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(b) COVERED FUNDS.—For purposes of this section, 
the term ‘‘fiscal year 2011 and 2012 Aircraft Procurement, 
Air Force funds’’ means— 
(1) amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2011 by section 103(1) of the Ike Skelton 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4152) for air-
craft procurement for the Air Force; and 
(2) amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2012 by section 101 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public 
Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1317) and available for Air-
craft Procurement, Air Force as specified in the fund-
ing table in section 4101 of that Act. 
(c) EFFECT ON AUTHORIZATION AMOUNTS.—A trans-
fer made from one account to another under the authority 
of this section shall be deemed to increase the amount au-
thorized for the account to which the amount is transferred 
by an amount equal to the amount transferred. 
(d) CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY.—The transfer au-
thority in this section is in addition to any other transfer 
authority provided in this Act. 
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Subtitle E—Joint and Multiservice 
Matters 
SEC. 151. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR V–22 
JOINT AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. 
(a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.— 
Subject to section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, the 
Secretary of the Navy may enter into a multiyear contract 
or contracts, beginning with the fiscal year 2013 program 
year, for the procurement of V–22 aircraft for the Depart-
ment of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and 
the United States Special Operations Command. 
(b) CONDITION
FOR
OUT-YEAR
CONTRACT
PAY-
MENTS.—A contract entered into under subsection (a) shall 
provide that any obligation of the United States to make 
a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal 
year 2013 is subject to the availability of appropriations 
for that purpose for such later fiscal year. 
SEC. 152. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
FULL-RATE 
PRODUCTION 
OF 
HANDHELD, 
MANPACK, AND SMALL FORM/FIT RADIOS 
UNDER THE JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM 
PROGRAM. 
Amounts available for the Joint Tactical Radio Sys-
tem (JTRS) program may not be obligated or expended for 
full-rate production of the Handheld, Manpack, and Small 
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Form/Fit (HMS) radios under that program until the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics certifies to the congressional defense commit-
tees that the acquisition strategy for such radios provides, 
to the maximum extent practicable, for full and open com-
petition in the acquisition of such radios. 
SEC. 153. SHALLOW WATER COMBAT SUBMERSIBLE PRO-
GRAM. 
(a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Commander of the 
United States Special Operations Command shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report setting 
forth the following: 
(1) A description of the efforts of the contractor 
under the Shallow Water Combat Submersible 
(SWCS) program and the United States Special Op-
erations Command to improve the accuracy of the 
tracking of the schedule and costs of the program. 
(2) The revised timeline for the initial and full 
operational capability of the Shallow Water Combat 
Submersible. 
(3) A current estimate of the cost to meet the 
basis of issue requirement under the program. 
(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.— 
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(1) QUARTERLY REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Com-
mander of the United States Special Operations Com-
mand shall submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees on a quarterly basis updates on the metrics 
from the earned value management system with which 
the Command is tracking the schedule and cost per-
formance of the contractor of the Shallow Water Com-
bat Submersible program. 
(2) SUNSET.—The requirement in paragraph (1) 
shall cease on the date the Shallow Water Combat 
Submersible has completed operational testing and 
has been found to be operationally effective and oper-
ationally suitable. 
SEC. 154. AC–130 AIRCRAFT ELECTRO-OPTICAL AND INFRA-
RED SENSORS. 
(a) ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR PROCUREMENT, DE-
FENSE-WIDE.—The amount authorized to be appropriated 
for fiscal year 2013 by section 101 is hereby increased by 
$6,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be available 
for amounts authorized to be appropriated by that section 
and available for procurement, Defense-wide, other procure-
ment programs, line 079, Combat mission requirements, as 
specified in the funding table in section 4101. 
(b) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNT.—To the extent pro-
vided in appropriations Acts, the amount authorized and 
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made available by subsection (a) may be obligated and ex-
pended for a new program to procure color electro-optical 
and infrared imaging sensors for AC–130 aircraft used by 
the United States Special Operations Command in ongoing 
contingency operations. 
TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOP-
MENT, TEST, AND EVALUA-
TION 
Subtitle A—Authorization of 
Appropriations 
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fis-
cal year 2013 for the use of the Department of Defense for 
research, development, test, and evaluation as specified in 
the funding table in section 4201. 
Subtitle B—Program Requirements, 
Restrictions, and Limitations 
SEC. 211. NEXT GENERATION FOUNDRY FOR THE DEFENSE 
MICROELECTRONICS ACTIVITY. 
Amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2013 by section 201 and available for research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation for the Next Generation Foundry 
for the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) (PE 
#603720S) as specified in the funding table in section 4201 
may not be obligated or expended for that purpose until 
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60 days after the date on which the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering— 
(1) develops a microelectronics strategy as de-
scribed in the Senate report to accompany S. 1235 of 
the 112th Congress (S. Rept. 112–26) and an estimate 
of the full life-cycle costs for the upgrade of the Next 
Generation Foundry; and 
(2) submits the strategy and cost estimate re-
quired by paragraph (1) to the congressional defense 
committees. 
SEC. 212. ADVANCED ROTORCRAFT INITIATIVE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall, in 
consultation with the military departments, the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, and industry (including 
the Vertical Lift Consortium (VLC)), submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report setting forth a strategy 
for the use of integrated platform design teams and agile 
prototyping approaches for the development of advanced 
rotorcraft capabilities. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) Mechanisms for establishing agile proto-
typing practices and programs, including rotorcraft 
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X-planes, and an identification of the resources re-
quired for such purposes. 
(2) A restructuring of the Joint Multi-role 
(JMR) development program of the Army to include 
more technology demonstration platforms with chal-
lenge goals of significant reductions in cost and time 
to flight. 
(3) A restructuring of the X-Plane Rotorcraft 
program of the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency to develop performance objectives beyond the 
Joint Multi-role development program, including at 
least two competing teams. 
(4) Approaches, including competitive prize 
awards, to encourage the development of advanced 
rotorcraft capabilities to address challenge problems 
such as nap-of-earth automated flight, urban oper-
ation near buildings, slope landings, automated auto-
rotation or power-off recovery, and automated selec-
tion of landing areas. 
SEC. 213. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2012 NAVY 
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVAL-
UATION FUNDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—To the extent provided in appro-
priations Acts, the Secretary of the Navy may transfer from 
fiscal year 2012 Navy research, development, test, and eval-
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uation funds, $8,832,000 to other, higher priority programs 
of the Navy. 
(b) COVERED FUNDS.—For purposes of this section, 
the term ‘‘fiscal year 2012 Navy research, development, test, 
and evaluation funds’’ means amounts authorized to be ap-
propriated for fiscal year 2012 by section 201 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub-
lic Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1329) and available for Re-
search, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy as speci-
fied in the funding table in section 4201 of that Act. 
(c) EFFECT ON AUTHORIZATION AMOUNTS.—A trans-
fer made from one account to another under the authority 
of this section shall be deemed to increase the amount au-
thorized for the account to which the amount is transferred 
by an amount equal to the amount transferred. 
(d) CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY.—The transfer au-
thority in this section is in addition to any other transfer 
authority provided in this Act. 
SEC. 214. AUTHORITY FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAB-
ORATORIES 
TO 
ENTER 
INTO 
EDUCATION 
PARTNERSHIPS WITH EDUCATIONAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN UNITED STATES TERRITORIES 
AND POSSESSIONS. 
(a) AUTHORITY.—Subsection (a) of section 2194 of 
title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘, 
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the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the 
United States’’ after ‘‘institutions of the United States’’. 
(b) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.—Subsection (f)(2) of 
such section is amended by inserting ‘‘(20 U.S.C. 7801)’’ 
before the period. 
SEC. 215. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2012 AIR 
FORCE 
RESEARCH, 
DEVELOPMENT, 
TEST, 
AND EVALUATION FUNDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—To the extent provided in appro-
priations Acts, the Secretary of the Air Force may transfer 
from fiscal year 2012 Air Force research, development, test, 
and evaluation funds, $78,426,000 to other, higher priority 
programs of the Air Force. 
(b) COVERED FUNDS.—For purposes of this section, 
the term ‘‘fiscal year 2012 Air Force research, development, 
test, and evaluation funds’’ means amounts authorized to 
be appropriated for fiscal year 2012 by section 201 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
(Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1329) and available for Re-
search, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force as 
specified in the funding table in section 4201 of that Act. 
(c) EFFECT ON AUTHORIZATION AMOUNTS.—A trans-
fer made from one account to another under the authority 
of this section shall be deemed to increase the amount au-
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thorized for the account to which the amount is transferred 
by an amount equal to the amount transferred. 
(d) CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY.—The transfer au-
thority in this section is in addition to any other transfer 
authority provided in this Act. 
SEC. 216. RELOCATION OF C–BAND RADAR FROM ANTIGUA 
TO H.E. HOLT STATION IN WESTERN AUS-
TRALIA TO ENHANCE SPACE SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS CAPABILITIES. 
