H. R. 927
One Hundred Fourth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six
An Act
To seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba, to plan
for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected govern-
ment in Cuba, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Purposes.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
Sec. 5. Severability.
TITLE I—STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
CASTRO GOVERNMENT
Sec. 101. Statement of policy.
Sec. 102. Enforcement of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 103. Prohibition against indirect financing of Cuba.
Sec. 104. United States opposition to Cuban membership in international financial
institutions.
Sec. 105. United States opposition to termination of the suspension of the Cuban
Government from participation in the Organization of American States.
Sec. 106. Assistance by the independent states of the former Soviet Union for the
Cuban Government.
Sec. 107. Television broadcasting to Cuba.
Sec. 108. Reports on commerce with, and assistance to, Cuba from other foreign
countries.
Sec. 109. Authorization of support for democratic and human rights groups and
international observers.
Sec. 110. Importation safeguard against certain Cuban products.
Sec. 111. Withholding of foreign assistance from countries supporting Juragua nu-
clear plant in Cuba.
Sec. 112. Reinstitution of family remittances and travel to Cuba.
Sec. 113. Expulsion of criminals from Cuba.
Sec. 114. News bureaus in Cuba.
Sec. 115. Effect of Act on lawful United States Government activities.
Sec. 116. Condemnation of Cuban attack on American aircraft.
TITLE II—ASSISTANCE TO A FREE AND INDEPENDENT CUBA
Sec. 201. Policy toward a transition government and a democratically elected gov-
ernment in Cuba.
Sec. 202. Assistance for the Cuban people.
Sec. 203. Coordination of assistance program; implementation and reports to Con-
gress; reprogramming.
Sec. 204. Termination of the economic embargo of Cuba.
Sec. 205. Requirements and factors for determining a transition government.
Sec. 206. Requirements for determining a democratically elected government.
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Sec. 207. Settlement of outstanding United States claims to confiscated property in
Cuba.
TITLE III—PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF UNITED STATES
NATIONALS
Sec. 301. Findings.
Sec. 302. Liability for trafficking in confiscated property claimed by United States
nationals.
Sec. 303. Proof of ownership of claims to confiscated property.
Sec. 304. Exclusivity of Foreign Claims Settlement Commission certification proce-
dure.
Sec. 305. Limitation of actions.
Sec. 306. Effective date.
TITLE IV—EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN ALIENS
Sec. 401. Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have confiscated property
of United States nationals or who traffic in such property.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of
at least 60 percent in the last 5 years as a result of—
(A) the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet
Union of between 5 billion and 6 billion dollars annually;
(B) 36 years of communist tyranny and economic mis-
management by the Castro government;
(C) the extreme decline in trade between Cuba and
the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and
(D) the stated policy of the Russian Government and
the countries of the former Soviet bloc to conduct economic
relations with Cuba on strictly commercial terms.
(2) At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban
people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this eco-
nomic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to permit
free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
(3) The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that
it will not engage in any substantive political reforms that
would lead to democracy, a market economy, or an economic
recovery.
(4) The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban
on free and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations
of fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime
as the only completely nondemocratic government in the West-
ern Hemisphere.
(5) As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the
economic condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban
people will not improve in any significant way.
(6) The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has
deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve
their condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens to
risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from
Cuba to freedom.
(7) Radio Marti and Television Marti have both been effec-
tive vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and
information and have helped to bolster the morale of the people
of Cuba living under tyranny.
(8) The consistent policy of the United States towards
Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out
by both Democratic and Republican administrations, has sought
to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective
in sanctioning the totalitarian Castro regime.
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(9) The United States has shown a deep commitment, and
considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter
of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
(10) The Congress has historically and consistently mani-
fested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people
with the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.
(11) The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 calls upon the
President to encourage the governments of countries that con-
duct trade with Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations
with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of that
Act.
(12) Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
made by the FREEDOM Support Act require that the President,
in providing economic assistance to Russia and the emerging
Eurasian democracies, take into account the extent to which
they are acting to ‘‘terminate support for the communist regime
in Cuba, including removal of troops, closing military facilities,
and ceasing trade subsidies and economic, nuclear, and other
assistance’’.
(13) The Cuban Government engages in the illegal inter-
national narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice in
the United States.
