H. R. 1646—87
SEC. 1303. INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CON-
TROL TRAINING.
Chapter 9 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2349bb et seq.) is amended—
(1) by redesignating sections 584 and 585 as sections 585
and 586, respectively; and
(2) by inserting after section 583 the following:
‘‘SEC. 584. INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROL
TRAINING.
‘‘(a) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to fur-
nish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this chapter
(but whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis), education and
training to appropriate military and civilian personnel of foreign
countries for the purpose of enhancing the nonproliferation and
export control capabilities of such personnel through their attend-
ance in special courses of instruction conducted by the United
States.
‘‘(b) ADMINISTRATION OF COURSES.—The Secretary of State shall
have overall responsibility for the development and conduct of inter-
national nonproliferation education and training programs under
this section, and may utilize other departments and agencies of
the United States, as appropriate, to recommend personnel for
the education and training and to administer specific courses of
instruction.
‘‘(c) PURPOSES.—Education and training activities conducted
under this section shall be—
‘‘(1) of a technical nature, emphasizing techniques for
detecting, deterring, monitoring, interdicting, and countering
proliferation;
‘‘(2) designed to encourage effective and mutually beneficial
relations and increased understanding between the United
States and friendly countries; and
‘‘(3) designed to improve the ability of friendly countries
to utilize their resources with maximum effectiveness, thereby
contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.
‘‘(d) PRIORITY TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES.—In selecting personnel
for education and training pursuant to this section, priority should
be given to personnel from countries determined by the Secretary
of State to be countries frequently transited by proliferation-related
shipments of cargo.’’.
SEC. 1304. RELOCATION OF SCIENTISTS.
(a) REINSTATEMENT OF CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY.—Section 4
of the Soviet Scientists Immigration Act of 1992 (Public Law 102–
509; 106 Stat. 3316; 8 U.S.C. 1153 note) is amended by striking
subsection (d) and inserting the following:
‘‘(d) DURATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority under subsection
(a) shall be in effect during the following periods:
‘‘(1) The period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act and ending 4 years after such date.
‘‘(2) The period beginning on the date of the enactment
of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 and ending 4 years
after such date.’’.
(b) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS ELIGIBLE FOR VISAS
UNDER AUTHORITY.—Section 4(c) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1153 note)
is amended by striking ‘‘750’’ and inserting ‘‘950’’.
H. R. 1646—88
(c) LIMITATION
ON ELIGIBILITY.—Section 4(a) of that Act (8
U.S.C. 1153 note) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentence: ‘‘A scientist is not eligible for designation under
this subsection if the scientist has previously been granted the
status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as
defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)).’’.
(d) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—The Attorney General shall
consult with the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of Energy, and the heads of other appropriate agencies of the
United States regarding—
(1) previous experience in implementing the Soviet Sci-
entists Immigration Act of 1992; and
(2) any changes that those officials would recommend in
the regulations prescribed under that Act.
SEC. 1305. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY REGULAR
BUDGET ASSESSMENTS AND VOLUNTARY CONTRIBU-
TIONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Department has concluded that the International
Atomic Energy Agency (in this section referred to as the
‘‘IAEA’’) is a critical and effective instrument for verifying
compliance with international nuclear nonproliferation agree-
ments, and that it serves as an essential barrier to the spread
of nuclear weapons.
(2) The IAEA furthers United States national security
objectives by helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons material, especially through its work on effective
verification and safeguards measures.
(3) The IAEA can also perform a critical role in monitoring
and verifying aspects of nuclear weapons reduction agreements
between nuclear weapons states.
(4) The IAEA has adopted a multifaceted action plan, to
be funded by voluntary contributions, to address the threats
posed by radioactive sources that could be used in a radiological
weapon and will be the leading international agency in this
effort.
(5) As the IAEA has negotiated and developed more effec-
tive verification and safeguards measures, it has experienced
significant real growth in its mission, especially in the vital
area of nuclear safeguards inspections.
(6) Nearly two decades of zero budget growth have affected
the ability of the IAEA to carry out its mission and to hire
and retain the most qualified inspectors and managers, as
evidenced in the decreasing proportion of such personnel who
hold doctorate degrees.
(7) Increased voluntary contributions by the United States
will be needed if the IAEA is to increase its safeguards activities
and also to implement its action plan to address the worldwide
risks posed by lost or poorly secured radioactive sources.
(8) Although voluntary contributions by the United States
lessen the IAEA’s budgetary constraints, they cannot readily
be used for the long-term capital investments or permanent
staff increases necessary to an effective IAEA safeguards
regime.
