1950 one purpose is the perce of the world, of understanding among the nations, In closing let me say that whatever we do in S, 3809 or in any actions that follow in the course of the next weeks and months, let us remember above all things that what we do must be done only after the most earnest and prayer- ful consideration, because we represent the believing nations and it is in God that we trust. As my Ohio colleague 80 well said, it is His truth that is march- ing on. But people do not like to face truth. Yet we must face it and act upon dt and we must declare ourselves. I hope there will be so few dissenting voices to this bill that they will hardly be heard, I hope above all things that in the consideration of this legislation and in all legislation pertaining to the future of mankind on this earth we as @ legislative body may be governed en- tirely by the long view of man’s respon- sibility to Deity. Mr. KEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentlewoman from Cali- fornia (Mrs. Dovezas]. Mrs. DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the gentlewoman from Ohio (Mrs. Borron] for the very kind things she said about me. I want to say to the members of the committee that it Js with very real regret that I leave the House, with very real regret that I leave the Committee on Foreign Affairs. If nonpartisanship has any reality at all, I think we have come very near achiev- ing it in the Committee on Foreign Af- fairs. The differences of opinion of that committee, as Mrs. Bouton, the gentlewoman from Ohio, has said, have been individual differences for the most part. We have been able to create in the committee a healthy atmosphere that has been very productive. Much far- sighted legislation has been proposed by the Committee on Foreign Affatrs to this body. I think an objective appraisal of the performance and record of the com~ mittee will prove this. I have enjoyed serving on the com- mittee under the great chairmanship of the late Sol Bloom, then under the very distinguished chairmanship of the gentieman from New Jersey, Mr. Craries A. Faron, and now under the farsighted and wise chairmanship of Judge Jomn Kee, whom al! of us in this House tove and admire so greatly. The bill before us today, S. 3809, which would bring up to date the Mu- tual Defense Assistance program to Eu- rope and to other parts of the world, I support wholeheartedly. I supported it before the committee when it was ini- tially presented. If my memory serves me right, I think I was the first one on the Foreign Affatrs Committee to state my full approval of this legislation when it was first discussed by the Secretary of State, the Hon. Dean Acheson. ‘Yhrough weeks of executive session, I fought for the bill as tt was presented by the Defense and State Departments. I opposed any cut tn the bill last year, poth in committee and on this ftoor. 1 now support the bil to extend the mu- tual defense assistance program which fs before the House today. I belteved then and I believe now that the military CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE aid program which was conceived and has been carried out im consonance with the United Nations Charter, ts the only possible step we can take at this time teward creating the international police force which the world needs if aggres- sion js to be checked and peace secured. T still believe that the establishment of such en international police force is the goal toward which we ought to Strive. Mr. Chairman, the Members would do well, I think, to go back and read the findings and declaration of policy in the mutual defense assistance bill which the Committee on Foreign Affairs brought to the House last year. I quote the statement in full: Fineina anp Decnarkavion or Pouicr The Congress of the United States re- affirms the poltey of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be weed except tn the com- mon tnterest. The Congress hereby finds that the efforta of the United States and other countries to promote peace and se- curlty in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations require addi- tional measures of support based upon the principle of continuous and effective self. help and mutual aid. These measures in- clude the furnishing of military assistance essential to enable the United States and other nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter to participate effectively In arrangements for mdividual and collective self-defense in sup- port of those purposes and principles. In furnishing such military assistance, it re- mains the policy of the United States to con- tinue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations require addl- control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of arma- ments, including armed forces, under ade- quate safeguards to protect complying na- tions against violation and evaston. The Congress hereby expresses iteelf as favoring the creation by the free countries and the free peoples of the Far East of a joint organization consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well- being, to safeguard basic rights and Hberties and to protect their security and independ- ence, The Congress recognizes that economic recovery is essential to international peace and securfty and must be given clear pri- ority. The Congress aleo recognizes that the increased confidence of free peoples tn their ability to resist direct or indirect ag- gression and to maintain internal security will advance such recovery and support po- litical stability. In the findings and declaration of policy which I have just read you will note that the committee goes on record to declare that the United States should take the leadership in bringing about disarmament, with proper safeguards among the nations of the world, while providing the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter. But {¢ must be recognized that disarma- ment {s impossible unless {t is universal, In bringing the mutual defense as- sistance program to the floor last year, the Committee on Foreign Affairs thad not given up alt hope of achieving a permanent peace in the world, but we felt 10535 the steps outiined fn the Findings and Declaration of Policy of the Mutual De- fense Assistance bill were essential if we were to prevent war and if there was to be real progress toward the accomplish- ment of a permanent peace in the world. The measure was brought to the floor as the beginning of a preventive program. That is why I felt it was foolhardy to cut the program, since the military said they had given us the basic minimum of what the first step toward such a preventive program ought to be. If there were doubts about the pro- gram in the minds of some members a year ago, I am sure there are no doubts today in anybody's mind as to the sound- ness of this program. I do not suppose there will be many votes against it now— nor will there be any motion this time to cut the program. You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that there were 209 Members of this body who voted last year to cut the pro- gram the military had presented as a basic minimum, if security was to be secured within a reasonable number of years. I want to discuss at this point the Korean program as it relates to the European situation and to this mutual defense assistance bill now before us. ‘We found ourselves in Korea as an acci- dent of war. Korea had become a pro- tectorate of Japan in 1905. It became her puppet in 1907. It was formally an- nexed by Japan in 1910. It was one of the conquered areas of the Japanese Em- pire awaiting liberation at the end of World War II. At the Cairo Confer- ence, on December 1, 1943, China, Great Britain, and the United States were party to the pledge to guarantee Korea’s in- dependence. That pledge was later un- derwritten by Russia at the Potsdam Conference on July 26, 1945. Immedi- ately after the Japanese ended hostilities Korea was occupied by forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. That occupation was solely for the pur- pose of receiving and administering the capitulation of the Japanese forces. To meet the immediate problem of eoordi- nating the acceptance of the Japanese surrender in Korea, military authorities agreed on August 11, 1945, on the 38th parallel as the administrative line be- tween the two forces. It approximately divides the country. It was a clear line onthe map. That is the simple explana- tion for the line drawn on the 38th parallel. The Russians entered first, on August 12, 1945. They were already just over the border of eastern Siberia. Our nearest forces were in Okinawa and in the Philippimes. It took us almost 4 weeks to get to Korea. Someone might ask, “Why did it take so long?” The wonder is how we got there as fast as we did. Our troops were in a tropical climate. They had to be reequipped for 8 cold climate. Furthermore, Javan had first priority. Mr. GRANGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield for a question? Mrs. DOUGLAS. I yield. Mr. GRANGER. The gentlewoman said the thirty-eighth parallel was a line drawn only for receiving the surrender,
10536 Is that actually true, or is there any di- vision there as between people? Is there any division of the country that natu- rally heretofore had been divided? Mrs. DOUGLAS. No. Mr. GRANGER. Then the thirty- eighth paralle) was just a division to re- ceive the surrender of the Russians on one side and the Americans on the other? Mrs. DOUGLAS. That is all. As I say, the Russians got into Korea faster than the Americans did, because they were right on the eastern Siberian bor- der. As a matter of fact, they came down below the thirty-eighth parallel, but when the United States forces came in the Russians went back above that thirty-eighth parallel. Mr. KEE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield? Mrs, DOUGLAS. Certainly, I yield to my chairman. Mr. KEE. As a matter of fact, at the time of the surrender of the Japanese Army, the nearest troops of the United States were in the Philippine Islands. The Russians, as you have said, were poised on the northern border of Korea, ready to march in. That agreement was made at that time for the sole purpose of taking the surrender of the Japanese Army, and the Russians took the sur- render down to the thirty-eighth paral- Jel, and the United States, when we got our troops in Korea, took it up to the thirty-eighth parallel The Russians went in on August 2, 1945. It was not until September 12 that we were able to get our troops from the Philippines into the southern part of Korea, and then we found the Russians had moved in and had come south of the thirty-eighth par- allel. We had to persuade them to go back. The line at the thirty~eighth par- allel was never intended to have any political significance; tt was solely a mil- itary measure. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Dovc.ias] has expired. Mr. KEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentlewoman five additional minutes. Mrs. DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, the events that followed have been stated in the House, I made a speech about it a few days after the invasion against the Republic of Korea, and I will not repeat it here, except to brief those incidents. The Russians dropped what amounted to an iron curtain at the thirty-eighth parallel, We sought to fulfill our pledge of Korean independence. We remained in Korea in order to fulfill that pledge. We endeavored for 2 years to negotiate with the Russian military in northern Korea so that that pledge could be ful- filled, but we were unable to get any- where. We sought, first of all, to nego- tiate with the Russians in Korea, our military men talked with the Russian military in Korea. Then, it was taken up by the governments. When those at- tempts failed, we laid the problem before the General Assembly of the United Na- tions on September 17, 1947, and ever since that time, which is about 3 years, we have been the servant of the United Nations in Korea. The United Nations decided that there should be a free election held in Korea CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE under the supervision of a United Na- tions Commission. They sent a commis- sion to Korea. We sent a commission to Korea. The Soviets were asked to send a commission into Korea to help supervise such an election. Russia did not send any such commission, nor would she allow the United Nations Commis- sion to go into northern Korea. So that in southern Korea elections were held which ended finally in the establishment of the Republic of Korea. The United Nations declared that this was the only legitimate government in Korea. As talent was developed among the Ko- reans, as their own governmental agen- cies were set up, our authorities trans- ferred functions to them. Finally, a year ago our military units were withdrawn in compliance with United Nations instructions. At this point we could have abandoned the young Republic of Korea. Up to this time any economic aid that had been given was given under our military government and after January 1, 1949, under the Economic Coopera- tion Administration. The Coneress did not have a voice in establishing the pol- icy in Korea. But it was the belief of the President of the United States, the State Department, and the military offi- cials and concurred in largely by the Foreign Affairs Committee that if we did abandon the Republic of Korea she would collapse. It was recognized that the Republic needed economic aid over a short period of time in order to put it on its feet, especially since the country was divided. You will remember that we had in Korea just the reverse of what we have in Germany today. In southern Korea we have the agricultural half of the country, and in northern Korea we have the industrial half under the in- fluence of the Russians. The Foreign Affairs Committee brought to the floor a Korean aid bill which, you will remember, was defeated by one vote. I strongly supported that bill. I agreed with the findings of the military and the State Department that to abandon Korea would in a very real sense undermine our security in the Far East. We cannot hope to have security in the world or to have a peace- ful world, or a free world, unless we have the confidence and trust of the people of the Far East. Had we abandoned Korea, had we not insisted on bringing through the House the Senate bill that provided aid to Korea, I am convinced that the Russians would have been in control of all of Korea today without a struggle. The failure of this Congress to act would have given to the Russians by default Korea which the Communists are now trying to take by force. If we had not passed the Korean aid bill we would have lost the confidence, I am sure, of the peoples in the Far East. But we did pass the Korean aid bill through the insistence of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. We also enacted some military aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of last year. The question now is—it gets very in- teresting—the question now is, why have the Koreans not been able to withstand this onslaught from the north? Why JULY 18 were they not given tanks and heavy equipment? First of all, the money pro- posed for military aid for Korea was $10,000,000. Do you know what we have spent in Greece to date? We have spent over $500,000,000. And this is not eco- nomic aid; this is military aid, and part of the economic aid that was given was made up of military items that were used in the military program. In the first year of our program in Greece, hardly any of the money went for eco- nomic aid; it all went for military aid, The military did not propose the same kind of military aid brought to the floor of the House for Greece, You cannot furnish the arms to stop full-scale in- vasion with $10,000,000. The program passed by the Congress last year pro- posed to give to the Republic of Korea only the light arms and ammunition nec- essary to maintain internal order and to ward off the kind of skirmishes that had been going on along the thirty- eighth parallel. Had we brought to the floor of the House, Mr. Chairman, a bill for one, two, or three hundred millions, does anyone seriously support that the Congress would have authorized any such measure? Then there is a much wider consid- eration that we must also keep before us. How much could we have afforded to put into this part of the world, considering the pressures in Europe and our commit- ments there? The very same people who last year scoffed at military aid to Korea are now the greatest self-styled boosters of mili- tary aid. Before then they clamored, “This is money down a rathole.” Now they shout, “We should have given Korea more.” What if this Congress had appropri- ated half a billion of military assistance to Korea, and instead of an attack on Korea, we were now faced with an at- tack on Burma or Indochina or Iran or on one of the North Atlantic Treaty countries? The answer is obvious: The same professional experts on criticism would be crying, “Why so much on Korea and so little on Burma or Indochina or Iran or the North Atlantic Treaty area?” This whole matter is one of doing the most with a given sum of money and using it according to carefully con- sidered plans and priorities designed to serve the total security interest of the United States. Those strategic deci- sions must be evaluated on the judgment made upon then existing facts and not upon events which later transpired. The mutual defense assistance program has emphasized the solidarity of west- ern Europe, and I believe correctly so. There we have a collective self-defense organization which is functioning and which is making definite plans for the North Atlantic area. We are trying to do the same thing for the Far East. We have just declared unanimously that we favor the negotiation of a Pacific pact for the common defense of the Pacific area and the participation of the United States in that. pact. But in western Europe we have a functioning collective self-defense organization which is de- veloping over-all, integrated defense plans. We must therefore concentrate our energy on working through that or-
1950 ganization, insofar as western Europe is concerned, and in building up a similar organization in the Far East. The program of mutual defense assist- ance ts a program to attain reasonable security. Nobody can guerantee abso- lute security. Now, referring to the Korean situation today, I support the President’s action 100 percent. If he had not moved, the United Nations would have been a dead thing today. Because he moved with dispatch to implement the United Na- tions Security Council resolutions on Korea he has buttressed the United Na- tions as a great instrumentality of in- ternational cooperation. The fact that the nations have responded to the re- quest of the Security Council for aid to the Republic of Korea has brought the establishment of an international police force within the body more nearly in sight, As a result of the police action in Korea there are certain steps that are clearly indicated at this time. First, the United Nations itself. We could not have taken the immediate action that we did in the United Nations if Russia had sat on the Security Council and had ex- ercised {ts right of veto. Happily Rus- sia was not there. Had she been there, we would then have had to turn to the General Assembly. It would have taken at least 3 days, maybe more, before a resolution from the Assembly of the United Nations could have been passed condemning the aggression against the Republic of Korea. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentiewoman from California has expired. Mr. KEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentlewoman an additional § minutes. Mrs. DOUGLAS. Had it taken that long for the United Nations to act, the Republic of Korea might have fallen in that time to the aggressive forces from the north. It is clearly indicated that the action that has taken place in Korea is not a singie, isolated incident. I think we may expect a series of such aggressions throughout the world. Looking ahead to the future, should we not at once within the United Nations take the kind of action which will make it possible for that bedy to act instantly, even if there are those sitting on the Security Council who might want to veto such instant action? No.2: The Korean incident high lights our own deficiencies as far as military preparedness is concerned. We are go- ing to have to appropriate more money for preparedness. We are going to have to have our Armed Forces better equipped. To do this will mean that there will have to be a greater drain on our economy. I do not believe, and I have not believed at any time since the end of the war, that the way to do this is to cut taxes and arbitrarily begin to re- iuce across the board. That is as detri- mental to our position in a free world as not te have any defense forces at all. For instance, we talk about preparing ourselves militarily, and very few people will object to that today, but will they take the other steps that are demanded? Let us take steel. Today we are produc- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE ing steel at 100 percent capacity. In other words, we are using our entire capacity in steel] at the present time. If we increase our Armed Forces we have got to produce more steel. We entered World War II with an excess capacity of power—public and private—of between 30 and 40 pereent. Never at any time during the war did our reserves of power drep lower than 18 percent, and today, my friends, I would point out to the Members of the Committee that we are below that figure; dangerously below that figure. Today the margin is only 12 percent. You cannot live without power; you cannot run your great indus- tries without power. You cannot make aluminum without power and you cannot make planes without aluminum. When people blow off the tops of their heads with the cry, “We will cut off the De- partment of the Interior,” they are cut- ting away the very strength that will en- able this country to defend itself in war. We must give some real study to this. I believe that the situation in Korea can be an eye opener that will save us in the long run. I think we can point to our shortcomings, point out the things we have not done that we must do, maybe make us talk some sense for a change, and not try to appeal to the voters, to “cut taxes” when it means maybe that this man’s son or that woman’s son would have to die on the battlefield be- eause of a few dollars cut in taxes. No, nobody likes to pay taxes, but we have got to expand our economy if we are to seriously plan for peace in the world. What is Russia afraid of? She is afraid of the ereat potential of this country to mobilize our industrial strength, and I believe she is afraid more of that than of our soldiers at var- jous places in the world. She knows that this country can out produce her. This will do more to hold her, to restrain her, than any other single thing, So, I think it was foolhardy when the power program was eut in this country. I think it has been foolhardy ever since the end of the war when those of short sight or selfish interest moved to cut that power program. We must try to achieve the goals that we all want. ‘There are those who are rather shortsighted; some may be a little more absorbed with their own de- sires than they ought to be, but basically we all want the same thing. I think we have got to sit down very realistically anl see what it will take, and then we have got to proceed and do the things that are necessary. Peace is not cheap, but war is a lot more expensive. Mr. Hoffman testified some months ago be- fore the Senate Foreign Relations Com- mittee, I believe, that the cost of the war, when it is finatiy added up, will be over $1,350,000,000,000—that is one trillion three hundred and fifty billion dollars. So, in terms of money there is no com- parison between what war costs and what it will cost to build an enduring peace. But, we have to build it; we have to build it brick by brick, and stone by stone. What those of us who pointed to the importance of Korea have said has been borne out. I think in terms of peace and in terms of security for our own children, Let us learn by it. Let us 186587 not spend our time in recriminations. Let us profit from our lessona, and let us all, together, wisely plan for the future, a future that has strength in it; a future that is mapped along courageous and hopeful lines, and let us rid ourselves of the fear that is every day being deliber- ately injected by some into the blood- stream of America. We have nothing to fear except our failure to face facts and to take the action they call for. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 19 minutes to the gentleman from Wis- consin [Mr. Suars). Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Chair- man, I intend to support this legislation. I think that whatever differences we may have had on this kind of assistance in the past We must now close ranks, and the command is “Forward,” together. I wish it might be as easy as that, Mr. Chairman, to satisfy my people. They are asking many questions today and they want to know how we came to get into this situation. The bill before us contains some money for Korean assist- ance. In the time allotted me I shall address myself to that problem. Many Members who have opposed aid for Korea in the past did so on the ground that it could not be defended with Communists in control of China. Cer- tainly economic aid without adequate military support was an unwise opera- ion. Then there was a further reason and that was the testimony of both State Department officers and menabers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that South Korea was untenabdie if the Red Koreans or the Russians decided to attack. There never was justification {n my opinion for the investment of American Golars for permanent improvements in Korea when the Red Koreans could take it over at will. In order to keep the record straight and not in the spirit of “I told you so,” I shall refer to pertinent testimony by administration witnesses from hearings before our committee in support of the Korean programs. In February 1948, in the Hightieth Con- gress, Gen. George Marshall, then Secre- tary of State, testified: Mr. Jupp. There is a military attack upon the governments in each case and the eco- nomic aid can do no good if the govern- ments go down; js not that correct? Secretary MARSHALL, That ig correct. And further and at the same time, apropos Korea, Secretary Marshall said: Mr. Jupp. * * If North Korea and Manchuria should be taken over and organ- ized by the Communists, do you think our position in Korea would long be tenable? Secretary Manariann. I think it would not be tenable. Hearings on H. R. 5330; providing aid for the Republic of Korea, June 1949: Developed interesting testimony on the questions of economic aid and the futility of it, without military support. Also that the administration did not want to sup- port Korea militarily. Excerpts follow: Page 48: Mr. OnIPerrie.p. If we would draw our troops out of South Korea, is there anything that would stop the Russians from taking over South Korea if they decided to do so?
