IB 
Union Calendar No. 36
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. R. 760
[Report No. 108–58] 
To prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth abortion. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 13, 2003
Mr. CHABOT (for himself, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. KEN-
NEDY of Minnesota, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. BRADY of Texas, Mr. CANNON, 
Mr. CANTOR, Mr. CUNNINGHAM, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin, 
Ms. HART, Mr. HAYES, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. HOEKSTRA, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. 
JENKINS, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. 
NEY, Mr. PENCE, Mr. PETERSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. PITTS, Mr. 
TOOMEY, Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania, Mr. PICKERING, Mr. OXLEY, 
Mr. CRANE, Mr. DEMINT, Mr. SCHROCK, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. 
ADERHOLT, Mr. TIAHRT, Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. SHADEGG, Mr. BURTON of 
Indiana, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. EHLERS, Mr. ROGERS of Michigan, Mr. 
BAKER, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. MCCRERY, Mr. RENZI, 
Mr. FLETCHER, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. AKIN, Mr. COLLINS, Mr. JOHN, Mr. 
RYUN of Kansas, Mr. HOSTETTLER, Mr. VITTER, Mr. MCCOTTER, Mr. 
PORTMAN, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. WOLF, Mr. 
POMBO, Mr. DELAY, Mr. CAMP, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. COSTELLO, 
Mr. BISHOP of Utah, Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi, Mr. EVERETT, Mr. 
BLUNT, Mr. TERRY, Mrs. CUBIN, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. GRAVES, Mr. 
WHITFIELD, Mr. ISSA, Mr. FEENEY, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. GOSS, Mr. 
SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HYDE, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. 
GUTKNECHT, Mr. PETRI, Mr. LINDER, Mr. COBLE, Mr. HAYWORTH, Mr. 
FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. BEAUPREZ, Mr. 
HULSHOF, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. BURNS, Mr. PLATTS, Mr. 
BROWN of South Carolina, Mr. REHBERG, Mrs. EMERSON, Mr. KLINE, 
Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. MORAN of Kansas, Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. 
BOOZMAN, Mr. OSBORNE, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. 
SIMPSON, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina, Mrs. JO ANN 
DAVIS
of Virginia, Mr. WAMP, Mr. GOODE, Mr. CHOCOLA, Mrs. 
NORTHUP, Mr. FORBES, Mr. SULLIVAN, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. PUTNAM, 
Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. TURNER of Ohio, Mr. PEARCE, Mrs. MILLER of
Michigan, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. GINGREY, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. COLE, Mr. 
FERGUSON, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. GARRETT of New 
Jersey, Mr. STUPAK, Mr. BURR, Mr. RYAN of Wisconsin, Mr. JONES of 
North Carolina, Mrs. MUSGRAVE, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. LATOURETTE, 
Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. BARRETT of South Carolina, and Mr. HENSARLING) 
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary 
APRIL 3, 2003
Additional sponsors: Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland, 
Mr. KING of New York, Mr. WELLER, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. SKELTON, 
Mr. BUYER, Mr. NUSSLE, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. PETERSON of Minnesota, Mr. 
JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. MICA, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. LUCAS of Okla-
homa, Mr. JANKLOW, Mr. LUCAS of Kentucky, Mr. DOYLE, Mr. ROGERS 
of Kentucky, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. OTTER, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. CARTER, and 
Mr. KELLER 
APRIL 3, 2003
Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
and ordered to be printed 
A BILL 
To prohibit the procedure commonly known as partial-birth 
abortion.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
The Congress finds and declares the following: 
(1) A moral, medical, and ethical consensus ex-
ists that the practice of performing a partial-birth 
abortion—an abortion in which a physician delivers
an unborn child’s body until only the head remains 
inside the womb, punctures the back of the child’s 
skull with a sharp instrument, and sucks the child’s 
brains out before completing delivery of the dead in-
fant—is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is 
never medically necessary and should be prohibited. 
(2) Rather than being an abortion procedure 
that is embraced by the medical community, particu-
larly among physicians who routinely perform other 
abortion procedures, partial-birth abortion remains a 
disfavored procedure that is not only unnecessary to 
preserve the health of the mother, but in fact poses 
serious risks to the long-term health of women and 
in some circumstances, their lives. As a result, at 
least 27 States banned the procedure as did the 
United States Congress which voted to ban the pro-
cedure during the 104th, 105th, and 106th Con-
gresses. 
