partment of Defense report says that this net-
work of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilo-
meters and is used to transport nuclear weap-
ons and forces.’’. 
(b) REPORT AND CERTIFICATION.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 
United States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is 
amended by adding at the end the following new sec-
tion: 
‘‘§ 494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces 
of other countries 
‘‘(a) REPORT
AND CERTIFICATION.—During any 
year in which the President recommends any reductions 
in the nuclear forces of the United States, none of the 
funds made available for fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal 
year thereafter for the Department of Defense or the Na-
tional Nuclear Security Administration may be used for 
such recommended reduction until the date on which— 
‘‘(1) the President transmits to the congres-
sional defense committees a report detailing, for 
each country with nuclear weapons— 
‘‘(A) the number of each type of nuclear 
weapons possessed by such country; 
‘‘(B) the modernization plans for such 
weapons of such country; 
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‘‘(C) the production capacity of nuclear 
warheads and strategic delivery systems (as de-
fined in section 491(c) of this title) of such 
country; and 
‘‘(D) the nuclear doctrine of such country; 
and 
‘‘(2) the Commander of the United States Stra-
tegic Command certifies to the congressional defense 
committees whether such recommended reductions in 
the nuclear forces of the United States will— 
‘‘(A) impair the ability of the United 
States to address— 
‘‘(i) unplanned strategic or geo-
political events; or 
‘‘(ii) technical challenge; or 
‘‘(B) degrade the deterrence or assurance 
provided by the United States to friends and al-
lies of the United States. 
‘‘(b) FORM.—The reports required by subsection 
(a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex.’’. 
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to sec-
tion 493 the following: 
‘‘494. Consideration of expansion of nuclear forces of other countries.’’. 
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SEC. 9. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY RESEARCH RE-
PLACEMENT NUCLEAR FACILITY AND URA-
NIUM PROCESSING FACILITY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Administrator for Nuclear Security Thomas 
D’Agostino testified before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives in Feb-
ruary 2008 that ‘‘Infrastructure improvements are a 
major part of the complex transformation plan that 
we have, and we’ve made important progress, but we 
have a lot more to do. Some major facilities that we 
have date back to World War II and cannot readily 
meet today’s safety and security requirements. Let 
me give you just two quick examples, if I could. A 
sufficient capability to work with plutonium is an es-
sential part of a national security enterprise and is 
required for as long as we retain a nuclear deter-
rent, and most likely even longer. Currently, we have 
a very small production capacity at Los Alamos, 
about 10 pits per year, at our TA–55 area. Our 
building at Los Alamos, the Chemistry and Metal-
lurgy Research Facility, is well over 50 years old 
and is insufficient to support the national security 
requirements for the stockpile and for future na-
tional security mission areas. So, whether we con-
tinue on our existing path or move towards a re-
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placement modern warhead-type stockpile, we still 
need the capacity to produce about 50 to 80 pits per 
year, which is less than one-tenth of our Cold War 
level, as well as the ability to carry out pit surveil-
lance, which is an essential part of maintaining our 
stockpile.’’. 
(2) Then Commander of the United States 
Strategic Command General Kevin P. Chilton also 
testified in February 2008 that ‘‘When you have a 
responsive complex that has the capacity to flex to 
production as you may need it or adjust your de-
ployed force posture in the future, should you need 
it—in other words, if we go to a lower number, you 
need to be certain that you can come back up, 
should the strategic environment change, and you 
can’t necessarily without that flexible or responsive 
infrastructure behind it, and that’s probably one of 
my great concerns. And then how you posture both 
the portion of your stockpile that you hold in reserve 
and your confidence in the weapons that you have 
deployed is very much a function of modernizing, in 
my view, the weapons systems that we have available 
today, which are, as the secretary described, of Cold 
War legacy design, and the associated issues with 
them.’’. 
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(3) The Congressional Commission on the Stra-
tegic Posture of the United States reported in May 
2009, with respect to the timing of the replacement 
of the nuclear weapons infrastructure of the United 
States, that ‘‘This raises an obvious question about 
whether these two replacement programs might pro-
ceed in sequence rather than concurrently. There are 
strong arguments for moving forward concurrently. 
Existing facilities are genuinely decrepit and are 
maintained in a safe and secure manner only at high 
cost. Moreover, the improved production capabilities 
they promise are integral to the program of refur-
bishment and modernization described in the pre-
ceding chapter. If funding can be found for both, 
this would best serve the national interest in main-
taining a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of weap-
ons in the most effective and efficient manner.’’. 
