(4) EXECUTION
OF
STRATEGY.—The President 
should issue an Executive Order to implement the 
strategy and make such changes in agency regulations 
and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy 
into effect. 
(5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘relevant congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-
mittee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
of the Senate. 
(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized 
to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the 
‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’, 
under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented 
on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
carry out various programs to advance the development of 
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sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure 
worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by— 
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 
improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 
procurement environments, and project preparation 
capacity of countries that are partners of the United 
States in such development; 
(2) providing transaction advisory services and 
project preparation assistance to support sustainable 
infrastructure; and 
(3) coordinating the provision of United States 
assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
cluding infrastructure that uses United States manu-
factured goods and services, and catalyzing invest-
ment led by the private sector. 
(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 
‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ de-
scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost 
the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential 
infrastructure projects, including through providing serv-
ices such as— 
(1) legal services; 
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(2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 
(3) debt sustainability analyses; 
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 
(5) other services relevant to advancing the devel-
opment of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
infrastructure. 
(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described under 
subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to 
provide support, including through the Strategic In-
frastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project 
preparation, pipeline development, and other infra-
structure project support. 
(2) 
JOINT
STRATEGIC
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infra-
structure Fund should be used in coordination with 
the Department of Defense, the International Develop-
ment Finance Corporation, like-minded donor part-
ners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to sup-
port joint infrastructure projects that are in the na-
tional security interest of the United States and vul-
nerable to strategic competitors. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 
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to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made 
available for the Transaction Advisory Fund. 
SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-
ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lend-
ing and financing, including in the form of providing sup-
port to companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Govern-
ment of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing coun-
tries. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted en-
ergy needs and capacities of developing countries, and 
analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state- 
owned industries and other companies incorporated 
in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and 
financing of energy projects, including direct financ-
ing by the PRC government, PRC financial institu-
tions, or direct state support to state-owned enter-
prises and other companies incorporated in the PRC; 
(2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sec-
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tor reforms, to expand the development and deploy-
ment of advanced energy technologies in developing 
countries; 
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and 
other financial products on terms that advance do-
mestic economic and local employment opportunities, 
utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage pri-
vate sector growth, and, when appropriate United 
States equity and sovereign lending products as alter-
natives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chi-
nese financial institutions; 
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
verage investment in advanced energy technologies in 
developing countries; and 
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the ef-
fects of energy engagement by the PRC through preda-
tory lending or other actions that negatively impact 
other countries. 
(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary 
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of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United 
States Government strategy to increase United States ex-
ports of advanced energy technologies to— 
(1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
oping countries; 
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and trans-
parent energy markets; 
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 
trading relationships; and 
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy. 
SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 
INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-
OPMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress a report that— 
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening 
United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
cordance with the economic and national security in-
terests of the United States and where deeper energy 
partnerships are most achievable; 
(2) describes the involvement of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and compa-
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nies incorporated in the PRC in the development, op-
eration, financing, or ownership of energy generation 
facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy re-
sources in the countries identified in paragraph (1); 
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
implications for United States national interests and 
the interests of the countries identified in paragraph 
(1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influ-
ence in developing country energy production or 
transmission; and 
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 
United States to partner with the countries identified 
in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support 
shared interests between the United States and such 
countries. 
(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s 
website. 
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States played a leadership role 
in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms 
governing the international economic order following 
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the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic 
economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability. 
(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic 
pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 
40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 re-
maining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Com-
prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting 
high-standard rules for regional economic engage-
ment. 
(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, 
China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of 
GDP. 
(4) Reduced United States economic engagement 
has led United States allies and partners to question 
the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific re-
gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, 
the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of 
this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the re-
gion and promoting its own state-led economic model. 
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(5) The United States is increasingly on the out-
side looking in with regards to economic pacts in the 
Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agree-
ments puts it at both a strategic and competitive dis-
advantage in the region and allows competitors to ex-
pand their economic influence at the United States’ 
expense. 
(6) Given that these partnerships and agree-
ments will define the rules and norms that will gov-
ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the 
United States is currently not well positioned to 
shape the coming economic landscape. 
(7) It is in the United States’ vital interest to 
upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to 
strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-
ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism. 
SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-
ordination with the United States Trade Representative 
and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to 
the appropriate congressional committees that describes the 
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global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, 
including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and invest-
ment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the 
United States economy, American companies and workers, 
as well as on the countries that have entered into agree-
ments with the PRC and the global economy as a whole. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall in-
clude the following: 
(1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s inter-
national economic practices, which will— 
(A) provide an overview of the PRC’s dis-
tortive trade policies; 
(B) list the PRC’s trade and investment 
agreements globally, both agreements it has 
signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia-
tions it has with individual countries or groups 
of countries; 
(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC 
uses to advance its international economic objec-
tives, including economic and commercial dia-
logues and BRI related activities; 
(D) compare the United States and Chinese 
approaches and priorities on trade and invest-
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United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied 
to the following economic objectives: 
(1) Deepening United States trade and invest-
ment relationships in the region, especially with key 
allies and partners. 
(2) Confirming American leadership and par-
ticipation in global regional economic organizations 
and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral 
agreements on trade and investment, as well as nego-
tiations at the WTO to reassert United States eco-
nomic leadership by writing the rules of the road on 
critical economic questions. 
(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains 
for industries critical for United States national in-
terest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per-
sonal protective equipment. 
(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a 
market-based economic model. 
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the United States Trade Representa-
tive and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report 
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to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the 
steps the United States is taking and plans to take to 
achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and in-
cludes specific action plans for the following: 
(1) Enhancing United States trade and invest-
ment relationships in the region bilaterally and 
plurilaterally, especially with United States allies 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component 
of the region’s economic architecture. 
(3) Work to ensure that the United States ab-
sence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not under-
mine the United States’ ability to shape regional 
trade and investment rules. 
(4) Working with allies and partners to build re-
silient and trusted supply chains especially for crit-
ical and emerging technologies, including semiconduc-
tors, and products and components critical for na-
tional health, including vaccines and related mate-
rials and personal protective equipment. 
(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high- 
standards and rules for the region in the following 
areas: 
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(A) Advanced technologies and the digital 
sphere. 
(B) Labor practices and environmental 
standards. 
(C) Intellectual property rights. 
(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the 
PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a 
specific focus on— 
(A) subsidies and unfair competition by 
state-owned enterprises; and 
(B) corruption and politicized infrastruc-
ture. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES
OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; 
and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER 
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
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(1) the United States has benefitted from the re-
gional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-
cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its 
inception in 1989; 
(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 
21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 
60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global 
trade; 
(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in 
trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en-
hanced access to global value chains, while raising the 
profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustain-
ability, gender parity, and inclusive growth; 
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage 
and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive 
regional economy that benefits United States workers, 
consumers, and businesses and better integrates the 
United States economy with others in the region; 
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 
2011, it was able to promote United States interests, 
while reassuring allies and partners about its strong 
commitment to the region in the economic arena; 
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum 
to make progress on several United States priorities, 
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that are shared by United States allies and partners, 
including— 
(A) making regional commerce more inclu-
sive; 
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; 
and 
(C) addressing climate change and environ-
mental protection; 
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous 
opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape 
the regional economic agenda; 
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United States 
to advance several of its own priorities in the region, 
including to— 
(A) expand the participation of APEC 
stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-
mental advocates, and other part of civil society; 
(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and 
promote small and medium enterprises; 
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to up-
grade skills for the next-generation of technology 
jobs; 
(D) advance a climate and sustainable 
trade and development agenda with a focus on 
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green technologies, infrastructure and finance; 
and 
(E) advance work on digital trade, includ-
ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro-
moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the 
free flow of data; and 
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United 
States should immediately announce its interest to 
host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-
tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-
port. 
SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COER-
CION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-govern-
ment strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against 
third countries that includes the following: 
(1) An explanation of the means available to the 
United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable 
a country with a smaller economy to withstand such 
coercion. 
(2) A description of the role that the Secretary 
of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in 
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the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for 
conducting economic coercion. 
(3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Secretary of Defense, the 
head of each element of the intelligence community 
(as such term is defined by section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
United States Trade Representative, and the United 
States International Development Finance Corpora-
tion in implementing such strategy. 
