•HCON 340 IH
Whereas hostilities in Operation Desert Storm ended on Feb-
ruary 28, 1991, and the conditions governing the cease-
fire were specified in United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 686 (March 2, 1991) and 687 (April 3,
1991);
Whereas Security Council Resolution 687 requires that inter-
national economic sanctions remain in place until Iraq
discloses and destroys its programs for weapons of mass
destruction and commits unconditionally never to resume
such programs;
Whereas Resolution 687 established the United Nations Spe-
cial Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to uncover all as-
pects of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs
and tasked the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to locate and remove or destroy
all nuclear weapons systems, subsystems, or material
from Iraq;
Whereas Security Council Resolution 715, adopted on Octo-
ber 11, 1991, empowered UNSCOM to maintain a long-
term monitoring program designed to ensure that Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction programs are dismantled
and not restarted;
Whereas Iraq has consistently fought to hide the full extent
of its weapons programs and has systematically made
false declarations to the Security Council and to
UNSCOM regarding those programs, and has systemati-
cally obstructed weapons inspections for 7 years;
Whereas on April 10, 1995, UNSCOM reported to the Secu-
rity Council that Iraq had concealed its biological weap-
ons program and failed to account for 17 tons of biologi-
•HCON 340 IH
cal weapons material, and the Security Council subse-
quently renewed sanctions against Iraq;
Whereas on July 1, 1995, Iraq admitted to a full-scale bio-
logical weapons program, but denied incorporating bio-
logical agents into weapons and subsequently threatened
to end cooperation with UNSCOM, and the Security
Council subsequently renewed sanctions against Iraq;
Whereas in December 1996, Iraq prevented UNSCOM from
removing 130 Scud missile engines from Iraq, and the
Security Council issued a Presidential Statement deplor-
ing Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM;
Whereas the Security Council has repeatedly demanded that
Iraq end its obstruction of UNSCOM, including in Reso-
lutions 1060 (June 12, 1996), 1115 (June 21, 1996),
1134 (October 23, 1997), and 1137 (November 12,
1997);
Whereas on January 16, 1998, an UNSCOM team led by
American Scott Ritter was withdrawn from Iraq after
being barred for 3 days by Iraq from conducting inspec-
tions, resulting in the issuance of a Security Council
Presidential Statement deploring Iraq’s decision to bar
the team as a clear violation of all applicable resolutions;
Whereas despite a clear agreement between Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein and United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan to grant access to all sites and fully cooper-
ate with UNSCOM, and the adoption on March 2, 1998,
of Security Council Resolution 1154, warning that any
violation of the agreement with Annan would have the
‘‘severest consequences’’ for Iraq, Iraq has continued to
actively conceal weapons and weapons programs, provide
•HCON 340 IH
misinformation, and otherwise deny UNSCOM inspectors
access to suspected weapons facilities;
Whereas President Clinton warned at that time that if Sad-
dam Hussein defied the UNSCOM inspectors ‘‘and we
fail to act . . . he will conclude that the international
community has lost its will. He will then conclude that
he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of
devastating destruction. And some day, some way, I
guarantee you he’ll use the arsenal.’’;
Whereas United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
also stated at the time that if Saddam Hussein ‘‘reneges
on this deal, there will be no question that force is the
only way to go’’;
Whereas on June 24, 1998, UNSCOM Director Richard But-
ler presented information to the United Nations Security
Council indicating clearly that traces of the nerve agent
VX had been discovered by UNSCOM in Iraqi missile
warheads and that Iraq, contrary to information provided
by Iraq to UNSCOM, had incorporated VX into weapons;
Whereas the Iraqi Government has since admitted making
3.9 tons of VX while continuing to deny ever incorporat-
ing any into a weapon;
Whereas on August 5, 1998, the Iraqi Government said it
would halt cooperation with most inspections until the
United Nations Security Council eliminated the economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in
1990;
Whereas on August 26, 1998, UNSCOM inspection team
leader Scott Ritter resigned his post citing ‘‘interference
and manipulation usually coming from the highest levels
of the [Clinton] Administration’s national security team’’
•HCON 340 IH
that undermined UNSCOM’s ability to inspect suspected
weapons facilities;
Whereas Mr. Ritter testified before Congress that inter-
ference from the United States and the United Kingdom
has given the appearance that UNSCOM is conducting
unhindered weapons inspections when in fact such inspec-
tions are not occurring;
Whereas Mr. Ritter also testified that it would take Iraqi
leader Saddam Hussein only 6 months to reconstitute his
chemical weapons capability and the ballistic missiles to
deliver them;
Whereas Mr. Ritter also noted that the appearance of arms
control is more dangerous than no arms control at all;
Whereas reports in the news media cite Mr. Ritter as telling
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that Iraq
has 3 ‘‘technologically complete’’ nuclear bombs that only
lack the fissile material to make them operational;
Whereas the Security Council voted on September 9, 1998,
to suspend any further periodic reviews of the economic
sanctions imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf
War;
Whereas the United States spends billions of dollars each
year to enforce United Nations sanctions on Iraq; and
Whereas Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction pro-
grams threaten vital United States interests and inter-
national peace and security, and make a mockery of the
sacrifices made during the Gulf War: Now, therefore, be
it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that Iraq
•HCON 340 IH
is in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations, and therefore—
(1) the President is urged to take appropriate
action, in accordance with the Constitution and laws
of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance
with its international obligations;
(2) the President should insist on the removal,
destruction, or rendering harmless of Iraq’s pro-
grams for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons;
(3) the President should fully support the right
of inspectors of the United Nations Special Commis-
sion on Iraq to unfettered and unannounced inspec-
tions of suspected weapons facilities; and
(4) the President should not renege on past
warnings, issued by the President, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Defense, that the United
States is committed to using military force, if nec-
essary, to punish Iraq for interfering with or ob-
structing UNSCOM’s weapons inspections.
Æ