To the extent provided in appropriations Acts, of the 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2013 
by section 201 and available for research, development, test, 
and evaluation for Space Situation Awareness Systems 
(PE 0604425F) for System Development and Demonstra-
tion as specified in the funding table in section 4201, 
$3,000,000 may be obligated and expended for a new pro-
gram for the relocation and research and development ac-
tivities to enhance Space Situational Awareness capabili-
ties through— 
(1) the repurposing of the C–Band Radar at An-
tigua; 
(2) the relocation of that radar to the H.E. Holt 
Station in Western Australia; 
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(3) upgrades of the hardware and software of 
that radar to meet Space Situational Awareness mis-
sion needs; 
(4) operational testing of that radar; and 
(5) transfer of jurisdiction of that radar to the 
Air Force Space Command for operations and 
sustainment by September 30, 2016. 
SEC. 217. DETAILED DIGITAL RADIO FREQUENCY MODULA-
TION COUNTERMEASURES STUDIES AND SIM-
ULATIONS. 
(a) ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR RDT&E, ARMY.—The 
amount authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2013 
by section 201 is hereby increased by $38,000,000, with the 
amount of the increase to be available for amounts author-
ized to be appropriated by that section and available for 
research, development, test, and evaluation, Army, for sys-
tem development and demonstration (PE 0605457A) Army 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD), as specified 
in the funding table in section 4201. 
(b) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNT.—To the extent pro-
vided in appropriations Acts, the amount authorized and 
made available by subsection (a) may be obligated and ex-
pended for a new program to conduct detailed digital radio 
frequency modulation (DRFM) countermeasures studies 
and simulations to develop algorithms to address this threat 
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change in support of the accelerated fielding of a new capa-
bility in Patriot, Sentinel, and Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (IAMD) for the requirements of the commanders of 
the combatant commands. 
Subtitle C—Missile Defense Matters 
SEC. 231. HOMELAND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Ballistic Missile Defense Review of Feb-
ruary 2010 stated as its first policy priority that ‘‘the 
United States will continue to defend the homeland 
against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack’’ 
and that ‘‘an essential element of the United States’ 
homeland ballistic missile defense strategy is to hedge 
against future uncertainties, including both the un-
certainty of future threat capabilities and the tech-
nical risks inherent to our own development plans’’. 
(2) The United States currently has an oper-
ational Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) sys-
tem with 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) de-
ployed in Alaska and California, protecting the 
United States against the potential future threat of 
limited ballistic missile attack from countries such as 
North Korea and Iran. 
(3) As Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy Bradley Roberts 
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testified before the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate on April 25, 2012, ‘‘[w]ith 30 GBIs in 
place, the United States is in an advantageous posi-
tion vis-a`-vis the threats from North Korea and 
Iran,’’ and ‘‘neither has successfully tested an ICBM 
or demonstrated an ICBM-class warhead’’. 
(4) Deputy Assistant Secretary Roberts testified 
that maintaining this advantageous position ‘‘re-
quires continued improvement to the GMD system, 
including enhanced performance by the GBIs and the 
deployment of new sensors. It also requires the devel-
opment of the Precision Tracking Space System 
(PTSS) to handle larger raid sizes and the Standard 
Missile-3 (SM–3) Block IIB as the ICBM threat from 
states like Iran and North Korea matures. These ef-
forts will help to ensure that the United States pos-
sesses the capability to counter the projected threat for 
the foreseeable future’’. 
(5) As its highest priority, the Missile Defense 
Agency is designing a correction to the problem that 
caused a December 2010 flight test failure of the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system using the Ca-
pability Enhancement II (CE–II) model of exo-atmos-
pheric kill vehicle, and plans to demonstrate the cor-
rection in two flight tests before resuming production 
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or assembly of additional Capability Enhancement II 
kill vehicles. 
(6) The Department of Defense has a program to 
improve the performance and reliability of the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, including a 
plan to test every component of the Ground-Based 
Interceptors for reliability. According to Department 
of Defense officials, the goal of the Ground-Based In-
terceptor reliability program is to double the number 
of threat Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 
that our current inventory of Ground-Based Intercep-
tors could defeat, thereby effectively doubling the ca-
pability of our current Ground-based Midcourse De-
fense system. 
(7) The Missile Defense Agency, working with the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and 
with United States Strategic Command, has devel-
oped a comprehensive Integrated Master Test Plan 
(IMTP) for missile defense, with flight tests for the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system planned 
through fiscal year 2022, including salvo testing, mul-
tiple simultaneous engagement testing, and oper-
ational testing. 
(8) The Director of Operational Test and Eval-
uation, who must review, approve, and sign each 
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semi-annual version of the Integrated Master Test 
Plan, testified that the Test Plan is ‘‘a robust and 
rigorous test plan’’. He also testified that the current 
pace of Ground-based Midcourse Defense system test-
ing of one flight test per year is the ‘‘best that we’ve 
been able to achieve over a decade’’. 
