134 
in the covered annex should remain classified, the 
Director may redact such information in a manner 
that— 
(A) prevents public release of information 
only to the extent necessary to protect specific, 
identified harms to the national security of the 
United States; and 
(B) does not alter or obscure the deter-
minations of, presentation of evidence by, or 
identification of relevant persons by, the intel-
ligence community with respect to the murder 
of Jamal Khashoggi. 
(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 15 days be-
fore the date on which the Director makes the cov-
ered annex public under paragraph (1), the Director 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees a report on the redactions made by the Di-
rector under such paragraph, including, for each 
such redaction, an explanation of how the redacted 
information would harm the national security of the 
United States despite the robust body of available 
open-source reporting on the murder of Jamal 
Khashoggi. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00134
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
135 
(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (2) 
shall be in unclassified form to the extent prac-
ticable, but may include a classified annex. 
(e) COVERED ANNEX DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘covered annex’’ means the report regarding the 
murder of Jamal Khashoggi submitted on February 20, 
2020, by the Director of National Intelligence to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
SEC. 802. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
INTELLIGENCE SHARING RELATING TO CER-
TAIN AIR STRIKES IN YEMEN. 
(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided by subsection 
(b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 
for any element of the intelligence community may be obli-
gated or expended to share intelligence for the purpose 
of enabling or assisting air strikes in Yemen by the Saudi 
Arabia-led coalition. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition under subsection 
(a) shall not apply with respect to the sharing of intel-
ligence with Saudi Arabia for the purposes of countering 
al-Qaeda, the Islamic State in Yemen, or other terrorist 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00135
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
136 
groups that the intelligence community assesses to be op-
erating in Yemen and to pose a threat to the United 
States. 
SEC. 803. REPORT ON UNDERSTANDING AND MITIGATING 
CIVILIAN HARM FROM USE OF CERTAIN 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN YEMEN. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS; POLICY.— 
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 
Congress that it is in the national interest of the 
United States that the United States that all parties 
to the Yemen conflict comply with the law of armed 
conflict. 
(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 
the United States that credible evidence of gross vio-
lations of internationally recognized human rights by 
the coalition led by Saudi Arabia in Yemen should 
be a principal factor in United States decisions to 
authorize the sale, transfer, or delivery of offensive 
weapons and equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
heads of relevant intelligence community entities, 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00136
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
137 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report containing— 
(A) a detailed description of any incident 
that has occurred since 2015 in which Saudi 
Arabia or one of its coalition partners has been 
determined to have used United States weapons 
against civilians or civilian objects in Yemen; 
(B) for each such incident, the assessment 
of the intelligence community as to whether the 
leadership of Saudi Arabia took credible steps 
following the incident to alter the conduct of its 
armed forces; and 
(C) an assessment of— 
(i) efforts by the Government of Saudi 
Arabia since 2015 to avoid dispropor-
tionate harm to civilians and civilian ob-
jects in Yemen; 
(ii) whether United States assistance 
to the Saudi-led coalition has led to a de-
monstrable decrease in civilians killed or 
injured by Saudi-led airstrikes and damage 
to civilian infrastructure; 
(iii) the humanitarian and strategic 
consequences of strikes against civilians in 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00137
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
138 
Yemen for the broader Middle East region 
and United States interests; and 
(iv) the credibility of written assur-
ances officials of Saudi Arabia provided to 
the United States Government in 2017, in-
cluding whether Saudi Arabia has taken 
substantial and meaningful steps to adhere 
to such assurances. 
(2) SOURCES.—The report required under this 
subsection shall be based on all available sources. 
(3) DELAY OF SUBMITTAL.—If the Director de-
termines that the report cannot be submitted by the 
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director shall, before such date— 
(A) submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report setting forth the rea-
sons why the report cannot be submitted by 
such date and an estimated date for the sub-
mission of the report; and 
(B) together with the relevant experts from 
the National Intelligence Council and other rel-
evant elements of the intelligence community, 
testify before the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to the issues to be cov-
ered by the report. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00138
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
139 
(4) FORM
OF
REPORT.—The report required 
under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may contain a classified annex. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion may be construed as authorizing the use of military 
force or sharing of intelligence with the Government of 
Saudi Arabia. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
(2) The term ‘‘offensive weapons’’ means preci-
sion-guided munitions, other bombs, anti-tank mis-
siles, small-diameter rockets, and large mortars. 
