H. R. 5515—538 
(C) Options for sustaining more than one supplier for 
large solid rocket motors, including through leveraging— 
(i) the ground-based strategic deterrent program; 
(ii) the Trident II D5 fleet ballistic missile pro-
gram; 
(iii) the ground-based midcourse defense program; 
(iv) national security space launch programs; 
(v) programs of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration; and 
(vi) any other applicable programs that use or 
may use solid rocket motors of any size, including 
with respect to substrategic and tactical systems. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives. 
(3) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
TITLE XVII—REVIEW OF FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT AND EXPORT CONTROLS 
Subtitle A—Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
Sec. 1701. Short title: Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018. 
Sec. 1702. Findings; sense of Congress. 
Sec. 1703. Definitions. 
Sec. 1704. Acceptance of written notices. 
Sec. 1705. Inclusion of partnership and side agreements in notice. 
Sec. 1706. Declarations for certain covered transactions. 
Sec. 1707. Stipulations regarding transactions. 
Sec. 1708. Authority for unilateral initiation of reviews. 
Sec. 1709. Timing for reviews and investigations. 
Sec. 1710. Identification of non-notified and non-declared transactions. 
Sec. 1711. Submission of certifications to Congress. 
Sec. 1712. Analysis by Director of National Intelligence. 
Sec. 1713. Information sharing. 
Sec. 1714. Action by the President. 
Sec. 1715. Judicial review. 
Sec. 1716. Considerations for regulations. 
Sec. 1717. Membership and staff of Committee. 
Sec. 1718. Actions by the Committee to address national security risks. 
Sec. 1719. Modification of annual report and other reporting requirements. 
Sec. 1720. Certification of notices and information. 
Sec. 1721. Implementation plans. 
Sec. 1722. Assessment of need for additional resources for Committee. 
Sec. 1723. Funding. 
Sec. 1724. Centralization of certain Committee functions. 
Sec. 1725. Conforming amendments. 
Sec. 1726. Briefing on information from transactions reviewed by Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States relating to foreign efforts to in-
fluence democratic institutions and processes. 
Sec. 1727. Effective date. 
Sec. 1728. Severability. 
Subtitle B—Export Control Reform 
Sec. 1741. Short title. 
Sec. 1742. Definitions. 
PART I—AUTHORITY AND ADMINISTRATION OF CONTROLS 
Sec. 1751. Short title.
H. R. 5515—539 
Sec. 1752. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 1753. Authority of the President. 
Sec. 1754. Additional authorities. 
Sec. 1755. Administration of export controls. 
Sec. 1756. Licensing. 
Sec. 1757. Compliance assistance. 
Sec. 1758. Requirements to identify and control the export of emerging and 
foundational technologies. 
Sec. 1759. Review relating to countries subject to comprehensive United States 
arms embargo. 
Sec. 1760. Penalties. 
Sec. 1761. Enforcement. 
Sec. 1762. Administrative procedure. 
Sec. 1763. Review of interagency dispute resolution process. 
Sec. 1764. Consultation with other agencies on commodity classification. 
Sec. 1765. Annual report to Congress. 
Sec. 1766. Repeal. 
Sec. 1767. Effect on other Acts. 
Sec. 1768. Transition provisions. 
PART II—ANTI-BOYCOTT ACT OF 2018 
Sec. 1771. Short title. 
Sec. 1772. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 1773. Foreign boycotts. 
Sec. 1774. Enforcement. 
PART III—ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Sec. 1781. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security. 
Subtitle C—Miscellaneous 
Sec. 1791. Extension of authority. 
Sec. 1792. Limitation on cancellation of designation of Secretary of the Air Force 
as Department of Defense Executive Agent for a certain Defense Produc-
tion Act program. 
Sec. 1793. Review of and report on certain defense technologies critical to the 
United States maintaining superior military capabilities. 
Subtitle A—Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States 
SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE: FOREIGN INVESTMENT RISK REVIEW MOD-
ERNIZATION ACT OF 2018. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act of 2018’’. 
SEC. 1702. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) According to a February 2016 report by the Inter-
national Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce, 
12,000,000 United States workers, equivalent to 8.5 percent 
of the labor force, have jobs resulting from foreign investment, 
including 3,500,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector alone. 
(2) In 2016, new foreign direct investment in United States 
manufacturing totaled $129,400,000,000. 
