107TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 5531
AN ACT
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a
comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.
107TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 5531
AN ACT
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive
solution to the war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified
its prosecution of the war against areas outside of
its control, which has already cost more than
2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than
4,000,000 people.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally
sponsored peace process, protected from manipula-
tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso-
lution of the war, protection of human rights, and
a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu-
manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential
element in the effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States
is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of
the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov-
ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au-
thority and institutions is a major impediment to
achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
process. It is critical that credible civil authority and
institutions play an important role in the reconstruc-
tion of post-war Sudan.
(6) Through the manipulation of traditional ri-
valries among peoples in areas outside of its full con-
trol, the Government of Sudan has used divide-and-
conquer techniques effectively to subjugate its popu-
lation. However, internationally sponsored reconcili-
ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
human suffering and the effectiveness of this tactic.
(7) The Government of Sudan utilizes and or-
ganizes militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other
irregular units for raiding and enslaving parties in
areas outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan in an effort to disrupt severely the ability of
the populations in those areas to sustain themselves.
The tactic helps minimize the Government of Su-
dan’s accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly
stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
lethality of the war against the areas outside of its
control.
(9) By regularly banning air transport relief
flights by the United Nations relief operation OLS,
the Government of Sudan has been able to manipu-
late the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people
from the United States and other donor countries as
a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by
the Government of Sudan to starve targeted groups
and subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Govern-
ment’s control.
(10) The acts of the Government of Sudan, in-
cluding the acts described in this section, constitute
genocide as defined by the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(78 U.N.T.S. 277).
(11) The efforts of the United States and other
donors in delivering relief and assistance through
means outside of OLS have played a critical role in
addressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the
Government of Sudan’s manipulation of food dona-
tions to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(12) While the immediate needs of selected
areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-
dressed in the near term, the population in areas of
Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of
their ability to sustain themselves.
(13) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in
Bahr al Ghazal and the Upper Nile and the Blue
Nile regions have been excluded completely from re-
lief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their
populations at increased risk of famine.
(14) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded
$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on
providing only for the immediate food needs of the
recipients, the current international relief operations
are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
term.
(15) The ability of populations to defend them-
selves against attack in areas outside of the control
of the Government of Sudan has been severely com-
promised by the disengagement of the front-line
states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fostering
the belief among officials of the Government of
Sudan that success on the battlefield can be
achieved.
(16) The United States should use all means of
pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-
tion to the war in Sudan, including—
(A) the multilateralization of economic and
diplomatic tools to compel the Government of
Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable demo-
cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
Sudan outside of government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-
people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in
areas outside of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms
to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;
and
(E) cooperation among the trading part-
ners of the United States and within multilat-
eral institutions toward those ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov-
ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic
Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United
Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the
World Food Program, and participating relief orga-
nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF SUDAN.
The Congress hereby—
(1) condemns—
(A) violations of human rights on all sides
of the conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall
human rights record, with regard to both the
prosecution of the war and the denial of basic
human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-
ting and tolerating the practice;
(D) the Government of Sudan’s use and
organization 
of 
‘‘murahalliin’’ 
or
‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces, and
regular Sudanese Army units into organized
and coordinated raiding and slaving parties in
Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, and the
Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions; and
(E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets
that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan;
and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on
air transport relief flights by the Government of
Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a
tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys-
tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and
economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in
a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. ASSISTANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC GOV-
ERNANCE.
(a) ASSISTANCE TO SUDAN.—The President is au-
thorized to provide increased assistance to the areas of
Sudan that are not controlled by the Government of
Sudan to prepare the population for peace and democratic
governance, including support for civil administration,
communications infrastructure, education, health, and ag-
riculture.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be
appropriated to the President to carry out the activi-
ties described in subsection (a) of this section
$100,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2003,
2004, and 2005.
(2) AVAILABILITY.— Amounts appropriated
pursuant to the authorization of appropriations
under paragraph (1) of this subsection are author-
ized to remain available until expended.
SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED
PEACE PROCESS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby—
(1) recognizes that—
(A) a single, viable internationally and re-
gionally sanctioned peace process holds the
greatest opportunity to promote a negotiated,
peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; and
(B) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is
best made through a peace process based on the
Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi,
Kenya, on July 20, 1994, and on the Machakos
Protocol in July 2002; and
(2) commends the efforts of Special Presi-
dential Envoy, Senator Danforth and his team in
working to assist the parties to the conflict in Sudan
in finding a just, permanent peace to the conflict in
Sudan.
(b) MEASURES
OF
CERTAIN
CONDITIONS
NOT
MET.—
(1) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.—
(A) The President shall make a determina-
tion and certify in writing to the appropriate
congressional committees within 6 months after
the date of enactment of this Act, and each 6
months thereafter, that the Government of
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement are negotiating in good faith and
that negotiations should continue.
(B) If, under subparagraph (A) the Presi-
dent determines and certifies in writing to the
appropriate congressional committees that the
Government of Sudan has not engaged in good
faith negotiations to achieve a permanent, just,
and equitable peace agreement, or has unrea-
sonably interfered with humanitarian efforts,
then the President, after consultation with the
Congress, shall implement the measures set
forth in paragraph (2).
