A98 @ figure goes into the budget message that Tam not familiar with. Iam very highly pleased with your pledge of support in the present emergency. I don’t think there has ever been any serious difference of opinion between us on the operations of the Government except maybe in some policy approaches on which we naturally would not agree, Thanks very much for your kind letter, Sincerely yours, HARRY TRUMAN, The UN Should Act EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. RICHARD B. RUSSELL OF GEORGIA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appenuix of the Recorp an editorial entitled “The UN Should Act,” published in the Christian Science Monitor of Tuesday, January 9, 1951. I believe this editorial expresses the opinion of the most temperate school of thought in America on the subject discussed in the editorial. Trere being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RrecorpD, as follows: Tue UN SHoutp Act The United Nations was built to stop ag- gression. That, in the service of maintain- ing peace, security, and justice, was its pri- mary purpose. If the UN is to be effective as a deterrent to militarism it must recognize aggression when it sees it and be willing to call aggres- sion by its name. Right now, with reference to the attack of Communist China on UN forces in Korea, there would be not levity but grim candor in reminding the members of the UN through paraphrase of Gertrude Stein, Aggression is aggression is aggression is aggression. If the Chinese are not aggressors, why are British, Turkish, Australian, and other troops as well as American resisting them in Korea? ‘Those forces need the backing of a UN decla- ration of position in the matter. A declaration of position does not neces- sarily bind the UN members to any particular course of action, any specific sanctions against the offender. But it does put the world’s moral conviction on record. And it lays the foundation for whatever effective action can be taken thereafter. Some nations, notably Great Britain, un- derstandably draw back from proposals of blockade, which might result in war on a broader scale. India, a member of the British Commonwealth, apparently still cherishes hope of a truce. But if Chinese Communists have any dis- position to negotiate instead of fight they will be just as ready to talk with a realistic UN as with an unrealistic one. Indeed Com- munisis generally have shown more respect for an antagonist who calls a spade a spade than for one who shilly-shallies. The UN Political Committee, or “little as- sembly,” should proceed at once with adop- tion of a resolution designating the so-called Chinese People's Government as an aggressor for its intervention in Korea. Thereafter, the matter of sanctions, such @s blockade, embargoes, or nonrecognition of territorial gains, can be debated and de- termined on the basis of thelr wisdom and effectiveness. There its need for Britons to understand the de; th of American feeling on this sub- ject, Just as many Americans at times have argued with their compatriots for under- standing of British feelings and responsibili- ties. It would become very difficult indeed to marshal any enthusiastic American senti- ment for the UN if the UN now should allow Korea to go the way Manchuria, Ethiopia, and the Spanish Republic went in the 1930's. We earnestly hope the membership of the UN will see the necessity of keeping the record honest and clear by calling aggression aggression. West Europe’s Morale EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. HARRY FLOOD BYRD OF VIRGINIA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Ap- pendix of the Recorp a very interesting article written by a distinguished for- eign correspondent of the Associated Press, Mr. Wes Gallagher, which ap- peared in the Washington Star of Janu- ary 10. Mr. Gallagher has just re- turned from 10 years of foreign-service assignments. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Recorp, as follows: West Eurors’s MORALE CALLED HARDER PROB- LEM THAN ARMS (By Wes Gallagher ) New Yorx, January 10.-~Rearming Europe today is fundamentally a question of morale, not guns and planes. A large part of Europe hasn't the will to defend itself. On a grand scale, General Eisenhower is in the position of a football coach trying to instill the “will to win” in his team, General Eisenhower must try to instill the “will to fight.” Without it the United States can pour arms into Europe from now until doomsday without the slightest result, This colors the way Europeans look on the East-West confiict and the way Amer- icans look at it. Europeans are no less conscious than Americans of the menace of Soviet aggres- sion, The vast majority of French, Germans, British, Italians, and other Europeans have no more liking than Americans for com- munism. They dislike the Kremlin rulers, poke jibes at Stalin privately and wish Russia