I 
117TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3524 
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 25, 2021 
Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Serv-
ices, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Se-
lect), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each 
case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 
the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, invest-
ment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and 
globally. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement 
Act’’ or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
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Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Definitions. 
Sec. 3. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 5. Rules of construction. 
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
Subtitle A—Science and Technology 
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply 
chain diversification and management. 
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development 
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment 
standards. 
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from China. 
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure. 
Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign en-
ergy development. 
Sec. 116. Ensuring the International Development Finance Corporation is posi-
tioned to achieve national security, economic, and development 
objectives. 
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership 
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order. 
Sec. 122. Review of PRC trade and economic engagement globally. 
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pa-
cific. 
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in 
APEC. 
Sec. 125. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues. 
Sec. 126. Digital trade agreements. 
Sec. 127. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership. 
Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership 
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy. 
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global lead-
ership. 
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets. 
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross- 
border payment and financial messaging systems. 
TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters 
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation. 
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group. 
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN. 
Sec. 206. United States representation in standards-setting bodies. 
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Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries. 
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership. 
Sec. 209. Taiwan Fellowship Program. 
Sec. 210. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to 
the Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 211. Diplomatic and economic efforts to deter PRC use of force against 
Taiwan. 
Sec. 212. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking. 
Sec. 213. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utiliza-
tion of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. 
Sec. 214. Expanding investment by United States International Development 
Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing. 
Sec. 215. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American stra-
tegic national security and economic objectives. 
Sec. 216. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program. 
Sec. 217. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation. 
Sec. 218. Global Engagement Center. 
Subtitle B—International Security Matters 
Sec. 221. Definitions. 
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training 
in the Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in inter-
national waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on ar-
tificial land features in the South China Sea. 
Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. 
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power 
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement. 
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement. 
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations. 
Sec. 234. Report on American employment in international organizations. 
Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power 
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around 
the world. 
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations. 
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China’s arbitrary im-
prisonment of Canadian citizens. 
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada. 
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human 
rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Carib-
bean. 
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean 
regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of perva-
sive surveillance technologies. 
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
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Sec. 250. U.S.-Caribbean resilience partnership. 
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on Transatlantic relationships. 
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector fi-
nance. 
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and be-
tween China and Russia. 
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia. 
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia. 
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review. 
PART IV—AFRICA 
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s 
Republic of China in Africa. 
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. 
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa. 
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca focused on the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. 
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks. 
Sec. 277. Expansion of authorities of the United States International Develop-
ment Finance Corporation in sub-Saharan Africa. 
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement. 
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy. 
PART VII—OCEANIA 
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania. 
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap. 
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue. 
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships. 
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS 
Sec. 295. Short title. 
Sec. 296. Findings. 
Sec. 297. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 298. Definitions. 
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports. 
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies. 
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands. 
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TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES 
Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms 
of the people of Hong Kong. 
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong 
Kong. 
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice. 
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force. 
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress condemning the ongoing genocide and crimes 
against humanity against Uyghurs and other minority groups. 
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor. 
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection. 
Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
that commit human rights abuses. 
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet. 
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession 
or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of 
Tibetan Buddhists. 
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall 
circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong. 
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the 
People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global Magnitsky 
Human Rights Accountability Act. 
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination. 
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to inter-
national abuses of human rights. 
TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the PRC’s industrial policy. 
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams. 
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy. 
TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY 
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. 
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of 
China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues. 
Sec. 503. Countering China’s proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear tech-
nology to the Middle East. 
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 
Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China and 
other countries account for environmental issues and climate 
change. 
Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions. 
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China. 
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and eco-
nomic interests. 
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy. 
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 
security. 
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Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high- 
GWP hydrofluorocarbons. 
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation 
through the Green Climate Fund. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives. 
(2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
(3) PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY; PLA.—The 
terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 
the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 
(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 
‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United 
States to pursue the following objectives: 
(1) The United States global leadership role is 
sustained and its political system and major founda-
tions of national power are secured for the long-term 
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in the political, economic, technological, and military 
domains. 
(2) The United States position as an indispen-
sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
gagement. 
(3) The United States deters military con-
frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 
reduce the risk of conflict. 
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a 
stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with 
China. The United States and its allies maintain un-
fettered access to the region, including through free-
dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, 
consistent with international law and practice. 
(5) The allies and partners of the United 
States— 
(A) maintain confidence in United States 
leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
cific region; 
(B) can withstand and combat subversion 
by the PRC; and 
(C) work closely with the United States in 
setting global rules, norms, and standards that 
benefit the international community. 
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(6) The combined weight of the United States 
and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to 
dominate other states outweigh the potential bene-
fits. 
(7) The United States leads the free and open 
international order, which comprises resilient states 
and institutions that uphold and defend principles, 
such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, 
and human rights. The international order is 
strengthened to withstand attempts at destabiliza-
tion by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of 
international engagement in the 21st century are 
maintained, including— 
(A) the protection of human rights, com-
mercial engagement and investment, and tech-
nology; and 
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
are in alignment with the values and interests 
of the United States, its allies and partners, 
and other stakeholders in the liberal inter-
national order. 
(9) The United States counters attempts by the 
PRC to— 
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(A) undermine open and democratic soci-
eties; 
(B) distort global markets; 
(C) manipulate the international trade sys-
tem; 
(D) coerce other nations via economic and 
military means; or 
(E) use its technological advantages to un-
dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na-
tional security interests. 
(10) The United States deters military con-
frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 
reduce the risk of conflict. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 
in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic 
foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 
growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 
improve the ability of the United States to pursue 
its vital economic, foreign policy, and national secu-
rity interests; 
(2) to maximize the United States strengths in 
the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
military, informational, and technological realms in 
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order to safeguard United States interests and the 
values of United States allies and partners, and to 
strengthen incentives for the PRC to collaborate in 
addressing common global and regional challenges; 
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
national system characterized by the rule of law, 
open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a 
shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes, human rights, good and transparent 
governance, and freedom from coercion; 
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral 
and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance 
shared interests and values and bolster partner 
countries’ confidence that the United States is and 
will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner 
that respects the views and interests of its allies and 
friends; 
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United 
States allies and partners in boosting their own ca-
pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro-
tect shared interests and values, free from coercion 
and external pressure; 
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(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 
healthy, constructive competition in United States- 
China economic relations by— 
(A) advancing policies that harden the 
United States economy against unfair and ille-
gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
ercion of United States businesses; and 
(B) improving United States laws and reg-
ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-
tempts to harm United States economic com-
petitiveness; 
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector- 
led growth in emerging markets around the world, 
including through the use of United States Govern-
ment tools that— 
(A) support greater private sector invest-
ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 
that are grounded in the rule of law; 
(B) promote open markets; 
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
frameworks; 
(D) improve the management of key eco-
nomic sectors; 
(E) combat corruption; and 
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(F) foster and support greater collabora-
tion with and among partner countries and the 
United States private sector to develop secure 
and sustainable infrastructure; 
(8) to play a leading role in advancing inter-
national rules and norms that foster free and recip-
rocal trade and open and integrated markets; 
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy 
in support of United States companies and busi-
nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
tion; 
(10) to ensure that the United States is second 
to none in the innovation of critical and emerging 
technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 
semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— 
(A) providing necessary investment and 
concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
celerate development of such technologies; 
(B) modernizing export controls and in-
vestment screening regimes and associated poli-
cies and regulations; 
(C) enhancing the role of the United 
States in technical standards-setting bodies and 
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avenues for developing norms regarding the use 
of emerging critical technologies; 
(D) reducing United States barriers and 
increasing incentives for collaboration with al-
lies and partners on the research and co-devel-
opment of critical technologies; 
(E) collaborating with allies and partners 
to protect critical technologies by— 
(i) coordinating and aligning export 
control measures; 
(ii) building capacity for defense tech-
nology security; 
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-
tegically critical supply chains; and 
(iv) ensuring diversification; and 
(F) designing major defense capabilities 
for export to vetted allies and partners; 
(11) to collaborate with like-minded democ-
racies and other willing partners to promote ideals 
and principles that— 
(A) advance a free and open international 
order; 
(B) strengthen democratic institutions; 
(C) protect and promote human rights; 
and 
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(D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
porting; 
(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and 
policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; 
(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 
United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 
multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity 
and effectiveness of these organizations in facili-
tating solutions to global challenges; 
(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
lationship with the PRC; 
(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a 
free and open order and address regional and global 
challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-
garding— 
(A) violations and abuses of human rights; 
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and 
(C) the undermining and abrogation of 
treaties, other international agreements, and 
other international norms related to human 
rights; 
(16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re-
pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-
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vantages or compel other nations to defer to its po-
litical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten 
the United States or its allies and partners; 
(17) to maintain United States access to the 
Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-
ments in United States military capabilities, policies, 
and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust 
cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with al-
lies and partners; 
(18) to deter the PRC from— 
(A) initiating armed conflict; 
(B) coercing nations; or 
(C) using malign grey-zone tactics to 
achieve national goals; 
(19) to attempt to strengthen United States- 
PRC military-to-military communication and im-
prove both military and civilian crisis avoidance and 
management procedures to de-conflict operations 
and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; and 
(20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-
picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests 
align, including through bilateral or multilateral 
means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, 
and especially in the following areas— 
(A) global fight against climate change; 
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(B) nuclear security; and 
(C) global financial stability. 
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the 
policy described in section 3(b) requires the following ac-
tions: 
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally 
and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United 
States— 
(A) to marshal sustained political will to 
protect its vital interests, promote its values, 
and advance its economic and national security 
objectives; and 
(B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
persuade the American people and United 
States allies and partners of— 
(i) the current challenges facing the 
international rules based order; and 
(ii) the need for long-term invest-
ments and engagement to defend shared 
interests and values. 
(2) The United States must coordinate closely 
with allies and partners to compete effectively with 
the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 
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to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 
and checking aggressive PRC behavior. 
(3) Effective United States strategy toward 
China requires— 
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
gress; and 
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
collaboration and consultation between the exec-
utive branch and Congress. 
(4) The United States must ensure close inte-
gration among economic and foreign policymakers 
and provide support to the private sector, civil soci-
ety, universities and academic institutions, and other 
relevant actors in free and open societies to enable 
such actors— 
(A) to collaborate to advance common in-
terests; and 
(B) to identify appropriate policies— 
(i) to strengthen the United States 
and its allies; and 
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of 
a free and open order. 
(5) The United States must ensure that all 
Federal departments, agencies, and overseas mis-
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sions are organized and resourced to effectively de-
fend and advance United States interests, by— 
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo- 
Pacific region, at posts around the world, and 
in Washington, DC; 
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign 
service officers, international development pro-
fessionals, members of the foreign commercial 
service, intelligence professionals, and other 
United States Government personnel in the 
Indo-Pacific region; and 
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the 
training, demonstrated proficiency in language 
and culture, technical skills, and other com-
petencies required to advance a successful strat-
egy in relation to the PRC. 
