I 
112TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5734 
To provide compensation for the deadly acts by elements of the Pakistani 
military and intelligence services against United States citizens. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 10, 2012 
Mr. ROHRABACHER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on 
Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speak-
er, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the ju-
risdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To provide compensation for the deadly acts by elements 
of the Pakistani military and intelligence services against 
United States citizens. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Pakistan Terrorism 
Accountability Act of 2012’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
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(1) Pakistan, through the Inter-Services Intel-
ligence (ISI) organization, maintains control and in-
fluence in Afghanistan through militant Islamic net-
works, such as the Haqqani Network, in order to se-
cure its strategic position and expand its sphere of 
influence, not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kash-
mir and against India. 
(2) A 2011 report published by the Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point states that during 
the 1980s: ‘‘[T]he Pakistani state has long been a 
core sponsor and beneficiary of the Haqqani net-
work. During the 1980s Jalaluddin [Haqqani] 
quickly rose to be one of the ISI’s most favored field 
commanders and the support he provided would have 
a significant impact upon Pakistan’s security estab-
lishment and the jihad in Kashmir in the years to 
follow . . . Yet, Pakistan’s favored Afghan proxy is 
also the very same actor that has served as al- 
Qaida’s primary local enabler for over two decades. 
Given the ISI’s historical sponsorship of the 
Haqqani network, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan 
has not been aware of this history.’’. 
(3) The Government of Pakistan, including the 
ISI Directorate, has long supported the Haqqani 
Network, including by supporting the following: 
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(A) Attacks on the United States Embassy 
in Kabul and NATO Headquarters on Sep-
tember 12, 2011. 
(B) Attack on the Combat Post Sayed 
Abad, Wardak Province, Afghanistan, on Sep-
tember 10, 2011. 
(C) Attack on the Hotel-Intercontinental 
Kabul on June 28, 2011. 
(D) Attack on the Kabul Bank on Feb-
ruary 19, 2011. 
(E) Continued attacks on United States- 
funded road construction projects across Af-
ghanistan. 
(F) Attack on Forward Operating Base 
Chapman on December 30, 2009. 
(G) Attack on Forward Operating Base 
Salerno on May 13, 2009. 
(H) Attack on the Khost Governor’s office 
on May 12, 2009. 
(I) Attack on Forward Operating Base 
Salerno on May 13, 2009. 
(J) Attacks on the Afghan Ministries of 
Justice, Education, and Prison Directorate on 
February 11, 2009. 
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(K) Attack on the Germany Embassy in 
Kabul in January 2009. 
(L) Attack on Afghan Intelligence Head-
quarters, Khost, in December 2008. 
(M) Kidnapping of journalist David Rohde 
on November 10, 2008. 
(N) Bombing of the Indian Embassy in 
Kabul on July 7, 2008. 
(O) Assassination attempt on Hamid 
Karzai on April 27, 2008. 
(P) Kidnapping of British journalist Sean 
Langan in March 2008. 
(Q) Attack on Sabari district center in 
Khost on March 3, 2008. 
(R) Attack on Kabul Serena Hotel on Jan-
uary 14, 2008. 
(4) On September 17, 2011, the Voice of Amer-
ica reported that ‘‘The United States has suspected 
Pakistan’s intelligence agency has ties to the 
Haqqani network and other militant groups in Af-
ghanistan but rarely says so publicly. The U.S. and 
NATO have blamed the Haqqani network for at-
tacks on U.S. and NATO troops and on U.S. tar-
gets, including the September 13 strike against the 
U.S. Embassy in Kabul.’’. 
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(5) Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated that ‘‘with ISI 
support, Haqqani operatives planned and conducted 
that truck bomb attack, as well as the assault on 
our embassy [in September 2011] . . . We also have 
credible evidence that they were behind the June 
28th attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in 
Kabul and a host of other smaller but effective oper-
ations.’’. Mullen continued ‘‘the Haqqani network 
acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services 
Intelligence agency.’’. 
(6) Admiral Mike Mullen was quoted in Dawn, 
a major English language newspaper in Pakistan, 
that ‘‘It’s fairly well known that the ISI has a long-
standing relationship with the Haqqani network . . . 
Haqqani is supporting, funding, training fighters 
that are killing Americans and killing coalition part-
ners.’’. 
(7) On April 19, 2012, the Associated Press re-
ported that the United States Ambassador to Af-
ghanistan, Ryan Crocker, stated that there is ‘‘no 
question’’ that the Haqqani network was behind this 
week’s brazen attacks on Kabul and other eastern 
cities and said Pakistan needs to do more to clamp 
down on the group’s safe havens and that ‘‘There is 
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no question in our mind that the Haqqanis were re-
sponsible for these attacks.’’. Crocker also stated 
that ‘‘We know where their leadership lives and we 
know where these plans are made. They’re not made 
in Afghanistan. They’re made in Miram Shah, which 
is in North Waziristan, which is in Pakistan.’’. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to limit 
United States foreign assistance to Pakistan if Pakistan’s 
military or intelligence services continue to support or pro-
vide assistance to organizations that target United States 
citizens. 
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSIST-
ANCE TO PAKISTAN. 
(a) LIMITATION.—Of the amounts made available for 
assistance to Pakistan for fiscal year 2013 or any subse-
quent 
fiscal 
year, 
the 
President 
shall 
withhold 
$50,000,000 for each United States citizen who is killed 
as a result of actions of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intel-
ligence (ISI) or support provided by the ISI to other orga-
nizations or individuals, including the Haqqani Network. 
(b) CERTIFICATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall, 
not later than the first day of each month of the fiscal 
years described in subsection (a), certify to Congress the 
number of United States citizens who, during the imme-
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diately preceding month, have been killed as a result of 
actions or support described in subsection (a). 
(c) FUND.—Amounts withheld pursuant to sub-
section (a) shall, notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, be administered by the Department of Defense and 
made available on an equitable basis to provide payments 
to survivors of United States citizens described in sub-
section (a). 
Æ 
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