never existed, But they don't see that they can do much about the situation except commit suicide, And this is more than a figure of speech; I know Germans who keep poisons on hand and swear they will take them if overrun by the Soviet army again. From the Baltic to Spain, Europe has been ravaged and bled white by recent wars. The torrents of blood shed touching every family have drained away that intangible called morale. They know that any Soviet attack must be met in the heart of Europe. Whether the attack is held or not they know their homes will be devastated by battle and bombings. They and their sons and daughters ‘will die by the thousands, “APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE By experience they know that there are no winners in war, Even if they are on the winning side they know they will be tao prostrate to enjoy it. They still believe in freedom and wish with all their hearts they can keep it but have difficulty convincing themselves they can do it. They want to stop the Russians, but with- out morale the dangers and sacrifices of re- arming seem almost too much to bear. There are scores of other factors compli- cating the rearming of Europe. But most of them would fade if the morale problem were settled. This is General Eisenhower's big task. Tanks and guns are no good unless the sol- diers and peoples bchind them have the will to fight and use them. There are exceptions, of course, among the European nations. Great Britain can be counted on to fight bravely, as she has in the past. British and American Army coopera- tion in Germany is wholehearted and un- stinting on either side. Some of the smaller countries like the Norwegians also are pre- pared to stand and fight. Unfortunately they are not strong enough to tip the scales in the west’s favor. BRITISH POWFR DIVIDED Britain is forced to divide her might among sea, alr, and land forces She cannot make a large enough land contribution on the Con- tinent to deter the Russians even with Amer- {ean and small-country aid. European defense depends primarily on France and Germany and to a lesser extent on Italy. These are the only nations with the manpower and the strategic position among the Atlantic Pact powers to make a successful defense of the Continent possible France is depended on under the Atlantic pact program to supply the bulk ot the ground forces needed in Europe. France was beaten in the war of 1870. She was virtually beaten and bled white in the 1914-1918 war. In 1940 she was overrun in 6 weeks and put a resistance that at best must be described as feeble. Four years of morale-sapping occupation followed. These scars cannot be removed overnight and they are still visible today. French morale is, perhaps, the lowest in Europe when it comes to rearming to the hilt and making a firm stand against the Russians. GOVERNMENT IS SHAKY France's position is further complicated by (1) @ weak, divided government which is seldom able to hold power more than a few months, and (2) an estimated 6,000,000 Communists in the country. In contrast to the other political parties the French Communists are a hard, dis- ciplined core. They are ruthless. In a crisis they probably could seriously cripple any war effort with sabotage, resistance, strikes, and overt acts. Just how large an infiltration the Com- munists have in the French armed forces remains to be seen. For the moment there are not many armed forces to count, . The French have three divisions in their army of occupation but only a fraction of these are ready to fight. Their present re- serves in France proper are negligible and poorly equipped. The professional heart of the army is fighting in Indochina and can- not be counted on for European defense. ITALIAN POSITION SIMILAR France has plans to raise an army of near- ly a million in the next 2 or 3 years. Even if the west has this long, the question re- mains: Will these forces have the will to fight? Italy is in a similar position. Dumag the last war the morale of the Itallan soldier was notoriously bad under fascism. No one knows whether it would be any better under
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD democracy. There is no doubt the Italian people are war weary and politically cyni- cal. Although the Government is stable, there is a large and vigorous Italian Com- munist Party which has proven its ability to torture the country with disabling strikes when opportunity offers. As an ex-enemy nation, Italy also has been largely disarmed and it will take time and money to rebuild her armed forces. Western Germany with its 48,000,000 peo- ple and large reservoir of trained soldiers is eyed enviously by military men. THE GERMAN ATTITUDE I have been asked frequently: “Is it true the Germans really do not want to fight or are they just trying to get some concessivuns?" After fighting the Germans in two World Wars and having a terrible time