10538 General Hetmice. If the Russians decided to do so, they could take over South Korea without any great military difficulty, sir. They are right there with large armies. Any troops that we have there would suffer an- other Bataan, Page 44: Mrs. Bouron. General, you made a remark that this would prove militarily another Ba- taan if Russia were to move down. Does that mean that you, feel it is just a matter of time before they would simply move on? General Hutaaick. What I meant was a military force on a peninsula like that would be out of luck with an overwhelming force coming down from the north. I think Rus- sia could do it any time that she decided it was worth while. Mrs, Botron. That might well happen at any time if she made up her mind, Now, that she has all of northern China, she would want that little peninsula to hop off to Japan with? General Hetumicx. I think she would have to estimate the effects of her doing it. Page 52: Mr. Jackson. * * * Now it has been said so often that Korea is absolutely un- tenable, or would be, in the face of any de- termined opposition, whether that opposi- tion be military or whether !t be by infil- tration. That is a fair statement, is it not, General? General Hemuick. From a military point of view, yes. Page 120—Mr. George F. Kennan, di- rector, Policy Planning Staff, Depart- ment of State: Mrs, Dovatas.* * * Is it sound to withdraw United States troops from Korea, July 1, having only technical forces to fur- ther train the Korean army? * * * Mr. KENNAN. I do not think, myself, that the retention of American troops there will be what it takes to do the thing we want to have done in the next year in Korea. * * General Botts. With respect to whether the tactical units should come out now or whether they should remain for an addi- tional period of, say, a year, we feel that they should come out now. © * * We feel that they not only could come out but that they should come out, and their place be taken by the Korean military advisory group. Gen. Charles L. Bolte testified as director, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army, Page 137: Mr. Lover. Mr, Kennan, there is an inter- esting article in Time magazine on Korea. * © T understood you to say that you thought in a battle between North and South, the South Koreans would have a pretty fair chance, Do you suggest that this informa- tion in Time magazine is erroneous or do you think that 300,000 North Koreans would have a very difficult time against 100,000 armed South Koreans? Mr. KenwaNn, I would like to refer that question to General Bolte. General BoLre. I believe that is an exag- g@eration. * * * We feel that the forces in South Korea are far better equipped than the North Korean troops. Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I yield. Mr. CRAWFORD. Why did the gen- eral make that statement? What basis did he have for making that statement? The gentleman, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, ought to be able to answer that question. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. I think that was a military question, if you please. Mr. CRAWFORD. No, what I mean js, I think the Committee on Foreign Affairs should have asked the general on what basis he made that statement, and make him put it in the record, be- cause we have to depend upon you to get the information for us. I do not think he had any basis on earth for making that statement. Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Page 140: General Bore. If I may, I would like to make three comments in the interest of clar- ification of what was said yesterday. First, that the Army as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Far East, is not only agreeable to the withdr. wal of the tactical formations from Korea, but are heartily in favor of it, as they feel that the point has been reached in the development of the South Korean forces and in the supplying of material aid as well as advisory aid to the South Korean forces, that it has reached a point where the tactical units can and should be withdrawn. The second point I should like to make— and I think it has been made before this morning—is that we have provided very sub- stantial material aid to the South Korean forces in the way of small arms and other military equipment. This has been estimated to be $125,000,000. Page 141: Mr. SmatHers. I have not had the benefit of the general’s direct testimony, but I understood Mr. Kennan to say that it was the policy, General, to withdraw what small troops we have in Korea. Is that right? General Bourse. That is correct, Mr. SmatHers. Then the withdrawal is solely in conformity with the United Na- tion's resolution? General Boirs. Yes, but the Army is defi- nitely in favor of it for other military reasons. Page 143: Mr. Lopce. You feel that the Korean Gov- ernment is able to fill the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the occupation forces? General Botts. Definitely. Page 160: General Trmserman. * * * From the Army point of view on the military signifi- cance or impact upon our positiof in the Far East that attends the tactical withdrawal of our forces in Korea, we will be in much better shape militarily when the tactical forces have been withdrawn from Korea. Page 163: General TrmBerMaAN. If we left troops in Korea, I do not think anyone would suggest we enter into combat with the Korean forces. Page 169: Mr. SmiTH. Yes, but I have asked you from ® military standpoint how will this aid pro- gram increase our security. I would cer- tainly like to have some conclusion by the military on that question. In what way? That is what Iam concerned about, * * (Discussion off the record.) Mr, SsarrH. It seems to me that you have just admitted that from a military stand- point it does not affect our national security. General Trsenman. No; it does not. As an agency of the government we help where we can, I do not think the military part of the matter enters into the economic ald at JULY 18 all, besides we might get into trouble later on, after we are in there militarily, which ‘would be unfortunate. Page 170: Mr. Smirn. Assuming it (Korea) went down because we did not give the aid, would it fol- low from that, that we might have to go in there with military force and defend our- selves or our national security? General HAMILTON. No, sir; I do not think it is a question of direct military security in that sense. I do not think, unless we were to put absolutely inordinate forces in Korea, that we could guarantee by military force against economic collapse. The military phases are over. Page 177: Mr. Ricuarps, I just want to ask one ques- tion: Is it your position * * * that it would not be wise to keep troops in Korea? ° * * Goneral TIMBERMAN, Yes, sir; it would not be wise. * Admiral WooumDar, I concur. General HaMILton. I concur fully and that has been the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been unanimous. There has been no difference so far as I know. Page 178: Mrs. Dovctias. I would like to ask the rep- resentatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff this question: Do I understand correctly that the Chiefs of Staff advise the withdrawal of troops from Korea at this time? Genera] HAMILTON, That is correct. Admiral Woo.emer. That is correct, General T1mBEeRMAN, That is correct. Mrs. Doveias. The Army, Navy, and Alr Force? General Hamitron. That is correct. Page 181: Mr. Jupp. You do not deny that the Army has wanted to get out for a long, long time? Mr. JOHNSON of ECA. No, sir. Page 186: General Hamiton. * * * It has un- questionably been decided long since by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there is nothing further that we should do militarily. e s * ® e Mr. Jupp. * * * I believe sincerely that the Korea economic program, accom- panied by military withdrawal and without ® program to keep the Chinese Communists busy, does not have more than a 25 percent chance of success and therefore I question whether we are justified in approving this. * * * Mr, JOHNSON, I think this committee will admit that I have been very honest and candid with you. I frankly believe this pro- gram has a 90 percent chance of success. Mr. Chairman, until last June 25 there was great reluctance on the part of Pres- ident Truman and Secretary Acheson and his advisers—Jessup, Lattimore, and Service—to come to grips with the real problem in the Far East, in fact, they deliberately avoided it. They were per- fectly willing to let the dust settle and wait for results. They also appeared ready to recognize Communist China and do business with it. When the blow fell on the 25th of June it was obvious that our far-eastern policy or lack of it was a colossal blunder and it has put us in another war 7,000 miles from home. Mr. Chairman, the record of our for- eign policy in the Far East has been made. Our mistakes live after us but the people are entitled to the facts, We
1950 had @ good yardstick to follow in ‘the Wedemeyer report contained in the State Department's so-called white paper on China, We chose to ignore Generat Wedemeyer's recommendations. Here are his words; . In order to prealude defeat by Communist forces it ts necessary to give the National Government sufficient and prompt military assistance under the supervision of Amerti- can advisers in specified military fields. American military aid to China, ground, sea, and air, would, if appropriately super- vised, contribute to gradual development of stability in the Far East and lessen the pos- sibility of a Communist-dominated China, So Mr. Chairman, when the National- ist Government in China went down, our position in Korea was untenable and Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Ma- Jaya, and Indochina were placed in jeopardy. It was our colleague the gen- tleman from Minnesota [Mr. Jupp], who fought so valiantly for the program in China that General Wedemeyer advo- cated, Had the advice of Mr. Junp been followed by the State Department, there would have been no war in Korea and American boys would not be dying 7,000 miles from home. But do I hear someone say, “But that is all water over the dam’? Quite true, but dumb indeed must we be if we do not profit by experience. As has just been shown, the adminis- tration’s conduct !n Korea and other places is full of contradictions, It has demonstrated its inconsistency, its in- competence, That being true, in these tragic days, when the very security of the Republic is threatened, we should not look for guidance nor entrust our future to those who are responsible for the position in which we now find our- selves, In November the people, regardless of their political faith, should elect a Con- gress, and in 1952 a President, who will always have first in mind the welfare and future security of this Republic. Mr. KEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 13 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr, Barrxx). Mr. BATTLE, Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this legislation because it is part of a program necessary to bring about peace in the world. As a result of the tragic invasion of Korea, we should learn the hard lesson that it will be necessary in the future for us to abandon the policy of retaliation and invest our time, money, and efforts in a policy of war prevention. Our whole defense is built on the basis of retaliation. On the basis of what we will do, after we have been attacked. We all remember Secretary of Defense Johnson's speech a few days ago when he said that within an hour after we are attacked we will be ready to retaliate. Irrespective of our state of preparedness or unpreparedness, Secretary Johnson was reflecting the policy established by the American people and the American Government under which the military must operate. Korea emphasizes the fact that the overwhelming odds favor the aggressor. An aggressor nation knows what it i preparing for, knows what it is going to CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE do, knows where it is going to attack, and is in a position to choose the time and place for a knockout blow with the least effort, Our policy has been to wait, to alt back, to take a beating, and then struggle to our fest and whip the bully. We have always been saved by time, dis- tance, and strong allies. But we have none of these things between us and the enemy now, and we had better not count on them. In the warfare of today it is not a ques- tion of being knocked off our feet and getting up to retaliate. If we wait until the global battle lines are formed and until an aggressor delivers a sneak knock- out punch at America—then it might be too late to act. The United States and the world must be ready and prepared to stop war before it starts. Plenty of danger signals have warned us that an aggressor nation was on the move in every instance, long be- fore the attack came. That is the time to call their hand. We must never again underestimate the ability of a nation that has clearly demonstrated that it is following a policy of world aggression. We must adopt a policy of war preven- tion and discard our old policy of re- taliation if we are to escape man’s in- humanity to man in this twentieth cen- tury of technical geniuses and social idiots. Investment in a peace offensive will be cheap indeed as compared to the money and lives we spent in emergencies such as we are facing today, after they have developed. Of course, in this crisis we must rem- edy our weakness as quickly as possible and build up our armed forces to what- ever strength is necessary for defense, If the successful conclusion of this crisis takes total industrial and military mo- bilization, then Iam for ft. If the suc- cessfu] preservation of peace in the world takes the greatest defense effort we have ever made, I am for that too. The quicker we face the realities and the graveness of the situation, and pre- pare ourselves and our allies to meet this crisis, the closer the world will be to peace. While the Mutual Defense As- sistance Act is only a small part of this program, it is necessary at this time to give the friendly, peace-loving countries throughout the world this moral and material protection against invasion. Supplying arms to the friendly nations under this Mutual Defense Act is a dan- gerous program, there is no doubt about it. But the alternatives appear to be more dangerous. We have learned the hard way that there is no peace in appeasement, that dictators make slaves out of pacifists, and that isolationism is a fiction in this age when we can fiy around the world in just a few hours, Mr, Chairman, in addition to this nec- essary mutual defense assistance pro- gram, I think very definitely we had better develop a Pacific pact similar to the Atlantic Pact, to insure mutual par- ticipation in the Pacific against aggres- sion and to tnsure a strong arm in the Far East as well as in Europe. Neither the United States nor any one nation alone can afford the men and money necessary to i 3 E cli feted made her biggest blunder in her paign to enslave the freedom-loving tions of the world when she boycotted gE mended, and certainly has my support 100 percent. The usual veto would have rendered the UN helpless again in its most crucial hour. A Communist victory over the democratic country of South Korea, which was established ‘by the United Nations with the full backing of the United States, would make world war ITI almost certain. Other nations in the Far East and in Europe would bow to Stalin’s superior forces which could overrun any of her neighbor countries uniess America helped to stop them. Now we have a fighting chance for peace. Freedom-loving people the world over should press the advantage of our com- bined peace offensive which will be im- Plemented by this mutual defense assist- ance program. When this fight is won, as it will be, let us not stop short of reorganizing the United Nations, to make it capable of preventing war under any conditions. World peace must not de- pend upon the wrong moves or blunders by Russia, or by any other greedy nation. Hitler proved that the waiting, appease- ment, retaliation process is too costly and deadly. World peace must not de- pend upon the wrong moves of Russia but must be won and preserved by the right moves of America, the United Na- tions, and the freedom-loving countries everywhere. Mr. Chairman, America has taken the lead to stop Russia and save the United Nations. When the shooting is over, and I pray that may be soon, we should take the lead in rebuilding the United Nations into an organization capable of prevent- ing war. Some time ago I tntroduced House Concurrent Resolution 15, along with several other Members of Congress, which calls upon the President to imme. diately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Na- tions pursuant to Article 109 for the purpose of making the United Nations capable of enacting, interpreting, and enforcing world law to prevent war. Therefore, it is with a deep conviction that T am asking the House Foreign Af- fairs Committee and the Members of this great body to give your most serious consideration to this resolution designed to take the first step in reorganizing the United Nations which is absolutely necessary if we are to have peace,
10540 The idealistic and the best solution to our international difficulties would be a moral reawakening throughout the world. That places. a tremendous re- sponsibility upan our religious and po- litical leaders, a responsibility which to date has not been successfully met. Until such time as we are successful in bringing about conditions where nations truly feel that they are their brother's keeper, and until nations will follow the golden rule of “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” it will be necessary for us to stay adequately pre- pared to stop an aggressor nation before it attacks us, and it will be necessary to create a police force for the United Nations to keep law and order. These things are necessary in the smallest community. They are also necessary in our world community. Mr. Chairman, with the extension of the mutual defense assistance program, the development of a Pacific pact, the strengthening of the United Nations, and the encouragement of a moral reawaken- ing, I believe we can look forward with more assurance to the peaceful world community we all hope and pray for. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 13 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. Merrow], Mr. MERROW. Mr. Chairman, on the 11th of June, the Foreign Affairs Committee, by a vote of 24 to 0, reported 5. 3809, an act to extend the mutual de- fense assistance program of 1949. This bill was passed by the Senate on June 30, 1950, without a dissenting vote. 8. 3809 authorizes funds to continue the mutual defense assistance program through the current fiscal year. Since the substance of the Senate bill incor- porates the provisions of the measure on which the Foreign Affairs Committee held long and extensive hearings, it was decided to report S. 3809 to the House without further amendment. This is a defense measure. The secu- rity of the United States is closely en- twined with the security of all free na- tions throughout the world. We cannot follow a policy of arming ourselves in isolation and thereby insure our secu- rity. We are assisting our friends not that they will defend us, but so that we and they will be able to defend our- selves and together defend the free world, COST OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PROGRAMS Since the termination of World War Tl and particularly since the inception of the Marshall plan, the United States has been extensivély helping in the eco- nomic rehabilitation of Europe. To carry on the European recovery pro- gram we have spent $10,230,000,000 to date and have authorized $2,850,000,000 for the present fiscal year. Last year the Congress authorized and appropri- ated $1,314,010,000 for military aid to the following countries: United King- dom, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iran, Korea, Philippines, Greece, and Turkey. The measure which we are now considering authorizes a total of about $1,436,500,000 to continue the mu- tual defense assistance program until June 30, 1951—~$1,222,500,000 of new CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE funds and approximately 6214,000,000 carried over from last year, ALLOCATION OF FUNDS Title I of Senate bill 3809 provides $1,000,000,000 for the North Atlantic Treaty area, This will be used to pro- vide actual military equipment and training assistance and the means to produce more to build up the armed forces of the individual nations accord- ing to the integrated defense plan for the protection of the whole area. In addition, $75,000,000 will be spent for raw materials and industrial equipment for the production of military items in Hurope by Europeans in their own fac- tories. The $1,000,000,000 also includes $12,000,000 for the expense of adminis- tering the whole program. Title IZ provides $131,500,000 for Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The funds will be used in these countries to strengthen the combat effectiveness of their armed forces. The objective of these funds is to increase the capacity of each to maintain internal security and to resist aggression. In Greece the aim is to improve the ability to deal with guerrilla activity, actual or threatened. In Turkey the goal is to modernize and streamline their army to increase Tur- key’s capacity to resist aggression. A modernized force would permit a maxi- mum military effort at a cost less than at present. In Iran the problem is one of capacity to maintain internal stabil- ity, as well as to strengthen the defense against aggression from the outside. Title TII provides $16,000,000 for the Philippines and Korea. The objective in the Philippines is to provide equipment and training to preserve order and sup- press the Hukbalahap guerrilla activity threatening the country. The share for Korea was based on building up the ca- pacity of the Korean security forces to maintain stability in the country and prevent border raids from the north. Since the invasion from the north, the nature of the problem has totally changed. At the present time equip- ment is being rushed to meet the pres- ent crisis. The Korean program obvi- ously must be revised completely to meet the need of the present situation. Seventy-five million dollars for the general area of China is made available in addition to the same sum provided last year. This will be used to continue and expand programs already in opera- tion, also to begin those now being for- mulated. The funds are to aid forces in that area that are either now engaged or may possibly become engaged in active conflict with Communist elements. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES In adopting the Mutual Defense As- sistance Act of 1948, the Congress estab- lished certain lines of policy to guide the operation of the program. It was rec- ognized that economic strength is a pre- requisite to peace and security. In Bu- rope, particularly, this meant that eco- nomic rehabilitation was a first order of business, However, it was also recog- nized that in some instances military assistance might be required to achieve & reasonable degree of order in which economic rehabilitation could proceed, JULY 18 Economic recovery was given a clear priority, but the committee pointed out in its report that the principle should be generalized in application. It is a settled policy of the Govern- ment to support actively and fully the principles of the United Nations Char- ter. We are acting in Korea in accord- ance with this principle. Military as- sistance was tied closely to this policy by the explicit mandate of the Congress. Support of the Charter included the fur- nishing of mutual-defense assistance to those nations participating in individual and collective arrangements under the Charter. It is clear that no individual nation has economic and military strength suf- ficient to carry the security burden of the whole free world. Therefore, the principle of self-help was laid down as a policy for this program. Self-help means that each country receiving as-~- sistance is to exert the utmost effort in its own behalf, but self-help in a collec- tive endeavor of all to provide the needed economic and military strength means that this program is a mutual under- taking. Security of the free world is, indeed, a mutual problem. The policy of the Congress is that assistance should also be based on the mutuality of secu- rity. All of these principles relate closely to another—the confidence of people and their ability to resist aggression, whether direct or indirect. Morale is an important factor in any undertaking. Increased confidence and ability to re- sist aggression is indispensable to eco- nomic recovery, also to political, eco- nomic, and social stability. They are essential elements of military strength. CONCERTED ACTION Much progress has been made toward the economic recovery of western Eu- rope. Under the relentless pressure of events Europe has moved toward unity as evidenced by the creation of such ar- rangements as the Western Union and its various subsidiary groups, the Euro- pean Payments Union, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Never has there been a more pressing need for unity. The West faces ominous danger, Unless there is concerted action toward the immediate achievement of military integration and unity, the West will be at an obvious dis- advantage in the struggle against inter- national communism. The mutual aid program should be accelerated, and it is most essential to extend at once the help contemplated in this measure. At an early date additional assistance will be required to so increase the defenses of the West that our security will be impreg- nable. On the 4th of April 1849 the North At- lantic Treaty was signed in the city of Washington. The free nations of the West, realizing the necessity for concert- ed action, decided to form an association under the Charter of the United Nations for the purpose of protecting themselves from a possible aggressor. Under the North Atlantic Pact “the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” .