(6) The United States must place renewed pri-
ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary 
instruments of national power, including diplomacy, 
information, technology, economics, foreign assist-
ance and development finance, commerce, intel-
ligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
addressing the challenges posed by the PRC. 
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(7) The United States must sustain military ca-
pabilities necessary to achieve United States political 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including— 
(A) promoting regional security in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(B) reassuring allies and partners while 
protecting them from coercion; and 
(C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
venting unwanted conflict. 
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful 
adaptation to the information environment of the 
21st century. United States public diplomacy and 
messaging efforts must effectively— 
(A) promote the value of partnership with 
the United States; and 
(B) 
counter 
CCP 
propaganda 
and 
disinformation that threatens United States in-
terests. 
SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON 
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing 
in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the 
United States Government under section 620M of the 
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec-
tion 362 of title 10, United States Code. 
(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY 
FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
izing the use of military force. 
TITLE I—INVESTING IN 
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
Subtitle A—Science and 
Technology 
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-
PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-
SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
tate the contracting by the Department of State for the 
professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States 
persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
ment issues related to the PRC, including— 
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 
certain production facilities to locations outside the 
PRC; 
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(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside 
of the PRC; 
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
lenges in the course of the activities described in 
paragraphs (1) and (2); and 
(4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 
through providing market intelligence, facilitating 
contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 
and other services. 
(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons 
hired to perform the services described in subsection (a) 
shall— 
(1) be under the authority of the United States 
Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 
hired, in accordance with existing United States 
laws; 
(2) coordinate with Department of State and 
Department of Commerce officers; and 
(3) coordinate with United States missions and 
relevant local partners in other countries as needed 
to carry out the services described in subsection (a). 
(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in 
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subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, 
small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the 
matters described in subsection (a). 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fis-
cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying 
out this section. 
(e) PROHIBITION
ON ACCESS
TO ASSISTANCE
BY 
FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity— 
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
fluence of the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other 
foreign adversary; 
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership 
from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, 
direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and 
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time 
of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract 
within the previous one year that is no longer in ef-
fect, with— 
(A) the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China; 
(B) the Chinese Communist Party; 
(C) the Chinese military; 
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(D) an entity majority-owned, majority- 
controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, the 
CCP, or the Chinese military; or 
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an 
entity described in subparagraph (D). 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, 
control, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings 
given to those terms in the National Industrial Security 
Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc-
cessor document. 
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure 
and Energy Development 
SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
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SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-
ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-
ARDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should initiate collaboration 
among governments, the private sector, and civil society 
to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality 
global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at 
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following 
issues: 
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in 
which infrastructure investments are made. 
(2) Anti-corruption. 
(3) Rule of law. 
(4) Human rights and labor rights. 
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability. 
(6) Social and governance safeguards. 
(7) Transparency. 
(8) Environmental and energy standards. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should launch a series of fora 
around the world showcasing the commitment of the 
United States and partners of the United States to high- 
quality development cooperation, including with respect to 
the issues described in subsection (a). 
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SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM 
CHINA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—It is in the national interest of the 
United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat-
egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern-
ment to provide foreign countries with financing that 
strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore 
reduce a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-
ments with China, including support from its Belt and 
Road Initiative. 
(b) STRATEGY.— 
(1) AUTHORITY.—Within 180 days of enact-
ment of this Act, the President should develop and 
submit a strategy to the relevant congressional com-
mittees to utilize the resources of Federal agencies 
to counteract offers of assistance and financing from 
China to foreign governments that are of strategic 
importance to the United States. 
(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy 
should— 
(A) identify primary sectors where the 
United States could provide a competitive ad-
vantage to increase a country’s economic inde-
pendence; 
(B) select countries with corresponding 
economic needs, with priority given to those 
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who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influ-
ence; 
(C) identify any corresponding existing fi-
nancing available from United States Govern-
ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-
nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign 
governments if none are currently available; 
(D) identify any cooperative and com-
plementary assistance and financing from 
friendly foreign governments, including coordi-
nated assistance and co-financing; 
(E) create a streamlined decision-making 
process, directed by the National Security 
Council, to devise financing and make agency 
decisions and commitments on a timely basis to 
support United States competitive offers; 
(F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
mission Working Group to develop a com-
prehensive strategy to develop alternatives to 
the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative for development finance; and 
(G) integrate existing efforts into the 
strategy, including efforts to address the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China’s use 
of the United Nations to advance the Belt and 
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Road Initiative, including the proliferation of 
memoranda of understanding between the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and United Nations 
funds and programs regarding the implementa-
tion of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
(3) PARTICIPATING
AGENCIES.—Participating 
Federal agencies should include the Department of 
State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, DFC, 
MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and other 
Federal departments and agencies as appropriate. 
(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President 
should issue an Executive order to implement the 
strategy and make such changes in agency regula-
tions and procedures as are necessary to put the 
strategy into effect. 
(5) 
RELEVANT
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—For the purposes of this subsection, the 
phrase ‘‘relevant congressional committees’’ shall 
mean the House and Senate Committees on Appro-
priations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
House Committee on Financial Services, and the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs. 
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(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State in coordina-
tion with the USAID Administrator is authorized to estab-
lish or continue an initiative, to be known as the ‘‘Infra-
structure Transaction and Assistance Network’’, under 
which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other 
relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on 
the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
carry out various programs to advance the development 
of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastruc-
ture worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by— 
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 
improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 
procurement environments, and project preparation 
capacity of countries that are partners of the United 
States in such development; 
(2) providing transaction advisory services and 
project preparation assistance to support sustainable 
infrastructure; and 
(3) coordinating the provision of United States 
assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States 
manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-
vestment led by the private sector. 
(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 
‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ de-
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scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost 
the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten-
tial infrastructure projects, including through providing 
services such as— 
(1) legal services; 
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 
(3) debt sustainability analyses; 
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 
(5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high- 
quality infrastructure. 
(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastruc-
ture Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described 
under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the 
Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist-
ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and 
other infrastructure project support. 
(2) 
JOINT
INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS.— 
Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund should be used in coordination with the De-
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partment of Defense, the International Development 
Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, 
and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support 
joint infrastructure projects. 
(3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 
Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure 
Fund should be used to support strategic infrastruc-
ture projects that are in the national security inter-
est of the United States and vulnerable to strategic 
competitors. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 
2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Trans-
action and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 
should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund. 
SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-
ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory 
lending and financing by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, including support to companies incor-
porated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the 
energy sectors of developing countries. 
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(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States 
to— 
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted 
energy needs and capacities of developing countries, 
and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC 
state-owned industries and other companies incor-
porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing 
labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-
rect financing by the PRC government, PRC finan-
cial institutions, or direct state support to state- 
owned enterprises and other companies incorporated 
in the PRC; 
(2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power 
sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
oping countries; 
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, 
and other financial products on terms that advance 
domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage 
private sector growth, and, when appropriate United 
States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
ternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 
Chinese financial institutions; 
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(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
verage investment in advanced energy technologies 
in developing countries; and 
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the 
effects of energy engagement by the PRC through 
predatory lending or other actions that negatively 
impact other countries. 
(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
ergy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a United States Government strategy to increase 
United States exports of advanced energy technologies 
to— 
(1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
oping countries; 
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and 
transparent energy markets; 
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 
trading relationships; and 
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(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy. 
SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 
INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-
OPMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report that— 
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening 
United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
cordance with the economic and national security in-
terests of the United States and where deeper en-
ergy partnerships are most achievable; 
(2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov-
ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in 
the development, operation, financing, or ownership 
of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
structure, or energy resources in the countries iden-
tified in paragraph (1); 
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
implications for United States national interests and 
the interests of the countries identified in paragraph 
(1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and in-
fluence in developing country energy production or 
transmission; and 
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(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 
United States to partner with the countries identi-
fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
port shared interests between the United States and 
such countries. 
(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s 
website. 
SEC. 116. ENSURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE CORPORATION IS POSITIONED TO 
ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, 
AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.— 
(1) When establishing the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress 
sought to facilitate the participation of private sector 
capital and skills in the economic development of 
countries with low- or lower-middle-income econo-
mies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to 
market economies in order to complement United 
States assistance and foreign policy objectives. 
(2) The priority for such support has been and 
remains intended for less developed countries with a 
low-income economy or a lower-middle-income econ-
omy; however, using income as a discriminator for 
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which countries merit investment will not often cap-
ture other important factors, such as the wealth dis-
parity within a country, vulnerability to external 
shocks including from natural disasters, and United 
States foreign policy and national security concerns. 
For this reason, Congress has currently authorized 
DFC investment in less developed countries with an 
upper-middle-income economy where the President 
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
that such support furthers the national economic or 
foreign policy interests of the United States and 
such support is designed to produce significant de-
velopmental outcomes or provide developmental ben-
efits to the poorest population of that country. 
(3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexi-
bility in DFC directed assistance be made available 
to all countries, including those with so-called high- 
income economies such as the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other allies and 
partners exceeding the Gross National Income per 
Capita definition threshold for high-income country. 
Otherwise, previously eligible partner countries find 
themselves now ineligible. 
(4) The United States already provides a simi-
lar national security interest exception for high in-
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come countries under the European Energy Security 
and Diversification Act of 2019, which gives the 
DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia 
on energy and energy related investments regardless 
of the income status of the countries. 
(5) While continuing to prioritize DFC invest-
ment in low and lower-middle income countries, it is 
the sense of Congress that the DFC should support 
investments in certain projects in both upper-middle 
income and high-income countries that address key 
national security and economic interests. The DFC 
is authorized to and should support projects in any 
country regardless of income status when not doing 
so would damage the United States interest or those 
of its allies and partners vis-a`-vis its global strategic 
competitors. 
(b) AMENDMENT.—To address the objectives in para-
graph (1) above, section 1412 of Public Law 115–254 per-
taining to the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the text under 
section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection 
(c) and inserting the following: 
‘‘(c) SUPPORT
IN
UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME
AND 
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES/THE LESS DEVELOPED COUN-
TRY FOCUS.— 
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‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Corporation shall 
prioritize the provision of support under title II in 
less developed countries with a low-income economy 
or a lower-middle-income economy. 
‘‘(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND 
HIGH-INCOME
COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall 
restrict the provision of support under title II in 
countries with an upper-middle-income or high-in-
come economy unless— 
‘‘(A) the President certifies to the appro-
priate congressional committees that such sup-
port furthers the national economic, foreign pol-
icy, or development interests of the United 
States; and 
‘‘(B) such support is designed to produce 
significant developmental outcomes or provide 
developmental 
benefits 
to 
the 
poorest, 
marginalized, or equity-disadvantaged popu-
lation groups of that country.’’. 
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States played a leadership role 
in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms 
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governing the international economic order following 
the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic 
economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability. 
(2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic 
pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that cov-
ered 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 
11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following 
year, setting high-standard rules for regional eco-
nomic engagement. 
(3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, 
China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of 
GDP. 
(4) Reduced United States economic engage-
ment has led United States allies and partners to 
question the United States commitment to the Indo- 
Pacific region. Despite its distortive and unfair trade 
practices, the People’s Republic of China is taking 
advantage of this vacuum by deepening its partner-
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ships in the region and promoting its own state-led 
economic model. 
