H. R. 3979—364 
(B) 
land-based 
intercontinental 
ballistic 
missiles 
equipped with nuclear warheads that are capable of car-
rying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; 
and 
(C) ballistic missile submarines equipped with sub-
marine launched ballistic missiles and multiple nuclear 
warheads; 
(2) to operate, sustain, and modernize or replace a capa-
bility to forward-deploy nuclear weapons and dual-capable 
fighter-bomber aircraft; 
(3) to deter potential adversaries and assure allies and 
partners of the United States through strong and long-term 
commitment to the nuclear deterrent of the United States and 
the personnel, systems, and infrastructure that comprise such 
deterrent; and 
(4) to ensure that the members of the Armed Forces who 
operate the nuclear deterrent of the United States have the 
training, resources, and national support required to execute 
the critical national security mission of the members. 
SEC. 1653. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE POS-
TURE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that the United States reaffirms 
and remains committed to the policies enumerated by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Deterrence and Defense Posture 
Review, dated May 20, 2012, and the Wales Summit Declaration 
of September 2014, including the following statements: 
(1) As stated in the Deterrence and Defense Posture 
Review: 
(A) ‘‘The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to 
protect and defend our territory and our populations 
against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington 
Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be 
its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO’s 
resolve if the security of any of its members were to be 
threatened. NATO will ensure that it maintains the full 
range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against 
any threat to the safety and security of our populations, 
wherever it should arise. Allies’ goal is to bolster deterrence 
as a core element of our collective defense and contribute 
to the indivisible security of the Alliance.’’. 
(B) ‘‘Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s 
overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside 
conventional and missile defense forces. The review has 
shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently 
meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense 
posture.’’. 
(C) ‘‘The circumstances in which any use of nuclear 
weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely 
remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will 
remain a nuclear alliance. The supreme guarantee of the 
security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear 
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United 
States; the independent strategic forces of the United 
Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their 
own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of 
the Allies.’’.
H. R. 3979—365 
(D) ‘‘NATO must have the full range of capabilities 
necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety 
of its populations and the security of its territory, which 
is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility.’’. 
(E) ‘‘NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate 
mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabili-
ties for deterrence and defense to fulfill its commitments 
as set out in the Strategic Concept. These capabilities, 
underpinned by NATO’s Integrated Command Structure, 
offer the strongest guarantee of the Alliance’s security and 
will ensure that it is able to respond to a variety of chal-
lenges and unpredictable contingencies in a highly complex 
and evolving international security environment.’’. 
(2) As stated in the Wales Summit Declaration: 
(A) ‘‘Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of 
nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities, 
remains a core element of our overall strategy.’’. 
(B) ‘‘Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation 
continue to play an important role in the achievement 
of the Alliance’s security objectives. Both the success and 
failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the 
threat environment of NATO. In this context, it is of para-
mount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation 
commitments 
under 
existing 
treaties 
are 
honoured, 
including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty, which is a crucial element of Euro-Atlantic security. 
In that regard, Allies call on Russia to preserve the viability 
of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable 
compliance.’’. 
Subtitle E—Missile Defense Programs 
SEC. 1661. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE 
ROCKET DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by section 1502 for procurement, Defense-wide, and 
available for the Missile Defense Agency, not more than 
$350,972,000 may be provided to the Government of Israel to pro-
cure the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system as specified 
in the funding table in section 4102, including for co-production 
of Iron Dome parts and components in the United States by industry 
of the United States. 
(b) CONDITIONS.— 
(1) AGREEMENT.—Funds described in subsection (a) to 
produce the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense program 
shall be available subject to the terms, conditions, and co- 
production targets specified for fiscal year 2015 in the ‘‘Agree-
ment Between the Department of Defense of the United States 
of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel 
Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement,’’ signed 
on March 5, 2014. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days prior to the 
initial obligation of funds described in subsection (a), the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall 
jointly submit to the congressional defense committees—
H. R. 3979—366 
(A) a certification that the agreement specified in para-
graph (1) is being implemented as provided in such agree-
ment; and 
(B) an assessment detailing any risks relating to the 
implementation of such agreement. 
