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SEC. 1334. ASSISTANCE FOR DEMINING AND RELATED AC-
TIVITIES. 
(a) ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary is authorized to 
provide grants to, or enter into contracts or cooperative 
agreements with, public-private partnerships for the pur-
pose of establishing and carrying out demining, clearance 
of unexploded ordnance, and related activities in foreign 
countries. 
(b) LIMITATION.—Except as otherwise provided, the 
total amount provided on a grant basis to public-private 
partnerships under subsection (a) for a fiscal year may 
not exceed $450,000. 
(c) FUNDING.—Amounts made available to carry out 
‘‘Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Re-
lated Programs’’ for fiscal year 2004 are authorized to 
be made available to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1335. REPORTS RELATING TO TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUC-
TIONS. 
The President shall submit to the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives 
all reports submitted to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions pursuant to section 2 of the Senate Resolution of 
Ratification to Accompany Treaty Document 107–8,
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Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. 
SEC. 1336. STATEMENT OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
REGARDING THE TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUC-
TIONS. 
The House of Representatives—
(1) concurs with the declarations of the 
Senate in section 3 of the Resolution of Ratifi-
cation to Accompany Treaty Document 107–8, 
Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offen-
sive Reductions; 
(2) encourages the President to continue 
strategic offensive reductions to the lowest pos-
sible levels consistent with national security re-
quirements and alliance obligations of the 
United States; 
(3) urges the President to engage the Rus-
sian Federation with the objectives of estab-
lishing cooperative measures to give each party 
to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Stra-
tegic Offensive Reductions improved confidence
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regarding the accurate accounting and security 
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by 
the other party; and 
(4) encourages the President to accelerate 
United States strategic force reductions, to the 
extent feasible and consistent with the treaty, in 
order that the reductions required by Article I 
of the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Stra-
tegic Offensive Reductions may be achieved 
prior to December 31, 2012. 
SEC. 1337. NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FUND. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President to carry out section 
504 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eur-
asian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act 
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5854; relating to the ‘‘Non-
proliferation and Disarmament Fund’’) $60,000,000 
for each of the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 
(2) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pur-
suant to the authorization of appropriations under 
paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available 
until expended.
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(b) NONPROLIFERATION
OF
HIGHLY
ENRICHED 
URANIUM.—
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(A) Highly enriched uranium is the most 
likely source material for terrorist or other out-
law organizations that seek to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. 
(B) Such organizations are not likely to 
produce this source material on their own, but 
will instead look to divert highly enriched ura-
nium from some of the many vulnerable stock-
piles in numerous facilities around the world. 
(C) There is a need for a coordinated 
United States Government initiative to secure 
and dispose of highly enriched uranium stock-
piles in these vulnerable facilities around the 
world. 
(D) The Nonproliferation and Disar-
mament Fund (NDF) is a unique and flexible 
entity that is well-suited to carry out the initia-
tive described in subparagraph (C), in coopera-
tion with other Federal departments and agen-
cies, including the Department of Energy. 
(2) INITIATIVE.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to establish and carry out an initiative to
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secure and dispose of highly enriched uranium stock-
piles in foreign countries, including the provision of 
such assistance as may be required to secure host 
country cooperation under the initiative. 
(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of 
the amounts made available to carry out section 504 
of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 
1992 (22 U.S.C. 5854) for fiscal years 2004 and 
2005, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
Secretary to carry out paragraph (2) $25,000,000 
for each such fiscal year. 
SEC. 1338. MARITIME INTERDICTION PATROL BOATS FOR 
MOZAMBIQUE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to 
carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act for 
fiscal year 2004, there is authorized to be appropriated 
$1,000,000 for refurbishment, delivery, operational train-
ing, and related costs associated with the provision of not 
more than four excess coastal patrol boats to the Govern-
ment of Mozambique for maritime patrol and interdiction 
activities. 
(b) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)
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are authorized to remain available until September 30, 
2006. 
SEC. 1339. REPORT ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION. 
Not later than December 31, 2003, and December 
31, 2004, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report on cooperative ef-
forts that have been undertaken by the United States with 
foreign governments to foster the development and deploy-
ment of defenses against missile attack. Such report shall 
include a detailed description of such efforts on a country-
by-country basis, and may be submitted in classified and 
unclassified form, as appropriate. 
SEC. 1340. IRAN’S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EX-
PLOSIVE DEVICE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Iran, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has legally for-
sworn developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. 