(5) The United States is increasingly on the 
outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in 
the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these 
agreements puts it at both a strategic and competi-
tive disadvantage in the region and allows competi-
tors to expand their economic influence at the 
United States expense. 
(6) Given that these partnerships and agree-
ments will define the rules and norms that will gov-
ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the 
United States is currently not well positioned to 
shape the coming economic landscape. 
(7) It is in the United States vital interest to 
upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to 
strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-
ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism. 
SEC. 122. REVIEW OF PRC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGE-
MENT GLOBALLY. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Represent-
ative and the Department of Commerce, shall submit a 
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report to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes the PRC’s global trade and investment diplo-
macy and engagement over the past decade, including any 
bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements 
it has signed, and their impact on the United States econ-
omy, American companies and workers, as well as on the 
countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC 
and the global economy as a whole. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall 
include the following: 
(1) A Survey and Comparison of China’s inter-
national economic practices, which will— 
(A) provide an overview of the PRC’s dis-
tortive trade policies; 
(B) list the PRC’s trade and investment 
agreements globally, both agreements it has 
signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia-
tions it has with individual countries or groups 
of countries; 
(C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC 
uses to advance its international economic ob-
jectives, including economic and commercial 
dialogues and BRI related activities; 
(D) compare the United States and Chi-
nese approaches and priorities on trade and in-
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SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that United States national interests and the pri-
macy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are inti-
mately tied to the following economic objectives: 
(1) Deepening United States trade and invest-
ment relationships in the region, especially with key 
allies and partners. 
(2) Confirming American leadership and par-
ticipation in global regional economic organizations 
and fora, including APEC and the WTO. 
(3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sec-
toral agreements on trade and investment, as well as 
negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States 
economic leadership by writing the rules of the road 
on critical economic questions. 
(4) Building secure and resilient supply chains 
for industries critical for United States national in-
terest, including semiconductors and vaccines and 
PPE. 
(5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a 
market-based economic model. 
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
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resentative and the Department of Commerce, shall sub-
mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
that presents the steps the United States is taking and 
plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in sub-
section (a) above and includes specific action plans for the 
following: 
(1) Enhancing American trade and investment 
relationships 
in 
the 
region 
bilaterally 
and 
plurilaterally, especially with American allies and 
ASEAN. 
(2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component 
of the region’s economic architecture. 
(3) Work to ensure that the United States ab-
sence from CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine 
the United States ability to shape regional trade and 
investment rules. 
(4) Working with allies and partners to build 
resilient and trusted supply chains especially for 
critical and emerging technologies, including semi-
conductors, and products and components critical 
for national health, including vaccines and related 
materials, and PPE. 
(5) Driving the formation and adoption of high- 
standards and rules for the region in the following 
areas: 
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(A) Advanced technologies and the digital 
sphere. 
(B) Labor practices and environmental 
standards. 
(C) Intellectual property rights. 
(6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the 
PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a 
specific focus on— 
(A) subsidies and unfair competition by 
state-owned enterprises; and 
(B) corruption and politicized infrastruc-
ture. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER 
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN APEC. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States has benefitted from the 
regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-
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cific Economic Cooperation forum since its inception 
in 1989; 
(2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 
21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted 
for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of 
global trade; 
(3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in 
trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en-
hanced access to global value chains, while raising 
the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sus-
tainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth; 
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage 
and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive 
regional economy that benefits United States work-
ers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates 
the United States economy with others in the region; 
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC 
in 2011, it was able to promote United States inter-
ests, while reassuring allies and partners about its 
strong commitment to the region in the economic 
arena; 
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum 
to make progress on several United States priorities, 
that are shared by United States allies and partners, 
including— 
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(A) making regional commerce more inclu-
sive; 
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; 
and 
(C) addressing climate change and environ-
mental protection; 
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous 
opportunity to leverage American leadership to 
shape the regional economic agenda; 
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United 
States to advance several of its own priorities in the 
region, including to— 
(A) expand the participation of APEC 
stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-
mental advocates, and other part of civil soci-
ety; 
(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and 
promote small and medium enterprises; 
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to 
upgrade skills for the next-generation of tech-
nology jobs; 
(D) advance a climate and sustainable 
trade and development agenda with a focus on 
green technologies, infrastructure and finance; 
and 
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(E) advance work on digital trade, includ-
ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro-
moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the 
free flow of data; and 
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United 
States should immediately announce its interest to 
host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-
tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-
port. 
SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 
ISSUES. 
(a) LEADERSHIP
IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States must lead in international bodies that set the gov-
ernance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled tech-
nologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate 
within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital do-
main. 
(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It 
is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with 
allies and partners, should lead an international effort 
that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at 
its disposal to combat the expanding use of information 
and communications technology products and services to 
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surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known 
as ‘‘digital authoritarianism’’). 
(c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish 
information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained 
as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 
mechanism for communication. 
(d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-
ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards 
for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such 
technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether 
they are governments or other entities, and that they do 
not threaten democratic governance or human rights. 
SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated our 
dependence on digital tools, international rules 
around digital governance and trade have remained 
largely piecemeal; 
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(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating 
under and advancing a set of digital rules that are 
contrary to United States values and interests, and 
those of United States allies and partners; 
(3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and 
bilateral digital trade agreements, including the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Singapore- 
Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singa-
pore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partner-
ship Agreement have emerged, creating a set of 
rules that the United States should be driving; 
(4) the United States has already underscored 
the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.- 
Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 
and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce 
chapter in the USMCA; 
(5) a regional deal on digital governance and 
trade would allow the United States to unite a group 
of like-minded economies around common standards 
and norms, including the principles of openness, in-
clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow 
of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the 
global economy; 
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(6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-
ation of common rules and standards that govern 
cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, 
and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital 
vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-
tutions around the world; 
(7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-
ticipation of SMEs in the global economy through 
trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e- 
invoicing and e-payment; and 
(8) the United States Trade Representative, in 
consultation with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplo-
macy at the Department of State should negotiate 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrange-
ments relating to digital trade with the like-minded 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European 
Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes intel-
ligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and al-
lies, as appropriate. 
SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY
AND CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish 
a program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and 
Cybersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries— 
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(1) expand and increase secure Internet access 
and digital infrastructure in emerging markets; 
(2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that 
foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, 
and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi- 
stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro- 
competitive and secure information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) policies and regulations; 
(3) promote exports of United States ICT 
goods and services and increase United States com-
pany market share in target markets; 
(4) promote the diversification of ICT goods 
and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC 
imports; and 
(5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
operability, and promote best practices for a national 
approach to cybersecurity. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development shall jointly submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementa-
tion plan for the coming three years to advance the goals 
identified in subsection (a). 
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(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan 
required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and 
USAID Administrator shall consult with— 
(1) the appropriate congressional committees; 
(2) leaders of the United States industry; 
(3) other relevant technology experts, including 
the Open Technology Fund; 
(4) representatives from relevant United States 
Government agencies; and 
(5) representatives from like-minded allies and 
partners. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section. 
Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a 
system of state-owned financial institutions including 
retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and 
insurers which are given favorable treatment under 
Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have 
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strict restrictions on their ability to operate in 
China. 
(2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire 
Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state- 
owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public 
offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by 
Chinese regulators. 
(3) In order to join the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese Government com-
mitted to opening the credit card payment business 
to foreign firms by 2006. 
(4) After years of China refusing to open its 
payment market, the United States brought a case 
against China before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO 
mandated China to open its card payment market to 
global competitors. 
(5) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov-
ernment refused to comply with the ruling and 
maintained a rule that required all yuan-denomi-
nated payment cards to utilize China’s Union Pay 
network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment 
market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Gov-
ernment approve the application of foreign firms to 
enter the market. 
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(6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive 
capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese mar-
ket to foreign investors while hamstringing its own 
citizens ability to control their money. 
(7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping announced that China would launch a 
technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 
2019. 
(8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use 
a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world’s 
first central bank backed digital currency, and the 
People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Mone-
tary Authority have already begun testing the cross- 
border functionality of the digital currency. 
SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-
CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the 
United States and the American people by allowing 
the United States to maintain economic independ-
ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance 
government outlays; 
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(2) American global leadership has benefited 
from the United States monetary stability, credit-
worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
nology innovations; 
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of 
American national security rely on the United States 
role as the global financial leader, hub of global 
trade, and source of economic opportunity; 
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of 
a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing 
forward a Central Bank digital currency, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is attempting to become the 
leading hub of finance in the world; and 
(5) the United States must maintain its posi-
tion as a global financial leader to continue its 
broader global leadership role around the world. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall sub-
mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
that— 
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American 
foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-
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nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the 
world’s global reserve currency; 
(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s 
Republic of China that could cement China’s role as 
the world’s leading financial center; 
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American 
national security and foreign policy were the yuan to 
supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve 
currency; 
(4) outlines how the United States can work 
diplomatically with allies, partners, and other na-
tions to preserve a financial system that is free, 
open, and fair; and 
(5) identifies steps the United States can take 
to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial 
center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob-
al reserve currency. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House of Representatives; 
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(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and 
(4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate. 
SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED 
STATES CAPITAL MARKETS. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro-
priate congressional committees that describes the 
costs and benefits to the United States posed by the 
presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that 
are listed on American stock exchanges or traded 
over the counter in the form of American depository 
receipts. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
shall— 
(A) identify companies incorporated in the 
PRC that— 
(i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
eral stock exchanges within the United 
States, including over-the-counter market 
and ‘‘A Shares’’ added to indexes and ex-
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change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
changes in the PRC; and 
(ii) based on the factors for consider-
ation described in paragraph (3), have 
knowingly and materially contributed to— 
(I) 
activities 
that 
undermine 
United States national security; 
(II) serious abuses of internation-
ally recognized human rights; or 
(III) a substantially increased fi-
nancial risk exposure for United 
States-based investors; 
(B) describe the activities of the companies 
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 
their implications for the United States; and 
(C) develop policy recommendations for the 
United States Government, State governments, 
United States financial institutions, United 
States equity and debt exchanges, and other 
relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed 
by the presence in United States capital mar-
kets of the companies identified pursuant to 
subparagraph (A). 
(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.— 
In completing the report under paragraph (1), the 
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President shall consider whether a company identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)— 
(A) has materially contributed to the devel-
opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated 
procurement by the PLA, of lethal military 
equipment or component parts of such equip-
ment; 
(B) has contributed to the construction 
and militarization of features in the South 
China Sea; 
(C) has been sanctioned by the United 
States or has been determined to have con-
ducted business with sanctioned entities; 
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of 
acts of intellectual property theft; 
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic 
espionage; 
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of 
nuclear or missile technology in violation of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions or 
United States sanctions; 
(G) has contributed to the repression of re-
ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, 
including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
gion or Tibet Autonomous Region; 
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(H) has contributed to the development of 
technologies that enable censorship directed or 
directly supported by the Government of the 
PRC; and 
(I) has contributed to other activities or 
behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
dent. 
