I 
115TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 4747 
To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with an entity that 
uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, and for other 
purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JANUARY 9, 2018 
Mr. CONAWAY (for himself and Ms. CHENEY) introduced the following bill; 
which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
A BILL 
To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with 
an entity that uses certain telecommunications services 
or equipment, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defending U.S. Gov-
ernment Communications Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) In its 2011 ‘‘Annual Report to Congress on 
Military and Security Developments Involving the 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
People’s Republic of China’’, the Department of De-
fense stated that, ‘‘China’s defense industry has ben-
efited from integration with a rapidly expanding ci-
vilian economy and science and technology sector, 
particularly elements that have access to foreign 
technology. Progress within individual defense sec-
tors appears linked to the relative integration of 
each, through China’s civilian economy, into the 
global production and R&D chain . . . Information 
technology 
companies 
in 
particular, 
including 
Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintain close ties 
to the PLA.’’. 
(2) In a 2011 report titled ‘‘The National Secu-
rity Implications of Investments and Products from 
the People’s Republic of China in the Telecommuni-
cations Sector’’, the United States China Commis-
sion stated that ‘‘[n]ational security concerns have 
accompanied the dramatic growth of China’s telecom 
sector. . . . Additionally, large Chinese companies – 
particularly those ‘national champions’ prominent in 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy of overseas expansion – 
are directly subject to direction by the Chinese Com-
munist Party, to include support for PRC state poli-
cies and goals.’’. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
(3) The Commission further stated in its report 
that ‘‘[f]rom this point of view, the clear economic 
benefits of foreign investment in the U.S. must be 
weighed against the potential security concerns re-
lated to infrastructure components coming under the 
control of foreign entities. This seems particularly 
applicable in the telecommunications industry, as 
Chinese companies continue systematically to ac-
quire significant holdings in prominent global and 
U.S. telecommunications and information technology 
companies.’’. 
(4) In its 2011 Annual Report to Congress, the 
United States China Commission stated that ‘‘[t]he 
extent of the state’s control of the Chinese economy 
is difficult to quantify . . . There is also a category 
of companies that, though claiming to be private, are 
subject to state influence. Such companies are often 
in new markets with no established SOE leaders and 
enjoy favorable government policies that support 
their development while posing obstacles to foreign 
competition. Examples include Chinese telecoms 
giant Huawei and such automotive companies as 
battery maker BYD and vehicle manufacturers 
Geely and Chery.’’. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
(5) General Michael Hayden, who served as Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and Direc-
tor of the National Security Agency, stated in July 
2013 that Huawei had ‘‘shared with the Chinese 
state intimate and extensive knowledge of foreign 
telecommunications systems it is involved with.’’. 
(6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a 
February 2015 Counterintelligence Strategy Part-
nership Intelligence Note stated that, ‘‘[w]ith the ex-
panded use of Huawei Technologies Inc. equipment 
and services in U.S. telecommunications service pro-
vider networks, the Chinese Government’s potential 
access to U.S. business communications is dramati-
cally increasing. Chinese Government-supported tele-
communications equipment on U.S. networks may be 
exploited through Chinese cyber activity, with Chi-
na’s intelligence services operating as an advanced 
persistent threat to U.S. networks.’’. 
(7) The FBI further stated in its February 
2015 counterintelligence note that, ‘‘China makes no 
secret that its cyber warfare strategy is predicated 
on controlling global communications network infra-
structure.’’. 
(8) At a hearing before the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
September 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work, responding to a question about the 
use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, stat-
ed, ‘‘In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abso-
lutely not. And I know of no other—I don’t believe 
we operate in the Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems 
in the Pentagon.’’. 
(9) At such hearing, the Commander of the 
United States Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rog-
ers, responding to a question about why such 
Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used, 
stated, ‘‘as we look at supply chain and we look at 
potential vulnerabilities within the system, that it is 
a risk we felt was unacceptable.’’. 
(10) In March 2017, ZTE Corporation pled 
guilty to conspiring to violate the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act by illegally ship-
ping U.S.-origin items to Iran, paying the United 
States Government a penalty of $892,360,064 dol-
lars for activity between January 2010 and January 
2016. 
(11) The Treasury Department’s Office of For-
eign Assets Control issued a subpoena to Huawei as 
part of a Federal investigation of alleged violations 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
of trade restrictions on Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria. 
(12) In the bipartisan House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence ‘‘Investigative Report on 
the United States National Security Issues Posed by 
Chinese Telecommunication Companies Huawei and 
ZTE’’ released in 2012, it was recommended that 
‘‘U.S. government systems, particularly sensitive 
systems, should not include Huawei or ZTE equip-
ment, including in component parts. Similarly, gov-
ernment contractors – particularly those working on 
contracts for sensitive U.S. programs – should ex-
clude ZTE or Huawei equipment in their systems.’’. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT. 
(a) PROHIBITION ON AGENCY USE OR PROCURE-
MENT.—The head of an agency may not procure or obtain, 
may not extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, 
and may not enter into a contract (or extend or renew 
a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, sys-
tem, or service that uses covered telecommunications 
equipment or services as a substantial or essential compo-
nent of any system, or as critical technology as part of 
any system. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS
(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ has the 
meaning given that term in section 551 of title 5, 
United States Code. 
(2) COVERED FOREIGN COUNTRY.—The term 
‘‘covered foreign country’’ means the People’s Re-
public of China. 
(3) COVERED
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EQUIP-
MENT
OR
SERVICES.—The term ‘‘covered tele-
communications equipment or services’’ means any 
of the following: 
(A) Telecommunications equipment pro-
duced by Huawei Technologies Company or 
ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate 
of such entities). 
(B) Telecommunications services provided 
by such entities or using such equipment. 
(C) 
Telecommunications 
equipment 
or 
services produced or provided by an entity that 
the head of the relevant agency reasonably be-
lieves to be an entity owned or controlled by, or 
otherwise connected to, the government of a 
covered foreign country. 
Æ 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
01:51 Jan 11, 2018
Jkt 079200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\H4747.IH
H4747
lotter on DSKBCFDHB2PROD with BILLS