in beating them, western nations find !t difficult to be- lleve the Germans really don’t want to go back into uniform again. But the fact is the people as such do not. Those, particularly between the ages of 20 and 40, have had a stomach full of war. There 1s scarcely a family that has not lost at least two close relatives in the last war. Virtually all have lost their homes, their money, and their security. On top of this, they are an occupied coun- try, treated as second-class citizens, and largely through French fears they are being asked to rearm as second-Class soldiers— pawns of nations that defeated them. AWARE OF WEAK DEFENSES The Germans are also military realists. They know the sad state of western defenses in Europe, compared to the six Soviet armies that rattle their tanks in the middle of Ger- many along the occupation border. They know that there is no such thing as a little rearming such as the Atlantic Pact has thus far proposed for them. A ttle rearming would provide no de- fense and only leave them at the mercy of the Russians as an enemy, should the So- viets attack. They also know any attack would begin in the middle of Germany and devastate a country just now getting back on its feet. There is no doubt a vote now for rearming would be overwhelmingly defeated if the West Germans were polled. West German politicians are riding this antirearming tide to gain concessions from the west. Even if they got all the conces- sions they are asking it is doubtful if they could pull the voters on their side and con- vince them they must arm. Should the west become stronger, offering some protection against the threat of attack, and should the west Germans feel them- selves equal partners of the western nations, they might vote to rearm. No one can say for sure. This does not mean the Germans would favor the Russians. With millions of dead and hundreds of thousands of brothers, sons, and daughters having disappeared into Rus- sia as prisoners, the Germans hate the Soviets, It is axiomatic that the closer the Euro- peans are to the Russians, the more they dislike them. Germans say if the west really wants some- one to fight the Soviets they should recruit eastern Germans who live under Soviet rule, It 1s true that west Berlin, which is com- pletely surrounded by the Soviet Army, is the most belligerent and outspoken against them. The Germans, like the rest of the continent, must be convinced that what they have is worth fighting for and if they prepare to fight they have a chance of winning without being wiped out in the process. Under these conditions it is well not to be misled or interpret some European political statements as appeasement or collaboration with communism or just silly unjustified optimism. It is probable the speaker does not really believe what he is saying but is lke the small boy whistling in the graveyard. He hopes for the best but fears the worst. A Slap on the Wrist EXTENSION OF REMARKS oF HON. CLYDE R. HOEY OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. HOEY. Mr. President, I ask unan- {mous consent to have inserted in the Appendix of the Recorp an editorial en- titled “A Slap on the Wrist,” from the Evening Star of Washington, D. C., of January 10, 1951. This editorial recites the finding of the National Labor Relations Board as to the policy of intimidation and violence practiced by the United Mine Workers against nonunion members in the coal strike of 1949, which discloses the method employed by the forces of John L. Lewis in bludgeoning nonunior miners into joining the union. The National Labor Relations Board finds them guilty, but claims that it has no power to enforce any penalty. This Board always seems to have great diffi- culty in finding any authority to take definite and vital action when the unions violate the law. Certainly Congress should provide a remedy so that infrac- tions of a law of this kind could be prop- erly dealt with. Otherwise, the freedom and independence of the average worker is destroyed. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Rec- ORD, as follows: A SLAP ON THE WrisT During Inst fall’s election campaign in Ohio, John L. Lewis, with much huffing and pufting, announced that he wou!d shut down the con! mines if Senator Tart tried to talk to the miners. His men, he announced, were not going to serve as captive audiences for anybody. Mr. Lewis takes a different view of cap- tive audiences, howaver, when he or his lleu- tenants are trying to bludgeon nonunion miners into joining the United Mine Workers, Here are some of the things the UMW goon squads were doing to nonunion men during the coal strike in 1949: At about 8 o'clock on the morning of June 29 some 2,000 UMW men went to the East Diamond mine in Kentucky, where 165 non- union men were at work. A sheriff and a State policeman at the scene said they could not “try to handle” the union mob. So the