I 
117TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 2227 
To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings from develop-
ment of the new ground-based strategic deterrent program toward the 
development of a universal coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 26, 2021 
Mr. KHANNA (for himself, Mr. MCGOVERN, Mr. POCAN, Mr. HUFFMAN, Ms. 
LEE of California, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. BLUMENAUER, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 
GRIJALVA, Mr. GARCI´A of Illinois, Ms. JACKSON LEE, Ms. PRESSLEY, 
Ms. OMAR, and Ms. NORTON) introduced the following bill; which was re-
ferred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To extend the life of the Minuteman III and redirect savings 
from development of the new ground-based strategic de-
terrent program toward the development of a universal 
coronavirus vaccine, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investing in Cures Be-
fore Missiles Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘ICBM Act’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) According to the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the 
United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2017, ‘‘is $1.2 
trillion in 2017 dollars over the 2017–2046 period: 
more than $800 billion to operate and sustain (that 
is, incrementally upgrade) nuclear forces and about 
$400 billion to modernize them’’. With inflation, the 
cost rises to $1,700,000,000,000 and does not in-
clude the cost of the additional nuclear capabilities 
proposed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. 
(2) The Government Accountability Office 
found in July 2020 that the Department of Defense 
and the National Nuclear Security Administration 
have still not taken meaningful steps to address af-
fordability concerns or heeded the Government Ac-
countability Office’s recommendation to consider 
‘‘deferring the start of or cancelling specific mod-
ernization programs’’, including the W87–1 warhead 
modification program, to address increases in the 
weapons activities budget requests of the National 
Nuclear Security Administration. 
(3) The ground-based strategic deterrent pro-
gram is expected to cost between $93,100,000,000 
and $95,800,000, which does not include the cost of 
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the W87–1 warhead modification program or the 
cost to produce new plutonium pits for the warhead. 
The total estimated life cycle cost of the ground- 
based 
strategic 
deterrent 
program 
is 
$264,000,000,000, and the program is intended to 
replace 400 deployed Minuteman III missiles with 
more than 600 new missiles, to allow for test flights 
and spares. 
(4) The Air Force awarded a sole-source con-
tract to Northrop Grumman for the engineering and 
manufacturing component of the ground-based stra-
tegic deterrent program in September 2020, raising 
concerns that the absence of competition for the 
award may result in higher than projected costs to 
United States taxpayers. 
(5) The National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion is also in the early stages of developing a re-
placement intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, 
the W87–1, and expanding plutonium pit production 
to build new warhead cores, costing at least 
$12,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000, respectively, 
to meet the modernization needs of the ground-based 
strategic deterrent program. 
(6) Maintaining and updating the current Min-
uteman III missiles is possible for multiple decades 
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and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, 
through 2036 this would cost $37,000,000,000 less 
in 2017 dollars than developing and deploying the 
ground-based strategic deterrent program. 
(7) A public opinion poll conducted from Octo-
ber 12 to 28, 2020, by ReThink Media and the Fed-
eration of American Scientists found that only 26 
percent of registered voters in the United States pre-
ferred replacing the Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missile with the ground-based strategic de-
terrent, as compared to 60 percent of registered vot-
ers who opposed replacing the Minuteman III mis-
sile. 
(8) On April 3, 2019, Lieutenant General Rich-
ard M. Clark, then-Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, 
noted in testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives that we 
have ‘‘one more opportunity’’ to conduct life exten-
sion on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missile, indicating the technical feasibility of extend-
ing the Minuteman III missile despite his stated 
preference for the ground-based strategic deterrent. 
(9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile leg of the triad, the 2018 Nuclear 
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Posture Review signaled that the United States 
would have an assured retaliatory capability in the 
form of several ballistic missile submarines, which 
are, ‘‘at present, virtually undetectable, and there 
are no known, near-term credible threats to the sur-
vivability of the [ballistic missile submarine] force’’, 
a benefit that will be enhanced as the Department 
of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class ballistic 
submarine fleet with the new Columbia class ballistic 
missile fleet. 
(10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles 
had historically been the most responsive leg of the 
United States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic 
missile submarine communications to allow for the 
dissemination of emergency action messages in war-
time have negated that advantage. 
