I
103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 2076
To establish a policy of the United States with respect to nuclear
nonproliferation.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 11, 1993
Mr. STARK
(for himself, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. PENNY, and Mr.
FALEOMAVAEGA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
A BILL
To establish a policy of the United States with respect to
nuclear nonproliferation.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Policy Act of 1993’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The United States has been a leader in
seeking to contain the spread of nuclear weapons
technology and materials.
(2) With the end of the Cold War and the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, especially to countries in unstable re-
gions, is now the leading military threat to the na-
tional security of the United States and its allies.
(3) The United Nations Security Council de-
clared on January 31, 1992, that ‘‘proliferation of
all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat
to international peace and security’’ and committed
to taking appropriate action to prevent proliferation
from occurring. The establishment of the United Na-
tions Special Commission on Iraq was an important
precedent to that end.
(4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon
states, a number of other nations have or are pursu-
ing nuclear weapons capabilities.
(5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps
the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear
weapons.
(6) The break-up of the Soviet Union has in-
creased the threat of nuclear proliferation.
(7) In May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan signed the protocols to START I and
committed to acceding to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states ‘‘in the
shortest possible time’’.
(8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear
weapons program which went undetected by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspec-
tion process and was greatly assisted by dual-use ex-
ports from western countries, including the United
States.
(9) North Korea’s statement of intent to with-
draw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and its refusal to allow IAEA inspections of all of
its known and suspected nuclear facilities, are un-
precedented actions which could greatly undermine
efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.
(10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial pro-
grams to build nuclear weapons and South Africa
has admitted developing and building 6 nuclear
weapons, but in response to reduced regional ten-
sions and other factors, all 3 countries have re-
nounced nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safe-
guards for all of their nuclear facilities, and South
Africa has acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
as a non-nuclear weapon state.
(11) United States security interests and cur-
rent policy and practices are consistent with the
terms of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Trea-
ty which, like nuclear weapons free zones in Latin
America, South Asia, and the Middle East that the
United States supports, can contribute to efforts to
avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races.
(12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter
proliferation, but the effectiveness of its system to
safeguard nuclear materials may be adversely af-
fected by institutional and financial constraints.
(13) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which codifies world consensus against further nu-
clear proliferation and is scheduled for review and
extension in 1995, should be expanded in member-
ship and extended indefinitely, and additional steps
should be taken to strengthen the international nu-
clear nonproliferation regime.
(14) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978
declared that the United States is committed to con-
tinued strong support for the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty and to a strengthened and more effective
IAEA, and established that it is United States policy
to establish more effective controls over the transfer
of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.
(15) The goal of the United States is to end the
further spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll
back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and
prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the
world. To that end the United States should adopt
a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation policy.
SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
POLICY.
In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce cur-
rent nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nu-
clear materials, it shall be the policy of the United States
to pursue the following objectives:
(1) Encourage Ukraine to join Kazakhstan and
Belarus in ratifying the START I treaty and en-
courage Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join Belarus in
voting to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest
possible time.
(2) 
Encourage 
Belarus, 
Ukraine, 
and
Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from
their territory, accept IAEA safeguards over all of
their nuclear facilities, and implement effective con-
trols on nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use ex-
ports.
(3) Reach an agreement with the Russian Fed-
eration—
(A) to deactivate and retire from field de-
ployment on an accelerated schedule all weap-
ons to be withdrawn under the START I treaty
and the START II treaty;
(B) on data exchanges and inspection ar-
rangements to verify the elimination of all nu-
clear weapons scheduled to be withdrawn under
the START I treaty and the START II treaty;
and
(C) to place all fissile material from such
weapons under bilateral or international con-
trols, or both.
(4) Prepare for the ratification of the START
II treaty by seeking the exchange of information be-
tween the United States and the Russian Federation
on nuclear weapons stockpiles and fissile material
facilities and inventories as required by the United
States Senate as a condition to its approval of the
START I Treaty.
(5) Conclude a multilateral comprehensive nu-
clear test ban treaty by early 1995, before the con-
ference to renew and extend the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty is held.
(6) Ratify the START II treaty in the United
States and encourage ratification of that treaty by
the Russian Federation, and reach agreement with
the Russian Federation to end the production of new
types of nuclear warheads.
(7) Conclude a multilateral agreement to reduce
the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States
and the Russian Federation to within a range of
1,000 to 2,000 each, with lower levels for the United
Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of
China.
(8) Conclude additional multilateral agreements
to significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear
arsenals of all countries through a stage-by-stage
process.
(9) Reach immediate agreement with the Rus-
sian Federation to halt permanently the production
of fissile material for weapons purposes, and achieve
worldwide agreements to—
(A) end by 1995 the production of fissile
material for any purpose;
(B) place existing stockpiles of such mate-
rials under bilateral or international controls;
and
(C) require all countries to place all of
their nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful
purposes under IAEA safeguards.
(10) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more ef-
fectively verify that countries are complying with
their nonproliferation commitments and provide the
IAEA with the political, technical, and financial sup-
port necessary to implement the necessary safeguard
reforms.
(11) Strengthen nuclear export controls in the
United States and other nuclear supplier nations,
impose sanctions on individuals, companies, and
countries which contribute to nuclear proliferation,
and provide increased public information on nuclear
export licenses approved in the United States.
(12) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to re-
duce regional tensions and to strengthen regional se-
curity agreements, and encourage the United Na-
tions Security Council to increase its role in enforc-
ing international nuclear nonproliferation agree-
ments.
(13) Support the indefinite extension of the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 con-
ference to review and extend that treaty and seek to
ensure that all countries sign the treaty or partici-
pate in a comparable international regime for mon-