(5) The Russian Federation succeeded to the 
INF Treaty obligations of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics in a declaration issued at Biskek, 
Kyrgyzstan, in October 1992. 
(6) The flight test or deployment of any INF- 
banned weapon delivery vehicle by the Russian Fed-
eration constitutes a militarily significant violation 
of the INF Treaty. 
(7) The INF Treaty has unlimited duration, 
but, under the terms of the Treaty, inspections and 
continuous monitoring of Russian missile production 
under the Treaty ceased on June 1, 2001, thus the 
Treaty no longer offers any verification to detect any 
militarily significant violations. 
(8) A major problem exists with respect to the 
application of the INF Treaty to any new ballistic 
or cruise missile that is flight tested or otherwise 
flown once at a range not prohibited by the Treaty 
(that is a range less than 500 kilometers or more 
than 5,500 kilometers) but will be flown at a range 
that is banned by the Treaty (at a range that is be-
tween 500 and 5,500 kilometers) as a weapon deliv-
ery vehicle. 
(9) President Obama has not made use of any 
INF Treaty-provided means to address Russian non-
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compliance with the Treaty, to include convening a 
meeting of the Treaty’s Special Verification Commis-
sion under Article XIII of the Treaty. 
(10) The Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate noted in its 1988 report on the INF 
Treaty that, ‘‘In the event Soviet actions appear to 
contradict their obligations under the treaty, Con-
gress should be kept fully informed. Any question-
able activity should be fully discussed in the Special 
Verification Commission. If the Soviet Union has 
not, after a sufficient period of time, satisfied 
United States concerns or ceased the activity in 
question, and if the Soviet activity is deemed to be 
militarily significant, the President should propose 
implementation of an appropriate and proportionate 
response.’’. 
(11) The Administration has not made any seri-
ous or credible effort, over several years, to respond 
to violations by the Russian Federation of its obliga-
tions under the INF Treaty. 
(12) The INF Treaty is no longer effectively 
verifiable. 
(13) The Russian Federation’s actions, as de-
tailed in the January 29, 2014, report of the New 
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York Times have defeated the object and purpose of 
the INF Treaty. 
(14) Continued noncompliance by the Russian 
Federation with its obligations under the INF Trea-
ty and continued United States adherence to the 
INF Treaty, in light of failure to respond in a timely 
manner to Russian noncompliance, places the su-
preme interests of the United States and its allies in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
jeopardy. 
(15) The Russian Federation has violated its 
obligations under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum 
on Security Assurances and has rendered null the ef-
fect and assurances of the NATO–Russia Founding 
Act of 1997. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Russian Federation, through its flight 
testing of both a ballistic missile intended for inter-
mediate-range targets as well its flight testing of a 
ground-launched cruise missile prohibited by the 
INF Treaty has acted contrary to the object and 
purpose of a central purpose of the Treaty and is 
therefore in material breach of its obligations under 
the Treaty; and 
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(2) the President, after consultation with 
United States allies directly affected by such Rus-
sian Federation ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, 
should take such actions as the President determines 
to be necessary to deny the Russian Federation any 
militarily significant advantage resulting from its 
noncompliance with the INF Treaty. 
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, 
OR ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S.-RUSSIA BILAT-
ERAL PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION. 
No funds made available to the Department of State 
may be used to carry out programs, projects, or activities 
of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission until 
the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that the Russian Federation as of the date of 
the certification has or has not flight tested a ballistic mis-
sile at strategic range in a configuration (booster stages, 
post-boost vehicle, or reentry vehicles) that is unlike a con-
figuration that is used for remaining tests of the system 
at ranges that are prohibited under the INF Treaty. 
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SEC. 5. PROGRAM TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOP GROUND- 
LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE AND GROUND- 
LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILI-
TIES. 
(a) PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The President shall es-
tablish and carry out a program to research and develop 
ground-launched cruise missile and ground-launched bal-
listic missile capabilities, including by modification of 
exiting United States military capabilities, with a range 
between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. 
(b) STUDY AND REPORT.— 
(1) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a 
study for potential sites of the cruise missile and 
ballistic missile capabilities specified in subsection 
(a). In conducting the study, the President shall 
consider selecting sites on United States overseas 
military bases and sites offered by United States al-
lies. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that contains the results of the 
study. 
(c) WAIVER.—The President may waive the require-
ment to establish and carry out the program under sub-
section (a) if, on or before October 1, 2014, the President 
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