IV 
110TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 799 
Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United States, of 
high crimes and misdemeanors. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NOVEMBER 6, 2007 
Mr. KUCINICH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary 
RESOLUTION 
Impeaching Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the United 
States, of high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Resolved, That Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of 
the United States, is impeached for high crimes and mis-
demeanors, and that the following articles of impeachment 
be exhibited to the United States Senate: 
Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in the 
name of itself and of the people of the United States of 
America, against Richard B. Cheney, Vice President of the 
United States of America, in maintenance and support of 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
HRES 799 IH 
its impeachment against him for high crimes and mis-
demeanors. 
Article I 
In his conduct while Vice President of the United 
States, Richard B. Cheney, in violation of his constitu-
tional oath to faithfully execute the office of Vice Presi-
dent of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty 
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has pur-
posely manipulated the intelligence process to deceive the 
citizens and Congress of the United States by fabricating 
a threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to justify 
the use of the United States Armed Forces against the 
nation of Iraq in a manner damaging to our national secu-
rity interests, to wit: 
(1) Despite all evidence to the contrary, the 
Vice President actively and systematically sought to 
deceive the citizens and Congress of the United 
States about an alleged threat of Iraqi weapons of 
mass destruction: 
(A) ‘‘We know they have biological and 
chemical weapons.’’ March 17, 2002, Press 
Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and 
His Highness Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
HRES 799 IH 
Crown Prince of Bahrain at Shaikh Hamad 
Palace. 
(B) ‘‘. . . and we know they are pursuing 
nuclear weapons.’’ March 19, 2002, Press 
Briefing by Vice President Dick Cheney and 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Jeru-
salem. 
(C) ‘‘And he is actively pursuing nuclear 
weapons at this time . . .’’ March 24, 2002, 
CNN Late Edition interview with Vice Presi-
dent Cheney. 
(D) ‘‘We know he’s got chemicals and bio-
logical and we know he’s working on nuclear.’’ 
May 19, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview 
with Vice President Cheney. 
(E) ‘‘But we now know that Saddam has 
resumed 
his 
efforts 
to 
acquire 
nuclear 
weapons . . . Simply stated, there is no doubt 
that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass 
destruction. There is no doubt that he is amass-
ing them to use against our friends, against our 
allies, and against us.’’ August 26, 2002, 
Speech of Vice President Cheney at VFW 
103rd National Convention. 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
HRES 799 IH 
(F) ‘‘Based on intelligence that’s becoming 
available, some of it has been made public, 
more of it hopefully will be, that he has indeed 
stepped up his capacity to produce and deliver 
biological weapons, that he has reconstituted 
his nuclear program to develop a nuclear weap-
on, that there are efforts under way inside Iraq 
to significantly expand his capability.’’ Sep-
tember 8, 2002, NBC Meet the Press interview 
with Vice President Cheney. 
(G) ‘‘He is, in fact, actively and aggres-
sively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.’’ 
September 8, 2002, NBC Meet the Press inter-
view with Vice President Cheney. 
(H) ‘‘And we believe he has, in fact, recon-
stituted nuclear weapons.’’ March 16, 2003, 
NBC Meet the Press interview with Vice Presi-
dent Cheney. 
(2) Preceding the March 2003 invasion of Iraq 
the Vice President was fully informed that no legiti-
mate evidence existed of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq. The Vice President pressured the intel-
ligence community to change their findings to enable 
the deception of the citizens and Congress of the 
United States. 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
HRES 799 IH 
(A) Vice President Cheney and his Chief of 
Staff, Lewis Libby, made multiple trips to the 
CIA in 2002 to question analysts studying 
Iraq’s weapons programs and alleged links to al 
Qaeda, creating an environment in which ana-
lysts felt they were being pressured to make 
their assessments fit with the Bush administra-
tion’s policy objectives accounts. 
(B) Vice President Cheney sought out 
unverified and ultimately inaccurate raw intel-
ligence to prove his preconceived beliefs. This 
strategy of cherry picking was employed to in-
fluence the interpretation of the intelligence. 
(3) The Vice President’s actions corrupted or 
attempted to corrupt the 2002 National Intelligence 
Estimate, an intelligence document issued on Octo-
ber 1, 2002, and carefully considered by Congress 
prior to the October 10, 2002, vote to authorize the 
use of force. The Vice President’s actions prevented 
the necessary reconciliation of facts for the National 
Intelligence Estimate which resulted in a high num-
ber of dissenting opinions from technical experts in 
two Federal agencies. 
(A) The State Department’s Bureau of In-
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
HRES 799 IH 
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
stated ‘‘Lacking persuasive evidence that Bagh-
dad has launched a coherent effort to reconsti-
tute its nuclear weapons program INR is un-
willing to speculate that such an effort began 
soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to 
project a timeline for the completion of activi-
ties it does not now see happening. As a result 
INR is unable to predict that Iraq could ac-
quire a nuclear device or weapon.’’. 
(B) The State Department’s Bureau of In-
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
also stated that ‘‘Finally, the claims of Iraqi 
pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in 
INR’s assessment, highly dubious.’’. 
(C) The State Department’s Bureau of In-
telligence and Research dissenting view in the 
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate 
references a Department of Energy opinion by 
stating that ‘‘INR accepts the judgment of 
technical experts at the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the 
tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for 
use in gas centrifuges to be used for uranium 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
05:46 Nov 07, 2007
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\HR799.IH
HR799
ccoleman on PROD1PC69 with BILLS