nonunion workers were rounded up, some by force. Any who tried to leave were seized and compelled to atay at the scene. Then union officials addressed the workers, de- manding that they join the union, He called for a show of hands from those who would sign up, and the men who did not raise their hands were cursed and threat- ened by the mob. Finally all of the non- union men were coerced into indicating that they would join. A99 That afternoon the UMW caravan, 2,000 strong, went to the Homestead mine. OCom- pany officials asked the police to prevent the mob from coming on company property, but the officers said they were helpless. So the union men rounded up the outnumbered nonunion workers and held them under guard until the organising speeches began. Again there was the demand for a show of hands, and when none of the nonunion men responded “an angry roar and booing arose from the massed throng of UMW men sur- rounding the employees, and cries of ‘We'll make them hold up thetr hands’ and ‘We'll come back and see these—,’ were heard.” These incidents are taken from the report of the National Labor Relations Board trial examiner who took testimony in the cases, and essentially the same procedure was re- peated by the UMW at one mine after an- other in Kentucky and West Virginia. The picture is clear. The weapons of the United Mine Workers are terrorism, mob violence, threats, and, in some inetances, physical in- jury. Yet John L. Lewis haa the effrontery to threaten a strike to keep his men from pains held as a captive audience for Senator ‘AFT. More to the point, however, is the attitude of the National Labor Relations Board. It has now upheld in substance the findings of its trial examiners, agreeing that the UMW and certain of its subordinate groups and officials are guilty of unfair labor practices. A cease and desist order has been issued, which means that the union has been told not to do it again. But beyond that there {6 no penalty—just a slap on the wrist. Board member Reynolds would have com- pelled the union to reimburse the nonunion men for time lost when they were driven from their jobs. But the majority would not agree to this, contending that the board lacked the authority to impose such a pen- alty. It does not follow, however, that no use- ful purpose is served by a proceeding of this kind. At least a record has been made. And the next time Mr. Lewis begins to talk about his oppressed and downtrodden men, the facts as to how the UMW really operates will be on the record for the benefit of any one who cares to look at them. Neoisolationism Is Surrender EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. GEORGE A. SMATHERS OF FLORIDA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Recorp a well-writ- ten and lucid editorial from the Miami Dally News. This editorial presents the other side of the argument to the one recently made by former President Her- bert Hoover concerning our foreign policy. It merits the attention of those who desire a better understanding of all points of view on the momentous prob- Jem: What should our future policy be? There being no objection, the editorial ‘was ordered to be printed in the Recorp, as follows: N&OISOLATIONISM Is SURRENDER Former President Hoover’s pronouncement this week on foreign policy—in effect a call for a new foreign policy—has been named
A100 neoisolationism. It is still closely akin to jsclationism if the word hes meaning. It is also surrender in advance of vast areas of the world to aggressive communiam. The Hoover thesis of concentration upon defense of the Western Hemisphere would surrender the entire Eurasian land mass to the Kremlin. There is a qualification: If West Europe first erected a sure dam against the Red flood, then Mr. Hoover would be willing to commit American soldiers and dollars further there. In other words, take the gamble out of the gamble in West Europe and Mr. Hoover will give it his blessing. This amounts to no qualification at all. The Hoover thesis virtually boils down to this: Holding the Atlantic Ocean with Britain as one frontier, and the Pacific Ocean with an armed Japan and other islande as the other frontier, What does surrender of the Eurasian con- tinents to aggressive communism mean? This is the home of 1,600,000,000 people, and it is the source of virtually all the raw mate- rials the Kremlin-Peiping axis needs for eventual conquest of the United States. At present Russia needs some materials to wage a war of conquest against the United States. At the end of its current 6-year plan, Russia is still expected to be one-third behind the United States in annual produc- tion of steel; one-half behind in coal. Most authoritative figures recently obtainable in- dicated that Russia intended by 1960 to ate tain a goal in steel and coal which would still be below our prewar output. This would no longer be a problem if we give the Eurasian