1950 Since the signing of this pact the West- ern World has moved toward unifying the Atlantic community. The North At- Jantic Council has been working to achieve unity, and through the mutual defense assistance program we have suc- ceeded in laying a foundation for mili- tary coordination and integration which will materially assist in protecting the Western World. The west must hasten rearmament programs to deter aggres- sion and to defend itself if a direct as- sault is perpetrated. EUROPE IN DANGER The free nations of western Europe are in grave danger. The brazen attack on South Korea may be but the begin- ning of a world-wide program of care- fully planned aggression. Free peoples must move to improve their military po- sitions immediately. Only by fully pre- paring for any emergency will the West be in a position to turn back the Red tide. By continuing arms aid to Europe and by speeding our own military pre- paredness, the power of the free world will be so augmented that the encroach- ments of communism can be checked. Time is exceedingly important. We are in a world-wide struggle for keeps. The road to survival is strength. WORLD DIVIDED The world is sharply divided. On the one hand is Communist Russia and her satellites; on the other are the democ- racies. Communism means despotism, tyranny, enslavement and death. De- mocracy embraces the finest ideas and the highest ideals to which the human spirit is capable of aspiring. Democracy is freedom and the opportunity to live without the constant fear of aggression and attack. We are engaged in a strug- gle for our survival; communism strives to engulf all the nations of this earth. RED PRESSURE A cursory survey of a world map im- presses us vividly with the points of ris- ing Communist pressure. The Soviet Union through its satellites are inces- santly pushing against western Ger- many, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Within the past few days there have been re- ports of Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Ru- manian troop movements opposite the border of Yugoslavia. Demands for the control of the Dardanelles are constant. Iran is being pressed by Moscow to grant concessions. This strategic country could well be the victim of aggression in the not too far distant future. The Far East is now in sharp focus as Red pressure ‘is being exerted on Tibet, Burma, Thailand, French Indochina, and Formosa, and as Communist-con- ducted warfare is being waged against the Republic of Korea. We are in a continuing crisis. In view of the unprovoked attack on the Repub- lic of Korea and the mounting pressure against free nations, it is essential that our policy of extending military assist- ance to free nations be accelerated as rapidly as possible. It has become clear beyond dispute that the only language the Communists understand is the lan- guage of armed strength. In this world. wide struggle for survival the democ- tactes can and must prevail. To do this there must be an immediate augmenta- XCVI-——664 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE tion of their defenses. Such a course will discourage future attacks, COMMUNIST TACTICS In view of the philosophy and the ac- tivities of the Communists, we can ex- pect not less but more aggression, The Soviet Union has a large military force and is in control of thousands of satel- lite troops. We cannot proceed on the assumption that the satellite forces are militarily second rate, This has been blasted by the operations in Korea. This encounter demonstrates that the Com- munigt troops possess good equipment, employ smart tactics, have excellent Jeadership, and are motivated by a fa- natical determination to spread their tyranny. It is possible, under the system of in- ternational communism, to have the military forces of the free world very heavily committed and in dangerous places all over the earth without the Soviet Union committing any of its huge military machine. It is perfectly clear that satellite forces may initiate a shoot- ing war simultaneously in many places. Thus, world conditions make impera- tive the immediate passage of this meas- ure. World conditions make it neces- sary for the democracies to accelerate their military production, At the end of the Second World War our Allies were exhausted, both eco- nomically and militarily. After the ter- mination of hostilities in 1945 the United States disarmed unilaterally. Efforts to reconcile the differences between the free world and the Soviet world have proved fruitless and futile. A quick re- view of the years extending from 1945 to the present time shows that the Soviet Union has done everything to prevent the establishment of a free world and has done all within its power to frustrate the efforts of those who seek to build a decent international society. This has been accomplished in several ways. The veto has been employed in the United Nations on 39 occasions. The United Nations has been used as a sounding board for vituperative utterances against the free world and particularly the United States. International confer- ence after conference has been wrecked and torpedoed by the recalcitrance and uncompromising attitude of the Commu- nists. The Soviet Union has prevented any basic agreement on the solution of international problems. Ambassador Douglas, in a statement made when the hearings on the mutual defense assistance program were going on this year, said: We have learned that only the strong can settle issues with the Kremlin peacefully. Collateral dividends are derived from a con- dition of strength. I have held this opinion for a long time. In a speech to the House on De- cember 15, 1947, after having been to the Near East and Western Europe, I said: In the face of the open hostility being displayed by the dictatorship of Ruesia, our only course is to strengthen our defenses and make ourselves sufficiently strong to cope with any and all emergencies. There is not the least sointilla of evidence that the Communist dictatorship entertains even the remotest desire to establish a peaceful world, Even the most superficial inspection 10541 of the record leads us to the conclusion that they will not accede to any program other than their own sinister plan which leads to the complete crushing of freedom and to a final and ultimate tyrannous subjection of all people. The great significance of the Pres!- dent's action in the Far East is that we have now definitely drawn a line against aggression in Asia. From now on ag- gression in the east, as well as in the west, will be met with determined action. In a speech entitled “A Bipartsan For- elgn Policy,” on this floor the ist of April 1948, I proposed definite action against aggression. The seventh prin- ciple reads as follows: The United States should inform the world and particularly the Soviet Union that we intend to use our force to stop aggression directed at strategic points euch as the ap- proaches to the Atlantic, Gibraltar, the coun- tries of western Europe, the Dardanelles, Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Near East, the Persian Gulf area, China, and the islands of the Pacific. We should state clearly that whenever there is encroachment on these areas, or any other strategic positions, the integrity of which we deem essential to the security and the survival of the United States, the power making such an encroach- ment will meet with our immediate, sus- tained, and unrelenting resistance. We should for our own self-interest and the peace of the world establish a line beyond which an aggressor may not move without encountering the full force and power of the United States, CLEAR AND REALISTIC THINKING The current crisis demands clear real- istic thinking and most competent statesmanship. We must clearly evalu- ate our foreign policy and more particu- larly our military policy in relation to our total foreign policy. Military as- sistance to the countries of western Eu- rope and to the free nations in the Near and Far East has become a part of our over-all policy. The mutual defense as- sistance program begun last year will have to be continued until this struggle between the free and the enslaved world has been resolveg in favor of human lib- erty. The lot of Europe is cast with that of the free world. ‘The net effect of an increase in the growth of power in Eu- rope is to increase the power of the West. This is most urgent. Militant commu- nism is not a theory. Militant commu- nism is a program of aggression, seeking to carry the techniques of tyranny to every corner of the earth. It is an in- escapable fact that communism, as has been demonstrated very graphically in the Korean situation, does not shrink from aggression—cold or hot. Nothing except superior force will stop commu- nism in its attempt to achieve its sinister goal of world domination. MORE FUNDS REQUIRED This bill is calculated to help estab- lish and maintain peace so as to prevent a general world cqnflict. In view of the tension existing around the globe it is my opinion that the sum authorized in the measure under discussion is insuffi- cient. I am ready to vote for much larger sums to improve at once the mu- tual defenses of the free world. By adopting this measure and immediately agreeing to the appropriation we will have again made it perfectly clear that
10542 we intend to continue our resistance to aggression. It will be plain that we will employ our power to maintain the ine tegrity and the independence of the free world. Just as we have fought ag- gression in the past, so we will continue our stand against tyranny until the Communist drive in Korea is halted and until the spread of despotism is arrested around this globe. Nothing less than human freedom is at stake. Democracy today is hanging in the balance. The Western World is waging a life-and- death struggle for its existence. The free nations must, and will, cooperate to win this battle for liberty. The Western World has the resources, the ability, and the determination to prevent commu- nism from dominating the earth. OBJECTIVES OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT In joining the North Atlantic Treaty and in adopting the Mutual Defense As- sistance Act last year, we drew a line against aggression in western Europe, and on June 27, 1950, a similar line was drawn in Asia. I supported the mutual defense assistance program last year and voted for the entire authorization, also the full appropziation as requested. I am happy to give my full support to the present measure under discussion and stand ready to vote to authorize and ap- propriate all the funds necessary to in- crease the strength of the Western World sufficiently to stop the universal Communist drive. The 1951 mutual defense assistance program is planned to carry on the ob- jectives of the 1950 program which has changed only in the urgency of achieving the end result. In the present situation there are several important factors which must be considered. The program before the House was planned prior to the invasion of Korea. But the clash of arms in the Far East does not change the over-all plan in substance. Develop- ments in Korea emphasize the urgency and the necessity of making it more ef- fective as soon as possfBle. Mutual de- fense assistance program is a potent instrumentality for strengthening the nations that love liberty. Our defenses should be immediately increased in the Pacific and elsewhere. We must exert our every effort in fully and adequately preparing this Nation for future emergencies. I said in a speech on foreign policy on April 1, 1948, that— Most important of all planks in a realistic, bipartisan program on foreign policy is the achievement and the maintenance of ade- quate preparedness on the sea, on the land, and more especially in the air. Atomic su- and air supremacy by the United States must be realized at all costs. United States air supremacy is the only road to world peace. All the funds required to keep us the strongest miiltary nation on the aac should be unhesttatingly appropriated the Congress. Having done this, the Congress should insist that the armed serv- foes efficiently and effectively move to an early and full realization of this determined objective, CONCLUSIONS The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the bill we are considering to- day for the continuation of this program were carefully drawn to achieve given objectives as soon as possible, This was CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE @ mandate of the Congress. MDAP has been slow in developing. The tempo of this program must be inereased at once, Its continuation is essential to our de- fense and security. Through the mutual defense assist- ance program we are assisting our friends in becoming strong, and we are helping them construct military power so that they can make their contribution to the survival of the western world. It is becoming clearer day by day that the next few years will be exceedingly cru- cial in man’s long struggle to acquire freedom. During the years immediately before us the issue between freedom and tyranny will be jained on many fronts. A hot war is possible in various areas. The future of the free world is now being decided, To maintain the free world and the free way of life we must look to our de- fenses and do everything to increase our military effectiveness immediately. We ere faced with a great challenge and a great opportunity to make an outstand- ing contribution to the construction of a decent international society. The passage of this measure now under dis- cussion will bolster the West, psychologi- cally and militarily. By swift con- certed action the free nations can aug- ment their military power to the point that a third world-wide conflict can per- haps be averted. Firm and resolute ac- tion on this measure and future similar measures will enable the West to main- tain a democratic society. Time is run- ning out. Quick action is imperative. Failure to arm ourselves sufficiently to meet any emergency would mean that we are not cognizant of the frightful times in which we live. Strong, resolute, firm, and realistic policies, dedicated to world freedom, backed by the armed might of this Re- public and the other democratic states, will guarantee a free world, a world in which nations can exist without fear of intimidation, of aggression, of enslave- ment, and of ultimate annthilation, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Smatuers]. Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, the mutual defense assistance pact now be- fore us for consideration was adopted by your House Foreign Affairs Committee by a unanimous vote. Partisanship and politics never came into the discussion of this legislation. The urgency of this moment requires partisanship to be at least temporarily laid aside. I have never met the man whose hindsight is not superior to his foresight. This bill was reported from the Foreign Affairs Committee by 24 affirmative votes be- cause everyone on that committee rec- ognized that the bill is an essential piece of legislation if the freedom and security of the democracies of western Europe are to be preserved, It is essential if our own freedom and democracy are to be pre- served. The men who sit in the Kremlin today have well-expressed ambitions to achieve for themselves warld domination and world control. Their forces are world-wide and indivisible. Wherever and whenever they can hite off another group of peoples, another portion of land, they do s0, and then they immediately JuLy 18 turn those peoples and that land against freedom and democracy and use them and that land for further and additional etaging grounds from which they con- tinue their endeavors to destroy that for which the United States stands. There- fore, when we assist the democracies of Europe and Asia, when we help to strengthen them, to make them able to fight and resist Communist aggression, we are not only assisting them to pre- serve liberty but at the same time we im- prove our own position in this mortal struggle with the Communists. We know that today the battle which is going on in Korea—some people say it is not a war, but certainly we must all admit that while it may not be war it is at least a battle—that the Korean battle is just one facet—just one small operation—in this struggle for world domination by the Communists, It really is no more than a continuation of the battle that we waged 5 years ago against the forces of Hitler. The battle we are fighting in Korea is a continuation of the fight against dicta- torship and totalitarianism. It is important that we not at any time lose sight of the fact that the Com- munists have military forces all over the world poised and ready to move at a mo- ment’s notice. The mutual defense as- sistance pact is a recognition of the type and the kind of a world-wide conflict which we are in, and it is a recognition of the fact that while Korea is most im- portant, that there are at the same time other important areas which must be de- fended. This legislation is this country’s best and quickest way to help defend those other vital areas from being over-~ run. Now, Mr. Chairman, this legislation is a@ continuation of legislation which was adopted by the Congress last year. It was bitterly fought last year in fts origi- nal form by several Members of this Congress. I do not in any way wish to condemn those who opposed it last year. There are many Members of this great body who are sincere in their beliefs that we should adept a policy of isolationism. They sincerely believe that we are wast- ing our substance and resources to at- tempt to assist other democracies in their fight against Communist aggres- sion. And then there ts another group who fought this and other similar legisia- tion. It is that group that somehow be- lieved they saw some relationship be- tween the Communist philosophy and so-called liberalism to which they give such loud verbal support. They were led to this belief because the Com- munists are smart enough to pick up a few desirable domestic programs and advocate them—then, having ensnared support from these well-intentioned people on those domestic issues, the Communists were abie to sell them on some of their foreign programs with- out at any time our friends being aware of what was happening to them. This tactic is known in fishing as “chumming up.” That is the practice which pre- vails in Florida where, in order to get the appetite of the fish exercised and whetted, you chop up bait and throw it overboard for a little while, then later on put a hook in some of that other bait
