping these forces), and the 
milestones 
and 
notional 
timetable 
for 
achieving these goals. 
(iii) The operational readiness status 
of the Iraqi military forces, including the 
type, number, size, and organizational 
structure of Iraqi battalions that are— 
(I) 
capable 
of 
conducting 
counterinsurgency 
operations 
inde-
pendently; 
(II) 
capable 
of 
conducting 
counterinsurgency operations with the
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support of United States or coalition 
forces; or 
(III) 
not 
ready 
to 
conduct 
counterinsurgency operations. 
(iv) The rates of absenteeism in the 
Iraqi military forces and the extent to 
which insurgents have infiltrated such 
forces. 
(v) The training provided Iraqi police 
and other Ministry of Interior forces and 
the equipment used by such forces. 
(vi) Key criteria for assessing the ca-
pabilities and readiness of the Iraqi police 
and other Ministry of Interior forces, goals 
for achieving certain capability and readi-
ness levels (as well as for recruiting, train-
ing, and equipping), and the milestones and 
notional timetable for achieving these goals, 
including— 
(I) the number of police recruits 
that have received classroom training 
and the duration of such instruction; 
(II) the number of veteran police 
officers who have received classroom in-
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struction and the duration of such in-
struction; 
(III) the number of police can-
didates screened by the Iraqi Police 
Screening Service, the number of can-
didates derived from other entry proce-
dures, and the success rates of those 
groups of candidates; 
(IV) the number of Iraqi police 
forces who have received field training 
by international police trainers and 
the duration of such instruction; and 
(V) attrition rates and measures 
of absenteeism and infiltration by in-
surgents. 
(vii) The estimated total number of 
Iraqi battalions needed for the Iraqi secu-
rity forces to perform duties now being un-
dertaken by coalition forces, including de-
fending the borders of Iraq and providing 
adequate levels of law and order throughout 
Iraq. 
(viii) The effectiveness of the Iraqi 
military and police officer cadres and the 
chain of command.
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(ix) The number of United States and 
coalition advisors needed to support the 
Iraqi security forces and associated min-
istries. 
(x) An assessment, in a classified 
annex if necessary, of United States mili-
tary requirements, including planned force 
rotations, through the end of calendar year 
2006. 
(3) The deadline for submittal of the report to 
Congress was 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief, 2005, that is July 11, 2005, and every 90 days 
thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2006. 
(4) The report has not yet been received by Con-
gress. 
(5) The availability of accurate data on key per-
formance indicators is critical to understanding 
whether the United States strategy in Iraq is suc-
ceeding, and the substantial resources provided by 
Congress, which total more than $200,000,000,000 
and 
an 
approximate 
monthly 
expenditure 
of 
$5,000,000,000, with substantial resource expendi-
tures still to come, are being utilized effectively.
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(b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate 
that— 
(1) the information requested in the report de-
scribed by subsection (a) is critical— 
(A) to fulfilling the oversight obligations of 
Congress; 
(B) to ensuring the success of United States 
strategy in Iraq; 
(C) to maximizing the effectiveness of the 
substantial resources provided by Congress and 
the American people for United States efforts in 
Iraq; 
(D) to identifying when the Iraqi security 
forces will be able to assume responsibility for se-
curity in Iraq; and 
(E) to obtaining an estimate of the level of 
United States troops that will be necessary in 
Iraq during 2005 and 2006, and in any years 
thereafter; 
(2) the report should be provided by the Depart-
ment of Defense, as required by the Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 as soon as 
possible; and
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(3) the Secretary of Defense should communicate 
to Congress and the American people why the report 
was not submitted to Congress by the original dead-
line for its submittal. 
SEC. 533. SENSE OF THE SENATE. (a) FINDINGS.— 
The Senate finds that: 
(1) On February 6, 2002, Director of Central In-
telligence George Tenet testified that ‘‘[A]l Qaeda or 
other terrorist groups might also try to launch con-
ventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear in-
dustrial infrastructure of the United States to cause 
widespread toxic or radiological damage.’’ 
(2) On April 27, 2005, the GAO found that ‘‘Ex-
perts agree that the nation’s chemical facilities 
present an attractive target for terrorists intent on 
causing massive damage. For example, the Depart-
ment of Justice has concluded that the risk of an at-
tempt in the foreseeable future to cause an industrial 
chemical release is both real and credible. Terrorist 
attacks involving the theft or release of certain chemi-
cals could significantly impact the health and safety 
of millions of Americans, disrupt the local or regional 
economy, or impact other critical infrastructures that 
rely on chemicals, such as drinking water and waste-
water treatment systems.’’
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(3) As of May 2005, according to data collected 
pursuant to the Risk Management Plan (RMP) of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a worst- 
case release of chemicals from 2237 facilities would 
potentially affect between 10,000 and 99,999 people, 
a release from 493 facilities would potentially affect 
between 100,000 and 999,000, and a release from 111 
facilities would potentially affect over 1,000,000. 
