I 
116TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1231 
To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international restric-
tions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range missiles, and 
for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 14, 2019 
Ms. FRANKEL (for herself, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. KHANNA, and 
Mr. POCAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened 
international 
restrictions 
on 
the 
proliferation 
of 
intermediate- and short-range missiles, and for other 
purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevention of Arms 
Race Act of 2019’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) On February 1, 2019, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo announced the United States would 
immediately suspend its obligations and would with-
draw, in six months, from the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their In-
termediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, to-
gether with the Memorandum of Understanding and 
Two Protocols (commonly known as the ‘‘INF Trea-
ty’’), signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and 
entered into force June 1, 1988. 
(2) The United States Senate provided its ad-
vice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty 
on May 27, 1988, by a vote of 93 to 5. 
(3) The INF Treaty permanently bans the 
United States and twelve former Soviet republics, in-
cluding Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, 
from testing or possessing ground-launched cruise or 
ballistic missiles of intermediate range (500 to 5,500 
kilometers, or roughly 300 to 3,400 miles). 
(4) The INF Treaty, signed by President Ron-
ald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev, led to the elimination of entire classes of 
United States and Russian nuclear and conventional 
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ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles—2,692 
in total—supported by on-site inspections that al-
lowed both sides to ‘‘trust but verify’’ compliance 
with the Treaty. 
(5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) allies were deeply involved in the pursuit of 
negotiation on the INF Treaty and have significant 
national security interests in the Treaty’s preserva-
tion. The communique from the July 11, 2018, 
NATO Summit in Brussels stated that the INF 
Treaty ‘‘has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security’’. 
(6) Less than one month prior to the announce-
ment of the United States intent to withdraw from 
the INF Treaty, then-Secretary of Defense Jim 
Mattis met with his NATO counterparts to discuss 
the full-range of diplomatic, economic, and INF- 
compliant military options to pressure the Russian 
Federation to return to compliance with the Treaty 
as outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 
Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ published December 8, 
2017. 
(7) Since the United States publicly declared in 
July 2014 that the Russian Federation was in viola-
tion of the INF Treaty’s prohibition on possessing, 
producing, or flight-testing a ground-launched cruise 
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missile (GLCM), which is the equivalent of the Rus-
sian SSC–8 missile system, the United States has 
worked with its NATO allies to identify a unified ap-
proach on the best way forward. 
(8) The United States did not exhaust diplo-
matic, economic, and military means to bring the 
Russian Federation back into compliance with the 
Treaty, and in 2018 alone, the United States can-
celled at least two strategic stability dialogues 
planned to be conducted with the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(9) On January 16, 2019, Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security 
Andrea Thompson confirmed that the Russian Fed-
eration offered to exhibit the SSC–8 missile system 
for the United States, which, while insufficient in 
itself to resolve its Treaty violation, represented the 
first such offer since the first United States finding 
of non-compliance in 2014. 
(10) The United States withdrawal from the 
INF Treaty will allow the Russian Federation to es-
cape international criticism for its violation of the 
Treaty and sow division among NATO allies at a 
time when Alliance unity is critical to respond to a 
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range of destabilizing actions by the Russian Fed-
eration. 
(11) The United States withdrawal from the 
INF Treaty will free the Russian Federation to ex-
pand deployment of the SSC–8 missile system in 
ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific allies 
without bearing any international legal cost in doing 
so. 
(12) The Department of Defense has also not 
yet identified the full estimated research, develop-
ment, testing, and evaluation, procurement, or per-
sonnel costs of producing, testing, and deploying a 
new short- or intermediate-range ground-launched 
cruise or ballistic missile currently prohibited by the 
INF Treaty. 
(13) No European or Asian ally has publicly de-
clared its willingness or readiness to host a future 
United States short- or intermediate-range ground- 
launched cruise or ballistic missile currently prohib-
ited by the INF Treaty should the United States 
seek to deploy that capability. 