1950 and the fish unsuspectingly goes for it and is caught. I am proud to have not been so be- guiled. Iam proud to have supported the Truman doctrine and been one of those who firmly believe that the only way we could ever win a peace, or get the Rus- sians to agree to a peace was to make them see the futility of their aggression by our strength and resolve to resist them. I am proud to have raised my voice in pleading that we leave our troops in South Korea until we were sure the Communists had been withdrawn from North Korea. I am proud of having invited Gen. Claire Chennault to appear before our Foreign Affairs Committce in order to impress upon its membership the necessity for holding up the hand of Nationalist China in its resistance to communism. I am proud of being co- sponsor of a resolution calling for a mutual assistance pact with the democ- racies of Asia and the United States in resisting the spread of communism, I am proud of my record in opposing Com- munist philosophy and expansion at each and every opportunity. There were times when it was not as popular to be against it, as it is today. However, the situation is changed now. The naked and brutal, the inexcusable and cynical aggression on the part of the men of the Kremlin on the South Koreans in order to further the cause of Communist domi- nation has made everyone, I am sure, realize the real intention and the mad- ness of the men of Moscow. We are all now suddenly awake to the danger. I think we all now believe this mutual defense assistance pact is at this time a must. Certainly it is absolutely essen- tial that at the earliest possible moment we strengthen with military assistance those democratic allies of ours who, op- erating under the UN just as we are doing, desire to band together in order to protect their people and their govern- ment from dictatorship and to preserve their freedom. In the name of common sense and prudence this is the minimum at least that we can do. I personally believe that we should even go further. When men are dying as they are in the battle of Korea, it is no time in my opinion for business as usual, pleasure as usual, or politics as usual, and certainly today American men are dying in the rice paddies of Korea; and they are dying in order to protect our freedom and our democracy. AS grateful Americans who appreciate and understand the sacrifices which are be- ing made, we should immediately gather our strength, firm up our resolve to see that those men now engaged in this battle have every physical, every eco- nomic, and every military advantage that it is possible for this Nation to give them. The time has come when we must call on industry, labor, management, and manpower to immediately undertake a program of mobilization for not only the battle which is now raging in Korea, but because of the prospects of a total war which can happen at any moment the Communist leadership decide on it. The gathering up of all of our resources, the readying of all of our people for an all-out effort will not necessarily signify the beginning of world war III, but on CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE the contrary the evidence of a realistic, determined and unified American people resolved to go all the way to preserve freedom and democracy as a possibility of bringing about a peace. From the ex- perience that we have had with the Rus- sians since World War II, we must all agree that above everything else they are practical men. The men of the Kremlin, while pursuing the philosophy of com- munism, are nevertheless realists. If once they get it clear in their minds the understanding and appreciation of our resolve, our firm determination not only to fight, but our willingness to fight with every ounce of strength and man- power, and wealth that we have to fight with, they then can see, and probably for the first time, that a continuation of their present course of aggressive expansion will lead them to total war and the devastation and destruction which auto- matically follows. Then, and only then, Mr. Chairman, will they as realists and practical men sit down and say to themselves “let’s stop, let’s look, let’s listen.” Then, and only then, in my opinion, do we in America, and we of the democratic na- tions throughout the world have the hope of averting world war III. We must by our acts prove that our fervor and de-~ votion to democracy and our country are as strong and irresistible as is their en- thusiasm to destroy it. We must make them see this. This military assistance program is an essential part of our de- termination and willingness to sacrifice in order to stop the encroachments on freedom. To win a peace this legislation is essential; to win a war, which let us hope and pray will never happen, this program is also essential. Iam confident that every Member of this Congress, now that the mask has been stripped from the hearts of the men in the Kremlin will enthusiastically support this pro- gram of mutual defense. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Penn- sylvania (Mr. Futon). Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, this mutual defense assistance program is an important measure. It is not a measure that we should pass over lightly and think of as just the ordinary procure- ment program. This is the implement- ing of foreign policy of the United States for the security of the United States. The people in the Congress and the people in the country often talk of for- eign policy as if it were just a method of speaking about a subject which did not concern them, and which was simply theorizing about disturbing and entan- gling alliances. Foregn policy is only powerful and effective when it is imple- mented by the force of intelligent public opinion, and when it can be supported, if necessary, by the strength of arms and economic power of the country. United States foreign policy should be based on clear principles of justice in dealing with the peoples of the world. It should not be used to support totter- ing imperialistic regimes which peoples are repudiating. The duty of the Amer- ican people, of course, is to have the kind of a progressive program that will weld public opinion both in this country and the world behind it. As a corollary, 10543 we must have power behind our foreign policy. If necessary, when there is ag- gression, we must have the strength that these policies can be implemented. One of my criticisms has been of the general foreign policy of the country, that we have not been accurate enough to assess the impact of fast-moving changes which are occurring in this rev- olutionary era. We have not been quick enough to realize that often the forces of world public opinion are shut out, and that the forces of world public opinion cannot effectively assist a particular pol- icy so that it can be implemented be- cause of restrictive conditions, In our country we insist that there be certain rules and conditions under which public opinion is free to operate, under which business, labor, and farmer, and pro- duction and distribution, can operate. We must insist on such conditions in the world regardless of boundaries, and aim our policies toward promoting world se- curity for the average man today, and a future of hope for him and his family free from repression and exploitation. Where the rules of public security break down, then the whole economic life of the local community breaks down and the same thing happens in the world. As I felt this program is important for our security if kept within proper limits, I am one of those that has pressed the program ever since its first introduction into the House, As you know, this program passed the Senate on Friday, June 30 of this year. The House came back into session after a 10-day recess on July 10, 1950. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which has been on the job right straight through on this particular program, met immediately; in fact, on Tuesday, July 11 of this year, we reported the Senate bill out without any amendments. The peo- ple who had amendments felt that if we held this program up for even the time to consider amendments we were endan- gering the security of the United States and endangering this program through- out the world. The people who are our friends among the democratic nations of the world are looking to see whether we are standing behind these United States commitments abroad, whether we mean what we say, that the world shall be a world where free people can live, whether we will provide that bland security force for our alles, and stand behind them; or whether, on the other hand, the United States is go- ing to start into a policy of appeasement and retreat, both geographically and in the world of ideas, whether the United States will gradually pull in its horns and interests to the shores of this country and make the last stand, ourselves, iso- lated, friendless, and alone. In order to show that we really mean that the United States will implement the United Nations and assist the economic progress and implement the security of the free nations wherever they are, Congress must immediately take action on legislation of this kind in the House. What has happened? You would think that when the House Committee on Foreign Affairs unanimously, 24 to 0, regardless of party, on a bipartisan bill, reported out a mutual defense
10544 assistance bill on July 11, that the House would take immediate action. On the contrary, the House Rules Committee did not consider this bill unttl yesterday, July 17. Here we are on July 18 of this year of our Lord 1950 trying to discuss this bill, a whole week after the time when it could have been considered if the Rules Committee had met, and ac- cepted the responsibility of this legisla- tion, and had taken the action to report 4t out so it could have been debated. We in this House should have been working on this legislation either Tues- day afternoon of last week or Wednesday morning, July 12, The boys in Korea certainly do not have the time to put off their immediate actions for a week, and we in Congress in backing them and in backing the forces that are allied with us abroad should likewise not be able to take the time for 1 week to let a measure such as this lie idle. I have asked the Rules Committee for a public explanation because, as I said earlier today, they are responsible to the House, and they are responsible to the country. There can be no com- mittee of this Congress that avoids its responsibiity Someone from the Dem- ocratic administration on the Rules Committee should answer this to the country. Why was this vital military assistance program delayed for a week without action? Why, when this bill is so important to our security, was this allowed to He on the table with nothing being done? Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentle- man from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. The gentleman speaks of responsibility. What has been done with respect to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who set forth one policy before the Committee on Poreign Affairs and now we find that policy completely reversed? Who is placing the responsibility for that sort of thing? Mr. FULTON. The responsibility for the policies and the execution of the poli- cies lies fundamentally with the admin- istration. Mr. GROSS. With the Commander in Chief, is that not correct, in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Mr. FULTON. The foreign policy of the United States fs placed by the Con- stitution under the President of the United States. Congress simply imple- ments these policies. Mr. GROSS. What has been done to remove these generals who gave the For- eign Affairs Committee contrary infor- mation? Mr. FULTON. Several days ago on the floor I raised the question as to the adequacy of our intelligence. There should be an explanation by the Central Intelligence Agency of this coun- try as to whether intelligence is accurate because there is no doubt we have been deficient in having accurate information upon Which to take action. Mr. HERTER. Mr. Chairman, vill the gentleman yiela? Mr, TON. Iam glad to yield, sir, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Mr. HERTER. The gentleman com- men ‘ed on why this matter was never taken up by the Committee on Rules. Mr. FULTON, As to when it was. Mr. HERTER. As an individual mem- ber of the Committee on Rules I might say my office telephoned regularly to the clerk of the committee to find out whether a meeting would be held to con- sider this very important matter. Mr. FULTON. Iam glad to have that, because I know the gentleman is doing his job and he thinks this military-aid legislation is important for United States security, too. Mr. HERTER. After hearing the testimony of the members of the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs that of the authorization and appropriation made last year of $1,300,000,000 for this pur- pose, less than $100,000,000 had ever found its way overseas, it does not seem, from the point of view of urgency that the matter was quite as urgent as the gentleman makes it out. Mr. FULTON. Events have proved the program was as urgent as I am making it out, because I have no excuse for any department of this Government failing to carry out the expressed will and de- termination of this Congress. As you will find through the hearings, there are various of us on the committee who have said time and again that these programs are important and have examined the Government witnesses regularly on why those items of security legislation were not being implemented. You will find there are many members on both sides of our committee, but especially the Re- publican side, who haye cross-examined, saying, “Why the delay? Where is the delay? Is it in the State Department? Is it in the Department of Defense? Is it in Procurement? Is it in transpor- tation? Why are not these policies of Congress carried out?” I agree with the gentleman thoroughly that Congress generally has done its fob, but the question is why have not these policies been properly implemented when Congress a year ahead of time pointed out the direction and laid down the fun- damental purposes which the adminis- tration should carry out, I want to thank the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Hertgsr} for his comments. Mr, Chairman, the question comes up as to the particular implementation of the policy. One of the great criticisms of the program in the Communist world and one of the claimed alibis of the proe gram by the Communists is that this is merely a dumping ground for useless and obsolete American military equipment, and chiefly equipment which has passed its present usability, left over from the last war. In order to meet that question directly I have asked for an authoritative state- ment from the Office of Military Assist- ance to find just what type of equipment and the usability and modernity of the equipment is, which is being sent under this program. As of July 18, 1950, I have 8 letter of transmittal from Major Gen- eral of the United States Army, L. L. Lemnitzer, the Director of the Office of JuLY 18 Military Assistance, answering that ques- tion specifically and authoritatively. The general states this categorically: The equipment furnished under the Mutual defense assistance programs is the game as that now in the hands of our own Armed Forces and it is the same equipment our own forces would use in the event of an immediate war. The equipment coming from our own stocks is thoroughly rehabill- tated and placed in first-cless operational condition with the latest and improved auxiliary equipment such as armament and electronics. Accordingly, all equipment be- ing provided under the mutual defense eesistance program, including aircraft (pare ticularly B-29’s), tanks, artillery, antialr- craft guns and fire-control equipment, is modern in every respect, As new equipment is developed for our own forces, this new equipment is included in the mutual defense assistance programs. Improvements in our present equipments are incorporated into all the equipment fur- nished under the mutual defense assistance program. The equipment being furnished is neither obsolete nor discarded but can be considered the most modern operational equipment available in quantity today for use by our own forces. Mr. GROSS. Myr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. FULTON. I yield. Mr. GROSS. I want to compliment the gentleman as being the first speaker in 3 hours who has given us any infor- mation as to the particulars of this bill. In other words, what they are getting over there is about the same equipment we have in Korea today, which is far from modern equipment, apparently. They may be getting rehabilitated equipment, but certainly medium tanks and light tanks will not stand up to 60-ton tanks, which the Russians are using fn Korea, so they are not getting modern equipment. Mr. FULTON. As you know, the policy of the administration has changed. Pre- viousty the policy had been simply to im- plement the police force for internal security within Korea. It was not for the purpose of meeting major armed ag- gression against South Korea. We must see our boys in Korea and our allies receive first-class equipment, which I am now assured by Genera] Lemnitzer, ts being provided. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania {Mr. Fut- ton] has expired. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman three additional minutes. Mr. FULTON. May I go to one fur- ther point, as to how this equipment that we are supplying is being received by the recipient countries. I believe the Congress should not only look to see that. the equipment 1s good, efficient, current, modern, usable, and effective, but we should also see whether the public in the recipient countries, are receiving the equipment well; whether it is being effectively integrated into their defense establishments or whether it is causing civil strife within those coun- tries, The authoritative statement I have received today from the Director of the Office of Military Assistance is this, and I will quote this as the authoritative
1950 statement by the head of the program, General Lemnitzer—— Mr. GROSS. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield again? Can the gentle- man give us any idea of how this equip- ment is being distributed as to countries? Mr. FULTON. Iwill be glad to do that Jater, but I would like at this point to give this authoritative statement as to how it is being received upon being un- loaded, generally, and then the commit. tee can give you those details country by country at a later time in the debate. However, on the general proposition of the receipt of this equipment, General Lemnitzer, who is head of the adminis- tration of the Military Assistance, says: Communist propaganda and, unfortu- nately, stories carried by the American press, would have you believe that mutual defense assistance equipment arriving in western Europe is received under a virtual state of siege. This is definitely not true. The Communists made extensive plans to interfere with the unloading of equipment and to prevent its overland movement by means of organized resistance among dock and transportation workers and through acts of sabotage. Thus far they have failed com- pletely, The countries concerned have thus Zar demonstrated their determination to pre- vent such interference and the security meas- ures taken by them have been very effective. At all ports the cooperation of the non- Communist dock workers has been out- standing. They have voluntarily unloaded the equipment and are continuing to do so with the arrival of each vessel at European ports. The police and troop protection which has been provided these workers by the gov- ernments concerned has permitted the ma- tériel to be unloaded and to proceed to its destination in an orderly fashion. The only case where equipment has not been unloaded by non-Communist longshore- men and dock workers was in the case of the shipment of naval aircraft from Norfolk, Va., to Bizerte, Tunisia, since this aircraft was loaded at a United States naval base and unloaded at a French naval air station at Bizerte. Both the loading in the United States and the unloading at Bizerte was ac- complished by military personnel since ci- vilfan unloading personnel and facilities were not avallable under these circumstances. The CHAIRMAN, The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fut- Ton] has again expired. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Javits}. Mr. JAVITS. First of all I want to refer to what one of my colleagues, Mr, Gross of Iowa, just said about some- thing which I think is very pertinent, and to which I wish to address myself, He said that my colleague from Penn- sylvania {Mr. Fulton] said the first en- lightening thing about this bill that has been said during the course of this de- bate. I propose to confine myself to the bill, as did my colleague from Penn- sylvania. Perhaps it was because my colleague from Pennsylvania talked about the particular thing in which the gentleman from Iowa was interested and about which he wanted to hear that he made that remark; but I, too, would like to stick to the facts, not alone upon this bill but upon the situation which this bill is designed to correct. For I think that at a time like this, when we are ad- dressing ourselves to questions of high CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE policy we are inclined to overlook what & profoundly difficult situation we face in very realistic terms. The Orient, as anyone knows who has been there, is a vast place with enor- mous populations, and enormous popu- lations which have extremely low stand- ards of living. And so, before we lull ourselves into a sense of false security about what we have accomplished when we drive the North Koreans back above the thirty-eighth parallel, which I am sure we will do, I would like to call my colleagues’ attention to the very realis. tci words of people who are experts in this business, the British, which I read from an issue of the London Times of July 15. I shall quote this and I think every Member should take it very much to heart, for it states the problem which we face in the best and shortest terms that I know: Events there have several lessons for the Western Powers. For one thing, they under- line the need for political and economic changes in southeast Asian countries to counter the Communist appeal. Although the goal of the Communist challenge is dic- tatorship, the Asian Communists rally their following by cries of: ‘Land to the peas- ants,” “Efficient government,” and “National independence.” The Western Powers must be careful to avoid the charge of supporting backward or corrupt regimes, and they must supply the common need for improvement of land and farming methods, for more con- sumer goods, and for better production and marketing of the staple foods. More money must be spent on both arms and economic help, or aggressors will be invited into areas that are now both rich and weak. I ask you to ponder that statement very very carefully. This is no super- ficial job; it is not going to be finished by the driving back of the North Koreans beyond the thirty-eighth parallel, or in- deed by the conquest of North Korea; it requires a social, economic, and political concept equal in size to the task. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. GROSS. Nor can we hope to be successful if we put this man Rhee back as President of the Republic of Korea. Mr. JAVITS. That is exactly the sort of question the Times was addressing itself to, the political questions in the Far East, Now, Mr. Chairman, there has been a far-eastern policy, a decisive far-east- ern policy; it has not been made by the State Department; it has not been made by the President, but it has been made right here in the Congress, and I think from present indications the Executive and the administration are finally get- ting the point of the policy and finally getting aboard it, and I hope that they will not again be too little or too late, I think that we must have in the Far East a program for economic cooperation so that free peoples may help themselves to have better standards of living and better social conditions just like we have in Europe. Our program in western Eu- rope was successful in the defeat of the Communists, it absolutely and decisively defeated them in the two western Euro- pean powers of Italy and France, That 10545 program was the European recovery program, Let us not forget that, and as men of experience let us apply a good program when it works. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield. Mr. GROSS. The gentleman says we defeated communism in France when 183 members of the National Assembly of France are Communists? Mr. JAVITS. We have, considering the alternative we faced of having France taken over by the Communists. Mr. GROSS. When the Communists constitute the largest political party in the National Assembly? Mr. JAVITS. Isay that advisedly. As a@ result of the European recovery pro- gram there is a majority of the members of the Chamber who were not Commu- nists. Without it both Italy and France could have been under Communist gov- ernments—just so close were they to it in 1946. Mr. GROSS. But they are still power- ful enough to have caused the collapse of the government twice in 48 hours during the last 2 weeks. Mr. JAVITS. But they were not pow- erful enough to stop the coalition that supports a government of the middle of Pleven or keep him from taking power; and he is on the side of democracies, not of Moscow. Our far-eastern program should be based on economic cooperation and on security for the participating peoples. The administration must try to get the nations and states of the Pacific together and to deyise, as we did in Europe, a program for economic cooperation which would raise the standards of living of their peoples and give them a material as well as a spiritual stake in anticom- munism, Now, the Foreign Affairs Committee, as you will find on page 3 of the report on this bill, is again perfecting our far- eastern policy, blazing the trail which the administration if it has the wisdom must and should follow. The Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously decided that what it wants is a Pacific Pact, a Pacific Pact on the model of the Atlantic Pact, which will enable these powers of the Pacific which are today admittedly weak in terms of their own physical security, to lean on each other and to draw strength from each other. It is true there no longer is “a white man’s burden” in the Far East and there should not be. The Pacific nations and free peoples there are perfectly able to stand on their own feet and we should be the first to recognize that, but the way to recognize that is to dignify their de- fensive power and strength as we have dignified the defensive power and the defensive strength of Europe by an At- Jantic Pact. So we must dignify it in the Pacific by a Pacific Pact, If, as the administration tells us, an invitation is required of the Pacific states to get together and to dravy upon each other for their own defense, I say to it, and I hope many Members of the Congress in the next 2 days will join
10546 with me in saying that from the Con- gress of the United States, the repre- sentatives of the American people, this is the invitation and we devoutly hope they will accept it. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman fram Ohio. Mr, VORYS. Just going backward, the record for the Pacific Pact found in the report at page 3, the gentleman hav- ing introduced the motion, was based upon a bipartisan statement of congres- sional policy now found in the findings and declaration of policy of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act? Mr. JAVITS. The gentleman is ex- actly correct. Mr. VORYS. ‘Those were preceded by a bipartisan action by both Houses of Congress, going back to the China Aid Act of 1948; so that we have had a bi- partisan congressional policy for the Far East for a number of years. The only trouble is it has never been implemented by the Executive. My. JAVITS, Exactly. Certainly the disposition which is shown on this bill by its unanimous report from the com- mittee, and by the acceptance of the bill without amendments being offered in our own Foreign Affairs Committee, and by what I hope will be a resounding vote of support for this bill tomorrow, shows that we in the Congress are prepared for @ Pacific Pact and are prepared to back it. We often underestimate our own strength, the power of the demecratic ideal, and the power of our own allies. It 4s true the Russians have captured China with its 400,000,000 people and that we have suffered a severe reverse in China. But let us see what support for liberty there is in the Pacific. There are Aus- tralia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Phil- idppines, Malaya, India, Pakistan, Burma, Afghanistan, Siam, Indochina, Korea, and China on Formosa, in order to make up a Pacific Pact. There is great power in the Pacific peoples who are still on the side of freedom if we only have the sense and the judgment to marshal them today. There is one other point which is very important in appraising what we are doing. I think it is high time that we got very realistic about the magnitude of what we are engaged in. Little, to my mind, has vindicated more the action which we took in Europe in backing the Atlantic Pact which this bill to the tune of a billion dollars is to implement—and let us not forget that we are implement- ing the arming of the western European ations in this bill with another $1,000,- 000,000—than reading the papers this morning to find that when the United Nations needed aid for the enforcement of military sanctions in Korea, immedi- ately after us are coming the Brussels Pact nations—Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem- burg. It is they who will support us; it is they who have the ideal of freedom 6o seriously in their hearts. It is still they with the greatest military capa-~ bility in being im the free world after us. So let us not be confused about where the powcrhouse of democracy still is, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE We want ft created in the Pacific, too, s0 that the powerhouse of democracy 1s on both shores of the Atlantic, and of the Pacific. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentle- man from Iowa. Mr. GROSS. What assurance does the gentleman have that we are going to get this help he is talking about? We are not getting it in Korea. Mr. JAVITS. Let us not be hasty. We have been fighting in Korea for about 2 weeks. We were the ones who had forces on the spot in Japan and were able to get the jump. We did the right thing. We did get the jump and we did get in there, The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired. Myr. BATTLE, Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, based upon reports we have already seen and the fact we know the mettle of our allies in western Europe, we will get the neces- sary units, the necessary help which we want, both in ground forces and other- wise, Also, I remind the gentleman from Jowa that the British Navy’s units and the Australian Air Forces’ nnits were im- mediately put at our disposal and are be- ing used. I have confidence now we will get ground-force assistance from these sources, a8 well, Mr. GROSS. When? Mr. JAVITS. Promptly, that is the most that one can say. They are meet- ing on it right now, as the gentleman knows from reading the morning papers, and that was the point of my statement in pointing out that the great military capability that resided in that area of the world. Mrs. DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentle- woman from California. Mrs. DOUGLAS. New Zealand and the Canadian and the Netherland forces are also at work. Mr. JAVITS. Yes; that is true, and I appreciate that correction. I would just like to come to this last point in terms of realism. The United States has an annual income of §250,- 000,009,000. That is the totality of our production. That means that every man, woman, and child tn the United States has generally a per capita income of somewhere between $1,200 and $1,500 a year, Let us compare that with those next in line, the peoples of western Eu- rope, who are a numerous people and next in line after us in industrial capa- bility. They have a population of over 200,000,000 people, with an annual in- come of $170,000,000,000 in terms of pro- duction, somewhere in the area of §400 to $600 per capita. Once you get beyond that—which takes in practically the whole world with the exception of Can- ada, South Africa, Australia, New Zea- jand, and a few South American coun- tries, all with relatively small popula- tiong—but once you get beyond that for practically the whole population of the rest of the world, you are in the area of @ per capita income of something like $100 a year or less. When we talk about the appeal of communism and the coun- JULY 18 terappeal which we must make if we are to decisively defeat communism, let us never forget those figures. Let us never forget that, in terms of standards of liv- ing, the people of the world have a very long way to go. Now, the whole world respects Ameri- can industrial power, and if they did not respect it, they could not help but re- spect it, based upon the very figures which I have just quoted and the stand- ard of living which it has given te the United States. But there is a big failacy which we are still laboring under in this country, which is very strange for busi- nessmen, that for one reason or another that we really are stretching ourselves too far considering the magnitude of the job and the magnitude of our resources, to improve the standard of living of the other peoples of the world, essential though it is if we are to defeat commu- nism, and deliver the goods if we are to show up Communist promises as the lies they are. There is that fallacy in the thinking of many people in our country that somehow or other it will break us or bankrupt us or make us poor or bleed us white to do the job we must do to save ourselves and mankind from Com- munist slavery. We are great businessmen, but in this critical instance we seem to forget that business is always best on a busy street; that we sell the most to people who are prosperous; that where there are high standards of living there is a greater in- come for everybody. We do not seem to realize that that fs the only way in which the enormous economic burden of reconstructing the world’s economy and of raising of the standards of living of terribly distressed peoples is possible and that the arma- ments which we and the rest.of the free world need, and which I believe the Presi- dent will recommend tomorrow and which he should have recommended a year ago, that all of that cannot be car- ried on for the time it will take solely on the basis of the economy of the United States; that it can only be carried on in terms of a world economy, and that in- stead of our exports and imports of $12,- 000,000,000 a year, now largely financed by Marshall-plan money, it should be for us and on the same scale for other free peoples, $40,000,000,000 a year on a normal basis. Then we will have a world economy that can sustain the kind of a job which we have to do in the world. Again I repeat, it is amazing to me that Americans, skilled in business, do not realize that business is best on a busy street. Take a look at the 10 biggest cor- porations in the United States today. In 1929, a boom year, they had individ- ual resources in the hundreds of mil- lions each. They include General Mo- tors, United States Steel, General Elec- tric, and others of similar size. Today their resources are in terms of $5,000,- 000,000 for General Motors and down from that. All of these problems, both of economic reconstruction and of assur- ing security to the free world have to be looked at in those terms. We are living in a truly new world; if we do not rec- ognize that we can lose, we can lose In this struggle egainst communism, and nobody knows that better than the people
1950 of Asia. But, if we look at this world in terms of completely new conceptions and new figures, then I am confident that the world can have the most glorious centuries ahead that it has ever had in all of its history, and that the free peo- ples of Asia and elsewhere, will be with us because we are the hope for a decent and peaceful world and because we are right. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Cali- fornia [Mr. Jackson] who has just re- turned from a mission to Latin America for the committee. Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr, Chairman, as the gentleman from Ohio has stated, I have just returned from 8 weeks in Central America and Mexico on a committee mission intended to de- velop the present situation with respect to the military, political, and economic postures now obtaining in those coun- tries, I am very happy to say that during the course of that trip we found a great and almost universal expression of friendship and good will for the United States. I was surprised upon my return to Washington and to the House to find that those of us who, a year ago opposed economic aid to Korea on grounds which we considered to be valid, were in effect being charged with having sabotaged South Korea and American interests in that part of the world. Many years ago a great American sald: Gentlemen may cry peace, peace, but there is no peace. The war has actually begun, The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the crash of resounding arms. Our brothers are already in the fleld. Why stand we here idle? Those words might well be spoken today on the floor of the Congress. We are no longer engaged in a cold war but in a war that is as hot as war can ever become. It is useless to berate at this moment, it is useless to indulge in recriminations as to who is responsible for the position in which our men now find themselves in the rice paddies of Korea, but it is very important that today’s Recorp show cer- tain warnings, certain things that were said on the floor of this House a year ago as to what might reasonably be expected if we embarked upon a course of action such as the one that was proposed at that time. In spite of warnings and in spite of storm signals which were flown over the floor of this House, we proceeded along a course of action which many of us con- sidered in all honesty to be a course of folly. We set up in the form of meager economic assistance a showcase for de- mocracy in the last place any thinking man would have tried to establish such a showcase. There were warnings then that the Russian bear would, when the proper moment came, put his foot through the glass, and that is precisely what has happened. Korea was a soft spot, and in the Russian probings for soft spots it was inevitable that Korea's weakness would be found, and that in due time 2 or 6 or 11 divisions would plunge across the thirty-eighth parallel CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE to undo the good we were trying to do, and garner the prize being dangled un- der the Communist nose. However, that is largely water over the dam and under the bridge. Mr. KEATING, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JACKSON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York. Mr. KEATING. That may be water over the dam, and I quite agree with the gentleman that we must now look for- ward and not backward. But I think the record should contain at this point a commendation of the prophetic utterance of the gentleman now addressing us. The words in the minority report on economic aid to Korea, which were uttered by the gentle- man from California, as we read them now, were a complete and accurate fore- cast of exactly what has happened. The gentleman said that economic aid to Korea would be useless unless accom- panied by military assistance. Certainly events have proven that statement. I think the gentleman now speaking is en- titled to our highest commendation for the leadership which he took in what has now turned out to be the proper course. : Mr. JACKSON of California. I thank the gentleman from New York. Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr. Chair- man, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JACKSON of California. I yield. Mr, HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. I also want to join in commending the gentleman for the minority report which he wrote at that time when he pointed out to the Congress and used the phrase: The House should be aware of these facts; that already aggression was beginning back of the thirty-eighth parallel; already Soviet advisers were engaged; and that without the accompaniment of adequate military force, the use of economic assistance could only enhance the prize in the eyes of the aggres- sor, I would like to point out here that on page 42 of the committee report there is not only confirmation of the gentleman’s prophecy as to economic aid, but there is an admission that military aid voted in connection with the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 did not reach Korea. The words used are: No deliveries of any consequence have been made as yet. And it goes on to say: The committee regrets that so little of the aid voted has reached Korea before the attack, But worse than that is the admission, as the gentleman is aware, that it was not intended to supply sufficient military aid to repel an aggression because it is specifically stated on this same page that the military aid was to preserve internal security; prevent border raids; and as a byproduct to deter armed at- tack or other aggression from North Korea. Does the gentleman agree that tak- ing that into consideration plus the tes- timony of General Lemnitzer and others before this committee that it was in- tended to leave South Korea as a mere sitting duck in the presence of the greedy Russian bear? 10547 Mr. JACKSON of California. I thank the gentleman, In response to his ques- tion I can only say that in my own mind during the hearings there was never any question as to what we intended to do from a military standpoint in the case of attack upon South Korea—that was to leave it. I invite the attention of every Member of this body to the remarks made by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SsutTH] in which he quotes time and time again from witnesses before the com-~ mittee of the intention not to defend South Korea in case of attack. But all of that aside we are now confronted with the reality of war which we have tried to avert by every honest means. We have leaned over backward in an effort to ap~ pease the Soviet. We have done every- thing that any reasonable nation might be expected to do and much more besides. I, too, am a veteran of the last war. I am also a member of the minority party in the House of Representatives. But I am first of all a citizen of this country, one who loves it very deeply and one who has a deep and abiding regard for its in- stitutions and ideals, Although I raised my voice last year against the folly that has proven to be Korea and although at that time, as many of us did who cast our votes in good conscience against the proposal, I did everything in my power to divert what appeared to be a disastrous step, I submitted in the American way to the will of the majority. However, again I think the record should be clear on several points. I read from the minor- ity report which was referred to by the gentleman from New York. I quote: As desirable as are the aims of those who would furnish economic assistance to Korea at this time, there are factors which indl- cate that such a program is foredoomed to failure. Korea is hopeletsly outflanked by the adjacent land maes of China, and the peninsula has no connecting link with any friondly continental power. Every ton of supplies contemplated to be furnished under the terms of this legislation must be trans- ported vast distances, only to be put down in the midst of a complex and daily shifting Pacific picture, in which the rapid and un- deterred :pread of communism ip the salient feature. And again: Every authority who has testified before the Committee on Foreign Affairs with re- spect to the Korean situation has acknowl- edged the fact that there could be no effec- tive defense against an armed aggression originating in the northern half of the coun- try, The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes, Mr. JACKSON of California— Nor has any satisfactory evidence been pro- duced to indicate that a determined politi- cal attack could be long withstood. And again, and this has reference to the announcement that Soviet soldiers were engaged in an action on the Ongjin Peninsula as long as a year ago: ’ This development may well presage the launching of a full-scale military drive across the thirty-eighth parallel. Unless this Na- tion fs prepared to meet force with compar- able force, economic assistance cannot of it- self insure the safety or the integrity of South Korea.
