193
DIVISION F—ADDITIONAL
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
TITLE XXVIII—INDONESIA
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
SEC. 2801. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO INDO-
NESIA MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:
(1)(A) Despite a surface adherence to demo-
cratic forms, the Indonesian political system remains
strongly authoritarian.
(B) The government is dominated by an elite
comprising President Soeharto (now in his sixth 5-
year term), his close associates, and the military.
(C) The government requires allegiance to a
state ideology known as ‘‘Pancasila’’, which stresses
consultation and consensus, but is also used to limit
dissent, to enforce social and political cohesion, and
to restrict the development of opposition elements.
(2) The Government of Indonesia recognizes
only one official trade union, has refused to register
independent trade unions such as the Indonesian
Prosperity Trade Union (SBSI), has arrested
Muchtar Pakpahan, the General Chairman of the
SBSI, on charges of subversion, and other labor ac-
194
tivists, and has closed the offices and confiscated
materials of the SBSI.
(3) Civil society organizations in Indonesia,
such as environmental organizations, election-mon-
itoring organizations, legal aid organizations, stu-
dent organizations, trade union organizations, and
community organizations, have been harassed by the
Government of Indonesia through such means as de-
tentions, interrogations, denial of permission for
meetings, banning of publications, repeated orders to
report to security forces or judicial courts, and ille-
gal seizure of documents.
(4)(A) The armed forces of Indonesia continue
to carry out torture and other severe violations of
human rights in East Timor, Irian Jaya, and other
parts of Indonesia, to detain and imprison East
Timorese and others for nonviolent expression of po-
litical views, and to maintain unjustifiably high
troop levels in East Timor.
(B) From May 27 to May 31, the East
Timorses resistance forces carried out deplorable
human rights violations, including the reported kill-
ing of over two dozen persons in an apparent at-
tempt to disrupt national elections. A resistance at-
tack on a truck resulted in the deaths of 16 police-
195
men and one soldier. Attacks on polling places also
resulted in the deaths of two election officials.
(C) Violence on the part of either the Indo-
nesian military or the East Timorese resistance
forces is not conducive to the just and peaceful solu-
tion to the conflict in East Timor.
(D) Indonesian civil authorities must improve
their human rights performance in East Timor,
Irian Jaya, and elsewhere in Indonesia, and aggres-
sively prosecute violations.
(E) The Indonesian authorities and the resist-
ance forces in East Timor must refrain from human
rights violations, including attacks on civilians and
non-combatants.
(5) The Nobel Prize Committee awarded the
1996 Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Carlos Felipe
Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos Horta for their tire-
less efforts to find a just and peaceful solution to
the conflict in East Timor.
(6) In 1992, the Congress suspended the inter-
national military and education training (IMET)
program for Indonesia in response to a November
12, 1991, shooting incident in East Timor by Indo-
nesian security forces against peaceful Timorese
demonstrators in which no progress has been made
196
in accounting for the missing persons either in that
incident or others who disappeared in 1995–96.
(7) On August 1, 1996, then Secretary of State
Warren Christopher stated in testimony before the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, ‘‘I
think there’s a strong interest in seeing an orderly
transition of power there [in Indonesia] that will rec-
ognize the pluralism that should exist in a country
of that magnitude and importance.’’.
(8) The United States has important economic,
commercial, and security interests in Indonesia be-
cause of its growing economy and markets and its
strategic location astride a number of key inter-
national straits which will only be strengthened by
democratic development in Indonesia and a policy
which promotes political pluralism and respect for
universal human rights.
(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
the Congress that the United States should not provide
military assistance and arms transfers for a fiscal year
to the Government of Indonesia unless the President de-
termines and certifies to the Congress for that fiscal year
that the Government of Indonesia meets the following re-
quirements:
197
(1) DOMESTIC MONITORING OF ELECTIONS.—
(A) The Government of Indonesia provides official
accreditation to independent election-monitoring or-
ganizations, including the Independent Election
Monitoring Committee (KIPP), to observe national
elections without interference by personnel of the
Government or of the armed forces.
(B) In addition, such organizations are allowed
to assess such elections and to publicize or otherwise
disseminate the assessments throughout Indonesia.
(2) PROTECTION OF NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS.—The police or military of Indonesia do
not confiscate materials from or otherwise engage in
illegal raids on the offices or homes of members of
both domestic or international nongovernmental or-
ganizations, including election-monitoring organiza-
tions, legal aid organizations, student organizations,
trade union organizations, community organizations,
environmental organizations, and religious organiza-
tions.
(3) ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR
ATTACK
ON
PDI
HEADQUARTERS.—As recommended by the Govern-
ment of Indonesia’s National Human Rights Com-
mission, the Government of Indonesia has inves-
tigated the attack on the headquarters of the Demo-
198
cratic Party of Indonesia (PDI) on July 27, 1996,
prosecuted individuals who planned and carried out
the attack, and made public the postmortem exam-
ination of the five individuals killed in the attack.
