I 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 2352 
To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to place reasonable 
limits on contributions to Super PACs which make independent expendi-
tures, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 26, 2025 
Ms. LEE of Pennsylvania (for herself, Mr. KHANNA, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. 
JAYAPAL, Ms. TLAIB, Mr. DELUZIO, and Mrs. RAMIREZ) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on House Administra-
tion 
A BILL 
To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to 
place reasonable limits on contributions to Super PACs 
which make independent expenditures, and for other pur-
poses. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Abolish Super PACs 
Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds as follows: 
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(1) Contribution limits to political action com-
mittees (PACs), including those that make inde-
pendent expenditures, help secure elections by lim-
iting both the risk of corruption and the risk that 
significant contributions will create the appearance 
of corruption. 
(2) Since contribution limits on super PACs 
were lifted in 2010, the number, influence, and 
wealth of super PACs have exploded. Obtaining mil-
lions or billions of dollars in contributions to super 
PACs is now critical to the success of Federal can-
didates’ campaigns. 
(3) As the influence of super PACs grows, so 
does the likelihood that they will serve as a conduit 
for corrupt agreements between contributor and can-
didate, whose communications are not subject to co-
ordination limitations. 
(4) Between 2008 and 2020, the amount of 
independent expenditures increased more than 700 
percent, and in 2024, more than $4.48 billion in 
independent expenditures were spent on United 
States elections. The money for these expenditures 
largely came from contributions to 2,459 registered 
super PACs. 
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(5) In 2012, the first modern elections for Fed-
eral office held without contribution limits to super 
PACs, the top 1 percent of all individual super PAC 
contributors contributed 76.76 percent of all indi-
vidual super PAC contributions, and that percentage 
rose to 96.94 percent in 2024. Recent elections have 
been influenced by individual contributors who gave 
more than $100 million to super PACs. 
(6) As bribery laws have long recognized, un-
lawful quid pro quo exchanges can occur where the 
bribe is funneled into a third party, such as a super 
PAC. See, e.g., section 201 of title 18, United States 
Code; U.S. v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 606, 621–23 
(D. N.J. 2018). Law enforcement in several States 
have prosecuted cases that involve bribes directed to 
super PACs. However, bribery is notoriously difficult 
to prosecute, and these laws do not adequately pro-
tect American voters from corruption. 
(7) Without reasonable limitations on contribu-
tions, super PACs create an appearance of corrup-
tion. A bipartisan majority of Americans believe that 
large super PAC contributions are made in exchange 
for political favors, and that corruption is pervasive 
in the Federal Government. This is, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Buckley v. Valeo, ‘‘disastrous’’ 
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to ‘‘confidence in the system of representative gov-
ernment’’ 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
(8) Placing limits on super PAC contributions 
will also lessen the risk of foreign interference in 
United States elections, making it more difficult for 
foreign entities to funnel contributions to super 
PACs via third-party contributors. 
(9) SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), the appellate court case that void-
ed existing contribution limits to super PACs, 
wrongly treated contributions as expenditures and 
wrongly assumed that because uncoordinated inde-
pendent expenditures cannot give rise to quid pro 
quo corruption, that contributions to independent 
expenditure committees similarly cannot give rise to 
corruption. But they can and do. 
(10) In the 14 years since SpeechNow un-
leashed billions of dollars in unregulated contribu-
tions, super PACs have obtained unprecedented 
wealth and value to candidate campaigns and can fa-
cilitate vast, nearly untraceable corrupt transactions. 
(11) Because Super PACs have become unique-
ly important to candidate campaigns and can accept 
millions and even hundreds of millions of dollars 
from single entities, candidates and contributors 
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have reason and opportunity to guide corrupt con-
tributions into super PACs, establishing a significant 
risk of corruption and creating an appearance of 
corruption that undermines the public’s faith in 
their representatives and our political system. 
(12) Reasonable limits on contributions to 
super PACs are lawful and necessary to protect 
American democracy and American voters. 
(b) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this Act— 
(1) to limit the risk of corrupt agreements be-
tween candidates and contributors by placing rea-
sonable limits on contributions to political action 
committees that make independent expenditures; 
(2) to limit the appearance of corruption cre-
ated by uncapped contributions to political action 
committees that make independent expenditures; 
and 
(3) to restore the public’s faith in our elections. 
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDEPENDENT 
EXPENDITURE COMMITTEES. 
(a) LIMITATIONS.—Section 315(a)(1)(C) of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 
30116(a)(1)(C)) is amended by striking ‘‘to any other po-
litical committee’’ and inserting ‘‘to an independent ex-
penditure committee or any other political committee’’. 
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(b) DEFINITION.—Section 301 of such Act (52 
U.S.C. 30101) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(27) 
INDEPENDENT
EXPENDITURE
COM-
MITTEE.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—The term ‘inde-
pendent expenditure committee’ means a polit-
ical committee which— 
‘‘(i) makes independent expenditures 
aggregating $5,000 or more during a cal-
endar year; or 
‘‘(ii) makes contributions to other 
independent expenditure committees aggre-
gating $5,000 or more during a calendar 
year. 
‘‘(B) TREATMENT
OF
SEPARATE
AC-
COUNTS.—The term ‘independent expenditure 
committee’ includes an account of a political 
committee which is established for the purpose 
of making independent expenditures or con-
tributions to other committees making inde-
pendent expenditures.’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall apply with respect to contributions and 
independent expenditures made during the first calendar 
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year which begins after the date of the enactment of this 
Act and each succeeding calendar year. 
Æ 
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