I
104TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 3144
To establish a United States policy for the deployment of a national missile
defense system, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 21, 1996
Mr. LIVINGSTON (for himself, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. SPENCE, Mr.
GILMAN, Mr. KASICH, Mr. HYDE, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. HUNTER,
and Mr. HOKE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on National Security, and in addition to the Committee on
International Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within
the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To establish a United States policy for the deployment of
a national missile defense system, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defend America Act
of 1996’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Although the United States possesses the
technological means to develop and deploy defensive
systems that would be highly effective in countering
limited ballistic missile threats to its territory, the
United States has not deployed such systems and
currently has no policy to do so.
(2) The threat that is posed to the national se-
curity of the United States by the proliferation of
ballistic missiles is significant and growing, both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
(3) The trend in ballistic missile proliferation is
toward longer range and increasingly sophisticated
missiles.
(4) Several countries that are hostile to the
United States (including North Korea, Iran, Libya,
and Iraq) have demonstrated an interest in acquir-
ing ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United
States.
(5) The Intelligence Community of the United
States has confirmed that North Korea is developing
an intercontinental ballistic missile that will be capa-
ble of reaching Alaska or beyond once deployed.
(6) There are ways for determined countries to
acquire missiles capable of threatening the United
States with little warning by means other than in-
digenous development.
(7) Because of the dire consequences to the
United States of not being prepared to defend itself
against a rogue missile attack and the long-lead time
associated with preparing an effective defense, it is
prudent to commence a national missile defense de-
ployment effort before new ballistic missile threats to
the United States are unambiguously confirmed.
(8) The timely deployment by the United States
of an effective national missile defense system will
reduce the incentives for countries to develop or oth-
erwise acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles,
thereby inhibiting as well as countering the pro-
liferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
(9) Deployment by the United States of a na-
tional missile defense system will reduce concerns
about the threat of an accidental or unauthorized
ballistic missile attack on the United States.
(10) The offense-only approach to strategic de-
terrence presently followed by the United States and
Russia is fundamentally adversarial and is not a
suitable basis for stability in a world in which the
United States and the states of the former Soviet
Union are seeking to normalize relations and elimi-
nate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
(11) Pursuing a transition to a form of strate-
gic deterrence based increasingly on defensive capa-
bilities and strategies is in the interest of all coun-
tries seeking to preserve and enhance strategic sta-
bility.
(12) The deployment of a national missile de-
fense system capable of defending the United States
against limited ballistic missile attacks would (A)
strengthen deterrence at the levels of forces agreed
to by the United States and Russia under the
START I Treaty, and (B) further strengthen deter-
rence if reductions below START I levels are imple-
mented in the future.
(13) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions
‘‘possible changes in the strategic situation which
have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty’’.
(14) Articles XIII and XIV of the treaty estab-
lish means for the parties to amend the treaty, and
the parties have in the past used those means to
amend the treaty.
(15) Article XV of the treaty establishes the
means for a party to withdraw from the treaty, upon
six months notice ‘‘if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests’’.
(16) Previous discussions between the United
States and Russia, based on Russian President
Yeltsin’s proposal for a Global Protection System,
envisioned an agreement to amend the ABM Treaty
to allow (among other measures) deployment of as
many as four ground-based interceptor sites in addi-
tion to the one site permitted under the ABM Trea-
ty and unrestricted exploitation of sensors based
within the atmosphere and in space.
SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
(a) It is the policy of the United States to deploy by
the end of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that—
(1) is capable of providing a highly-effective de-
fense of the territory of the United States against
limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile
attacks; and
(2) will be augmented over time to provide a
layered defense against larger and more sophisti-
cated ballistic missile threats as they emerge.
(b) It is the policy of the United States to seek a
cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature
an offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strate-
gic stability.
SEC. 4. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITEC-
TURE.
(a) REQUIREMENT
FOR DEVELOPMENT
OF SYS-
TEM.—To implement the policy established in section
3(a), the Secretary of Defense shall develop for deploy-
ment an affordable and operationally effective National
Missile Defense (NMD) system which shall achieve an ini-
tial operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2003.
(b) ELEMENTS OF THE NMD SYSTEM.—The system
to be developed for deployment shall include the following
elements:
(1) An interceptor system that optimizes defen-
sive coverage of the continental United States, Alas-
ka, and Hawaii against limited, accidental, or unau-
thorized ballistic missile attacks and includes one or
a combination of the following:
(A) Ground-based interceptors.
(B) Sea-based interceptors.
(C) Space-based kinetic energy intercep-
tors.
(D) Space-based directed energy systems.
(2) Fixed ground-based radars.
(3) Space-based sensors, including the Space
and Missile Tracking System.
(4) Battle management, command, control, and
communications (BM/C3).
SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
SYSTEM.
The Secretary of Defense shall—
(1) upon the enactment of this Act, promptly
initiate required preparatory and planning actions
that are necessary so as to be capable of meeting the
initial operational capability (IOC) date specified in
section 4(a);
(2) plan to conduct by the end of 1998 an inte-
grated systems test which uses elements (including
BM/C3 elements) that are representative of, and
traceable to, the national missile defense system ar-
chitecture specified in section 4(b);
(3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition
policies and procedures to reduce the cost and in-
crease the efficiency of developing the system speci-
fied in section 4(a); and
(4) develop an affordable national missile de-
fense follow-on program that—
(A) leverages off of the national missile de-
fense system specified in section 4(a), and
(B) augments that system, as the threat
changes, to provide for a layered defense.
SEC. 6. REPORT ON PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DE-
FENSE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOY-
MENT.
Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to Congress a report on the Secretary’s
plan for development and deployment of a national missile
defense system pursuant to this Act. The report shall in-
clude the following matters:
(1) The Secretary’s plan for carrying out this
Act, including—
(A) a detailed description of the system ar-
chitecture selected for development under sec-
tion 4(b); and
(B) a discussion of the justification for the
selection of that particular architecture.
(2) The Secretary’s estimate of the amount of
appropriations required for research, development,
test, evaluation, and for procurement, for each of
fiscal years 1997 through 2003 in order to achieve
the initial operational capability date specified in
section 4(a).
(3) A cost and operational effectiveness analysis
of follow-on options to improve the effectiveness of
such system.
(4) A determination of the point at which any
activity that is required to be carried out under this
Act would conflict with the terms of the ABM Trea-
ty, together with a description of any such activity,
the legal basis for the Secretary’s determination, and
an estimate of the time at which such point would
be reached in order to meet the initial operational
capability date specified in section 4(a).
SEC. 7. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) ABM TREATY NEGOTIATIONS.—In light of the
findings in section 2 and the policy established in section
3, Congress urges the President to pursue high-level dis-
cussions with the Russian Federation to achieve an agree-
ment to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of
the national missile defense system being developed for de-
ployment under section 4.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR SENATE ADVICE AND CON-
SENT.—If an agreement described in subsection (a) is
achieved in discussions described in that subsection, the
President shall present that agreement to the Senate for
its advice and consent. No funds appropriated or otherwise
available for any fiscal year may be obligated or expended
to implement such an amendment to the ABM Treaty un-
less the amendment is made in the same manner as the
manner by which a treaty is made.
(c) ACTION UPON FAILURE TO ACHIEVE NEGO-
TIATED CHANGES WITHIN ONE YEAR.—If an agreement