(9) The Director of the Missile Defense Agency 
testified before the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate on April 25, 2012, that flight testing the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system more often 
than once per year could cause ‘‘greater risk of fur-
ther failure and setbacks to developing our homeland 
defense capability as rapidly as possible’’. 
(10) As part of its homeland defense hedging 
strategy, the Department of Defense has already de-
cided upon or implemented a number of actions to 
improve the missile defense posture of the United 
States in case the threat of Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles from North Korea or Iran emerges sooner or 
in greater numbers than anticipated. These include 
the following actions: 
(A) The Missile Defense Agency has com-
pleted construction of Missile Field-2 at Fort 
Greely, Alaska, with eight extra silos available to 
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deploy additional operational Ground-Based 
Interceptors, if needed. 
(B) With its request for 5 additional 
Ground-Based Interceptors in the budget of the 
President for fiscal year 2013, the Missile De-
fense Agency plans to have enough test and spare 
Ground-Based Interceptors to emplace in the 8 
extra silos from 2014 through 2025, and will 
keep the Ground-Based Interceptor production 
line active for 5 additional years, thus allowing 
additional Ground-Based Interceptor purchases 
in the future, if needed. 
(C) The Department has decided not to de-
commission prototype Missile Field-1 at Fort 
Greely but, instead, to keep it in a storage status 
that would permit it to be refurbished and reac-
tivated within a few years if future threat devel-
opments make that necessary. 
(D) The Missile Defense Agency plans to 
build an in-flight interceptor communications 
terminal at Fort Drum, New York, to enhance 
the performance of Ground-Based Interceptors 
defending the eastern United States against pos-
sible future missile threats from Iran. 
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(E) The Missile Defense Agency is con-
tinuing the development and testing of the two- 
stage Ground-Based Interceptor for possible de-
ployment in the future, if needed. 
(F) The Missile Defense Agency is upgrad-
ing early warning radars in Clear, Alaska, and 
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, to enhance the ability 
to defend against potential multiple future Inter-
continental Ballistic Missile threats from North 
Korea and Iran. 
(G) The Missile Defense Agency is pursuing 
development of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB 
interceptor for Phase 4 of the European Phased 
Adaptive Approach. It is intended to augment 
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system as a 
cost-effective first layer of defense of the home-
land against a possible future Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missile threat from Iran. 
(H) The Missile Defense Agency is pursuing 
development of the Precision Tracking Space 
System, a satellite sensor system to provide per-
sistent tracking of large numbers of missiles in 
flight, and fire-control quality targeting data to 
various missile defense interceptor systems. Ac-
cording to the Director of the Missile Defense 
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Agency, ‘‘the greatest future enhancement for 
both homeland and regional defense in the next 
ten years is the development of the Precision 
Tracking Space System satellites’’. 
(11) As part of its homeland defense hedging 
strategy review, the Department of Defense is consid-
ering other options to enhance the future United 
States posture to defend the homeland, including the 
feasibility, advisability and affordability of deploying 
additional Ground-Based Interceptors, either in Alas-
ka or at a missile defense site on the East Coast of 
the United States. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) it is a national priority to defend the home-
land against the potential future threat of limited 
ballistic missile attack from countries such as North 
Korea and Iran; 
(2) the currently deployed Ground-based Mid-
course Defense system, with 30 Ground-Based Inter-
ceptors deployed in Alaska and California, provides 
protection of the United States homeland against the 
potential future threat of limited ballistic missile at-
tack from North Korea and Iran; 
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(3) it is essential for the Ground-based Mid-
course Defense system to achieve the levels of reli-
ability, availability, sustainability, and operational 
performance that will allow it to continue providing 
protection of the United States homeland against lim-
ited ballistic missile attack; 
(4) the Missile Defense Agency should, as its 
highest priority, correct the problem that caused the 
December 2010 Ground-based Midcourse Defense sys-
tem flight test failure and demonstrate the correction 
in flight tests before resuming production of the Capa-
bility Enhancement-II kill vehicle, in order to provide 
confidence that the system will work as intended; 
(5) the Department of Defense should continue to 
enhance the performance and reliability of the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and enhance 
the capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, 
to provide improved capability to defend the home-
land against possible increased future missile threats 
from North Korea and Iran; 
(6) the Missile Defense Agency should continue 
its robust, rigorous, and realistic testing of the 
Ground-based Midcourse Defense system at a pace of 
one flight test per year, as described in the Integrated 
Master Test Plan, including salvo testing, multiple si-
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multaneous engagement testing, and operational test-
ing; 
(7) if successfully developed, the Standard Mis-
sile-3 Block IIB interceptor would provide an essen-
tial first layer of defense of the homeland against an 
emerging Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat 
from Iran, using a cost-effective forward-based early 
intercept system that could permit holding Ground- 
Based Interceptors in reserve, and if such interceptor 
could be deployed on ships, it would also provide a 
significant enhancement to defense against possible 
future threats from North Korea; 
(8) the Precision Tracking Space System has the 
potential to improve dramatically the capability of 
homeland and regional missile defense systems 
against large numbers of missiles launched simulta-
neously, and should remain a high priority for devel-
opment; 
(9) the Department of Defense has taken a num-
ber of prudent, affordable, cost-effective, and oper-
ationally significant steps to hedge against the possi-
bility of future growth in the missile threat to the 
homeland from North Korea and Iran; and 
(10) the Department of Defense should continue 
to evaluate the evolution of the long-range missile 
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threat from North Korea and Iran and consider other 
possibilities for prudent, affordable, cost-effective, and 
operationally significant steps to improve the posture 
of the United States to defend the homeland against 
possible future growth in the threat. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) REPORT
REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the status of efforts to 
improve the homeland ballistic missile defense capa-
bility of the United States. 