(4) RESOLUTION
OF
CONFLICT
IN
EAST
TIMOR.—
(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF DIALOGUE.—The
Government of Indonesia is doing everything
possible to enter into a process of dialogue,
under the auspices of the United Nations, with
Portugal and East Timorese leaders of various
viewpoints to discuss ideas toward a resolution
of the conflict in East Timor and the political
status of East Timor.
(B) REDUCTION
OF
TROOPS.—The Gov-
ernment of Indonesia has established and im-
plemented a plan to reduce the number of Indo-
nesian troops in East Timor.
(C) RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.—
Individuals detained or imprisoned for the non-
violent expression of political views in East
Timor have been released from custody.
(5) IMPROVEMENT
IN
LABOR
RIGHTS.—The
Government of Indonesia has taken the following ac-
tions to improve labor rights in Indonesia:
199
(A) The Government has dropped charges
of subversion, and previous charges against the
General Chairman of the SBSI trade union,
Muchtar Pakpahan, and released him from cus-
tody.
(B) The Government has substantially re-
duced the requirements for legal recognition of
the SBSI or other legitimate worker organiza-
tions as a trade union.
(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It also is the sense
of the Congress that the violent acts of the resistance in
East Timor should be condemned, as they discredit the
East Timorese cause, and could result in additional violent
reprisals by the Indonsian armed forces.
(d) UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AND
ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.—As used in this section, the
term ‘‘military assistance and arms transfers’’ means—
(1) small arms, crowd control equipment, ar-
mored personnel carriers, and such other items that
can commonly be used in the direct violation of
human rights; and
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et
seq.; relating to international military education and
training or ‘‘IMET’’), except such term shall not in-
200
clude Expanded IMET, pursuant to section 541 of
such Act.
DIVISION 
G—FURTHER 
ADDI-
TIONAL 
MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
TITLE 
XXIX—PROHIBITION 
ON
FUNDS TO FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES THAT ASSIT THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF LIBYA
SEC. 2901. PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO ANY
COUNTRY 
THAT 
ASSISTS 
LIBYA 
IN 
CIR-
CUMVENTING UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds made available
in this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall
be made available for assistance to any government if the
President determines that such country has assisted the
Government of Libya in violating sanctions imposed by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 748 (1992).
(b) EXCEPTION.—This section shall not apply if the
President determines that making such funds available is
important to the national security interest of the United
States.
201
DIVISION H—ARMS TRANSFERS
CODE OF CONDUCT
TITLE XXX—ARMS TRANSFERS
CODE OF CONDUCT
SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Code of Conduct
on Arms Transfers Act of 1997’’.
SEC. 3002. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Approximately 40,000,000 people, over 75
percent civilians, died as a result of civil and inter-
national wars fought with conventional weapons dur-
ing the 45 years of the cold war, demonstrating that
conventional weapons can in fact be weapons of
mass destruction.
(2) Conflict has actually increased in the post
cold war era, with 30 major armed conflicts in
progress during 1995.
(3) War is both a human tragedy and an ongo-
ing economic disaster affecting the entire world, in-
cluding the United States and its economy, because
it decimates both local investment and potential ex-
port markets.
(4) International trade in conventional weapons
increases the risk and impact of war in an already
202
over-militarized world, creating far more costs than
benefits for the United States economy through in-
creased United States defense and foreign assistance
spending and reduced demand for United States ci-
vilian exports.
(5) The United Nations Register of Conven-
tional Arms can be an effective first step in support
of limitations on the supply of conventional weapons
to developing countries and compliance with its re-
porting requirements by a foreign government can
be an integral tool in determining the worthiness of
such government for the receipt of United States
military assistance and arms transfers.
(6) It is in the national security and economic
interests of the United States to reduce dramatically
the $840,000,000,000 that all countries spend on
armed forces every year, $191,000,000,000 of which
is spent by developing countries, an amount equiva-
lent to 4 times the total bilateral and multilateral
foreign assistance such countries receive every year.
(7) According to the Congressional Research
Service, the United States supplies more conven-
tional weapons to developing countries than all other
countries combined, averaging $11,889,000,000 a
year in agreements to supply such weapons to devel-
203
oping countries for the six years since the end of the
cold war, 58 percent higher than the $7,515,000,000
a year in such agreements for the six years prior to
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
(8) Since the end of the cold war, 84 percent
of United States arms transfers have been to devel-
oping countries are to countries with an undemo-
cratic form of government whose citizens, according
to the Department of State Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to
peaceably change their form of government.
