I 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3347
To amend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to prevent the direct 
and indirect financing of the development of weapons of mass destruction 
programs by Iran and Libya, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OCTOBER 20, 2003
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees 
on Financial Services, Ways and Means, and Government Reform, for a 
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
A BILL 
To amend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to 
prevent the direct and indirect financing of the develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction programs by Iran 
and Libya, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘ILSA Enhancement and Compliance Act’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of 
this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
TITLE I—AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS 
ACT OF 1996
Sec. 101. Multilateral regime. 
Sec. 102. Imposition of sanctions. 
Sec. 103. Description of sanctions. 
Sec. 104. Termination of sanctions. 
Sec. 105. Sunset. 
Sec. 106. Definitions. 
Sec. 107. Effective date. 
TITLE II—OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY RISK IN THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Sec. 201. Establishment of office. 
Sec. 202. Reports.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) On September 16, 2003, the Under Sec-
retary for Arms Control and International Security, 
John R. Bolton, stated before the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representa-
tives that: ‘‘Without question, among rogue states, 
those most aggressively seeking to acquire or develop 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of de-
livery, and which are therefore threats to our na-
tional security, are Iran and North Korea, followed 
by Libya and Syria. It is also the case that these 
states are among those we identify as state sponsors 
of terrorism.’’.
(2) In his statement before the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the United Na-
tions on September 8, 2003, United States Ambas-
sador Kenneth Brill denounced Iran’s patterns of 
deception regarding its nuclear program by declaring 
Iran to be ‘‘working in secret, going back into the 
1980s, to develop sophisticated nuclear facilities; 
stalling, stonewalling, and on a number of occasions 
first providing the IAEA false information, and then 
changing its story when the original version was re-
vealed to be inaccurate; and attempting to cover up 
traces of its activities to avoid detection by the 
Agency’’. 
(3) The Final Resolution of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
on September 11, 2003, noted with concern, ‘‘that 
the agency environmental sampling at Natanz has 
revealed the presence of two types of highly enriched 
uranium, which requires additional work to enable 
the Agency to arrive at a conclusion; that IAEA in-
spectors found considerable modifications had been 
made to the premises at the Kalaye Electric Com-
pany prior to inspections that may impact on the ac-
curacy of the environmental sampling; that some of 
Iran’s statements to the IAEA have undergone sig-
nificant and material changes, and that the number 
of outstanding issues has increased since the report; 
and that despite the Board’s statement in June 
2003 encouraging Iran as a confidence-building 
measure, not to introduce nuclear material into its 
pilot centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz, Iran 
has introduced such material’’. 
(4) The Government of Iran, in a letter to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of August 19, 
2003, acknowledged that, in the early 1990s, there 
had been ‘‘bench scale’’ uranium conversion experi-
ments. Iran has indicated that more time will be 
needed to find the people involved in these experi-
ments and to trace any other closed down facilities. 
(5) Iranian authorities have stated that none of 
the imported uranium had been processed and spe-
cifically, that it had not been used in any centrifuge 
tests. It was observed, however, during IAEA 
verification in March 2003, that some of the UF6 
was in fact missing from the two small cylinders. 
(6)(A) Iranian authorities told the International 
Atomic Energy Agency that the decision to launch 
a centrifuge enrichment program had actually been 
taken in 1985 and that Iran had received drawings