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(9) The recent United States decision to accept a 25 percent
IAEA regular budget assessment was based upon a correct
interpretation of existing law. It was not the intent of Congress
that the United States contributions to all United Nations-
related organizations and activities be reduced pursuant to
the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted
into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106–113; 113
Stat. 1501A–405 et seq.), which sets 22 percent assessment
rates as benchmarks for the general United Nations budget,
the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health
Organization, and the International Labor Organization.
Rather, contributions for an important and effective agency
such as the IAEA should be maintained at levels commensurate
with the criticality of its mission.
(10) The Secretary should negotiate a gradual and sus-
tained increase in the regular budget of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, which should begin with the 2004
budget.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs there is authorized to be appro-
priated $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2003 for a United States vol-
untary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
including for the purpose of implementing the Protection Against
Nuclear Terrorism program adopted by the International Atomic
Energy Agency Board of Governors in March 2002.
SEC. 1306. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT OF
2000.
(a) REPORTS
ON PROLIFERATION
TO IRAN.—Section 2 of the
Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–178; 114 Stat.
39; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
‘‘(e) CONTENT OF REPORTS.—Each report under subsection (a)
shall contain, with respect to each foreign person identified in
such report, a brief description of the type and quantity of the
goods, services, or technology transferred by that person to Iran,
the circumstances surrounding the transfer, the usefulness of the
transfer to Iranian weapons programs, and the probable awareness
or lack thereof of the transfer on the part of the government
with primary jurisdiction over the person.’’.
(b) DETERMINATION EXEMPTING FOREIGN PERSONS FROM CER-
TAIN MEASURES UNDER THE ACT.—Section 5(a)(2) of such Act is
amended by striking ‘‘systems’’ and inserting ‘‘systems, or weapons
listed on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List of July 12,
1996, or any subsequent revision of that list’’.
SEC. 1307. AMENDMENTS TO THE NORTH KOREA THREAT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1999.
(a) RESTRICTIONS.—Section 822(a) of the North Korea Threat
Reduction Act of 1999 (subtitle B of title VIII of division A of
H.R. 3427, as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public
Law 106–113; appendix G; 113 Stat. 1501A–472) is amended by
striking ‘‘nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods,
services, or technology that would be subject to such agreement,’’
each of the two places it appears and inserting ‘‘specified nuclear
item,’’.
H. R. 1646—90
(b) SPECIFIED NUCLEAR ITEM DEFINED.—Section 823 of the
North Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999 is amended by inserting
at the end the following:
‘‘(5) SPECIFIED NUCLEAR ITEM.—The term ‘specified nuclear
item’ includes—
‘‘(A) nuclear material, facilities, components, or other
goods, services, or technology the transfer of which to North
Korea would be required by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to be subject to an agreement for cooperation, as
defined in section 11 b. of that Act (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.),
between the United States and North Korea; and
‘‘(B) components that are listed on Annex A or Annex
B to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export
of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology (published
by the International Atomic Energy Agency as Information
Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev. 5/Part 1, or any subsequent
revision thereof).’’.
SEC. 1308. ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES
AND 
ESSENTIAL 
COMPONENTS 
OF 
NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 2003, and annually there-
after, the President shall transmit to the designated congressional
committees an annual report on the transfer by any country of
weapons, technology, components, or materials that can be used
to deliver, manufacture (including research and experimentation),
or weaponize nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons
(in this section referred to as ‘‘NBC weapons’’) to any country
other than a country referred to in subsection (d) that is seeking
to possess or otherwise acquire such weapons, technology, or mate-
rials, or other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense
has reason to believe could be used to develop, acquire, or deliver
NBC weapons.
(b) MATTERS
TO
BE
INCLUDED.—Each such report shall
include—
(1) the transfer of all aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery
weapons, unguided rockets and multiple rocket systems, and
related bombs, shells, warheads and other weaponization tech-
nology and materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of
Defense has reason to believe may be intended for the delivery
of NBC weapons;
(2) international transfers of MTCR equipment or tech-
nology to any country that is seeking to acquire such equipment
or any other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of
Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC
weapons; and
(3) the transfer of technology, test equipment, radioactive
materials, feedstocks and cultures, and all other specialized
materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has
reason to believe could be used to manufacture NBC weapons.
(c) CONTENT OF REPORT.—Each such report shall include the
following with respect to preceding calendar year:
(1) The status of missile, aircraft, and other NBC weapons
delivery and weaponization programs in any such country,
including efforts by such country or by any subnational group
to acquire MTCR-controlled equipment, NBC-capable aircraft,
or any other weapon or major weapon component which may