I 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1875
To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and for 
other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
APRIL 30, 2003
Mr. LANTOS (for himself, Mr. HYDE, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BEREUTER, and Mr. 
ACKERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on International Relations 
A BILL 
To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United 
States, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Missile Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 2003’’. 
TITLE 
I—STRENGTHENING 
INTERNATIONAL 
MISSILE 
NONPROLIFERATION LAW 
SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles 
suitable for launching nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal warheads is accelerating across the globe. 
(2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, more than 25 countries possess 
missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and 
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. 
(3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing 
such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer 
of such missiles and their production technology to 
other countries, are directly hostile to the United 
States, its interests, and its allies. 
(B) Of particular concern in this regard is 
North Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles 
and technology to countries in regions of instability 
and concern to the United States. 
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated 
in its most recent report on the foreign ballistic mis-
sile threat the following: 
‘‘Emerging ballistic missile states continue 
to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy 
of the missile systems in their inventories—pos-
ing ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, 
and allies throughout the world. A decade ago, 
U.S. and allied forces abroad faced threats
from SRBM’s [Short Range Ballistic Mis-
siles]—primarily the Scud and its variants. 
Today, countries have deployed or are on the 
verge of deploying MRBM’s [Medium Range 
Ballistic Missiles], placing greater numbers of 
targets at risk. 
‘‘Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 
technologies, materials, and expertise—espe-
cially by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean 
entities—has enabled emerging missile states to 
accelerate the development timelines for their 
existing programs, acquire turnkey systems to 
gain previously non-existent capabilities—in the 
case of the Chinese sale of the M–11 SRBM to 
Pakistan—and lay the groundwork for the ex-
pansion of domestic infrastructures to poten-
tially accommodate even more capable and 
longer range future systems.’’. 
(5) The same CIA report also noted the fol-
lowing: ‘‘North Korea has assumed the role as the 
missile and manufacturing technology source for 
many programs. North Korean willingness to sell 
complete systems and components has enabled other 
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier 
than otherwise would have been possible—notably
the sale of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The 
North also has helped countries to acquire tech-
nologies to serve as the basis for domestic develop-
ment efforts—as with Iran’s reverse-engineering of 
the No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, 
Iran is expanding its efforts to sell missile tech-
nology.’’. 
(6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to 
abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), where-
by adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to 
nonadherents of certain categories of whole missiles, 
their constituent parts, and the facilities to manu-
facture them, especially ‘‘Category I’’ missiles, which 
at a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload 
capacity of 500 kilograms or more are especially 
suited for delivering nuclear weapons.
(7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to 
observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from, 
but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR. 
While this is a welcome achievement, it does not pro-
vide a legal obligation on its adherents to refrain 
from the trade in missiles or missile technology. 
(8) On December 10, 2002, the White House 
released its ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction’’, wherein it is stated that 
strengthening international nonproliferation controls 
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon 
the missiles that can deliver them is the second of 
three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The 
National Strategy also states that ‘‘effective inter-
diction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to com-
bat WMD and their delivery means’’. 
(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States 
took control of an unflagged freighter that was at-
tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to 
Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen-
erally prohibited from transfer as Category I mis-
siles. 
(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad-
herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case 
are not legally binding, and there is no binding 
international legal instrument that would prohibit 
shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph 
(9). 
(11) At Yemen’s request, the United States re-
leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles 
to Yemen. 
(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White 
House press spokesman stated that existing inter-