H. R. 7776—1487 
‘‘SEC. 603. UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITY DEFINED. 
‘‘In this title, the terms ‘United States diplomatic facility’ and 
‘diplomatic facility’ mean any chancery, consulate, or other office 
that— 
‘‘(1) is considered by the Secretary of State to be diplomatic 
or consular premises, consistent with the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations, done at Vienna April 18, 1961, and 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna 
April 24, 1963, and was notified to the host government as 
such; or 
‘‘(2) is otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral 
agreement with the host government (contained in the records 
of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the 
official status of the United States Government personnel 
present at the facility.’’. 
(e) GUIDANCE
AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR DIPLOMATIC FACILI-
TIES.— 
(1) GUIDANCE FOR CLOSURE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FACILI-
TIES.—Section 5606(a) of the Public Diplomacy Modernization 
Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–81; 22 U.S.C. 1475g note) is 
amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—In order to preserve public diplomacy facili-
ties that are accessible to the publics of foreign countries, not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Secure 
Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 2022, the Sec-
retary of State shall adopt guidelines to collect and utilize informa-
tion from each diplomatic post at which the construction of a new 
embassy compound or new consulate compound could result in 
the closure or co-location of an American Space that is owned 
and operated by the United States Government, generally known 
as an American Center, or any other public diplomacy facility 
under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act 
of 1999 (22 U.S.C. 4865 et seq.).’’. 
(2) SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
UNITED
STATES
DIPLO-
MATIC
FACILITIES.—Section 606(a) of the Secure Embassy 
Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (22 U.S.C. 
4865(a)) is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ‘‘the threat’’ and 
inserting ‘‘a range of threats, including that’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2)— 
(i) in subparagraph (A)— 
(I) by inserting ‘‘in a location that has certain 
minimum ratings under the Security Environment 
Threat List as determined by the Secretary in 
his or her discretion’’ after ‘‘abroad’’; and 
(II) by inserting ‘‘, personnel of the Peace 
Corps, and personnel of any other type or category 
of facility that the Secretary may identify’’ after 
‘‘military commander’’; and 
(ii) in subparagraph (B)— 
(I) by amending clause (i) to read as follows: 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clause (ii), the Sec-
retary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the 
Secretary, in consultation with, as appropriate, the 
head of each agency employing personnel that would 
not be located at the site, if applicable, determines 
that it is in the national interest of the United States
H. R. 7776—1488 
after taking account of any considerations the Sec-
retary in his or her discretion considers relevant, which 
may include security conditions.’’; and 
(II) in clause (ii), by striking ‘‘(ii) CHANCERY 
OR CONSULATE BUILDING.—’’ and all that follows 
through ‘‘15 days prior’’ and inserting the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(ii) CHANCERY OR CONSULATE BUILDING.—Prior’’; 
and 
(C) in paragraph (3)— 
(i) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(A) REQUIREMENT.— 
‘‘(i) IN
GENERAL.—Each newly acquired United 
States diplomatic facility in a location that has certain 
minimum ratings under the Security Environment 
Threat List as determined by the Secretary of State 
in his or her discretion shall— 
‘‘(I) be constructed or modified to meet the 
measured building blast performance standard 
applicable to a diplomatic facility sited not less 
than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property 
on which the facility is situated; or 
‘‘(II) fulfill the criteria described in clause (ii). 
‘‘(ii) 
ALTERNATIVE
ENGINEERING
EQUIVALENCY 
STANDARD REQUIREMENT.—Each facility referred to in 
clause (i) may, instead of meeting the requirement 
under such clause, fulfill such other criteria as the 
Secretary is authorized to employ to achieve an 
engineering standard of security and degree of protec-
tion that is equivalent to the numerical perimeter dis-
tance setback described in such clause seeks to 
achieve.’’; and 
(ii) in subparagraph (B)— 
(I) in clause (i)— 
(aa) by striking ‘‘security considerations 
permit and’’; and 
(bb) by inserting ‘‘after taking account of 
any considerations the Secretary in his or her 
discretion considers relevant, which may 
include security conditions’’ after ‘‘national 
interest of the United States’’; 
(II) in clause (ii), by striking ‘‘(ii) CHANCERY 
OR CONSULATE BUILDING.—’’ and all that follows 
through ‘‘15 days prior’’ and inserting the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(ii) CHANCERY OR CONSULATE BUILDING.—Prior’’; 
and 
(III) in clause (iii), by striking ‘‘an annual’’ 
and inserting ‘‘a quarterly’’. 