(b) UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date 
of the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and 
every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-
ment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, 
lessons learned from the past year, and planned changes 
to the strategy. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy and update required by sub-
sections (a) and (b), respectively, shall be submitted in clas-
sified form with an unclassified summary. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
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(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee 
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; 
and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate. 
SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 
ISSUES. 
(a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SET-
TING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
must lead in international bodies that set the governance 
norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies 
in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a 
free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain. 
(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is 
the sense of Congress that the United States, along with al-
lies and partners, should lead an international effort that 
uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal 
to combat the expanding use of information and commu-
nications technology products and services to surveil, re-
press, and manipulate populations (also known as ‘‘digital 
authoritarianism’’). 
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(c) FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION
IN
THE DIGITAL 
AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish 
information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained 
as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 
mechanism for communication. 
(d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOP-
MENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR 
HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the 
United States should lead a global effort to develop and 
adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical 
technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies can-
not be abused by malign actors, whether they are govern-
ments or other entities, and that they do not threaten demo-
cratic governance or human rights. 
SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated 
United States dependence on digital tools, inter-
national rules around digital governance and trade 
have remained largely piecemeal; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating 
under and advancing a set of digital rules that are 
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contrary to United States values and interests, and 
those of United States allies and partners; 
(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and 
bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Com-
prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital 
Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand- 
Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have 
emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States 
should be driving; 
(4) the United States has already underscored 
the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.- 
Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and 
including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chap-
ter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement; 
(5) a regional deal on digital governance and 
trade would allow the United States to unite a group 
of like-minded economies around common standards 
and norms, including the principles of openness, in-
clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow 
of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the 
global economy; 
(6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-
ation of common rules and standards that govern 
cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and 
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cybersecurity 
at 
a 
time 
of 
growing 
digital 
vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-
tutions around the world; 
(7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-
ticipation of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
the global economy through trade facilitation meas-
ures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-pay-
ment; and 
(8) the United States Trade Representative, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State should nego-
tiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar-
rangements relating to digital trade with the like- 
minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the Eu-
ropean Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes 
intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and 
allies, as appropriate. 
SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) DIGITAL
CONNECTIVITY
AND
CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish a 
program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and Cy-
bersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries— 
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access 
and digital infrastructure; 
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(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that 
foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and 
secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data, 
multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and 
pro-competitive and secure information and commu-
nications technology (ICT) policies and regulations; 
(3) promote and protect human rights and 
counter corruption and predatory behavior through-
out communications and cybersecurity policy and im-
plementation; 
(4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, 
disinformation and misinformation, and the use of 
digital technology and services to carry out criminal 
activity or human rights violations; 
(5) bolster the role of civil society in informing 
ICT policy and regulations; 
(6) promote exports of United States ICT goods 
and services and increase United States company 
market share in target markets; 
(7) promote the innovation and diversification of 
ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant 
on imports from the People’s Republic of China; 
(8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
operability, and promote best practices for a national 
approach to cybersecurity; and 
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(9) enhance the security of their digital infra-
structure to facilitate better information sharing with 
the United States and United States allies and part-
ners, as appropriate. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development shall jointly submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees an implementation 
plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the sub-
mission of the plan to advance the goals identified in sub-
section (a). The implementation plan shall also include a 
description of interagency responsibilities to carry out im-
plementation, a description of any barriers to successful im-
plementation, and a description of any additional resources 
or authorities needed for successful implementation. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementa-
tion plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State 
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall consult with— 
(1) the appropriate congressional committees; 
(2) leaders of the United States industry; 
(3) civil society leaders with expertise in tech-
nology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic 
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development and competitiveness, and human rights, 
including from the Open Technology Fund; 
(4) representatives from relevant United States 
Government agencies; and 
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and 
partners. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETI-
TION. 
It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advi-
sor Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the United States 
and likeminded democracies are in an ideological competi-
tion with the People’s Republic of China, under the direc-
tion and control of the Chinese Communist Party, when he 
stated, ‘‘China is essentially making the case that the Chi-
nese model is better than the American model. . . This is 
not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an ex-
plicit statement that there is an alternative model to the 
democratic market economy model that the United States 
has been advancing over the course of decades.’’. 