(2) Iran has for more than a decade pursued a 
program aimed at the development of a nuclear ex-
plosive device. 
(3) Director of Central Intelligence George 
Tenet has repeatedly warned of Iran’s clandestine 
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, stat-
ing as recently as February 11, 2003, in testimony
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before Congress that ‘‘Iran is continuing to pursue 
development of a nuclear fuel cycle for civilian and 
nuclear weapons purposes . . . [and further that] 
Tehran may be able to indigenously produce enough 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon’’ within this 
decade. 
(4) On March 17, 2003, Dr. el Baradei, Direc-
tor General of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), called on Iran to agree to a more 
intrusive monitoring regime at its nuclear sites and 
demanded that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty, agree to an ‘‘addi-
tional protocol’’ under the IAEA’s nuclear inspection 
rights, which would enable more intrusive moni-
toring. 
(5) In early 2003 Iran announced plans to mine 
its own natural uranium and admitted constructing 
two nuclear facilities, one a gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment facility and the other a heavy water pro-
duction plant. 
(6) A uranium enrichment facility would give 
Iran the capability to indigenously produce nuclear-
weapons grade uranium. Further, heavy water is 
used in reactors that not only produce weapons-
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grade plutonium, but also tritium, a key ingredient 
in boosted-fission weapons. 
(7) At the same time, Iran has been developing 
long-range missiles that could deliver nuclear explo-
sive devices. Director of Central Intelligence Tenet 
has warned that Iran could flight test an interconti-
nental ballistic missile later this decade. 
(8) Iran has received considerable assistance in 
its nuclear program and in its missile development 
program from the Russian Federation, the People’s 
Republic of China, and North Korea. 
(9) Congress has long been seized with finding 
ways to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or develop-
ment of such deadly weapons, including through the 
enactment of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1992, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 
the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000, and the 
Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 2002. 
(10) Successive Administrations have similarly 
sought to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or devel-
opment of such weapons by such measures as ele-
vating Iran’s proliferation behavior in bilateral rela-
tions with the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China, sanctioning entities of the Rus-
sian Federation providing technology or expertise to
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Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and urging 
multilateral export control regimes to deny sensitive 
technology to proliferators like Iran. 
(11) President Bush included Iran as one of the 
countries that comprise the ‘‘axis of evil’’ in his Jan-
uary 2002 State of the Union Address because of its 
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and 
its support of international terrorism. Iran has been 
the principle supporter and supplier to Hizballah in 
southern Lebanon, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Fur-
ther, the leaders of Iran have publicly called for the 
destruction of the State of Israel. 
(12) A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave 
threat to the national security of the United States 
and to our allies in the region. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress—
(1) finds that Iran’s support of terrorism and 
its efforts to develop nuclear weapons are a grave 
threat to the national security of the United States 
and its allies and to the United States Armed 
Forces; 
(2) declares that the United States and our 
friends and allies must make maximum efforts to 
prevent Iran from developing or acquiring nuclear 
weapons and the missiles to deliver them;
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(3) urges the President to use all appropriate 
means to prevent Iran from gaining such capabili-
ties; 
(4) urges the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) to employ the full range of its in-
spection authorities to ensure that Iran’s nuclear 
program is used for peaceful purposes only; 
(5) encourages Iran to sign and ratify the new 
nuclear safeguards protocol, the ‘‘Model Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC/540-Corr)’’ to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would 
demonstrate Iran’s commitment to sharing informa-
tion about its nuclear program with the IAEA and 
the international community and to full disclosure 
and transparency about its nuclear program; and 
(6) urges the United States resident representa-
tive to the IAEA to work with the Board of Gov-
ernors of the IAEA on guidelines for early identifica-
tion of noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty. 
TITLE XIV—MISSILE THREAT 
REDUCTION ACT OF 2003
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Missile Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 2003’’.
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Subtitle 
A—Strengthening 
Inter-
national Missile Nonprolifera-
tion Law 
SEC. 1411. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles 
suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal warheads is accelerating across the globe. 
(2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, more than 25 countries possess 
missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and 
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. 
(3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing 
such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer 
of such missiles and their production technology to 
other countries, are directly hostile to the United 
States, its interests, and its allies. 
(B) Of particular concern in this regard is 
North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles 
and technology to countries in regions of instability 
and concern to the United States. 
