2342 
the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 
shall— 
(A) conduct an assessment of the effective-
ness of the selection criteria and methods speci-
fied in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the posi-
tion of the Inspector General of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency; and 
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report containing the results of 
such assessment. 
(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1)(B) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.
2343 
TITLE VI—ANOMALOUS HEALTH 
INCIDENTS 
AND 
OTHER 
HEALTH CARE MATTERS 
SEC. 601. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL OFFICERS OF CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
3501 et seq.), as amended by section 411, is further amend-
ed by adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 27. COMPENSATION AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
FOR CERTAIN MEDICAL OFFICERS. 
‘‘(a) OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES.—There is in the 
Agency an Office of Medical Services. 
‘‘(b) COMPENSATION.—Beginning not later than 1 
year after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, each medical officer 
of the Office of Medical Services who meets the qualifica-
tions under subsection (c) shall be compensated during a 
pay period pursuant to a pay range that is equal to the 
pay range published in the Federal Register pursuant to 
section 7431(e)(1)(C) of title 38, United States Code (for 
the corresponding pay period), for a physician in the Vet-
erans Health Administration in the District of Columbia 
region with a medical subspecialty that is the equivalent 
of the medical subspecialty of the officer.
2344 
‘‘(c) CLINICAL PRACTICE QUALIFICATIONS.—A med-
ical officer meets the qualifications under this subsection 
if the officer provides direct care services to patients in con-
nection with the official duties of the officer and— 
‘‘(1) maintains current, active, full, and unre-
stricted licensure or registration as a physician from 
a State, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth 
or territory of the United States; 
‘‘(2) holds active board certification and main-
tains accreditation in an American Board of Medical 
Specialties direct care clinical specialty; and 
‘‘(3) except as provided in subsection (d), main-
tains a minimum of 96 hours per year of clinical 
practice in an accredited clinic or hospital facility 
that is not affiliated with the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
‘‘(d) EXCEPTION FOR OVERSEAS SERVICE.—If a med-
ical officer is a medical officer located in a duty station 
outside of the United States pursuant to a permanent 
change of station and greater than 50 percent of the official 
duties of the officer in such duty station involve direct pa-
tient care, the officer, in lieu of performing the minimum 
hours under subsection (c)(3) on an annual basis, may 
count up to 480 hours of clinical practice performed as 
specified in such subsection prior to such change of station,
2345 
to fulfill in advance the requirement under such subsection 
for up to 3 years. 
‘‘(e) CLINICAL PRACTICE HOURS.—The head of the Of-
fice of Medical Services shall make available to medical offi-
cers excused absence time to allow for the maintenance of 
clinical practice hours in accordance with subsection 
(c)(3).’’. 
SEC. 602. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD OF CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Central Intelligence Agen-
cy Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), as amended by 
section 601, is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 28. MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD. 
‘‘(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director shall establish 
within the Agency a medical advisory board (in this section 
referred to as the ‘Board’). 
‘‘(b) DUTIES.—The Board shall— 
‘‘(1) conduct a study on the Office of Medical 
Services of the Agency, and submit reports regarding 
such study, in accordance with subsection (c); and 
‘‘(2) upon request, provide advice and guidance 
in connection with any independent review of the Of-
fice conducted by an inspector general. 
‘‘(c) STUDY.—
2346 
‘‘(1) OBJECTIVES.—In conducting the study 
under subsection (b)(1), the Board shall seek to— 
‘‘(A) contribute to the modernization and 
reform of the Office of Medical Services; 
‘‘(B) ensure that the activities of the Office 
are of the highest professional quality; and 
‘‘(C) ensure that all medical care provided 
by the Office is provided in accordance with the 
highest professional medical standards. 
‘‘(2) REPORTS.—The Board shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, in writing— 
‘‘(A) interim reports on the study; and 
‘‘(B) a final report on the study, which 
shall— 
‘‘(i) set forth in detail the findings of 
the study and the recommendations of the 
Board, based on such findings and taking 
into consideration the objectives under 
paragraph (1), regarding any changes to 
the activities of the Office of Medical Serv-
ices; and 
‘‘(ii) include, as applicable, any addi-
tional or dissenting views submitted by a 
member of the Board. 
‘‘(d) MEMBERSHIP.—
2347 
‘‘(1) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.—The Board 
shall be composed of 9 members, appointed as follows: 
‘‘(A) 1 member appointed by the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives. 
‘‘(B) 1 member appointed by the minority 
leader of the House of Representatives. 
‘‘(C) 1 member appointed by the majority 
leader of the Senate. 
‘‘(D) 1 member appointed by the minority 
leader of the Senate. 
‘‘(E) 1 member appointed by the Chairman 
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives. 
‘‘(F) 1 member appointed by the ranking 
minority member of the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Represent-
atives. 
‘‘(G) 1 member appointed by the Chairman 
of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
‘‘(H) 1 member appointed by the Vice 
Chairman of the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate. 
‘‘(I) 1 member appointed by the Director of 
National Intelligence.
2348 
‘‘(2) CHAIRPERSON.—During the first meeting 
under subsection (e)(1), the members of the Board 
shall elect a Chairperson of the Board. In addition to 
meeting the criteria under paragraph (3), the Chair-
person may not be an employee, or former employee, 
of the Agency. 
‘‘(3) CRITERIA.—The members appointed under 
paragraph (1) shall meet the following criteria: 
‘‘(A) Each member shall be a recognized ex-
pert in at least 1 medical field, as demonstrated 
by appropriate credentials. 
‘‘(B) Each member shall possess significant 
and diverse medical experience, including clin-
ical experience. 
‘‘(C) Each member shall be eligible to hold 
an appropriate security clearance. 
‘‘(4) TERMS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each member, includ-
ing the Chairperson, shall be appointed or elect-
ed, as applicable, for the life of the Board. 
‘‘(B) VACANCIES.—Any vacancy in the 
Board occurring prior to the expiration of the 
term under subparagraph (A) shall be filled in 
the manner in which the original appointment 
or election was made.
2349 
‘‘(5) COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.— 
‘‘(A) COMPENSATION.—Except as provided 
in subparagraph (B), each member of the Board, 
including the Chairperson, may be compensated 
at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the an-
nual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at 
level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day 
during which that member is engaged in the ac-
tual performance of the duties under subsection 
(b). 
‘‘(B) EXCEPTION
FOR
FEDERAL
EMPLOY-
EES.—Members of the Board, including the 
Chairperson, who are officers or employees of the 
United States shall receive no additional pay by 
reason of the service of the member on the Board. 
‘‘(C) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—Each member of 
the Board, including the Chairperson, while 
away from the home or regular places of business 
of the member in the performance of services for 
the Board, may be allowed travel expenses, in-
cluding per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the 
same manner as persons employed intermittently 
in the Government service are allowed expenses 
under section 5703 of title 5, United States Code.
2350 
‘‘(6) DETAILEES.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Upon request of the 
Board, the Director of National Intelligence may 
detail to the Board, without reimbursement from 
the Board, any of the personnel of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence to assist in 
carrying out the duties under subsection (b). Any 
such detailed personnel shall retain the rights, 
status, and privileges of the regular employment 
of the personnel without interruption. 
‘‘(B) CLEARANCE.—Any personnel detailed 
to the Board under subparagraph (A) shall pos-
sess a security clearance in accordance with ap-
plicable laws and regulations concerning the 
handling of classified information. 
‘‘(e) MEETINGS.— 
‘‘(1) BOARD MEETINGS.—The Board shall meet 
not less frequently than on a quarterly basis. 
‘‘(2) MEETINGS
WITH
CONGRESS.—The Board 
shall meet with the congressional intelligence commit-
tees on a biannual basis. 
‘‘(f) INFORMATION ACCESS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), the Board may secure directly from any 
department or agency of the United States Govern-
2351 
ment information necessary to enable it to carry out 
the duties under subsection (b) and, upon request of 
the Chairperson of the Board, the head of that depart-
ment or agency shall furnish such information to the 
Board. 
‘‘(2) EXCEPTION.—The Director (without delega-
tion) may deny a request for information made by 
the Board pursuant to paragraph (1), regardless of 
the agency from which such information is requested. 
‘‘(3) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—If the Di-
rector denies a request under paragraph (2), not later 
than 15 days after the date of such denial, the Direc-
tor shall submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees a written notification of such denial. 
‘‘(4) BRIEFINGS.—The Director shall ensure that 
the Board receives comprehensive briefings on all ac-
tivities of the Office of Medical Services, including by 
promptly scheduling such briefings at the request of 
the Board. 
‘‘(g) TERMINATION.—The Board shall terminate on the 
date that is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of 
the Board. 
‘‘(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘congres-
sional intelligence committees’ and ‘intelligence community’
2352 
have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).’’. 
(b) DEADLINE
FOR APPOINTMENTS; FIRST MEET-
INGS.— 
(1) DEADLINE FOR APPOINTMENTS.—Each mem-
ber of the medical advisory board established under 
section 28 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (as added by subsection (a)), including the 
Chairperson, shall be appointed or elected, as applica-
ble, in accordance with subsection (d) of such section 
by not later than 45 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act. 
(2) FIRST BOARD MEETING.—Not later than 30 
days after the first date on which at least 5 members 
of the Board described in paragraph (1) hold the secu-
rity clearance and are able to access information in 
accordance with subsection (d)(3)(C) of such section 
28, the Board shall meet. During such meeting, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall pro-
vide to the Board a comprehensive briefing on all as-
pects of the Office of Medical Services of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. 
(3) FIRST MEETING WITH CONGRESS.—Not later 
than 30 days after the date of the briefing under 
paragraph (2), the Board described in such para-
2353 
graph shall meet with the staff members of the con-
gressional intelligence committees to discuss topics for 
the Board to examine in carrying out the duties 
under subsection (b) of such section 28. 
SEC. 603. CLARIFICATION OF EFFECT OF CERTAIN BENE-
FITS RELATING TO INJURIES TO THE BRAIN. 
(a) PERSONNEL OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN-
CY.—Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(5) NO
EFFECT
ON
OTHER
BENEFITS.—Pay-
ments made under paragraph (2) are supplemental to 
any other benefit furnished by the United States Gov-
ernment for which a covered dependent, covered em-
ployee, or covered individual is entitled, and the re-
ceipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility 
of such a person to any other benefit furnished by the 
United States Government.’’. 
(b) PERSONNEL OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Section 
901(i) of title IX of division J of the Further Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2020 (22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) is amended 
by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(5) NO
EFFECT
ON
OTHER
BENEFITS.—Pay-
ments made under paragraph (2) are supplemental to 
any other benefit furnished by the United States Gov-
2354 
ernment for which a covered dependent, dependent of 
a former employee, covered employee, former em-
ployee, or covered individual is entitled, and the re-
ceipt of such payments may not affect the eligibility 
of such a person to any other benefit furnished by the 
United States Government.’’. 
SEC. 604. ACCESS TO CERTAIN FACILITIES OF UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT FOR ASSESSMENT OF 
ANOMALOUS HEALTH CONDITIONS. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—The Director of National Intel-
ligence shall ensure that the elements of the intelligence com-
munity provide to individuals described in subsection (c) 
who are experiencing symptoms of anomalous health condi-
tions timely access for medical assessment to facilities of 
the United States Government with expertise in traumatic 
brain injury. 
(b) PROCESS FOR ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT.—In 
carrying out subsection (a), the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense and 
the heads of such Federal agencies as the Director considers 
appropriate to ensure that, by not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, there is a process to 
provide the individuals described in subsection (c) with 
timely access to the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, 
an Intrepid Spirit Center, or an appropriate medical treat-
2355 
ment facility for assessment as described in subsection (a) 
and, if necessary, treatment. 
(c) INDIVIDUALS DESCRIBED.—The individuals de-
scribed in this subsection are employees of elements of the 
intelligence community and the dependents or other imme-
diate family members of such employees. 
SEC. 605. REPORT ON PROTOCOLS FOR CERTAIN INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES AND DE-
PENDENTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning not later than 180 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall 
develop, for uniform implementation across the elements of 
the intelligence community, each of the protocols described 
in subsections (c) through (f). Such protocols shall be subject 
to review and revision on a periodic basis, and any imple-
mentation of such protocols shall be conducted in accord-
ance with applicable laws and current clinical and profes-
sional practices of the interagency medical community. 
(b) PRIVACY.—No data collected pursuant to any pro-
tocol under this section may be used for research or analyt-
ical purposes without the written consent of the individual 
from whom such data was collected with respect to such use. 
(c) PROTOCOL ON BASELINE MEDICAL TESTING.—The 
protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for con-
ducting voluntary baseline medical testing of covered em-
2356 
ployees, covered individuals, and the dependents of covered 
employees who are included on the overseas travel orders 
of the covered employee. Such protocol shall set forth the 
required elements of such baseline medical testing, such 
as— 
(1) standard lab collection and testing of rel-
evant biofluids; 
(2) the conduct of relevant visual and auditory 
examinations; 
(3) the conduct of Acquired Brain Injury Tool 
assessments, or other relevant assessments for balance, 
eye motion, and cognition; 
(4) the assessment of relevant medical histories; 
and 
(5) the conduct of any other standard relevant 
medical or neurological examinations, testing, or as-
sessments. 
(d) PROTOCOLS ON POST-INCIDENT MEDICAL TEST-
ING.—The protocols described in this subsection are proto-
cols to enable voluntary medical testing and the coordina-
tion of treatment for covered employees, covered individuals, 
and the dependents of covered employees, following a re-
ported anomalous health incident, such as—
2357 
(1) a protocol that sets forth elements, similar to 
the elements described in subsection (c), of such test-
ing; 
(2) a protocol pertaining to the voluntary testing 
and treatment for victims of anomalous health inci-
dents who are children; 
(3) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of 
anomalous health incidents receive access to prompt 
and consistent medical treatment, including from 
medical professionals holding appropriate security 
clearances and medical professionals with expertise in 
child care; 
(4) a protocol for ensuring that all victims of 
anomalous health incidents are offered options for 
psychological treatment for the effects of such inci-
dents; and 
(5) a protocol for ensuring that any testing, eval-
uation, or collection of biofluids or other samples fol-
lowing a reported anomalous health incident may be 
compared against the baseline for the victim of the 
anomalous health incident, to the extent the indi-
vidual participated in the baseline medical testing, 
consistent with subsections (b) and (c). 
(e) PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION COLLECTION, STOR-
AGE, AND SAFEGUARDING.—The protocol described in this
2358 
subsection is a protocol for the collection, storage, and safe-
guarding of information acquired as a result of the proto-
cols described in subsections (c) and (d). 
(f) PROTOCOL
ON REPORTING MECHANISMS.—The 
protocol described in this subsection is a protocol for the 
reporting of matters relating to anomalous health incidents 
by covered employees, covered individuals, and the depend-
ents of covered employees, including the development of a 
system for the adjudication of complaints regarding med-
ical treatment received by such covered employees, covered 
individuals, and dependents of covered employees. 
(g) REPORT AND BRIEFINGS.— 
(1) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the protocols de-
scribed in subsections (c) through (f). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—Such report shall include the 
following elements: 
(A) A copy of each protocol under this sec-
tion. 
(B) A description of the following: 
(i) Any interagency agreements, au-
thorities, or policies required to effectively 
implement the protocols under this section.
2359 
(ii) Any new facilities, medical equip-
ment, tools, training, or other resources re-
quired to effectively implement such proto-
cols. 
(C) A timeline for the implementation of 
the protocols under this section, including a pro-
posal for the prioritization of implementation 
with respect to various categories of covered em-
ployees and the dependents of covered employees. 
(3) BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days following 
the date of submission of the report under paragraph 
(1), and biannually thereafter, the Director shall pro-
vide to the appropriate congressional committees a 
briefing regarding the implementation of the protocols 
under this section. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; and 
(B) the Committees on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
(2) COVERED
EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘covered 
employee’’ means an individual who is an employee,
2360 
assignee, or detailee of an element of the intelligence 
community. 
(3) COVERED INDIVIDUAL.—The term ‘‘covered 
individual’’ means a contractor to an element of the 
intelligence community. 
(4) DEPENDENT OF A COVERED EMPLOYEE.— 
The term ‘‘dependent of a covered employee’’ means, 
with respect to a covered employee, a family member 
(including a child), as defined by the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence. 
(5) VICTIM
OF
AN
ANOMALOUS
HEALTH
INCI-
DENT.—The term ‘‘victim of an anomalous health in-
cident’’ means a covered employee, covered individual, 
or dependent of a covered employee, who is, or is sus-
pected to have been, affected by an anomalous health 
incident. 
SEC. 606. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTION OF OFFICE OF 
MEDICAL SERVICES. 
(a) INSPECTION.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, in coordination with, and 
with the support of, the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report containing an inspection of the respon-
2361 
sibilities, authorities, resources, and performance of the Of-
fice of Medical Services of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(in this section referred to as the ‘‘Office’’). 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The inspection under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A detailed description of the responsibilities 
and authorities of the Office, as set forth in Federal 
law and any applicable regulation, policy, or other 
document of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
(2) A detailed description of the budgetary, 
human, and other resources available to the Office, in-
cluding with respect to employees and any other per-
sonnel. 