continents to Russia. Most impore tant weakness of Russian war matériel is oll. Ample of] can be found in Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Eurasian land mass. Agriculture, transportation, go down the lst of geopolitical assets which we would sur- render with Eurasia, and it 1s incalculable. But these raw materials would not only be assets to the Russians, but also they would be losses to the United States. Hoover made ® point of the expectation that the United States could maintain supply lines to his island outposts in the Atlantic and Pacific frontiers. But could he be as hopeful of maintaining supply lines from these fron- tiers—supplies which would be badly needed to maintain the United States on an extraor- dinary war economy? ‘The World War IT search for the substitutes for rubber, hemp, and many other things previously imported from abroad would be duplicated in an even more desperate effort to match the enemy’s boundless supplies. Of course Western Europe—if we abandon it—offers Russia more than a storehouse of raw materials. Even more prised, perhaps the greatest prize of all Russian strategy for world conquest, Western Europe is the great- est concentration of industrial power out- side the United States. There are the ship- building facilities, aircraft factories, arae- nals, large cittes, resources and expendable trained manpower for great armies that would swell the Communist hordes. The Middle Hast and the rest of Asia not now in the grasp of the Moscow-Peiping tentacles would contribute their own vast potential to the eventual show-down between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, Even discounting this fantastically rich windfall to the Com- munists, which Mr. Hoover would do in order to concentrate on defense of the Atlantic and Pacific, consider the position of the United States, friendless save in the Western Hemi- sphere. This country would be without its powerful allies in World War II, unless it could hold an island fortress in Britain and one in Japan. But the latter consideration is hardly tenable. Neutralizing of Britain and Japan would not be difficult for the co- lossus of the Eurasian continents, not with the potential with which Mr. Hoover would endow it. This brings up the final, and in some-ways, most important default of all. In the de- grading process of deserting Western Europe, we would become an amoral colossus pitted against another amoral colossus. We would have shorn ourselves of our honor and Integ- rity as well as of our friends and allies. In running out on the plainly implied com- mitments of the Atlantic Treaty, the United States would have expended the last of what Wendell Willkie called the reservoir of good will throughout the world for America, The superficial appeal of the Hoover thesis is understandable. It will attract superficial debate by superficial minds among both the Republican and Democratic Members of the Eighty-second Congress. It fits into the scurrilous attack on the foreign policy, now focused on Secretary of State Acheson. It will do as yet incalculable harm to the chances for a West European defense force under General Eisenhower. But there is every reason to believe that the American people will not swallow neo- isolationism any more than they swallowed isolationism in similarly attractive packages. President Truman said, following the Brus- sels conference, that the spirit shown there has justified our confidence. In answer to Hoover, he added, “Let there be no mistake about it—the unity of the nations of West- ern Europe and of the North Atlantic area is vital to their security and ours.” The President need not fear, There is no mistake about it in the minds of the vast majority of Americans. Despite the failure of the United Nations forces in Korea to stem the Communist tide of con- quest, they know the challenge has met its challenger in the President of the United States. They will respond to his leadership. Perhaps former President Hoover has done us a favor in pulling aside the curtain on a vision corresponding to a nightmare, a scene borrowed from the pulp-magazine concep- tions of Armageddon. It will attract lively debate 1n Congress, in public forums, and in the corner stores of America. It will do its measure of damage to the cause of unity of all free people everywhere. But when debate has run its course—as assuredly it shall—Americans and free peo- ple everywhere will return to the grim real- ity and what to do about it. They will be immensely fortified by relief from the vision | of a future that might have been. Hemisphere Integration Now EXTENSION OF REMARKS or HON. HARRY FLOOD BYRD OF VIRGINIA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Rzcorp a speech made by Mr. Harry F. Guggenheim at the University of Florida on December 8, 1950. Mr. Guggenheim was formerly Am- bassador to Cuba, where he served with great