SEC. 9302. DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND SECURITY. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Diplomatic 
Support and Security Act of 2022’’. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) A robust overseas diplomatic presence is part of an 
effective foreign policy, particularly in volatile environments
H. R. 7776—1489 
where a flexible and timely diplomatic response can be decisive 
in preventing and addressing conflict. 
(2) Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families 
at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where 
they face threats related to international terrorism, violent 
conflict, and public health. 
(3) The Department has a remarkable record of protecting 
personnel while enabling an enormous amount of global diplo-
matic activity, often in unsecure and remote places and facing 
a variety of evolving risks and threats. With support from 
Congress, the Department has revised policy, improved physical 
security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, 
deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, 
and greatly enhanced training requirements and training facili-
ties, including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center 
in Blackstone, Virginia. 
(4) Diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambi-
tious external engagement to advance United States interests 
as diverse as competing with China’s malign influence around 
the world, fighting terrorism and transnational organized crime, 
preventing and addressing violent conflict and humanitarian 
disasters, promoting United States businesses and trade, pro-
tecting the rights of marginalized groups, addressing climate 
change, and preventing pandemic disease. 
(5) Efforts to protect personnel overseas have often resulted 
in inhibiting diplomatic activity and limiting engagement 
between embassy personnel and local governments and popu-
lations. 
(6) Given that Congress currently provides annual appro-
priations in excess of $1,900,000,000 for embassy security, 
construction, and maintenance, the Department should be able 
to ensure a robust overseas presence without inhibiting the 
ability of diplomats to— 
(A) meet outside United States secured facilities with 
foreign leaders to explain, defend, and advance United 
States priorities; 
(B) understand and report on foreign political, social, 
and economic conditions through meeting and interacting 
with community officials outside of United States facilities; 
(C) provide United States citizen services; and 
(D) collaborate and, at times, compete with other diplo-
matic missions, particularly those, such as that of the 
People’s Republic of China, that do not have restrictions 
on meeting locations. 
(7) Given these stakes, Congress has a responsibility to 
empower, support, and hold the Department accountable for 
implementing an aggressive strategy to ensure a robust over-
seas presence that mitigates potential risks and adequately 
considers the myriad direct and indirect consequences of a 
lack of diplomatic presence. 
(c) ENCOURAGING EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY.— 
(1) PURPOSE.—Section 102(b) of the Diplomatic Security 
Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4801(b)) is amended— 
(A) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows: 
‘‘(3) to promote strengthened security measures, institu-
tionalize a culture of learning, and, in the case of apparent
H. R. 7776—1490 
gross negligence or breach of duty, recommend that the Sec-
retary investigate accountability for United States Government 
personnel with security-related responsibilities under chief of 
mission authority;’’; 
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as para-
graphs (5) and (6), respectively; and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following: 
‘‘(4) to support a culture of risk management, instead of 
risk avoidance, that enables the Department of State to pursue 
its vital goals with full knowledge that it is neither desirable 
nor possible for the Department to avoid all risks;’’. 
(2) BRIEFINGS ON EMBASSY SECURITY.—Section 105(a)(1) of 
the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4804(a)) is amended— 
(A) by striking ‘‘any plans to open or reopen a high 
risk, high threat post’’ and inserting ‘‘progress towards 
opening or reopening a high risk, high threat post, and 
the risk to national security of the continued closure or 
any suspension of operations and remaining barriers to 
doing so’’; 
(B) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘the risk to 
United States national security of the post’s continued clo-
sure or suspension of operations,’’ after ‘‘national security 
of the United States,’’; and 
(C) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ‘‘the type and 
level of security threats such post could encounter, and’’ 
before ‘‘security ‘tripwires’ ’’. 