(3) In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 932 
(2000), the United States Supreme Court opined 
‘‘that significant medical authority supports the 
proposition that in some circumstances, [partial 
birth abortion] would be the safest procedure’’ for 
pregnant women who wish to undergo an abortion. 
Thus, the Court struck down the State of Nebras-
ka’s ban on partial-birth abortion procedures, con-
cluding that it placed an ‘‘undue burden’’ on women 
seeking abortions because it failed to include an ex-
ception for partial-birth abortions deemed necessary 
to preserve the ‘‘health’’ of the mother. 
(4) In reaching this conclusion, the Court de-
ferred to the Federal district court’s factual findings 
that the partial-birth abortion procedure was statis-
tically and medically as safe as, and in many cir-
cumstances safer than, alternative abortion proce-
dures. 
(5) However, the great weight of evidence pre-
sented at the Stenberg trial and other trials chal-
lenging partial-birth abortion bans, as well as at ex-
tensive Congressional hearings, demonstrates that a 
partial-birth abortion is never necessary to preserve 
the health of a woman, poses significant health risks 
to a woman upon whom the procedure is performed, 
and is outside of the standard of medical care. 
(6) Despite the dearth of evidence in the 
Stenberg trial court record supporting the district 
court’s findings, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court re-
fused to set aside the district court’s factual findings 
because, under the applicable standard of appellate
review, they were not ‘‘clearly erroneous’’. A finding 
of fact is clearly erroneous ‘‘when although there is 
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the en-
tire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed’’. Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 
564, 573 (1985). Under this standard, ‘‘if the dis-
trict court’s account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court 
of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced 
that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would 
have weighed the evidence differently’’. Id. at 574. 
(7) Thus, in Stenberg, the United States Su-
preme Court was required to accept the very ques-
tionable findings issued by the district court judge—
the effect of which was to render null and void the 
reasoned factual findings and policy determinations 
of the United States Congress and at least 27 State 
legislatures. 
(8) However, under well-settled Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the United States Congress is not
bound to accept the same factual findings that the 
Supreme Court was bound to accept in Stenberg 
under the ‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard. Rather, the 
United States Congress is entitled to reach its own
factual findings—findings that the Supreme Court 
accords great deference—and to enact legislation 
based upon these findings so long as it seeks to pur-
sue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of 
the Constitution, and draws reasonable inferences 
based upon substantial evidence. 
(9) In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966), the Supreme Court articulated its highly 
deferential review of Congressional factual findings 
when it addressed the constitutionality of section 
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Regarding 
Congress’ factual determination that section 4(e) 
would assist the Puerto Rican community in ‘‘gain-
ing nondiscriminatory treatment in public services,’’ 
the Court stated that ‘‘[i]t was for Congress, as the 
branch that made this judgment, to assess and 
weigh the various conflicting considerations. . . . It 
is not for us to review the congressional resolution 
of these factors. It is enough that we be able to per-
ceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve 
the conflict as it did. There plainly was such a basis
to support section 4(e) in the application in question 
in this case.’’. Id. at 653. 
(10) Katzenbach’s highly deferential review of 
Congress’s factual conclusions was relied upon by
the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia when it upheld the ‘‘bail-out’’ provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, (42 U.S.C. 1973c), 
stating that ‘‘congressional fact finding, to which we 
are inclined to pay great deference, strengthens the 
inference that, in those jurisdictions covered by the 
Act, state actions discriminatory in effect are dis-
criminatory in purpose’’. City of Rome, Georgia v. 
U.S., 472 F. Supp. 221 (D. D. Col. 1979) aff’d City 
of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
(11) The Court continued its practice of defer-
ring to congressional factual findings in reviewing 
the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992. See Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 
512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). At 
issue in the Turner cases was Congress’ legislative 
finding that, absent mandatory carriage rules, the 
continued viability of local broadcast television would 
be ‘‘seriously jeopardized’’. The Turner I Court rec-
ognized that as an institution, ‘‘Congress is far bet-
ter equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evalu-
ate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon an issue 
as complex and dynamic as that presented here’’. 
512 U.S. at 665–66. Although the Court recognized 
that ‘‘the deference afforded to legislative findings 
does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the 
facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,’ ’’ its 
‘‘obligation to exercise independent judgment when 
First Amendment rights are implicated is not a li-
cense to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace 
Congress’ factual predictions with our own. Rather, 
it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence.’’ Id. at 666. 