(14) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens 
Stoltenberg, stated on October 24, 2018, that ‘‘we 
don’t want a new Cold War, we don’t want a new 
arms race and therefore I don’t foresee that Allies 
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will deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe as a re-
sponse to the new Russian missile,’’ which precedes 
United States National Security Advisor John 
Bolton’s statement of November 9, 2018, that 
‘‘there are no American plans to seek to deploy INF 
non-compliant missiles in Europe for the foreseeable 
future’’. 
(15) Any effort by the United States Govern-
ment to proceed beyond research and development of 
an intermediate-range cruise or ballistic missile that 
is nuclear armed will be portrayed in as deeply in-
consistent with the United States obligation under 
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, July 1, 
1968 (commonly known as the ‘‘NPT’’), to ‘‘pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures re-
lating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race’’. 
(16) Achieving the objective of expanding the 
INF Treaty’s membership to the People’s Republic 
of China, which has deployed intermediate-range 
missile systems in great number, is greatly dimin-
ished if parties to the existing Treaty cease imple-
mentation. 
(17) The Congressional Budget Office in Octo-
ber 2017 estimated that the costs of United States 
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nuclear weapons spending over the next three dec-
ades 
will 
amount 
to 
$1,200,000,000,000, 
or 
$1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for inflation, 
which does not include new systems proposed in the 
2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as 
a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM), a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), and 
a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Secretary of State Pompeo’s announcement 
of the decision of the United States to withdraw 
from the INF Treaty, without proper consultation 
with Congress, is a serious breach of Congress’s 
proper constitutional role as a co-equal branch of 
government; 
(2) United States withdrawal from the INF 
Treaty will free the Russian Federation to deploy 
greater quantities of the SSC–8 missile to the det-
riment of United States national security and that 
of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific; 
(3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to 
limit or eliminate China’s short- and intermediate- 
range missiles; 
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(4) the NATO alliance makes critical contribu-
tions to United States national security, and the 
failure to weigh the concerns of NATO allies risks 
weakening the joint resolve necessary to counter 
Russia’s aggressive behavior; and 
(5) as opposed to withdrawing from the INF 
Treaty, the United States should continue to ad-
vance other diplomatic, economic, and military meas-
ures outlined in the ‘‘Trump Administration INF 
Treaty Integrated Strategy’’ to resolve the concerns 
related to the Russian Federation’s violation of the 
Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to en-
sure the Treaty’s future viability. 
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROCURE-
MENT, FLIGHT TESTING, OR DEPLOYMENT OF 
SHORT- OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND- 
LAUNCHED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE 
SYSTEM. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No funds may be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for the procurement, flight test-
ing, or deployment of a United States short- or inter-
mediate-range ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile 
system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers 
until the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the 
Secretary of State and the Director of National Intel-
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ligence, submits a report and offers a briefing to the ap-
propriate committees of Congress that— 
(1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) from a NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that com-
mits such ally to host deployment of any such mis-
sile on its own territory, and in the case of deploy-
ment on the European continent, has the concur-
rence of the North Atlantic Council; 
(2) confirms that the United States has not re-
jected any diplomatic offer to exhibit the SSC–8 
missile system, negotiations on a verifiable mutual 
agreement prohibiting the placement of INF-range 
missiles on NATO territory or within range of a 
NATO Member State, or any other transparency 
measure which may successfully move Russia closer 
to returning to compliance with the Treaty or pre-
vent a proliferation of INF-range systems on the 
continent; 
(3) assesses the implications, in terms of the 
military threat to the United States and its allies in 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federa-
tion deployment of intermediate-range cruise and 
ballistic missiles without restriction; 
(4) identifies what types of technologies and 
programs the United States would need to pursue to 
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offset the additional Russian capabilities, and at 
what cost; 
(5) identifies what mission requirements with 
respect to the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China will be met by INF-type systems; 
(6) identifies the degree to which INF-compli-
ant capabilities, such as sea and air-launched cruise 
missiles, can meet those same mission requirements; 
and 
(7) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of 
the INF Treaty on the ability to generate consensus 
among States Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of 
the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and assesses the 
degree to which the Russian Federation will use the 
United States unilateral withdrawal to sow discord 
within the NATO alliance. 
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
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(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
Æ 
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