(d) SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEES.—Section 301 of the Diplo-
matic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4831) is amended— 
(1) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘ACCOUNTABILITY 
REVIEW BOARDS’’ and inserting ‘‘SECURITY REVIEW COMMIT-
TEES’’; 
(2) in subsection (a)— 
(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows: 
‘‘(1) CONVENING THE SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE.—In any 
case of a serious security incident involving loss of life, serious 
injury, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, 
a United States Government diplomatic mission abroad 
(referred to in this title as a ‘Serious Security Incident’), and 
in any case of a serious breach of security involving intelligence 
activities of a foreign government directed at a United States 
Government mission abroad, the Secretary of State shall con-
vene a Security Review Committee, which shall issue a report 
providing a full account of what occurred, consistent with sec-
tion 304.’’; 
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) and (3) as para-
graphs (3) and (4), respectively; 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following: 
‘‘(2) COMMITTEE COMPOSITION.—The Secretary shall des-
ignate a Chairperson and may designate additional personnel 
of commensurate seniority to serve on the Security Review 
Committee, which shall include— 
‘‘(A) the Director of the Office of Management Strategy 
and Solutions; 
‘‘(B) the Assistant Secretary responsible for the region 
where the incident occurred; 
‘‘(C) the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic 
Security;
H. R. 7776—1491 
‘‘(D) the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence 
and Research; 
‘‘(E) an Assistant Secretary-level representative from 
any involved United States Government department or 
agency; and 
‘‘(F) other personnel determined to be necessary or 
appropriate.’’; 
(D) in paragraph (3), as redesignated by subclause 
(B)— 
(i) in the paragraph heading, by striking ‘‘DEPART-
MENT
OF
DEFENSE
FACILITIES
AND
PERSONNEL’’ and 
inserting ‘‘EXCEPTIONS
TO
CONVENING
A
SECURITY 
REVIEW COMMITTEE’’; 
(ii) by striking ‘‘The Secretary of State is not 
required to convene a Board in the case’’ and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is not 
required to convene a Security Review Committee— 
‘‘(i) if the Secretary determines that the incident 
involves only causes unrelated to security, such as 
when the security at issue is outside of the scope 
of the Secretary of State’s security responsibilities 
under section 103; 
‘‘(ii) if operational control of overseas security func-
tions has been delegated to another agency in accord-
ance with section 106; 
‘‘(iii) if the incident is a cybersecurity incident 
and is covered by other review mechanisms; or 
‘‘(iv) in the case’’; and 
(iii) by striking ‘‘In any such case’’ and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(B) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVESTIGATIONS.—In the 
case of an incident described in subparagraph (A)(iv)’’; and 
(E) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(5) RULEMAKING.—The Secretary of State shall promulgate 
regulations defining the membership and operating procedures 
for the Security Review Committee and provide such guidance 
to the Chair and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives.’’; 
(3) in subsection (b)— 
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking ‘‘BOARDS’’ 
and inserting ‘‘SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEES’’; and 
(B) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows: 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall convene 
a Security Review Committee not later than 60 days after 
the occurrence of an incident described in subsection (a)(1), 
or 60 days after the Department first becomes aware of such 
an incident, whichever is earlier, except that the 60-day period 
for convening a Security Review Committee may be extended 
for one additional 60-day period if the Secretary determines 
that the additional period is necessary.’’; and 
(4) by amending subsection (c) to read as follows: 
‘‘(c) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Whenever the Secretary 
of State convenes a Security Review Committee, the Secretary 
shall promptly inform the chair and ranking member of— 
‘‘(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
H. R. 7776—1492 
‘‘(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
‘‘(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
‘‘(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives; 
‘‘(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives; and 
‘‘(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives.’’. 
(e) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 302 
of the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4832) is 
amended— 
(1) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘ACCOUNTABILITY 
REVIEW BOARD’’ and inserting ‘‘SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE’’; 
and 
(2) by striking ‘‘a Board’’ each place such term appears 
and inserting ‘‘a Security Review Committee’’. 
(f) SERIOUS SECURITY INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS.—Sec-
tion 303 of the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4833) 
is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 303. SERIOUS SECURITY INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESS. 
‘‘(a) INVESTIGATION PROCESS.— 
‘‘(1) INITIATION UPON REPORTED INCIDENT.—A United States 
mission shall submit an initial report of a Serious Security 
Incident not later than 3 days after such incident occurs, when-
ever feasible, at which time an investigation of the incident 
shall be initiated. 
