SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Belarus Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Section 2 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 
(Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
‘‘Congress finds the following: 
‘‘(1) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a 
pattern of clear and persistent violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
‘‘(2) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to engage in a 
pattern of clear and uncorrected violations of basic 
principles 
of 
democratic 
governance, 
including 
through a series of fundamentally flawed presi-
dential and parliamentary elections undermining the 
legitimacy of executive and legislative authority in 
that country. 
‘‘(3) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to subject thou-
sands of pro-democracy political activists and peace-
ful protesters to harassment, beatings, and imprison-
ment, particularly as a result of their attempts to
peacefully exercise their right to freedom of assem-
bly and association. 
‘‘(4) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to suppress inde-
pendent media and journalists and to restrict access 
to the internet, including social media and other dig-
ital communication platforms, in violation of the 
right to freedom of speech and expression of those 
dissenting from the dictatorship of Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka. 
‘‘(5) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues a systematic 
campaign of harassment, repression, and closure of 
nongovernmental 
organizations, 
including 
inde-
pendent trade unions and entrepreneurs, creating a 
climate of fear that inhibits the development of civil 
society and social solidarity. 
‘‘(6) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, has pursued a policy un-
dermining the country’s sovereignty and independ-
ence by making Belarus political, economic, cultural, 
and societal interests subservient to those of Russia. 
‘‘(7) The Government of Belarus, led by 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, continues to reduce the 
independence of Belarus through integration into a
so-called ‘Union State’ that is under the control of 
Russia. 
‘‘(8) On August 9, 2020, the Government of 
Belarus conducted a presidential election that was 
fraudulent and did not meet international standards. 
There were serious irregularities with ballot counting 
and the reporting of election results. The Govern-
ment of Belarus also put in place restrictive meas-
ures that impeded the work of local independent ob-
servers and did not provide sufficient notice to the 
OSCE to allow for the OSCE to monitor the elec-
tions, as is customary. 
‘‘(9) After the August 9, 2020, presidential 
election, the Government of Belarus responded to 
the peaceful opposition protests, which are the larg-
est in Belarus history, with a violent crackdown, in-
cluding, according to the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur, the detention of more than 10,000 
peaceful protestors as of September 18, 2020. 
‘‘(10) Thousands of employees at Belarusian 
state-owned enterprises, who have been seen as 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s traditional base during his 
26-year rule, went on strike across the country to 
protest Lukashenka’s illegitimate election and the 
subsequent crackdowns, including at some of
Belarus’s largest factories such as the BelAZ truck 
plant, the Minsk Tractor Works, and the Minsk 
Automobile Plant. 
‘‘(11) Women have served as the leading force 
in demonstrations across the country, protesting the 
police brutality and mass detentions by wearing 
white, carrying flowers, forming ‘solidarity chains’, 
and unmasking undercover police trying to arrest 
demonstrators. 
‘‘(12) After the August 9, 2020, presidential 
election, the Government of Belarus has sought to 
stop the work of the Coordination Council, which 
was formed by the leading opposition presidential 
candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, to facilitate a 
peaceful transition of power by subjecting the Coun-
cil’s senior members to violence, detention, and 
forced exile. 
‘‘(13) After the August 9, 2020, presidential 
election, the Government of Belarus restricted the 
free flow of information to silence the opposition and 
to conceal the regime’s violent crackdown on peace-
ful protestors, including by stripping the accredita-
tion of journalists from major foreign news outlets, 
disrupting internet access, limiting access to social
media and other digital communication platforms, 
and detaining and harassing countless journalists. 
‘‘(14) Before the European Parliament on Au-
gust 25, 2020, Tsikhanouskaya stressed that a 
‘peaceful revolution’ was underway in Belarus, and 
that ‘It is neither a pro-Russian nor anti-Russian 
revolution. It is neither an anti-European Union nor 
a pro-European Union revolution. It is a democratic 
revolution.’. 
‘‘(15) Against the will of the majority of the 
Belarusian people, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
has propped up the Alyaksandr Lukashenka regime, 
including by offering security assistance, providing 
significant financial support, and sending Russian 
propagandists to help disseminate pro-regime propa-
ganda on Belarus state television. 
‘‘(16) After the August 9, 2020, presidential 
election, the United States, the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada condemned the violent 
crackdown on peaceful protestors, refused to accept 
the results of the fraudulent election and called for 
new free and fair elections under independent obser-
vation. 
‘‘(17) On September 8, 2020, Secretary of 
State Michael R. Pompeo said, ‘The United States,
in coordination with our partners and Allies, is con-
sidering additional targeted sanctions to promote ac-
countability for those involved in human rights 
abuses and repression in Belarus.’. 