(3) An assessment of the ability of the Office to 
consistently discharge the responsibilities of the Office, 
with an emphasis on the provision of medical treat-
ment and care by personnel of the Office, including 
with respect to— 
(A) the roles of personnel of the Office, and 
of senior officials of the Agency outside of the Of-
fice, in determining what medical evaluation, 
treatment, and care should be provided in a par-
ticular case, including the provision of specialty 
care by medical personnel outside of the Office;
2362 
(B) whether personnel of the Office consist-
ently provide appropriate and high-quality med-
ical treatment and care in accordance with 
standards set independently by the professional 
medical community; 
(C) whether the Office has sufficient human 
and other resources, including personnel with 
specialized background, qualifications, or exper-
tise, to consistently provide high-quality medical 
treatment and care in accordance with standards 
set independently by the professional medical 
community; 
(D) whether personnel of the Office, includ-
ing personnel claiming specialized medical back-
grounds and expertise, are required by the Agen-
cy to maintain current board certifications or 
other certifications and licenses, and the extent 
to which the Office verifies such certifications 
and licenses; 
(E) the extent to which the Office makes 
consistent and effective use of the specialized 
medical background, qualifications, and expertise 
of the personnel of the Office in providing med-
ical treatment and care;
2363 
(F) an assessment of whether personnel of 
the Office who provide medical treatment and 
care, or who make decisions with respect to such 
treatment or care, are required to have extensive 
clinical or other experience in directly treating 
patients, including in areas requiring specialized 
background, qualifications, or expertise; 
(G) any factors that have frustrated or de-
layed the provision of medical treatment and 
care by personnel of the Office in significant 
cases; and 
(H) any factors that have frustrated or 
could frustrate prompt detection, effective over-
sight, and swift remediation of problems within 
the Office, including such factors that frustrate 
or delay the provision of medical treatment and 
care in significant cases. 
(c) INDEPENDENT ADVICE.—In conducting the inspec-
tion under subsection (a), the Inspector General may obtain 
the advice of the medical advisory board established under 
section 28 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(as added by section 602). 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form to the extent practicable,
2364 
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and 
methods, but may include a classified annex. 
TITLE VII—MATTERS RELATING 
TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Subtitle A—Matters Relating to 
China 
SEC. 701. UPDATES TO ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS 
AND 
CAMPAIGNS 
IN 
THE 
UNITED 
STATES 
BY 
THE 
CHINESE 
COM-
MUNIST PARTY. 
Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended— 
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as para-
graph (10); and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the fol-
lowing new paragraph: 
‘‘(9) A listing of all known Chinese talent re-
cruitment programs operating in the United States as 
of the date of the report.’’. 
SEC. 702. ASSESSMENT OF GENOMIC COLLECTION BY 
CHINA. 
(a) ASSESSMENT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESSIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
2365 
tor of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
heads of other entities of the United States Govern-
ment the Director determines appropriate, shall sub-
mit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
assessment of the plans, intentions, capabilities, and 
resources of China devoted to biotechnology, and the 
objectives underlying those plans, intentions, capabili-
ties, and resources. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under para-
graph (1) shall include— 
(A) a detailed analysis of efforts undertaken 
by China to acquire foreign-origin biotechnology, 
research and development, and genetic informa-
tion, including technology owned by United 
States companies, research by United States in-
stitutions, and the genetic information of United 
States citizens; 
(B) identification of China-based organiza-
tions conducting or directing efforts described in 
subparagraph (A), including information about 
the ties between those organizations and the Chi-
nese government, the Chinese Communist Party, 
or the People’s Liberation Army; and 
(C) a detailed analysis of the resources of 
the intelligence community devoted to bio-
2366 
technology, including synthetic biology and 
genomic-related issues, and a plan to improve 
understanding of these issues and ensure the in-
telligence community has the requisite expertise. 
(3) FORM.—The assessment under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. 
(b) ASSESSMENT SUBMITTED
TO CERTAIN OTHER 
COMMITTEES.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
heads of other entities of the United States Govern-
ment the Director determines appropriate, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees an 
assessment of the plans, intentions, capabilities, and 
resources of China devoted to biotechnology, and the 
objectives underlying those plans, intentions, capabili-
ties, and resources. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by 
paragraph (1) shall include the elements described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (a)(2). 
(3) FORM.—The assessment under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form.
2367 
(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 703. REPORT ON THREAT POSED BY EMERGING CHI-
NESE TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis and the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and consistent with 
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the threat to the economic and security interests of the 
United States posed by emerging Chinese technology compa-
nies. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection 
(a) shall include the following:
2368 
(1) An assessment of the threat to the economic 
and security interests of the United States posed by 
emerging Chinese technology companies, including 
with respect to— 
(A) the practices of such companies and the 
relationships of such companies to the govern-
ment of China and the Chinese Communist 
Party; 
(B) the extent to which such companies ben-
efit from government financing or contracting 
vehicles outside of China; 
(C) the extent to which such companies fa-
cilitate the targeting of dissidents and other vul-
nerable populations; 
(D) the market penetration of such compa-
nies among allies and strategic partners of the 
United States; 
(E) the security of the communications, 
data, and commercial interests of consumer and 
commercial end-users of the products of such 
companies; and 
(F) the privacy interests of such consumers 
and commercial end-users. 
(2) An assessment of the ability of the United 
States to counter any such threat, including with re-
2369 
spect to different tools that could counter such a 
threat. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall in-
clude an unclassified executive summary. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committees on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate; 
(C) the Subcommittees on Commerce, Jus-
tice, Science, and Related Agencies and the Sub-
committees on Financial Services and General 
Government of the Committees on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate; and 
(D) the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation of the Senate. 
(2) EMERGING
CHINESE
TECHNOLOGY
COMPA-
NIES.—The term ‘‘emerging Chinese technology com-
2370 
panies’’ means a Chinese technology company, includ-
ing a company listed on the Science and Technology 
Innovation Board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
that the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intel-
ligence and Analysis determines poses a significant 
threat to the national security of the United States. 
SEC. 704. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-
TWEEN CHINA AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of 
the intelligence community that the Director determines ap-
propriate, and consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, shall provide to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a briefing, and submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report, containing the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Details on the cooperation between China 
and the United Arab Emirates regarding defense, se-
curity, technology, and other strategically sensitive 
matters that implicate the national security interests 
of the United States. 
(2) The most recent (as of the date of the report 
or briefing, as the case may be) quarterly assessment 
by the intelligence community of measures that the
2371 
United Arab Emirates has implemented to safeguard 
technology of the United States and the reliability of 
any assurances by the United Arab Emirates (with 
respect to both current assurances and assurances 
being considered as of such date). 
(3) A certification by the Director regarding 
whether such assurances described in paragraph (2) 
are viable and sufficient to protect technology of the 
United States from being transferred to China or 
other third parties. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall in-
clude an unclassified executive summary. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
2372 
SEC. 705. REPORT ON CREATION OF OFFICIAL DIGITAL 
CURRENCY BY CHINA. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President, consistent with the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall trans-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the short-, medium-, and long-term national security 
risks associated with the creation and use of the official dig-
ital renminbi of China, including— 
(1) risks arising from potential surveillance of 
transactions; 
(2) risks relating to security and illicit finance; 
and 
(3) risks relating to economic coercion and social 
control by China. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
and
2373 
(3) the Committee on Financial Services, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 706. REPORT ON INFLUENCE OF CHINA THROUGH 
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE PROJECTS WITH 
OTHER COUNTRIES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on recent projects negotiated by China 
with other countries as part of the Belt and Road Initiative 
of China. The Director shall include in the report informa-
tion about the types of such projects, costs of such projects, 
and the potential national security implications of such 
projects. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and
2374 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 707. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTY TO ERODE FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY 
IN HONG KONG. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on efforts of the Chinese Communist 
Party to stifle political freedoms in Hong Kong, influence 
or manipulate the judiciary of Hong Kong, destroy freedom 
of the press and speech in Hong Kong, and take actions 
to otherwise undermine the democratic processes of Hong 
Kong. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under sub-
section (a) shall include an assessment of the implications 
of the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party described in 
such subsection for international business, investors, aca-
demic institutions, and other individuals operating in 
Hong Kong. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
2375 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 708. REPORT ON TARGETING OF RENEWABLE SECTORS 
BY CHINA. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report assessing the efforts and advancements 
of China in the wind power, solar power, and electric vehi-
cle battery production sectors (or key components of such 
sectors). 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report under subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(1) An assessment of how China is targeting rare 
earth minerals and the effect of such targeting on the 
sectors described in subsection (a).
2376 
(2) Details of the use by the Chinese Communist 
Party of state-sanctioned forced labor schemes, includ-
ing forced labor and the transfer of Uyghurs and 
other ethnic groups, and other human rights abuses in 
such sectors. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
Subtitle B—Matters Relating to 
Other Countries 
SEC. 711. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON SECU-
RITY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND RE-
LATED REGION. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intel-
ligence, acting through the National Intelligence Council, 
shall produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the situa-
tion in Afghanistan and the covered region.
2377 
(b) MATTERS.—The National Intelligence Estimate 
produced under subsection (a) shall include, with respect 
to the 2-year period beginning on the date on which the 
Estimate is produced, an assessment of the following: 
(1) The presence in Afghanistan (including fi-
nancial contributions to the Taliban, political rela-
tions with the Taliban, military presence in the cov-
ered region, economic presence in the covered region, 
and diplomatic presence in the covered region) of 
China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and any other foreign 
country determined relevant by the Director, respec-
tively, and an assessment of the potential risks, or 
benefits, of any such presence, contributions, or rela-
tions. 
(2) Any change in the threat to the United 
States homeland or United States entities abroad as 
a result of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from 
Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, including an assess-
ment of the risk of al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, 
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or 
any affiliates thereof, or any other similar inter-
national terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a safe 
haven for launching attacks on the United States and 
its interests abroad.
2378 
(3) The political composition and sustainability 
of the governing body of Afghanistan, including an 
assessment of the ability of the United States Govern-
ment to influence the policies of such governing body 
on the following: 
(A) Counterterrorism. 
(B) Counternarcotics. 
(C) Human rights (particularly regarding 
women and girls and traditionally targeted eth-
nic groups). 
(D) The treatment and safe transit of Af-
ghans holding special immigrant visa status 
under section 602 of the Afghan Allies Protection 
Act of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note) and other Af-
ghans who, during the period beginning in 2001, 
assisted efforts of the United States in Afghani-
stan or the covered region. 
(4) The effect on the covered region, and Europe, 
of refugees leaving Afghanistan. 
(5) The commitments of the Taliban relating to 
counterterrorism, including an assessment of— 
(A) whether such commitments required 
under the agreement entered into between the 
United States Government and the Taliban in 
February 2020, have been tested, or will be tested
2379 
during the 2-year period covered by the Esti-
mate, and what such commitments entail; 
(B) whether any additional commitments 
relating to counterterrorism agreed to by the 
Taliban pursuant to subsequent negotiations 
with the United States Government following 
February 2020, have been tested, or will be tested 
during the 2-year period covered by the Esti-
mate, and, if applicable, what such commitments 
entail; 
(C) any benchmarks against which the 
Taliban are to be evaluated with respect to com-
mitments relating to counterterrorism; and 
(D) the intentions and capabilities of the 
Taliban with respect to counterterrorism (as 
such term is understood by the United States 
and by the Taliban, respectively), including the 
relations of the Taliban with al-Qaeda or any af-
filiates thereof, the Islamic State of Iraq and ash 
Sham-Khorasan or any affiliates thereof, or any 
other similar international terrorist group. 
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
2380 
tees the National Intelligence Estimate produced 
under subsection (a). In so submitting the Estimate 
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Direc-
tor shall include all intelligence reporting underlying 
the Estimate. 
(2) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate 
shall be submitted under paragraph (1) in classified 
form. 
(d) PUBLIC VERSION.—Consistent with the protection 
of intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as 
the Director submits to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees the National Intelligence Estimate under subsection 
(c), the Director shall make publicly available on the inter-
net website of the Director an unclassified version of the 
key findings of the National Intelligence Estimate. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; and 
(B) the Committees on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
(2) COVERED REGION.—The term ‘‘covered re-
gion’’ includes the following countries:
2381 
(A) China. 
(B) The Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates. 
(C) India. 
(D) Iran. 
(E) Pakistan. 
(F) Tajikistan. 
(G) Turkey. 
(H) Turkmenistan. 
(I) Uzbekistan. 
(3) UNITED STATES ENTITY.—The term ‘‘United 
States entity’’ means a citizen of the United States, 
an embassy or consulate of the United States, or an 
installation, facility, or personnel of the United 
States Government. 
SEC. 712. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION POS-
TURE AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO AF-
GHANISTAN AND RELATED REGION. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of the 
intelligence community determined relevant by the Direc-
tor, shall submit to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees a report on the collection posture of the intelligence
2382 
community and other matters relating to Afghanistan and 
the covered region. 
(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A detailed description of the collection pos-
ture of the intelligence community with respect to Af-
ghanistan, including with respect to the following: 
(A) The countering of terrorism threats that 
are directed at the United States homeland or 
United States entities abroad. 
(B) The finances of the Taliban, including 
financial and nonfinancial contributions to the 
Taliban from foreign countries (particularly 
from China, Iran, Russia, and any other foreign 
country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere) 
determined relevant by the Director, respec-
tively). 
(C) The detection, and prevention of, any 
increased threat to the United States homeland 
or United States entities abroad as a result of 
the withdrawal of the United States Armed 
Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021, in-
cluding any such increased threat resulting from 
al-Qaeda or any affiliates thereof, the Islamic 
State of Iraq and ash Sham-Khorasan or any af-
2383 
filiates thereof, or any other similar inter-
national terrorist group, using Afghanistan as a 
safe harbor. 
(2) A detailed description of any plans, strate-
gies, or efforts to improve the collection posture de-
scribed in paragraph (1)(A), including by filling any 
gaps identified pursuant to such paragraph. 
(3) An assessment of the effect of publicly docu-
menting abuses engaged in by the Taliban, and a de-
scription of the efforts of the intelligence community 
to support other departments and agencies in the Fed-
eral Government with respect to the collection and 
documentation of such abuses. 
(4) An assessment of the relationship between the 
intelligence community and countries in the covered 
region, including an assessment of the following: 
(A) Intelligence and information sharing 
with such countries. 
(B) Any change in the collection posture of 
the intelligence community with respect to the 
nuclear activities of such countries as a result of 
the withdrawal of the United States Armed 
Forces from Afghanistan on August 31, 2021. 
(C) The collection posture of the intelligence 
community with respect to the presence of such
2384 
countries in Afghanistan (including financial 
contributions to the Taliban, political relations 
with the Taliban, military presence in Afghani-
stan, economic presence in Afghanistan, and dip-
lomatic presence in Afghanistan) and the under-
standing of the intelligence community regarding 
the potential risks, or benefits, of any such pres-
ence, contributions, or relations. 
(D) The ability of the intelligence commu-
nity to use the airspace of any such countries. 
(5) An assessment of any financial contributions 
to the Taliban from foreign countries (particularly 
from China, Iran, Russia, and any other foreign 
country in the Arab Gulf region (or elsewhere) deter-
mined relevant by the Director, respectively) made 
during the year preceding the withdrawal of the 
United States Armed Forces from Afghanistan on Au-
gust 31, 2021. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassi-
fied summary. 
(d) BIANNUAL UPDATES.—On a biannual basis dur-
ing the 5-year period following the date of the submission 
of the report under subsection (a), the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements
2385 
of the intelligence community determined relevant by the 
Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees an update to such report. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COVERED REGION.—The term ‘‘covered re-
gion’’ includes the following countries: 
(A) China. 
(B) The Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United 
Arab Emirates. 
(C) India. 
(D) Iran. 
(E) Pakistan. 
(F) Tajikistan. 
(G) Turkey. 
(H) Turkmenistan. 
(I) Uzbekistan. 
(2) UNITED STATES ENTITY.—The term ‘‘United 
States entity’’ means a citizen of the United States, 
an embassy or consulate of the United States, or an 
installation, facility, or personnel of the United 
States Government.
2386 
SEC. 713. REPORT ON PROPAGATION OF EXTREMIST 
IDEOLOGIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than May 30, 2022, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, in consultation with other rel-
evant Federal departments and agencies, and consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the threat of extremist ideologies propagated from 
Saudi Arabia and the failure of the Government of Saudi 
Arabia to prevent the propagation of such ideologies. Such 
report shall include a detailed description of— 
(1) the role of governmental and nongovern-
mental entities and individuals of Saudi Arabia in 
promoting, funding, and exporting ideologies, includ-
ing so-called ‘‘Wahhabist ideology’’, that inspire extre-
mism or extremist groups in other countries; and 
(2) the practical and strategic consequences for 
vital national security interests of the United States 
as a result of such promotion, funding, or export. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
2387 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
SEC. 714. REPORT ON LIKELIHOOD OF MILITARY ACTION BY 
COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report assessing the likelihood of a South 
Caucasus country taking military action against another 
country (including in Nagorno-Karabakh or any other dis-
puted territory). Such report shall include an indication 
of the strategic balance in the region, including with respect 
to the offensive military capabilities of each South Caucasus 
country. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means—
2388 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate. 
(2) SOUTH
CAUCASUS
COUNTRY.—The term 
‘‘South Caucasus country’’ means any of the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Armenia. 
(B) Azerbaijan. 
(C) Georgia. 
SEC. 715. REPORT ON NORD STREAM II COMPANIES AND IN-
TELLIGENCE TIES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, and in consultation with the heads of other 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
as the Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on Nord 
Stream II efforts, including—
2389 
(1) an unclassified list of all companies sup-
porting the Nord Stream II project; and 
(2) an updated assessment of current or former 
ties between Nord Stream’s Chief Executive Officer 
and Russian, East German, or other hostile intel-
ligence agencies. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on 
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives.
2390 
SEC. 716. ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE 
INNOVATION AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, and in consultation with the heads 
of other departments and agencies of the United States Gov-
ernment as the Director determines appropriate, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-
ment of the activities and objectives of the Organization of 
Defensive Innovation and Research. The Director shall in-
clude in the assessment information about the composition 
of the organization, the relationship of the personnel of the 
organization to any research on weapons of mass destruc-
tion, and any sources of financial and material support 
that such organization receives, including from the Govern-
ment of Iran. 