SEC. 1662. TESTING AND ASSESSMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
PRIOR TO PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) it is a high priority of the United States that the 
ballistic missile defense system should work in an operationally 
effective and cost-effective manner; 
(2) prior to making final production decisions for such 
systems, and prior to the operational deployment of such sys-
tems, the United States should conduct operationally realistic 
intercept flight testing that should create sufficiently chal-
lenging operational conditions to establish confidence that such 
systems will work in an operationally effective and cost-effective 
manner when needed; and 
(3) in order to achieve these objectives, and to avoid post- 
production and post-deployment problems, it is essential for 
the Department of Defense to follow a ‘‘fly before you buy’’ 
approach to adequately test and assess the elements of the 
ballistic missile defense system before final production decisions 
or operational deployment. 
(b) SUCCESSFUL TESTING REQUIRED PRIOR TO FINAL PRODUC-
TION OR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT.—The Secretary of Defense may 
not make a final production decision for, or operationally deploy, 
a covered system unless— 
(1) the Secretary ensures that— 
(A) sufficient and operationally realistic testing of the 
covered system is conducted to assess the performance 
of the covered system in order to inform a final production 
decision or an operational deployment decision; and 
(B) the results of such testing have demonstrated a 
high probability that the covered system— 
(i) will work in an operationally effective manner; 
and 
(ii) has the ability to accomplish the intended mis-
sion of the covered system; 
(2) the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has 
carried out subsection (c) with respect to such covered system; 
and 
(3) the Commander of the United States Strategic Com-
mand has carried out subsection (d) with respect to such covered 
system. 
(c) ASSESSMENT
BY DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONAL TEST
AND 
EVALUATION.—The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
shall— 
(1) provide to the Secretary the assessment of the Director, 
based on the available test data, of the sufficiency, adequacy, 
and results of the testing of each covered system, including 
an assessment of whether the covered system will be sufficiently 
effective, suitable, and survivable when needed; and 
(2) submit to the congressional defense committees a writ-
ten summary of such assessment.
H. R. 3979—367 
(d) ASSESSMENT BY COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC 
COMMAND.—The Commander of the United States Strategic Com-
mand shall— 
(1) provide to the Secretary a military utility assessment 
of the operational utility of each covered system; and 
(2) not later than 30 days after providing such assessment 
to the Secretary, submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a written summary of such assessment. 
(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to alter, modify, or otherwise affect a determination of 
the Secretary with respect to the participation of the Missile Defense 
Agency in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
or the acquisition reporting process under the Department of 
Defense Directive 5000 series. 
(f) COVERED
SYSTEM.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered 
system’’ means a new or substantially upgraded interceptor or 
weapon system of the ballistic missile defense system, other than 
the re-designed exo-atmospheric kill vehicle covered by the acquisi-
tion plan developed under section 1663. 
SEC. 1663. ACQUISITION PLAN FOR RE-DESIGNED EXO-ATMOSPHERIC 
KILL VEHICLE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the existing models of the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle 
of the ground-based midcourse defense system are prototype 
designs that were developed and deployed without using tradi-
tional acquisition practices in order to provide an initial defen-
sive capability for an emerging ballistic missile threat; 
(2) consequently, while the deployed models of the exo- 
atmospheric kill vehicle have demonstrated an initial level 
of capability against a limited threat, such models do not have 
the degree of reliability, robustness, cost effectiveness, and 
performance that are desirable; 
(3) the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle for the ground-based 
midcourse defense system needs to be re-designed to substan-
tially improve the performance and reliability of such kill 
vehicles; and 
(4) the Secretary of Defense should follow a robust and 
rigorous acquisition plan for the design, development, and 
testing of the re-designed exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. 
(b) ACQUISITION PLAN REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop an acquisition plan for the re-design of the exo- 
atmospheric kill vehicle of the ground-based midcourse defense 
system that includes rigorous elements for system engineering, 
design, integration, development, testing, and evaluation. 
(c) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the acquisition plan under 
subsection (b) shall be to ensure that the re-designed exo- 
atmospheric kill vehicle is operationally effective, reliable, produc-
ible, cost effective, maintainable, and testable. 
(d) APPROVAL OF ACQUISITION PLAN REQUIRED.—The acquisi-
tion plan under subsection (b) shall be subject to approval by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. 
(e) TESTING REQUIRED.—Prior to operational deployment of the 
re-designed exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, the Secretary shall ensure 
that the re-designed kill vehicle has demonstrated, through success-
ful, operationally realistic flight testing—