H. R. 2401—303
(3) Strengthening of United States and international sup-
port to the IAEA so that the IAEA has the technical, financial,
and political resources to verify that countries are complying
with their nonproliferation commitments.
(4) Strengthening of nuclear export controls in the United
States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions
on individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to
nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information
on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States.
(5) Reduction in incentives for countries to pursue the
acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional
tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and
encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its
role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation agree-
ments.
(6) Support for the indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and
extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign
the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime
for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and mate-
rials.
(7) Reaching agreement with the Russian Federation to
end the production of new types of nuclear warheads.
(8) Pursuing, once the START I treaty and the START
II treaty are ratified by all parties, a multilateral agreement
to significantly reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the
United States and the Russian Federation to below the levels
of the START II treaty, with lower levels for the United King-
dom, France, and the People’s Republic of China.
(9) Reaching immediate agreement with the Russian Fed-
eration to halt permanently the production of fissile material
for weapons purposes, and working to achieve worldwide agree-
ments to—
(A) end in the shortest possible time the production
of weapons-usable fissile material;
(B) place existing stockpiles of such materials under
bilateral or international controls; and
(C) require countries to place all of their nuclear facili-
ties dedicated to peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards.
(10) Strengthening IAEA safeguards to more effectively
verify that countries are complying with their nonproliferation
commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical,
and financial support necessary to implement the necessary
safeguard reforms.
(11) Conclusion of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear
test ban treaty.
(c) REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.—(1) Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the President shall submit to the Congress a report, in unclassified
form, with a classified appendix if necessary, on the actions the
United States has taken and the actions the United States plans
to take during the succeeding 12-month period to implement each
of the policy objectives set forth in this section.
(2) Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall submit to the Congress a report
in unclassified form, with a classified appendix if necessary, which—
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H. R. 2401—304
(A) addresses the implications of the adoption by the United
States of a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons;
(B) addresses the implications of an agreement with the
other nuclear weapons states to adopt such a policy; and
(C) addresses the implications of a verifiable bilateral
agreement with the Russian Federation under which both coun-
tries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all tactical
nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all nuclear weapons
states this zero option for tactical nuclear weapons.
(d) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
(2) The term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ means the safeguards
set forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA,
as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency.
(3) The term ‘‘non-nuclear weapon state’’ means any coun-
try that is not a nuclear weapon state.
(4) The term ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ means
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed
at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.
(5) The term ‘‘nuclear weapon state’’ means any country
that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3)
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968.
(6) The term ‘‘weapons-usable fissile materials’’ means
highly enriched uranium and separated or reprocessed pluto-
nium.
(7) The term ‘‘policy of no first use of nuclear weapons’’
means a commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.
(8) The term ‘‘START II treaty’’ means the Treaty on Fur-
ther Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms,
signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on
January 3, 1993.
SEC. 1612. CONDITION ON ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA FOR CONSTRUC-
TION OF PLUTONIUM STORAGE FACILITY.
(a) LIMITATION.—Until a certification under subsection (b) is
made, no funds may be obligated or expended by the United States
for the purpose of assisting the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia
to construct a storage facility for surplus plutonium from dismantled
weapons.
(b) CERTIFICATION OF RUSSIA’S COMMITMENT TO HALT CHEMICAL
SEPARATION
OF WEAPON-GRADE PLUTONIUM.—The prohibition in
subsection (a) shall cease to apply upon a certification by the
President to Congress that Russia—
(1) is committed to halting the chemical separation of
weapon-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel; and
(2) is taking all practical steps to halt such separation
at the earliest possible date.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PLUTONIUM POLICY.—It is the sense
of Congress that a key objective of the United States with respect
to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons should be to obtain
a clear and unequivocal commitment from the Government of Russia
that it will (1) cease all production and separation of weapon-
grade plutonium, and (2) halt chemical separation of plutonium
produced in civil nuclear power reactors.