(b) FORM.—The assessment under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
2391 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 717. REPORT ON EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
BY UNITED STATES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the effects 
of economic sanctions imposed by the United States. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection 
(a) shall— 
(1) cover entities, individuals, and governments 
that the Director, in consultation with the Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Intelligence and Anal-
ysis, determines appropriate as case studies for the 
purposes of the report, including with respect to 
China and Iran; and 
(2) include— 
(A) an assessment of whether economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States on enti-
2392 
ties, individuals, or governments have con-
strained, modified, or otherwise affected the abil-
ity of the individuals, entities, or governments to 
continue the activities for which they were sanc-
tioned; and 
(B) an assessment of the effectiveness of im-
posing additional sanctions. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall in-
clude an unclassified executive summary. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Subcommittees on Financial Services and 
General Government of the Committees on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives and the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation of the Senate.
2393 
TITLE VIII—REPORTS AND 
OTHER MATTERS 
Subtitle A—Matters Relating to 
Personnel 
SEC. 801. PERIODIC REPORT ON POSITIONS IN INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY THAT CAN BE CON-
DUCTED WITHOUT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED 
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, OR FACILITIES. 
Section 6610 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352e) is amend-
ed— 
(1) by striking ‘‘this Act and not less frequently 
than once every 5 years thereafter,’’ and inserting 
‘‘this Act, and biennially thereafter,’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new sen-
tence: ‘‘Such report shall take into account the poten-
tial effect of maintaining continuity of operations 
during a covered national emergency (as defined by 
section 303 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021 (division W of Public Law 116– 
260)) and the assessed needs of the intelligence com-
munity to maintain such continuity of operations.’’.
2394 
SEC. 802. IMPROVEMENTS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON DEMO-
GRAPHIC DATA OF EMPLOYEES OF INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
Section 5704(c) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Mat-
thew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334b(c)) is 
amended— 
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by 
striking ‘‘After making available a report under sub-
section (b), the Director of National Intelligence shall 
annually provide a report’’ and inserting ‘‘Not later 
than March 31 of each year, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall provide a report’’; and 
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the 
following new paragraph: 
‘‘(1) demographic data and information on the 
status of diversity and inclusion efforts of the intel-
ligence community, including demographic data re-
lating to— 
‘‘(A) the average years of service; 
‘‘(B) the average number of years of service 
for each level in the General Schedule, Senior 
Executive Service, Senior Intelligence Service, or 
equivalent; and 
‘‘(C) career categories;’’.
2395 
SEC. 803. PLAN FOR AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CON-
TRACTS WITH PROVIDERS OF SERVICES RE-
LATING TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED IN-
FORMATION FACILITIES. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a plan for providing elements of the intel-
ligence community with the authority to enter into con-
tracts with providers of services relating to sensitive com-
partmented information facilities for the providers to facili-
tate the use of such facilities by businesses and organiza-
tions performing work, at multiple security levels, in such 
facilities pursuant to contracts with the element. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
(1) An explanation of how the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence will leverage the contracting meth-
odology of the National Reconnaissance Office for 
leasing sensitive compartmented information facili-
ties, or space therein, to businesses and organizations. 
(2) Policy and budget guidance to incentivize the 
heads of the elements of the intelligence community to 
implement such plan.
2396 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. 
SEC. 804. STUDY ON UTILITY OF EXPANDED PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Director of 
National Intelligence shall jointly submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a study on the utility of providing 
elements of the intelligence community of the Department 
of Defense, other than the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, personnel management authority to attract experts 
in science and engineering under section 4092 of title 10, 
United States Code. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees.
2397 
SEC. 805. REPORT ON PROSPECTIVE ABILITY TO ADMIN-
ISTER COVID–19 VACCINES AND OTHER MED-
ICAL INTERVENTIONS TO CERTAIN INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
and Security, in consultation with the elements of the intel-
ligence community and relevant public health agencies of 
the United States, shall jointly develop and submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the pro-
spective ability of the intelligence community to administer 
COVID–19 vaccines, and such other medical interventions 
as may be relevant in the case of a future covered national 
emergency, to covered personnel (particularly with respect 
to essential covered personnel and covered personnel de-
ployed outside of the United States). 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection 
(a) shall include an assessment of the following: 
(1) The prospective ability of the elements of the 
intelligence community to administer COVID–19 vac-
cines (including subsequent booster shots for COVID– 
19), to covered personnel, and whether additional au-
thorities or resources are necessary for, or may other-
wise facilitate, such administration.
2398 
(2) The potential risks and benefits of granting 
the additional authorities or resources described in 
paragraph (1) to the Director, the Under Secretary, 
or both. 
(3) With respect to potential future covered na-
tional emergencies, including future outbreaks of an 
infectious pandemic disease or similar public health 
emergencies, the following: 
(A) The ability of the intelligence commu-
nity to ensure the timely administration of med-
ical interventions to covered personnel during the 
covered national emergency. 
(B) Whether additional authorities or re-
sources are necessary to ensure, or may otherwise 
facilitate, such timely administration, including 
with respect to the ability of the Director or 
Under Secretary to provide an alternative means 
of access to covered personnel with reduced access 
to the interventions provided by the respective 
element. 
(C) The potential risks and benefits of 
granting the additional authorities or resources 
described in subparagraph (B) to the Director, 
the Under Secretary, or both.
2399 
(4) A summary of the findings of the survey 
under subsection (c). 
(c) SURVEY.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and prior to submitting the 
report under subsection (a), the Director and the Under 
Secretary shall jointly conduct a survey to determine the 
process by which each element of the intelligence community 
has administered COVID–19 vaccines to covered personnel, 
to inform continued medical care relating to COVID–19 
and future responses to covered national emergencies. Such 
survey shall address, with respect to each element, the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The timeline of the element with respect to 
the administration of COVID–19 vaccines prior to the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) The process by which the element determined 
when covered personnel would become eligible to re-
ceive the COVID–19 vaccine (including if certain cat-
egories of such personnel became eligible before oth-
ers). 
(3) A general approximation of the percentage of 
covered personnel of the element that received the 
COVID–19 vaccine from the element versus through 
an alternative means (such as a private sector entity, 
foreign government, State, or local government), par-
2400 
ticularly with respect to covered personnel deployed 
outside of the United States. 
(4) Any challenges encountered by the element 
with respect to the administration of COVID–19 vac-
cines prior to the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(5) Any other feedback determined relevant for 
purposes of the survey. 
(d) PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out the 
report and survey requirements under this section, the Di-
rector, the Under Secretary, and the heads of the elements 
of the intelligence community shall ensure, to the extent 
practicable, the preservation of medical privacy and the an-
onymity of data. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; and 
(B) the Committees on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
(2) COVERED NATIONAL EMERGENCY.—The term 
‘‘covered national emergency’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 303 of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (50 U.S.C. 3316b).
2401 
(3) COVERED PERSONNEL.—The term ‘‘covered 
personnel’’ means personnel who are— 
(A) employees of, or otherwise detailed or 
assigned to, an element of the intelligence com-
munity; or 
(B) funded under the National Intelligence 
Program or the Military Intelligence Program. 
(4) ESSENTIAL COVERED PERSONNEL.—The term 
‘‘essential covered personnel’’ means covered personnel 
deemed essential to— 
(A) continuity of operations of the intel-
ligence community; 
(B) continuity of operations of the United 
States Government; or 
(C) other purposes related to the national 
security of the United States. 
(5) NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM.—The 
term ‘‘National Intelligence Program’’ has the mean-
ing given such term in section 3 of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
2402 
SEC. 806. FEDERAL POLICY ON SHARING OF COVERED IN-
SIDER THREAT INFORMATION PERTAINING 
TO CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES IN THE TRUST-
ED WORKFORCE. 
(a) POLICY REQUIRED.—Not later than 2 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the Attorney General, shall issue a policy for 
the Federal Government on sharing covered insider threat 
information pertaining to contractor employees. 
(b) CONSENT REQUIREMENT.—The Director shall en-
sure that the policy issued under subsection (a) requires, 
as a condition of obtaining and maintaining a security 
clearance with the Federal Government, that a contractor 
employee provide prior written consent for the Federal Gov-
ernment to share covered insider threat information with 
the senior official responsible for the insider threat program 
of the contracting agency. The Director may include in such 
policy restrictions on the further disclosure of such informa-
tion. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—On a quarterly basis during the 
period in which the Director is developing the policy under 
subsection (a), the Director shall consult with Congress and 
industry partners with respect to such development. 
(d) REVIEW.—
2403 
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the issuance of the policy under subsection 
(a), the Director of National Intelligence and the Sec-
retary of Defense shall jointly submit to Congress and 
make available to such industry partners as the Di-
rector and the Secretary consider appropriate a re-
view of the policy. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The review under paragraph 
(1) shall include the following: 
(A) An assessment of the utility and effec-
tiveness of the policy issued under subsection (a). 
(B) Such recommendations as the Director 
and the Secretary determine appropriate with 
respect to legislative or administrative action 
relevant to such policy. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COVERED INSIDER THREAT INFORMATION.— 
The term ‘‘covered insider threat information’’— 
(A) means information that— 
(i) is relevant with respect to adjudica-
tions relating to determinations of eligi-
bility for access to classified information; 
(ii) an agency or department of the 
Federal Government has vetted and verified; 
and
2404 
(iii) according to Director of National 
Intelligence policy, is considered relevant to 
the ability of a contractor employee to pro-
tect against insider threats as required by 
section 117.7(d) of title 32, Code of Federal 
Regulations, or successor regulation; and 
(B) includes pertinent information consid-
ered in the counter-threat assessment, as author-
ized by a provision of Federal law or Executive 
Order. 
(2) CONTRACTOR
EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘con-
tractor employee’’ means an employee of a contractor, 
subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal serv-
ices contractor, of a department or agency of the Fed-
eral Government. 
SEC. 807. GOVERNANCE OF TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0 INI-
TIATIVE. 
(a) GOVERNANCE.—The Director of National Intel-
ligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, and the Di-
rector of the Office of Personnel Management, acting as the 
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordi-
nation with the Deputy Director for Management in the 
Office of Management and Budget, acting as the chairman 
of the Performance Accountability Council, and the Under
2405 
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security shall 
jointly— 
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, publish, in the Federal Register 
as appropriate, a policy with guidelines and stand-
ards for Federal Government agencies and industry 
partners to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 ini-
tiative; 
(2) not later than 2 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and not less frequently than 
once every 6 months thereafter, submit to Congress a 
report on the timing, delivery, and adoption of Fed-
eral Government agencies’ policies, products, and 
services to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 ini-
tiative, including those associated with the National 
Background Investigation Service; and 
(3) not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, submit to Congress perform-
ance management metrics for the implementation of 
the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative, including per-
formance metrics regarding timeliness, cost, and 
measures of effectiveness. 
(b) INDEPENDENT STUDY ON TRUSTED WORKFORCE 
2.0.—
2406 
(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence shall enter into an agree-
ment with an entity that is not part of the Federal 
Government to conduct a study on the effectiveness of 
the initiatives of the Federal Government known as 
Trusted Workforce 1.25, 1.5, and 2.0. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The study required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) An assessment of how effective such ini-
tiatives are or will be in determining who should 
or should not have access to classified informa-
tion. 
(B) A comparison of the effectiveness of such 
initiatives with the system of periodic reinves-
tigations that was in effect on the day before the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(C) Identification of what is lost from the 
suspension of universal periodic reinvestigations 
in favor of a system of continuous vetting. 
(D) An assessment of the relative effective-
ness of Trusted Workforce 1.25, Trusted Work-
force 1.5, and Trusted Workforce 2.0. 
(3) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall
2407 
submit a report on the findings from the study con-
ducted under paragraph (1) to the following: 
(A) The congressional intelligence commit-
tees. 
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs of the Senate. 
(C) The Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the 
House of Representatives. 
Subtitle B—Matters Relating to 
Organizations and Capabilities 
SEC. 811. PLAN TO ESTABLISH INTEGRATED COMMERCIAL 
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE DATA PROGRAM 
OFFICE. 
(a) PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Re-
connaissance Office and the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in consultation with the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, shall jointly develop and 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan 
to establish an integrated commercial geospatial intelligence 
data program office. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The plan under subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
2408 
(1) An explanation of how the Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office will elevate the com-
mercial space program office within the organiza-
tional structure of the National Reconnaissance Of-
fice. 
(2) An explanation of how the Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency will inte-
grate the commercial space program office within the 
National Reconnaissance Office to include empowered 
functional manager personnel to ensure imagery pur-
chases are responsive to functional manager-provided 
requirements and priorities. 
(3) An explanation of— 
(A) an approach that will rapidly leverage 
innovative commercial geospatial intelligence 
data capabilities to meet new intelligence chal-
lenges and inform operational requirements; 
(B) how the Directors will annually evalu-
ate new commercially available capabilities and 
provide opportunities for new entrants; and 
(C) how the Directors will synchronize the 
procurement of commercial geospatial intel-
ligence data and commercial geospatial intel-
ligence analytic services, respectively.
2409 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
ate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 812. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACQUISITION 
INNOVATION CENTER REPORT, STRATEGY, 
AND PLAN. 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT AND STRATEGY.—Not 
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees— 
(1) a report stating the mission and purpose of 
the Acquisition Innovation Center of the Agency; and 
(2) a strategy for incorporating the Acquisition 
Innovation Center into the standard operating proce-
dures and procurement and acquisition practices of 
the Agency. 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not 
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Director shall, using the findings of the Director 
with respect to the report submitted under subsection (a)(1),
2410 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees an im-
plementation plan that addresses— 
(1) how the Director will ensure the contracting 
officers of the Agency and the technical representa-
tives of the Acquisition Innovation Center for the con-
tracting officers have access to the technical expertise 
required to inform requirements development, tech-
nology maturity assessments, and monitoring of ac-
quisitions; 
(2) how the plan specifically applies to technical 
industries, including telecommunications, software, 
aerospace, and large-scale construction; and 
(3) projections for resources necessary to support 
the Acquisition Innovation Center, including staff, 
training, and contracting support tools. 
SEC. 813. REPORT ON UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COM-
MAND INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such 
other Federal Government entities as the Director considers 
relevant, and consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report detailing the status of the 
intelligence collection, analysis, and operational capabili-
2411 
ties of the United States Southern Command to support 
Latin America-based missions. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees. 
SEC. 814. REPORT ON PROJECT MAVEN TRANSITION. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, in consulta-
tion with such other Federal Government entities as the Di-
rector considers appropriate, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report on the transition 
of Project Maven to operational mission support. 
(b) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES.—The report 
required by subsection (a) shall include a detailed plan of 
action and milestones that identifies— 
(1) the milestones and decision points leading up 
to the transition of successful geospatial intelligence 
capabilities developed under Project Maven to the Na-
tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
2412 
(2) the metrics of success regarding the transi-
tion described in paragraph (1) and mission support 
provided to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agen-
cy for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees. 
SEC. 815. REPORT ON FUTURE STRUCTURE AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES OF FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE 
CENTER. 
(a) ASSESSMENT AND REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall— 
(1) conduct an assessment as to the future struc-
ture, responsibilities, and organizational placement of 
the Foreign Malign Influence Center; and 
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees a report on the findings of the Director with 
respect to the assessment conducted under paragraph 
(1).
2413 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment conducted under sub-
section (a)(1) shall include— 
(1) an assessment of whether the statutory func-
tions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center are opti-
mized to the needs of the intelligence community and 
policymakers; 
(2) a description of potential changes to the stat-
utory functions of the Foreign Malign Influence Cen-
ter that might further advance the counter-foreign 
malign influence mission of the Center and the intel-
ligence community, including whether the Director of 
the Foreign Malign Influence Center should continue 
to report directly to the Director of National Intel-
ligence and whether the Foreign Malign Influence 
Center should remain a separate, stand-alone center; 
and 
(3) an assessment of the risks, benefits, and feasi-
bility of predominantly staffing the Foreign Malign 
Influence Center with detailees from other agencies, 
including from outside the intelligence community. 
Subtitle C—Other Matters 
SEC. 821. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL 
THREATS. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Title XI of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding
2414 
at the end the following new section (and conforming the 
table of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly): 
‘‘SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL 
THREATS. 
‘‘(a) REPORTS.—On a biennial basis until the date 
that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the ac-
tivities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the intel-
ligence community with respect to foreign biological threats 
emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered 
country. 
‘‘(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Each report under sub-
section (a) shall include, with respect to foreign biological 
threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, 
a covered country, the following: 
‘‘(1) A detailed description of all activities relat-
ing to such threats undertaken by each element of the 
intelligence community, and an assessment of any 
gaps in such activities. 
‘‘(2) A detailed description of all duties and re-
sponsibilities relating to such threats explicitly au-
thorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, 
to each element of the intelligence community, and an
2415 
assessment of any identified gaps in such duties or re-
sponsibilities. 
‘‘(3) A description of the coordination among the 
relevant elements of the intelligence community with 
respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1) 
and the duties and responsibilities specified in para-
graph (2). 
‘‘(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, poli-
cies, and interagency agreements of the intelligence 
community relating to the collection, monitoring, 
analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats, 
and an assessment of any identified gaps therein. 
‘‘(5) A description of the coordination and inter-
actions among the relevant elements of the intelligence 
community and non-intelligence community partners. 
‘‘(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence 
efforts relating to such threats, including any foreign 
academics engaged in such efforts, and a description 
of how the intelligence community contributes to ef-
forts by non-intelligence community partners to 
counter such foreign malign influence. 
‘‘(c) FORM.—Each report submitted under subsection 
(a) may be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted 
shall include an unclassified executive summary. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
2416 
‘‘(1) COVERED
COUNTRY.—The term ‘covered 
country’ means— 
‘‘(A) China; 
‘‘(B) Iran; 
‘‘(C) North Korea; 
‘‘(D) Russia; and 
‘‘(E) any other foreign country— 
‘‘(i) from which the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence determines a biological 
threat emanates; or 
‘‘(ii) that the Director determines has 
a known history of, or has been assessed as 
having conditions present for, infectious dis-
ease outbreaks or epidemics. 