‘‘(2) INVESTIGATION.—Not later than 10 days after the 
submission of a report pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary 
shall direct the Diplomatic Security Service to assemble an 
investigative team to investigate the incident and independ-
ently establish what occurred. Each investigation under this 
subsection shall cover— 
‘‘(A) an assessment of what occurred, who perpetrated 
or is suspected of having perpetrated the Serious Security 
Incident, and whether applicable security procedures were 
followed; 
‘‘(B) in the event the Serious Security Incident involved 
a United States diplomatic compound, motorcade, resi-
dence, or other facility, an assessment of whether adequate 
security countermeasures were in effect based on a known 
threat at the time of the incident; 
‘‘(C) if the incident involved an individual or group 
of officers, employees, or family members under Chief of 
Mission security responsibility conducting approved oper-
ations or movements outside the United States mission, 
an assessment of whether proper security briefings and 
procedures were in place and whether weighing of risk 
of the operation or movement took place; and 
‘‘(D) an assessment of whether the failure of any offi-
cials or employees to follow procedures or perform their 
duties contributed to the security incident. 
‘‘(3) INVESTIGATIVE TEAM.—The investigative team assem-
bled pursuant to paragraph (2) shall consist of individuals 
from the Diplomatic Security Service who shall provide an 
independent examination of the facts surrounding the incident 
and what occurred. The Secretary, or the Secretary’s designee,
H. R. 7776—1493 
shall review the makeup of the investigative team for a conflict, 
appearance of conflict, or lack of independence that could under-
mine the results of the investigation and may remove or replace 
any members of the team to avoid such an outcome. 
‘‘(b) REPORT OF INVESTIGATION.—Not later than 90 days after 
the occurrence of a Serious Security Incident, the investigative 
team investigating the incident shall prepare and submit a Report 
of Investigation to the Security Review Committee that includes— 
‘‘(1) a detailed description of the matters set forth in sub-
paragraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (a)(2), including all 
related findings; 
‘‘(2) a complete and accurate account of the casualties, 
injuries, and damage resulting from the incident; and 
‘‘(3) a review of security procedures and directives in place 
at the time of the incident. 
‘‘(c) CONFIDENTIALITY.—The investigative team investigating a 
Serious Security Incident shall adopt such procedures with respect 
to confidentiality as determined necessary, including procedures 
relating to the conduct of closed proceedings or the submission 
and use of evidence in camera, to ensure in particular the protection 
of classified information relating to national defense, foreign policy, 
or intelligence matters. The Director of National Intelligence shall 
establish the level of protection required for intelligence information 
and for information relating to intelligence personnel included in 
the report required under subsection (b). The Security Review Com-
mittee shall determine the level of classification of the final report 
prepared pursuant to section 304(b), and shall incorporate the same 
confidentiality measures in such report to the maximum extent 
practicable.’’. 
(g) FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITY REVIEW 
COMMITTEE.—Section 304 of the Diplomatic Security Act of 1986 
(22 U.S.C. 4834) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 304. SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND REPORT. 
‘‘(a) FINDINGS.—The Security Review Committee shall— 
‘‘(1) review the Report of Investigation prepared pursuant 
to section 303(b), and all other evidence, reporting, and relevant 
information relating to a Serious Security Incident at a United 
States mission abroad, including an examination of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding any serious injuries, loss of 
life, or significant destruction of property resulting from the 
incident; and 
‘‘(2) determine, in writing— 
‘‘(A) whether the incident was security related and 
constituted a Serious Security Incident; 
‘‘(B) if the incident involved a diplomatic compound, 
motorcade, residence, or other mission facility— 
‘‘(i) whether the security systems, security counter-
measures, 
and 
security 
procedures 
operated 
as 
intended; and 
‘‘(ii) whether such systems worked to materially 
mitigate the attack or were found to be inadequate 
to mitigate the threat and attack; 
‘‘(C) if the incident involved an individual or group 
of officers conducting an approved operation outside the 
mission, whether a valid process was followed in evaluating
H. R. 7776—1494 
the requested operation and weighing the risk of the oper-
ation, which determination shall not seek to assign account-
ability for the incident unless the Security Review Com-
mittee determines that an official breached his or her duty; 
‘‘(D) the impact of intelligence and information avail-
ability, and whether the mission was aware of the general 
operating threat environment or any more specific threat 
intelligence or information and took that into account in 
ongoing and specific operations; and 
‘‘(E) any other facts and circumstances that may be 
relevant to the appropriate security management of United 
States missions abroad. 