(12) Three years later in Turner II, the Court 
upheld the ‘‘must-carry’’ provisions based upon Con-
gress’ findings, stating the Court’s ‘‘sole obligation 
is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Con-
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on sub-
stantial evidence.’ ’’ 520 U.S. at 195. Citing its rul-
ing in Turner I, the Court reiterated that ‘‘[w]e owe 
Congress’ findings deference in part because the in-
stitution ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to 
‘‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’’ 
bearing upon’ legislative questions,’’ id. at 195, and 
added that it ‘‘owe[d] Congress’ findings an addi-
tional measure of deference out of respect for its au-
thority to exercise the legislative power.’’ Id. at 196. 
(13) There exists substantial record evidence 
upon which Congress has reached its conclusion that 
a ban on partial-birth abortion is not required to 
contain a ‘‘health’’ exception, because the facts indi-
cate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary 
to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious 
risks to a woman’s health, and lies outside the 
standard of medical care. Congress was informed by 
extensive hearings held during the 104th, 105th, 
and 107th Congresses and passed a ban on partial-
birth abortion in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Con-
gresses. These findings reflect the very informed 
judgment of the Congress that a partial-birth abor-
tion is never necessary to preserve the health of a 
woman, poses serious risks to a woman’s health, and 
lies outside the standard of medical care, and 
should, therefore, be banned. 
(14) Pursuant to the testimony received during 
extensive legislative hearings during the 104th, 
105th, and 107th Congresses, Congress finds and 
declares that: 
(A) Partial-birth abortion poses serious 
risks to the health of a woman undergoing the
procedure. Those risks include, among other 
things: an increase in a woman’s risk of suf-
fering from cervical incompetence, a result of 
cervical dilation making it difficult or impos-
sible for a woman to successfully carry a subse-
quent pregnancy to term; an increased risk of 
uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embo-
lus, and trauma to the uterus as a result of 
converting the child to a footling breech posi-
tion, a procedure which, according to a leading 
obstetrics textbook, ‘‘there are very few, if any, 
indications for . . .
other than for delivery of 
a second twin’’; and a risk of lacerations and 
secondary hemorrhaging due to the doctor 
blindly forcing a sharp instrument into the base 
of the unborn child’s skull while he or she is 
lodged in the birth canal, an act which could re-
sult in severe bleeding, brings with it the threat 
of shock, and could ultimately result in mater-
nal death.
(B) There is no credible medical evidence 
that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer 
than other abortion procedures. No controlled 
studies of partial-birth abortions have been con-
ducted nor have any comparative studies been
conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy 
compared to other abortion methods. Further-
more, there have been no articles published in 
peer-reviewed journals that establish that par-
tial-birth abortions are superior in any way to 
established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike 
other more commonly used abortion procedures, 
there are currently no medical schools that pro-
vide instruction on abortions that include the 
instruction in partial-birth abortions in their 
curriculum. 
(C) A prominent medical association has 
concluded that partial-birth abortion is ‘‘not an 
accepted medical practice,’’ that it has ‘‘never 
been subject to even a minimal amount of the 
normal medical practice development,’’ that 
‘‘the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
the procedure in specific circumstances remain 
unknown,’’ and that ‘‘there is no consensus 
among obstetricians about its use’’. The asso-
ciation has further noted that partial-birth 
abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical 
experts and the public, is ‘‘ethically wrong,’’ 
and ‘‘is never the only appropriate procedure’’.
(D) Neither the plaintiff in Stenberg v. 
Carhart, nor the experts who testified on his 
behalf, have identified a single circumstance
during which a partial-birth abortion was nec-
essary to preserve the health of a woman. 
(E) The physician credited with developing 
the partial-birth abortion procedure has testi-
fied that he has never encountered a situation 
where a partial-birth abortion was medically 
necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, 
thus, is never medically necessary to preserve 
the health of a woman. 
(F) A ban on the partial-birth abortion 
procedure will therefore advance the health in-
terests of pregnant women seeking to terminate 
a pregnancy. 
(G) In light of this overwhelming evidence, 
Congress and the States have a compelling in-
terest in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. In 
addition to promoting maternal health, such a 
prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly 
distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that pre-
serves the integrity of the medical profession, 
and promotes respect for human life.