(4) FACTORS
FOR
MAKING
POLICY
REC-
OMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under 
paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the na-
tional security implications considering the following 
factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)— 
(A) 
the 
possibility 
that 
banning 
or 
delisting companies from our markets could 
lead to an outflow of companies to list in the 
PRC; 
(B) 
the 
possibility 
that 
banning 
or 
delisting companies from our markets could im-
pact United States leadership in the asset man-
agement industry, particularly vis-a`-vis the 
PRC; 
(C) the possibility that banning or delisting 
companies from our markets could impact the 
impact the United States status as the world’s 
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leading capital markets center, particularly vis- 
a`-vis the PRC; and 
(D) the impact on American foreign policy 
and national security if United States leader-
ship in capital markets was weakened vis-a`-vis 
the PRC. 
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 
report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to 
the public online through relevant United States Govern-
ment websites. 
SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI-
CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER 
PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS-
TEMS. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro-
priate congressional committees on the diplomatic 
and economic implications of cross-border payment 
systems. 
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(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
shall— 
(A) assess the extent to which American 
diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the 
current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of 
cross-border payment and financial messaging 
systems; 
(B) examine the durability of the Society 
for 
Worldwide 
Interbank 
Financial 
Tele-
communication cooperative; 
(C) review and analyze ways in which the 
Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems 
(CIPS), cryptocurrencies, and central bank dig-
ital currencies could erode this system; and 
(D) analyze how changes to global cross- 
border payment systems could undermine 
United States national security interests includ-
ing impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the 
countering of terrorist finance, and the enforce-
ment of anti-money laundering provisions. 
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 
report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to 
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the public online through relevant United States Govern-
ment websites. 
TITLE II—INVESTING IN 
ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Subtitle A—Strategic and 
Diplomatic Matters 
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT 
FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-
CIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the 
Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to 
the United States and are among the Nation’s most 
precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-
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vance its vital national interests, defend its territory, 
expand its economy through international trade and 
commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies 
while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent 
the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur-
rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power 
or powers, and deter potential aggressors; 
(2) the Governments of the United States, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing 
a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and 
tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have 
collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared in-
terest in areas such as defense and security, eco-
nomic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and 
fundamental freedoms; 
(3) the United States greatly values other part-
nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 
India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, 
and Vietnam as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-
eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), 
which are essential to further shared interests; 
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(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 
demands consistent United States and allied com-
mitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so 
that they are postured to meet these challenges, and 
will require sustained political will, concrete partner-
ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-
rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-
ments, high-level and extensive consultations on 
matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
ercion; 
(5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance 
shared interests; 
(6) the United States must work with allies to 
prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region; 
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by 
the Expert Group of the International Military 
Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled 
‘‘Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ 
noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions 
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most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 
and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary Gen-
eral of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat 
multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing hu-
manitarian response costs and impacting security 
throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing pat-
terns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow 
stronger and more frequent; 
(8) the United State should continue to engage 
on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners 
of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-
lic Law 115–409), in the areas of— 
(A) forecasting environmental challenges; 
(B) assisting with transnational coopera-
tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity 
and access to safe drinking water; 
(C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
tion; and 
(D) meeting environmental challenges and 
developing resilience; 
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of 
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the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pa-
cific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy fo-
cusing on internal and external actions needed— 
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, 
risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related 
impacts on strategic interests of the United 
States and partners and allies of the United 
States in the region; and 
(B) to address humanitarian and food se-
curity impacts of weather-related changes in the 
region; and 
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-
nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional 
architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States— 
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
rity cooperation between and among the United 
States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, as appropriate, including 
through diplomatic engagement, regional develop-
ment, energy security and development, scientific 
and health partnerships, educational and cultural ex-
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changes, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic 
and defense-related initiatives; 
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral 
and bilateral treaty obligations, including— 
(A) defending Japan consistent with the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-
tween the United States of America and Japan, 
done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all 
related and subsequent bilateral security agree-
ments and arrangements concluded on or before 
the date of enactment of this Act; 
(B) defending the Republic of Korea con-
sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
tween the United States and the Republic of 
Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, 
and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
agreements and arrangements concluded on or 
before the date of enactment of this Act; 
(C) defending the Philippines consistent 
with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
Between the United States and the Republic of 
the Philippines, done at Washington, August 
30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilat-
eral security agreements and arrangements con-
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cluded on or before the date of enactment of 
this Act; 
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma-
nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 
1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk 
communique of 1962, and all related and subse-
quent bilateral security agreements and ar-
rangements concluded on or before the date of 
enactment of this Act; and 
(E) defending Australia consistent with the 
Security Treaty Between Australia and the 
United States of America, done at San Fran-
cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and 
subsequent bilateral security agreements and 
arrangements concluded on or before the date 
of enactment of this Act; 
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States 
bilateral and regional partnerships, including with 
India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand; 
(4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to 
promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and 
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(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and India. 
SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should 
continue to strengthen its cooperation with Aus-
tralia, India, and Japan, (through the Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to enhance and imple-
ment a shared vision to meet regional challenges and 
to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and 
healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for 
democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven 
economic growth, and is free from undue influence 
and coercion; 
(2) the United States should expand dialogue 
and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 
democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to 
uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-
cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific; 
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(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 
leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to 
the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in-
cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
cine production and equitable access, and to address 
shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical 
technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure 
investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-
aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad-
vances the important cooperation among Quad na-
tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 
(4) building upon their announced commitment 
to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vac-
cines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific 
region, the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, the Japan International Co-
operation Agency, and the Japan Bank for Inter-
national Cooperation, including through partnerships 
other multilateral development banks, should also 
venture to finance development and infrastructure 
projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competi-
tive, transparent, and sustainable; 
(5) the United States should participate in the 
Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar 
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initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, 
economic, and national security sectors to the 
United States, its Quad partners, and other like- 
minded countries; and 
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group could— 
(A) sustain and deepen engagement be-
tween senior officials of the Quad countries on 
a full spectrum of issues; and 
(B) be modeled on the successful and long- 
standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 
between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as other for-
mal and informal parliamentary exchanges. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall develop and submit a com-
prehensive strategy for bolstering engagement and 
cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to 
the appropriate congressional committees laying out 
the strategy. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 
required by subsection (a) shall include the fol-
lowing: 
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(A) A description of how the United States 
intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-
ment with India, Japan, and Australia on 
shared interests and common challenges. 
(B) A summary of— 
(i) current and past Quad initiatives 
across the whole of the United States Gov-
ernment, including to promote broad based 
and inclusive economic growth, trade, in-
vestment, and to advance technology co-
operation, energy innovation, climate miti-
gation and adaptation, physical and digital 
infrastructure development, education, dis-
aster management, and global health secu-
rity; 
(ii) proposals shared among Quad na-
tions to deepen existing security coopera-
tion, intelligence sharing, economic part-
nerships, and multilateral coordination; 
and 
(iii) initiatives and agreements under-
taken jointly with Quad nations plus other 
like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on 
areas of shared interest. 
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(C) A description of efforts to jointly— 
(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co-
operation to prepare for the next pandemic 
by focusing on medium-term vaccine and 
medical supply production and building a 
broader dialogue on global public health; 
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 
regional economic engagement and integra-
tion, and strengthen regional rules and 
standards around trade and investment; 
(iii) strengthen climate actions on 
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-
nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-
nance; 
(iv) facilitate the development of qual-
ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific 
through joint financing, investment, tech-
nical assistance, and standards setting; 
(v) enhance joint maritime security 
and maritime domain awareness initiatives 
to protecting the maritime commons and 
supporting international law and freedom 
of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and 
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(vi) develop international technology 
standards and share or co-develop new in-
novative technologies of the future. 
SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-
TARY WORKING GROUP. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the govern-
ments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the 
United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of 
reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra- 
Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting 
on the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups de-
scribed in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer coopera-
tion on shared interests and values. 
(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern-
ments of the Quad countries enter into a written 
agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be 
established a United States Group, which shall rep-
resent the United States at the Quad Intra-Par-
liamentary Working Group. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.— 
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(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 
Members of Congress. 
(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of 
Congress appointed to the United States Group 
under subparagraph (A)— 
(i) half shall be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
from among Members of the House, not 
less than 4 of whom shall be members of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and 
(ii) half shall be appointed by the 
President pro tempore of the Senate, based 
on recommendations of the majority leader 
and minority leader of the Senate, from 
among Members of the Senate, not less 
than 4 of whom shall be members of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations (unless 
the majority leader and minority leader de-
termine otherwise). 
(3) MEETINGS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall seek to meet not less frequently 
than annually with representatives and appro-
priate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Aus-
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tralia, and India, and any other country invited 
by mutual agreement of the Quad countries. 
(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in 
subparagraph (A) may be held— 
(i) in the United States; 
(ii) in another Quad country during 
periods when Congress is not in session; or 
(iii) virtually. 
(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.— 
(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of 
the House of Representatives shall designate 
the chairperson or vice chairperson of the dele-
gation of the United States Group from the 
House from among members of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. 
(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President 
pro tempore of the Senate shall designate the 
chairperson or vice chairperson of the delega-
tion of the United States Group from the Sen-
ate from among members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. 
(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to 
be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 
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2022 through 2025 for the United States 
Group. 
(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year 
for which an appropriation is made for the 
United States Group, half of the amount 
appropriated shall be available to the dele-
gation from the House of Representatives 
and half of the amount shall be available 
to the delegation from the Senate. 
(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The 
amounts available to the delegations of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate 
under clause (i) shall be disbursed on 
vouchers to be approved by the chairperson 
of the delegation from the House of Rep-
resentatives and the chairperson of the del-
egation from the Senate, respectively. 
(6) PRIVATE
SOURCES.—The United States 
Group may accept gifts or donations of services or 
property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 
the Senate. 
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(7) CERTIFICATION
OF
EXPENDITURES.—The 
certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from 
the House of Representatives or the delegation of 
the Senate of the United States Group shall be final 
and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the 
auditing of the accounts of the United States Group. 
(8) ANNUAL
REPORT.—The United States 
Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is 
made for the United States Group, which shall in-
clude a description of its expenditures under such 
appropriation. 
SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 
ASEAN. 