(11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles cannot be 
recalled, leaving decision-makers with mere minutes 
to decide whether to launch the missiles before they 
are destroyed, known as a posture of ‘‘launch on 
warning’’ or ‘‘launch under attack’’ in the face of a 
perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk 
of a national leader initiating a nuclear war by mis-
take. 
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(12) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieu-
tenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces cor-
rectly identified a false warning in an early warning 
system that showed several United States incoming 
nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders from 
launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel 
Petrov the nickname ‘‘the man who saved the 
world’’. 
(13) Former Secretary of Defense William 
Perry, who once briefed President Bill Clinton on a 
suspected Russian first nuclear strike, wrote that 
the ground-based leg of the nuclear triad is ‘‘desta-
bilizing because it invites an attack’’ and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles are ‘‘some of the most dan-
gerous weapons in the world’’ and ‘‘could even trig-
ger an accidental nuclear war’’. 
(14) General James Cartwright, former vice 
chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Com-
mander of the United States Strategic Command, 
wrote, with Secretary Perry, ‘‘[T]he greatest danger 
is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder—that we 
might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we 
make decisions about which weapons to buy, we 
should use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon in-
creases the risk of accidental war and is not needed 
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to deter an intentional attack, we should not build 
it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 
[intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks 
of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer 
need to bear. We are safer without these expensive 
weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.’’. 
(15) General George Lee Butler, the former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command 
and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States Strategic Command, said, ‘‘I would have re-
moved land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 
time ago. I’d be happy to put that mission on the 
submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bomb-
ers having a nuclear weapons capability that can be 
restored to alert very quickly, and with even a small 
component of Trident submarines—with all those 
missiles and all those warheads on patrol—it’s hard 
to imagine we couldn’t get by.’’. 
(16) While a sudden ‘‘bolt from the blue’’ first 
strike from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly 
unlikely scenario, extending the Minuteman III 
would maintain the purported role of the interconti-
nental ballistic missile leg of the triad to absorb such 
an attack. 
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SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EXTENSION OF LIFE-
SPAN OF MINUTEMAN III AND DEVELOPING A 
VACCINE OF MASS PREVENTION. 
It is the policy of the United States that— 
(1) the operational life of the Minuteman III 
missiles can be safely extended until at least 2050; 
and 
(2) investments in developing a universal 
coronavirus vaccine and efforts to save lives from 
other types of infectious diseases are a better use of 
United States taxpayer resources than building a 
new and unnecessary intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile. 
SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR VACCINES INSTEAD 
OF MISSILES. 
(a) TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 
Of the unobligated balances of appropriations made avail-
able for the Department of Defense for the research, de-
velopment, test, and evaluation of the ground-based stra-
tegic deterrent program, the Secretary of Defense shall 
transfer $1,000,000,000 to the National Institute of Al-
lergy and Infectious Diseases to conduct or support com-
prehensive research for the development of a universal 
coronavirus vaccine. 
(b) TRANSFER FROM NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall trans-
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fer all unobligated balances of appropriations made avail-
able for the National Nuclear Security Administration for 
the W87–1 warhead modification program to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention to research and com-
bat emerging and zoonotic infectious diseases. 
SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND- 
BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM 
AND W87–1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO-
GRAM. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 may be obli-
gated or expended for the ground-based strategic deter-
rent program or the W87–1 warhead modification pro-
gram. 
SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTE-
MAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MIS-
SILES. 
(a) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on extend-
ing the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to 2050. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
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(1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 
of— 
(A) extending the life of Minuteman III 
intercontinental ballistic missiles; and 
(B) deploying the ground-based strategic 
deterrent program. 
(2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missile program as part of a service life ex-
tension program that could also be incorporated in 
the future ground-based strategic deterrent pro-
gram, including, at a minimum, opportunities to in-
crease the resilience against adversary missile de-
fenses. 
(3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of in-
corporating sensors and nondestructive testing meth-
ods and technologies to reduce destructive testing re-
quirements and increase the service life and number 
of Minuteman III missiles through 2050. 
(4) An analysis and validation of the methods 
used to estimate the operational service life of Min-
uteman II and Minuteman III motors, taking into 
account the test and launch experience of motors re-
tired after the operational service life of such motors 
in the rocket systems launch program. 
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