IV
105TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. CON. RES. 341
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the commitment made by the
United States, in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to arrange
financing and construction of 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, and
to provide fuel oil and other assistance to North Korea, should be
suspended until North Korea no longer poses a nuclear threat to the
peace and security of Northeast Asia or the United States.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 8, 1998
Mr. DELAY (for himself, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. WELDON of
Pennsylvania, Mr. FORBES, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. ADERHOLT, Mr. GIBBONS,
Mr. TALENT, Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. WATTS of Oklahoma, Mr. MILLER of
Florida, Mr. HAYWORTH, and Mr. KNOLLENBERG) submitted the follow-
ing concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the commitment
made by the United States, in conjunction with South
Korea and Japan, to arrange financing and construction
of 2 nuclear reactors for North Korea, and to provide
fuel oil and other assistance to North Korea, should
be suspended until North Korea no longer poses a nu-
clear threat to the peace and security of Northeast Asia
or the United States.
Whereas North Korea refuses to carry out its obligations
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other
•HCON 341 IH
nuclear accords to which it is a signatory, including by
refusing to allow the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy to inspect 2 suspected nuclear waste sites at the
Yongbyon nuclear complex and interfering with the in-
spections the agency conducted at North Korea’s pluto-
nium reprocessing plant and other sites;
Whereas the United States entered an Agreed Framework
with North Korea on October 21, 1994, to build 2 light
water nuclear reactors for North Korea at a cost of be-
tween $4,000,000,000 and $6,000,000,000, and to pro-
vide to North Korea 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per
year until construction of the first reactor is complete,
and in exchange North Korea agreed to cease operating
its graphite moderated reactors, plutonium reprocessing
facilities, and other related facilities out of international
concern that plutonium produced by them might be di-
verted to nuclear weapons production;
Whereas the agreement delays inspection of suspected nuclear
waste sites until the near completion of the 2 new reac-
tors, and effectively condones North Korea’s original re-
fusal to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency
to inspect the nuclear waste sites, which precipitated the
crisis that led to the agreement;
Whereas this multiyear delay in inspecting the suspected nu-
clear waste sites precludes any determination of the
amount of reprocessed plutonium North Korea may al-
ready have available for possible nuclear weapons produc-
tion;
Whereas former United States Ambassador-at-Large Robert
Gallucci has stated that primitive graphite nuclear plants
being built by North Korea would be capable of produc-
ing enough spent fuel to produce nearly 30 nuclear weap-
•HCON 341 IH
ons per year, and along with outside experts has acknowl-
edged the ‘‘technical possibility’’ that fuel from the new
light water reactors built with help from the United
States could produce enough plutonium to make up to 70
nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas North Korea has refused, and continues to refuse,
the International Atomic Energy Agency permission to
inspect and inventory the spent fuel rods from North Ko-
rea’s existing nuclear reactors prior to their encasement
in order to determine whether any plutonium has been
extracted from them, even though the United States has
provided over $20,000,000 to pay for the cost of encasing
the rods;
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency has indi-
cated that the United States gave no support to the
Agency’s attempts to persuade North Korea to allow in-
spection of the fuel rods;
Whereas in May 1998, North Korea announced that it was
unsealing its nuclear reactors and might restart them,
and was ceasing further encasement of nuclear fuel rods;
Whereas in July 1998, North Korea sent ‘‘maintenance
teams’’ back into the weapons-grade plutonium reprocess-
ing plant;
Whereas the former Director-General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, North Korean defec-
tors, and the United States Defense Intelligence Agency
have all reported that North Korea has 15,000 workers
constructing a nuclear weapons program underground,
including a plutonium production plant for making weap-
ons-grade plutonium;
•HCON 341 IH
Whereas the State Department warned North Korea during
talks in New York on August 25, 1998, that the building
of a secret underground nuclear facility that would per-
mit North Korea to restart its nuclear program was un-
acceptable;
Whereas the United States expression of displeasure with
North Korea’s secret underground activities was under-
mined by the State Department’s subsequent request to
Congress on September 23, 1998, for permission to re-
program $27,000,000 in additional fiscal year 1998
funds to provide assistance to North Korea pursuant to
the Agreed Framework and by the Department’s decision
in early September 1998 to provide an additional
300,000 tons of food aid;
Whereas State Department officials claim that the heavy fuel
oil being provided has no direct military benefit to North
Korea, while other observers have noted that the deliv-
eries permit North Korea to use its own funds to pay for
larger quantities of lighter grade oil that can be used for
other purposes, including military transport;
Whereas the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil being delivered
each year exceeds the capacity of North Korea’s only oil-
fired electrical plant, and United States officials have ac-
knowledged that North Korea diverted some of the fuel
oil to steel production and other industrial uses;
Whereas North Korea additionally has demanded that the
United States immediately lift decades-old economic sanc-
tions, finance the $750,000,000 cost of modernizing its
electric power grid, and pay for other auxiliary facilities;
Whereas during June and July 1998, Secretary of Defense
Cohen and other United States military officials disclosed
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that North Korea had succeeded in developing a missile
with a 600-mile range capable of reaching South Korea
and part of Japan, and was developing 2 longer-range
missiles that could reach all of Japan, Okinawa, and pos-
sibly Alaska and Hawaii;
Whereas on August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a ballis-
tic missile that crossed over Japanese territory, parts of
which traveled almost 4,000 miles to land off the coast
of Alaska, in an apparent attempt to launch a satellite;
and
Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency’s senior intelligence
officer for strategic programs has publicly stated that the
3-stage configuration used in the missile launch on Au-
gust 31, 1998, could enable North Korea to send war-
heads across the Pacific: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the commitment made by the United States,
in conjunction with South Korea and Japan, to help
finance and build 2 nuclear reactors for North
Korea, to provide fuel oil and other assistance to
North Korea, and to begin lifting the decades-old
economic embargo on North Korea, should be sus-
pended until the President certifies that North
Korea has agreed to—
(A) cease further development of its ballis-
tic missile program;
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(B) cease all aspects of its nuclear weap-
ons development program;
(C) cease all construction and activity on
all nuclear facilities other than the light water
nuclear reactors permitted by the Agreed
Framework entered into on October 21, 1994;
(D) allow international inspectors complete
access to the Yongbyon nuclear complex, all
plutonium reprocessing facilities, and other sus-
pected nuclear weapons sites consistent with
North Korea’s commitments under the Agreed
Framework and other international treaties to
which North Korea is a signatory;
(E) eliminate its existing stockpile of weap-
ons-grade plutonium and allow verification of
such elimination; and
(F) stop diverting food, fuel oil, and other
international humanitarian assistance to its
military personnel and infrastructure; and
(G) sign an agreement formally ending the
war with South Korea; and
(2) the President should at no time, with re-
spect to North Korea, waive section 123(a)(2) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which requires the
maintaining of International Atomic Energy Agency
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safeguards as a precondition for the transfer of nu-
clear technology.
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