(4) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states— 
(A) ‘‘The National Nuclear Security Ad-
ministration (NNSA), in close coordination with 
DoD, will provide a new stockpile stewardship 
and management plan to Congress within 90 
days, consistent with the increases in infra-
structure investment requested in the Presi-
dent’s FY 2011 budget. As critical infrastruc-
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ture is restored and modernized, it will allow 
the United States to begin to shift away from 
retaining large numbers of non-deployed war-
heads as a technical hedge, allowing additional 
reductions in the U.S. stockpile of non-deployed 
nuclear weapons over time.’’; 
(B) ‘‘In order to sustain a safe, secure, 
and effective U.S. nuclear stockpile as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, the United States must 
possess a modern physical infrastructure—com-
prised of the national security laboratories and 
a complex of supporting facilities.’’; 
(C) ‘‘Funding the Chemistry and Metal-
lurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Al-
amos National Laboratory to replace the exist-
ing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Re-
search facility in 2021.’’; 
(D) ‘‘Developing a new Uranium Proc-
essing Facility at the Y–12 Plant in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee to come on line for production oper-
ations in 2021.’’; 
(E) ‘‘Without an ability to produce ura-
nium components, any plan to sustain the 
stockpile, as well as support for our Navy nu-
clear propulsion, will come to a halt. This would 
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have a significant impact, not just on the weap-
ons program, but in dealing with nuclear dan-
gers of many kinds.’’; and 
(F) ‘‘The non-deployed stockpile currently 
includes more warheads than required for the 
above purposes, due to the limited capacity of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) complex to conduct LEPs for deployed 
weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restor-
ing NNSA’s production infrastructure will allow 
these excess warheads to be retired along with 
other stockpile reductions planned over the next 
decade.’’. 
(5) In the memorandum of agreement between 
the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Energy concerning the modernization of the nuclear 
weapon stockpile of the United States dated May 3, 
2010, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu agreed that ‘‘DOE 
Agrees to . . . increase pit production capacity . . . 
plan and program to ramp up to a minimum of 50– 
80 PPY in 2022.’’. 
(6) The plan required under section 1251 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) sub-
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mitted by the President states that the Chemistry 
and Metallurgy Research Replacement building and 
the Uranium Processing Facility will complete con-
struction by 2021 and will achieve full operational 
functionality by 2024. 
(7) The Senate required that, prior to the entry 
into force of the New START Treaty, the President 
certifies to the Senate that the President intends 
to— 
(A) accelerate to the extent possible the 
design and engineering phase of the Chemistry 
and Metallurgy Research Replacement building 
and the Uranium Processing Facility; and 
(B) request full funding, including on a 
multiyear basis as appropriate, for the Chem-
istry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
building and the Uranium Processing Facility 
upon completion of the design and engineering 
phase for such facilities. 
(8) The President did request full funding for 
such facilities on February 2, 2011, when the Presi-
dent stated, ‘‘I intend to (a) accelerate, to the extent 
possible, the design and engineering phase of the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
(CMRR) building and the Uranium Processing Fa-
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cility (UPF); and (b) request full funding, including 
on a multi-year basis as appropriate, for the CMRR 
building and the UPF upon completion of the design 
and engineering phase for such facilities.’’. 
(b) LIMITATION.—Section 1045 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (50 U.S.C. 
2523b) is further amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new subsection: 
‘‘(e) CMRR AND UPF.— 
‘‘(1) ANNUAL CERTIFICATION.—Beginning fis-
cal year 2013, the President shall annually certify in 
writing to the congressional defense committees 
whether— 
‘‘(A) the construction of both the Chem-
istry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 
building and the Uranium Processing Facility 
will be completed by not later than 2021; and 
‘‘(B) both facilities will be fully operational 
by not later than 2024. 
‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—If the President certifies 
under paragraph (1) that the Chemistry and Metal-
lurgy Research Replacement building and the Ura-
nium Processing Facility will be completed by later 
than 2021 or be fully operational by later than 
2024, none of the funds made available for fiscal 
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year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Na-
tional Nuclear Security Administration may be used 
to reduce the nondeployed nuclear warheads in the 
nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States until 
a period of 120 days has elapsed following the date 
of such certification. 
‘‘(3) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in paragraph 
(2) shall not apply to— 
‘‘(A) reductions made to ensure the safety, 
security, reliability, and credibility of the nu-
clear weapons stockpile and delivery systems, 
including activities related to surveillance, as-
sessment, certification, testing, and mainte-
nance of nuclear warheads and strategic deliv-
ery systems; or 
‘‘(B) nuclear warheads that are retired or 
awaiting dismantlement on the date of the cer-
tification under paragraph (1). 
‘‘(4) TERMINATION.—The requirement in para-
graph (1) shall terminate on the date on which the 
President certifies in writing to the congressional de-
fense committees that the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Replacement building and the Uranium 
Processing Facility are both fully operational.’’. 