(14) The Castro government threatens international peace
and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and
terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups dedi-
cated to international violence.
(15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception
and continues to utilize torture in various forms (including
by psychiatry), as well as execution, exile, confiscation, political
imprisonment, and other forms of terror and repression, as
means of retaining power.
(16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as
‘‘pluralistic garbage’’ and continues to make clear that he has
no intention of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society.
(17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage
in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely because
relatives have escaped the country.
(18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American
Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (which protects the right to leave one’s
own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds embassies in its
capital by armed forces to thwart the right of its citizens
to seek asylum and systematically denies that right to the
Cuban people, punishing them by imprisonment for seeking
to leave the country and killing them for attempting to do
so (as demonstrated in the case of the confirmed murder of
over 40 men, women, and children who were seeking to leave
Cuba on July 13, 1994).
(19) The Castro government continues to utilize blackmail,
such as the immigration crisis with which it threatened the
United States in the summer of 1994, and other unacceptable
and illegal forms of conduct to influence the actions of sovereign
states in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Charter
of the Organization of American States and other international
agreements and international law.
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(20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights
has repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights
situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step of
appointing a Special Rapporteur.
(21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access
to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its decision
not to ‘‘implement so much as one comma’’ of the United
Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.
(22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolu-
tion 47–139 on December 18, 1992, Resolution 48–142 on
December 20, 1993, and Resolution 49–200 on December 23,
1994, referencing the Special Rapporteur’s reports to the United
Nations and condemning violations of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms in Cuba.
(23) Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
provides that the United Nations Security Council ‘‘shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken . . ., to maintain
or restore international peace and security.’’.
(24) The United Nations has determined that massive and
systematic violations of human rights may constitute a ‘‘threat
to peace’’ under Article 39 and has imposed sanctions due
to such violations of human rights in the cases of Rhodesia,
South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
(25) In the case of Haiti, a neighbor of Cuba not as close
to the United States as Cuba, the United States led an effort
to obtain and did obtain a United Nations Security Council
embargo and blockade against that country due to the existence
of a military dictatorship in power less than 3 years.
(26) United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of
July 31, 1994, subsequently authorized the use of ‘‘all necessary
means’’ to restore the ‘‘democratically elected government of
Haiti’’, and the democratically elected government of Haiti was
restored to power on October 15, 1994.
(27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive
manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36
years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically
improper conduct by the international community.
(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has
posed and continues to pose a national security threat to the
United States.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom
and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of demo-
cratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere;
(2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro
government;
(3) to provide for the continued national security of the
United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro
government of terrorism, theft of property from United States
nationals by the Castro government, and the political manipula-
tion by the Castro government of the desire of Cubans to
escape that results in mass migration to the United States;
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(4) to encourage the holding of free and fair democratic
elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of inter-
nationally recognized observers;
(5) to provide a policy framework for United States support
to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a transition
government or a democratically elected government in Cuba;
and
(6) to protect United States nationals against confiscatory
takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated
by the Castro regime.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act, the following terms have the following
meanings:
(1) AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF A FOREIGN STATE.—
The term ‘‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’’ has
the meaning given that term in section 1603(b) of title 28,
United States Code.
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee
on International Relations and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate.
(3) COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY.—The term ‘‘commercial activity’’
has the meaning given that term in section 1603(d) of title
28, United States Code.
(4) CONFISCATED.—As used in titles I and III, the term
‘‘confiscated’’ refers to—
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure
by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of prop-
erty, on or after January 1, 1959—
(i) without the property having been returned or
adequate and effective compensation provided; or
(ii) without the claim to the property having been
settled pursuant to an international claims settlement
agreement or other mutually accepted settlement
procedure; and
(B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the
default by the Cuban Government on, or the failure of
the Cuban Government to pay, on or after January 1,
1959—
(i) a debt of any enterprise which has been
nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the
Cuban Government;
(ii) a debt which is a charge on property national-
ized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban
Government; or
(iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban
Government in satisfaction or settlement of a con-
fiscated property claim.
(5) CUBAN GOVERNMENT.—(A) The term ‘‘Cuban Govern-
ment’’ includes the government of any political subdivision of
Cuba, and any agency or instrumentality of the Government
of Cuba.
(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ‘‘agency
or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba’’ means an