376
are authorized to remain available until September 30,
2006.
SEC. 1339. REPORT ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION.
Not later than December 31, 2003, and December
31, 2004, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report on cooperative ef-
forts that have been undertaken by the United States with
foreign governments to foster the development and deploy-
ment of defenses against missile attack. Such report shall
include a detailed description of such efforts on a country-
by-country basis, and may be submitted in classified and
unclassified form, as appropriate.
SEC. 1340. IRAN’S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EX-
PLOSIVE DEVICE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Iran, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has legally for-
sworn developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
(2) Iran has for more than a decade pursued a
program aimed at the development of a nuclear ex-
plosive device.
(3) Director of Central Intelligence George
Tenet has repeatedly warned of Iran’s clandestine
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, stat-
ing as recently as February 11, 2003, in testimony
377
before Congress that ‘‘Iran is continuing to pursue
development of a nuclear fuel cycle for civilian and
nuclear weapons purposes . . . [and further that]
Tehran may be able to indigenously produce enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon’’ within this
decade.
(4) On March 17, 2003, Dr. el Baradei, Direc-
tor General of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), called on Iran to agree to a more
intrusive monitoring regime at its nuclear sites and
demanded that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty, agree to an ‘‘addi-
tional protocol’’ under the IAEA’s nuclear inspection
rights, which would enable more intrusive moni-
toring.
(5) In early 2003 Iran announced plans to mine
its own natural uranium and admitted constructing
two nuclear facilities, one a gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment facility and the other a heavy water pro-
duction plant.
(6) A uranium enrichment facility would give
Iran the capability to indigenously produce nuclear-
weapons grade uranium. Further, heavy water is
used in reactors that not only produce weapons-
378
grade plutonium, but also tritium, a key ingredient
in boosted-fission weapons.
(7) At the same time, Iran has been developing
long-range missiles that could deliver nuclear explo-
sive devices. Director of Central Intelligence Tenet
has warned that Iran could flight test an interconti-
nental ballistic missile later this decade.
(8) Iran has received considerable assistance in
its nuclear program and in its missile development
program from the Russian Federation, the People’s
Republic of China, and North Korea.
(9) Congress has long been seized with finding
ways to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or develop-
ment of such deadly weapons, including through the
enactment of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation
Act of 1992, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,
the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000, and the
Iran Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 2002.
(10) Successive Administrations have similarly
sought to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or devel-
opment of such weapons by such measures as ele-
vating Iran’s proliferation behavior in bilateral rela-
tions with the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China, sanctioning entities of the Rus-
sian Federation providing technology or expertise to
379
Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and urging
multilateral export control regimes to deny sensitive
technology to proliferators like Iran.
(11) President Bush included Iran as one of the
countries that comprise the ‘‘axis of evil’’ in his Jan-
uary 2002 State of the Union Address because of its
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and
its support of international terrorism. Iran has been
the principle supporter and supplier to Hizballah in
southern Lebanon, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Fur-
ther, the leaders of Iran have publicly called for the
destruction of the State of Israel.
(12) A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave
threat to the national security of the United States
and to our allies in the region.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress—
(1) finds that Iran’s support of terrorism and
its efforts to develop nuclear weapons are a grave
threat to the national security of the United States
and its allies and to the United States Armed
Forces;
(2) declares that the United States and our
friends and allies must make maximum efforts to
prevent Iran from developing or acquiring nuclear
weapons and the missiles to deliver them;
380
(3) urges the President to use all appropriate
means to prevent Iran from gaining such capabili-
ties;
(4) urges the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to employ the full range of its in-
spection authorities to ensure that Iran’s nuclear
program is used for peaceful purposes only;
(5) encourages Iran to sign and ratify the new
nuclear safeguards protocol, the ‘‘Model Additional
Protocol (INFCIRC/540-Corr)’’ to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would
demonstrate Iran’s commitment to sharing informa-
tion about its nuclear program with the IAEA and
the international community and to full disclosure
and transparency about its nuclear program; and
(6) urges the United States resident representa-
tive to the IAEA to work with the Board of Gov-
ernors of the IAEA on guidelines for early identifica-
tion of noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty.
TITLE XIV—MISSILE THREAT
REDUCTION ACT OF 2003
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Missile Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 2003’’.