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H. R. 2401—305
(d) REPORT.—Not later than June 1, 1994, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the status of efforts by the United
States to secure the commitments and achieve the objective
described in subsections (b) and (c). The President shall include
in the report a discussion of the status of joint efforts by the
United States and Russia to replace any remaining Russian pluto-
nium production reactors with alternative power sources or to con-
vert such reactors to operation with alternative fuels that would
permit their operation without generating weapon-grade plutonium.
SEC. 1613. NORTH KOREA AND THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERA-
TION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:
(1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, to which 156 states are party, is the cornerstone of the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
(2) Any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is obligated
to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on
all source or special fissionable material that is within its
territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control
anywhere.
(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency is permitted
to conduct inspections in a nonnuclear weapon state that is
a party to the Treaty at any site, whether or not declared
by that state, to ensure that all source or special fissionable
material in that state is under safeguards.
(4) North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapons state in
December 1985.
(5) North Korea, after acceding to that Treaty, refused
until 1992 to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards as required under the Treaty.
(6) Inspections of North Korea’s nuclear materials by the
International Atomic Energy Agency suggested discrepancies
in North Korea’s declarations regarding special nuclear mate-
rials.
(7) North Korea has not given a scientifically satisfactory
explanation for those discrepancies.
(8) North Korea refused to provide International Atomic
Energy Agency inspectors with full access to two sites for
the purposes of verifying its compliance with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(9) When called upon by the International Atomic Energy
Agency to provide such full access as required by the Treaty,
North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the
Treaty, effective after the required three months notice.
(10) After intensive negotiations with the United States,
North Korea agreed to suspend its intention to withdraw from
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
begin consultations with the International Atomic Energy
Agency on providing access to its suspect sites.
(11) In an attempt to persuade North Korea to abandon
its nuclear weapons program, the United States has offered
to discuss with North Korea specific incentives that could be
provided for North Korea once (A) outstanding inspection issues
between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy
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H. R. 2401—306
Agency are resolved, and (B) progress is made in bilateral
talks between North Korea and South Korea.
(b) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS.—The Congress—
(1) notes that the continued refusal of North Korea nearly
eight years after ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons to fully accept International Atomic
Energy Agency safeguards raises serious questions regarding
a possible North Korean nuclear weapons program;
(2) notes that possession by North Korea of nuclear weap-
ons (A) would threaten peace and stability in Asia, (B) would
jeopardize the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and
(C) would undermine the goal of the United States to extend
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at
the 1995 review conference;
(3) urges continued pressure from the President, United
States allies, and the United Nations Security Council on North
Korea to adhere to the Treaty and provide full access to the
International Atomic Energy Agency in the shortest time
possible;
(4) urges the President, United States allies, and the United
Nations Security Council to press for continued talks between
North Korea and South Korea on denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula;
(5) urges that no trade, financial, or other economic benefits
be provided to North Korea by the United States or United
States allies until North Korea has (A) provided full access
to the International Atomic Energy Agency, (B) satisfactorily
explained any discrepancies in its declarations of bomb-grade
material, and (C) fully demonstrated that it does not have
or seek a nuclear weapons capability; and
(6) calls on the President and the international community
to take steps to strengthen the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.
SEC. 1614. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO THE PROLIFERATION
OF SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:
(1) The United States has joined with other nations in
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts
the transfer of missiles or equipment or technology that could
contribute to the design, development, or production of missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
(2) Missile technology is indistinguishable from, and inter-
changeable with, space launch vehicle technology.
(3) Transfers of missile technology or space launch vehicle
technology cannot be safeguarded in a manner that would
provide timely warning of diversion for military purposes.
(4) It has been United States policy since agreeing to the
guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime to treat
the sale or transfer of space launch vehicle technology as restric-
tively as the sale or transfer of missile technology.
(5) Previous congressional action on missile proliferation,
notably title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101–510; 104 Stat. 1738),
has explicitly supported the policy described in paragraph (4)
through such actions as the statutory definition of the term
‘‘missile’’ to mean ‘‘a category I system as defined in the MTCR
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