(9) Although a goal of United States foreign
policy should be to work with foreign governments
and international organizations to reduce militariza-
tion and dictatorship and therefore prevent conflicts
before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of
United States Armed Forces—to the Republic of
Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti—
such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that
had been provided or financed by the United States
to undemocratic governments.
(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and
conflicts around the globe are multilateral problems,
and the fact that the United States has emerged as
the world’s primary seller of conventional weapons,
204
combined with the world leadership role of the Unit-
ed States, signifies that the United States is in a po-
sition to seek multilateral restraints on the competi-
tion for and transfers of conventional weapons.
(11) The Congress has the constitutional re-
sponsibility to participate with the executive branch
in decisions to provide military assistance and arms
transfers to a foreign government, and in the formu-
lation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically the
level of international militarization.
(12) A decision to provide military assistance
and arms transfers to a government that is undemo-
cratic, does not adequately protect human rights, is
currently engaged in acts of armed aggression, or is
not fully participating in the United Nations Reg-
ister of Conventional Arms, should require a higher
level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such
assistance and arms transfers to a government to
which these conditions do not apply.
SEC. 3003. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this title is to provide clear policy
guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining
the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for
United States military assistance and arms transfers.
205
SEC. 3004. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CER-
TAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections
(b) and (c), beginning on and after October 1, 1998, Unit-
ed States military assistance and arms transfers may not
be provided to a foreign government for a fiscal year un-
less the President certifies to the Congress for that fiscal
year that such government meets the following require-
ments:
(1) PROMOTES
DEMOCRACY.—Such govern-
ment—
(A) was chosen by and permits free and
fair elections;
(B) promotes civilian control of the mili-
tary and security forces and has civilian institu-
tions controlling the policy, operation, and
spending of all law enforcement and security in-
stitutions, as well as the armed forces;
(C) promotes the rule of law, equality be-
fore the law, and respect for individual and mi-
nority rights, including freedom to speak, pub-
lish, associate, and organize; and
(D) promotes the strengthening of politi-
cal, legislative, and civil institutions of democ-
racy, as well as autonomous institutions to
206
monitor the conduct of public officials and to
combat corruption.
(2) RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS.—Such govern-
ment—
(A) does not engage in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, includ-
ing—
(i) extra judicial or arbitrary execu-
tions;
(ii) disappearances;
(iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
(iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
(v) systematic official discrimination
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, national origin, or political affili-
ation; and
(vi) grave breaches of international
laws of war or equivalent violations of the
laws of war in internal conflicts;
(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and
prosecutes those responsible for gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights;
(C) permits access on a regular basis to
political prisoners by international humani-
207
tarian organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross;
(D) promotes the independence of the judi-
ciary and other official bodies that oversee the
protection of human rights;
(E) does not impede the free functioning of
domestic and international human rights orga-
nizations; and
(F) provides access on a regular basis to
humanitarian organizations in situations of con-
flict or famine.
(3) NOT ENGAGED IN CERTAIN ACTS OF ARMED
AGGRESSION.—Such government is not currently en-
gaged in acts of armed aggression in violation of
international law.
(4) FULL PARTICIPATION IN U.N. REGISTER OF
CONVENTIONAL
ARMS.—Such government is fully
participating in the United Nations Register of Con-
ventional Arms.
(b) REQUIREMENT
FOR
CONTINUING
COMPLI-
ANCE.—Any certification with respect to a foreign govern-
ment for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to
be effective for that fiscal year if the President certifies
to the Congress that such government has not continued
208
to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs
(1) through (4) of such subsection.
(c) EXEMPTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The prohibition contained in
subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a for-
eign government for a fiscal year if—
(A) subject to paragraph (2), the President
submits a request for an exemption to the Con-
gress containing a determination that it is in
the national security interest of the United
States to provide military assistance and arms
transfers to such government; or
(B) the President determines that an
emergency exists under which it is vital to the
interest of the United States to provide military
assistance and arms transfers to such govern-
ment.
(2) DISAPPROVAL.—A request for an exemption
to provide military assistance and arms transfers to
a foreign government shall not take effect, or shall
cease to be effective, if a law is enacted disapproving
such request.
(d) NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit
to the Congress initial certifications under sub-
209
section (a) and requests for exemptions under sub-
section (c)(1)(A) in conjunction with the submission
of the annual request for enactment of authoriza-
tions and appropriations for foreign assistance pro-
grams for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate,
submit additional or amended certifications and re-
quests for exemptions at any time thereafter in the
fiscal year.
(2) DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMER-
GENCY SITUATIONS.—The President, when, in his
determination, it is not contrary to the national in-
terest to do so, shall submit to the Congress at the
earliest possible date reports containing determina-
tions with respect to emergencies under subsection
(c)(1)(B). Each such report shall contain a descrip-
tion of—
(A) the nature of the emergency;
(B) the type of military assistance and
arms transfers provided to the foreign govern-
ment; and
(C) the cost to the United States of such
assistance and arms transfers.