‘‘(2) FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREAT.—The term 
‘foreign biological threat’ means biological warfare, 
bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases, 
or accidental exposures to biological materials, with-
out regard to whether the threat originates from a 
state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, or 
an undetermined source. 
‘‘(3) FOREIGN
MALIGN
INFLUENCE.—The term 
‘foreign malign influence’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 119C(e) of this Act.
2417 
‘‘(4) 
NON-INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
PART-
NER.—The term ‘non-intelligence community partner’ 
means a Federal department or agency that is not an 
element of the intelligence community.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees the first report required under section 1111 of 
the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection 
(a). 
SEC. 
822. 
ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
ON 
CERTAIN 
CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES 
PROCURED 
BY 
INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCIAL 
PROVIDERS 
OF 
CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Title XI of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 
821, is further amended by adding at the end the following 
new section (and conforming the table of contents at the 
beginning of such Act accordingly):
2418 
‘‘SEC. 
1112. 
ANNUAL 
REPORTS 
ON 
CERTAIN 
CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES 
PROCURED 
BY 
INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCIAL 
PROVIDERS 
OF 
CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES. 
‘‘(a) ANNUAL REPORTS.—On an annual basis through 
2026, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Director of the National Security Agency, in coordina-
tion with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
containing information on foreign commercial providers 
and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence 
community through foreign commercial providers. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) 
shall include, with respect to the period covered by the re-
port, the following: 
‘‘(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability 
procured through a foreign commercial provider, in-
cluding— 
‘‘(A) a description of the vulnerability; 
‘‘(B) the date of the procurement; 
‘‘(C) whether the procurement consisted of 
only 
that 
vulnerability 
or 
included 
other 
vulnerabilities; 
‘‘(D) the cost of the procurement;
2419 
‘‘(E) the identity of the commercial pro-
vider and, if the commercial provider was not 
the original supplier of the vulnerability, a de-
scription of the original supplier; 
‘‘(F) the country of origin of the vulner-
ability; and 
‘‘(G) an assessment of the ability of the in-
telligence community to use the vulnerability, in-
cluding whether such use will be operational or 
for research and development, and the approxi-
mate timeline for such use. 
‘‘(2) An assessment of foreign commercial pro-
viders that— 
‘‘(A) pose a significant threat to the na-
tional security of the United States; or 
‘‘(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to 
any foreign government that— 
‘‘(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities 
to target United States persons, the United 
States Government, journalists, or dis-
sidents; or 
‘‘(ii) has an established pattern or 
practice of violating human rights or sup-
pressing dissent.
2420 
‘‘(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence 
community has conducted business with the foreign 
commercial providers identified under paragraph (2) 
during the 5-year period preceding the date of the re-
port. 
‘‘(c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) COMMERCIAL PROVIDER.—The term ‘com-
mercial provider’ means any person that sells, or acts 
as a broker, for a cyber vulnerability. 
‘‘(2) CYBER VULNERABILITY.—The term ‘cyber 
vulnerability’ means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, 
or code that is intended to compromise a device, net-
work, or system, including such a tool, exploit, vul-
nerability, or code procured by the intelligence com-
munity for purposes of research and development.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Secu-
rity Agency shall jointly submit the first report required 
under section 1112 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by subsection (a).
2421 
SEC. 823. PERIODIC REPORTS ON TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY 
OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
(a) PERIODIC REPORTS REQUIRED.—Title XI of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as 
amended by section 822, is further amended by adding at 
the end the following new section (and conforming the table 
of contents at the beginning of such Act accordingly): 
‘‘SEC. 1113. PERIODIC REPORTS ON TECHNOLOGY STRAT-
EGY OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
‘‘(a) REPORTS.—On a basis that is not less frequent 
than once every 4 years, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in coordination with the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary of Commerce, 
and the heads of such other agencies as the Director con-
siders appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees a comprehensive report on the technology 
strategy of the intelligence community, which shall be de-
signed to support the maintenance of the leadership of the 
United States in critical and emerging technologies essen-
tial to the national security of the United States. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
‘‘(1) An assessment of technologies critical to the 
national security of the United States, particularly 
those technologies with respect to which foreign coun-
tries that are adversarial to the United States have
2422 
or are poised to match or surpass the technology lead-
ership of the United States. 
‘‘(2) A review of current technology policies of 
the intelligence community, including long-term 
goals. 
‘‘(3) An identification of sectors and supply 
chains the Director determines to be of the greatest 
strategic importance to national security. 
‘‘(4) An identification of opportunities to protect 
the leadership of the United States, and the allies and 
partners of the United States, in critical technologies, 
including through targeted export controls, investment 
screening, and counterintelligence activities. 
‘‘(5) An identification of research and develop-
ment areas the Director determines critical to the na-
tional security of the United States, including areas 
in which the private sector does not focus. 
‘‘(6) Recommendations for growing talent in key 
critical and emerging technologies and enhancing the 
ability of the intelligence community to recruit and 
retain individuals with critical skills relating to such 
technologies. 
‘‘(7) An identification of opportunities to im-
prove the leadership of the United States in critical 
technologies, including opportunities to develop inter-
2423 
national partnerships to reinforce domestic policy ac-
tions, develop new markets, engage in collaborative re-
search, and maintain an international environment 
that reflects the values of the United States and pro-
tects the interests of the United States. 
‘‘(8) A technology annex to establish an ap-
proach for the identification, prioritization, develop-
ment, and fielding of emerging technologies critical to 
the mission of the intelligence community. 
‘‘(9) Such other information as the Director de-
termines may be necessary to inform Congress on 
matters relating to the technology strategy of the in-
telligence community and related implications for the 
national security of the United States. 
‘‘(c) FORM OF ANNEX.—Each annex submitted under 
subsection (b)(8) may be submitted in classified form.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees the first report required under section 1113 of 
the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection 
(a).
2424 
SEC. 824. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND REPORTS ON 
FOREIGN RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EX-
TREMISTS. 
(a) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, acting through the Direc-
tor of the National Counterterrorism Center, in co-
ordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in con-
sultation with other relevant Federal departments and 
agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees an intelligence assessment on sig-
nificant threats to the United States associated with 
foreign racially motivated violent extremist organiza-
tions. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A list of foreign racially motivated vio-
lent extremist organizations that pose a signifi-
cant threat to the national security of the United 
States. 
(B) With respect to each such organiza-
tion—
2425 
(i) an overview of the membership, ide-
ology, and activities; 
(ii) a description of any transnational 
links to the United States or United States 
persons; 
(iii) a description of the leadership, 
plans, intentions, and capabilities; 
(iv) whether (and if so, to what extent) 
foreign governments or their proxies provide 
any manner of support to such organiza-
tions, including a list of each such foreign 
government or proxy; 
(v) a description of the composition 
and characteristics of the members and sup-
port networks, including whether (and if so, 
to what extent) the members are also a part 
of a military, security service, or police; 
(vi) a description of financing and 
other forms of material support; 
(vii) an assessment of trends and pat-
terns relative to communications, travel, 
and training (including whether and to 
what extent the organization is engaged in 
or facilitating military or paramilitary 
training);
2426 
(viii) 
an 
assessment 
of 
the 
radicalization and recruitment, including 
an analysis of the extremist messaging mo-
tivating members and supporters; and 
(ix) whether (and if so, to what extent) 
foreign governments have sufficient laws 
and policies to counter threats to the United 
States associated with the organization, in-
cluding best practices and gaps. 
(C) An assessment of the status and extent 
of information sharing, intelligence partnerships, 
foreign police cooperation, and mutual legal as-
sistance between the United States and foreign 
governments relative to countering threats to the 
United States associated with foreign racially 
motivated violent extremist organizations. 
(D) An assessment of intelligence gaps and 
recommendations on how to remedy such gaps. 
(E) An opportunity analysis regarding 
countering such threats, including, at a min-
imum, with respect to mitigating and disrupting 
the transnational nexus. 
(3) STANDARDS.—The intelligence assessment 
under paragraph (1) shall be conducted in a manner
2427 
that meets the analytic integrity and tradecraft 
standards of the intelligence community. 
(4) FORM.—The intelligence assessment under 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex in electronic form 
that is fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out 
this paragraph, the officials responsible for submit-
ting such assessment shall ensure that the assessment 
is unclassified to the extent practicable. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 150 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, acting through the Direc-
tor of the National Counterterrorism Center, in co-
ordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, and in a manner consistent 
with the authorities and responsibilities of such Sec-
retary or Director, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the use of Fed-
eral laws, regulations, and policies by the Federal 
Government to counter significant threats to the 
United States and United States persons associated 
with foreign racially motivated violent extremist or-
ganizations.
2428 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph 
(1) shall include the following: 
(A) An identification, description, and as-
sessment of the use and efficacy of, Federal laws, 
regulations, and policies used by the Federal 
Government to address significant threats to the 
United States and United States persons associ-
ated with foreign racially motivated violent ex-
tremist organizations, including pursuant to— 
(i) section 1016 of the Intelligence Re-
form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(6 U.S.C. 485) and section 119 of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
3056), particularly with respect to the co-
ordination and integration of all instru-
ments of national power; 
(ii) Executive Order 12333 (50 U.S.C. 
3001 note), as amended; 
(iii) the designation of foreign terrorist 
organizations under section 219 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1189); 
(iv) the designation of specially des-
ignated terrorists, specially designated glob-
al terrorists, or specially designated nation-
2429 
als and blocked persons, pursuant to Execu-
tive Orders 13886, 13372, and 13224 and 
parts 594, 595, 596, and 597 of title 31, 
Code of Federal Regulations; 
(v) National Security Presidential 
Memorandums 7 and 9, particularly with 
respect to the sharing of terrorism informa-
tion and screening and vetting activities; 
and 
(vi) any other applicable Federal laws, 
regulations, or policies. 
(B) An assessment of whether (and if so, to 
what extent and why) such Federal laws, regula-
tions, and policies are sufficient to counter such 
threats, including a description of any gaps and 
specific examples to illustrate such gaps. 
(C) Recommendations regarding how to 
remedy the gaps under subparagraph (B). 
(3) PRIVACY
AND
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
ASSESS-
MENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, in consultation with the civil lib-
erties and privacy officers of the Federal departments 
and agencies the Board determines appropriate, shall
2430 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report containing— 
(A) an assessment of the impacts on the pri-
vacy and civil liberties of United States persons 
concerning the use or recommended use of any 
Federal laws, regulations, and policies specified 
in paragraph (2); and 
(B) recommendations on options to develop 
protections to mitigate such impacts. 
(4) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex in electronic form that is 
fully indexed and searchable. In carrying out this 
paragraph, the officials responsible for submitting 
such report shall ensure that the report is unclassified 
to the extent practicable. 
(5) SEPARATE SUBMISSION.—The Director shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
the report under paragraph (1) as a separate report 
from the report submitted under section 826(a)(2). 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means—
2431 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Subcommittees on Financial Serv-
ices and General Government, the Subcommittees 
on Homeland Security, and the Subcommittees 
on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro-
grams of the Committees on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
(2) TERRORISM INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘ter-
rorism information’’ has the meaning given that term 
in section 1016(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(a)). 
(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United 
States person’’ has the meaning given that term in 
section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3039). 
SEC. 825. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCA-
LATION AND DE-ESCALATION OF GRAY ZONE 
ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The conventional power of the United States 
has driven foreign adversaries to a level of competi-
2432 
tion that does not always depend on military con-
frontation with the United States. 
(2) Rather than challenging the United States in 
a manner that could provoke a kinetic military re-
sponse, foreign adversaries of the United States have 
turned to carrying out gray zone activities to advance 
the interests of such adversaries, weaken the power of 
the United States, and erode the norms that underpin 
the United States-led international order. 
(3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of at-
tribution and deniability that ranges from covert ad-
versary operations, to detectible covert adversary op-
erations, to unattributable adversary operations, to 
deniable adversary operations, to open adversary op-
erations. 
(4) To adequately address such a shift to gray 
zone activity, the United States must understand 
what actions tend to either escalate or de-escalate such 
activity by its adversaries. 
(5) The laws, principles, and values of the 
United States are strategic advantages in great power 
competition with authoritarian foreign adversaries 
that carry out gray zone activities, because such laws, 
principles, and values increase the appeal of the gov-
ernance model of the United States, and the United
2433 
States-led international order, to states and peoples 
around the world. 
(6) The international security environment has 
demonstrated numerous examples of gray zone activi-
ties carried out by foreign adversaries, including the 
following activities of foreign adversaries: 
(A) Information operations, such as efforts 
by Russia to influence the 2020 United States 
Federal elections (as described in the March 15, 
2021, intelligence community assessment of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
made publicly available on March 15, 2021). 
(B) Adversary political coercion operations, 
such as the wielding of energy by Russia, par-
ticularly in the context of Ukrainian gas pipe-
lines, to coerce its neighbors into compliance 
with its policies. 
(C) Adversary economic coercion operations, 
such as the threat, and use, by China of eco-
nomic retaliation to coerce sovereign countries 
into compliance with its policies or to blunt any 
criticism of its violations of the rules-based inter-
national order and its perpetration of severe 
human rights abuses.
2434 
(D) Cyber operations, such as the use by 
China of cyber tools to conduct industrial espio-
nage. 
(E) Provision of support to proxy forces, 
such as the support provided by Iran to 
Hezbollah and Shia militia groups. 
(F) Provocation by armed forces controlled 
by the government of the foreign adversary 
through measures that do not rise to the level of 
an armed attack, such as the use of the China 
Coast Guard and maritime militia by China to 
harass the fishing vessels of other countries in the 
South China Sea. 
(G) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign 
soil, such as the 2018 poisoning of Sergei 
Skripal in London by Russia. 
(H) The potential use by an adversary of 
technology that causes anomalous health inci-
dents among United States Government per-
sonnel. 
(b) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National 
Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence 
Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Esti-
mate on how foreign adversaries use gray zone activi-
2435 
ties to advance interests, what responses by the 
United States (or the allies or partners of the United 
States) would tend to result in the escalation or de- 
escalation of such gray zone activities by foreign ad-
versaries, and any opportunities for the United States 
to minimize the extent to which foreign adversaries 
use gray zone activities in furtherance of great power 
competition. 
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—To the extent deter-
mined appropriate by the National Intelligence Coun-
cil, the National Intelligence Estimate produced 
under paragraph (1) may include an assessment of 
the following topics: 
(A) Any potential or actual lethal or harm-
ful gray zone activities carried out against the 
United States by foreign adversaries, including 
against United States Government employees 
and United States persons, whether located with-
in or outside of the United States. 
(B) To the extent such activities have oc-
curred, or are predicted to occur— 
(i) opportunities to reduce or deter any 
such activities; and
2436 
(ii) any actions of the United States 
Government that would tend to result in the 
escalation or de-escalation of such activities. 
(C) Any incidents in which foreign adver-
saries could have used, but ultimately did not 
use, gray zone activities to advance the interests 
of such adversaries, including an assessment as 
to why the foreign adversary ultimately did not 
use gray zone activities. 
(D) The effect of lowering the United States 
Government threshold for the public attribution 
of 
detectible 
covert 
adversary 
operations, 
unattributable adversary operations, and deni-
able adversary operations. 
(E) The effect of lowering the United States 
Government threshold for responding to detectible 
covert adversary operations, unattributable ad-
versary operations, and deniable adversary oper-
ations. 
(F) The extent to which the governments of 
foreign adversaries exercise control over any 
proxies or parastate actors used by such govern-
ments in carrying out gray zone activities.
2437 
(G) The extent to which gray zone activities 
carried out by foreign adversaries affect the pri-
vate sector of the United States. 
(H) The international norms that provide 
the greatest deterrence to gray zone activities 
carried out by foreign adversaries, and opportu-
nities for strengthening those norms. 
(I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening of 
democratic governance abroad on the resilience of 
United States allies and partners to gray zone 
activities. 
(J) Opportunities to strengthen the resil-
ience of United States allies and partners to 
gray zone activities, and associated tactics, car-
ried out by foreign adversaries. 
(K) Opportunities for the United States to 
improve the detection of, and early warning for, 
such activities and tactics. 
(L) Opportunities for the United States to 
galvanize international support in responding to 
such activities and tactics. 
(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director shall submit to the congressional intel-
2438 
ligence committees and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate the National Intelligence Estimate pro-
duced under paragraph (1). In so submitting the 
Estimate to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees, the Director shall include all intelligence 
reporting underlying the Estimate. 
(B) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If at 
any time before the deadline specified in sub-
paragraph (A), the Director determines that the 
National Intelligence Estimate produced under 
paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by such dead-
line, the Director shall (before such deadline) 
submit to the committees specified in subpara-
graph (A) a report setting forth the reasons why 
the National Intelligence Estimate cannot be 
submitted by such deadline and an estimated 
date for the submission of the National Intel-
ligence Estimate. 
(C) FORM.—Any report under subpara-
graph (B) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form. 
(4) PUBLIC VERSION.—Consistent with the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods, at the 
same time as the Director submits to the congres-
2439 
sional intelligence committees and the Committees on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate the National Intelligence Estimate under 
paragraph (1), the Director shall make publicly avail-
able on the internet website of the Director an unclas-
sified version of the key findings of the National In-
telligence Estimate. 
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
(A) GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY.—The term ‘‘gray 
zone activity’’ means an activity to advance the 
national interests of a State that— 
(i) falls between ordinary statecraft 
and open warfare; 
(ii) is carried out with an intent to 
maximize the advancement of interests of 
the state without provoking a kinetic mili-
tary response by the United States; and 
(iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges 
from 
covert 
adversary 
operations, 
to 
detectible covert adversary operations, to 
unattributable adversary operations, to de-
niable adversary operations, to open adver-
sary operations.