It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond 
to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in 
building capacity to prepare for and respond to 
pandemics and other public health challenges; 
(2) support high-level United States participa-
tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year; 
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(3) reaffirm the importance of United States- 
ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and 
support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) 
goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable 
long-term economic growth and cooperation with the 
United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster 
management, food security, human rights, and trade 
facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun-
tries; 
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN 
community, as well as to foster greater integration 
and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and 
security partners, including Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India; 
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic 
initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, 
which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and 
the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in 
the region; 
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
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matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and 
international arbitration mechanisms, consistent 
with international law, including through the adop-
tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea 
that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
motes peace and stability in the region; 
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime 
and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, 
including the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China— 
(A) to cease any current activities, and 
avoid undertaking any actions in the future, 
that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
timidation, or military force; 
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, 
and other features, and refrain from new ef-
forts to militarize, including the construction of 
new garrisons and facilities and the relocation 
of additional military personnel, material, or 
equipment; 
(C) to oppose actions by any country that 
prevent other countries from exercising their 
sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
sive economic zones and continental shelves by 
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enforcing claims to those areas in the South 
China Sea that lack support in international 
law; and 
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
ministrative and military districts in contested 
areas in the South China Sea; 
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
tions that cause permanent physical damage to the 
marine environment and support the efforts of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 
region; 
(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 
common approach to encourage China and the Phil-
ippines to comply with the decision of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of 
the Republic of the Philippines in the case against 
the People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime 
claims; 
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United 
States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt 
human smuggling and trafficking in persons and 
urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional 
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mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
refugees and migrants; 
(11) support the Mekong-United States Part-
nership; 
(12) support newly created initiatives with 
ASEAN countries, including the United States- 
ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Pol-
icy Implementation Project, the United States- 
ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States- 
ASEAN Health Futures; 
(13) encourage the President to communicate 
to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the 
rule of law and open and transparent government, 
strengthening civil society, and protecting human 
rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing 
politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary 
killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom 
of speech and expression; 
(14) support efforts by organizations in 
ASEAN that address corruption in the public and 
private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
force bribery criminalization in the private sector, 
and build beneficial ownership transparency through 
the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered 
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with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
tion (SEA-PAC); 
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people 
partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
ership training to a new generation that will create 
and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and 
partnerships, and rise to address the regional and 
global challenges of the future; 
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar 
to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for 
other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to- 
people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society 
leaders; 
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments 
that have fully upheld and implemented all United 
Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
national agreements with respect to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN 
governments to do the same; and 
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the 
United States Government to articulate and imple-
ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports 
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ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and prob-
lem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific 
community. 
SEC. 206. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-
ARDS-SETTING BODIES. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G 
Act of 2021’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States and its allies and part-
ners should maintain participation and leadership at 
international standards-setting bodies for 5th and 
future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
tems and infrastructure; 
(2) the United States should work with its allies 
and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th 
and future generation mobile telecommunications 
systems and infrastructure; and 
(3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between 
the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
tional security interest of the United States. 
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(c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP 
OF UNITED STATES
AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS- 
SETTING BODIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 
(A) establish an interagency working group 
to provide assistance and technical expertise to 
enhance the representation and leadership of 
the United States at international bodies that 
set standards for equipment, systems, software, 
and virtually defined networks that support 5th 
and future generation mobile telecommuni-
cations systems and infrastructure, such as the 
International Telecommunication Union and the 
3rd Generation Partnership Project; and 
(B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
vate sector to increase productive engagement. 
(2) 
INTERAGENCY
WORKING
GROUP.—The 
interagency working group described in paragraph 
(1)— 
(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of 
State or a designee of the Secretary of State; 
and 
(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) 
of each Federal department or agency the 
President determines appropriate. 
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(3) BRIEFINGS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided 
under subparagraph (B), the interagency work-
ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro-
vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional 
committees that addresses— 
(i) promotion of United States leader-
ship at international standards-setting bod-
ies for equipment, systems, software, and 
virtually defined networks relevant to 5th 
and future generation mobile telecommuni-
cations systems and infrastructure, taking 
into account the different processes fol-
lowed by the various international stand-
ard-setting bodies; 
(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies 
and partners to share security risk infor-
mation and findings pertaining to equip-
ment that supports or is used in 5th and 
future generation mobile telecommuni-
cations systems and infrastructure and co-
operation on mitigating such risks; 
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(iii) China’s presence and activities at 
international standards-setting bodies rel-
evant to 5th and future generation mobile 
telecommunications systems and infra-
structure, including information on the dif-
ferences in the scope and scale of China’s 
engagement at such bodies compared to 
engagement by the United States or its al-
lies and partners and the security risks 
raised by Chinese proposals in such stand-
ards-setting bodies; and 
(iv) engagement with private sector 
communications and information service 
providers, equipment developers, academia, 
federally funded research and development 
centers, and other private-sector stake-
holders to propose and develop secure 
standards for equipment, systems, soft-
ware, and virtually defined networks that 
support 5th and future generation mobile 
telecommunications systems and infra-
structure. 
(B) SUBSEQUENT
BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
ceiving a request from the appropriate congres-
sional committees, or as determined appropriate 
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by the chair of the interagency working group 
established pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
interagency working group shall provide such 
committees an updated briefing that covers the 
matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of 
subparagraph (A). 
SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 
AND G20 COUNTRIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the President, acting through the Secretary of State, 
should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on 
matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, in-
cluding the following: 
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
ment. 
(2) Building support for international infra-
structure standards, including those agreed to at the 
G20 summit in Osaka in 2018. 
(3) The erosion of democracy and human 
rights. 
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications. 
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
nies, and other policies and practices. 
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(6) Predatory international sovereign lending 
that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris 
Club principles. 
(7) International influence campaigns. 
(8) Environmental standards. 
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
ners that are not in the G7 and G20. 
SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-
NERSHIP. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to support the close economic, political, and 
security relationship between Taiwan and the United 
States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 
approach to the United States Indo-Pacific; 
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its 
democracy a vital national security interest of the 
United States; 
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov-
ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with 
the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the 
three joint communiques, and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’; 
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(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 
asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 
identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept; 
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense 
spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
egy; 
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop 
and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti- 
ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad-
vanced command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 
and resilient command and control capabilities, into 
its military forces; 
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in international organiza-
tions, including the World Health Assembly, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization, and other 
international bodies as appropriate; 
(8) to advocate for information sharing with 
Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer; 
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(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among 
the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 
partners; 
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
tially through new agreements or resumption of 
talks under the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement; 
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
ance of a bilateral free trade agreement; 
(12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
logical cooperation, including improving supply chain 
security; 
(13) to support United States educational and 
exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
tory, and politics in Taiwan; and 
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
tween the United States and Taiwan. 
(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL 
AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES- 
TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The 
Secretary of State should consider establishing an 
independent nonprofit that— 
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(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between 
the future leaders of Taiwan and the United 
States; and 
(B) works with State and local school dis-
tricts and educational institutions to send high 
school and university students to Taiwan to 
study the Chinese language, culture, history, 
politics, and other relevant subjects. 
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 
and educational institutions, including public univer-
sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the 
United States to establish programs to promote an 
increase in educational and cultural exchanges. 
SEC. 209. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 
(b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.— 
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 
96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United 
States policy ‘‘to preserve and promote exten-
sive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, 
and other relations between the people of the 
United States and the people on Taiwan, as 
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well as the people on the China mainland and 
all other peoples of the Western Pacific area’’. 
(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), 
the United States has grown its strategic part-
nership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 
23,000,000 people. 
(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the 
People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 
from its diplomatic partners and from inter-
national organizations, including the World 
Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a 
global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic 
response, including by donating more than 
2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical 
equipment to the United States. 
(D) The creation of a United States fellow-
ship program with Taiwan would support— 
(i) a key priority of expanding people- 
to-people exchanges, which was outlined in 
President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na-
tional Security Strategy; 
(ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com-
mitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy 
and a critical economic and security part-
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ner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 In-
terim National Security Strategic Guid-
ance; and 
(iii) April 2021 guidance from the De-
partment of State based on a review re-
quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 
2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF 
of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage 
U.S. government engagement with Taiwan 
that reflects our deepening unofficial rela-
tionship’’. 
(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act 
are— 
(A) to further strengthen the United 
States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broad-
en understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by 
temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the 
United States Government to Taiwan for inten-
sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 
as Fellows with the governing authorities on 
Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution; 
(B) to expand United States Government 
expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills 
and understanding of the politics, history, and 
culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region 
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by providing eligible United States personnel 
the opportunity to acquire such skills and un-
derstanding through the Taiwan Fellowship 
Program established under subsection (c); and 
(C) to better position the United States to 
advance its economic, security, and human 
rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
(c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.— 
(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(A) AGENCY
HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency 
head’’ means, in the case of the executive 
branch of United States Government, or in the 
case of a legislative branch agency specified in 
subparagraph (B), the head of the respective 
agency. 
(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United 
States Government’’ includes the Government 
Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Congressional Research Service, and 
the United States-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission of the legislative branch, as 
well as any agency of the executive branch. 
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(C) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COM-
MITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(i) the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate; 
(ii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate; 
(iii) the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives; 
(iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives; and 
(v) the Committee on Armed Services 
of the House of Representatives. 
(D) 
DETAILEE.—The 
term 
‘‘detailee’’ 
means an employee of an agency of the United 
States Government on loan to the American In-
stitute in Taiwan, without a change of position 
from the agency at which such employee is em-
ployed. 
(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term 
‘‘implementing partner’’ means any United 
States 
organization 
described 
in 
section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of 
such Code that— 
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(i) is selected through a competitive 
process; 
(ii) performs logistical, administrative, 
and other functions, as determined by the 
Department of State and the American In-
stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Tai-
wan Fellowship Program; and 
(iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
ment with the American Institute in Tai-
wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship 
Program. 
(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP 
PROGRAM.— 
(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of 
State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship 
Program’’ (hereafter referred to in this section 
as the ‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship op-
portunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligi-
ble United States citizens through the coopera-
tive agreement established in subparagraph (B). 
The Department of State, in consultation with 
the American Institute in Taiwan and the im-
plementing partner, may modify the name of 
the Program. 
(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.— 
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(i) IN GENERAL.—The American In-
stitute in Taiwan shall use amounts au-
thorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual 
or multi-year cooperative agreement with 
an appropriate implementing partner. 
(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department 
of State, in consultation with the American 
Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, 
the implementing partner, shall award to 
eligible United States citizens, subject to 
available funding— 
(I) not fewer than five fellow-
ships during the first two years of the 
Program; and 
(II) not fewer than ten fellow-
ships during each of the remaining 
years of the Program. 
(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE-
MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation 
with the Department of State, shall— 
(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Of-
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100 
fice, or with another appropriate entity, for 
the purpose of entering into an agreement 
to facilitate the placement of fellows in an 
agency of the governing authorities on Tai-
wan; and 
(ii) begin the process of selecting an 
implementing partner, which— 
(I) shall agree to meet all of the 
legal requirements required to operate 
in Taiwan; and 
(II) shall be composed of staff 
who demonstrate significant experi-
ence managing exchange programs in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(D) CURRICULUM.— 
(i) FIRST
YEAR.—During the first 
year of each fellowship under this sub-
section, each fellow should study— 
(I) the Mandarin Chinese lan-
guage; 
(II) the people, history, and polit-
ical climate on Taiwan; and 
(III) the issues affecting the rela-
tionship between the United States 
and the Indo-Pacific region. 
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101 
(ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the sec-
ond year of each fellowship under this sec-
tion, each fellow, subject to the approval of 
the Department of State, the American In-
stitute in Taiwan, and the implementing 
partner, and in accordance with the pur-
poses of this Act, shall work in— 
(I) a parliamentary office, min-
istry, or other agency of the governing 
authorities on Taiwan; or 
(II) an organization outside of 
the governing authorities on Taiwan, 
whose interests are associated with 
the interests of the fellow and the 
agency of the United States Govern-
ment from which the fellow had been 
employed. 