SEC. 3005. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representa-
210
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate should hold hearings on—
(1) controversial certifications submitted under
section 2004(a);
(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under
section 2004(c)(1)(A); and
(3) all determinations with respect to emer-
gencies under section 2004(c)(1)(B).
SEC. 3006. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.
For purposes of this title, the terms ‘‘United States
military assistance and arms transfers’’ and ‘‘military as-
sistance and arms transfers’’ mean—
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military
assistance), including the transfer of excess defense
articles under section 516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to inter-
national military education and training); or
(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense
services, or design and construction services under
the Arms Export Control Act (excluding any trans-
fer or other assistance under section 23 of such
Act), including defense articles and defense services
212
(1) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGE-
MENT.—(A) The emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe that will be invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Ma-
drid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last
such countries invited to join NATO.
(B) The United States should seek to ensure
that the NATO leaders assembled in Madrid agree
on a process whereby all other emerging democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join
NATO will be considered for membership in NATO
as soon as they meet the criteria for such member-
ship.
(2) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS
WITH RUSSIA.—(A) NATO enlargement should be
carried out in such a manner as to underscore the
Alliance’s defensive nature and demonstrate to Rus-
sia that NATO enlargement will enhance the secu-
rity of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Ac-
cordingly, the United States and its NATO Allies
should make this intention clear in the negotiations
with Russia, including those regarding adaptation of
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty of November 19, 1990.
213
(B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia
NATO’s defensive and security-enhancing intentions,
it is essential that neither fundamental United
States security interests in Europe nor the effective-
ness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance
be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments
should be made to Russia that would have the effect
of—
(i) extending rights or imposing respon-
sibilities on new NATO members different from
those applicable to current NATO members, in-
cluding with respect to the deployment of nu-
clear weapons and the stationing of troops and
equipment from other NATO members;
(ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend
the territory of new NATO members by, for ex-
ample, restricting the construction of defense
infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO
to deploy necessary reinforcements;
(iii) providing any international organiza-
tion, or any country that is not a member of
NATO, with authority to review, delay, veto, or
otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of
the North Atlantic Council or the implementa-
tion of such decisions, including with respect to
214
the deployment of NATO forces or the admis-
sion of additional members to NATO; or
(iv) impeding the development of enhanced
relations between NATO and other European
countries that do not belong to the Alliance.
(C) In order to enhance security and stability in
Europe, the United States should seek commitments
from the Russian Federation—
(i) to demarcate and respect all its borders
with neighboring states;
(ii) to station its armed forces on the terri-
tory of other states only with the consent of
such states and in strict accordance with inter-
national law; and
(iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and
conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
(D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
proceed, the United States should engage in close
and continuous consultations not only with its
NATO allies, but also with the emerging democ-
racies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and
the newly independent states of the Caucasus region.
(3) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.—(A) As
215
the United States proceeds with efforts to develop
defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should
seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia
on matters related to missile defense. In particular,
the United States and its NATO allies should seek
to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early
warning and technical aspects of ballistic missile de-
fense.
(B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote bal-
listic missile defense cooperation with Russia, it
must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regard-
ing consideration of arms control agreements with
Russia that bear on ballistic missile defense.
SEC. 3203. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGE-
MENT.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in
order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
(b) DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELI-
GIBLE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT ASSISTANCE.—
(1) 
DESIGNATION
OF
ADDITIONAL
COUN-
TRIES.—Effective 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania are each designated as eligible to receive
assistance under the program established under sec-
tion 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
216
and shall be deemed to have been so designated pur-
suant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act, except that
any such country shall not be so designated if, prior
to such effective date, the President certifies to the
Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that the country fails to
meet the criteria under section 203(d)(3) of the
NATO Participation Act of 1994.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The designation
of countries pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to
receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act
of 1994—
(A) is in addition to the designation of
other countries by law or pursuant to section
203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive as-
sistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act; and
(B) shall not preclude the designation by
the President of other emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe pursuant to sec-
tion 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive
assistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act.
217
(3) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense
of the Congress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania—
(A) are to be commended for their
progress toward political and economic reform
and meeting the guidelines for prospective
NATO members;
(B) would make an outstanding contribu-
tion to furthering the goals of NATO and en-
hancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe
should they become NATO members; and
(C) upon complete satisfaction of all rel-
evant criteria should be invited to become full
NATO members at the earliest possible date.
(c) REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE AND PARTNER-
SHIP
FOR
PEACE INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
SYS-
TEM.—
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Funds described in para-
graph (2) are authorized to be made available to
support the implementation of the Regional Airspace
Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information
Management System, including—
(A) the procurement of items in support of
these programs; and