(2) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—The report required 
by paragraph (1)) shall include the following: 
(A) A detailed description of the actions 
taken or planned to improve the reliability, 
availability, and capability of the Ground-based 
Midcourse Defense system. 
(B) A description of any improvements 
achieved as a result of the actions described in 
subparagraph (A). 
(C) A description of the results of the two 
planned flight tests of the Ground-based Mid-
course Defense system (Control Test Vehicle flight 
test-1, and GMD Flight Test–06b) intended to 
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demonstrate the success of the correction of the 
problem that caused the flight test failure of De-
cember 2010, and the status of any decision to 
resume production of the Capability Enhance-
ment-II kill vehicle. 
(D) A detailed description of actions taken 
or planned to improve the homeland defense pos-
ture of the United States to hedge against poten-
tial future Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
threat growth from North Korea and Iran. 
(E) Any other matters the Secretary con-
siders appropriate. 
(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
SEC. 232. REGIONAL BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) In the introduction to the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review of February 2010, Secretary of De-
fense Robert Gates states that ‘‘I have made defending 
against near-term regional threats a top priority of 
our missile defense plans, programs and capabilities’’. 
(2) In describing the threat of regional ballistic 
missiles, the report of the Ballistic Missile Defense Re-
view states that ‘‘there is no uncertainty about the ex-
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istence of regional threats. They are clear and present. 
The threat from short-range, medium-range, and in-
termediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, 
and IRBMs) in regions where the United States de-
ploys forces and maintains security relationships is 
growing at a particularly rapid pace’’. 
(3) In testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate on April 25, 2012, Dr. Bradley 
Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy stated, with re-
spect to regional missile defense, that ‘‘the need arises 
from the rapidly emerging threats to our armed forces 
in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia from re-
gional missile proliferators and the basic challenge 
such proliferation poses to the safety and security of 
our forces and allies and to our power projection 
strategy’’. 
(4) Iran has the largest inventory of regional 
ballistic missiles in the Middle East, with hundreds 
of missiles that can reach southeastern Europe and 
all of the Middle East, including Israel. Iran is im-
proving its existing missiles and developing new and 
longer-range missiles. 
(5) North Korea has a large and growing inven-
tory of short-range and medium-range ballistic mis-
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siles that can reach United States forces and allies in 
South Korea and Japan. North Korea is improving 
its existing missiles and developing new and longer- 
range missiles. 
(6) In September 2009, President Barack Obama 
announced that he had accepted the unanimous rec-
ommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a European Phased 
Adaptive Approach to missile defense, designed to 
protect deployed United States forces and allies and 
partners in Europe against the large and growing 
threat of ballistic missiles from Iran. 
(7) In November 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) de-
cided to adopt the core mission of missile defense of 
its population, territory and forces. The North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization agreed to enhance its missile 
defense command and control system, the Active Lay-
ered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, to provide a 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization command and 
control capability. This is in addition to contribu-
tions of missile defense capability from individual na-
tions. 
(8) During 2011, the United States successfully 
implemented Phase 1 of the European Phased Adapt-
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ive Approach, including deployment of an AN/TPY– 
2 radar in Turkey, deployment of an Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense ship in the eastern Mediterranean Sea 
with Standard Missile-3 Block IA interceptors, and 
establishment of a missile defense command and con-
trol system in Germany. 