2440 
(B) COVERT ADVERSARY OPERATION.—The 
term ‘‘covert adversary operation’’ means an op-
eration by an adversary that— 
(i) the adversary intends to remain 
below the threshold at which the United 
States detects the operation; and 
(ii) does stay below such threshold. 
(C) DETECTIBLE COVERT ADVERSARY OPER-
ATION.—The term ‘‘detectible covert adversary 
operation’’ means an operation by an adversary 
that— 
(i) the adversary intends to remain 
below the threshold at which the United 
States detects the operation; but 
(ii) is ultimately detected by the 
United States at a level below the level at 
which the United States will publicly at-
tribute the operation to the adversary. 
(D) UNATTRIBUTABLE
ADVERSARY
OPER-
ATION.—The term ‘‘unattributable adversary op-
eration’’ means an operation by an adversary 
that the adversary intends to be detected by the 
United States, but remains below the threshold 
at which the United States will publicly at-
tribute the operation to the adversary.
2441 
(E) DENIABLE
ADVERSARY
OPERATION.— 
The term ‘‘deniable adversary operation’’ means 
an operation by an adversary that— 
(i) the adversary intends to be detected 
and publicly or privately attributed by the 
United States; and 
(ii) the adversary intends to deny, to 
limit the response by the United States, and 
any allies of the United States. 
(F) OPEN
ADVERSARY
OPERATION.—The 
term ‘‘open adversary operation’’ means an oper-
ation by an adversary that the adversary openly 
acknowledges as attributable to the adversary. 
(c) REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP LEXICON.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National 
Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence 
Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms 
(and corresponding definitions for such terms) for 
concepts associated with gray zone activities. 
(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the lexicon 
under paragraph (1), the National Intelligence Coun-
cil shall include in the lexicon each term (and the cor-
responding definition for each term) specified in sub-
section (b)(5), unless the National Intelligence Council
2442 
determines that an alternative term (or alternative 
definition)— 
(A) more accurately describes a concept as-
sociated with gray zone activities; or 
(B) is preferable for any other reason. 
(3) REPORT.— 
(A) PUBLICATION.—The Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall publish a report con-
taining the lexicon developed under paragraph 
(1). 
(B) FORM.—The report under subpara-
graph (A) shall be published in unclassified 
form. 
SEC. 826. ASSESSMENT OF ROLE OF FOREIGN GROUPS IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, shall— 
(1) complete an assessment to identify the role of 
foreign groups, including entities, adversaries, govern-
ments, or other groups, in domestic violent extremist 
activities in the United States; and
2443 
(2) submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report containing the findings of the Direc-
tor with respect to the assessment. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a)(2) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
(c) SEPARATE SUBMISSION.—The Director shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees the report 
under subsection (a)(2) as a separate report from the report 
submitted under section 824(b)(1). 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 827. REPORT ON POTENTIAL INCLUSION WITHIN IN-
TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF THE OFFICE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
2444 
ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of adding the Office of National Security of 
the Department of Health and Human Services as a new 
element of the intelligence community. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment of the following: 
(A) The likelihood that the addition of the 
Office of National Security as a new element of 
the 
intelligence 
community 
would 
increase 
connectivity between other elements of the intel-
ligence community working on health security 
topics and the Department of Health and 
Human Services. 
(B) The likelihood that such addition would 
increase the flow of raw intelligence and finished 
intelligence products to officials of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. 
(C) The likelihood that such addition would 
facilitate the flow of information relating to 
health security topics to intelligence analysts of 
various other elements of the intelligence commu-
nity working on such topics.
2445 
(D) The extent to which such addition 
would clearly demonstrate to both the national 
security community and the public health com-
munity that health security is national security. 
(E) Any anticipated impediments to such 
addition relating to additional budgetary over-
sight by the executive branch or Congress. 
(F) Any other significant advantages or dis-
advantages of such addition, as identified by ei-
ther the Director of National Intelligence or the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
(2) A joint recommendation by the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services as to whether to add the Office of 
National Security as a new element of the intelligence 
community. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on
2446 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of the Sen-
ate; and 
(3) the Subcommittees on Labor, Health and 
Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of 
the Committees on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. 
SEC. 828. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO BUILD AN INTEGRATED 
HYBRID SPACE ARCHITECTURE. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
for 2 years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for In-
telligence and Security and the Director of the National Re-
connaissance Office, shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report on the efforts of the intel-
ligence community to build an integrated hybrid space ar-
chitecture that combines national and commercial capabili-
ties and large and small satellites. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment of how the integrated hybrid 
space architecture approach is being realized in the 
overhead architecture of the National Reconnaissance 
Office.
2447 
(2) An assessment of the benefits to the mission 
of the National Reconnaissance Office and the cost of 
integrating capabilities from smaller, proliferated sat-
ellites and data from commercial satellites with the 
national technical means architecture. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees. 
SEC. 829. REPORT ON CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency, the Director of the National Security 
Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, and consistent with the protec-
tion of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on certain 
actions taken by the intelligence community with respect 
to human rights and international humanitarian law.
2448 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A detailed explanation of whether, and to 
what extent, each element of the intelligence commu-
nity has provided intelligence products relating to the 
efforts of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Treasury regarding the categorization, determinations 
on eligibility for assistance and training, and general 
understanding, of covered entities that commit, en-
gage, or are otherwise complicit in, violations of 
human rights or international humanitarian law. 
(2) A detailed explanation of whether, and to 
what extent, each element of the intelligence commu-
nity has provided intelligence products relating to 
any of the following: 
(A) Section 7031(c) of the Department of 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of 
Public Law 116–94; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note). 
(B) The visa restriction policy of the De-
partment of State announced on February 26, 
2021, 
and 
commonly 
referred 
to 
as 
the 
‘‘Khashoggi Ban’’. 
(C) The annual report requirement of the 
Department of Defense under section 1057 of the
2449 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018 (131 Stat. 1572). 
(D) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of 
Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note). 
(3) A detailed explanation of the following proc-
esses: 
(A) The process of each element of the intel-
ligence community for monitoring covered enti-
ties for derogatory human rights or international 
humanitarian law information. 
(B) The process of each element of the intel-
ligence community for determining the credi-
bility of derogatory human rights or inter-
national humanitarian law information. 
(C) The process of each element of the intel-
ligence community for determining what further 
action is appropriate if derogatory human rights 
or international humanitarian law information 
is determined to be credible. 
(4) An unredacted copy of each policy or similar 
document that describes a process specified in para-
graph (3). 
(5) A detailed explanation of whether, with re-
spect to each element of the intelligence community,
2450 
the head of the element has changed or restricted any 
activities of the element in response to derogatory 
human rights or international humanitarian law in-
formation. 
(6) Examples of any changes or restrictions spec-
ified in paragraph (5) taken by the head of the ele-
ment of the intelligence community during the two 
years preceding the date of the submission of the re-
port. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate; and
2451 
(D) the Subcommittees on Financial Serv-
ices and General Government and the Sub-
committees on State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs of the Committees on Appro-
priations of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. 
(2) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘‘covered enti-
ty’’— 
(A) means an individual, unit, or foreign 
government that— 
(i) has a cooperative relationship with 
the United States Government; or 
(ii) is the target of an intelligence col-
lection activity carried out by the United 
States Government; but 
(B) does not include an employee of the 
United States Government. 
(3) DEROGATORY
HUMAN
RIGHTS
OR
INTER-
NATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN
LAW
INFORMATION.—The 
term ‘‘derogatory human rights or international hu-
manitarian law information’’ means information 
tending to suggest that a covered entity committed, 
participated, or was otherwise complicit in, a viola-
tion of human rights or international humanitarian 
law, regardless of the credibility of such information,
2452 
the source of the information, or the level of classifica-
tion of the information. 
(4) VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OR INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.—The term ‘‘violation 
of human rights or international humanitarian law’’ 
includes a violation of any authority or obligation of 
the United States Government related to human 
rights or international humanitarian law, without re-
gard to whether such authority or obligation is codi-
fied in a provision of law, regulation, or policy. 
SEC. 830. REPORT ON RARE EARTH ELEMENTS. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in coordination with the Director of the Defense In-
telligence Agency, the Director of the Office of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, and 
any other head of an element of the intelligence community 
that the Director of National Intelligence determines rel-
evant, shall submit to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees a report on rare earth elements. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment coordinated by the National 
Intelligence Council of—
2453 
(A) long-term trends in the global rare 
earth element industry; 
(B) the national security, economic, and in-
dustrial risks to the United States, and to the 
partners and allies of the United States, with re-
spect to relying on foreign countries, including 
China, for rare earth mining and the processing 
or production of rare earth elements; 
(C) the intentions of foreign governments, 
including the government of China, with respect 
to limiting, reducing, or ending access of the 
United States or the partners and allies of the 
United States to— 
(i) rare earth elements; or 
(ii) any aspect of the rare earth min-
ing, processing, or production chain; and 
(D) opportunities for the United States, and 
for the partners and allies of the United States, 
to assure continued access to— 
(i) rare earth elements; and 
(ii) the rare earth mining, processing, 
or production chain. 
(2) A description of—
2454 
(A) any relevant procurement, use, and 
supply chain needs of the intelligence community 
with respect to rare earth elements; 
(B) any relevant planning or efforts by the 
intelligence community to assure secured access 
to rare earth elements; 
(C) any assessed vulnerabilities or risks to 
the intelligence community with respect to rare 
earth elements; 
(D) any relevant planning or efforts by the 
intelligence community to coordinate with de-
partments and agencies of the United States 
Government that are not elements of the intel-
ligence community on securing the rare earth 
element supply chain; and 
(E) any previous or anticipated efforts by 
the Supply Chain and Counterintelligence Risk 
Management Task Force established under sec-
tion 6306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Mat-
thew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 
U.S.C. 3370) with respect to rare earth elements. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
2455 
(d) RARE EARTH ELEMENTS DEFINED.—In this sec-
tion, the term ‘‘rare earth elements’’ includes products that 
contain rare earth elements, including rare earth magnets. 
SEC. 831. REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF ALL-SOURCE CYBER 
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community, in coordination 
with the Inspector General of the National Security Agency 
and the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a report on the effectiveness of the intelligence community 
with respect to the integration and dissemination of all- 
source intelligence relating to foreign cyber threats. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) An assessment of the effectiveness of the all- 
source cyber intelligence integration capabilities of the 
intelligence community, including the identification 
of capability gaps relating to the integration of all- 
source intelligence, or any deficiencies associated with 
the timely dissemination of such intelligence. 
(2) An assessment of the effectiveness of the intel-
ligence community in analyzing and reporting on 
cyber supply chain risks, including with respect to
2456 
interagency coordination and the leadership of the Of-
fice of the Director of National Intelligence. 
SEC. 
832. 
BRIEFING 
ON 
TRAININGS 
RELATING 
TO 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY. 
(a) BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall provide to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees a briefing on the feasibility and benefits of pro-
viding training described in subsection (b). 
(b) TRAINING DESCRIBED.—Training described in this 
subsection is training that meets the following criteria: 
(1) 
The 
training 
is 
on 
cryptocurrency, 
blockchain technology, or both subjects. 
(2) The training may be provided through part-
nerships with universities or private sector entities. 
SEC. 833. REPORT ON TRENDS IN TECHNOLOGIES OF STRA-
TEGIC IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once every 
2 years until the date that is 4 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Di-
rector of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report 
assessing commercial and foreign trends in technologies the
2457 
Director considers of strategic importance to the national 
and economic security of the United States. 
(b) CONTENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
(1) A list of the top technology focus areas the 
Director determines to be of the greatest strategic im-
portance to the United States. 
(2) A list of the top technology focus areas in 
which the Director determines foreign countries that 
are adversarial to the United States are poised to 
match or surpass the technological leadership of the 
United States. 
(c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a)— 
(1) may be submitted in the form of a National 
Intelligence Estimate; and 
(2) shall be submitted in classified form, but 
may include an unclassified summary. 
SEC. 834. PLAN FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DIGITAL 
ECOSYSTEM. 
(a) PLAN.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall coordinate with the heads of other elements of the intel-
ligence community and, in conjunction with the heads of 
those elements, shall—
2458 
(1) develop a plan for the development and 
resourcing of a modern digital ecosystem that em-
braces state-of-the-art tools and modern processes to 
enable development, testing, fielding, and continuous 
updating of artificial intelligence-powered applica-
tions at speed and scale from headquarters to the tac-
tical edge; and 
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees the plan developed under paragraph (1). 
(b) CONTENTS OF PLAN.—At a minimum, the plan re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) Policies to enable elements of the intelligence 
community to adopt a hoteling model to allow trusted 
small- and medium-sized artificial intelligence com-
panies access to classified facilities on a flexible basis. 
(2) Policies for an open architecture and an 
evolving reference design and guidance for needed 
technical investments in the proposed ecosystem that 
address issues, including common interfaces, authen-
tication, applications, platforms, software, hardware, 
and data infrastructure. 
(3) Policies to ensure, to the extent possible, 
interoperability, and the reduction of duplication, of 
artificial intelligence capabilities developed or ac-
quired by elements of the intelligence community.
2459 
(4) A governance structure, together with associ-
ated policies and guidance, to drive the implementa-
tion of the reference throughout the intelligence com-
munity on a federated basis. 
(5) Community standards for the use of artifi-
cial intelligence and associated data, as appropriate. 
(6) Recommendations to ensure that use of arti-
ficial intelligence and associated data by the Federal 
Government related to United States persons comport 
with rights relating to freedom of expression, equal 
protection, privacy, and due process. 
(c) FORM.—The plan submitted under subsection 
(a)(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. 
SEC. 835. REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR AND 
CAPACITY OF THE SERGEANTS AT ARMS OF 
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES AND THE UNITED STATES 
CAPITOL POLICE. 
(a) REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall submit to
2460 
the congressional intelligence committees, the Sub-
committees on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Re-
lated Agencies and the Subcommittees on Homeland 
Security of the Committees on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, and con-
gressional leadership a report on intelligence support 
provided to the Sergeants at Arms and the United 
States Capitol Police. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph 
(1) shall include a description of the following: 
(A) Policies related to the Sergeants at 
Arms and the United States Capitol Police as 
customers of intelligence. 
(B) How the intelligence community, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the De-
partment of Homeland Security, including the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agen-
cy, are structured, staffed, and resourced to pro-
vide intelligence support to the Sergeants at 
Arms and the United States Capitol Police. 
(C) The classified electronic and telephony 
interoperability of the intelligence community, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the De-
partment of Homeland Security with the Ser-
2461 
geants at Arms and the United States Capitol 
Police. 
(D) Any expedited security clearances pro-
vided for the Sergeants at Arms and the United 
States Capitol Police. 
(E) Counterterrorism intelligence and other 
intelligence relevant to the physical security of 
Congress that are provided to the Sergeants at 
Arms and the United States Capitol Police, in-
cluding— 
(i) strategic analysis and real-time 
warning; and 
(ii) access to classified systems for 
transmitting and posting intelligence. 
(F) Cyber intelligence relevant to the protec-
tion of cyber networks of Congress and the per-
sonal devices and accounts of Members and em-
ployees of Congress, including— 
(i) strategic and real-time warnings, 
such as malware signatures and other indi-
cations of attack; and 
(ii) access to classified systems for 
transmitting and posting intelligence.
2462 
(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. 
(b) GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
RE-
PORT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comp-
troller General of the United States shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees and con-
gressional leadership a report on the capacity of the 
Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol Po-
lice to access and use intelligence and threat informa-
tion relevant to the physical and cyber security of 
Congress. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report under paragraph 
(1) shall include the following: 
(A) An assessment of the extent to which the 
Sergeants at Arms and the United States Capitol 
Police have the resources, including facilities, 
cleared personnel, and necessary training, and 
authorities to adequately access, analyze, man-
age, and use intelligence and threat information 
necessary to defend the physical and cyber secu-
rity of Congress.
2463 
(B) The extent to which the Sergeants at 
Arms and the United States Capitol Police com-
municate and coordinate threat data with each 
other and with other local law enforcement enti-
ties. 
(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
Rules and Administration, the Committee on the 
Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, 
the Committee on House Administration, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives.
2464 
(2) CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP.—The term 
‘‘congressional leadership’’ means— 
(A) the majority leader of the Senate; 
(B) the minority leader of the Senate; 
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives; and 
(D) the minority leader of the House of 
Representatives. 
(3) SERGEANTS AT ARMS.—The term ‘‘Sergeants 
at Arms’’ means the Sergeant at Arms and Door-
keeper of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms of the 
House of Representatives, and the Chief Administra-
tive Officer of the House of Representatives. 
DIVISION 
Y—CYBER 
INCIDENT 
REPORTING FOR CRITICAL IN-
FRASTRUCTURE ACT OF 2022 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Cyber Incident Re-
porting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022’’. 
SEC. 102. DEFINITIONS. 
In this division: 
(1) COVERED CYBER INCIDENT; COVERED ENTI-
TY; CYBER INCIDENT; INFORMATION SYSTEM; RANSOM 
PAYMENT; RANSOMWARE ATTACK; SECURITY VULNER-
ABILITY.—The terms ‘‘covered cyber incident’’, ‘‘cov-
2465 
ered entity’’, ‘‘cyber incident’’, ‘‘information system’’, 
‘‘ransom payment’’, ‘‘ransomware attack’’, and ‘‘secu-
rity vulnerability’’ have the meanings given those 
terms in section 2240 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division. 
(2) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the 
Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Se-
curity Agency. 
SEC. 103. CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING. 