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated 
in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic mis-
sile threat the following:
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‘‘Emerging ballistic missile states continue 
to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy 
of the missile systems in their inventories—pos-
ing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, 
and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, 
U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats 
from SRBM’s [Short Range Ballistic Mis-
siles]—primarily the Scud and its variants. 
Today, countries have deployed or are on the 
verge of deploying MRBM’s [Medium Range 
Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of 
targets at risk. 
‘‘Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 
technologies, materials, and expertise—espe-
cially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean 
entities—has enabled emerging missile states to 
accelerate the development timelines for their 
existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to 
gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the 
case of the Chinese sale of the M–11 SRBM to 
Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the ex-
pansion of domestic infrastructures to poten-
tially accommodate even more capable and 
longer range future systems.’’.
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(5) The same CIA report also noted the fol-
lowing: ‘‘North Korea has assumed the role as the 
missile and manufacturing technology source for 
many programs. North Korean willingness to sell 
complete systems and components has enabled other 
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier 
than otherwise would have been possible—notably 
the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The 
North also has helped countries to acquire tech-
nologies to serve as the basis for domestic develop-
ment efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of 
the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, 
Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile tech-
nology.’’. 
(6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to 
abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where-
by adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to 
nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles, 
their constituent parts, and the facilities to manu-
facture them, especially ‘‘Category I’’ missiles, which 
at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload 
capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially 
suited for delivering nuclear weapons.
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(7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to 
observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from, 
but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR. 
While this is a welcome achievement, it does not pro-
vide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain 
from the trade in missiles or missile technology. 
(8) On December 10, 2002, the White House 
released its ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction’’, wherein it is stated that 
strengthening international nonproliferation controls 
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon 
the missiles that can deliver them is the second of 
three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The 
National Strategy also states that ‘‘effective inter-
diction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to com-
bat WMD and their delivery means’’. 
(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States 
took control of an unflagged freighter that was at-
tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to 
Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen-
erally prohibited from transfer as Category I mis-
siles. 
(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad-
herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case 
are not legally binding, and there is no binding
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international legal instrument that would prohibit 
shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph 
(9). 
(11) At Yemen’s request, the United States re-
leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles 
to Yemen. 
(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White 
House press spokesman stated that existing inter-
national law regarding halting the spread of missile 
proliferation could be strengthened. The new Na-
tional Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass De-
struction also commits the United States to support 
those regimes that are currently in force, and to 
work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance 
with, those regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a 
regime that the United States will seek to strength-
en. 
(13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
testifying on February 12, 2003, before the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the 
following: ‘‘. . . [I]t’s pretty clear that the prolifera-
tion regimes that exist in the world worked pretty 
well before, [but] they’re not working very well right 
now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up and says this 
is a dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes
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that will in fact get cooperation to stop those weap-
ons, we’re going to be facing a very serious situation 
in the next five years.’’. 
(14) The MTCR has made an invaluable con-
tribution to restraint in the international trade of of-
fensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international 
controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a 
dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously 
abide by the MTCR’s guidelines, and a binding legal 
basis for the United Nations and countries devoted 
to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary 
act to prevent, further proliferation of offensive bal-
listic missiles around the world. 
(15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the 
United States to promote the creation of new inter-
national mechanisms that would, in all future cir-
cumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding 
nations of the world the authority to interdict and 
prevent the transfer of such missiles. 
SEC. 1412. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to seek 
a binding international instrument or instruments to re-
strict the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges 
of 300 kilometers or more that have a payload capacity 
of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding international
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instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a 
United Nations Security Council resolution, or other in-
strument of international law, and should provide for en-
forcement measures including interdiction, seizure, and 
impoundment of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic mis-
siles and related technology, equipment, and components.
SEC. 1413. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
should immediately introduce a resolution in the United 
Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the 
United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or al-
lowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent 
interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, 
missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or 
missile-related technology from North Korea. 
Subtitle B—Strengthening United 
States Missile Nonproliferation 
Law 
SEC. 1421. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PER-
SONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiv-
er, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a 
foreign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section
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11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a li-
cense shall be required, for a period of not less than 3 
years, for the export to that foreign person of all items 
controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), 
as continued in effect under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations. 