(9) During 2011, the United States successfully 
negotiated all the international agreements with 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies needed to 
permit future phases of the European Phased Adapt-
ive Approach, including agreements with Romania 
and Poland to permit the deployment of Aegis Ashore 
missile defense systems on their territory, an agree-
ment with Turkey to permit deployment of an AN/ 
TPY–2 radar on its territory, and an agreement with 
Spain to permit the forward stationing of four Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense ships at Rota. 
(10) Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach is planned for deployment in 2015, and is 
planned to include the deployment of Standard Mis-
sile-3 Block IB interceptors on Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Roma-
nia. 
(11) Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach is planned for deployment in 2018, and is 
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planned to include the deployment of Standard Mis-
sile-3 Block IIA interceptors on Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense ships and at an Aegis Ashore site in Poland. 
(12) Phase 4 of the European Phased Adaptive 
Approach is planned for deployment in 2020, and is 
planned to include the deployment of Standard Mis-
sile-3 Block IIB interceptors at Aegis Ashore sites. 
This interceptor is intended to protect both Europe 
and the United States against potential future long- 
range ballistic missiles from Iran. 
(13) At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Summit in Chicago in 2012, the North Atlantic Trea-
ty Organization plans to announce it has achieved an 
‘‘interim capability’’ for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization missile defense system, including initial 
capability of its Active Layered Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense system at a command and control fa-
cility in Germany. 
(14) The United States has a robust program of 
missile defense cooperation with Israel, including 
joint development of the Arrow Weapon System and 
the new Arrow-3 upper tier interceptor, designed to 
defend Israel against ballistic missiles from Iran. 
These jointly developed missile defense systems are de-
signed to be interoperable with United States ballistic 
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missile defenses, and these interoperable systems are 
tested in large military exercises. The United States 
has deployed an AN/TPY–2 radar in Israel to en-
hance missile defense against missiles from Iran. 
(15) The United States is working with the na-
tions of the Gulf Cooperation Council on enhanced 
national and regional missile defense capabilities 
against growing missile threats from Iran. As part of 
this effort, the United Arab Emirates plans to pur-
chase two batteries of the Terminal High Altitude Air 
Defense (THAAD) system, as well as other equipment. 
(16) The United States has a strong program of 
missile defense cooperation with Japan, including the 
co-development of the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) 
Block IIA interceptor for the Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense system, intended to be deployed by Japan and 
in Phase 3 of the European Phased Adaptive Ap-
proach, Japan’s fleet of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
ships using the SM–3 Block IA interceptors, and the 
United States deployment of an AN/TPY–2 radar in 
Japan. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the threat from regional ballistic missiles, 
particularly from Iran and North Korea, is serious 
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and growing, and puts at risk forward-deployed 
United States forces and allies and partners in Eu-
rope, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region; 
(2) the Department of Defense has an obligation 
to provide force protection of forward-deployed United 
States forces, assets, and facilities from regional bal-
listic missile attack; 
(3) the United States has an obligation to meet 
its security commitments to its allies, including bal-
listic missile defense commitments; 
(4) the Department of Defense has a balanced 
program of investment and capabilities to provide for 
both homeland defense and regional defense against 
ballistic missiles, consistent with the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review and with the prioritized and inte-
grated needs of the commanders of the combatant 
commands; 
(5) the European Phased Adaptive Approach to 
missile defense is an appropriate and necessary re-
sponse to the existing and growing ballistic missile 
threat from Iran to forward deployed United States 
forces and allies and partners in Europe; 
(6) the Department of Defense— 
(A) should, as a high priority, continue to 
develop, test, and plan to deploy all four phases 
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of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, in-
cluding all variants of the Standard Missile-3 
interceptor; and 
(B) should also continue with its other 
phased and adaptive regional missile defense ef-
forts tailored to the Middle East and the Asia- 
Pacific region; 
(7) European members of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization are making valuable contribu-
tions to missile defense in Europe, by hosting ele-
ments of United States missile defense systems on 
their territories, through individual national con-
tributions to missile defense capability, and by collec-
tive funding and development of the Active Layered 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system; and 
(8) the Department of Defense should continue 
with the development of the key enablers of enhanced 
regional missile defense, including the Precision 
Tracking Space System. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees a report describing the status and progress of 
regional missile defense programs and efforts. 
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(2) ELEMENTS OF REPORT.—The report required 
by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) An assessment of the adequacy of the ex-
isting and planned European Phased Adaptive 
Approach to provide force protection for forward 
deployed United States forces in Europe against 
ballistic missile threats from Iran, and an as-
sessment whether adequate force protection would 
be available absent the European Phased Adapt-
ive Approach. 
