H. R. 2617—1304 
as the ‘National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity’ (referred 
to in this section as the ‘Board’). 
‘‘(b) DUTIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The National Science Advisory Board 
for Biosecurity referred to in section 205 of the Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act (Public Law 109–417) (referred 
to in this section as the ‘Board’) shall provide technical advice, 
guidance, or recommendations, to relevant Federal departments 
and agencies related to biosafety and biosecurity oversight of 
biomedical research, including— 
‘‘(A) oversight of federally-conducted or federally-sup-
ported dual use biomedical research, such as the review 
of policies or frameworks used to assess and appropriately 
manage safety and security risks associated with such 
research, taking into consideration national security con-
cerns, the potential benefits of such research, consider-
ations related to the research community, transparency, 
and public availability of information, and international 
research collaboration; and 
‘‘(B) continuing to carry out the activities required 
under section 205 of the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (Public Law 109–417). 
‘‘(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out the duties under sub-
section (b), the Board may consider strategies to improve the safety 
and security of biomedical research, including through— 
‘‘(1) leveraging or using new technologies and scientific 
advancements to reduce safety and security risks associated 
with such research and improve containment of pathogens; 
and 
‘‘(2) outreach to, and education and training of, researchers, 
laboratory personnel, and other appropriate individuals with 
respect to safety and security risks associated with such 
research and mitigation of such risks. 
‘‘(d) MEMBERSHIP.—The Board shall be composed of the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(1) Non-voting, ex officio members, including the following: 
‘‘(A) At least one representative of each of the following: 
‘‘(i) The Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices. 
‘‘(ii) The Department of Defense. 
‘‘(iii) The Department of Agriculture. 
‘‘(iv) The Department of Homeland Security. 
‘‘(v) The Department of Energy. 
‘‘(vi) The Department of State. 
‘‘(vii) The Office of Science and Technology Policy. 
‘‘(viii) The Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence. 
‘‘(B) Representatives of such other Federal departments 
or agencies as the Secretary determines appropriate to 
carry out the requirements of this section. 
‘‘(2) Individuals, appointed by the Secretary, with expertise 
in biology, infectious diseases, public health, ethics, national 
security, and other fields, as the Secretary determines appro-
priate, who shall serve as voting members.’’. 
(b) ORDERLY TRANSITION.—The Secretary of Health and Human 
Services shall take such steps as are necessary to provide for 
the orderly transition to the authority of the National Science
H. R. 2617—1305 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity established under section 404O of 
the Public Health Service Act, as added by subsection (a), from 
any authority of the Board described in section 205 of the Pandemic 
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (Public Law 109–417), as in 
effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act. 
(c) APPLICATION.—The requirements under section 404O of the 
Public Health Service Act, as added by subsection (a), related to 
the mission, activities, or functions of the National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity shall not apply until the completion of any 
work undertaken by such Board before the date of enactment of 
this Act. 
SEC. 2314. RESEARCH TO IMPROVE BIOSAFETY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(referred to in this section as the ‘‘Secretary’’) shall, as appropriate, 
conduct or support research to improve the safe conduct of bio-
medical research activities involving pathogens of pandemic poten-
tial or biological agents or toxins listed pursuant to section 
351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262a(a)(1)). 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 5 years after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary shall prepare and submit a report to 
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the 
Senate and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives regarding an overview of any research conducted 
or supported under this section, any relevant findings, and steps 
the Secretary is taking to disseminate any such findings to support 
the reduction of risks associated with biomedical research involving 
pathogens of pandemic potential or biological agents or toxins listed 
pursuant to section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act 
(42 U.S.C. 262a(a)(1)). 
SEC. 2315. FEDERALLY-FUNDED RESEARCH WITH ENHANCED PATHO-
GENS OF PANDEMIC POTENTIAL. 
(a) REVIEW AND OVERSIGHT OF ENHANCED PATHOGENS OF PAN-
DEMIC POTENTIAL.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Director of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘Director’’), in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall— 
(A) not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 
of this Act— 
(i) continue or conduct a review of existing Federal 
policies related to research proposed for Federal 
funding that may be reasonably anticipated to involve 
the creation, transfer, or use of enhanced pathogens 
of pandemic potential; and 
(ii) establish or update a Federal policy for the 
consistent review and oversight of such proposed 
research that appropriately considers the risks associ-
ated with, and potential benefits of, such research; 
and 
(B) not less than every 4 years thereafter, review and 
update such policy, as necessary and appropriate, to ensure 
that such policy fully accounts for relevant research that 
may be reasonably anticipated to involve the creation, 
transfer, or use of enhanced pathogens of pandemic poten-
tial, takes into consideration the benefits of such research, 
and supports the mitigation of related risks.
H. R. 2617—1306 
(2) REQUIREMENTS.—The policy established pursuant to 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) a clear scope to support the consistent identification 
of research proposals subject to such policy by relevant 
Federal departments and agencies; 
(B) a framework for such reviews that accounts for 
safety, security, and ethical considerations related to the 
creation, transfer, or use of enhanced pathogens of pan-
demic potential; 
(C) measures to enhance the transparency and public 
availability of information related to such research activi-
ties in a manner that does not compromise national secu-
rity, the safety and security of such research activities, 
or any identifiable, sensitive information of relevant 
individuals; and 
(D) consistent procedures across relevant Federal 
department and agencies to ensure that— 
(i) proposed research that has been determined 
to have scientific and technical merit and may be sub-
ject to such policy is identified and referred for review; 
(ii) subjected research activities conducted under 
an award, including activities undertaken by any sub-
recipients of such award, are monitored regularly 
throughout the project period to ensure compliance 
with such policy and the terms and conditions of such 
award; and 
(iii) in the event that federally-funded research 
activities not subject to such policy produce unantici-
pated results related to the creation, transfer, or use 
of enhanced pathogens of pandemic potential, such 
research activities are identified and appropriately 
reviewed under such policy. 
(3) CLARIFICATION.—Reviews required pursuant to this sec-
tion shall be in addition to any applicable requirements for 
research project applications required under the Public Health 
Service Act, including reviews required under section 492 of 
such Act (42 U.S.C. 289a), as applicable, or other applicable 
laws. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall direct all heads of 
relevant Federal departments and agencies to update, mod-
ernize, or promulgate applicable implementing guidance to 
implement the requirements of this section. 
(2) UPDATES.—Consistent with the requirements under sub-
section (a)(1)(B), the Director shall require all heads of relevant 
Federal departments and agencies to update such policies con-
sistent with any changes to the policy established pursuant 
to subsection (a)(1). 
(c) LIMITATIONS ON COUNTRIES OF CONCERN CONDUCTING CER-
TAIN RESEARCH.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services shall not fund research conducted by 
a foreign entity at a facility located in a country of concern, 
in the estimation of the Director of National Intelligence or 
the head of another relevant Federal department or agency, 
as appropriate, in consultation with the Secretary of Health
H. R. 2617—1307 
and Human Services, involving pathogens of pandemic potential 
or biological agents or toxins listed pursuant to section 
351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
262a(a)(1)). 
(2) CONDITIONS FOR LIFTING OR SUSPENDING PROHIBITION.— 
The Secretary of Health and Human Services may lift or sus-
pend the prohibition of funding under paragraph (1)— 
(A) only after the review required under subsection 
(a)(1)(A)(i) is complete; and 
(B) only if the Secretary notifies Congress not less 
than 15 days before such prohibition is lifted or suspended. 
CHAPTER 3—PREVENTING UNDUE FOREIGN 
INFLUENCE IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
SEC. 2321. FOREIGN TALENT RECRUITMENT PROGRAMS. 
(a) INTRAMURAL RESEARCH.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (referred to in this chapter as the ‘‘Secretary’’) shall 
prohibit personnel of the National Institutes of Health engaged 
in intramural research from participation in foreign talent 
recruitment programs. 
(2) EXEMPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to participa-
tion in international conferences or other international 
exchanges, partnerships, or programs, for which such participa-
tion has been approved by the National Institutes of Health. 
In such circumstances, the National Institutes of Health shall 
ensure appropriate training is provided to the participant on 
how to respond to overtures from individuals associated with 
foreign talent recruitment programs. 
(b) EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH.—The Secretary shall require disclo-
sure of participation in foreign talent recruitment programs, 
including the provision of copies of all grants, contracts, or other 
agreements related to such programs, and other supporting docu-
mentation related to such programs, as a condition of receipt of 
Federal extramural biomedical research funding awarded through 
the Department of Health and Human Services. 
(c) CONSISTENCY.—The Secretary shall ensure that the policies 
developed, updated, or issued pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) 
are, to the greatest extent practicable, consistent with the require-
ments of subtitle D of title VI of division B of Public Law 117– 
167 (42 U.S.C. 19231 et seq.) related to foreign talent recruitment 
programs. 
SEC. 2322. SECURING IDENTIFIABLE, SENSITIVE INFORMATION AND 
ADDRESSING 
OTHER 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
RISKS 
RELATED TO RESEARCH. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other national security 
experts, as appropriate, shall ensure that biomedical research con-
ducted or supported by the National Institutes of Health and other 
relevant agencies and offices within the Department of Health 
and Human Services is conducted or supported in a manner that 
appropriately considers national security risks, including national 
security implications related to research involving the sequencing