SEC. 804. REPORT ON PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION OF 
SENSITIVE 
UNMANNED 
AERIAL 
VEHICLES 
AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS; POLICY.— 
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 
Congress that it is in the national interest of the 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00139
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
140 
United States to prevent the proliferation of sen-
sitive unmanned aerial vehicles (in this section re-
ferred to as ‘‘UAV’’) and related technology, espe-
cially to China, Russia, and other countries that the 
National Defense Strategy identifies as peer or near- 
peer competitors. 
(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 
the United States that actions to prevent the pro-
liferation of sensitive UAV technology to China, 
Russia, and other countries shall be a principal fac-
tor in decisions of the United States to authorize the 
sale, transfer, or delivery of category 1 UAV systems 
to the United Arab Emirates. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
heads of relevant intelligence community elements, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report containing— 
(A) an assessment of efforts by the United 
Arab Emirates (in this section referred to as 
‘‘UAE’’) since 2014 to prevent the proliferation 
of UAV and related technology, including cat-
egory 1 UAV systems; 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00140
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
141 
(B) a description of any cooperation be-
tween UAE-based entities and entities in China, 
Russia, or any other country that the National 
Defense Strategy identifies as a peer compet-
itor; 
(C) a description of any effort by the gov-
ernment of the UAE and UAE-based entities to 
conceal such cooperation from the United 
States; 
(D) a detailed inventory of all instances in 
which the government of the UAE and UAE- 
based entities have promoted the transfer and 
sale of armed and unarmed UAV technology, 
including details regarding to which countries 
the government of the UAE and UAE-based en-
tities transferred or proposed transferring the 
technology; 
(E) a description of the attitude and will-
ingness of the leadership of the UAE to take 
steps to comply with the standards of the Mis-
sile Technology Control Regime (in this section 
referred to as the ‘‘MTCR’’) for the export of 
UAVs and category 1 UAV systems; and 
(F) a description of the technological and 
defense benefits that Russia, China, and other 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00141
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
142 
countries are assessed to have accrued as a re-
sult of cooperation, research and development, 
and related activities with UAE-based entities. 
(2) SOURCES.—The report required under this 
subsection shall be based on all available sources. 
(3) DELAY OF SUBMITTAL.—If the Director de-
termines that the report cannot be submitted by the 
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director shall, before such date— 
(A) submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report setting forth the rea-
sons why the report cannot be submitted by 
such date and an estimated date for the sub-
mission of the report; and 
(B) together with the relevant experts from 
the National Intelligence Council and other rel-
evant elements of the intelligence community, 
testify before the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to the issues to be cov-
ered by the report. 
(4) FORM
OF
REPORT.—The report required 
under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may contain a classified annex. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00142
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
143 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion may be construed as authorizing the sharing of intel-
ligence with the government of the UAE. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
(2) The term ‘‘UAV technology’’ means armed 
and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles capable of 
carrying 500 kilogram payloads for more than 300 
kilometers, including those that fly under 650 kilo-
meters per hour. 
(3) The term ‘‘category 1 UAV system’’ means 
a complete rocket and all unmanned aerial vehicle 
systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch ve-
hicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target 
drones, and reconnaissance drones), capable of deliv-
ering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a range 
of at least 300 kilometers, and the major complete 
subsystems (including rocket stages, engines, guid-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00143
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS
156 
every known individual subject to such rendition 
during the year covered by the report; and 
‘‘(C) an assessment of how such activities 
conducted by Chinese security services con-
tribute to self-censorship and corruption within 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
‘‘(5) A discussion of the doctrine and tactics 
employed by Chinese security services operating 
within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, including an overview of the extent to which 
such security services employ surveillance, detection, 
and control methods, including ‘high-tech’ policing 
models and ‘preventative policing tactics’, that are 
consistent with the rise of digital authoritarianism, 
and used in a manner similar to methods used in the 
Xinjiang region of China. 
‘‘(6) An overview of the funding for Chinese se-
curity services operating within the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region, including an assessment 
of the extent to which funding is drawn locally from 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gov-
ernment or from the Government of China. 
‘‘(7) A discussion of the various surveillance 
technologies used by security services operating 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:06 Jul 31, 2020
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00156
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7856.IH
H7856
pamtmann on DSKBC07HB2PROD with BILLS