10548 The character of aid proposed at that time was the root of the opposition of the Members who opposed the bill. ‘The thought of sending hydroelectric plants, mine equipment, and other capital in- vestments to enhance the prize to be taken by the aggressor without adequate military assistance to cover, defend, and protect those suppHes was the only rea- son we opposed the legislation at that e. Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr, JACKSON of California. TI yield. Mr. HOEVEN. Of course, the propa- ganda mills are already grinding, and Members of the Congress who voted against the so-called economic aid to Korea bill last January are being ac- cused of having been against national defense and the defense of Korea. Iam glad the gentleman has called attention to the minority report which specifically clears up that matter. Is it not a fact that there was not a penny of money in that bill for the de- fense of Korea; not one cent for arms or ammunition? Everything that was au- thorized to be appropriated was for cap- ital improvements, which it is quite evi- dent now, would have been taken over by the Communists. Mr. JACKSON of California. The bill ‘was an economic-assistance measure, which was designed to rehabilitate rail- roads, open entry to coal mines, install hydroelectric plants, and generally re- habilitate heavy industry in South Korea. Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JACKSON of California. I yield. Mr. LODGE. I congratulate my friend from California on his excellent state- ment. As the gentleman knows, I was one of those who signed the minority report on Korea, feeling, as the gentle- man felt, that economic aid without mill- tary aid was a wasteful performance especially since the military and naval witnesses who came before our commit- tee testified that Korea is not only in- defensible but of slight strategic impor- tance. Nevertheless, I voted for the aid to Korea bill mainly in the forlorn hope that something might be done, and be- cause I favored aid to the people of For- mosa, I thought that we should do what we could to buoy up their spirits. This aid provided the only hope that was left to the people of Korea. I felt that Korea could not be saved by our aid alone, but I did not want to help in underwriting their doom. I felt that we were respon- sible for the formation of this young Republic and therefore we must at least give them a chance. Certainly, the dis- tinguished gentleman from California courageously anticipated what has hap- pened, I congratulate him on his fore- sight and on the remarks which he has addressed to us. Mr. JACKSON of California. I thank the gentleman. Mr. KEATING, Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further? Mr. JACEKGBON of California. I yield. , Mr. KEATING. I think there should be added to the comment which the gen- tleman from Iowa {Mr. Horven] made that not one dollar of the military aid CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE which we voted for Korea, according to the evidence, has ever arrived there. That was voted long before the economic aid, so that there has been nothing done to implement the action of Congress. Mr. JACKSON of California. I think one important point that every Member of Congress should realize is that the de- cision to aid and assist South Korea was a diplomatic decision and not a military decision. Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JACKSON of California. I yield. Mr. MCDONOUGH. The record will also show that the rule for the bill which the gentleman is referring to was adopted by the Rules Committee on Sep- tember 27, 1949, and it laid in the House until January 19, when the bill was en- acted. In other words, during that in- terim the Syngman Rhee government had been elected, and if there had been any intention on the part of the admin- istration to help, the bill should have been acted upon before we recessed in October 1949. Mr. JACKSON of California. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. Mr. HALE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. JACKSON of California. Very briefly, to the gentleman from Maine. Mr. HALE. I just wanted to ask the gentleman if he was not impressed by the fact that the military aid which we voted for China had apparently been sabotaged? Did not that seem to indi- cate the entire futility of trying to help these countries? Mr. JACKSON of California. I would say to the gentleman from Maine that I have long since ceased being surprised at anything. But, having been an un- willing passenger on this wave of short- sighted idealism, I accept the inevitable outcome of folly. As a veteran and a citizen to whom the safety of this Na- tion is of paramount consideration, I ac- cept the grisly facts which have led to bloodshed. I opposed the arms-aid bill last year. It is my intention to support it this year. We are in such position that our national security and our national safety are at stake, and I cannot in the light of that oppose the pending legislation. Circumstances attendant on an abys-~- mal failure properly to evaluate the Korean situation has brought us into war, and it is a war that may well go on for the next two decades. Let no one think for an instant that this is not war, hot war of the hottest variety, and a war in which hundreds and possibly thousands of American men are going to lose their lives. Those men are dying this instant because we attempted to meet the threat of bayonets and 60-ton tanks with tons of manure and garden The time has come for us to realize that the Soviet Union and its satellites intend the destruction of every constitu- tional form of government in this world which does not coincide in every respect with the political philosophy of the So- viet Union and with the Communist manifesto written in s Paris attic 102 years ago, The time has come to write our own manifesto, a manifesto which will be unmistakable to the aggressors judgment of the prophets who have been consistently wrong or who have consist- ently fumbled the ball, but only because I am one of 150,000,000 Americans in s fight not for social security, but in a fight for ultimate survival. At the proper time during the course of the amending procedure on this bill I shall offer again the amendment I of- fered last year which will open negotia- tion for air bases in western Europe on which shall be mounted units of the American Air Force armed with the most devastating weapons at our command. In the moment one foot of an aggressor is placed across the frontier of any friendly nation this force should be in & position to take off from bases on the Continent and wreak whatever havoc they can in the ranks of the greatest ag- gression since Adolph Hitler. Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Minne- sota [Mr. MarsHALL]. Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I was one of the few Members of this House—and the only Democrat—who voted to oppose passage of the recent so-called tax revision bill, H. R. 8920. Recent developments in the Far East throw new light on this bill. We have committed our troops to enforce the United Nations cease-fire order. In 80 doing, we have committed the financial resources of the United States to sup- port these troops. It is now apparent that H. R. 8820 ought to be shelved and a new bill substituted by the House of Representatives. The bill passed by the House did con- tain provisions necessary to plug obvious loopholes in our present tax laws. These provisions ought to be incorporated in another bill and passed immediately. If we are to maintain our financial stability in the present criss, it is imperative that we have additional funds. It is not a popular thing for me or for any Member of Congress to talk about additional revenue in an election year. If speaking frankly and honestly and being true to my convictions means de- feat in the coming elections, so be it. I would be a coward to my conscience and traitor to my country were I to pursue another course. The American people are prepared to face the facts. There has been over- whelming support of our action in Ko- rea. There is no war hysteria. But there is a stern realization that this will be a hard struggle. There are serious ques- tions about the prospects ahead and we need to face them squarely. Whether we want to or not, we are building a war economy. Our recent his- tory has demonstrated that a war econ- omy leads to the attendant dangers of rising debt and inflationary trends. To check both a rising debt and inflation, we must pass sound revenue laws. We
1950 know the tremendous costs of war. And even the police action we have now un- dertaken is an expensive one, particu- larly since it is necessary to build our own strength in the interest of national defense and security, Had we taken early steps to insure suf- ficient revenue during World War I and World War II, a larger part of these wars could have been paid out of the increased national income. To postpone the day of payment is not only a dangerous fiscal policy; it is an ungrateful one. We send young men to war and then ask those who return to pay for their own war during the height of their earning power through taxes. We have made this mis- take twice. Must we make it again? Our national income increased from $41,700,000,000 in 1932 to $221,000,000,000 in 1949. Our national debt rose from $19,400,000,000 in 1932 to $251,600,000,- 000 in 1949, It is true that the cost of World War TI boosted our debt to this peak, but we can see now that some of this might have been avoided. There- fore, I repeat that we ought to face the facts realistically and enact a tax bill that will produce revenue sufficient to meet the costs of national defense and security in these troubled times. Since the end of World War II our mil- itary costs have remained steadily high. We have been spending one out of every three dollars spent by the Federal Gov- ernment for defense. Only a few years before the last war we were spending about one out of ten dollars for military preparedness. Viewed another way, in the recent years we have been spending six cents of every dollar of national income for military defense. During World War II, the United States spent up to 95 percent of its total budget to carry on a Global War. In terms of national income, about 50 cents of every dollar earned was spent to win the war. But this was at the peak of World War II when our efforts demanded every hu- man and physical resource at our com- mand We again need to make this ef- fort now to avoid another war too terrible to comprehend. Foresight will help us to meet the costs in money without bringing disaster to our economy. To meet the new emergency with still bigger and faster deficits would be folly. It would mean defeat at home while try- ing to protect and promote peace and security abroad, A healthy fiscal policy is as much a part of national defense in the world now as armaments. If we are Not strong financially we will fall prey to weaknesses at home that will make se- curity impossible. We know that it will now be necessary to increase the volume of defense spend- ing. This increase will be reflected in both the dollar volume of armament spending and in the proportion of the budget devoted to that spending. Un- less honest efforts are made now to meet the additional needs of the United States, we will be building a bigger deficit. More debt and more inflation might well be the fifth column that will under- mine our country. To allow these twin evils to run rampant might well nullify any military victory that we can gain. We need only to look to the countries of CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Europe to know that financial ruin is the breeding ground of totalitarianism. To fight the false philosophies threatening the peace of the world on battlefronts, while making breeding grounds for them at home would be defeat. This is one of the most serious prob- lems now facing this Congress. God for- bid that we shirk our responsibility and again find that we have done too little too late. Gentlemen, I cannot stress too strongly the need for a sound tax policy now to meet these problems squarely and honestly, Because the human mind is permitted to choose evil, we have among us those who seek profit from the misery of their fellowmen. We have among us the weak and the men of little faith who would shirk their share of suffering. These are the profiteers and the hoarders, some big and some small, but all traitors to themselves and to their country. These are the realities of life and society must depend upon government to protect it from this insidious element threatening the common good. The moral bankruptcy of the few can well work grave harm on the good of the many. None of us want controls, whether political or economic. But we know from sad experience that some economic con- trol is necessary in time of crisis to pro- tect us from ourselves—from the greed which drives men to make fortunes from the blood and tears of their fellow citi- zens. War wrecks death and suffering upon great masses of people—but it also makes great fortunes for those few who feed on the misfortunes of others. World War I and World War II meant death to our young men—it also meant mil- lions to those who trade in death for their own profit. Modern war demands the effort of every citizen. Peace in modern times demands the effort of every citizen. Just as the soldier at the front must be pre- pared for the ultimate sacrifice, so the citizen at home must be prepared to sac- rifice at least those material goods which would be empty frills without the free- dom which is the natural chmate of happiness for man. The increased expenditures necessary to carry our efforts to secure the peace to a successful conclusion could lead not only to debt but to the kind of inflation we have already witnessed. A wise tax policy can be a major move toward ward- ing off the evil of inflation. Used with moderate economic controls 1t could pro- tect us from the decline in dollar value which contributed so enormously to the costs of both World War I and World War II. We know that these costs were inflationary costs and many generations of Americans will be called upon to pay them. Good tax policy has always been rec- ognized as an effective brake on inflation. We knew this in World War II but we were too late and we stopped too early, ‘The result was the 57-cent dollar of 1948. Must we make the same mistake again? Must we wait until the apparent has occurred before we learn that foresight is better than hindsight? Already hoarders and profiteers with an eye to the Korean struggle are push- 10549 ing up prices and hoarding the mate- rials and resources we will need to force the hand of those who plotted the un- provoked aggression in Korea, I hope we do not wait until extreme controls and extreme taxes are necessary, Mr. Chair- man. Now is the time to adopt a sound “middle course” policy of revenue rais~ ing and economic controls. Unless we are prepared to enact moderate, sensible legislation now we will find ourselves forced to enact extreme legislation after the harm has been done. I only ask that we face the facts. Cer- tainly we can do that much. We are not different from the Americans who fought at Valley Forge, at Gettysburg, at the Argonne, or at Iwo Jima—then, let us do honestly what needs to be done. Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr, MARSHALL. I yield to the gen- tleman from Pennsylvania. Mr. FULTON. Did the gentleman support the Mutual Defense Assistance Act program last year? Did he vote for or against this program last year? Mr. MARSHALL. On aid to Europe? Mr, FULTON. The Mutual Defense Assistance program, the extension of which we are working on now? Mr. MARSHALL, I supported the re- covery programs. I have supported every recovery program that the House has had brought before it. I have not supported the military assistance pro- gram. Mr. FULTON. The gentleman voted against that last year when this bill first came up. Did the gentleman support the bill for the 70-group Air Force as against the 48-group Air Force? Mr. MARSHALL. I want to assure the gentleman I did not. As far as I am able to determine so far that was entirely the wise policy to follow. Mr. FULTON. The gentleman voted against the 70-group Air Force program last year? Mr. MARSHALL. Yes. All action to date points to the wisdom of that vote. Our productive resources are in better shape. Up to this time the 48-unit Air Force has been all this country could support. Furthermore, military action demonstrates the adequacy of air strength. It has been our ground forces that have needed more and better arma- ments, The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired. Mr, KEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes. Mr. FULTON. Was the gentleman the only Democrat that did that in the House, too? Mr. MARSHALL. I was the only Member of the House who did that. Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MARSHALL. I yield to the gen- tleman from Indiana. Mr. JACOBS, I want to compliment the gentleman on what he has said here this afternoon. I want to compliment the gentleman from Minnesota upon what he is saying here. Regardless of how he may have voted on any other bill does not preclude him from calling these vital matters to the attention of the House. It is our duty in this House to
16550 have the courage to levy sufficient taxes to raise the revenue to pay for this war as we fight it rather than to leave it for future generations to shoulder. I com- pliment the gentleman. He is exactly righ’ Mr. MARSHALL. TI thank the gentle- man from Indiana. I would like to say to the Members of the House that I have not apologized or tried to find an excuse for any votes that I have cast in the past. Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr, MARSHALL. I yield to the gen- tleman from Pennsylvania. Mr. EBERHARTER. The gentieman from Minnesota is entitled to the thanks of the Members of Congress and the country at large for the remarks he has just made. It seems to me we ought to consider seriously the immediate imposi- tion of additional taxes on the American people, both on business and personal in- comes. We should not wait until we have spent millions of dollars and then try to impose a tax. I think it should be done right away. I seriously question also the decision not to go forward and pass at least a portion of the tax bill the House has al- ready passed and let it become law, es- pecially that portion pertaining to loop- holes and that portion pertaining to an increase in corporate taxes. It would have the effect of curbing inflation. It would make business and individuals in the country realize that we are in a state of emergency. The longer we put it off the more pain- ful it is going to be. I sincerely hope that what the gentleman has stated this afternoon will get widespread publicity. I know that when the people begin to think about it it will have the approval of the vast majority of the people of the country. Mr. MARSHALL. I thank the gentle- man from Pennsylvania. Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. MARSHALL, I yield to the gen- tleman from Massachusetts. Mr. NICHOLSON. I think the gentle- man has made an excellent speech. The fact that he changed his mind has made me think a great deal more of him, be- cause I was told when I was a little boy that a wise man changes his mind and a fool never does. Mr. MARSHALL, I thank the gentle- man from Massachusetts. I have sup- ported the reorganization plans and other measures of economy. I have felt that we ought to have a balanced budget and to that end I believe we ought to have a realistic revenue policy. My ef- forts in that regard have been consistent, I voted against military aid. I’m going to support this program because to my mind we are at war and are viewing the situation as a war measure. We did not start this agressive action but it will be up to us to end it. Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 40 minutes to the gentleman from Min- nesota (Mr, Jupp]. Mr. JODD. Mr. Chairman, naturally I favor the passage of this bill to extend further military assistance to certain na- tions of western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East—the mutual defense CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE assistance program. ‘When the first eco- nomic recovery program bill came before us in the Eightieth Congress, it was gen- erally presented as a thing we ought to do out of charity or humanitarianism or for solely economic reasons. It was argued that we ought to help the people and rehabilitate the industries in the countries in Europe which had suffered physical devastation during the war. The Recorp will show, I think, that I was the only Member of Congress who said in the debate then—ConcressionaL Recor, page 3872, March 31, 1946—that we could not justify it primarily on such a basis— that such measures as this (ECA and China aid) could be justified in this present world situation and in the present straitened state of America’s finances and supplies only if they are essential from the standpoint of the security of the Nation. We had hoped it would be an alternative to & military policy. 8ix months ago it per- haps could have been. But world events and Communist aggression have advanced s0 rapidly that now it probably is more in sup- port of a military policy than an alternative Oo one. The bill before us today deals with that military policy. It is designed to strengthen our allies. It is not that our Government is under any obligation to use our taxpayers’ money to help Eng- land, France, Turkey, China, Korea, or any other country. But we do owe it to our own people to try to get for them the maximum of security. And they do not have real security in a world where free nations are being taken over one by one by the Soviet Union and its fifth columns. So I was relieved when a year later the administration finally came along with a military aid program. As between the economic and military assistance pro- grams, you cannot say that one is more important than the other. Both are necessary if either is to succeed. I should like to approach the prob- lems we face today as a result of the Ko- rean invasion much as a doctor ap- proaches the body of a patient at the autopsy table. That is never a pleasant task; yet every physician knows that practically all the progress we have ever made in medicine came from honest ex- amination of our mistakes. The doctor may have been ever so careful in the ex- amination which led him to the diag- nosis that the patient’s trouble was, for example, in the stomach. He may have called in half a dozen expert consultants who also decided after careful examina- tion that the trouble was in the stom- ach. He may even have had a propa- ganda agency to convince all the rela- tives that the trouble was in the stom- ach, But if, when the man is dead and the doctor examines him at the autopsy table, he finds that the trouble was in the liver—then that is all there is to it, it was in the liver. A doctor conducts an autopsy, not to recriminate, because that does not get him anywhere; not 50 much to determine who was to blame as to try to find out, if he can, what was to blame. What went wrong with his thinking, that he missed some signs or misinterpreted other signs which the autopsy explains JuLy 18 as plain as day? He wants to learn so that in the next similar case he will not make the same mistakes again. Just so, in the grave crisis our country faces today, we need to conduct if not an autopsy, at least an exploratory opera- tion, in order to discover if we can how ‘we made the grave miscalculations that have brought us for the second time in one decade to the brink of a world war. Both times it began with the very same error: Failure to realize how important it is to our own security that the opposite shores of the Pacific as well as of the At- lantic be in the hands of friends instead of enemies; more specifically, failure to understand that it is imperative to the security of the United States and to the establishment of peace and order and security in the world that the nations of Asia be independent and friendly to our- selves and the other democratic free na- tions of the world, instead of organized and controlled either by Japan’s totali- tarian militarism or by the Soviet Union’s new imperialism—which is no less raw and cruel imperialism because it is called liberation or some other fancy slogan. For almost 100 years our forefathers did not make the mistake we have made. They saw that the best guaranty of our security on our west was to have there an independent China friendly to our- selves. They supported whatever gov- ernment was in China, whether good, bad, or indifferent, rather than let China's potential might come under any outside power that might be hostile to ourselves. They recognized China as im- portant to us not because of any senti- mental concern for the Chinese but be- cause of the geography of the Pacific area. If China were independent and friendly, then we were secure on our west, because neither of the two Asiastic na- tions which conceivably might ‘threaten us, Japan and Russia, could move in our direction if in its rear, in the case of Japan, or on its long southern flank, in the case of Russia, there was a strong independent China friendly to the United That was our basic policy and it was sound. We got into trouble in Asia only when we abandoned it in 1931 after Ja- pan invaded Manchuria. To the credit of Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stimson they saw the danger and recommended that the League of Nations take a strong stand, pledging our support. There were many factors in its failure to do 80; but I can- not really blame the League for not com- ing along. We were not a member. Other countries did not know whether this country would stand behind Hoover and Stimson or would repudiate them as it had Wilson. If the League took action, would we support it? ‘They did not know. In any case, the free world refused to take strong action against that aggres- sion which tore up all there was to show for World War I: Three pieces of paper and the ideas, moral principles, and com- mitments behind them—the League of Nations Covenant, the Nine-Power Pact, and the Eellogg-Briand Treaty outlaw- ing war as a means of settling disputes. The western world’s default set up the situation which led to World War II in the Pacific and to the destruction of the League, Japan's aggression, unchecked