distinction. For many years he has been a student of conditions in the Western Hemisphere. In my judgment, Mr. Guggenheim has made in this speech a very valuable and constructive contribution to the thought of the day—looking toward a solution of the great problems which confront us. APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the Recorp, as follows: HEMISPHERE INTEGRATION Now A foreign policy for the United States, which includes the political, economic, and mijitary integration of this hemisphere 1s essential to our well-being, and possibly even our survival, as a free Nation. The integration of the Western Hemisphere now is not suggested as a policy of isola- tionism or insulation from the rest of the world, or as a substitute for the role that we should play, say, in the North Atlantic Pact or the movement for a united Europe. It is an anchor that we should let go now to windward, in the best holding ground, before the storm breaks. I speak as a citizen of the United States without office, and as a seeker of truth. My thesis rests on the following premises: 1. War is bestial and inhuman. It is a curse on the people of the world. There is, however, a greater curse, and that is na- tional enslavement, which is the danger trom @ lost war. 2. Nationalist communism as presently practiced by the Politburo of Soviet Russia is an international conspiracy to overthrow non-Communist governments throughout the world. Should Soviet Russia be suc- cessful in this conspiracy, sovereign states will disappear under the dictatorship of Rus- sia’s imperialist Politburo. 8. The transition from the sea age of transportation to the air age has now de- veloped to a stage where all nations are susceptible to attack and many to destruc- tion from the air. 4. Neutrality is a luxury that weak states can only indulge in with the approval of strong states. 5. The United Nations and the organiza- tion of American states are aids, but not yet substitutes for foreign policy. Franklin D. Roosevelt warned us in 1939 that our frontiers were on the Rhine, Eu- rope still may be our first line of defense, but this hemisphere is our last line of de- fense. It is our inner citadel, and it must be made impregnable. The age of the air has made this citadel vulnerable. In World Wars I and II we succeeded in keeping the lands of this hemi- sphere free from attack. That was only be~ cause we were in a transition period from the sea age to the air age. Now we can no longer expect to keep this hemisphere from assault by air. We must prepare for its defense now before it is too ate. In our haste to accept world responsibility and assume world leadership, we have neg- lected our nearest neighbors in the Ameri- cas. Isolationism has kept us from them in the past, and our new foreign policy, which plummets us into Europe and Asia, keeps us from them now. 1 Before elaborating on the proposal to in- tegrate this hemisphere, it is essential to examine briefly the present over-all foreign policy of the United States. The first pur- pose of any such policy is to maintain our integrity as a sovereign power. The second is, with enlightenment and consideration of others, to promote our national interests. What is the new foreign policy that has been developing since the close of World War II? It is vague, confusing, and headed in three different directions at the same time: 1. We are attempting to assume, in a meas- ure, the old role of Great Britain in main- taining the balance of power in Europe and in the protection of British trade routes in the Mediterranean and Near East. 2. The second course of our foreign policy flowed from the first. When we assumed
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Great Britain’s place in Greece, President Truman enunciated his doctrine tn which he said, in part: “I believe tt must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” This is the policy of containing Russia. 8. There is a third part of our foreign pol- fey which Edgar Mowrer has called the mo- ralistic fallacy. “This is the belief,” he says, “that in its dealings with foreign states or groups, the United States should be guided by the degree to which said states or groups conform internally to American standards.” In other words, we are attempting to reform the world. Mowrer, describing how it worked in China, came to the conclusion that our diplomats were more eager to promote what they called the revolt of Asia than to se- cure a China impervious to Russian influ- ence. The first part of our foreign policy, an at- tempt to maintain the balance of power in Europe, is logical. Today, with our frontiers still on the Rhine, the balance of power in Burope is of vital importance to us. The North Atlantic Pact, and the move- ment for a United Europe, stand in the way of Russian aggression. The United States has taken the leadership in the North Atlantic Pact. It is