(E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.— 
Notwithstanding any requirement under this 
section, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
appropriate, the implementing partner, may 
award fellowships that have a duration of be-
tween nine months and two years, and may 
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102 
alter the curriculum requirements under sub-
paragraph (D) for such purposes. 
(F) SUNSET.—The Program shall termi-
nate ten years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) 
ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS.—A 
United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship 
under this section if he or she— 
(i) is an employee of the United 
States Government; 
(ii) has received at least one exem-
plary performance review in his or her cur-
rent United States Government role within 
at least the last three years prior to the be-
ginning the fellowship; 
(iii) has at least two years of experi-
ence in any branch of the United States 
Government; 
(iv) has a demonstrated professional 
or educational background in the relation-
ship between the United States and coun-
tries in the Indo-Pacific region; and 
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103 
(v) has demonstrated his or her com-
mitment to further service in the United 
States Government. 
(B) RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
FELLOWS.— 
Each recipient of a fellowship under this section 
shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship— 
(i) to maintain satisfactory progress 
in language training and appropriate be-
havior in Taiwan, as determined by the 
Department of State, the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its im-
plementing partner; 
(ii) to refrain from engaging in any 
intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment; and 
(iii) to continue Federal Government 
employment for a period of not less than 
four years after the conclusion of the fel-
lowship or for not less than two years for 
a fellowship that is one year or shorter. 
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING 
PARTNER.— 
(i) SELECTION
OF
FELLOWS.—The 
implementing partner, in close coordination 
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104 
with the Department of State and the 
American Institute in Taiwan, shall— 
(I) make efforts to recruit fellow-
ship candidates who reflect the diver-
sity of the United States; 
(II) select fellows for the Pro-
gram based solely on merit, with ap-
propriate supervision from the De-
partment of State and the American 
Institute in Taiwan; and 
(III) prioritize the selection of 
candidates willing to serve a fellow-
ship lasting one year or longer. 
(ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing 
partner should provide each fellow in the 
first year (or shorter duration, as jointly 
determined by the Department of State 
and the American Institute in Taiwan for 
those who are not serving a two-year fel-
lowship) with— 
(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 
language training; and 
(II) courses in the politic, cul-
ture, and history of Taiwan, China, 
and the broader Indo-Pacific. 
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105 
(iii) WAIVER
OF
REQUIRED
TRAIN-
ING.—The Department of State, in coordi-
nation with the American Institute in Tai-
wan and, as appropriate, the implementing 
partner, may waive any of the training re-
quired under clause (ii) to the extent that 
a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language 
skills, knowledge of the topic described in 
clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons 
approved by the Department of State and 
the American Institute in Taiwan. If any 
of the training requirements are waived for 
a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the 
training portion of his or her fellowship 
may be shortened to the extent appro-
priate. 
(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
menting partner, in consultation with the 
Department of State and the American In-
stitute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office 
and at least one full-time staff member in 
Taiwan— 
(I) to liaise with the American 
Institute in Taiwan and the governing 
authorities on Taiwan; and 
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106 
(II) to serve as the primary in- 
country point of contact for the recipi-
ents of fellowships under this section 
and their dependents. 
(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
menting partner should perform other 
functions in association in support of the 
Program, including logistical and adminis-
trative functions, as prescribed by the De-
partment of State and the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan. 
(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.— 
(i) IN
GENERAL.—Any fellow who 
fails to comply with the requirements 
under this section shall reimburse the 
American Institute in Taiwan for— 
(I) the Federal funds expended 
for the fellow’s participation in the 
fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) 
and (iii); and 
(II) interest accrued on such 
funds (calculated at the prevailing 
rate). 
(ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub-
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107 
paragraph (B) shall reimburse the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
(I) all of the Federal funds ex-
pended for the fellow’s participation 
in the fellowship; and 
(II) interest on the amount speci-
fied in subclause (I), which shall be 
calculated at the prevailing rate. 
(iii) PRO
RATA
REIMBURSEMENT.— 
Any fellow who violates subparagraph 
(B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the 
difference between— 
(I) the amount specified in clause 
(ii); and 
(II) the product of— 
(aa) the amount the fellow 
received in compensation during 
the final year of the fellowship, 
including the value of any allow-
ances and benefits received by 
the fellow; multiplied by 
(bb) the percentage of the 
period specified in subparagraph 
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108 
(B)(iii) during which the fellow 
did not remain employed by the 
United States Government. 
(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 
days after the selection of the first class of fel-
lows under this Act, and annually thereafter for 
10 years, the Department of State shall offer to 
brief the appropriate congressional committees 
regarding the following issues: 
(i) An assessment of the performance 
of the implementing partner in fulfilling 
the purposes of this section. 
(ii) The number of applicants each 
year, the number of applicants willing to 
serve a fellowship lasting one year or 
longer, and the number of such applicants 
selected for the fellowship. 
(iii) The names and sponsoring agen-
cies of the fellows selected by the imple-
menting partner and the extent to which 
such fellows represent the diversity of the 
United States. 
(iv) The names of the parliamentary 
offices, ministries, other agencies of the 
governing authorities on Taiwan, and non-
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109 
governmental institutions to which each 
fellow was assigned. 
(v) Any recommendations, as appro-
priate, to improve the implementation of 
the Program, including added flexibilities 
in the administration of the program. 
(vi) An assessment of the Program’s 
value upon the relationship between the 
United States and Taiwan or the United 
States and Asian countries. 
(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.— 
(i) 
IN
GENERAL.—The 
financial 
records of any implementing partner shall 
be audited annually in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards by 
independent certified public accountants or 
independent licensed public accountants 
who are certified or licensed by a regu-
latory authority of a State or another po-
litical subdivision of the United States. 
(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under 
clause (i) shall be conducted at the place 
or places where the financial records of the 
implementing partner are normally kept. 
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110 
(iii) ACCESS
TO
DOCUMENTS.—The 
implementing partner shall make available 
to the accountants conducting an audit 
under clause (i)— 
(I) all books, financial records, 
files, other papers, things, and prop-
erty belonging to, or in use by, the 
implementing partner that are nec-
essary to facilitate the audit; and 
(II) full facilities for verifying 
transactions with the balances or se-
curities held by depositories, fiscal 
agents, and custodians. 
(iv) REPORT.— 
(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 
six months after the end of each fiscal 
year, the implementing partner shall 
provide a report of the audit con-
ducted for such fiscal year under 
clause (i) to the Department of State 
and the American Institute in Taiwan. 
(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re-
port shall— 
(aa) set forth the scope of 
the audit; 
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111 
(bb) 
include 
such 
state-
ments, along with the auditor’s 
opinion of those statements, as 
may be necessary to present fair-
ly the implementing partner’s as-
sets and liabilities, surplus or 
deficit, with reasonable detail; 
(cc) include a statement of 
the implementing partner’s in-
come and expenses during the 
year; and 
(dd) include a schedule of— 
(AA) all contracts and 
cooperative agreements re-
quiring 
payments 
greater 
than $5,000; and 
(BB) any payments of 
compensation, salaries, or 
fees at a rate greater than 
$5,000 per year. 
(III) COPIES.—Each audit report 
shall be produced in sufficient copies 
for distribution to the public. 
(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOV-
ERNMENT SERVICE.— 
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112 
(A) IN GENERAL.— 
(i) DETAIL
AUTHORIZED.—With the 
approval of the Secretary of State, an 
agency head may detail, for a period of not 
more than two years, an employee of the 
agency of the United States Government 
who has been awarded a fellowship under 
this Act, to the American Institute in Tai-
wan for the purpose of assignment to the 
governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-
ganization 
described 
in 
paragraph 
(2)(D)(ii)(II). 
(ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall 
enter into a written agreement with the 
Federal Government before receiving a fel-
lowship, in which the fellow shall agree— 
(I) to continue in the service of 
the sponsoring agency at the end of 
fellowship for a period of at least four 
years (or at least two years if the fel-
lowship duration is one year or short-
er) unless such detailee is involun-
tarily separated from the service of 
such agency; and 
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(II) to pay to the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan any additional ex-
penses incurred by the United States 
Government in connection with the 
fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 
separates from service with the spon-
soring agency before the end of the 
period for which the detailee has 
agreed to continue in the service of 
such agency. 
(iii) 
EXCEPTION.—The 
payment 
agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be 
required of a detailee who leaves the serv-
ice of the sponsoring agency to enter into 
the service of another agency of the United 
States Government unless the head of the 
sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
fore the effective date of entry into the 
service of the other agency that payment 
will be required under this subsection. 
(B) 
STATUS
AS
GOVERNMENT
EM-
PLOYEE.—A detailee— 
(i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
serving allowances, privileges, rights, se-
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niority, and other benefits, to be an em-
ployee of the sponsoring agency; 
(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 
benefits from funds available to such agen-
cy, which is deemed to comply with section 
5536 of title 5, United States Code; and 
(iii) may be assigned to a position 
with an entity described in paragraph 
(2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position 
does not involve— 
(I) the taking of an oath of alle-
giance to another government; or 
(II) the acceptance of compensa-
tion or other benefits from any foreign 
government by such detailee. 
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
SPONSORING 
AGENCY.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the 
United States Government from which a 
detailee is detailed should provide the fel-
low allowances and benefits that are con-
sistent with Department of State Stand-
ardized Regulations or other applicable 
rules and regulations, including— 
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(I) a living quarters allowance to 
cover the cost of housing in Taiwan; 
(II) a cost of living allowance to 
cover any possible higher costs of liv-
ing in Taiwan; 
(III) a temporary quarters sub-
sistence allowance for up to seven 
days if the fellow is unable to find 
housing immediately upon arriving in 
Taiwan; 
(IV) an education allowance to 
assist parents in providing the fellow’s 
minor children with educational serv-
ices 
ordinarily 
provided 
without 
charge by public schools in the United 
States; 
(V) moving expenses to transport 
personal belongings of the fellow and 
his or her family in their move to Tai-
wan, which is comparable to the al-
lowance given for American Institute 
in Taiwan employees assigned to Tai-
wan; and 
(VI) an economy-class airline 
ticket to and from Taiwan for each 
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fellow and the fellow’s immediate fam-
ily. 
(ii) MODIFICATION
OF
BENEFITS.— 
The American Institute in Taiwan and its 
implementing partner, with the approval of 
the Department of State, may modify the 
benefits set forth in clause (i) if such 
modification is warranted by fiscal cir-
cumstances. 
(D) 
NO
FINANCIAL
LIABILITY.—The 
American Institute in Taiwan, the imple-
menting partner, and any governing authorities 
on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Tai-
wan at which a fellow is detailed during the sec-
ond year of the fellowship may not be held re-
sponsible for the pay, allowances, or any other 
benefit normally provided to the detailee. 
(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be 
detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse-
ment to the United States by the American In-
stitute in Taiwan. 
(F) 
ALLOWANCES
AND
BENEFITS.— 
Detailees may be paid by the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits 
listed in subparagraph (C). 