381
Subtitle 
A—Strengthening 
Inter-
national Missile Nonprolifera-
tion Law
SEC. 1411. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles
suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal warheads is accelerating across the globe.
(2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, more than 25 countries possess
missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.
(3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing
such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer
of such missiles and their production technology to
other countries, are directly hostile to the United
States, its interests, and its allies.
(B) Of particular concern in this regard is
North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles
and technology to countries in regions of instability
and concern to the United States.
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated
in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic mis-
sile threat the following:
382
‘‘Emerging ballistic missile states continue
to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy
of the missile systems in their inventories—pos-
ing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests,
and allies throughout the world. A decade ago,
U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats
from SRBM’s [Short Range Ballistic Mis-
siles]—primarily the Scud and its variants.
Today, countries have deployed or are on the
verge of deploying MRBM’s [Medium Range
Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of
targets at risk.
‘‘Proliferation of ballistic missile-related
technologies, materials, and expertise—espe-
cially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean
entities—has enabled emerging missile states to
accelerate the development timelines for their
existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to
gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the
case of the Chinese sale of the M–11 SRBM to
Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the ex-
pansion of domestic infrastructures to poten-
tially accommodate even more capable and
longer range future systems.’’.
383
(5) The same CIA report also noted the fol-
lowing: ‘‘North Korea has assumed the role as the
missile and manufacturing technology source for
many programs. North Korean willingness to sell
complete systems and components has enabled other
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier
than otherwise would have been possible—notably
the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The
North also has helped countries to acquire tech-
nologies to serve as the basis for domestic develop-
ment efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of
the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile,
Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile tech-
nology.’’.
(6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to
abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where-
by adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to
nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles,
their constituent parts, and the facilities to manu-
facture them, especially ‘‘Category I’’ missiles, which
at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload
capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially
suited for delivering nuclear weapons.
384
(7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to
observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from,
but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR.
While this is a welcome achievement, it does not pro-
vide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain
from the trade in missiles or missile technology.
(8) On December 10, 2002, the White House
released its ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction’’, wherein it is stated that
strengthening international nonproliferation controls
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon
the missiles that can deliver them is the second of
three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The
National Strategy also states that ‘‘effective inter-
diction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to com-
bat WMD and their delivery means’’.
(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States
took control of an unflagged freighter that was at-
tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to
Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen-
erally prohibited from transfer as Category I mis-
siles.
(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad-
herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case
are not legally binding, and there is no binding
385
international legal instrument that would prohibit
shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph
(9).
(11) At Yemen’s request, the United States re-
leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles
to Yemen.
(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White
House press spokesman stated that existing inter-
national law regarding halting the spread of missile
proliferation could be strengthened. The new Na-
tional Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass De-
struction also commits the United States to support
those regimes that are currently in force, and to
work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance
with, those regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a
regime that the United States will seek to strength-
en.
(13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
testifying on February 12, 2003, before the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the
following: ‘‘. . . [I]t’s pretty clear that the prolifera-
tion regimes that exist in the world worked pretty
well before, [but] they’re not working very well right
now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up and says this
is a dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes
386
that will in fact get cooperation to stop those weap-
ons, we’re going to be facing a very serious situation
in the next five years.’’.
(14) The MTCR has made an invaluable con-
tribution to restraint in the international trade of of-
fensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international
controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a
dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously
abide by the MTCR’s guidelines, and a binding legal
basis for the United Nations and countries devoted
to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary
act to prevent, further proliferation of offensive
ballistic missiles around the world.
(15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the
United States to promote the creation of new inter-
national mechanisms that would, in all future cir-
cumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding
nations of the world the authority to interdict and
prevent the transfer of such missiles.
SEC. 1412. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
It shall be the policy of the United States to seek
a binding international instrument or instruments to re-
strict the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges
of 300 kilometers or more that have a payload capacity
of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding international
387
instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a
United Nations Security Council resolution, or other in-
strument of international law, and should provide for en-
forcement measures including interdiction, seizure, and
impoundment of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic mis-
siles and related technology, equipment, and components.
SEC. 1413. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
should immediately introduce a resolution in the United
Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the
United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or al-
lowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent
interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile,
missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or
missile-related technology from North Korea.