unfortunate, in my opin- ion, that this leadership is not where it traditionally belongs—with England and France. We can only help Europe; we can- not save her from Russian ideology or force. If Europe no longer has the will to make desperate and supreme efforts to preserve the essential freedoms the democratic world has cherished, she will succumb to the ty- rants of Russia, no matter what we may try to do. The second part of our foreign policy fs the Truman doctrine—which is physically and financially beyond our abilities, and morally wrong in its implied righteousness. The Truman doctrine commits us to a world-wide policy of assistance, financial or military, on a scale we cannot possibly support. The third course of our foreign policy, in which we require other states to conform to United States standards if they would have relations with us, is inevitably doomed to failure in the future as it has so notably failed in the past in dealing with such di- verse ideologies as those of Spain, the Argen- tine, Guatemala, and China. The reductio ad absurdum of this doctrine would be to have no relations with any states unwilling to re-form themselves in our own image of white, male, Anglo-Gaxon democratic Protes- tant perfection. There ia a lack of understanding of our long-distance economic goals. We drift into situations and international political crises which may be quite contrary to our national interests. For example, during the crisis be- tween Arabs and Jews over Israel our policy shifted from quarter to quarter like a weath~- ervane in a storm. At that time the public had an intimation for the first time that ofl in the Middle East was one of the con- siderations of our foreign policy. How vital are these oi] flelds to us? isa keystone of our foreign icy to prevent Ruasia’s access to the oll eerie of the Middle East? if such a policy is necessary to our eurvival and national interests, and within the power of our resources, the public should be in- formed and made ready to approve such a& policy. We no longer believe that our national in- tereats can best be served by an overbearing, selfish nationalism. In the principle of point ¢ President Truman has proposed a plan for us to help less advanced nations to increase their productivity and well-being. But ere resources for this purpose to be prodigally expended for all peoples over the earth who need our aid? Obviously, even our great wealth could not stand such & strain, Yet at the Present time point 4 is an instrument the Department of State, to be bartered for day-to-day diplo- matic needs. Our foreign policy is muddled because our national interests are obscure. Further- more, while we are committing ourselves to financial and military aid all over the world, we do not Know whether our resources are great enough for our commitments. What we require is a new, bipartisan agency composed of the executive and leg- iglative branches of Government, coordi- nated with the State Department, to carry on a continuous appraisal of our national interests and national resources. Instead, in this time of crisis, we are staggering along with 59 major Government departments and agencies, of which 46 have interests in the field of foreign affairs. There are 32 inter- departmental committees coordinating work. It is an impossible and unworkable arrange- ment. At a moment in history when the United States must undertake, through foreign pol- icy, to lead the world away from wars toward peace, we have not set a course that even our own people can follow with understand- ing and approval. ur The United States has a last line of de- fense in this hemisphere to which she will be forced back tf our first line of defense in Europe fails, This Mne consists of our neighboring American states. To disregard this line of defense and neg- lect the Americas may be our greatest na- tional folly, Qur policy toward Latin America has been uncertain and vacillating. We have gone through periods of manifest destiny, impe- rialism, the big stick, dollar diplomacy, a tutorial policy, and an intervention policy. Finally, under President Hoover a noninter- vention policy was practiced which Franklin D. Roosevelt put into words, expanded, and sold as the good-netghbor policy. The pres- ent administration adheres to the letter of the good-neighbor policy, but has no Kinship with it in spirit. There is an apathy toward Latin America. Ae a result, we no longer enjoy the warm relationships built up during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. What course should our policy in Latin America take? I repeat that it should be directed toward the most complete political, economic, and military integration among all the states in this hemisphere that can be effected by diplomacy. We should make this our cornerstone of foreign policy, be- cause this hemisphere is our last Une of defense, and within it are deep national