IV 
108TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 406 
Remembering the victims of the genocide that occurred in 1994 in Rwanda 
and pledging to work to ensure that such an atrocity does not take 
place again. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
APRIL 2, 2004 
Mr. PAYNE (for himself, Mr. CUMMINGS, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. 
OWENS, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. JEFFERSON, Ms. NOR-
TON, Ms. WATERS, Mr. BISHOP of Georgia, Ms. CORRINE BROWN of 
Florida, Mr. CLYBURN, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE 
JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. THOMPSON of Mis-
sissippi, Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas, Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD, Ms. 
CARSON of Indiana, Mrs. CHRISTENSEN, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Ms. KIL-
PATRICK, Ms. LEE, Mr. MEEKS of New York, Mrs. JONES of Ohio, Ms. 
WATSON, Ms. MAJETTE, Mr. MEEK of Florida, Mr. RUSH, Mr. WATT, 
Mr. WYNN, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. JACKSON of Illinois, Mr. BALLANCE, Mr. 
TANCREDO, Mr. DAVIS of Alabama, and Mr. CLAY) submitted the fol-
lowing concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
International Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Remembering the victims of the genocide that occurred in 
1994 in Rwanda and pledging to work to ensure that 
such an atrocity does not take place again. 
Whereas in August 1993, the government of President Juve-
nal Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) signed a peace agreement, paving the way for a
•HCON 406 IH 
power-sharing arrangement and the return of Rwandan 
refugees to their country; 
Whereas shortly after signing the peace agreement, President 
Habyarimana deliberately and systematically delayed the 
setting up of the coalition government as agreed to by 
the parties, expanded the training of extremist groups, 
and intensified hate radio through Radio Mille Collines; 
Whereas as part of the Arusha Accords the United Nations 
agreed to deploy 2500 peacekeeping troops, known as the 
United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR); 
Whereas according to a UNAMIR report, on November 5, 
1993, at a meeting chaired by President Habyarimana, 
the government decided to provide the Interhamwe and 
other youth militia weapons, including grenades and ma-
chetes with a directive to kill Tutsis, and according to the 
same report, distribution of the weapons began that same 
month; 
Whereas on December 3, 1993, senior officers in the Rwan-
dan Armed Forces warned General Romeo Dallaire, com-
mander of United Nations forces in Rwanda, of increas-
ing and systematic killings of civilians by the militia, and 
planned assassinations of senior officials in the coalition 
government, 
including 
the 
fact 
that 
President 
Habyarimana himself had authorized this bloody cam-
paign; 
Whereas throughout December 1993, a number of reports, 
including reports from the Ambassador of Belgium in 
Rwanda, UNAMIR officials, and human rights groups, 
confirmed widespread killings of civilians by pro-govern-
ment militia and confirmed training of pro-government 
militia in government-run camps;
•HCON 406 IH 
Whereas on January 6, 1994, General Dallaire reported to 
the United Nations that the killings of civilians by militia 
groups were well-organized and indicated that these 
killings would continue for the foreseeable future; 
Whereas on January 10, 1994, UNAMIR officers met with 
an informant named Jean-Pierre, a commander in the 
Interhamwe militia, who told them of a large weapons 
cache intended for members of the Interhamwe militia; 
Whereas on January 11, 1994, General Dallaire sent a con-
fidential cable to United Nations headquarters informing 
United Nations officials about militia training and arms 
cache; 
Whereas General Dallaire wrote to his superiors that the mi-
litias intended to kill a large number of Tutsi and mod-
erate Hutu civilians, and he informed the United Nations 
peacekeeping department that he intended to seize the 
arms and asked for United Nations protection for the in-
formant who provided the information; 
Whereas on January 12, 1994, General Dallaire was told by 
United Nations headquarters that the United Nations 
mandate did not give him the authority to seize the arms 
cache and the United Nations would not provide protec-
tion to the informant, and instead, General Dallaire was 
ordered to provide the information to President 
Habyarimana and the ambassadors of Belgium, France, 
and the United States; 
Whereas on February 21, 1994, extremists assassinated the 
Minister of Public Works, Felicien Gatabazi, and on Feb-
ruary 20, 1994, Prime Minister-designate Twagiramungu 
escaped an assassination attempt;