(3) The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department 
of Commerce concluded that, in 2015— 
(A) foreign-owned affiliates in the United States— 
(i) contributed $894,500,000,000 in value added 
to the United States economy; 
(ii) exported goods valued at $352,800,000,000, 
accounting for nearly a quarter of total exports of 
goods from the United States; and 
(iii) undertook $56,700,000,000 in research and 
development; and
H. R. 5515—540 
(B) the 7 countries investing the most in the United 
States, all of which are United States allies (the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Switzerland, 
and the Netherlands) accounted for 72.1 percent of the 
value added by foreign-owned affiliates in the United States 
and more than 80 percent of research and development 
expenditures by such entities. 
(4) According to the Government Accountability Office, from 
2011 to 2016, the number of transactions reviewed by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (com-
monly referred to as ‘‘CFIUS’’) grew by 55 percent, while the 
staff of the Committees assigned to the reviews increased by 
11 percent. 
(5) According to a February 2018 report of the Government 
Accountability Office on the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (GAO–18–249): ‘‘Officials from Treasury 
and other member agencies are aware of pressures on their 
CFIUS staff given the current workload and have expressed 
concerns about possible workload increases.’’. The Government 
Accountability Office concluded: ‘‘Without attaining an under-
standing of the staffing levels needed to address the current 
and future CFIUS workload, particularly if legislative changes 
to CFIUS’s authorities further expand its workload, CFIUS 
may be limited in its ability to fulfill its objectives and address 
threats to the national security of the United States.’’. 
(6) On March 30, 1954, Dwight David Eisenhower—five- 
star general, Supreme Allied Commander, and 34th President 
of the United States—in his ‘‘Special Message to the Congress 
on Foreign Economic Policy’’, counseled: ‘‘Great mutual advan-
tages to buyer and seller, to producer and consumer, to investor 
and to the community where investment is made, accrue from 
high levels of trade and investment.’’. President Eisenhower 
continued: ‘‘The internal strength of the American economy 
has evolved from such a system of mutual advantage. In the 
press of other problems and in the haste to meet emergencies, 
this nation—and many other nations of the free world—have 
all too often lost sight of this central fact.’’. President Eisen-
hower concluded: ‘‘If we fail in our trade policy, we may fail 
in all. Our domestic employment, our standard of living, our 
security, and the solidarity of the free world—all are involved.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) foreign investment provides substantial economic bene-
fits to the United States, including the promotion of economic 
growth, productivity, competitiveness, and job creation, thereby 
enhancing national security; 
(2) maintaining the commitment of the United States to 
an open investment policy encourages other countries to recip-
rocate and helps open new foreign markets for United States 
businesses; 
(3) it should continue to be the policy of the United States 
to enthusiastically welcome and support foreign investment, 
consistent with the protection of national security; 
(4) at the same time, the national security landscape has 
shifted in recent years, and so has the nature of the investments 
that pose the greatest potential risk to national security, which 
warrants an appropriate modernization of the processes and
H. R. 5515—541 
authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States and of the United States export control system; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States plays a critical role in protecting the national security 
of the United States, and, therefore, it is essential that the 
member agencies of the Committee are adequately resourced 
and able to hire appropriately qualified individuals in a timely 
manner, and that those individuals’ security clearances are 
processed as a high priority; 
(6) the President should conduct a more robust inter-
national outreach effort to urge and help allies and partners 
of the United States to establish processes that are similar 
to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
to screen foreign investments for national security risks and 
to facilitate coordination; 
(7) the President should lead a collaborative effort with 
allies and partners of the United States to strengthen the 
multilateral export control regime; 
(8) any penalties imposed by the United States Government 
with respect to an individual or entity pursuant to a determina-
tion that the individual or entity has violated sanctions imposed 
by the United States or the export control laws of the United 
States should not be reversed for reasons unrelated to the 
national security of the United States; and 
(9) the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States should continue to review transactions for the purpose 
of protecting national security and should not consider issues 
of national interest absent a national security nexus. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF COVERED TRANS-
ACTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that, when considering 
national security risks, the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States may consider— 
(1) whether a covered transaction involves a country of 
special concern that has a demonstrated or declared strategic 
goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infra-
structure that would affect United States leadership in areas 
related to national security; 
(2) the potential national security-related effects of the 
cumulative control of, or pattern of recent transactions 
involving, any one type of critical infrastructure, energy asset, 
critical material, or critical technology by a foreign government 
or foreign person; 
(3) whether any foreign person engaging in a covered trans-
action with a United States business has a history of complying 
with United States laws and regulations; 
(4) the control of United States industries and commercial 
activity by foreign persons as it affects the capability and 
capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of 
national security, including the availability of human resources, 
products, technology, materials, and other supplies and serv-
ices, and in considering ‘‘the availability of human resources’’, 
should construe that term to include potential losses of such 
availability resulting from reductions in the employment of 
United States persons whose knowledge or skills are critical 
to national security, including the continued production in the 
United States of items that are likely to be acquired by the