1950 at the start in Manchuria, steadily spread over ever larger portions of the continent. By 1940 and 1941 President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull reawakened to the fact that it was essential to our security to keep Japan from getting control of the manpower, territory, and resources of China and then of the rest of Asia. So they took a belated stand against Ja~- pan’s further expansion, which, after we had systematically built her up to the point where she was strong enough to attack us, led of course to Pearl Harbor. But our Government's return to the principle of maintaining the independ- ence and territorial integrity of China was short lived. As we approached the end of the war in 1945, the desire to get the Soviet Union to join us against Ja- pan and to cooperate with us in forming the United Nations led our leaders to sell out the principles they themselves had declared in the Atlantic Charter. They invited the Soviet Union into Man- churia and gave her control of its major ports and railroads although at Cairo they had promised unequivocally that Manchuria would be returned to China. Thus was set up the situation which has Jed us in 5 years to the brink of another world war. Even before World War II was ended we had torn up the moral principles for which we had said that the war was being fought. I shall never forget August 8, 1945. AS Mrs. Judd and I at home in Minne- apolis were getting ready to go out to a friend's for dinner, the telephone rang and a newspaper reporter told me ex- citedly that Russia had just declared war against Japan and Secretary Byrnes had issued a statement that the United States had asked Russia to come in as that would shorten the war and save American lives. He asked for my com- ments. I was seized with the most intense feel- ing of dismay I have ever known, a sense almost of internal] dissolution. I had come home from China in 1938 and given up my work and my profession to try to report to the American people what I had seen of the Japanese invasion and what I felt sure it would lead to for our- selves, if we did not stop building up Japan's military power. I did not like it, but I was one of the few who had seen first-hand and I was under obligation as an American citizen to report to my people just as a doctor has to report what he finds, however disturbing it may be. If the people would not pay atten- tion, I could not help that, but at least Z had to warn them regarding the effects which Japan's aggression in Asia, if suc- cessful, would have on our country’s security. At frightful cost, we had now almost defeated Japan’s aggression in order to keep China independent and friendly to ourselves. And we were inviting in an- other potential enemy, Russia, and starting to build it up in Asia. Further- More our Government officials were en- deavoring to justify Russia's violation of its nonaggression pact with Japan, even though we had bitterly condemned Mus- solini when he violated his nonaggres- sion pact with France, and Hitler when he did the same with Poland and Russia, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE All I could say to the reporter was: “There gces the peace.” He asked, “What do you mean?” I said, “Well, there goes Manchuria, then China, then Asia, then Europe, and then ourselves—unless somewhere along the line we fight. We will not get real peace.” For without Manchuria, China could not recover, any more than western Eu- rope could recover without the Ruhr and western Germany—a fact which unfor- tunately it has taken 5 years to discover. Without China, the countries along her borders from Korea and Japan to India cannot recover or be secure. Without the resources and markets and trade of those countries—not on the old colonial basis of exploitation, but on the basis of mutual cooperation and develop- ment—Europe cannot recover or be- come secure. Western Europe has the second best workshop in the world, but a workshop is useless without raw materials; and Europe does not have the raw materials, Industrial capacity and technical pro- ficiency constitute only one of the four main factors of power. Western Europe does not have the other three factors: Raw materials, manpower, and terri- tory—and we cannot supply her out of our resources indefinitely. There was another consideration which led to my dismay at a time when almost everyone else was cheering. Ihad long urged that we try to keep Russia out of the Pacific war—including a personal appeal to that effect to President Tru- man the day before he went to Pots- dam. But I had repeatedly stated my belief that in the end Russia would enter the war against Japan because of her understandable desire to have a major hand in the settlements in that area of the world. However, it had not occurred to me that we would be asking Russia to come into a war that I felt sure noth- ing could keep her out of. So I added to the reporter: . Iam sorry the Russians broke their word with Japan, and I am even sorrier if we urged them to do so. It is short-sighted oxpediency for us at a time when we are trying to build a new world order based on the sanctity of the pledged word, to ask an ally to violate its pledged word. If it is all right for Russia to break its word in this instance because it is to our advantage, then how can we expect Russia or any other coun- try, to keep the new agreements we are enter- ing into, whenever it becomes advantageous to them not to do so? That is why I say, There goes the peace. We are cynically vio- lating the international morality on which alone a lasting peace can be bullt. The next day the paper reported what T had said and some people jumped on me as being unduly distrustful of Russia or even hostile to our ally, But my dis- may was not at Russia’s action. I had expected that. It was wholly in accord with her leaders’ principles—if that is the right word for the rules of conduct they follow. Rather, my dismay was at the immorality of my own country’s action. We cannot condemn the Government of the Soviet Union for betraying values which it does not profess. To the best of my knowledge, it lives completely ac- cording to its teachings, But we had 10551 made moral commitments of another sort. After this war there was to be no aggrandizement—tertitorial or other,’ There were to be no territorial changes that did not accord with the freely ex- pressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Sovereign rights and self-government were to be restored to those who had been deprived of them, and so on. Re- member? The world had ratiied around that great Atlantic Charter, It thought it was a set of moral principles—so did I—not a propaganda document to per- suade peoples to be our allies against one enemy—until we found it expedient to sacrifice them to another. So, Mr. Chairman, the first finding in the autopsy is that twice in one decade we made the same mistake of imagining that what happened in Europe was more likely to get us into war than what hap- pened in Asia. There were plenty of warnings, but few people heeded. On March 15, 1945, when it was clear that we were going to win World War II, I myself tried to warn as best I could against such a mistake, in a speech I made here, the opening sen- tence of which was: We got into this war through Asia, and 4f America gets into another war, almost cere tainly it will also be through Asia. This must have been read by many because the speech was reprinted in Time magazine and Reader’s Digest. Yet I suppose that few believed it really could happen. I wish so much that I had been wrong. It is no satisfaction or even consolation to a doctor to have his diagnosis proved right when the one who is going to die is his own loved one—or the youth of his own country. The second finding is that in both wars we ourselves helped bring on the trouble by putting expediency ahead of principle. In the thirties we helped the aggressor, Japan, instead of the victim, China. It was good business and it appeased Japan—for a time. In the forties we bribed Russia by giv- ing her China’s territory and then ap- peased communism in China while de- nouncing those who were resisting it. In Europe we insisted that in order to get our help the governments must keep the Communists out; but in China we insisted that in order to get our help the Government must take the Communists Mr. Chairman, we have used the Chi- nese as pawns and the Koreans as pawns, first, in our attempts to buy Rus- sian cooperation and then in our power struggle with the Soviets. The chick- ens are coming home to roost in Korea— as was inevitable. ‘The unforgivable tragedy is that, as always, innocent young men have to pay in blood for the mistakes in character and brains of those in charge of their Government. I do not say this for political reasons. I, too, am a part of this Government. I say it more like the publican who smote his breast and said, “Lord, be merciful to me a sinner.” We have had enough of the supercilious Pharisees, saying: “Thank God, we are not like those backward peoples in Asia, so inept, incompetent, inefficient.” We.
10552 are secing in Korea what those peoples can do when they have the training and the weapons. Our men, fighting both with them and against them, have quit making light of their capacities. We, too, had better begin to recognize the potentialities in Asia, For, Mr. Chairman, I have always be- Heved that World War IT will eventually be recognized as primarily a war to de- termine who is to control or whose ideas are to guide the development of the peo- ples and resources of Asia. Hitler understood that. He said one time that if Germany had all of Europe that would not solve Germany’s prob- lems. Of course not; there are no size- able undeveloped areas in Europe. He tried to get Europe merely to have a base or springboard from which to move to control of the undeveloped areas of the world. They are in South America, Africa, and Asia. South America and Africa have great natural resources, but they do not have adequate manpower. Only Asia has great undeveloped natural resources and great undeveloped human resources. More than half the people of the world live in Asia. Which way are they to go? That is likely to be the de- cisive question of this century. Japan knew it. That was why she worked so hard and so long and sacrificed so much trying to get control of the man- power and resources of China and then of Asia. Russia knew it. In 1923 Lenin wrote, “In the last analysis, the outcome of the world struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, and China, and so forth, constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe.” At the end of the last war the Soviets had about 200,000,000 people under their control. Now, with their satellites in Europe, and what they have seized in Asia, they have almost 800,000,000. We of the free western world, are almost 800,000,000 people. The two roughly balance. Who determines which way the balance ts to tip? The remaining 700,000,000, of course. And where do they live? On the periphery of China—from Korea to Iran. They are the spokes of the wheel of which China is the hub. That is why China has always been and still is the crucial area. Russia did not forget that fact even if we did. Here is a photostat copy of a page from the Daily Worker of Septem- ber 7, 1987. It reproduces three letters written to Earl Browder, then head of the Communist Party in the United States of America. One was from Mao Tse-tung, who signed himself as Presi- dent of the Chinese Soviet Republic; one from Chu Teh, leader of the Chinese Red Army, and one from Chow En-lai, now Prime Minister of the Communist regime in China. These men had written to him shortly after the outbreak of the Japanese all-out war against China in 1937, They were appealing for help from their Communist brethren here. Chow En-lai began his letter to Browder: Comrade, do you still remember the Chi- nese comrades who worked with you in China 10 years ago? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Now, what had Earl Browder been do- ing in China in 1927? Well, he was there with other leaders of the Communist hierarchy from all the world to help the Reds seize complete control of China as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia in the October revolution just 10 years before. Chiang Kai-shek in China was scheduled to be what Kerensky had been in Rus- sia—an interim leader to be overthrown by the Reds as soon as he had defeated the warlords in southern and central China. The original Kuomintang, under Sun Yat-sen, had liberated China from the Manchu emperors in 1911, but the sud- den transition to a republic had proved too difficult and the regime had disinte- erated. Chiang led a reform movement, revitalized the Kuomintang, accepted a coalition with the Communists, and was unifying China. When his forces reached Nanking and Shanghai in March 1927, the Communist units in his armies staged bloody coups. But Chiang was able to put them down. Kerensky had not been strong enough to keep the Bolsheviks from seizing con- trol of the young Russian Republic in 1917, Benes and Masaryk were not stronc enough to prevent the Communists taking over Czechoslovakia in 1948. But Chiang was strong enough to biock their “October revolution” in China in 1927 de- spite the expert assistance the Commu- nists had from Browder and a lot of Russian advisers on the spot, posing as friends. Chiang expelled them. The Russians and the master minds like Browder returned to their homelands, and the Kremlin licked its wounds while preparing relentlessly to avenge them. If the Communists had succeeded in their plans to overthrow the young Chi- nese Government and make China a sec- ond Russia, {t would have advanced their program of world conquest by at least a decade. Fortunately Chiang de- feated them in the only serious set-back they ever had until Tito defected and our aid beginning in 1947 saved Greece, Italy, and France. Naturally they have hated Chiang as flercely as any man in history has ever been hated, and smeared and reviled him accordingly, seeking al- ways to weaken and discredit him and the Chinese Government until they could take over China, the hub of the Asia wheel. Mr. Chairman, it will be tncompre- hensible to historians why some in the American State Department should also have made it a major project for the last 7 years to discredit and destroy the one man who more than all others bought us many years of time in this fight to the death with an enemy which he knew and has warned all along was our enemy as much as China’s. But that is an- other story. Apparently Browder in 1937 was still an agent for communications between the Chinese Reds and the Kremlin. For Chow En-lai continues in this letter to Browder: In China at the present time, the concrete process of bringing about the united front and the content of the united front is very devious and complicated. As to what actu- ally happened and what is the present status JULY 18 of the negétiations, I have already transe- mitted this to you. I fervently hope that you and the party under your leadership will giye us more support. Y am also anxious to get your opinion on our united-front work. Doubtless he received it, for the Amer. ican Reds have certainly been skillful in forming united fronts to deceive and use the gullible. Now may I read also one sentence from the 1937 letter to Browder by Mao Tse- tung, now president of the Communist regime in Peking: . We feel that when we achieve victory, this victory will be of considerable help to the struggle of the American people for liberation. You see, after they have conquered and subdued China, then they will be in a position to help “liberate” us too from the capitalist tyranny under which we are supposed to be suffering. They understood correctly what our Government refused to see, that Commu- nist victory in China would gravely weaken our position in the world, would make us vulnerable to attacks like that now going on in Korea, would increase the burdens and drains on our strength, would tip the scales against us. There it was, 13 years ago—all written out for any who would bother to read. Hitler too took the trouble, inasmuch as he had to sit in jail anyway, to write it all down so that everybody would be sure to know long ahead of time. We wouldn’t pay attention; but that was our tragic error, not his. Now, if you do not want to go back so far, may I take you to the Daily Worker for December 2, 1945. Here are the official instructions given by William Z. Foster, the head of the Communist Party in this country, to the national committee of the party at its meeting on November 18, 1945, shortly after VJ-day. How can we be sure that these are the Kremlin’s orders to the Commu- nist Party in this country? Because had Foster deviated by one iota from what the Kremlin wanted him to say, there would have happened to him what had just happened to Earl Browder for get- ting slightly off the Moscow beam-—he would have been liquidated as leader. Instead Foster is still in good standing. Let me read. Remember this is the Kremlin speaking: On the international scale, the key task, as emphasized in Comrade Dennis’ report, is to stop American intervention in China— Which is Communist lingo for “stop American assistance to China.” As- sistance to an ally grappling with a rebellion cannot rightly be called inter- vention. Now, why should the Soviets think that the most important thing for American Communists to do right after the defeat of Japan, was to get American assist- ance to China stopped? Because they knew, as everyone else should have known, that without the right kind of outside assistance the Chinese Govern- ment could not possibly recover. It had been through too much stress and strain, beginning in 1937 before it had had a chance to become strong. It had had to
1950 struggle with too much poverty, too much illiteracy, too much provincialism, too much traditionalism, too long a Japanese war, too much Communist sabotage and rebellion, too much inflation, too much hunger and disease, too many millions of displaced persons, along with too few trained civil servants and administra- tors, too few who understood that na- tionalism means putting country ahead of family—a brand new idea in China— and so on and on. General Marshall said the other day before our committee that we must be patient and generous with the European countries because it took our South 50 years to recover from 4 years of war. But China had been engaged in war with Japan for over 8 years, and inter- nal struggle with Communists for 20 years. China could not possibly recover without patient and generous assistance of the right sort from us—any more than Greece could or Italy could or France could. Even Britain would have gone down if we had not come to her aid with enormous quantities of money and material, in comparison with which China’s needs were small indeed. So if by constantly repeating the theme song that the Chinese Govern- ment was feudalistic, dictatorial. reac- tionary, inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, and all the other derogatory words—if by playing up all the weaknesses in China and never men- tioning any strengths or China’s vital importance to ourselves, the Commu- nists and their stooges, both inside our Government and among the writers, lec- turers, commentators, professors, and so forth, could divert our attention from our own national interests and persuade us to withdraw from China and stop ef- fective assistance to her weakened gov- ernment, they knew that its power to resist would be worn down and China at last be taken over. Russia would then have the giant hub of the Asia wheel and be able to move out into any of the surrounding spokes when and as she wished. What other task, I ask you, could be so important to the Krem- lin’s plan for conquest of Asia, then of Europe and then of ourselves as beguil- ing America into stopping effective as- sistance to China? Foster summed it up in this sentence: The war in China is the key of all problems on the international front— Not Japan, not Germany, not the Med- iterranean, not the Balkans, not the oil of the Middle East, not the North Atlan- tic or any of the other areas where we have focused our efforts—but China. The Kremlin 5 years ago instructed its followers that the war in China is the key of all—I repeat, all—problems on the international front. While we were seeking to forget China and its trouble- some war against Communists, the Kremlin was already working to win that war and the crucial victory which that would represent in its never-end- ing warfare against us and all the free world. How was the party to carry out the task assigned to it? Let me quote fur- ther: On the question of China, which is our key concentration, * * © we want to hold CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE 500 meetings all over the country to mobilize all the forces of the people that we can reach to put a stop to the intervention in China. Our party must use every ounce of its strength and skill and organizational ability to make these 500 meetings a success. These struggles will be a supreme test of the ability of our party to function effectively in such a complicated and difficult situa. tion as we now confront. We must keep clearly in mind that if we concentrate on these two key problems of the wage move- ment and American Intervention in China as the most burning and urgent of all the tarks confronting us, this does not mean that we can neglect the many other vital problems I have mentioned. * * * For example, would it not be a big mistake to neglect the fight over the atom bomb? On the contrary, we must find the ways and means to participate to a much greater ex- tent than we are now doing precisely in the mobilization of the people over this vital issue. * * *® We must while concentrating on thege two key questions of domestic and foreign policy—the wage movement and intervention in China—learn how to link up all the other struggles we are carrying on. Never in all its history was our party called upon to use such generalship. * * * It must fine more and more effective ways to ally itself with the broader masses of the people and to set these masses in motion. This is a supreme test of the maturity of our party. I wish I had time to read also the re- port to the same meeting in 1945 by Comrade Gene Dennis, secretary of the party, now in jail for contempt of Con- gress. He, too, demanded withdrawal of American troops and supplies from China, hammering on the slogans of the “reactionary Kucmintang dictatorship” and the “proved patriots of China’— meaning, of course, the same Reds who have now made China a colony of the Soviet Union. Also in his report you will find many phrases which soon appeared in the speeches of