(b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to 
a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate that he has determined that—
(1) the foreign person has—
(A) ceased all activity related to the origi-
nal imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) 
of the Arms Export Control Act or section 
11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979, as the case may be; and 
(B) has instituted a program of trans-
parency measures whereby the United States 
will be able to verify for at least a period of 3
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years that the foreign person is not engaging in 
prohibited activities under those provisions of 
law referred to in paragraph (1); and 
(2) there has been an appropriate resolution of 
the original violation or violations, such as financial 
penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited 
items, or other appropriate measures taken to pre-
vent a recurrence of the violation or violations. 
SEC. 1422. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PER-
SONS. 
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)(2) 
(22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ‘‘2 years’’ 
each place it appears and inserting ‘‘4 years’’. 
(b) PUBLIC INFORMATION.—Section 73(e)(2) (22 
U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new sentence: ‘‘Such report may be classified 
only to the extent necessary to protect intelligence sources 
and methods. If the report is so classified, the President 
shall make every effort to acquire sufficient alternative in-
formation that would allow a subsequent unclassified 
version of the report to be issued.’’. 
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—Any 
sanction imposed on a foreign person under section 
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
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U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall 
be in effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date 
on which the sanction was imposed. 
(d) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub-
sections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c) 
shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a) 
of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions 
that were committed by foreign persons on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2003. 
SEC. 1423. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPON-
SIBLE PERSONS. 
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a) 
(22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person 
under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any govern-
mental entity that the President determines exercises ef-
fective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly 
facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
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‘‘(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person 
under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that 
sanction on any other person or entity that the President 
has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may 
not be exported to that foreign person on account of the 
sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that for-
eign person access to, such items. 
‘‘(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period 
of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, 
by a United States person or within the United States, 
with any foreign person on whom sanctions have been im-
posed under this subsection. 
‘‘(D) The President shall report on an annual basis 
to the Committee on International Relations of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that 
engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign per-
son on whom sanctions have been imposed under this sub-
section that either—
‘‘(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 
under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions 
have not been imposed; or 
‘‘(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 
under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity
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had been carried out by a United States person or 
by a person in the United States. 
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent 
feasible, but may include a classified annex.’’. 
(b) DEFINITION OF PERSON.—Section 74(a)(8)(A) 
(22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(8)(A) the term ‘person’ means—
‘‘(i) a natural person; 
‘‘(ii) a corporation, business association, 
partnership, society, trust, transnational cor-
poration, or transnational joint venture, any
other nongovernmental entity, organization, or 
group, and any governmental entity; 
‘‘(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent en-
tity of any business enterprise or other organi-
zation or entity listed in clause (ii); and 
‘‘(iv) any successor of any business enter-
prise or other organization or entity listed in 
clause (ii) or (iii); and’’. 
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—
(1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT EN-
TITIES.—Any sanction imposed on a foreign person 
under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the Export Adminis-
tration 
Act 
of 
1979 
(50 
U.S.C. 
App. 
2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the
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International Emergency Economic Powers Act (in 
this subsection referred to as a ‘‘dual use sanction’’), 
shall also be imposed on any governmental entity 
that the President determines exercises effective con-
trol over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly fa-
cilitates the activities of that foreign person. 
(2) OTHER ENTITIES.—When a dual use sanc-
tion is imposed on a foreign person, the President 
may also impose that sanction on any other person 
or entity that the President has reason to believe 
has or may acquire items that may not be exported 
to that foreign person on account of the dual use 
sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the in-
tent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to 
that foreign person access to, such items. 
(3) TRANSACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES.—The 
President may also prohibit, for such period of time 
as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by 
a United States person or within the United States, 
with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions 
have been imposed. 
(4) REPORT.—The President shall submit on 
an annual basis to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains the identity of any 
foreign person that engages in any transaction or
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activity with a foreign person on whom dual use 
sanctions have been imposed that either—
(A) would be the basis for imposing dual 
use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for 
which such sanctions have not been imposed; or 
(B) would be the basis for imposing dual 
use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the trans-
action or activity had been carried out by a 
United States person or by a person in the 
United States. 
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum 
extent feasible, but may include a classified annex. 
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
(A) 
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘person’’ 
means—
(i) a natural person; 
(ii) a corporation, business associa-
tion, 
partnership, 
society, 
trust, 
transnational corporation, or transnational 
joint venture, any other nongovernmental 
entity, organization, or group, and any 
governmental entity; 
(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent 
entity of any business enterprise or other