IV 
110TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 625 
Censuring the President and Vice President. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
AUGUST 4, 2007 
Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 
DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of 
New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. 
MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. 
SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
on the Judiciary 
RESOLUTION 
Censuring the President and Vice President. 
Resolved, 
SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. 
(a) IRAQ’S ALLEGED NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—The 
House of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) In December 2001, the intelligence commu-
nity assessed that Iraq did not appear to have recon-
stituted its nuclear weapons program. 
(2) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-
timate assessed that Iraq did not have a nuclear 
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•HRES 625 IH 
weapon or sufficient material to make one, and that 
without sufficient fissile material acquired from 
abroad, Iraq probably would not be able to make a 
weapon until 2007 or 2009. 
(3) On October 6, 2002, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency advised the White House to remove 
references to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa from 
a Presidential speech, citing weak evidence. 
(4) In November 2002, the United States Gov-
ernment told the International Atomic Energy Asso-
ciation that ‘‘reporting on Iraqi attempts to procure 
uranium from Africa are fragmentary at best.’’. 
(5) On March 7, 2003, the Director General of 
the International Atomic Energy Association re-
ported to the United Nations Security Council that 
inspectors had found ‘‘no evidence or plausible indi-
cation of the revival of a nuclear weapons program 
in Iraq.’’. 
(6) On March 11, 2003, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency stated that it did not dispute the 
International Atomic Energy Association conclusions 
that the documents on Iraq’s agreement to buy ura-
nium from Niger were not authentic. 
(7) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the nature and 
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urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by 
making repeated, unqualified assertions about an 
Iraqi nuclear program that were not supported by 
available intelligence, including— 
(A) on March 22, 2002, President George 
W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam] is a dangerous 
man who possesses the world’s most dangerous 
weapons.’’; 
(B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[m]any of us 
are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear 
weapons fairly soon.’’; 
(C) on September 8, 2002, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e do know, 
with absolute certainty, that he is using his pro-
curement system to acquire the equipment he 
needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nu-
clear weapon.’’; 
(D) on September 20, 2002, Vice Presi-
dent Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we now 
have irrefutable evidence that he has once again 
set up and reconstituted his program, to take 
uranium, to enrich it to sufficiently high grade, 
so that it will function as the base material as 
a nuclear weapon.’’; 
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(E) on October 7, 2002, President George 
W. Bush stated that ‘‘[f]acing clear evidence of 
peril, we cannot wait for the final proof—the 
smoking gun—that could come in the form of 
a mushroom cloud.’’; 
(F) on December 31, 2002, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[w]e don’t know 
whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weap-
on.’’; 
(G) on January 28, 2003, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he British gov-
ernment has learned that Saddam Hussein re-
cently sought significant quantities of uranium 
from Africa.’’; and 
(H) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[w]e believe 
[Hussein] has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear 
weapons.’’. 
(b) SADDAM’S ALLEGED INTENT TO USE WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—The House of Representatives 
finds the following: 
(1) The October 2002 National Intelligence Es-
timate assessed that ‘‘Baghdad for now appears to 
be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist at-
tacks with conventional or CBW against the United 
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States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 
would provide Washington a stronger cause for mak-
ing war’’ and that ‘‘Iraq probably would attempt 
clandestine attacks against the United States Home-
land if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened 
the survival of the regime were imminent or un-
avoidable, or possibly for revenge.’’. 
(2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
dent Richard B. Cheney made misleading state-
ments, that were not supported by the available in-
telligence, suggesting that Saddam Hussein sought 
weapons of mass destruction for the purpose of an 
unprovoked, offensive attack, including— 
(A) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘. . . there is no 
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons 
of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is 
amassing them to use against our friends, 
against our allies, and against us.’’; 
(B) on August 26, 2002, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[t]hese are not 
weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; 
these are offensive weapons for the purpose of 
inflicting death on a massive scale, developed so 
that Saddam can hold the threat over the head 
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of anyone he chooses, in his own region or be-
yond.’’; and 
(C) on October 2, 2002, President George 
W. Bush stated that ‘‘On its present course, the 
Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We 
know the treacherous history of the regime. It 
has waged a war against its neighbors, it has 
sponsored and sheltered terrorists, it has devel-
oped weapons of mass death, it has used them 
against innocent men, women and children. We 
know the designs of the Iraqi regime.’’. 
(c) SADDAM’S ALLEGED LINKS TO AL QAEDA AND 
9/11.—The House of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) Before the war, the Central Intelligence 
Agency assessed that ‘‘Saddam has viewed Islamic 
extremists operating inside Iraq as a threat, and his 
regime since its inception has arrested and executed 
members of both Shia and Sunni groups to disrupt 
their organizations and limit their influence,’’ that 
‘‘Saddam Hussain and Usama bin Laden are far 
from being natural partners,’’ and that assessments 
about Iraqi links to al Qaeda rest on ‘‘a body of 
fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of 
varying reliability.’’. 
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(2) President George W. Bush and Vice Presi-
dent Richard B. Cheney overstated the threat posed 
by Saddam Hussein by making unqualified asser-
tions that were not supported by available intel-
ligence linking Saddam Hussein to the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks and stating that Saddam 
Hussein and al Qaeda had a relationship and that 
Saddam Hussein would provide al Qaeda with weap-
ons of mass destruction for purposes of an offensive 
attack against the United States, including— 
(A) on September 25, 2002, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Y]ou can’t dis-
tinguish between al Qa’ida and Saddam when 
you talk about the war on terror.’’; 
(B) on September 26, 2002, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he dangers we 
face will only worsen from month to month and 
from year to year. . . . Each passing day could 
be the one on which the Iraqi regime gives an-
thrax or VX—nerve gas—or some day a nu-
clear weapon to a terrorist ally.’’; 
(C) on October 14, 2002, President George 
W. Bush stated that ‘‘[t]his is a man that we 
know has had connections with al Qa’ida. This 
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is a man who, in my judgment, would like to 
use al Qa’ida as a forward army.’’; 
(D) on November 7, 2002, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘[Saddam is] a 
threat because he is dealing with al Qaida . . . 
[A] true threat facing our country is that an al 
Qaida-type network trained and armed by Sad-
dam could attack America and not leave one 
fingerprint.’’; 
(E) on January 31, 2003, President 
George W. Bush stated that ‘‘Saddam Hussein 
would like nothing more than to use a terrorist 
network to attack and to kill and leave no fin-
gerprints behind.’’; 
(F) on March 16, 2003, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘we also have to 
address the question of where might these ter-
rorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear 
weapons? And Saddam Hussein becomes a 
prime suspect in that regard because of his past 
track record and because we know he has, in 
fact, developed these kinds of capabilities, 
chemical and biological weapons. We know he’s 
used chemical weapons. And we know he’s re-
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