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(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year 
prior to the sunset of the Program pursuant to 
paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall transmit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
a report that includes the following: 
(A) An analysis of United States Govern-
ment participants in the Program, including the 
number of applicants and the number of fellow-
ships undertaken, the places of employment. 
(B) An assessment of the costs and bene-
fits for participants in the Program and for the 
United States Government of such fellowships. 
(C) An analysis of the financial impact of 
the fellowship on United States Government of-
fices that have detailed fellows to participate in 
the Program. 
(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to 
improve the Program. 
(6) FUNDING.— 
(A) 
AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated to the American Institute in Taiwan— 
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(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, 
of which $500,000 should be used by an 
appropriate 
implementing 
partner 
to 
launch the Program; and 
(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000. 
(B) 
PRIVATE
SOURCES.—The 
imple-
menting partner selected to implement the Pro-
gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or 
donations of services or property in carrying 
out such program, subject to the review and ap-
proval of the American Institute in Taiwan. 
SEC. 210. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-
SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of 
State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific 
region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance 
(FA) resources, including as authorized by section 
201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and 
$798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic en-
gagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent 
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only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent 
of the total Department of State-USAID budget. 
(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and 
personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 
percent of the total, while FA resources averaged 
only 4 percent of the total. 
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 
process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-
mands of great-power competition, including in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic 
corps must be sufficient to meet the current and 
emerging challenges of the 21st century, including 
those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere; 
(2) the increase must be designed to meet the 
objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on 
strengthening the good governance and sovereignty 
of states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based 
international order; and 
(3) the increase must be implemented with a 
focus on increased numbers of economic, political, 
and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumu-
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lative increase of at least 200 foreign service officer 
generalists, to— 
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade 
and open investment environments for United 
States companies, and engaged in increased 
commercial diplomacy in key markets; 
(B) better articulate and explain United 
States policies, strengthen civil society and 
democratic principles, enhance reporting on 
global activities, promote people-to-people ex-
changes, and advance United States influence; 
and 
(C) increase capacity at small- and me-
dium-sized embassies and consulates in the 
Indo-Pacific and other regions around the 
world, as necessary. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.— 
(1) It shall be the policy of the United States 
to ensure Department of State funding levels and 
personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re-
gion’s high degree of importance and significance to 
United States political, economic, and security inter-
ests. 
(2) It shall be the policy of the United States 
to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of 
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personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
spective to the Department of State’s total budget. 
(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress an action plan with the following elements: 
(1) Identification of requirements to advance 
United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific 
and the personnel and budgetary resources for the 
Department of State needed to meet them, assuming 
an unconstrained resource environment. 
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
partment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in 
terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
nomic, and security assistance. 
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions 
at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with 
responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 
description of increases at each post or bureau, a 
breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of 
how such increases in personnel will advance United 
States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 
that the Department will meet in implementing the 
action plan. 
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(5) A description of any barriers to imple-
menting the action plan. 
(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 
180 days after the submission of the action plan described 
in subsection (c) for no more than 3 years, the Secretary 
shall submit an update and brief the appropriate commit-
tees of Congress on the implementation of such action 
plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess-
ment of benchmarks reached. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, 
$2,000,000,000, under titles III and IV of the Foreign 
Assistance 
Act 
for 
the 
Indo-Pacific 
region 
and 
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
(g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.— 
Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection 
(f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant 
to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
of 2018 (Public Law 115–409). 
(h) SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not later than 2 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State should report on the extent to which the bench-
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marks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have 
been met or progress has been made. 
SEC. 211. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO DETER 
PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—In order to deter the 
use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change 
the status quo on Taiwan, the United States should co-
ordinate with allies and partners to identify and develop 
significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and 
impose costs on any such action by the People’s Republic 
of China. 
SEC. 212. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING. 
(a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND 
SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 
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days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a written report— 
(1) detailing a description of United States 
Government efforts to gain a commitment from the 
Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl 
precursors such as 4–AP to controls; and 
(2) detailing a plan for future steps the United 
States Government will take to urge China to com-
bat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking origi-
nating in China. 
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 
subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 
SEC. 213. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-
MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF 
INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 
ACT OF 2018. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of 
the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-
ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be con-
sidered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to 
the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et 
seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such 
Act to such support. 
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125 
(b) MAXIMUM
CONTINGENT
LIABILITY.—Section 
1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended 
by 
striking 
‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ 
and 
inserting 
‘‘$100,000,000,000’’. 
SEC. 214. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE 
CORPORATION 
FOR 
VACCINE 
MANUFAC-
TURING. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Cor-
poration is authorized to provide financing to entities in 
India and in other less developed countries to increase vac-
cine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes— 
(1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Au-
thorization (SRA) or World Health Organization 
(WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vac-
cines; 
(2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency 
Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re-
lated to COVID–19; and 
(3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies 
needed for preventing, detecting and treating 
COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective 
equipment (PPE), oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics 
and vaccines. 
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(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corpora-
tion, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall pro-
vide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees— 
(1) outlining the countries where DFC financ-
ing could be most impactful for vaccine manufac-
turing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 
billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022; 
(2) a detailed explanation of the United States 
and partner country interests served by the United 
States providing support to such projects; 
(3) a detailed description of any support pro-
vided by other United States allies and partners to 
expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and 
(4) a detailed description of any support pro-
vided by China in support of the initiatives outlined 
in subsection (a). 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 
a classified annex if necessary. 
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SEC. 215. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS 
ALIGN 
WITH 
AMERICAN 
STRATEGIC 
NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC-
TIVES. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.— 
(1) With 276 embassies and other representa-
tive offices globally, China now has more diplomatic 
posts around the world than any other country, in-
cluding the United States. Many of Beijing’s new 
missions can be found in countries that recently 
broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Domini-
can Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao 
Tome and Principe) or do not have any United 
States diplomatic physical presence despite these 
countries asking for increased United States engage-
ment and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and 
Dominica). 
(2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Depart-
ment of State conduct an assessment of all United 
States diplomatic posts to verify that they align with 
its United States national security and economic in-
terests, as well as ensuring that these locations posi-
tion the United States appropriately with its stra-
tegic competitors to advance the national interest in 
every country worldwide, including those countries 
currently lacking any physical United States diplo-
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matic presence whether an embassy, consulate gen-
eral, or principal officer post. 
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, 
the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report 
assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of 
its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an 
assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other coun-
try strategic competitors. The Secretary of State shall co-
ordinate with other Department and Agency heads having 
an overseas presence at any and all United States diplo-
matic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Fed-
eral Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify 
in writing the findings of this assessment. 
SEC. 216. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE 
FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM. 
There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5- 
year period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, 
to promote education, training, research, and foreign lan-
guage skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in ac-
cordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational 
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)). 
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129 
SEC. 217. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-
TERING DISINFORMATION. 
(a) 
AUTHORIZATION
OF
USAGM 
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each 
of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States 
Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and 
new programs to support local media, build independent 
media, combat PRC disinformation inside and outside of 
China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and 
monitor and evaluate these programs. 
(b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of 
State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International De-
velopment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for 
Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support 
and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary 
to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, 
fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to 
develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing 
their countries. 
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue 
to support internet freedom programs. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 
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130 
and United States Agency for International Development, 
for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000 
for ongoing and new programs in support of press free-
dom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized 
to remain available until expended and shall be in addition 
to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to 
support press freedom, training, and protection of journal-
ists. 
SEC. 218. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER. 
(a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
gagement Center to ‘‘direct, lead, and coordinate efforts’’ 
of the Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand, ex-
pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda 
and disinformation globally’’. 
(b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that 
is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ 
and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2027’’. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand 
its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through 
the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments 
and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and coun-
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tering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations 
Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign 
state 
and 
non-state 
sponsored 
propaganda 
and 
disinformation. 
Subtitle B—International Security 
Matters 
SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) COMPANY.—The term ‘‘company’’ means 
any corporation, company, limited liability company, 
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132 
limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
tion, or other similar entity. 
(3) OTHER
SECURITY
FORCES.—The term 
‘‘other security forces’’— 
(A) includes national security forces that 
conduct maritime security; and 
(B) does not include self-described militias 
or paramilitary organizations. 
SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of 
fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart-
ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise 
made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 
et seq.) (relating to international military education and 
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in 
the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act. 
SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM 
OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-
WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
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(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions 
or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation 
operations in international airspace by military or ci-
vilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to desta-
bilize the Indo-Pacific region; 
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China to refrain from implementing the de-
clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 
provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion; 
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court 
of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 
both parties and that the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s claims to offshore resources across most of the 
South China Sea are unlawful; and 
(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China 
for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as 
a state party to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States to— 
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(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
ing to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific 
allies as referenced elsewhere in this Act; 
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 
freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace 
above it, that are available to all nations, and oppose 
the militarization of new and reclaimed land features 
in the South China Sea; 
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the 
PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely— 
(A) that PRC claims in the South China 
Sea, including to offshore resources across most 
of the South China Sea, are unlawful; 
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 
maritime claim vis-a`-vis the Philippines in areas 
that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found 
to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived 
from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; 
and 
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 
or maritime claim to James Shoal; 
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(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
destabilizing activities, including environmentally 
harmful and provocative land reclamation; 
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without 
intimidation, coercion, or force; 
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 
claims in accordance with international law; 
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and 
maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
torial seas, must derive from land features and oth-
erwise comport with international law; 
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
tions covering disputed areas in the South China 
Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the 
region; 
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if 
that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a 
vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance 
its unlawful maritime claims; 
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), 
is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
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tween the United States Armed Forces and the 
forces of other countries, including the People’s Re-
public of China; 
(11) support the development of regional insti-
tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting 
Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
national law; 
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 
with other countries in the region for maritime do-
main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
forts by the United States Government to explore 
the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
nisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the 
South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries 
that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing 
behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities; 
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 
any other country from exercising its sovereign 
rights to the resources of the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims 
to those areas in the South China Sea that have no 
support in international law; and 
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(14) assure the continuity of operations by the 
United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 
when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 
allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over-
flight and other lawful uses of the sea. 
SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO- 
PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and 
strengthen existing measures under the United 
States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide 
capabilities to allies and partners consistent with 
agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, 
missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
United States strategic imperatives; 
(2) the United States should design for export 
to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in 
the region, including long-range precision fires, air 
and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional 
hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance capabilities, and command and control 
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systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and 
international commitments; 
(3) the United States should pursue, to the 
maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology 
security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems 
described in paragraph (2); and 
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense, should— 
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
tingency requirements and avoid the need for 
accessing United States stocks in wartime; and 
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ 
capacity to produce such munitions. 