‘‘(b) REPORT.— 
‘‘(1) SUBMISSION TO SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not later than 
60 days after receiving the Report of Investigation prepared 
pursuant to section 303(b), the Security Review Committee 
shall submit a report to the Secretary of State that includes— 
‘‘(A) the findings described in subsection (a); and 
‘‘(B) any related recommendations. 
‘‘(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 90 days 
after receiving the report pursuant to paragraph (1), the Sec-
retary of State shall submit a copy of the report to— 
‘‘(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
‘‘(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
‘‘(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
‘‘(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; 
‘‘(E) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives; and 
‘‘(F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
‘‘(c) PERSONNEL RECOMMENDATIONS.—If in the course of con-
ducting an investigation under section 303, the investigative team 
finds reasonable cause to believe any individual described in section 
303(a)(2)(D) has breached the duty of that individual or finds lesser 
failures on the part of an individual in the performance of his 
or her duties related to the incident, it shall be reported to the 
Security Review Committee. If the Security Review Committee finds 
reasonable cause to support the determination, it shall be reported 
to the Secretary for appropriate action.’’. 
(h) RELATION TO OTHER PROCEEDINGS.—Section 305 of the Dip-
lomatic Security Act of 1986 (22 U.S.C. 4835) is amended— 
(1) by inserting ‘‘(a) NO EFFECT ON EXISTING REMEDIES 
OR DEFENSES.—’’ before ‘‘Nothing in this title’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(b) FUTURE INQUIRIES.—Nothing in this title may be construed 
to preclude the Secretary of State from convening a follow-up public 
board of inquiry to investigate any security incident if the incident 
was of such magnitude or significance that an internal process 
is deemed insufficient to understand and investigate the incident. 
All materials gathered during the procedures provided under this 
title shall be provided to any related board of inquiry convened 
by the Secretary.’’. 
(i) TRAINING
FOR
FOREIGN
SERVICE
PERSONNEL
ON
RISK 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and submit 
a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees for training
H. R. 7776—1495 
and educating Foreign Service personnel regarding appropriate risk 
management practices while conducting their duties in high risk, 
high threat environments that includes— 
(1) plans to continue to develop and offer additional training 
courses, or augment existing courses, for Department personnel 
regarding the conduct of their duties in high risk, high threat 
environments outside of diplomatic compounds, including for 
diplomatic personnel, such as political officers, economic offi-
cers, and consular officers; 
(2) plans to educate Senior Foreign Service personnel 
serving abroad, including ambassadors, chiefs of mission, 
deputy chiefs of missions, and regional security officers, 
regarding appropriate risk management practices to employ 
while evaluating requests for diplomatic operations in high 
risk, high threat environments outside of diplomatic com-
pounds; and 
(3) plans and strategies for effectively balancing safety 
risks with the need for in-person engagement with local govern-
ments and populations. 
(j) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY AWARD.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the Secretary should— 
(1) encourage expeditionary diplomacy, proper risk manage-
ment practices, and regular and meaningful engagement with 
civil society at the Department by establishing an annual 
award, which shall be known as the ‘‘Expeditionary Diplomacy 
Award’’, to be awarded to deserving officers and employees 
of the Department; and 
(2) establish procedures for selecting the recipients of the 
Expeditionary Diplomacy Award, including any financial terms 
associated with such award. 
(k) PROMOTION IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE.—Section 603(b) of 
the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4003(b)) is amended— 
(1) in the third sentence of the matter preceding paragraph 
(1), by inserting ‘‘and when occupying positions for which the 
following is, to any degree, an element of the member’s duties,’’ 
after ‘‘as the case may be,’’; 
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘when occupying positions 
for which such willingness and ability is, to any degree, an 
element of the member’s duties, or’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(3) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following: 
‘‘(3) other demonstrated experience in public diplomacy; 
or’’; 
(4) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following: 
‘‘(2) a willingness and ability to regularly and meaningfully 
engage with civil society and other local actors in country;’’; 
and 
(5) by inserting after paragraph (3), as redesignated, the 
following: 
‘‘(4) the ability to effectively manage and assess risk associ-
ated with the conduct of diplomatic operations.’’. 
(l) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and every 180 days thereafter 
for the following 2 years, the Secretary shall submit a report to 
the appropriate congressional committees describing the Depart-
ment’s risk management efforts, including information relating to—