I
105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 1942
To provide authority to control exports, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 17, 1997
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr.
GALLEGLY, and Mr. MANZULLO) introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on International Relations
A BILL
To provide authority to control exports, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents of this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Table of contents.
TITLE I—EXPORT ADMINISTRATION
Sec. 101. Short title.
Sec. 102. Findings.
Sec. 103. Policy statement.
Sec. 104. General provisions.
Sec. 105. Multilateral controls.
Sec. 106. Emergency controls.
Sec. 107. Short supply controls.
Sec. 108. Foreign boycotts.
Sec. 109. Procedures for processing export license applications; other inquiries.
Sec. 110. Violations.
Sec. 111. Controlling proliferation activity.
Sec. 112. Administrative and judicial review.
Sec. 113. Enforcement.
Sec. 114. Export control authorities and procedures.
Sec. 115. Annual report.
Sec. 116. Definitions.
Sec. 117. Effects on other Acts.
Sec. 118. Secondary Arab boycott.
Sec. 119. Conforming amendments.
Sec. 120. Expiration date.
Sec. 121. Savings provisions.
TITLE II—NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PREVENTION
Sec. 201. Conforming amendment relating to provisions of the Nuclear Pro-
liferation Prevention Act of 1994.
Sec. 202. Seeking multilateral support for unilateral sanctions.
Sec. 203. Sanctions under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.
TITLE I—EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Export Administration
Act of 1997’’.
SEC. 102. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Export controls are a part of a comprehen-
sive response to national security threats. United
States exports should be restricted only for signifi-
cant national security, nonproliferation, and foreign
policy reasons.
(2) Exports of certain commodities and tech-
nology may adversely affect the national security
and foreign policy of the United States by making
a significant contribution to the military potential of
individual countries or by disseminating the capabil-
ity to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, or use
weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery sys-
tems, and other significant military capabilities.
Therefore, the administration of export controls
should emphasize the control of these exports.
(3) The acquisition of sensitive commodities
and technology by those countries and end users
whose actions or policies run counter to United
States national security or foreign policy interests
may enhance the military capabilities of those coun-
tries, particularly their ability to design, develop,
test, produce, stockpile, use, and deliver weapons of
mass destruction, missile delivery systems, and other
significant military capabilities. This enhancement
threatens the security of the United States and its
allies, and places additional demands on the defense
budget of the United States. Availability to countries
and end users of items that contribute to military
capabilities or the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is a fundamental concern of the United
States and should be eliminated through negotia-
tions and other appropriate means whenever pos-
sible.
(4) With the growing importance of exports to
sustained United States economic growth and vital-
ity, restrictions on exports must be evaluated in
terms of their effects on the United States economy.
(5) Export controls cannot be the sole instru-
ment of the United States to prevent a country or
end user from developing weapons of mass destruc-
tion. For this reason, export controls should be ap-
plied as part of a comprehensive response to security
threats.
(6) The national security of the United States
depends not only on wise foreign policies and a
strong defense, but also a vibrant national economy.
To be truly effective, export controls should be ap-
plied uniformly by all suppliers.
(7) International treaties, such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and international agreements
and arrangements intended to control, lessen, or
eliminate weapons of mass destruction should be
fully implemented by, among other things, imposing
restrictions on imports and exports of designated
items, monitoring, and transmitting reports on, the
production, processing, consumption, export, and im-
port of designated items, and complying with ver-
ification regimes mandated by such treaties, agree-
ments, and arrangements.
(8) Except in the event the United States is the
sole source of critical supplies, unilateral export con-
trols are generally not truly effective in influencing
the behavior of other governments or impeding ac-
cess to controlled items. Unilateral controls alone
may impede access to United States sources of sup-
ply without affecting the ability of countries to ob-
tain controlled items elsewhere. Moreover, unilateral
controls generally permit foreign competitors to
serve markets the United States Government denies
to United States firms and workers, thus impairing
the reliability of United States suppliers in compari-
son with their foreign competitors. At the same
time, the need to lead the international community
or overriding national security or foreign policy in-
terests may justify unilateral controls in specific
cases.
(9) The United States recognizes the impor-
tance of comprehensive enforcement measures to
maximize the effectiveness of multilateral controls.
(10) The United States export control system
must not be overly restrictive or bureaucratic, or un-
dermine the competitive position of United States in-
dustry. The export control system must be efficient,
responsive, transparent, and effective.