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SEC. 10. NUCLEAR WARHEADS ON INTERCONTINENTAL 
BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that reducing the number of nuclear warheads con-
tained on each intercontinental ballistic missile of the 
United States does not promote strategic stability if at 
the same time other nuclear weapons states, including the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 
are rapidly increasing the warhead-loading of their land- 
based missile forces. 
(b) LIMITATION.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 
United States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is 
amended by adding at the end the following new sec-
tion: 
‘‘§ 495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental bal-
listic missiles of the United States 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—During any year in which the 
President proposes to reduce the number of nuclear war-
heads contained on an intercontinental ballistic missile of 
the United States, none of the funds made available for 
fiscal year 2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the De-
partment of Defense or the National Nuclear Security Ad-
ministration may be used for such proposed reduction if 
the reduction results in such missile having only a single 
nuclear warhead unless the President certifies in writing 
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to the congressional defense committees that the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of China are both 
also carrying out a similar reduction. 
‘‘(b) EXCEPTION.—The limitation in subsection (a) 
shall not apply to reductions made to ensure the safety, 
security, reliability, and credibility of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile and delivery systems, including activities related 
to surveillance, assessment, certification, testing, and 
maintenance of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery 
systems.’’. 
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 24 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after the item relating to sec-
tion 494 the following: 
‘‘495. Nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 
States.’’. 
SEC. 11. NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTIONS 
AND EXTENDED DETERRENCE POLICY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 en-
dorsed the continued role of nuclear weapons in the 
security of the NATO alliance, stating— 
(A) ‘‘The supreme guarantee of the secu-
rity of the Allies is provided by the strategic nu-
clear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of 
the United States; the independent strategic 
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nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and 
France, which have a deterrent role of their 
own, contribute to the overall deterrence and 
security of the Allies.’’; 
(B) ‘‘We will ensure that NATO has the 
full range of capabilities necessary to deter and 
defend against any threat to the safety and se-
curity of our populations. Therefore, we will 
. . . maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear 
and conventional forces’’; and 
(C) ‘‘[NATO will] ensure the broadest pos-
sible participation of Allies in collective defence 
planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing 
of nuclear forces, and in command, control and 
consultation arrangements.’’. 
(2) However, the 2010 Strategic Concept also 
walked away from the decades-long policy encap-
sulated by the 1999 Strategic Concept that said, 
‘‘The presence of United States conventional and 
nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the secu-
rity of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that 
of North America.’’. 
(3) Former Secretary of Defense William Perry 
said in March 2011 testimony before the Sub-
committee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on 
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Armed Services of the House of Representatives that 
‘‘the reason we have nuclear weapons in Europe in 
the first place, is not because the rest of our weap-
ons are not capable of deterrence, but because, dur-
ing the Cold War at least, our allies in Europe felt 
more assured when we had nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope. That is why they were deployed there in the 
first place. Today the issue is a little different. The 
issue is the Russians in the meantime have built a 
large number of nuclear weapons, and we keep our 
nuclear weapons there as somewhat of a political le-
verage for dealing with an ultimate treaty in which 
we may get Russia and the United States to elimi-
nate tactical nuclear weapons. My own view is it 
would be desirable if both the United States and 
Russia would eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, but 
I see it as very difficult to arrive at that conclusion 
if we were to simply eliminate all of our tactical nu-
clear weapons unilaterally.’’. 
(4) During testimony before the Subcommittee 
on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives in July 
2011— 
(A) former Department of Defense official 
Frank Miller stated, ‘‘as long as U.S. allies be-
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lieve that those weapons need to be there, we 
need to make sure that we provide that secu-
rity.’’; and 
(B) former Department of Defense official 
Mort Halperin stated, ‘‘I do not think we 
should be willing to trade our withdrawal of our 
nuclear weapons from Europe for some reduc-
tion, even a substantial reduction, in Russian 
tactical nuclear weapons because if it is . . . 
that the credibility of the American nuclear de-
terrent for our NATO allies depends on the 
presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, that 
will not change if the Russians cut their tactical 
nuclear arsenal by two thirds, or even eliminate 
it because they will still have their strategic 
weapons, which, while they can’t have inter-
mediate range missiles, they can find a way to 
target them on the NATO countries.’’. 
(5) Section 1237(b) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 
112–81) expressed the sense of Congress that— 
(A) the commitment of the United States 
to extended deterrence in Europe and the nu-
clear alliance of NATO is an important compo-
nent of ensuring and linking the national secu-
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rity of the United States and its European al-
lies; 
(B) the nuclear forces of the United States 
are a key component of the NATO nuclear alli-
ance; and 
(C) the presence of the nuclear weapons of 
the United States in Europe—combined with 
NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements 
under which non-nuclear members participate 
in nuclear planning and possess specially con-
figured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons—provides reassurance to NATO allies 
who feel exposed to regional threats. 