(a) CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING.—Title XXII of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) is 
amended— 
(1) in section 2209(c) (6 U.S.C. 659(c))— 
(A) in paragraph (11), by striking ‘‘; and’’ 
and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) in paragraph (12), by striking the pe-
riod at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(13) receiving, aggregating, and analyzing re-
ports related to covered cyber incidents (as defined in 
section 2240) submitted by covered entities (as defined 
in section 2240) and reports related to ransom pay-
ments (as defined in section 2240) submitted by cov-
ered entities (as defined in section 2240) in further-
ance of the activities specified in sections 2202(e),
2466 
2203, and 2241, this subsection, and any other au-
thorized activity of the Director, to enhance the situa-
tional awareness of cybersecurity threats across crit-
ical infrastructure sectors.’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘Subtitle D—Cyber Incident 
Reporting 
‘‘SEC. 2240. DEFINITIONS. 
‘‘In this subtitle: 
‘‘(1) CENTER.—The term ‘Center’ means the cen-
ter established under section 2209. 
‘‘(2) CLOUD
SERVICE
PROVIDER.—The term 
‘cloud service provider’ means an entity offering 
products or services related to cloud computing, as de-
fined by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology in NIST Special Publication 800–145 
and any amendatory or superseding document relat-
ing thereto. 
‘‘(3) COUNCIL.—The term ‘Council’ means the 
Cyber Incident Reporting Council described in section 
2246. 
‘‘(4) COVERED CYBER INCIDENT.—The term ‘cov-
ered cyber incident’ means a substantial cyber inci-
dent experienced by a covered entity that satisfies the
2467 
definition and criteria established by the Director in 
the final rule issued pursuant to section 2242(b). 
‘‘(5) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘covered enti-
ty’ means an entity in a critical infrastructure sector, 
as defined in Presidential Policy Directive 21, that 
satisfies the definition established by the Director in 
the final rule issued pursuant to section 2242(b). 
‘‘(6) CYBER INCIDENT.—The term ‘cyber inci-
dent’— 
‘‘(A) has the meaning given the term ‘inci-
dent’ in section 2209; and 
‘‘(B) does not include an occurrence that 
imminently, but not actually, jeopardizes— 
‘‘(i) information on information sys-
tems; or 
‘‘(ii) information systems. 
‘‘(7) CYBER THREAT.—The term ‘cyber threat’ 
has the meaning given the term ‘cybersecurity threat’ 
in section 2201. 
‘‘(8) CYBER THREAT INDICATOR; CYBERSECURITY 
PURPOSE; DEFENSIVE
MEASURE; FEDERAL
ENTITY; 
SECURITY VULNERABILITY.—The terms ‘cyber threat 
indicator’, ‘cybersecurity purpose’, ‘defensive meas-
ure’, ‘Federal entity’, and ‘security vulnerability’
2468 
have the meanings given those terms in section 102 of 
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501). 
‘‘(9) INCIDENT; SHARING.—The terms ‘incident’ 
and ‘sharing’ have the meanings given those terms in 
section 2209. 
‘‘(10) INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS OR-
GANIZATION.—The term ‘Information Sharing and 
Analysis Organization’ has the meaning given the 
term in section 2222. 
‘‘(11) INFORMATION SYSTEM.—The term ‘infor-
mation system’— 
‘‘(A) has the meaning given the term in sec-
tion 3502 of title 44, United States Code; and 
‘‘(B) includes industrial control systems, 
such as supervisory control and data acquisition 
systems, distributed control systems, and pro-
grammable logic controllers. 
‘‘(12) MANAGED SERVICE PROVIDER.—The term 
‘managed service provider’ means an entity that de-
livers services, such as network, application, infra-
structure, or security services, via ongoing and reg-
ular support and active administration on the prem-
ises of a customer, in the data center of the entity 
(such as hosting), or in a third party data center.
2469 
‘‘(13) RANSOM
PAYMENT.—The term ‘ransom 
payment’ means the transmission of any money or 
other property or asset, including virtual currency, or 
any portion thereof, which has at any time been de-
livered as ransom in connection with a ransomware 
attack. 
‘‘(14) 
RANSOMWARE
ATTACK.—The 
term 
‘ransomware attack’— 
‘‘(A) means an incident that includes the 
use or threat of use of unauthorized or malicious 
code on an information system, or the use or 
threat of use of another digital mechanism such 
as a denial of service attack, to interrupt or dis-
rupt the operations of an information system or 
compromise the confidentiality, availability, or 
integrity of electronic data stored on, processed 
by, or transiting an information system to extort 
a demand for a ransom payment; and 
‘‘(B) does not include any such event where 
the demand for payment is— 
‘‘(i) not genuine; or 
‘‘(ii) made in good faith by an entity 
in response to a specific request by the 
owner or operator of the information sys-
tem.
2470 
‘‘(15) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—The 
term ‘Sector Risk Management Agency’ has the mean-
ing given the term in section 2201. 
‘‘(16) SIGNIFICANT CYBER INCIDENT.—The term 
‘significant cyber incident’ means a cyber incident, or 
a group of related cyber incidents, that the Secretary 
determines is likely to result in demonstrable harm to 
the national security interests, foreign relations, or 
economy of the United States or to the public con-
fidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of 
the people of the United States. 
‘‘(17) SUPPLY CHAIN COMPROMISE.—The term 
‘supply chain compromise’ means an incident within 
the supply chain of an information system that an 
adversary can leverage or does leverage to jeopardize 
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the in-
formation system or the information the system proc-
esses, stores, or transmits, and can occur at any point 
during the life cycle. 
‘‘(18) VIRTUAL
CURRENCY.—The term ‘virtual 
currency’ means the digital representation of value 
that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of ac-
count, or a store of value. 
‘‘(19) VIRTUAL CURRENCY ADDRESS.—The term 
‘virtual currency address’ means a unique public
2471 
cryptographic key identifying the location to which a 
virtual currency payment can be made. 
‘‘SEC. 2241. CYBER INCIDENT REVIEW. 
‘‘(a) ACTIVITIES.—The Center shall— 
‘‘(1) receive, aggregate, analyze, and secure, 
using processes consistent with the processes developed 
pursuant to the Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) reports from cov-
ered entities related to a covered cyber incident to as-
sess the effectiveness of security controls, identify tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures adversaries use to 
overcome those controls and other cybersecurity pur-
poses, including to assess potential impact of cyber 
incidents on public health and safety and to enhance 
situational awareness of cyber threats across critical 
infrastructure sectors; 
‘‘(2) coordinate and share information with ap-
propriate Federal departments and agencies to iden-
tify and track ransom payments, including those uti-
lizing virtual currencies; 
‘‘(3) leverage information gathered about cyber 
incidents to— 
‘‘(A) enhance the quality and effectiveness of 
information sharing and coordination efforts 
with appropriate entities, including agencies,
2472 
sector coordinating councils, Information Shar-
ing and Analysis Organizations, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial governments, technology 
providers, critical infrastructure owners and op-
erators, cybersecurity and cyber incident re-
sponse firms, and security researchers; and 
‘‘(B) provide appropriate entities, including 
sector coordinating councils, Information Shar-
ing and Analysis Organizations, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial governments, technology 
providers, cybersecurity and cyber incident re-
sponse firms, and security researchers, with 
timely, actionable, and anonymized reports of 
cyber incident campaigns and trends, including, 
to the maximum extent practicable, related con-
textual information, cyber threat indicators, and 
defensive measures, pursuant to section 2245; 
‘‘(4) establish mechanisms to receive feedback 
from stakeholders on how the Agency can most effec-
tively receive covered cyber incident reports, ransom 
payment reports, and other voluntarily provided in-
formation, and how the Agency can most effectively 
support private sector cybersecurity; 
‘‘(5) facilitate the timely sharing, on a voluntary 
basis, between relevant critical infrastructure owners
2473 
and operators of information relating to covered cyber 
incidents and ransom payments, particularly with re-
spect 
to 
ongoing 
cyber 
threats 
or 
security 
vulnerabilities and identify and disseminate ways to 
prevent or mitigate similar cyber incidents in the fu-
ture; 
‘‘(6) for a covered cyber incident, including a 
ransomware attack, that also satisfies the definition 
of a significant cyber incident, or is part of a group 
of related cyber incidents that together satisfy such 
definition, conduct a review of the details sur-
rounding the covered cyber incident or group of those 
incidents and identify and disseminate ways to pre-
vent or mitigate similar incidents in the future; 
‘‘(7) with respect to covered cyber incident re-
ports under section 2242(a) and 2243 involving an 
ongoing cyber threat or security vulnerability, imme-
diately review those reports for cyber threat indicators 
that can be anonymized and disseminated, with de-
fensive measures, to appropriate stakeholders, in co-
ordination with other divisions within the Agency, as 
appropriate; 
‘‘(8) publish quarterly unclassified, public re-
ports that describe aggregated, anonymized observa-
tions, findings, and recommendations based on cov-
2474 
ered cyber incident reports, which may be based on 
the unclassified information contained in the brief-
ings required under subsection (c); 
‘‘(9) proactively identify opportunities, con-
sistent with the protections in section 2245, to lever-
age and utilize data on cyber incidents in a manner 
that enables and strengthens cybersecurity research 
carried out by academic institutions and other pri-
vate sector organizations, to the greatest extent prac-
ticable; and 
‘‘(10) in accordance with section 2245 and sub-
section (b) of this section, as soon as possible but not 
later than 24 hours after receiving a covered cyber in-
cident report, ransom payment report, voluntarily 
submitted information pursuant to section 2243, or 
information received pursuant to a request for infor-
mation or subpoena under section 2244, make avail-
able the information to appropriate Sector Risk Man-
agement Agencies and other appropriate Federal 
agencies. 
‘‘(b) INTERAGENCY SHARING.—The President or a des-
ignee of the President— 
‘‘(1) may establish a specific time requirement 
for sharing information under subsection (a)(10); and
2475 
‘‘(2) shall determine the appropriate Federal 
agencies under subsection (a)(10). 
‘‘(c) PERIODIC BRIEFING.—Not later than 60 days 
after the effective date of the final rule required under sec-
tion 2242(b), and on the first day of each month thereafter, 
the Director, in consultation with the National Cyber Direc-
tor, the Attorney General, and the Director of National In-
telligence, shall provide to the majority leader of the Senate, 
the minority leader of the Senate, the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a brief-
ing that characterizes the national cyber threat landscape, 
including the threat facing Federal agencies and covered en-
tities, and applicable intelligence and law enforcement in-
formation, covered cyber incidents, and ransomware at-
tacks, as of the date of the briefing, which shall— 
‘‘(1) include the total number of reports sub-
mitted under sections 2242 and 2243 during the pre-
ceding month, including a breakdown of required and 
voluntary reports; 
‘‘(2) include any identified trends in covered 
cyber incidents and ransomware attacks over the 
course of the preceding month and as compared to
2476 
previous reports, including any trends related to the 
information collected in the reports submitted under 
sections 2242 and 2243, including— 
‘‘(A) the infrastructure, tactics, and tech-
niques malicious cyber actors commonly use; and 
‘‘(B) intelligence gaps that have impeded, or 
currently are impeding, the ability to counter 
covered cyber incidents and ransomware threats; 
‘‘(3) include a summary of the known uses of the 
information in reports submitted under sections 2242 
and 2243; and 
‘‘(4) include an unclassified portion, but may 
include a classified component. 
‘‘SEC. 2242. REQUIRED REPORTING OF CERTAIN CYBER IN-
CIDENTS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— 
‘‘(1) COVERED CYBER INCIDENT REPORTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A covered entity that 
experiences a covered cyber incident shall report 
the covered cyber incident to the Agency not later 
than 72 hours after the covered entity reasonably 
believes that the covered cyber incident has oc-
curred. 
‘‘(B) LIMITATION.—The Director may not 
require reporting under subparagraph (A) any
2477 
earlier than 72 hours after the covered entity 
reasonably believes that a covered cyber incident 
has occurred. 
‘‘(2) RANSOM PAYMENT REPORTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A covered entity that 
makes a ransom payment as the result of a 
ransomware attack against the covered entity 
shall report the payment to the Agency not later 
than 24 hours after the ransom payment has 
been made. 
‘‘(B) 
APPLICATION.—The 
requirements 
under subparagraph (A) shall apply even if the 
ransomware attack is not a covered cyber inci-
dent subject to the reporting requirements under 
paragraph (1). 
‘‘(3) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTS.—A covered enti-
ty shall promptly submit to the Agency an update or 
supplement to a previously submitted covered cyber 
incident report if substantial new or different infor-
mation becomes available or if the covered entity 
makes a ransom payment after submitting a covered 
cyber incident report required under paragraph (1), 
until such date that such covered entity notifies the 
Agency that the covered cyber incident at issue has 
concluded and has been fully mitigated and resolved.
2478 
‘‘(4) PRESERVATION
OF
INFORMATION.—Any 
covered entity subject to requirements of paragraph 
(1), (2), or (3) shall preserve data relevant to the cov-
ered cyber incident or ransom payment in accordance 
with procedures established in the final rule issued 
pursuant to subsection (b). 
‘‘(5) EXCEPTIONS.— 
‘‘(A) REPORTING OF COVERED CYBER INCI-
DENT WITH RANSOM PAYMENT.—If a covered en-
tity is the victim of a covered cyber incident and 
makes a ransom payment prior to the 72 hour 
requirement under paragraph (1), such that the 
reporting requirements under paragraphs (1) 
and (2) both apply, the covered entity may sub-
mit a single report to satisfy the requirements of 
both paragraphs in accordance with procedures 
established in the final rule issued pursuant to 
subsection (b). 
‘‘(B) SUBSTANTIALLY
SIMILAR
REPORTED 
INFORMATION.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the limi-
tation described in clause (ii), where the 
Agency has an agreement in place that sat-
isfies the requirements of section 104(a) of 
the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical
2479 
Infrastructure Act of 2022, the requirements 
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not 
apply to a covered entity required by law, 
regulation, or contract to report substan-
tially similar information to another Fed-
eral agency within a substantially similar 
timeframe. 
‘‘(ii) LIMITATION.—The exemption in 
clause (i) shall take effect with respect to a 
covered entity once an agency agreement 
and sharing mechanism is in place between 
the Agency and the respective Federal agen-
cy, pursuant to section 104(a) of the Cyber 
Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastruc-
ture Act of 2022. 
‘‘(iii) RULES
OF
CONSTRUCTION.— 
Nothing in this paragraph shall be con-
strued to— 
‘‘(I) exempt a covered entity from 
the reporting requirements under para-
graph (3) unless the supplemental re-
port also meets the requirements of 
clauses (i) and (ii) of this paragraph; 
‘‘(II) prevent the Agency from 
contacting an entity submitting infor-
2480 
mation to another Federal agency that 
is provided to the Agency pursuant to 
section 104 of the Cyber Incident Re-
porting for Critical Infrastructure Act 
of 2022; or 
‘‘(III) prevent an entity from 
communicating with the Agency. 
‘‘(C) DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM.—The require-
ments under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) shall 
not apply to a covered entity or the functions of 
a covered entity that the Director determines 
constitute critical infrastructure owned, oper-
ated, or governed by multi-stakeholder organiza-
tions that develop, implement, and enforce poli-
cies concerning the Domain Name System, such 
as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers or the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority. 
‘‘(6) MANNER, 
TIMING, 
AND
FORM
OF
RE-
PORTS.—Reports made under paragraphs (1), (2), 
and (3) shall be made in the manner and form, and 
within the time period in the case of reports made 
under paragraph (3), prescribed in the final rule 
issued pursuant to subsection (b).
2481 
‘‘(7) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Paragraphs (1) through 
(4) shall take effect on the dates prescribed in the 
final rule issued pursuant to subsection (b). 
‘‘(b) RULEMAKING.— 
‘‘(1) NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING.—Not 
later than 24 months after the date of enactment of 
this section, the Director, in consultation with Sector 
Risk Management Agencies, the Department of Jus-
tice, and other Federal agencies, shall publish in the 
Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking to 
implement subsection (a). 
‘‘(2) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 18 months 
after publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking 
under paragraph (1), the Director shall issue a final 
rule to implement subsection (a). 
‘‘(3) SUBSEQUENT RULEMAKINGS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The Director is author-
ized to issue regulations to amend or revise the 
final rule issued pursuant to paragraph (2). 
‘‘(B) PROCEDURES.—Any subsequent rules 
issued under subparagraph (A) shall comply 
with the requirements under chapter 5 of title 5, 
United States Code, including the issuance of a 
notice of proposed rulemaking under section 553 
of such title.
2482 
‘‘(c) ELEMENTS.—The final rule issued pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall be composed of the following elements: 
‘‘(1) A clear description of the types of entities 
that constitute covered entities, based on— 
‘‘(A) the consequences that disruption to or 
compromise of such an entity could cause to na-
tional security, economic security, or public 
health and safety; 
‘‘(B) the likelihood that such an entity may 
be targeted by a malicious cyber actor, including 
a foreign country; and 
‘‘(C) the extent to which damage, disrup-
tion, or unauthorized access to such an entity, 
including the accessing of sensitive cybersecurity 
vulnerability information or penetration testing 
tools or techniques, will likely enable the disrup-
tion of the reliable operation of critical infra-
structure. 
‘‘(2) A clear description of the types of substan-
tial cyber incidents that constitute covered cyber inci-
dents, which shall— 
‘‘(A) at a minimum, require the occurrence 
of— 
‘‘(i) a cyber incident that leads to sub-
stantial loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
2483 
availability of such information system or 
network, or a serious impact on the safety 
and resiliency of operational systems and 
processes; 
‘‘(ii) a disruption of business or indus-
trial operations, including due to a denial 
of service attack, ransomware attack, or ex-
ploitation of a zero day vulnerability, 
against 
‘‘(I) an information system or 
network; or 
‘‘(II) an operational technology 
system or process; or 
‘‘(iii) unauthorized access or disrup-
tion of business or industrial operations due 
to loss of service facilitated through, or 
caused by, a compromise of a cloud service 
provider, managed service provider, or other 
third-party data hosting provider or by a 
supply chain compromise; 
‘‘(B) consider— 
‘‘(i) the sophistication or novelty of the 
tactics used to perpetrate such a cyber inci-
dent, as well as the type, volume, and sensi-
tivity of the data at issue;
2484 
‘‘(ii) the number of individuals di-
rectly or indirectly affected or potentially 
affected by such a cyber incident; and 
‘‘(iii) potential impacts on industrial 
control systems, such as supervisory control 
and data acquisition systems, distributed 
control systems, and programmable logic 
controllers; and 
‘‘(C) exclude— 
‘‘(i) any event where the cyber incident 
is perpetrated in good faith by an entity in 
response to a specific request by the owner 
or operator of the information system; and 
‘‘(ii) the threat of disruption as extor-
tion, as described in section 2240(14)(A). 