(B) An assessment whether the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach and other planned 
regional missile defense approaches of the United 
States meet the integrated priorities of the com-
manders of the regional combatant commands in 
an affordable and balanced manner. 
(C) A description of the progress made in 
the development and testing of elements of sys-
tems intended for deployment in Phases 2 
through 4 of the European Phased Adaptive Ap-
proach, including the Standard Missile-3 Block 
IB interceptor and the Aegis Ashore system. 
(D) A description of the manner in which 
elements of regional missile defense architectures, 
such as forward-based X-band radars in Turkey 
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and Japan, contribute to the enhancement of 
homeland defense of the United States. 
(E) A description of the current and 
planned contributions of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization allies, both collectively and indi-
vidually, to missile defense in Europe. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 233. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) For more than a decade, the United States 
and Russia have discussed a variety of options for co-
operation on shared early warning and ballistic mis-
sile defense. For example, on May 1, 2001, President 
George W. Bush spoke of a ‘‘new cooperative relation-
ship’’ with Russia and said ‘‘it should be premised on 
openness, mutual confidence and real opportunities 
for cooperation, including the area of missile defense. 
It should allow us to share information so that each 
nation can improve its early warning capability, and 
its capability to defend its people and territory. And 
perhaps one day, we can even cooperate in a joint de-
fense’’. 
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(2) Section 1231 of the Floyd D. Spence Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 
(as enacted into law by Public Law 106–398; 1654A– 
329) authorized the Department of Defense to estab-
lish in Russia a ‘‘joint center for the exchange of data 
from systems to provide early warning of launches of 
ballistic missiles and for notification of launches of 
such missiles’’, also known as the Joint Data Ex-
change Center (JDEC). 
(3) On March 31, 2008, Deputy Secretary of De-
fense Gordon England stated that ‘‘we have offered 
Russia a wide-ranging proposal to cooperate on mis-
sile defense—everything from modeling and simula-
tion, to data sharing, to joint development of a re-
gional missile defense architecture—all designed to 
defend the United States, Europe, and Russia from 
the growing threat of Iranian ballistic missiles. An 
extraordinary series of transparency measures have 
also been offered to reassure Russia. Despite some 
Russian reluctance to sign up to these cooperative 
missile defense activities, we continue to work toward 
this goal’’. 
(4) On July 6, 2009, President Barack Obama 
and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a 
joint statement on missile defense issues, which stated 
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that ‘‘Russia and the United States plan to continue 
the discussion concerning the establishment of co-
operation in responding to the challenge of ballistic 
missile proliferation. . . We have instructed our ex-
perts to work together to analyze the ballistic missile 
challenges of the 21st century and to prepare appro-
priate recommendations’’. 
(5) The February 2010 report of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review established as one of its cen-
tral policy pillars that increased international missile 
defense cooperation is in the national security interest 
of the United States and, with regard to cooperation 
with Russia, the United States ‘‘is pursuing a broad 
agenda focused on shared early warning of missile 
launches, possible technical cooperation, and even 
operational cooperation’’. 
(6) at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided 
to develop a missile defense system to ‘‘protect NATO 
European populations, territory and forces’’ and also 
to seek cooperation with Russia on missile defense. In 
its Lisbon Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization reaffirmed its readiness to ‘‘in-
vite Russia to explore jointly the potential for linking 
current and planned missile defence systems at an 
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appropriate time in mutually beneficial ways’’. The 
new NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon 
Summit states that ‘‘we will actively seek cooperation 
on missile defense with Russia’’, that ‘‘NATO-Russia 
cooperation is of strategic importance’’, and that ‘‘the 
security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and Russia is intertwined’’. 
(7) In a December 18, 2010, letter to the leader-
ship of the Senate, President Obama wrote that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ‘‘invited Russia 
to cooperate on missile defense, which could lead to 
adding Russian capabilities to those deployed by 
NATO to enhance our common security against com-
mon threats. The Lisbon Summit thus demonstrated 
that the Alliance’s missile defenses can be strength-
ened by improving NATO-Russian relations. This 
comes even as we have made clear that the system we 
intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint sys-
tem, and it will not in any way limit United States’ 
or NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Effective co-
operation with Russia could enhance the overall effi-
ciency of our combined territorial missile defenses, 
and at the same time provide Russia with greater se-
curity’’. 
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(8) Section 221(a)(3) of the Ike Skelton National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub-
lic Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4167) states that it is the 
sense of Congress ‘‘to support the efforts of the United 
States Government and the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization to pursue cooperation with the Russian 
Federation on ballistic missile defense relative to Ira-
nian missile threats’’. 