(H) Based upon Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992), a governmental interest 
in protecting the life of a child during the deliv-
ery process arises by virtue of the fact that dur-
ing a partial-birth abortion, labor is induced 
and the birth process has begun. This distinc-
tion was recognized in Roe when the Court 
noted, without comment, that the Texas partu-
rition statute, which prohibited one from killing 
a child ‘‘in a state of being born and before ac-
tual birth,’’ was not under attack. This interest 
becomes compelling as the child emerges from 
the maternal body. A child that is completely 
born is a full, legal person entitled to constitu-
tional protections afforded a ‘‘person’’ under 
the United States Constitution. Partial-birth 
abortions involve the killing of a child that is in 
the process, in fact mere inches away from, be-
coming a ‘‘person’’. Thus, the government has 
a heightened interest in protecting the life of 
the partially-born child. 
(I) This, too, has not gone unnoticed in 
the medical community, where a prominent 
medical association has recognized that partial-
birth abortions are ‘‘ethically different from 
other destructive abortion techniques because 
the fetus, normally twenty weeks or longer in 
gestation, is killed outside of the womb’’. Ac-
cording to this medical association, the ‘‘ ‘par-
tial birth’ gives the fetus an autonomy which 
separates it from the right of the woman to 
choose treatments for her own body’’. 
(J) Partial-birth abortion also confuses the 
medical, legal, and ethical duties of physicians 
to preserve and promote life, as the physician 
acts directly against the physical life of a child, 
whom he or she had just delivered, all but the 
head, out of the womb, in order to end that life. 
Partial-birth abortion thus appropriates the ter-
minology and techniques used by obstetricians 
in the delivery of living children—obstetricians 
who preserve and protect the life of the mother 
and the child—and instead uses those tech-
niques to end the life of the partially-born child. 
(K) Thus, by aborting a child in the man-
ner that purposefully seeks to kill the child 
after he or she has begun the process of birth, 
partial-birth abortion undermines the public’s 
perception of the appropriate role of a physician
during the delivery process, and perverts a 
process during which life is brought into the 
world, in order to destroy a partially-born child. 
(L) The gruesome and inhumane nature of 
the partial-birth abortion procedure and its dis-
turbing similarity to the killing of a newborn in-
fant promotes a complete disregard for infant 
human life that can only be countered by a pro-
hibition of the procedure. 
(M) The vast majority of babies killed dur-
ing partial-birth abortions are alive until the 
end of the procedure. It is a medical fact, how-
ever, that unborn infants at this stage can feel 
pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that 
their perception of this pain is even more in-
tense than that of newborn infants and older 
children when subjected to the same stimuli. 
Thus, during a partial-birth abortion procedure, 
the child will fully experience the pain associ-
ated with piercing his or her skull and sucking 
out his or her brain.
(N) Implicitly approving such a brutal and 
inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit 
it will further coarsen society to the humanity 
of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and in-
nocent human life, making it increasingly dif-
ficult to protect such life. Thus, Congress has 
a compelling interest in acting—indeed it must 
act—to prohibit this inhumane procedure.
(O) For these reasons, Congress finds that 
partial-birth abortion is never medically indi-
cated to preserve the health of the mother; is in 
fact unrecognized as a valid abortion procedure 
by the mainstream medical community; poses 
additional health risks to the mother; blurs the 
line between abortion and infanticide in the kill-
ing of a partially-born child just inches from 
birth; and confuses the role of the physician in 
childbirth and should, therefore, be banned. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title 18, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after chapter 73 the following: 
‘‘CHAPTER 74—PARTIAL-BIRTH 
ABORTIONS
‘‘Sec. 
‘‘1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited.
‘‘§ 1531. Partial-birth abortions prohibited 
‘‘(a) Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth 
abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or
both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth 
abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother 
whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical 
illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering 
physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy 
itself. This subsection takes effect 1 day after the enact-
ment. 
‘‘(b) As used in this section—
‘‘(1) the term ‘partial-birth abortion’ means an 
abortion in which—
‘‘(A) the person performing the abortion 
deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers 
a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first 
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the 
body of the mother, or, in the case of breech 
presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past 
the navel is outside the body of the mother for 
the purpose of performing an overt act that the 
person knows will kill the partially delivered liv-
ing fetus; and 
‘‘(B) performs the overt act, other than 
completion of delivery, that kills the partially 
delivered living fetus; and 
‘‘(2) the term ‘physician’ means a doctor of 
medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice