I 
116TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 7850 
To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy forces, and 
for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 29, 2020 
Mr. SCHNEIDER (for himself, Mr. ZELDIN, Mrs. MURPHY of Florida, Mrs. 
BROOKS of Indiana, Mr. CORREA, Mrs. WALORSKI, Mr. GOTTHEIMER, 
Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. YOHO, and Mr. ROONEY of Florida) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, and in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a pe-
riod to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for con-
sideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
A BILL 
To require a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian proxy 
forces, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘NIE on Iranian Proxy 
Forces Act’’. 
SEC. 2. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
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(1) Hizballah is Iran’s oldest and most success-
ful proxy force. 
(2) Hizballah has trained militia groups in Iraq. 
(3) Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters 
have helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain re-
gime control. 
(4) Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon 
more battle-tested and more capable than ever be-
fore. 
(5) In 2006, Hizballah’s rocket and missile ar-
senal in Lebanon was approximately 15,000; how-
ever, by 2020, this figure has grown ten-fold to more 
than 150,000. 
(6) With the assistance of Iran, Hizballah’s 
weapons arsenal has not only increased in quantity, 
but also quality, including technologically advanced 
weapons and more accurate missiles. 
(7) Iran is reportedly building missile produc-
tion facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous 
rocket-producing capability for Hizballah. 
(8) Iran is actively pursuing its regional inter-
ests and challenging United States interests and 
United States allies through the use of proxy forces 
in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 
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(b) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.—Not later 
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, shall produce a National Intel-
ligence Estimate— 
(1) on Iranian support of proxy and other part-
ner and militia forces in the Middle East region; and 
(2) assessing the increased threat posed to 
Israel, other United States regional allies, and other 
specified interests of the United States as a result 
of such support. 
(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The National In-
telligence Estimate required under subsection (b) shall in-
clude, at a minimum, information relating to the following 
matters with respect to both the strategic and tactical im-
plications for the United States and its allies: 
(1) A description of Iranian and Iranian-con-
trolled personnel, including Hizballah, Shiite mili-
tias, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
forces, operating in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, in-
cluding the number and geographic distribution of 
such personnel. 
(2) A description of arms and related material 
transferred by Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
trolled personnel since January 2011, including the 
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number and type of such arms and related material 
and whether such transfer was by land, sea, or air, 
as well as financial and additional technological ca-
pabilities. 
(3) An identification of financial institutions, 
businesses, and other persons that provide material 
support, including financial support, to such Iranian 
and Iranian-controlled personnel. 
(4) An assessment of the operational and doc-
trinal lessons learned and relationships forged by 
such Iranian and Iranian-controlled personnel based 
on recent battle experiences in Iraq and Syria, and 
on the performance of these groups in the aftermath 
of the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu-Mahdi 
al-Muhandis. 
(5) A description of any rocket and missile pro-
duction and modification facilities in Lebanon and 
Syria for such Iranian and Iranian-controlled per-
sonnel, and whether— 
(A) such facilities involve precision-guided 
munitions; 
(B) such facilities were assessed to be built 
at the direction of Hizballah leadership, Iranian 
leadership, or both Hizballah and Iranian lead-
ership; and 
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(C) such facilities are connected to the Ira-
nian ‘‘landbridge’’ project. 
(6) An analysis of the foreign and domestic 
supply chains that significantly facilitate, support, or 
otherwise aid Hizballah’s acquisition or development 
of missile production facilities, including the geo-
graphic distribution of such foreign and domestic 
supply chains. 
(7) An assessment of the provision of goods, 
services, or technology transferred by Iran or its af-
filiates to Hizballah to indigenously manufacture or 
otherwise produce missiles. 
(8) The number of arms or related material 
transferred by Iran or its affiliates to such Iranian 
and Iranian-controlled personnel in Iraq, Syria, and 
Lebanon and an identification of the Iranian or Ira-
nian-controlled personnel to which the arms or re-
lated material were transferred. 
(9) An identification of foreign persons that 
are, based on credible information, facilitating the 
transfer of significant financial support or arms or 
related material to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
trolled personnel. 
(10) A description of the threat posed to Israel 
and other United States partners in the Middle East 
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by the transfer of arms or related material or other 
support offered to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
trolled personnel. 
(11) An assessment of the military capabilities 
of United States partners in the region to address 
and offset the transfers described in paragraph (10). 
(d) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Upon completion of 
the National Intelligence Estimate required under sub-
section (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall sub-
mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
eign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a copy of 
such estimate. 
(e) ARMS OR RELATED MATERIAL DEFINED.—The 
term ‘‘arms or related material’’ means— 
(1) nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
weapons or materials or components of such weap-
ons; 
(2) ballistic or cruise missile weapons or mate-
rials or components of such weapons; 
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(3) destabilizing numbers and types of ad-
vanced conventional weapons, as well as unmanned 
aerial threats such as drones, rockets, and mortars; 
(4) defense articles or defense services, as those 
terms are defined in paragraphs (3) and (4), respec-
tively, of section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act 
(22 U.S.C. 2794); 
(5) defense information, as that term is defined 
in section 644 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2403); or 
(6) items designated by the President for pur-
poses of the United States Munitions List under sec-
tion 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)). 
SEC. 3. STRATEGY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after com-
pletion of the National Intelligence Estimate required 
under section 2(b), the President shall transmit to Con-
gress a strategy to prevent Iran from expanding its influ-
ence and power in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Such strategy 
shall include plans to— 
(1) limit Iranian and Iranian-controlled per-
sonnel, including Hizballah, Shiite militias, and 
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Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, operating 
in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon; and 
(2) interdict the sale, supply, or transfer of 
weapons from Iran to such Iranian and Iranian-con-
trolled personnel operating in such countries. 
Æ 
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