(4) On April 27, 2005, the GAO found that EPA 
and RMP data was based on a release from a single 
vessel or pipe rather than the entire quantity on site 
and that ‘‘[A]n attack that breached multiple chem-
ical vessels simultaneously could result in a larger re-
lease with potentially more severe consequences than 
those outlined in ‘worst-case’ scenarios.’’ 
(5) On April 27, 2005, the GAO found that ‘‘De-
spite efforts by DHS to assess facility vulnerabilities 
and suggest security improvements, no one has com-
prehensively assessed security at facilities that house 
chemicals nationwide.’’ GAO further testified that 
‘‘EPA officials estimated in 2003, that voluntary ini-
tiatives led by industry associations only reach a por-
tion of the 15,000 RMP facilities. Further, EPA and 
DHS have stated publicly that voluntary efforts alone
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are not sufficient to assure the public of the industry’s 
preparedness.’’ 
(6) On June 15, 2005, Thomas P. Dunne, Dep-
uty Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid 
Waste and Emergency Response of the EPA testified 
that ‘‘[O]nly a fraction of U.S. hazardous chemical 
facilities are currently subject to Federal security re-
quirements’’ and that ‘‘we cannot be sure that every 
high-risk chemical facility has taken voluntary action 
to secure itself against terrorism.’’ 
(7) On June 15, 2005, Robert Stephan, Acting 
Undersecretary for Information Analysis and Infra-
structure Protection and Assistant Secretary for In-
frastructure Protection at the Department of Home-
land Security testified that that the Department ‘‘has 
concluded that from the regulatory perspective, the ex-
isting patchwork of authorities does not permit us to 
regulate the industry effectively.’’ Stephen further tes-
tified that ‘‘[I]t has become clear that the entirely vol-
untary efforts of [chemical facility] companies alone 
will not sufficiently address security for the entire 
sector’’ and that ‘‘The Department should develop en-
forceable performance standards. . .’’ 
(8) The Senate Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity and Governmental Affairs, through a series of
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valuable and wide-ranging hearings, has dem-
onstrated bipartisan commitment to effective Congres-
sional action to protect Americans against a possible 
terrorist attack against chemical facilities. 
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that the Congress should pass legislation establishing en-
forceable Federal standards to protect against a terrorist 
attack on chemical facilities within the United States. 
SEC. 534. In light of concerns regarding inconsistent 
policy memoranda and guidelines issued to counties and 
communities affected by the 2004 hurricane season, the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under 
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, shall 
provide clear, concise, and uniform guidelines for the reim-
bursement to any county or government entity affected by 
a hurricane of the costs of hurricane debris removal. 
SEC. 535. Not later than 60 days after the date of en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
acting through the Under Secretary for Emergency Pre-
paredness and Response, shall submit to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
of the House of Representatives a report describing any 
changes to Federal emergency preparedness and response 
policies and practices made as a result of the report of the
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Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security, 
dated May 20, 2005, relating to the individual and house-
hold program of the Federal Emergency Management Agen-
cy in Miami-Dade County, Florida, in response to Hurri-
cane Frances. 
SEC. 536. It is the sense of the Senate that the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security should conduct a study of the 
feasibility of leveraging existing FM broadcast radio infra-
structure to provide a first alert, encrypted, multi-point 
emergency messaging system for emergency response using 
proven technology. 
SEC. 537. Not later than 90 days after the date of en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
acting through the Under Secretary for Emergency Pre-
paredness shall propose new inspection guidelines that pro-
hibit inspectors from entering into a contract with any in-
dividual or entity for whom the inspector performs an in-
spection for purposes of determining eligibility for assist-
ance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
SEC. 538. None of the funds appropriated under this 
Act may be used to promulgate regulations to implement 
the plan developed pursuant to section 7209(b) of the 9/11 
Commission Implementation Act of 2004 (8 U.S.C. 1185 
note) to limit United States citizens to a passport as the
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exclusive document to be presented upon entry into the 
United States from Canada by land. 
SEC. 539. (a) Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Homeland Security Advisory System 
had been raised to threat level Code Orange, a level 
which indicates a high risk of terrorist attack, on six 
occasions since the Advisory System was created in 
March 2002, prior to the raising of the threat level to 
Code Orange following the bombings that occurred in 
London on July 7, 2005. 
(2) The Code Orange threat level remained in 
place for an average of 13 days on each of the first 
five occasions that it was raised to that level. 
(3) The sixth elevation of the threat level to Code 
Orange occurred in August 2004 and ended 98 days 
later, making it four times longer than any other such 
alert and constituting half of the days that the United 
States has been under a high risk of terrorist attack. 
(4) The Conference of Mayors estimates that cit-
ies in the United States spend some $70,000,000 per 
week to implement security measures associated with 
the Code Orange threat level. 
(5) The recommendation to elevate the threat 
level is made by the Homeland Security Council, a 
group of Cabinet officials and senior advisors to the