(9) In a speech in Russia on March 21, 2011, 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cited ‘‘the NATO- 
Russian decision to cooperate on defense against bal-
listic missiles. We’ve disagreed before, and Russia still 
has uncertainties about the European Phased Adapt-
ive Approach, a limited system that poses no chal-
lenges to the large Russian nuclear arsenal. However, 
we’ve mutually committed to resolving these difficul-
ties in order to develop a roadmap toward truly effec-
tive anti-ballistic missile collaboration. This collabo-
ration may include exchanging launch information, 
setting up a joint data fusion center, allowing greater 
transparency with respect to our missile defense plans 
and exercises, and conducting a joint analysis to de-
termine areas of future cooperation’’. 
(10) In testimony to the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate on April 13, 2011, Deputy As-
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sistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile 
Defense Policy Bradley H. Roberts stated that the 
United States has been pursuing a Defense Tech-
nology Cooperation Agreement with Russia since 
2004, and that such an agreement is necessary ‘‘for 
the safeguarding of sensitive information in support 
of cooperation’’ on missile defense, and to ‘‘provide 
the legal framework for undertaking cooperative ef-
forts’’. Further, Dr. Roberts stated that the United 
States would not provide any classified information 
to Russia without first conducting a National Disclo-
sure Policy review. He also stated that the United 
States is not considering sharing ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ tech-
nology with Russia. 
(11) In a March 2012 answer to a question from 
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on 
missile defense cooperation with Russia, Acting 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller 
wrote that ‘‘I support U.S.-Russian cooperation on 
missile defenses first and foremost because it could 
improve the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO missile 
defenses, thereby improving the protection of the 
United States, our forces overseas, and our Allies. 
Missile defense cooperation with Russia is in the secu-
rity interests of the United States, NATO, and Rus-
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item relating to section 2464 and inserting the fol-
lowing new item: 
‘‘2464. Core logistics capabilities.’’. 
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 
(1) Section 2366a of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended by striking ‘‘core depot-level main-
tenance and repair capabilities’’ each place it ap-
pears and inserting ‘‘core logistics capabilities’’. 
(2) Section 2366b(A)(3)(F) of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘core depot-level 
maintenance and repair capabilities, as well as the 
associated logistics capabilities’’ and inserting ‘‘core 
logistics capabilities’’. 
(3) Section 801(c) of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (125 Stat. 1483; 
10 U.S.C. 2366a note) is amended by striking ‘‘core 
depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities, as 
well as the associated logistics capabilities’’ and in-
serting ‘‘core logistics capabilities’’. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section and the amend-
ments made by this section shall take effect on December 
31, 2011, the date of the enactment of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, immediately after 
the enactment of that Act. 
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(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 2,261. 
(5) The Air National Guard of the United 
States, 14,871. 
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 2,888. 
SEC. 413. END STRENGTHS FOR MILITARY TECHNICIANS 
(DUAL STATUS). 
The minimum number of military technicians (dual 
status) as of the last day of fiscal year 2013 for the reserve 
components of the Army and the Air Force (notwith-
standing section 129 of title 10, United States Code) shall 
be the following: 
(1) For the Army Reserve, 8,445. 
(2) For the Army National Guard of the United 
States, 28,380. 
(3) For the Air Force Reserve, 10,716. 
(4) For the Air National Guard of the United 
States, 22,313. 
SEC. 414. FISCAL YEAR 2013 LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF 
NON-DUAL STATUS TECHNICIANS. 
(a) LIMITATIONS.— 
(1) NATIONAL
GUARD.—Within the limitation 
provided in section 10217(c)(2) of title 10, United 
States Code, the number of non-dual status techni-
cians employed by the National Guard as of Sep-
tember 30, 2013, may not exceed the following: 
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(2) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after re-
ceiving from the Director of Joint Force Development 
the report described in paragraph (1), the Comptroller 
General shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives a report on the review under paragraph (1) of 
the report described in that paragraph. The report of 
the Comptroller General under this paragraph shall 
set forth the following: 
(A) The results of the review under para-
graph (1). 
(B) Such recommendations as the Comp-
troller General considers appropriate in light of 
the results of the review. 
(b) REPORT ON JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDU-
CATION RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS.— 
(1) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than Janu-
ary 31, 2014, the Comptroller General of the United 
States shall submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees a report setting forth the assessment by the 
Comptroller General of the work performed by joint 
professional military education research institutions 
in support of professional military education and the 
broader mission of the Department of Defense, the 
military departments, and the Defense Agencies. 
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