‘‘(3) A requirement that, if a covered cyber inci-
dent or a ransom payment occurs following an ex-
empted threat described in paragraph (2)(C)(ii), the 
covered entity shall comply with the requirements in 
this subtitle in reporting the covered cyber incident or 
ransom payment. 
‘‘(4) A clear description of the specific required 
contents of a report pursuant to subsection (a)(1), 
which shall include the following information, to the
2485 
extent applicable and available, with respect to a cov-
ered cyber incident: 
‘‘(A) A description of the covered cyber inci-
dent, including— 
‘‘(i) identification and a description of 
the function of the affected information sys-
tems, networks, or devices that were, or are 
reasonably believed to have been, affected by 
such cyber incident; 
‘‘(ii) a description of the unauthorized 
access with substantial loss of confiden-
tiality, integrity, or availability of the af-
fected information system or network or dis-
ruption of business or industrial operations; 
‘‘(iii) the estimated date range of such 
incident; and 
‘‘(iv) the impact to the operations of 
the covered entity. 
‘‘(B) Where applicable, a description of the 
vulnerabilities exploited and the security defenses 
that were in place, as well as the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures used to perpetrate the 
covered cyber incident. 
‘‘(C) Where applicable, any identifying or 
contact information related to each actor reason-
2486 
ably believed to be responsible for such cyber in-
cident. 
‘‘(D) Where applicable, identification of the 
category or categories of information that were, 
or are reasonably believed to have been, accessed 
or acquired by an unauthorized person. 
‘‘(E) The name and other information that 
clearly identifies the covered entity impacted by 
the covered cyber incident, including, as applica-
ble, the State of incorporation or formation of 
the covered entity, trade names, legal names, or 
other identifiers. 
‘‘(F) Contact information, such as telephone 
number or electronic mail address, that the 
Agency may use to contact the covered entity or 
an authorized agent of such covered entity, or, 
where applicable, the service provider of such 
covered entity acting with the express permission 
of, and at the direction of, the covered entity to 
assist with compliance with the requirements of 
this subtitle. 
‘‘(5) A clear description of the specific required 
contents of a report pursuant to subsection (a)(2), 
which shall be the following information, to the extent
2487 
applicable and available, with respect to a ransom 
payment: 
‘‘(A) A description of the ransomware at-
tack, including the estimated date range of the 
attack. 
‘‘(B) Where applicable, a description of the 
vulnerabilities, tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures used to perpetrate the ransomware attack. 
‘‘(C) Where applicable, any identifying or 
contact information related to the actor or actors 
reasonably believed to be responsible for the 
ransomware attack. 
‘‘(D) The name and other information that 
clearly identifies the covered entity that made the 
ransom payment or on whose behalf the payment 
was made. 
‘‘(E) Contact information, such as telephone 
number or electronic mail address, that the 
Agency may use to contact the covered entity 
that made the ransom payment or an authorized 
agent of such covered entity, or, where applica-
ble, the service provider of such covered entity 
acting with the express permission of, and at the 
direction of, that covered entity to assist with 
compliance with the requirements of this subtitle.
2488 
‘‘(F) The date of the ransom payment. 
‘‘(G) The ransom payment demand, includ-
ing the type of virtual currency or other com-
modity requested, if applicable. 
‘‘(H) The ransom payment instructions, in-
cluding information regarding where to send the 
payment, such as the virtual currency address or 
physical address the funds were requested to be 
sent to, if applicable. 
‘‘(I) The amount of the ransom payment. 
‘‘(6) A clear description of the types of data re-
quired to be preserved pursuant to subsection (a)(4), 
the period of time for which the data is required to 
be preserved, and allowable uses, processes, and proce-
dures. 
‘‘(7) Deadlines and criteria for submitting sup-
plemental reports to the Agency required under sub-
section (a)(3), which shall— 
‘‘(A) be established by the Director in con-
sultation with the Council; 
‘‘(B) consider any existing regulatory re-
porting requirements similar in scope, purpose, 
and timing to the reporting requirements to 
which such a covered entity may also be subject, 
and make efforts to harmonize the timing and
2489 
contents of any such reports to the maximum ex-
tent practicable; 
‘‘(C) balance the need for situational aware-
ness with the ability of the covered entity to con-
duct cyber incident response and investigations; 
and 
‘‘(D) provide a clear description of what 
constitutes substantial new or different informa-
tion. 
‘‘(8) Procedures for— 
‘‘(A) entities, including third parties pursu-
ant to subsection (d)(1), to submit reports re-
quired by paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of sub-
section (a), including the manner and form 
thereof, which shall include, at a minimum, a 
concise, user-friendly web-based form; 
‘‘(B) the Agency to carry out— 
‘‘(i) the enforcement provisions of sec-
tion 2244, including with respect to the 
issuance, service, withdrawal, referral proc-
ess, and enforcement of subpoenas, appeals 
and due process procedures; 
‘‘(ii) other available enforcement mech-
anisms including acquisition, suspension 
and debarment procedures; and
2490 
‘‘(iii) other aspects of noncompliance; 
‘‘(C) implementing the exceptions provided 
in subsection (a)(5); and 
‘‘(D) protecting privacy and civil liberties 
consistent with processes adopted pursuant to 
section 105(b) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
(6 U.S.C. 1504(b)) and anonymizing and safe-
guarding, or no longer retaining, information re-
ceived and disclosed through covered cyber inci-
dent reports and ransom payment reports that is 
known to be personal information of a specific 
individual or information that identifies a spe-
cific individual that is not directly related to a 
cybersecurity threat. 
‘‘(9) Other procedural measures directly nec-
essary to implement subsection (a). 
‘‘(d) THIRD PARTY REPORT SUBMISSION AND RANSOM 
PAYMENT.— 
‘‘(1) REPORT
SUBMISSION.—A covered entity 
that is required to submit a covered cyber incident re-
port or a ransom payment report may use a third 
party, such as an incident response company, insur-
ance provider, service provider, Information Sharing 
and Analysis Organization, or law firm, to submit 
the required report under subsection (a).
2491 
‘‘(2) RANSOM PAYMENT.—If a covered entity im-
pacted by a ransomware attack uses a third party to 
make a ransom payment, the third party shall not be 
required to submit a ransom payment report for itself 
under subsection (a)(2). 
‘‘(3) DUTY TO REPORT.—Third-party reporting 
under this subparagraph does not relieve a covered 
entity from the duty to comply with the requirements 
for covered cyber incident report or ransom payment 
report submission. 
‘‘(4) RESPONSIBILITY
TO
ADVISE.—Any third 
party used by a covered entity that knowingly makes 
a ransom payment on behalf of a covered entity im-
pacted by a ransomware attack shall advise the im-
pacted covered entity of the responsibilities of the im-
pacted covered entity regarding reporting ransom 
payments under this section. 
‘‘(e) OUTREACH TO COVERED ENTITIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Agency shall conduct an 
outreach and education campaign to inform likely 
covered entities, entities that offer or advertise as a 
service to customers to make or facilitate ransom pay-
ments on behalf of covered entities impacted by 
ransomware attacks and other appropriate entities of
2492 
the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of 
subsection (a). 
‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—The outreach and education 
campaign under paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(A) An overview of the final rule issued 
pursuant to subsection (b). 
‘‘(B) An overview of mechanisms to submit 
to the Agency covered cyber incident reports, 
ransom payment reports, and information relat-
ing to the disclosure, retention, and use of cov-
ered cyber incident reports and ransom payment 
reports under this section. 
‘‘(C) An overview of the protections afforded 
to covered entities for complying with the re-
quirements under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of 
subsection (a). 
‘‘(D) An overview of the steps taken under 
section 2244 when a covered entity is not in 
compliance with the reporting requirements 
under subsection (a). 
‘‘(E) Specific outreach to cybersecurity ven-
dors, cyber incident response providers, cyberse-
curity insurance entities, and other entities that 
may support covered entities.
2493 
‘‘(F) An overview of the privacy and civil 
liberties requirements in this subtitle. 
‘‘(3) COORDINATION.—In conducting the out-
reach and education campaign required under para-
graph (1), the Agency may coordinate with— 
‘‘(A) the Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Advisory Council established under section 871; 
‘‘(B) Information Sharing and Analysis 
Organizations; 
‘‘(C) trade associations; 
‘‘(D) information sharing and analysis cen-
ters; 
‘‘(E) sector coordinating councils; and 
‘‘(F) any other entity as determined appro-
priate by the Director. 
‘‘(f) EXEMPTION.—Sections 3506(c), 3507, 3508, and 
3509 of title 44, United States Code, shall not apply to any 
action to carry out this section. 
‘‘(g) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion shall affect the authorities of the Federal Government 
to implement the requirements of Executive Order 14028 
(86 Fed. Reg. 26633; relating to improving the nation’s cy-
bersecurity), including changes to the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations and remedies to include suspension and debar-
ment.
2494 
‘‘(h) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to supersede or to abrogate, modify, or 
otherwise limit the authority that is vested in any officer 
or any agency of the United States Government to regulate 
or take action with respect to the cybersecurity of an entity. 
‘‘SEC. 2243. VOLUNTARY REPORTING OF OTHER CYBER IN-
CIDENTS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Entities may voluntarily report 
cyber incidents or ransom payments to the Agency that are 
not required under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 
2242(a), but may enhance the situational awareness of 
cyber threats. 
‘‘(b) VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL INFOR-
MATION IN REQUIRED REPORTS.—Covered entities may 
voluntarily include in reports required under paragraph 
(1), (2), or (3) of section 2242(a) information that is not 
required to be included, but may enhance the situational 
awareness of cyber threats. 
‘‘(c) APPLICATION OF PROTECTIONS.—The protections 
under section 2245 applicable to reports made under section 
2242 shall apply in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent to reports and information submitted under subsections 
(a) and (b).
2495 
‘‘SEC. 2244. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REQUIRED REPORTING. 
‘‘(a) PURPOSE.—In the event that a covered entity that 
is required to submit a report under section 2242(a) fails 
to comply with the requirement to report, the Director may 
obtain information about the cyber incident or ransom pay-
ment by engaging the covered entity directly to request in-
formation about the cyber incident or ransom payment, and 
if the Director is unable to obtain information through such 
engagement, by issuing a subpoena to the covered entity, 
pursuant to subsection (c), to gather information sufficient 
to determine whether a covered cyber incident or ransom 
payment has occurred. 
‘‘(b) INITIAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Director has reason to 
believe, whether through public reporting or other in-
formation in the possession of the Federal Govern-
ment, including through analysis performed pursuant 
to paragraph (1) or (2) of section 2241(a), that a cov-
ered entity has experienced a covered cyber incident 
or made a ransom payment but failed to report such 
cyber incident or payment to the Agency in accord-
ance with section 2242(a), the Director may request 
additional information from the covered entity to con-
firm whether or not a covered cyber incident or ran-
som payment has occurred.
2496 
‘‘(2) TREATMENT.—Information provided to the 
Agency in response to a request under paragraph (1) 
shall be treated as if it was submitted through the re-
porting procedures established in section 2242. 
‘‘(c) ENFORCEMENT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—If, after the date that is 72 
hours from the date on which the Director made the 
request for information in subsection (b), the Director 
has received no response from the covered entity from 
which such information was requested, or received an 
inadequate response, the Director may issue to such 
covered entity a subpoena to compel disclosure of in-
formation the Director deems necessary to determine 
whether a covered cyber incident or ransom payment 
has occurred and obtain the information required to 
be reported pursuant to section 2242 and any imple-
menting regulations, and assess potential impacts to 
national security, economic security, or public health 
and safety. 
‘‘(2) CIVIL ACTION.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If a covered entity fails 
to comply with a subpoena, the Director may 
refer the matter to the Attorney General to bring 
a civil action in a district court of the United 
States to enforce such subpoena.
2497 
‘‘(B) VENUE.—An action under this para-
graph may be brought in the judicial district in 
which the covered entity against which the action 
is brought resides, is found, or does business. 
‘‘(C) CONTEMPT OF COURT.—A court may 
punish a failure to comply with a subpoena 
issued under this subsection as contempt of 
court. 
‘‘(3) NON-DELEGATION.—The authority of the 
Director to issue a subpoena under this subsection 
may not be delegated. 
‘‘(4) AUTHENTICATION.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Any subpoena issued 
electronically pursuant to this subsection shall be 
authenticated with a cryptographic digital sig-
nature of an authorized representative of the 
Agency, or other comparable successor tech-
nology, that allows the Agency to demonstrate 
that such subpoena was issued by the Agency 
and has not been altered or modified since such 
issuance. 
‘‘(B) INVALID
IF
NOT
AUTHENTICATED.— 
Any subpoena issued electronically pursuant to 
this subsection that is not authenticated in ac-
cordance with subparagraph (A) shall not be
2498 
considered to be valid by the recipient of such 
subpoena. 
‘‘(d) PROVISION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION TO ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL.— 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 
2245(a)(5) and paragraph (b)(2) of this section, if the 
Director determines, based on the information pro-
vided in response to a subpoena issued pursuant to 
subsection (c), that the facts relating to the cyber inci-
dent or ransom payment at issue may constitute 
grounds for a regulatory enforcement action or crimi-
nal prosecution, the Director may provide such infor-
mation to the Attorney General or the head of the ap-
propriate Federal regulatory agency, who may use 
such information for a regulatory enforcement action 
or criminal prosecution. 
‘‘(2) CONSULTATION.—The Director may consult 
with the Attorney General or the head of the appro-
priate Federal regulatory agency when making the 
determination under paragraph (1). 
‘‘(e) CONSIDERATIONS.—When determining whether to 
exercise the authorities provided under this section, the Di-
rector shall take into consideration— 
‘‘(1) the complexity in determining if a covered 
cyber incident has occurred; and
2499 
‘‘(2) prior interaction with the Agency or aware-
ness of the covered entity of the policies and proce-
dures of the Agency for reporting covered cyber inci-
dents and ransom payments. 
‘‘(f) EXCLUSIONS.—This section shall not apply to a 
State, local, Tribal, or territorial government entity. 
‘‘(g) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The Director shall sub-
mit to Congress an annual report on the number of times 
the Director— 
‘‘(1) issued an initial request for information 
pursuant to subsection (b); 
‘‘(2) issued a subpoena pursuant to subsection 
(c); or 
‘‘(3) referred a matter to the Attorney General 
for a civil action pursuant to subsection (c)(2). 
‘‘(h) PUBLICATION OF THE ANNUAL REPORT.—The 
Director shall publish a version of the annual report re-
quired under subsection (g) on the website of the Agency, 
which shall include, at a minimum, the number of times 
the Director— 
‘‘(1) issued an initial request for information 
pursuant to subsection (b); or 
‘‘(2) issued a subpoena pursuant to subsection 
(c).
2500 
‘‘(i) ANONYMIZATION
OF REPORTS.—The Director 
shall ensure any victim information contained in a report 
required to be published under subsection (h) be anonymized 
before the report is published. 
‘‘SEC. 2245. INFORMATION SHARED WITH OR PROVIDED TO 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
‘‘(a) DISCLOSURE, RETENTION, AND USE.— 
‘‘(1) 
AUTHORIZED
ACTIVITIES.—Information 
provided to the Agency pursuant to section 2242 or 
2243 may be disclosed to, retained by, and used by, 
consistent with otherwise applicable provisions of 
Federal law, any Federal agency or department, com-
ponent, officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Gov-
ernment solely for— 
‘‘(A) a cybersecurity purpose; 
‘‘(B) the purpose of identifying— 
‘‘(i) a cyber threat, including the 
source of the cyber threat; or 
‘‘(ii) a security vulnerability; 
‘‘(C) the purpose of responding to, or other-
wise preventing or mitigating, a specific threat 
of death, a specific threat of serious bodily harm, 
or a specific threat of serious economic harm, in-
cluding a terrorist act or use of a weapon of 
mass destruction;
2501 
‘‘(D) the purpose of responding to, inves-
tigating, prosecuting, or otherwise preventing or 
mitigating, a serious threat to a minor, includ-
ing sexual exploitation and threats to physical 
safety; or 
‘‘(E) the purpose of preventing, inves-
tigating, disrupting, or prosecuting an offense 
arising out of a cyber incident reported pursuant 
to section 2242 or 2243 or any of the offenses 
listed in section 105(d)(5)(A)(v) of the Cyberse-
curity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1504(d)(5)(A)(v)). 
‘‘(2) AGENCY ACTIONS AFTER RECEIPT.— 
‘‘(A) RAPID, CONFIDENTIAL
SHARING
OF 
CYBER THREAT INDICATORS.—Upon receiving a 
covered cyber incident or ransom payment report 
submitted pursuant to this section, the Agency 
shall immediately review the report to determine 
whether the cyber incident that is the subject of 
the report is connected to an ongoing cyber 
threat or security vulnerability and where appli-
cable, use such report to identify, develop, and 
rapidly disseminate to appropriate stakeholders 
actionable, anonymized cyber threat indicators 
and defensive measures.
2502 
‘‘(B) PRINCIPLES FOR SHARING SECURITY 
VULNERABILITIES.—With respect to information 
in a covered cyber incident or ransom payment 
report regarding a security vulnerability referred 
to in paragraph (1)(B)(ii), the Director shall de-
velop principles that govern the timing and 
manner in which information relating to secu-
rity vulnerabilities may be shared, consistent 
with common industry best practices and United 
States and international standards. 