(C) If, under paragraph (A) the President
determines and certifies in writing to the appro-
priate congressional committees that the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement has not engaged
in good faith negotiations to achieve a perma-
nent, just, and equitable peace agreement, then
paragraph (2) shall not apply to the Govern-
ment of Sudan.
(D) If the President certifies to the appro-
priate congressional committees that the Gov-
ernment of Sudan is not in compliance with the
terms of a permanent peace agreement between
the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peo-
ple’s Liberation Movement, then the President,
after consultation with the Congress, shall im-
plement the measures set forth in paragraph
(2).
(E) If, at any time after the President has
made a certification under subparagraph (B),
the President makes a determination and cer-
tifies in writing to the appropriate congressional
committees that the Government of Sudan has
resumed good faith negotiations, or makes a de-
termination and certifies in writing to the ap-
propriate congressional committees that the
Government of Sudan is in compliance with a
peace agreement, then paragraph (2) shall not
apply to the Government of Sudan.
(2) MEASURES
IN
SUPPORT
OF
THE
PEACE
PROCESS.—Subject to the provisions of paragraph
(1), the President—
(A) shall, through the Secretary of the
Treasury, instruct the United States executive
directors to each international financial institu-
tion to continue to vote against and actively op-
pose any extension by the respective institution
of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Govern-
ment of Sudan;
(B) should consider downgrading or sus-
pending 
diplomatic 
relations 
between 
the
United States and the Government of Sudan;
(C) shall take all necessary and appro-
priate steps, including through multilateral ef-
forts, to deny the Government of Sudan access
to oil revenues to ensure that the Government
of Sudan neither directly nor indirectly utilizes
any oil revenues to purchase or acquire military
equipment or to finance any military activities;
and
(D) shall seek a United Nations Security
Council Resolution to impose an arms embargo
on the Government of Sudan.
(c) REPORT ON THE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS.—
If, at any time after the President has made a certification
under subsection (b)(1)(A), the Government of Sudan dis-
continues negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement for a 14-day period, then the President shall
submit a quarterly report to the appropriate congressional
committees on the status of the peace process until nego-
tiations resume.
(d) REPORT ON UNITED STATES OPPOSITION TO FI-
NANCING
BY
INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL
INSTITU-
TIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall submit a
semiannual report to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees describing the steps taken by the United States
to oppose the extension of a loan, credit, or guarantee if,
after the Secretary of the Treasury gives the instructions
described in subsection (b)(2)(A), such financing is ex-
tended.
(e) REPORT
ON EFFORTS TO DENY OIL REVE-
NUES.—Not later than 45 days after the President takes
an action under subsection (b)(2)(C), the President shall
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
comprehensive plan for implementing the actions de-
scribed in such subsection.
(f) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘inter-
national financial institution’’ means the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-
national Development Association, the International Mon-
etary Fund, the African Development Bank, and the Afri-
can Development Fund.
SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United Nations should help facilitate
peace and recovery in Sudan;
(2) the President, acting through the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, should seek to end the veto power of the Gov-
ernment of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air
transport relief flights and, by doing so, to end the
manipulation of the delivery of relief supplies to the
advantage of the Government of Sudan on the bat-
tlefield; and
(3) the President should take appropriate meas-
ures, including the implementation of recommenda-
tions of the International Eminent Persons Commis-
sion contained in the report issued on May 22,
2002, to end slavery and aerial bombardment of ci-
vilians by the Government of Sudan.
SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Not later than 6 months after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary
of State shall prepare and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report regarding the conflict in
Sudan. Such report shall include—
(1) a description of the sources and current sta-
tus of Sudan’s financing and construction of infra-
structure and pipelines for oil exploitation, the ef-
fects of such financing and construction on the in-
habitants of the regions in which the oil fields are
located, and the ability of the Government of Sudan
to finance the war in Sudan with the proceeds of the
oil exploitation;
(2) a description of the extent to which that fi-
nancing was secured in the United States or with in-
volvement of United States citizens;
(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan, includ-
ing targets, frequency, and best estimates of dam-
age; and
(4) a description of the extent to which humani-
tarian relief has been obstructed or manipulated by
the Government of Sudan or other forces.
SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR
RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that the President should continue to increase the
use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-
plies in southern Sudan.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report
describing the progress made toward carrying out sub-
section (a).
SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-
PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin-
gency plan to provide, outside the auspices of the United
Nations if necessary, the greatest possible amount of
United States Government and privately donated relief to
all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains
and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event
that the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial,
or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
(b) 
REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the
plan developed under subsection (a), the President may
reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations for the purposes of the plan.
SEC. 11. INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall col-
lect information about incidents which may constitute
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and other
violations of international humanitarian law by all parties
to the conflict in Sudan, including slavery, rape, and aerial
bombardment of civilian targets.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall prepare and submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a detailed report on the
information that the Secretary of State has collected
under subsection (a) and any findings or determinations
made by the Secretary on the basis of that information.
The report under this subsection may be submitted as part
of the report required under section 8.
(c) CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER DEPARTMENTS.—
In preparing the report required by this section, the Sec-
retary of State shall consult and coordinate with all other
Government officials who have information necessary to
complete the report. Nothing contained in this section
shall require the disclosure, on a classified or unclassified
basis, of information that would jeopardize sensitive
sources and methods or other vital national security inter-
ests.
Passed the House of Representatives October 7,
2002.
Attest:
Clerk.