I 
116TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1678 
To create a task force within the Department of Education to address the 
threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic research 
integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 12, 2019 
Mr. BANKS (for himself, Mr. KELLY of Mississippi, Mr. COOK, and Mr. 
BACON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on 
Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space, and 
Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the juris-
diction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To create a task force within the Department of Education 
to address the threat of foreign government influence 
and threats to academic research integrity on college 
campuses, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect Our Univer-
sities Act of 2019’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) Adversaries of the United States take ad-
vantage of a largely vulnerable academic system. 
Academia is a place of uniquely free thought; how-
ever, adversaries take advantage of access to feder-
ally funded sensitive research that takes place on the 
campuses of institutions of higher education. 
(2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White 
House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 
‘‘More than 300,000 Chinese nationals annually at-
tend U.S. universities or find employment at U.S. 
national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, 
and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for 
approximately one third of foreign university and 
college students in the United States and about 25 
percent of graduate students specializing in science, 
technology, engineering, or math (STEM).’’. 
(3) International students from nations that are 
adversarial to the United States could face undue 
pressure or incentives to divulge technology to their 
home nation or to use sensitive information to nega-
tively impact the United States. According to the 
same 2018 White House Report, ‘‘The national and 
economic security risks are that the Chinese State 
may seek to manipulate or pressure even unwitting 
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or unwilling Chinese nationals into becoming non- 
traditional information collectors that serve Beijing’s 
military and strategic ambitions.’’. 
(4) Technology and information that could be 
deemed sensitive to the national security interests of 
the United States should be given increased scrutiny 
to determine if access should be restricted in a re-
search environment. 
(5) An open federally funded research environ-
ment exposes the United States to the possibility of 
exchanging research affiliated with current or future 
critical military technological systems. 
(6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Director Wray’s view, Chinese non-traditional intel-
ligence collectors ‘‘are exploiting the very open re-
search and development environment that we have, 
which we all revere. But they‘re taking advantage of 
it, so one of the things we’re trying to do is view the 
China threat as not just the whole-of-government 
threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, 
and I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society re-
sponse by us.’’. 
(7) As stated in the January 2018 China’s 
Technology Transfer Strategy report by the Defense 
Innovation Unit, ‘‘Academia is an opportune envi-
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ronment for learning about science and technology 
since the cultural values of U.S. educational institu-
tions reflect an open and free exchange of ideas. As 
a result, Chinese science and engineering students 
frequently master technologies that later become 
critical to key military systems, amounting over time 
to unintentional violations of U.S. export control 
laws.’’. 
SEC. 3. TASK FORCE. 
(a) TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED.—Not later than one 
year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Education, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall es-
tablish the National Security Technology Task Force 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Task Force’’) within the 
Department of Education to address the threat of espio-
nage at institutions of higher education. 
(b) MEMBERSHIP.— 
(1) DESIGNATION.—The Task Force shall in-
clude not more than 30 members, of which— 
(A) at least 1 representative shall be from 
the Department of Defense, designated by the 
Secretary of Defense; 
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(B) at least 1 representative shall be from 
the intelligence community, designated by the 
Director of National Intelligence; 
(C) at least 1 representative shall be from 
the Department of Justice, designated by the 
United States Attorney General; 
(D) at least 1 representative shall be from 
the Department of Energy, designated by the 
Secretary of Energy; and 
(E) at least 1 representative shall be from 
each of the following offices of the Department 
of Education, as appointed and named by the 
Secretary of Education: 
(i) Office of Postsecondary Education. 
(ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation, 
and Policy Development. 
(iii) Office of the General Counsel. 
(iv) Any other office the Secretary of 
Education determines to be appropriate. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP
LIST.—Not later than 10 
days after the first meeting of the Task Force, the 
Task Force shall submit to Congress a list identi-
fying each member of the Task Force. 
(c) SENSITIVE
RESEARCH
PROJECT
LIST.—The 
Task Force shall, in consultation with the Office of the 
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