‘‘(3) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES.—Informa-
tion contained in covered cyber incident and ransom 
payment reports submitted to the Agency pursuant to 
section 2242 shall be retained, used, and dissemi-
nated, where permissible and appropriate, by the Fed-
eral Government in accordance with processes to be 
developed for the protection of personal information 
consistent with processes adopted pursuant to section 
105 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1504) 
and in a manner that protects personal information 
from unauthorized use or unauthorized disclosure. 
‘‘(4) DIGITAL SECURITY.—The Agency shall en-
sure that reports submitted to the Agency pursuant to 
section 2242, and any information contained in those 
reports, are collected, stored, and protected at a min-
2503 
imum in accordance with the requirements for mod-
erate impact Federal information systems, as de-
scribed in Federal Information Processing Standards 
Publication 199, or any successor document. 
‘‘(5) PROHIBITION ON USE OF INFORMATION IN 
REGULATORY ACTIONS.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A Federal, State, local, 
or Tribal government shall not use information 
about a covered cyber incident or ransom pay-
ment obtained solely through reporting directly 
to the Agency in accordance with this subtitle to 
regulate, including through an enforcement ac-
tion, the activities of the covered entity or entity 
that made a ransom payment, unless the govern-
ment entity expressly allows entities to submit 
reports to the Agency to meet regulatory report-
ing obligations of the entity. 
‘‘(B) CLARIFICATION.—A report submitted 
to the Agency pursuant to section 2242 or 2243 
may, consistent with Federal or State regulatory 
authority specifically relating to the prevention 
and mitigation of cybersecurity threats to infor-
mation systems, inform the development or im-
plementation of regulations relating to such sys-
tems.
2504 
‘‘(b) PROTECTIONS FOR REPORTING ENTITIES AND IN-
FORMATION.—Reports describing covered cyber incidents or 
ransom payments submitted to the Agency by entities in 
accordance with section 2242, as well as voluntarily-sub-
mitted cyber incident reports submitted to the Agency pur-
suant to section 2243, shall— 
‘‘(1) be considered the commercial, financial, and 
proprietary information of the covered entity when so 
designated by the covered entity; 
‘‘(2) be exempt from disclosure under section 
552(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code (commonly 
known as the ‘Freedom of Information Act’), as well 
as any provision of State, Tribal, or local freedom of 
information law, open government law, open meetings 
law, open records law, sunshine law, or similar law 
requiring disclosure of information or records; 
‘‘(3) be considered not to constitute a waiver of 
any applicable privilege or protection provided by 
law, including trade secret protection; and 
‘‘(4) not be subject to a rule of any Federal agen-
cy or department or any judicial doctrine regarding 
ex parte communications with a decision-making offi-
cial. 
‘‘(c) LIABILITY PROTECTIONS.—
2505 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—No cause of action shall lie 
or be maintained in any court by any person or enti-
ty and any such action shall be promptly dismissed 
for the submission of a report pursuant to section 
2242(a) that is submitted in conformance with this 
subtitle and the rule promulgated under section 
2242(b), except that this subsection shall not apply 
with regard to an action by the Federal Government 
pursuant to section 2244(c)(2). 
‘‘(2) SCOPE.—The liability protections provided 
in this subsection shall only apply to or affect litiga-
tion that is solely based on the submission of a cov-
ered cyber incident report or ransom payment report 
to the Agency. 
‘‘(3) 
RESTRICTIONS.—Notwithstanding 
para-
graph (2), no report submitted to the Agency pursu-
ant to this subtitle or any communication, document, 
material, or other record, created for the sole purpose 
of preparing, drafting, or submitting such report, 
may be received in evidence, subject to discovery, or 
otherwise used in any trial, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding in or before any court, regulatory body, or 
other authority of the United States, a State, or a po-
litical subdivision thereof, provided that nothing in 
this subtitle shall create a defense to discovery or oth-
2506 
erwise affect the discovery of any communication, 
document, material, or other record not created for 
the sole purpose of preparing, drafting, or submitting 
such report. 
‘‘(d) SHARING WITH NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES.—The 
Agency shall anonymize the victim who reported the infor-
mation when making information provided in reports re-
ceived under section 2242 available to critical infrastruc-
ture owners and operators and the general public. 
‘‘(e) STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT.—Nothing in this 
subtitle shall be construed to permit or require disclosure 
by a provider of a remote computing service or a provider 
of an electronic communication service to the public of in-
formation not otherwise permitted or required to be dis-
closed under chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code 
(commonly known as the ‘Stored Communications Act’). 
‘‘SEC. 2246. CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING COUNCIL. 
‘‘(a) RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SECRETARY.—The Sec-
retary shall lead an intergovernmental Cyber Incident Re-
porting Council, in consultation with the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Attorney General, 
the National Cyber Director, Sector Risk Management 
Agencies, and other appropriate Federal agencies, to coordi-
nate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal incident reporting 
requirements, including those issued through regulations.
2507 
‘‘(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in subsection 
(a) shall be construed to provide any additional regulatory 
authority to any Federal entity.’’. 
(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The 
table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–296; 116 Stat. 2135) is 
amended by inserting after the items relating to subtitle C 
of title XXII the following: 
‘‘Subtitle D—Cyber Incident Reporting 
‘‘Sec. 2240. Definitions. 
‘‘Sec. 2241. Cyber Incident Review. 
‘‘Sec. 2242. Required reporting of certain cyber incidents. 
‘‘Sec. 2243. Voluntary reporting of other cyber incidents. 
‘‘Sec. 2244. Noncompliance with required reporting. 
‘‘Sec. 2245. Information shared with or provided to the Federal Government. 
‘‘Sec. 2246. Cyber Incident Reporting Council.’’. 
SEC. 104. FEDERAL SHARING OF INCIDENT REPORTS. 
(a) CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING SHARING.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law or regulation, any Federal agency, 
including any independent establishment (as defined 
in section 104 of title 5, United States Code), that re-
ceives a report from an entity of a cyber incident, in-
cluding a ransomware attack, shall provide the report 
to the Agency as soon as possible, but not later than 
24 hours after receiving the report, unless a shorter 
period is required by an agreement made between the 
Department of Homeland Security (including the Cy-
bersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) and
2508 
the recipient Federal agency. The Director shall share 
and coordinate each report pursuant to section 
2241(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
added by section 103 of this division. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The requirements 
described in paragraph (1) and section 2245(d) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 
103 of this division, may not be construed to be a vio-
lation of any provision of law or policy that would 
otherwise prohibit disclosure or provision of informa-
tion within the executive branch. 
(3) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION.—The Direc-
tor shall comply with any obligations of the recipient 
Federal agency described in paragraph (1) to protect 
information, including with respect to privacy, con-
fidentiality, or information security, if those obliga-
tions would impose greater protection requirements 
than this division or the amendments made by this 
division. 
(4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This subsection shall take 
effect on the effective date of the final rule issued pur-
suant to section 2242(b) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division. 
(5) AGENCY AGREEMENTS.—
2509 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The Agency and any 
Federal agency, including any independent es-
tablishment (as defined in section 104 of title 5, 
United States Code), that receives incident re-
ports from entities, including due to ransomware 
attacks, shall, as appropriate, enter into a docu-
mented agreement to establish policies, processes, 
procedures, and mechanisms to ensure reports 
are shared with the Agency pursuant to para-
graph (1). 
(B) AVAILABILITY.—To the maximum ex-
tent practicable, each documented agreement re-
quired under subparagraph (A) shall be made 
publicly available. 
(C) 
REQUIREMENT.—The 
documented 
agreements required by subparagraph (A) shall 
require reports be shared from Federal agencies 
with the Agency in such time as to meet the 
overall timeline for covered entity reporting of 
covered cyber incidents and ransom payments es-
tablished in section 2242 of the Homeland Secu-
rity Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this 
division. 
(b) HARMONIZING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—The 
Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Direc-
2510 
tor, shall, in consultation with the Cyber Incident Report-
ing Council described in section 2246 of the Homeland Se-
curity Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division, 
to the maximum extent practicable— 
(1) periodically review existing regulatory re-
quirements, including the information required in 
such reports, to report incidents and ensure that any 
such reporting requirements and procedures avoid 
conflicting, duplicative, or burdensome requirements; 
and 
(2) coordinate with appropriate Federal partners 
and regulatory authorities that receive reports relat-
ing to incidents to identify opportunities to stream-
line reporting processes, and where feasible, facilitate 
interagency agreements between such authorities to 
permit the sharing of such reports, consistent with 
applicable law and policy, without impacting the 
ability of the Agency to gain timely situational 
awareness of a covered cyber incident or ransom pay-
ment. 
SEC. 105. RANSOMWARE VULNERABILITY WARNING PILOT 
PROGRAM. 
(a) PROGRAM.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish a 
ransomware vulnerability warning pilot program to lever-
2511 
age existing authorities and technology to specifically de-
velop processes and procedures for, and to dedicate resources 
to, identifying information systems that contain security 
vulnerabilities associated with common ransomware at-
tacks, and to notify the owners of those vulnerable systems 
of their security vulnerability. 
(b) IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABLE SYSTEMS.—The 
pilot program established under subsection (a) shall— 
(1) 
identify 
the 
most 
common 
security 
vulnerabilities utilized in ransomware attacks and 
mitigation techniques; and 
(2) utilize existing authorities to identify infor-
mation 
systems 
that 
contain 
the 
security 
vulnerabilities identified in paragraph (1). 
(c) ENTITY NOTIFICATION.— 
(1) IDENTIFICATION.—If the Director is able to 
identify the entity at risk that owns or operates a 
vulnerable information system identified in subsection 
(b), the Director may notify the owner of the informa-
tion system. 
(2) NO IDENTIFICATION.—If the Director is not 
able to identify the entity at risk that owns or oper-
ates a vulnerable information system identified in 
subsection (b), the Director may utilize the subpoena 
authority pursuant to section 2209 of the Homeland
2512 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659) to identify and 
notify the entity at risk pursuant to the procedures 
under that section. 
(3) REQUIRED
INFORMATION.—A notification 
made under paragraph (1) shall include information 
on the identified security vulnerability and mitiga-
tion techniques. 
(d) PRIORITIZATION OF NOTIFICATIONS.—To the ex-
tent practicable, the Director shall prioritize covered enti-
ties for identification and notification activities under the 
pilot program established under this section. 
(e) LIMITATION ON PROCEDURES.—No procedure, no-
tification, or other authorities utilized in the execution of 
the pilot program established under subsection (a) shall re-
quire an owner or operator of a vulnerable information sys-
tem to take any action as a result of a notice of a security 
vulnerability made pursuant to subsection (c). 
(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to provide additional authorities to the 
Director to identify vulnerabilities or vulnerable systems. 
(g) TERMINATION.—The pilot program established 
under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 4 
years after the date of enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 106. RANSOMWARE THREAT MITIGATION ACTIVITIES. 
(a) JOINT RANSOMWARE TASK FORCE.—
2513 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Director, in con-
sultation with the National Cyber Director, the Attor-
ney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, shall establish and chair the Joint 
Ransomware Task Force to coordinate an ongoing na-
tionwide campaign against ransomware attacks, and 
identify and pursue opportunities for international 
cooperation. 
(2) COMPOSITION.—The Joint Ransomware Task 
Force shall consist of participants from Federal agen-
cies, as determined appropriate by the National 
Cyber Director in consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Joint Ransomware 
Task Force, utilizing only existing authorities of each 
participating Federal agency, shall coordinate across 
the Federal Government the following activities: 
(A) Prioritization of intelligence-driven op-
erations to disrupt specific ransomware actors. 
(B) Consult with relevant private sector, 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments 
and international stakeholders to identify needs 
and establish mechanisms for providing input 
into the Joint Ransomware Task Force.
2514 
(C) Identifying, in consultation with rel-
evant 
entities, 
a 
list 
of 
highest 
threat 
ransomware entities updated on an ongoing 
basis, in order to facilitate— 
(i) prioritization for Federal action by 
appropriate Federal agencies; and 
(ii) identify metrics for success of said 
actions. 
(D) Disrupting ransomware criminal ac-
tors, associated infrastructure, and their fi-
nances. 
(E) Facilitating coordination and collabo-
ration between Federal entities and relevant en-
tities, including the private sector, to improve 
Federal actions against ransomware threats. 
(F) Collection, sharing, and analysis of 
ransomware trends to inform Federal actions. 
(G) Creation of after-action reports and 
other lessons learned from Federal actions that 
identify successes and failures to improve subse-
quent actions. 
(H) Any other activities determined appro-
priate by the Joint Ransomware Task Force to 
mitigate the threat of ransomware attacks.
2515 
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to provide any additional authority to 
any Federal agency. 
SEC. 107. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING. 
(a) REPORT ON STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT.—Not 
later than 30 days after the date on which the Director 
issues the final rule under section 2242(b) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this divi-
sion, the Director shall submit to the Committee on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and 
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
resentatives a report that describes how the Director en-
gaged stakeholders in the development of the final rule. 
(b) REPORT ON OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN SE-
CURITY RESEARCH.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Af-
fairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity of the House of Representatives a report describing how 
the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integra-
tion Center established under section 2209 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659) has carried out activi-
ties under section 2241(a)(9) of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division, by 
proactively identifying opportunities to use cyber incident
2516 
data to inform and enable cybersecurity research within the 
academic and private sector. 
(c) REPORT ON RANSOMWARE VULNERABILITY WARN-
ING PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
duration of the pilot program established under section 105, 
the Director shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
resentatives a report, which may include a classified annex, 
on the effectiveness of the pilot program, which shall include 
a discussion of the following: 
(1) The effectiveness of the notifications under 
section 105(c) in mitigating security vulnerabilities 
and the threat of ransomware. 
(2) 
Identification 
of 
the 
most 
common 
vulnerabilities utilized in ransomware. 
(3) The number of notifications issued during 
the preceding year. 
(4) To the extent practicable, the number of vul-
nerable devices or systems mitigated under the pilot 
program by the Agency during the preceding year. 
(d) REPORT ON HARMONIZATION OF REPORTING REG-
ULATIONS.—
2517 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date on which the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity convenes the Cyber Incident Reporting Council 
described in section 2246 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report 
that includes— 
(A) a list of duplicative Federal cyber inci-
dent reporting requirements on covered entities; 
(B) a description of any challenges in har-
monizing the duplicative reporting requirements; 
(C) any actions the Director intends to take 
to facilitate harmonizing the duplicative report-
ing requirements; and 
(D) any proposed legislative changes nec-
essary to address the duplicative reporting. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in para-
graph (1) shall be construed to provide any addi-
tional regulatory authority to any Federal agency. 
(e) GAO REPORTS.— 
(1) IMPLEMENTATION
OF
THIS
DIVISION.—Not 
later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security
2518 
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
resentatives a report on the implementation of this di-
vision and the amendments made by this division. 
(2) EXEMPTIONS TO REPORTING.—Not later than 
1 year after the date on which the Director issues the 
final rule required under section 2242(b) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 
103 of this division, the Comptroller General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of 
the House of Representatives a report on the exemp-
tions to reporting under paragraphs (2) and (5) of 
section 2242(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, as added by section 103 of this division, which 
shall include— 
(A) to the extent practicable, an evaluation 
of the quantity of cyber incidents not reported to 
the Federal Government; 
(B) an evaluation of the impact on im-
pacted entities, homeland security, and the na-
tional 
economy 
due 
to 
cyber 
incidents, 
ransomware attacks, and ransom payments, in-
cluding a discussion on the scope of impact of
2519 
cyber incidents that were not reported to the 
Federal Government; 
(C) an evaluation of the burden, financial 
and otherwise, on entities required to report 
cyber incidents under this division, including an 
analysis of entities that meet the definition of a 
small business concern under section 3 of the 
Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632); and 
(D) a description of the consequences and 
effects of limiting covered cyber incident and 
ransom payment reporting to only covered enti-
ties. 
(f) REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISMS.—Not later than 1 year after the date on 
which the Director issues the final rule required under sec-
tion 2242(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
added by section 103 of this division, the Director shall sub-
mit to the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Home-
land Security of the House of Representatives a report on 
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms within sec-
tion 2244 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added 
by section 103 of this division.
2520 
DIVISION Z—ISRAEL RELATIONS 
NORMALIZATION ACT OF 2022 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Israel Relations 
Normalization Act of 2022’’. 
SEC. 102. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Support for peace between Israel and its 
neighbors has longstanding bipartisan support in 
Congress. 
(2) For decades, Congress has promoted Israel’s 
acceptance among Arab and other relevant countries 
and regions by passing numerous laws opposing ef-
forts to boycott, isolate, and stigmatize America’s ally, 
Israel. 
(3) The recent peace and normalization agree-
ments between Israel and several Arab states—the 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Mo-
rocco—have the potential to fundamentally transform 
the security, diplomatic, and economic environment 
in the Middle East and North Africa and advance 
vital United States national security interests. 
(4) These historic agreements could help advance 
peace between and among Israel, the Arab states, and 
other relevant countries and regions, further diplo-
2521 
matic openings, and enhance efforts towards a nego-
tiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re-
sulting in two states—a democratic Jewish state of 
Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state— 
living side by side in peace, security, and mutual rec-
ognition. 
(5) These agreements build upon the decades-long 
leadership of the United States Government in help-
ing Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and Jor-
dan and promoting peace talks between Israel and 
Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. 
(6) These agreements also build on decades of 
private diplomatic and security engagement between 
Israel and countries in the region. 
(7) These normalization and peace agreements 
could begin to transform the region by spurring eco-
nomic growth, investment, and tourism, enhancing 
technological innovation, promoting security coopera-
tion, bolstering water security and sustainable devel-
opment, advancing understanding, and forging closer 
people-to-people relations. 
SEC. 103. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED. 
In this division, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 
committees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of