‘‘(18) Following Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s Sep-
tember 23, 2020, secret inauguration, the United 
States, the European Union, numerous European 
Union member states, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada announced they did not recognize him as the 
legitimately elected leader of Belarus.’’. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
Section 3 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 
(Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
‘‘It is the policy of the United States to— 
‘‘(1) condemn the conduct of the August 9, 
2020, presidential election and crackdown on opposi-
tion candidates, senior members of the Coordination 
Council, peaceful protestors, employees from state- 
owned enterprises participating in strikes, inde-
pendent election observers, and independent journal-
ists and bloggers; 
‘‘(2) continue to call for the immediate release 
without preconditions of all political prisoners in
Belarus, including all those individuals detained in 
connection with the August 9, 2020, presidential 
election, 
a 
leading 
opposition 
figure 
Maryia 
Kalesnikava, and United States citizen Vitali 
Shkliarov; 
‘‘(3) continue to support the aspirations of the 
people of Belarus for democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law; 
‘‘(4) continue to support the aspirations of the 
people of Belarus to exercise their religion freely, in-
cluding the head of the Catholic Church in Belarus 
Archbishop Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz who was barred 
from 
entering 
the 
country 
after 
criticizing 
Belarusian authorities; 
‘‘(5) continue to support actively the aspirations 
of the people of the Republic of Belarus to preserve 
the independence and sovereignty of their country; 
‘‘(6) not to recognize any incorporation of 
Belarus into a ‘Union State’ with Russia, as this so- 
called ‘Union State’ would be both an attempt to ab-
sorb Belarus and a step to reconstituting the totali-
tarian Soviet Union; 
‘‘(7) continue to reject the results of the fraud-
ulent August 9, 2020, presidential election in 
Belarus, and to support calls for new presidential
and parliamentary elections, conducted in a manner 
that is free and fair according to OSCE standards 
and under the supervision of OSCE observers and 
independent domestic observers; 
‘‘(8) 
refuse 
to 
recognize 
Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka as the legitimately elected leader of 
Belarus; 
‘‘(9) continue to call for the fulfillment by the 
Government of Belarus of Belarus’s freely under-
taken obligations as an OSCE participating state 
and as a signatory of the Charter of the United Na-
tions; 
‘‘(10) support an OSCE role in mediating a 
dialogue within Belarus between the government and 
genuine representatives of Belarusian society; 
‘‘(11) recognize the Coordination Council as a 
legitimate institution to participate in a dialogue on 
a peaceful transition of power; 
‘‘(12) urge an expanded United States diplo-
matic presence in Belarus to advocate for the aspira-
tions of the people of Belarus for democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law; 
‘‘(13) continue to work closely with the Euro-
pean Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
other countries and international organizations, to
promote the principles of democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights in Belarus; and 
‘‘(14) remain open to reevaluating United 
States policy toward Belarus as warranted by de-
monstrable progress made by the Government of 
Belarus consistent with the aims of this Act as stat-
ed in this section.’’. 
SEC. 4. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SO-
CIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS. 
Section 4 of the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 
(Public Law 109–480; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note) is amend-
ed— 
(1) in the section heading to read as follows: 
‘‘ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL 
SOCIETY, AND SOVEREIGNTY IN BELARUS.’’; 
(2) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘Euro-
pean’’ and inserting ‘‘Trans-Atlantic’’; and 
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and 
(3) as paragraphs (3) and 4, respectively; and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the 
following: 
‘‘(2) To assist the people of Belarus in building 
the sovereignty and independence of their country.’’; 
(3) in subsection (b)—
(A) by inserting ‘‘and Belarusian groups 
outside 
of 
Belarus’’ 
after 
‘‘indigenous 
Belarusian groups’’; and 
(B) by inserting ‘‘and Belarusian sov-
ereignty’’ before the period at the end; 
(4) in subsection (c)— 
(A) by striking paragraph (8); 
(B) 
by 
redesignating 
paragraphs 
(3) 
through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), re-
spectively; 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 
following: 
‘‘(3) countering internet censorship and repres-
sive surveillance technology that seek to limit free 
association, control access to information, and pre-
vent citizens from exercising their rights to free 
speech;’’; 
(D) in paragraph (8) (as redesignated), by 
striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; and 
(E) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(9) supporting the work of women advocating 
freedom, human rights, and human progress; 
‘‘(10) supporting the development of Belarusian 
language education;
‘‘(11) enhancing the development of the private 
sector, particularly the information technology sec-
tor, and its role in the economy of Belarus, including 
by increasing the capacity of private sector actors, 
developing business support organizations, offering 
entrepreneurship training, and expanding access to 
finance for small and medium enterprises; 
‘‘(12) supporting political refugees in neigh-
boring European countries fleeing the crackdown in 
Belarus; 
‘‘(13) supporting the gathering of evidence on 
and investigating of the human rights abuses in 
Belarus; 
‘‘(14) supporting the public health response, in-
cluding filling the information void, in Belarus dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic; and 
‘‘(15) other activities consistent with the pur-
poses of this Act.’’; 
(5) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
section (g); 
(6) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that, in light of the political crisis in Belarus and 
the unprecedented mobilization of the Belarusian people,
United States foreign assistance to Belarusian civil society 
should be reevaluated and increased to carry out the pur-
poses described in subsection (a) and to include the activi-
ties described in subsection (c). 
‘‘(e) COORDINATION WITH EUROPEAN PARTNERS.— 
In order to maximize impact, eliminate duplication, and 
further the achievement of the purposes described in sub-
section (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure coordina-
tion with the European Union and its institutions, the gov-
ernments of countries that are members of the European 
Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada. 
‘‘(f) REPORT ON ASSISTANCE.—Not later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of the Belarus De-
mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020, the 
Secretary of State, acting through the Office of the Coor-
dinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, and 
in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the programs and activities carried out to achieve the pur-
poses described in subsection (a), including an assessment 
of whether or not progress was made in achieving those 
purposes.’’; and 
(7) in subsection (g) (as redesignated)—