•HCON 406 IH 
Whereas the security situation in Rwanda deteriorated rap-
idly in late February 1994, with the slaughter of 70 civil-
ians in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda; 
Whereas on March 10, 1994, the National Republican Move-
ment for Democracy (MRND) party leaders expressed 
frustration and anger that President Habyarimana did 
not consult them before he left for a meeting with Presi-
dent Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and described his deci-
sion to go as ‘‘a serious political error’’; 
Whereas on April 6, 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Bu-
rundi, along with several senior government officials, 
were killed when their plane was shot down as it ap-
proached the capital of Rwanda; 
Whereas on April 7, 1994, the Rwandan Armed Forces and 
the Interhamwe militia unleashed genocide against Tutsi 
civilians and moderate Hutu politicians when tens of 
thousands of innocent civilians, including women and 
children, were massacred; 
Whereas ten Belgian peacekeeping troops assigned to protect 
the Rwandan Hutu Prime Minister were brutally mur-
dered along with the Prime Minister; 
Whereas on April 8, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
launched an offensive to stop the ongoing genocide and 
to rescue 600 RPF troops trapped in Kigali, who were 
sent to protect RPF officials as agreed to in the Arusha 
Accords; 
Whereas on April 8, 1994, France, Belgium, and the United 
States evacuated their citizens from Rwanda; 
Whereas on April 11, 1994, an estimated 2,000 civilians were 
slaughtered at the Don Bosco school in Kigali where they
•HCON 406 IH 
sought shelter and briefly were protected by UNAMIR 
troops; 
Whereas the civilians at the school were killed after the 
United Nations ordered UNAMIR troops to abandon the 
civilians and withdraw to the airport; 
Whereas on April 14, 1994, Belgium withdrew its troops 
from Rwanda and a week later the United Nations Secu-
rity Council voted unanimously to withdraw UNAMIR 
troops at the height of the Rwandan genocide; 
Whereas almost a month into the Rwandan genocide, the 
Clinton Administration refused to use the word genocide 
with respect to the situation in Rwanda and on April 28, 
1994, the United Nations Security Council deliberately 
omitted the word genocide from a Council resolution in 
order to avoid its legal and international obligations to 
intervene; 
Whereas on May 13, 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council began deliberation on a resolution to authorize a 
robust peacekeeping force for Rwanda; 
Whereas the United States ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, forced a delay on 
the United Nations Security Council vote because of 
funding issues; 
Whereas on May 17, 1994, Ambassador Albright defended 
her position by saying ‘‘sending a U.N. force into a mael-
strom in Rwanda without a sound plan of operations 
would be folly’’; 
Whereas on May 17, 1994, five weeks after the Rwandan 
genocide began, the United Nations Security Council au-
thorized the deployment of 6,800 United Nations peace-
keeping troops with a mandate to protect civilians;
•HCON 406 IH 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council resolution au-
thorizing such deployment stated that ‘‘acts of genocide 
may have been committed’’; 
Whereas on June 22, 1994, the United Nations Security 
Council authorized the deployment of French forces to 
south-west Rwanda to create a ‘‘safe area’’ for fleeing ci-
vilians and subsequently fleeing militia and government 
leaders were given safe haven and protection by the 
French forces most of whom eventually fled to Zaire; 
Whereas on July 4, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front cap-
tured Kigali, the Hutu-led government fled to Zaire, the 
French ended their mission and were replaced by a 
United Nations peacekeeping force from Ethiopia, and 
the RPF formed an interim national unity government; 
Whereas on August 17, 1994, Rwandan Defense Minister, 
Paul Kagame, warned the Government of Zaire not to 
allow members of the former Rwandan Armed Forces 
and the Interhamwe militia to train and launch attacks 
from Zaire; 
Whereas in August 1994, the United States deployed troops 
to the Central Africa region to assist in the relief oper-
ation; 
Whereas an estimated 2,000 United States troops partici-
pated in Operation Support Hope, however, the United 
States was criticized by some observers for not respond-
ing quickly to the Rwandan crisis and for its role in the 
United Nations Security Council; 
Whereas, Rwanda having joined the United Nations Security 
Council in early 1994, the United Nations representative 
of the new Rwandan Government took his seat at the Se-
curity Council on September 1, 1994, after months of de-