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Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a 
system of state-owned financial institutions including 
retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and 
insurers which are given favorable treatment under 
Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have 
strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the 
PRC. 
(2) In order to join the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed 
to opening the credit card payment business to for-
eign firms by 2006. 
(3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its 
payment market, the United States brought a case 
against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO 
mandated that the PRC open its card payment mar-
ket to global competitors. 
(4) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov-
ernment refused to comply with the ruling and main-
tained a rule that required all yuan-denominated 
payment cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network. 
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Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had 
grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government ap-
prove the application of foreign firms to enter the 
market. 
(5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive 
capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market 
to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citi-
zens ability to control their money. 
(6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi 
Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a 
technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 
2019. 
(7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire 
Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state- 
owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public of-
fering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chi-
nese regulators. 
(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use 
of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the 
world’s first central bank backed digital currency, 
and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority have already begun testing the 
cross-border functionality of the digital currency. 
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SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-
CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the 
United States and the American people by allowing 
the United States to maintain economic independ-
ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance 
government outlays; 
(2) American global leadership has benefited 
from the United States monetary stability, credit-
worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
nology innovations; 
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of 
American national security rely on the United States 
role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, 
and source of economic opportunity; 
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of 
a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing for-
ward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s 
Republic of China is attempting to become the leading 
hub of finance in the world; and 
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(5) the United States must maintain its position 
as a global financial leader to continue its broader 
global leadership role around the world. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-
ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that— 
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American 
foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-
nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the 
world’s global reserve currency; 
(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s 
Republic of China that could cement China’s role as 
the world’s leading financial center; 
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American 
national security and foreign policy were the yuan to 
supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve cur-
rency; 
(4) outlines how the United States can work dip-
lomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to 
preserve a financial system that is free, open, and 
fair; and 
(5) identifies steps the United States can take to 
preserve its status as the world’s leading financial 
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center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob-
al reserve currency. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES
OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House of Representatives; 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and 
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate. 
SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED 
STATES CAPITAL MARKETS. 
(a) FINDINGS.— 
(1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese 
companies sought to raise capital and list shares on 
American stock markets. 
(2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese 
firms were delisted from the New York Stock Ex-
change as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and 
other corporate governance failures. 
(3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the 
United States Government, the Public Company Ac-
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counting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memo-
randum of understanding with the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of 
Finance for the production and exchange of audit 
documents. 
(4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regu-
lators continue to hinder the PCAOB’s access to rel-
evant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to 
carry out its enforcement duties. 
(5) In August 2020, the Department of State 
sent a letter to American universities warning about 
national security implications related to Chinese 
stock holdings. 
(6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the 
President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Ac-
countable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires 
foreign companies listed on American stock markets 
to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three 
years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance 
within three years will be delisted. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
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sional committees a report that describes the costs and 
benefits to the United States posed by the presence of 
companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) that are listed on American stock ex-
changes or traded over the counter, in the form of 
American depository receipts. 
(2) MATTERS
TO
BE
INCLUDED.—The report 
shall— 
(A) identify companies incorporated in the 
PRC that— 
(i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
eral stock exchanges within the United 
States, including over-the-counter market 
and ‘‘A Shares’’ added to indexes and ex-
change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
changes in the PRC; and 
(ii) based on the factors for consider-
ation described in paragraph (3), have 
knowingly and materially contributed to— 
(I) 
activities 
that 
undermine 
United States national security; 
(II) serious abuses of internation-
ally recognized human rights; or 
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medical supply production and building a 
broader dialogue on global public health; 
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 
regional economic engagement and integra-
tion, and strengthen regional rules and 
standards around trade and investment; 
(iii) strengthen climate actions on 
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-
nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-
nance; 
(iv) facilitate the development of qual-
ity 
infrastructure 
in 
the 
Indo-Pacific 
through joint financing, investment, tech-
nical assistance, and standards setting; 
(v) enhance joint maritime security 
and maritime domain awareness initiatives 
to protect the maritime commons and sup-
port international law and freedom of navi-
gation in the Indo-Pacific; and 
(vi) develop international technology 
standards and share or co-develop new in-
novative technologies of the future. 
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