Subtitle B—Strengthening United
States Missile Nonproliferation
Law
SEC. 1421. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PER-
SONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiv-
er, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a
foreign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section
389
years that the foreign person is not engaging in
prohibited activities under those provisions of
law referred to in paragraph (1); and
(2) there has been an appropriate resolution of
the original violation or violations, such as financial
penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited
items, or other appropriate measures taken to pre-
vent a recurrence of the violation or violations.
SEC. 1422. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PER-
SONS.
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)(2)
(22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ‘‘2 years’’
each place it appears and inserting ‘‘4 years’’.
(b) PUBLIC INFORMATION.—Section 73(e)(2) (22
U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ‘‘Such report may be classified
only to the extent necessary to protect intelligence sources
and methods. If the report is so classified, the President
shall make every effort to acquire sufficient alternative in-
formation that would allow a subsequent unclassified
version of the report to be issued.’’.
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—Any
sanction imposed on a foreign person under section
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
390
U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall
be in effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date
on which the sanction was imposed.
(d) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub-
sections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c)
shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a)
of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Pow-
ers Act, by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions
that were committed by foreign persons on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2003.
SEC. 1423. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPON-
SIBLE PERSONS.
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)
(22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
‘‘(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person
under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any govern-
mental entity that the President determines exercises ef-
fective control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly
facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
391
‘‘(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person
under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that
sanction on any other person or entity that the President
has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may
not be exported to that foreign person on account of the
sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that for-
eign person access to, such items.
‘‘(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period
of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing,
by a United States person or within the United States,
with any foreign person on whom sanctions have been im-
posed under this subsection.
‘‘(D) The President shall report on an annual basis
to the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that
engages in any transaction or activity with a foreign per-
son on whom sanctions have been imposed under this sub-
section that either—
‘‘(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions
under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions
have not been imposed; or
‘‘(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions
under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity
392
had been carried out by a United States person or
by a person in the United States.
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent
feasible, but may include a classified annex.’’.
(b) DEFINITION OF PERSON.—Section 74(a)(8)(A)
(22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
‘‘(8)(A) the term ‘person’ means—
‘‘(i) a natural person;
‘‘(ii) a corporation, business association,
partnership, society, trust, transnational cor-
poration, or transnational joint venture, any
other nongovernmental entity, organization, or
group, and any governmental entity;
‘‘(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent en-
tity of any business enterprise or other organi-
zation or entity listed in clause (ii); and
‘‘(iv) any successor of any business enter-
prise or other organization or entity listed in
clause (ii) or (iii); and’’.
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—
(1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT EN-
TITIES.—Any sanction imposed on a foreign person
under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the Export Adminis-
tration 
Act 
of 
1979 
(50 
U.S.C. 
App.
2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the
393
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (in
this subsection referred to as a ‘‘dual use sanction’’),
shall also be imposed on any governmental entity
that the President determines exercises effective con-
trol over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly fa-
cilitates the activities of that foreign person.
(2) OTHER ENTITIES.—When a dual use sanc-
tion is imposed on a foreign person, the President
may also impose that sanction on any other person
or entity that the President has reason to believe
has or may acquire items that may not be exported
to that foreign person on account of the dual use
sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the in-
tent to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to
that foreign person access to, such items.
(3) TRANSACTIONS BY THIRD PARTIES.—The
President may also prohibit, for such period of time
as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by
a United States person or within the United States,
with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions
have been imposed.
(4) REPORT.—The President shall submit on
an annual basis to the appropriate congressional
committees a report that contains the identity of any
foreign person that engages in any transaction or
394
activity with a foreign person on whom dual use
sanctions have been imposed that either—
(A) would be the basis for imposing dual
use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for
which such sanctions have not been imposed; or
(B) would be the basis for imposing dual
use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the trans-
action or activity had been carried out by a
United States person or by a person in the
United States.
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum
extent feasible, but may include a classified annex.
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:
(A) 
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘person’’
means—
(i) a natural person;
(ii) a corporation, business associa-
tion, 
partnership, 
society, 
trust,
transnational corporation, or transnational
joint venture, any other nongovernmental
entity, organization, or group, and any
governmental entity;
(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent
entity of any business enterprise or other