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(c) REPORT.— 
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report that describes United States 
priorities for building more capable security partners 
in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required under paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) provide a priority list of defense and 
military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners must possess for the United States to 
be able to achieve its military objectives in the 
Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) identify, from the list referred to in 
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
provided, or can only be provided, by the 
United States; 
(C) identify— 
(i) actions required to expedite field-
ing the capabilities identified in subpara-
graph (B); and 
(ii) steps needed to fully account for 
and a plan to integrate all means of 
United States foreign military sales, direct 
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commercial sales, security assistance, and 
all applicable authorities of the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of De-
fense; 
(D) assess the requirements for United 
States security assistance, including Inter-
national Military Education and Training, in 
the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means 
to deliver critical partner capability require-
ments identified in subparagraph (B); 
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet 
the requirements for United States security as-
sistance, and identify resource gaps; 
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
requirements for United States security assist-
ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative 
and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
cific partner countries; 
(G) identify limitations on the ability of 
the United States to provide such capabilities, 
including those identified under subparagraph 
(B), because of existing United States treaty 
obligations, United States policies, or other reg-
ulations; 
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(H) recommend improvements to the proc-
ess for developing requirements for United 
States partner capabilities; and 
(I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
ommendations for infrastructure and posture, 
based on any ongoing mutual dialogues. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under this 
subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a 
classified annex. 
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies 
to Bolster American Power 
SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) Every UN member state is legally required 
to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure 
that these missions are properly resourced, and as-
sessment rates are renegotiated every three years by 
the UN General Assembly. 
(2) While the United States is the largest single 
financial contributor to the UN system, the current 
model is beneficial because it requires all UN mem-
ber states, no matter how big or small, to help 
shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets 
at specified levels. 
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(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments 
to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised 
our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable 
partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu-
tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in 
ways that run counter to United States interests and 
values. 
(4) The People’s Republic of China is now the 
second largest financial contributor to UN peace-
keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of 
just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent 
today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to 
UN missions, providing more personnel than the 
other four permanent members of the Security 
Council combined. 
(5) With greater engagement comes greater in-
fluence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their 
expanded clout to push back against the human 
rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence 
aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United 
States funding shortfalls as a pretext. 
(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to 
fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur-
rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 
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specialized agencies, while the United States occu-
pies only one. 
(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elec-
tions for the heads of UN specialized agencies and 
five for major UN funds and programs. With the ex-
ception of the World Food Programme, none are 
currently led by Americans. 
(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen-
eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter-
national Organizations did not have a standard oper-
ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em-
ployment of American Citizens in the UN system, 
and their recommendation to the department to es-
tablish one remains open. 
SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTI-
LATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 
It is the policy of the United States that— 
(1) the Special Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations serves as a standing 
member of the cabinet; 
(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations 
be paid in full in a timely fashion; 
(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities 
under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, 
and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regula-
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tions: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to 
International Organizations to detail or transfer em-
ployees to relevant international organizations; 
(4) the Secretary of State shall assist the De-
partment of State and other Federal agencies in car-
rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent; 
(5) the Secretary of State shall support quali-
fied American candidates in their bid to win election 
to UN-related leadership positions; and 
(6) the Secretary of State shall support the 
placement of Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) 
sponsored by the United States in UN-affiliated 
agencies. 
SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA-
TIONS. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu-
reau of International Organization Affairs (IO) an Office 
for American Citizens. 
(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection 
(a) of this section will be responsible for— 
(1) advocating for the employment of American 
citizens by all international organizations of which 
the United States is a member, including the United 
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Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other 
affiliated entities; 
(2) coordinating the interagency support of 
non-American candidates for leadership roles within 
all international organizations of which the United 
States is a member, including the United Nations 
and any of its agencies, offices, and other affiliated 
entities, when— 
(A) no American candidate has been nomi-
nated for election; and 
(B) it is determined that providing such 
support is in the interest of the United States; 
(3) establishing and implementing a standard 
operating procedure for the promotion and efficient 
tracking of United States citizen employment at the 
United Nations and other international organiza-
tions that includes Mission Geneva; 
(4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations 
jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other 
qualified nationals to promote for these positions; 
(5) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
tions secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and 
developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of 
likeminded states are assembled to ensure leadership 
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races are not won by countries that do not share 
United States interests; 
(6) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
ment of United States nationals in the United Na-
tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; 
and 
(7) increasing the number of qualified United 
States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
tions. 
SEC. 234. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, 
shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on how many Federal employees are 
currently detailed or transferred to an international orga-
nization during the immediately preceding 12-month pe-
riod and a one-time strategy for increasing the number 
of Federal employees so detailed or transferred. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 
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(1) The number of Federal employees detailed 
or transferred to an international organization under 
section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub-
part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: De-
tail and Transfer of Federal Employees to Inter-
national Organizations, and— 
(A) an identification of the Federal agency 
from which such employees were detailed or 
transferred; and 
(B) an identification of the international 
organizations to and from which such employ-
ees have been detailed or transferred. 
(2) A list of international organizations to and 
from which the United States previously detailed or 
transferred Federal employees. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate. 
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Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To 
Bolster American Power 
SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships 
with like-minded countries around the globe; and 
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
partners— 
(A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military challenges posed by the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(B) to deter the People’s Republic of 
China from pursuing military aggression; 
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
national law; 
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
economic development while countering efforts 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China to leverage predatory economic practices 
as a means of political and economic coercion in 
the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; 
(E) to promote the values of democracy 
and human rights, including through efforts to 
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end the repression by the People’s Republic of 
China of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other 
Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Chris-
tians, and other ethnic minorities; 
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the 
People’s Republic of China, in contravention of 
the commitments made under the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law 
of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of 
the people of Hong Kong; and 
(G) to counter the Chinese Government’s 
efforts to spread disinformation in China and 
beyond with respect to its response to COVID– 
19. 
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 
STATES-CANADA RELATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States and Canada have a 
unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
tensive personal connections, deep economic ties, 
mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to 
uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules 
based international order established after World 
War II; 
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(2) the United States and Canada can better 
address the People’s Republic of China’s economic, 
political, and security influence through closer co-
operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew-
ardship, transparent practices in public procurement 
and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 
connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, 
bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, 
good governance, and human rights; 
(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the 
United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
tiatives to address border management, commercial 
and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared ap-
proach with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China, and transnational challenges, including 
pandemics, energy security, and environmental stew-
ardship; 
(4) the United States and Canada should en-
hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, 
influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
ganda efforts; 
(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
cations technology, extraction of natural resources, 
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and port infrastructure, pose national security risks 
for the United States and Canada; 
(6) the United States should share, as appro-
priate, intelligence gathered regarding— 
(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and 
(B) the PRC government’s intentions with 
respect to 5G expansion; 
(7) the United States and Canada should con-
tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada 
Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development 
Collaboration; and 
(8) the United States and Canada must 
prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in 
the Arctic, including by modernizing the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
sensor architecture to provide effective warning and 
tracking of threats by peer competitors, including 
long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to 
the Northern Hemisphere. 
SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-
MENT OF CHINA’S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-
MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
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(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive 
treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and 
Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is 
deeply concerning; 
(2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
national leadership by— 
(A) upholding the rule of law and com-
plying with its international legal obligations, 
including those pursuant to the Extradition 
Treaty Between the United States of America 
and Canada, signed at Washington December 
3, 1971; and 
(B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, 
which has been endorsed by 57 countries and 
the European Union, and reaffirms well-estab-
lished prohibitions under international human 
rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage 
in state-to-state relations; and 
(3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for 
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due 
process 
for 
Canadian 
national 
Robert 
Schellenberg. 
SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
CANADA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President should 
submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes 
how the United States will enhance cooperation with the 
Government of Canada in managing relations with the 
PRC government. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall— 
(1) identify key policy points of convergence 
and divergence between the United States and Can-
ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains 
and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics; 
(2) include a description of United States devel-
opment and coordination efforts with Canadian 
counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the 
United States and Canada with respect to— 
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(A) managing economic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(B) democracy and human rights in the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(C) technology issues involving the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(D) defense issues involving the People’s 
Republic of China; and 
(E) international law enforcement and 
transnational organized crime issues. 
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 
work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection 
of an authoritarian governing model around the 
world; 
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 
to Huawei’s 5G technology; 
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
tion— 
(A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
dian priorities for responsible stewardship in 
the Arctic Region; and 
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(B) to counter the PRC’s efforts to project 
political, economic, and military influence into 
the Arctic Region; and 
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
ada to track and counter the PRC’s attempts to 
exert influence across the multilateral system. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex, if necessary. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre-
quently than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
regarding the development and implementation of the 
strategy required under this section. 
SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-
PETITIVENESS, 
GOVERNANCE, 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the 
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Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of USAID, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Cor-
poration, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting 
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in 
the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustain-
able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption 
activities, and infrastructure projects, to— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required 
under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to— 
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(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries 
in the region to advance the sustainable and inclu-
sive development of equitable economies; 
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between 
the countries of the Americas; 
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and 
competitive environment for United States busi-
nesses in the region; 
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
view long term financial sustainability and security 
implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
tors or services, including transportation, commu-
nications, natural resources, and energy; 
(5) establish competitive, transparent, and in-
clusive infrastructure project selection and procure-
ment processes that promote transparency, supplier 
diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, 
adherence to robust global standards, and the em-
ployment of a diverse local workforce and manage-
ment; 
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
democratic governance, fair competition, combatting 
corruption, and ending impunity; and 
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(7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi-
table access to the internet and digital infrastructure 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States 
Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United 
States International Development Finance Corporation, 
shall brief the congressional committees listed in sub-
section (a) regarding the implementation of this part, in-
cluding examples of successes and challenges. 
SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate; 
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(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives; and 
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that assesses the nature, intent, 
and impact to United States strategic interests of 
Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the 
decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral 
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
including the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Organization of American States, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
(2) DEFENSE
SECTOR.—The report required 
under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of 
the nature, intent, and impact on United States 
strategic interests of Chinese military activity in 
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Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 
education and training programs, weapons sales, and 
space-related activities in the military or civilian 
spheres, such as— 
(A) the satellite and space control station 
the People’s Republic of China constructed in 
Argentina; and 
(B) defense and security cooperation car-
ried out by the People’s Republic of China in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, including 
sales of surveillance and monitoring technology 
to governments in the region such as Venezuela, 
Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the poten-
tial use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 
intelligence services. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form 
and shall include classified annexes. 
SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the 
International Military Education and Training Program 
for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026. 
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(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 
take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such 
programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent 
choice for international military education and training for 
Latin American and Caribbean partners. 
(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred 
to in subsection (a) shall— 
(1) provide training and capacity-building op-
portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
rity services; 
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks 
for— 
(A) improving the functioning and organi-
zation of security services in Latin America and 
the Caribbean; 
(B) creating a better understanding of the 
United States and its values; and 
(C) using technology for maximum effi-
ciency and organization; and 
(3) promote and ensure that security services in 
Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian 
authority and operate in compliance with inter-
national norms, standards, and rules of engagement, 
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including a respect for human rights, and full com-
pliance with Leahy Law requirements. 
(d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-
ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d). 
SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-
NOLOGIES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China is exporting its model for internal security 
and state control of society through advanced tech-
nology and artificial intelligence; and 
(2) the inclusion of communication networks 
and communications supply chains with equipment 
and services from companies with close ties to or 
that are susceptible to pressure from governments or 
security services without reliable legal checks on gov-
ernmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ 
private information, increased censorship, violations 
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