(1) Venezuela and Iran have established exten-
sive political, military, and economic cooperation. 
(2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo 
Chavez, has publicly supported Iran’s development 
of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observ-
ers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program. 
(3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was 
seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear 
program in Venezuela. 
(4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of 
only three countries to vote against a resolution by 
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the 
United Nations Security Council for violating its ob-
ligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty. 
(5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the 
Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated 
that his government was prepared to discuss pro-
viding technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear 
program. 
(6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel 
El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela’s National As-
sembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran 
will ‘‘practically give away’’ its civilian nuclear tech-
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nology and that ‘‘if relations with Iran lead to shar-
ing nuclear technology with us, we would then give 
it away to our brothers in Latin America once we 
are successful.’’. 
(7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken 
steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program 
and that cooperation in this area was being dis-
cussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus. 
(8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of 
uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region. 
(9) In October 2009 Hugo Chavez stated Ven-
ezuela was ‘‘working with several countries, with 
Iran, with Russia’’ in their exploration for uranium. 
(10) In December 2009, Iran and Ecuador 
signed a mining agreement that establishes a frame-
work for potential uranium cooperation. 
(11) In 1985 the Brazilian government an-
nounced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear 
weapons program run by the military since 1975. 
(12) In August 2005 a former high-ranking 
Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military 
had continued to develop elements of a nuclear 
weapons program into the 1990s. 
(13) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General 
Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for 
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Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manu-
facture nuclear weapons. 
(14) The centrifuges at Brazil’s Resende ura-
nium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to 
produce highly enriched uranium in quantities suffi-
cient to produce several nuclear weapons annually. 
(15) Brazil has denied inspectors from the 
IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment cen-
trifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is pro-
tecting commercial secrets. 
(16) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved 
only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification 
methods to indirect inspections without direct in-
spection of the centrifuges, which many non-
proliferation experts fear could be used as a prece-
dent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA 
inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear fa-
cilities. 
(17) A prototype nuclear reactor is being devel-
oped at the Armar Research Center for use in Bra-
zil’s nuclear-powered submarine program. 
(18) On February 24, 2008, the Governments 
of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations 
regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor 
and construction of a uranium enrichment plant. 
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(19) In February 2008, President Christina 
Kirchner of Argentina and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 
of Brazil agreed to the establishment of a joint ura-
nium enrichment plant. 
(20) In 2010 Brazil facilitated a joint declara-
tion for Iran to send uranium to Turkey for enrich-
ment. After the announcement, Brazilian Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorin stated ‘‘in our view, the 
agreement eliminates any ground for sanctions 
against Iran.’’. 
(21) In 2011 Brazil expanded its uranium en-
richment capacity to an industrial level. 
(22) Until 1990 the Argentine Government con-
ducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program. 
(23) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran 
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Ar-
gentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched 
uranium. 
(24) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three 
agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reac-
tor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants 
for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication. 
(25) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nu-
clear program was reduced, but not terminated, fol-
lowing pressure by the United States. 
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(26) Several countries in Latin America, includ-
ing Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and im-
plemented an Additional Protocol which provides 
IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear fa-
cilities. 
(27) Some Western Hemisphere countries have 
not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also re-
ferred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention. 
(28) Several countries in Latin America have 
not signed and ratified The Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bac-
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction (also referred to as the Biological 
Weapons Convention). 
SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PRO-
LIFERATION 
OF 
WEAPONS-RELATED 
NU-
CLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATE-
RIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—To enhance the prevention of the 
proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and bi-
ological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the 
policy of the United States to— 
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(1) promote the negotiation and implementation 
by all countries of— 
(A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA); and 
(B) an Additional Protocol to the safe-
guards agreement; 
(2) secure guarantees by all countries of unre-
stricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-re-
lated materials and facilities in territories under the 
control of the host country; 
(3) promote the implementation by all countries 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
which was amended on April 20, 2011, by United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1977 and which 
reaffirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons and their means of delivery 
constitutes a threat to international peace and secu-
rity, and extends the mandate of the Resolution 
1540 Committee for a period of 10 years to 2021; 
(4) promote the accession to and ratification 
and implementation of— 
(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their De-
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struction (also referred to as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention); 
(B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 
(C) the 2005 United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nu-
clear Terrorism; and 
(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction (also referred to as the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention). 
(b) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DEFINED.—In this sec-
tion, the term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means the Protocol 
Additional to an agreement between a country and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards. 
SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL 
QUANTITIES PROTOCOL. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Because a Small Quantities Pro-
tocol (SQP) sets aside many of the operative provisions 
of a general safeguards agreement, the ability of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that nu-
clear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP 
are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly 
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impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to— 
(1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an 
SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as 
of January 1, 2012; and 
(2) encourage every country with an SQP to 
withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agree-
ment for the purpose of increasing transparency and 
eliminating any exemption or provision that could 
restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a 
country’s nuclear materials and facilities are not 
being diverted to impermissible uses. 
(b) COUNTRIES DESCRIBED.—For purposes of sub-
section (a)(1), as of January 1, 2012, the countries with 
an SQP are the following: Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United 
States. 
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SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS RE-
GARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY 
COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use all avail-
able political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure 
that each country in the Western Hemisphere— 
(1) has signed and implemented a comprehen-
sive safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); 
(2) has signed and implemented an Additional 
Protocol to its safeguards agreement; 
(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA 
personnel to all nuclear-related facilities; 
(4) has implemented the provisions of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 
(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully imple-
mented the conventions referred to in section 
202(a)(4); 
(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP 
if that country did not have an SQP as of January 
1, 2012; and 
(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an 
SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement. 
(b) SANCTIONS.—For any Western Hemisphere 
country that has not satisfied all of the requirements spec-
ified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to— 
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(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian 
foreign assistance to the government of that country; 
and 
(2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of 
articles, including the issuance of any specific license 
or grant of any other specific permission or author-
ity to export any goods or technology under— 
(A) the Export Administration Act of 1979 
(as continued in effect under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act); 
(B) the Arms Export Control Act; 
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 
(D) any other statute that requires the 
prior review and approval of the United States 
Government as a condition for the export or re- 
export of goods or services. 
SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
FUEL FABRICATION. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States to oppose the development or acquisi-
tion by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel 
if such country did not have such capacity as of January 
1, 2012. 
(b) PREVENTION OF CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NU-
CLEAR FUEL.—The President shall use all available polit-
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