in- terests which have been neglected. Latin America is an undeveloped and ex- cellent area for essential industry. It ia our only source of many strategic and critical materials. Of the 12 materials listed as stra- tegic in 1943, 1l—copper, manganese, chro- mium, tungsten, tin, antimony, platinum, mercury, iodine, sodium nitrate, and bauxite are available in Latin America. Nickel, the twelfth, comes from our friend and neighbor Canada. In addition, Latin America also pro- duces oil, iron ore, fibers, foodstuffs, drugs, woods, natural rubber, meats, hides, and wool. The population of the United States will reach its peak about 1970 accarding to stu- dents of population trends. Latin America, with a present population equal to our own, will atill be growing in 1970. It may well outgrow the Russians, particularly if we are able, by the right sort of assistance, to raise Latin American standards of public health to match our own. Potential industry, population, strategic materials and food are all here in our own hemisphere, for the survival of all of us, if we have the wit and the will to use them. Up to now, unfortunately, we have not shown an evidence of such acumen, A101 Take the case of Ohile, which has almost 80 percent of the world's copper. In view of her importance to us, what has our diplo- matic policy been toward Ohile? Regrettably, one of friendly apathy. Yet Chile, right now, like much of the world is suffering from the destroying germ of inflation. Like so many other countries in Latin America, her social soil is fertile for Communist tnfiltration. If we let Chile Japse into confusion through our own neglectfulness, then it 18 poszible that Communists could take over the state. If Chile should then agree to send her cop- per and nitrates to Rusala by commercial treaty, what would be the policy of our De- partment of State? We must never allow ourselves to be confronted by such a dilem- ma. We must bind Chile and all Latin American countries so closely to us thrt com~ munism will cease to be o threat. We need sugar from Cuba, oil and tron ore from Venezuela, coffee from Brazil, tin and tungsten from Bolivia, copper, lead, and gine from Mexico; hides and tungsten from the Argentine, vanadium from Peru, and platinum from Colombia. In emergencies wo may have to rely on Latin America for rub- ber, hemp, cocoa, tung oll, and quinine. The United States can, in my opinion, bring about integration in three ways: by diplomacy, economic union, and military alliances. First, by diplomacy: We must acknowledge the importance of good relations between the United States and the other states within this hemisphere. The Division of Latin American Affairs within our Depart- ment of State should be raised in dignity and expanded in organization, to cope with the diverse problems £0 vital to all the Americas. To accomplish our great aims now in this hemisphere we must sweep the embassies and legations of Latin America clean of mis- fits and incompetents, while encouraging the many able men who also represent us there. Our diplomacy in Latin America should be rigidly directed to respect the sovereignty of all of the states of this hemisphere. Sov- ereignty can only be respected by strict ad- herence to the policy of nonintervention, in- cluding direct action or intrigue. Finally, in our diplomacy, we should re- turn to our ancient policy of recognition of sovereign states with absolute impartialtty, not as a weapon to force reform. That pol- icy includes: “(1) the new regime must appear to have control of the governmental machinery of state; (2) it must have the assent of the people without ‘substantial resistance to its authority’; and (3) it must be in a position to fulfill all its international obligations and responsibilities.” At the present time we are in the incon- sistent position of carrying on full diplo- matic relations with Communist Russia, Socialist England, and several dictators in Latin America—but we draw the line at dic- tatorship in Spain. A short time ago we withheld recognition of Peron because we disapproved of his Third Position in the Argentine. If we are not to intervene or meddie in the internal affairs of the Latin-American States, neither can we tolerate intervention in this hemisphere by outside statea—the basic policy of the Monroe Doctrine. Russian intervention by intrigue to spread communism should be forestalled by rigid seourity measures and by the exchange of information between the agencies of the various nations entrusted with the task of maintaining domestic tranquillity. Second. We must bind together the eco- nomic resources of this hemisphere to pro- tect all of us againat military or economic aggression. We should be prepared and eager in this hemisphere to go as far as the rest of the world in breaking down all the bars to a free economy. In fact we should lead wherever possible, but we must protect