I
105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 1132
To limit United States military assistance and arms transfers to the
Government of Indonesia.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 19, 1997
Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island (for himself, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. BERMAN, Mr.
SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. PORTER, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. EVANS, Mr. KEN-
NEDY of Massachusetts, and Mr. HALL of Ohio) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
A BILL
To limit United States military assistance and arms transfers
to the Government of Indonesia.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Indonesia Military As-
sistance Accountability Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:
(1) Political stability and economic growth in
Indonesia are important to the national interests of
the United States, however, such stability and
growth are disrupted by the denial by the Govern-
ment of Indonesia, including the denial by the armed
forces of Indonesia, of—
(A) democratic freedoms, such as meaning-
ful elections, freedom of the press, and freedom
of assembly;
(B) human rights, such as protection from
torture and murder and protection from impris-
onment for the nonviolent expression of political
views;
(C) labor rights; and
(D) the rights of citizens to participate in
decisions affecting the environment.
(2) The Government of Indonesia is in a period
of crisis, as illustrated by—
(A) the extensive violations of human
rights by the Government of Indonesia docu-
mented in the Department of State’s Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996;
(B) the suppression of peaceful dissent and
extreme interference by the government with
the media;
(C) 
the 
deposing 
of 
Megawati
Sukarnoputri as the head of the Democratic
Party of Indonesia (PDI) in 1996; and
(D) the rating by Transparency Inter-
national of the Government of Indonesia as one
of the most corrupt governments in the world.
(3) The armed forces of Indonesia play a key
role in preserving nondemocratic rule in Indonesia
by deploying forces at all levels of society to repress
peaceful dissent and by participating in nonmilitary
economic ventures that are not subject to public
scrutiny or reported as sources of income to inter-
national financial institutions.
(4) The parliamentary elections in Indonesia
scheduled for May 1997 may be jeopardized by the
actions of the Government of Indonesia, including
the actions of the armed forces of Indonesia, because
the Government has repeatedly rendered past elec-
tions meaningless by denying constitutionally-guar-
anteed political rights to opposition candidates and
their supporters.
(5) The Government of Indonesia recognizes
only one official trade union, has refused to register
independent trade unions such as the Indonesian
Prosperous Labor Union (SBSI), has arrested
Mukhtar Pakpahan, the General Chairman of the
SBSI, on charges of subversion, and has closed the
offices and confiscated the materials of the SBSI.
(6) Civil society organizations in Indonesia,
such as environmental organizations, indigenous or-
ganizations, election-monitoring organizations, legal
aid organizations, student organizations, trade union
organizations, and community organizations, have
been harassed by the Government of Indonesia
through such means as detentions, interrogations,
denial of permission for meetings, banning of publi-
cations, repeated orders to report to security forces
or judicial courts, and illegal seizure of documents.
(7) The armed forces of Indonesia continue to
occupy East Timor in violation of two United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions and eight United
Nations General Assembly resolutions, and accord-
ing to the Department of State’s Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 1996, the armed
forces continue to carry out torture and killings and
other severe violations of human rights in East
Timor, and to detain and imprison East Timorese
for nonviolent expression of political views.
(8)(A) The Nobel Prize Committee has awarded
the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Felipe
Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos Horta for their tire-
less efforts to find a just and peaceful solution to
the conflict in East Timor.
(B) Both men are an inspiration for those who
desire peace in East Timor.
(9) As stated in a citation for the 1996 Nobel
Peace Prize, ‘‘it has been estimated that one-third of
the population of East Timor has lost their lives due
to starvation, epidemics, war, and terror’’.
(10) The people of East Timor have been forc-
ibly deprived of their right to self-determination by
the refusal of the Government of Indonesia to work
with the United Nations to resolve the political sta-
tus of East Timor.
(11) In August 1993, the Indonesian military
committed to a reduction in the number of combat
troops in East Timor.
(12) On August 1, 1996, former Secretary of
State Warren Christopher stated in testimony before
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate,
‘‘I think there’s a strong interest in seeing an or-
derly transition of power there [in Indonesia] that
will recognize the pluralism that should exist in a
country of that magnitude and importance’’.
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to promote
a peaceful transition from nondemocratic to democratic
rule in Indonesia by conditioning the provision of United
States military assistance to the Government of Indonesia,
including the armed forces of Indonesia, on the establish-
ment and implementation of specific democratic reforms.
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA.
(a) IN GENERAL.—United States military assistance
and arms transfers may not be provided to the Govern-
ment of Indonesia for a fiscal year unless the President
determines and certifies to the Congress for that fiscal
year that the Government of Indonesia meets the following
requirements:
(1) FREE
SELECTION
OF
CANDIDATES
AND
PARTY LEADERS; DOMESTIC MONITORING OF ELEC-
TIONS.—
(A) FREE
SELECTION
OF
CANDIDATES
AND PARTY LEADERS.—The Government of In-
donesia permits opposition parties, including
opposition parties that have collected the appro-
priate number of signatures of individuals re-
quired by the Government in order to have can-
didates of such parties placed on the ballot for
national elections (such as the Democratic
Party of Indonesia (PDI)), to freely choose
their own party leaders and candidates.