(b) LIMITATION.—Chapter 24 of title 10, United 
States Code, as added by section 6(b)(1), is amended by 
adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘§ 496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or 
withdrawal of nuclear forces based in Eu-
rope 
‘‘(a) POLICY ON NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS.—It is the policy of the United States— 
‘‘(1) to pursue negotiations with the Russian 
Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian de-
ployed and nondeployed, nonstrategic nuclear forces; 
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‘‘(2) that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should 
be considered when weighing the balance of the nu-
clear forces of the United States and the Russian 
Federation; 
‘‘(3) that any geographical relocation or storage 
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by the Russian Fed-
eration does not constitute a reduction or elimi-
nation of such weapons; 
‘‘(4) the vast advantage of the Russian Federa-
tion in nonstrategic nuclear weapons constitutes a 
threat to the United States and its allies and a 
growing asymmetry in Western Europe; and 
‘‘(5) the forward-deployed nuclear forces of the 
United States are an important contributor to the 
assurance of the allies of the United States and con-
stitute a check on proliferation and a tool in dealing 
with neighboring states hostile to NATO. 
‘‘(b) POLICY ON EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMIT-
MENT TO EUROPE.—It is the policy of the United States 
that— 
‘‘(1) it maintain its commitment to extended 
deterrence, specifically the nuclear alliance of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as an impor-
tant component of ensuring and linking the national 
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security interests of the United States and the secu-
rity of its European allies; 
‘‘(2) forward-deployed nuclear forces of the 
United States shall remain based in Europe in sup-
port of the nuclear policy and posture of NATO; 
‘‘(3) the presence of nuclear weapons of the 
United States in Europe—combined with NATO’s 
unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which 
non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning 
and possess specially configured aircraft capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons—contributes to the cohe-
sion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and 
partners who feel exposed to regional threats; and 
‘‘(4) only the President and Congress can ar-
ticulate when and how the United States will employ 
the nuclear forces of the United States and no mul-
tilateral organization, not even NATO, can articu-
late a declaratory policy concerning the use of nu-
clear weapons that binds the United States. 
‘‘(c) LIMITATION ON REDUCTION, CONSOLIDATION, 
OR WITHDRAWAL OF NUCLEAR FORCES BASED IN EU-
ROPE.—In light of the policy expressed in subsections (a) 
and (b), none of the funds made available for fiscal year 
2012 or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of 
Defense may be used to effect or implement the reduction, 
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consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe unless— 
‘‘(1) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 
of such nuclear forces is requested by the govern-
ment of the host nation in the manner provided in 
the agreement between the United States and the 
host nation regarding the forces; 
‘‘(2) the President certifies that— 
‘‘(A) NATO member states have consid-
ered the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 
in the High Level Group; 
‘‘(B) NATO has decided to support such 
reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal; 
‘‘(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe after 
such reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 
would provide a commensurate or better level of 
assurance and credibility as before such reduc-
tion, consolidation, or withdrawal; and 
‘‘(D) there has been reciprocal action by 
the Russian Federation, not including the Rus-
sian Federation relocating nuclear forces from 
one location to another; or 
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‘‘(3) the reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal 
of such nuclear forces is specifically authorized by 
an Act of Congress. 
‘‘(d) NOTIFICATION.—Upon any decision to reduce, 
consolidate, or withdraw the nuclear forces of the United 
States that are based in Europe, the President shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a notifi-
cation containing— 
‘‘(1) the certification required by paragraph (2) 
of subsection (c) if such reduction, consolidation, or 
withdrawal is based upon such paragraph; 
‘‘(2) justification for such reduction, consolida-
tion, or withdrawal; and 
‘‘(3) an assessment of how NATO member 
states, in light of such reduction, consolidation, or 
withdrawal, assess the credibility of the deterrence 
capability of the United States in support of its com-
mitments undertaken pursuant to article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, Dis-
trict of Columbia, on April 4, 1949, and entered into 
force on August 24, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 
1964). 
‘‘(e) NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENT.—The Presi-
dent may not commence a reduction, consolidation, or 
withdrawal of the nuclear forces of the United States that 
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are based in Europe for which the certification required 
by subsection (c)(2) is made until the expiration of a 180- 
day period beginning on the date on which the President 
submits the notification under subsection (d) containing 
the certification. 
‘‘(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 
In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’ means— 
‘‘(1) the Committees on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate; and 
‘‘(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate.’’. 
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 
at the beginning of chapter 24 of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 495 the following: 
‘‘496. Limitation on reduction, consolidation, or withdrawal of nuclear forces 
based in Europe.’’. 
Æ 
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