(B) DOMESTIC
MONITORING
OF
ELEC-
TIONS.—The Government of Indonesia provides
official accreditation to independent election-
monitoring organizations, including the Inde-
pendent 
Election 
Monitoring 
Committee
(KIPP), to observe national elections without
interference by personnel of the Government or
of the armed forces. In addition, such organiza-
tions are allowed to assess such elections and to
publicize or otherwise disseminate the assess-
ments throughout Indonesia.
(2) PROTECTION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS.—The police or military of Indonesia do
not confiscate materials from or otherwise engage in
illegal raids on the offices or homes of members of
both domestic or international nongovernmental or-
ganizations, including indigenous organizations, elec-
tion-monitoring organizations, legal aid organiza-
tions, student organizations, trade union organiza-
tions, community organizations, environmental orga-
nizations, and religious organizations.
(3) RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW.—
(A) ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATTACK ON PDI
HEADQUARTERS.—As recommended by the Gov-
ernment of Indonesia’s National Human Rights
Commission, the Government of Indonesia has
investigated the attack on the headquarters of
the Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) on
July 27, 1996, prosecuted individuals who
planned and carried out the attack, and made
public the postmortem examination of the five
individuals killed in the attack.
(B) RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.—
The following individuals, detained or impris-
oned for the nonviolent expression of political
views as part of the crackdown by the Govern-
ment of Indonesia on July 27, 1996, have been
released from custody:
(i) Budiman Sudjatmiko.
(ii) Mukhtar Pakpahan.
(iii) Other individuals detained or im-
prisoned on subversion charges relating to
the crackdown.
(4) RESOLUTION
OF
CONFLICT
IN
EAST
TIMOR.—
(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF DIALOGUE.—The
Government of Indonesia has entered into a
process of dialogue, under the auspices of the
United Nations, with Portugal and East Timor-
ese leaders of various viewpoints to discuss
ideas toward a resolution of the conflict in East
Timor and the political status of East Timor.
(B) REDUCTION
OF
TROOPS.—The Gov-
ernment of Indonesia has established and im-
plemented a plan to reduce the number of Indo-
nesian troops in East Timor, as stated by Indo-
nesian Major General Theo Syafei in August
1993.
(C) RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.—
Individuals detained or imprisoned for the non-
violent expression of political views, including
the right of self-determination in East Timor,
have been released from custody, including Fer-
nando DeArujo.
(D) RELIGIOUS RIGHTS.—The Government
of Indonesia—
(i) has prohibited policies and prac-
tices of persecution, harassment, detain-
ment, or confinement of individuals in
East Timor based on religious grounds;
and
(ii) has made substantial efforts to-
ward allowing the freedom of religious ex-
pression in East Timor.
(5) IMPROVEMENT
IN
LABOR
RIGHTS.—The
Government of Indonesia has taken the following ac-
tions to improve labor rights in Indonesia:
(A) The Government has dropped charges
of subversion against the General Chairman of
the SBSI trade union, Mukhtar Pakpahan, and
has released Mukhtar Pakpahan from custody
on this charge.
(B) The Government has also released
from custody trade union activists Dita Indah
Sari, Cohen Husein Ponto, and Mohammad
Sholeh.
(C) The Government has recognized SBSI
as a trade union and has restored all con-
fiscated equipment to SBSI.
(b) WAIVERS.—
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The limitation on United
States military assistance and arms transfers under
subsection (a) shall not apply if the President deter-
mines and notifies the Congress that—
(A) an emergency exists that requires pro-
viding such assistance or arms transfers for the
Government of Indonesia; or
(B) subject to paragraph (2), it is in the
national security interest of the United States
to provide such assistance or arms transfers for
the Government of Indonesia.
(2) APPLICABILITY.—A determination under
paragraph (1)(B) shall not become effective until 15
days after the date on which the President notifies
the Congress in accordance with such paragraph.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The limitation on United
States military assistance and arms transfers under sub-
section (a) shall apply only with respect to assistance pro-
vided for, and arms transfers made pursuant to agree-
ments entered into, fiscal years beginning after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 4. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS
TRANSFERS DEFINED.
As used in this Act, the term ‘‘United States military
assistance and arms transfers’’ means—
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military
assistance), including the transfer of excess defense
articles under section 516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to inter-
national 
military 
education 
and 
training 
or
‘‘IMET’’), except that such term shall not include
military education and training for civilian personnel
under section 541 of such Act (commonly referred to
as ‘‘Expanded IMET’’) that—
(A) promotes dialogue between civilians
and military officers of the armed forces of In-
donesia on the proper role of the armed forces
in a democratic society; or
(B) provides for training of civilian offi-
cials and military officers of the armed forces
of Indonesia on military justice and inter-
national human rights standards; or
(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense
services, or design and construction services under
the Arms Export Control Act, excluding—
(A) any transfer or other assistance under
section 23 of that Act; or
(B) defense articles and defense services li-
censed or approved for export under section 38
of that Act.
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