innocents like Henry Wallace, and reappear in the phony peace petitions and propaganda being promoted so vigorously just now by the Communists and their unconscious dupes. Let me show you one illustration of how rapidly the Kremlin’s instructions to “get resolutions of protest adopted” produced results, The instructions were transmitted by Foster to the national committee on November 18, 1945. In the same issue of the Daily Worker in which they were published only 2 weeks later, the lead story occupying two-thirds of the front page is headlined: “Protests forcing show-down on intervention in China—Representative DeLacy speaks up for aroused Nation.” The story begins: The American people have only just begun to speak up against the Truman adminis- tration'’s military intervention in China and its atomic diplomacy throughout the warld, On behalf of himself and five other west coast Congressman, Representatives John Coffee and Charles Savage, of Washington, and Helen Gahagan Douglas, Ellis Patterson, and Ned Healy, of California, DeLacy sub- mitted a resolution demanding the imme- diate withdrawal of all American troops and military equipment in China. DeLacy * * ® pointed to the demo- cratic character of the great mass move- ment led by the Chinese Communists and to the dictatorial character of the Kuomine tang clique led by Chiang Kai-shek. 10553 The text of the resolution is printed in full and, of course, is couched in the same party line double-talk about peace, unity, democracy, and so on, DeLacy did not mention that to with- draw assistance and support from the Chinese Government before it had a chance to restore order in the country, would be decisive intervention in favor of the Communists. American withdrawal looked like peace; but led, of course, to war—in China then just as later in Korea. That was what it was designed to do. It threw away that which 108,000 Ameri- cans had just died in the Pacific to win. It gave China to Russia, and China, I repeat, is the hub of the Asia wheel. Once their key task had been ex- plained to American Communists, they had their faithful followers and those whom the faithful could influence or use, Going the job effectively within 2 weeks. Do you vonder why as a result of the skillful drive to induce us to abandon China to the Red armies, we are fighting some of the same Red forces only 5 years later in Korea, fighting because we now cee that it is that or lose the rest of Asia too? So the third finding in the autopsy is that the Kremlin has been vastly smart- er than our Government in understand- ing where the real keys to world power are and more effective in extending its conquests than we have been in advanc- ing the cause of freedom and our own security. Is it surprising that the Kremlin was so successful in putting across its gi- gantic hoax about Chinese communism when there were eminent American of- ficials including Members of Congress who, however unknowingly, allowed at least their names to be used to further its purposes? The Chinese Communists did not need to drive us out of China. The Moscow directors of the world conspiracy and their agents and dupes inveigled us into leaving voluntarily. Let me pursue further the question of why the loss of China to Commu- nist control is the key to present events in the Far East. It is due in large part to China’s central geographical position in Asia. State Department spokesmen for years have talked almost casually of writing off China and then building up the countries around her. But if you let the hub of a wheel be chopped out, how can you hold together or make any- thing useful out of the individual spokes? Or, to change the figure: China is like a giant hand and the surrounding coun- tries like the outstretched fingers. God made them that way and we have to deal with the situation that exists, whether we like it or not. Here is the hand, mainland China, and here are the fingers—11 of them: Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Indochina, Siam, Malaya, Burma, India, Pakistan, almost to Iran. These fingers are where the 700,000,000 people live who can tip, one way or the other, the balance of power that exists today. between the Soviet world and the free world. These people are still on the fence. Which way are they to go—with us or with the So- viets? All the other problems on the international front do indeed depend on
10554 that. And what happens tn the fingers depends largely on what happens in the hand, China. Some who were charged with our pro- tection have argued that it did not make much difference to us what happened in China, apparently because they did not happen to like certain leaders in China or what those leaders were doing as they struggled with their gigantic problems. So instead of pitching tn to help the Chinese with their otherwise insur- mountable difficulties, our experts sat up in the bleachers and gave them moral lectures. We maintained our pose of pious propriety, but the Commies won the victories. Communist forces have now moved out into the Korea fingertip and we find our- selves fighting desperately to hold that tip. But if we push them back to the thirty-cighth parallel or even back to Manchuria, they can move right into that same finger again, as soon as our attention is turned elsewhere, or ftnto other fingers, Indochina, Burma, or the Philipptnes; or tnto two or three at the same time. They can bleed us to death in the figérs all around the periphery of the hand which ts China, here in the center, Plenty of people besides the Commu- nists have long understood this. I was in the Far East in October and Novem- ber of 1947 and on my return I made this report on November 14, 1947, to the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs. In addition to appearing in the hearings I inserted it in the Appendix of the Recorp in order to make reprints and distribute them as widely as I could. In it and in many talks over the country I reported what General MacArthur had said to me in a Iong interview he graciously grant- ed me. I did not identify him by name at the time; I merely referred to him as a great American out in the Far Enast. He said he was no longer anxious about Japan as such. What worried him was the situation in China, He put it this way: Our failure at the end of the war to help the Government of China effectively with its otherwise insuperable problems particu- larly the Communist rebellion, wii? turn out, I fear, to be the single greatest blunder in the history of the United States. Por the rst time tn our relations with Asia, we con- fused the paramount atrategic interests of the United States with an internal purifica- tion problem in China. He was concerned because he knew that Japan could hardly recover without China. Why? Because the Japanese have to eat. They cannot raise enough to feed themselves. They have got to get food and many raw materials from out- side. We put $856,000,000 mto Japan last year alone—about half of it for food and materials. We cannot do that in- definitely. But they must get food and Taw materials from somewhere. If they are to pay their own way they must use raw materials to manufacture products to sell to the bilHon people on the Asia Continent in order to get more raw ma- terials and food supplies for themselves, If the Communists have China and get more and more of these other fingers around Ching, and the day comes when CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE we cannot longer hold the Japanese up economically or continue to defend them with our troops, then the Communists do not nerd to invade Japan, The Japanese thems: ves will have to knock at the Red door and beg, “Please let us in behind the Iron Curtain, too. We have to eat.” When General MacArthur gave me some of his views on the whole area, and they were so different from what I had heard from our Government here about the supposed unimportance to us of Communist expansion in China, I said to him in perplexity, “Is it possible that our Government has sent you to do a job in Japan and has not consulted you as to what you think is necessary on the continent in order to enable you to succeed in Japan?” To which he replied, “That, of course, I cannot answer.” He did not need to. I had the answer. Do you wonder why he has been eating his heart out in Japan as he saw America’s position in the Far East steadily deteriorating from tts all- time high on VJ-day to its recent all- time low? . A few months later, when our commit- tee was holding hearings on the ECA program and considering aid to China, I urged it to send a cable to General MacArthur to ask him to come and tes- tify in person; or, if that were not pos- sible, to send his views on American policy in the extension of aid to China. Let me read two paragraphs of the cable he sent to the committee an March 3, 1948. Every word deserved most careful study, yet it was scarcely mentioned in the press, It did not fit the “line” that was being promulgated so skillfully about China. Here are his words: T can say without the slightest hesitation that a free, independent, peaceful, and friendly China is of profound importance to the peace of the world and to the position of the United States. It is the fundamental keystone to the Pacific arch. Underlying all issues in China is now the military problem, Until it is resolved Mttle progress can be expected toward internal rehabilitation, re- gardiess of the extent of outside aid. Once it is resolved, however, there is little doubt but that China's traditional resiliency will provide the basis for rapid recovery to rela- tive stability. Please listen to this: The Chinese problem ts pert of a global ettuation which should be considered in its entirety in the orientation of American pol- icy. Fragmentary decisions in disconnected sectors of the world will not bring an inte- grated solution. ‘The problem insofar as the United States ts concerned is an over-all one and can only be resolved on the broadest possible global basis. It would be utterly fallacious to underrate either China’s needs or her importance. For if we embark upon @ general policy to bulwark the frontiers of freedom against the assaults of potitical des- pottsm, one major frontier is no less impor- tant than another, and a declaive breach of any wit! inevitably threaten to engulf all. That was an inspired statement in its accurate understanding and analysis of the whole picture. One of the personal tragedies of the present Korean inva- sion is that General MacArthur is now called upon to retrieve an almost im- possible situation in which we would never have been if his counsel and advice had been sought and heeded. JULY 18 Instead, you will recall that right after the Japanese surrender he was officially lectured and put in his place by Mr. Dean Acheson, who was then Under Sec- retary of State. General MacArthur ‘was on the spot and he outlined policies for the occupation of Japan. The left- ists and those who always know how to reform others objected to it as soft. The State Department announced that— its decision for soctal and economic revolue tion in Japan would be carried out. MacArthur went ahead with his judg- ment that— by utilizing the Japanese Government struc- ture to the extent necessary to prevent com= Plete social disintegration, insure internal distribution, maintain labor, and prevent calamitous @isease or wholesale starvation, the purposes of the surrender terms can be accomplished with only a small fraction of the men, time, and money originally pro- jected. But that was not the policy that was desired by the State Department “ex. perts,” as was proved by the secret state- ment of policy—the notorious FEC~230— which they prepared. Under it General MacArthur, as the representative of a capitalist economy in the United States was to produce a socialist economy in Japan, with as much dislocation as pos- sible. They had sent over Mr. George Atcheson to be MacArthur's political ad- viser, and manage the social and eco- nomic revolution. I am glad to report that he had a conversion from his leftist views before he was killed in a plane crash. On his staf were men like John K. Emerson and John Service from the Far Eastern Office of the State Depart- ment. At the same time, another man Mr. John Carter Vincent, who frankly told me that for 3 years hé tried his best to get the Communists into the Chinese Government, was made Director of that Office. Altogether they were set to transform Japan into a nice little streamlined socialist “democracy” over- night. Under Secretary Dean Acheson pub- ltely spanked General MacArthur for having different policies. He seemed to be especially provoked because the lat- ter’s policies were suceeeding so well that MacArthur predicted on September 17, 1945, that the occupation army could probably be cut to 200,000 in 6 months, In Acheson's statement of rebuke made on September 19, 1945, he said: The occupation forces are the instruments of policy and not the determinants of policy, According to the New York Times, MacArthur said: It is extraordinarily dificult for me at times to exercise that degree of patience which ts unquestionably demanded if the long-time polictes which have been decreed are to be snecessfully accomplished without repercus- sions which would be detrimental to the well-being of the world, but I am restraine ing myself to the best of my ability and am generally satisfied with the progress being made. Fortunately General MacArthur’s po- sition prevailed because his prestige with the American people was such that they stood by him rather than the State De- partment, How tragte that he was not
1950 in charge of our affairs in China as well as in Japan. Now, coming to Korea, one of the fingers projecting out from the China hand. I reported when I came back from Asia in November 1947 that the Communists would get China unléss we changed our negative policies, and if they got China they would get Korea too. I did not like it, but it seemed to me clearly inevitable, so I had to report it. I told of a long conversation I had with a great Korean patriot, Mr. Kim Koo. He had been head of the Ko- rean Provisional Government, in exile in China, where it had been organized to carry on agitation and underground activities against Japanese rule of Ko- rea. The Chinese had been wise enough to give it asylum until it was able to go back to Korea after the surrender in 1945, Mr. Kim has since been assas- sinated, I talked to him in Korea one evening, and the following is from my report: I said to him, “What should America do now? We have delayed 2 years hoping we could get agreement with the Russians that would reunite Korea, but cooperation with them hasn't worked here any better than anywhere else. Should we delay longer, waiting for the UN Commission to see what it can do? Should we go ahead in South Korea anyway, hold elections, set up a de- fense force, and try to get the country on its feet and withdraw our forces? Or what?” He studied a minute and then said, “It doesn't make any difference what you do now. There isn't any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and self-sustaining, until you solve the Commu- nist problem across the border in Man- churia.” I asked various other questions, to all of which he replied 1n substance, ‘There is no way you can solve the problem so that we can be independent and secure until you help China remove the Communist menace in Manchuria.” He knows that if Russia controls Mans» churia, the Communists, when we leave Ko- rea, will take it over too. Our Government ought to have known it also. Or if it did know it, then it had no business to be so complacent and in- active about Manchuria, which at that time had not yet fallen to the Commu- nists. Our boys now have to go over to Korea to fight and die in an effort to save something out of the smashup there which inevitably followed our refusal to pay attention to the wisdom and fore- sight of the many men who did under- stand the problems of Asia as thorough- ly as the autopsy makes clear that the State Department policy-makers in re- cent years did not understand them. Mr. Chairman, I urge our Government to call back into emergency service statesmen like Grew, Hornbeck, Doo- man, Berle, and others—men who are real experts on Asia or on communism, men whom the left wing boys pushed out of the Department. You will re- call that Alger Hiss was a key man in the Far Eastern Office from 1939 to 1944 when the pattern of building up the Chinese Communists and building down the Chinese Government was estab- lished. The genuine experts had long warned about the miscalculations regarding Asia CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE which were leading to the crisis of today. We need them now. We need every bit of brains and ability and experience and understanding of so complicated and dangerous a situation, that the country can muster; for, as MacArthur warned would be the case, the breach of the Asia front already threatens to engulf all. It was considerations like the above which caused me to say when the com- mittee hearings on the bill for Korean economic aid were opened June 8, 1949: Mr. Jopp. Mr. Chairman, not since I have been in Congress have I been faced with a more difficult decision than this bill presenta. I have worked for Korean independence all these many years since I lived in the Far Hast. I have a great affection and regard for them as a people and confidence in their capacity to govern themselves well, if they have security and wise help and encourage- ment for a while. Yet, I can see no possible justification for setting up democratic governments in Korea and the Philippines and then allowing the continent to be taken over by the Commu- nists, which in my opinion will make it im- possible for those democratic governments to survive. I do not know an informed citizen of any country in Asia who thinks these marginal countries can long stand if all China is taken over by the Communists. If China is free, Korea and Japan have & good future. If not, then no matter how much we pour in, they cannot become self- sufficient and secure. China can get along without them but they cannot get along without her. Every- body in Asia knows that, * e . * e 'To me Korea is merely the first of the rat holes that we will have to pour money into all around China if we do not plug up the basic rat hole in China. Two years ago we reversed our policies with respect to Europe. We recognized we could not get recovery or security piecemeal. We took an over-all approach which made sense and we of this committee fought to get it through and it was a wise piece of legislation. If we will make o similar reversal of policy in Asia, see the area as a whole, of which the Korea program is merely a part, then this can be justified because it too makes sense, But a fragmentary approach, trying to sus- tain some countries while allowing others to go down is, I fear, doomed to failure. Despite the refusal of the administra- tion to support the sort of program which I thought was necessary if it were to have much chance of success in either Korea or Asia, I decided to go along and, as you know, spoke and voted for the Korean economic aid bill when the leadership finally brought it before the House on January 19, 1950—-7 months later. During that debate I said, as the orig- inal transcript shows: I am willing to predict, although I shall take this remark out of the Recorp, that it (Korea) will be overrun and our money will probably be lost, Then I added—and this appears in the printed Recorp (p. 651); But despite those reasons, and despite my fear that as a result of our actions at Yalta and our inaction tn China, the odds are against this young republic and the difficul- ties we have helped to pile up for it may prove beyond its strength, still I am in favor of passing this bill because the reasons for it outweigh those against it. It provides the only hope Korea has, 10555 Unfortunately our fears have become sad facts, That brings me to the place in the autopsy where we must report elght or so of the specific mistakes that have led to this Korean tragedy. In not a single one is it hindsight either, because the bad results were foreseen and warned against by many people—long before the autopsy, The first mistake was at Yalta. Mr. Acheson said to a group of us one day, in attempting to justify our granting to Russia rights in Manchuria which did not belong to us and without the consent or even the knowledge of the Chinese to whom they did belong and to whom we had solemnly and publicly promised at Cairo that they would be returned: Our concern was to get Russia into the war against Japan in order to shorten it and save American lives. I myself had @ son on a destroyer out in the Pacific. Now that is certainly a laudable ob- jJective—to save American lives imme- diately. But is it the only concern, or can it be the decisive consideration? What will it do to the hopes of enduring peace, which is the way to save the greatest number of lives? What will it do to the lives of people in countries that are our allies, like China, Korea, the Philippines? And to the lives of the Americans who have to go out later to try to undo the damage done by the decision? Mr. Chairman, Wendell Willkie told the whole truth on this difficult problem when he said early in the last war, “Every drop of blood saved through ex- pediency will be paid for by twenty drawn by the sword.” Perhaps some American lives were saved by the Yalta deal, And, if I had been fighting out there then, I realize that probably I would also have been praying that the Russians would enter the war to save me from having to land on a Japanese beachhead. But the fact remains that for every life saved by Yalta scores of Americans and thousands of Koreans are dying there today. Mr. Chairman, there is no way a na- tion can sell out its moral principles and escape the day of judgment. There is no way we can build a world order that will be just and peaceful without in- ternational morality, and we cannot get international morality by breaking com~ mitments. It was wrong when Hitler did it; it was wrong when Japan did it; it was wrong when the Kremlin did it; it was wrong when we did it. Most of our troubles today, in Korea and elsewhere, flow right from the expedi- encies of Yalta. Mr. Roosevelt was very, very sick, and I do not want to speak of him in the least uncharitably. Doubt- less he was trying desperately to get our relations with Russia on a firm basis. But that cannot be purchased with other peoples’ rights and territory. Lest anyone dislike to take my views on this, let me quote the findings of two devoted Democrats. In his book entitled “Where Are We Heading?” Sumner Welles has written of the Yalta agreement to restore to Russia the rights formerly possessed by the Imperial Russian Government to
10656 dominate Manchuria through the con- trol of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads and the port of Datren and the naval base at Port Arthur: These concesstons, which will make it alto- gether tmposs!bie for a new, unified China to exercise full sovereignty within Manchuria, are all the more objectionable in view of China's absence from the conference table when they were decided. Robert Sherwood cites this quotation in his book “Roosevelt and Hopkins” and adds this comment: Such criticism from Welles can hardly be dismissed as coming from one who did not know what he was talking about or who was embittered by hatred of Roosevelt. * s s e @ Stalin insisted that these agreements must be put in writing and must contain the statement: “The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably ful- filled after Japan has been defeated.” This, in my opinion, was the most assall- able point tn the entire Yalta record * * * tor, if China had refused to agree to any of the Soviet claims, presumably the United States and Britain would have been com- pelled to join in enforcing them. Again may I say that I report these things not to blame or recriminate, but if possible to prevent our Government’s ever again imagining that we can get good faith with one ally by had faith with another; that we can buy the good behavior or goodwill of the strong by sacrificmg the weak; or that might makes right, even if the might be our might. It must be driven home right now that just as the expediencies of Yalta did not end our troubles but multiplied them, so we must not be tempted to try to get out of our present predicament by making another deal at the expense of gzomeone else or of our own principles, no matter how sharp or clever or desir- able the scheme may appear. A second mistake was the decision by military men here in Washington to divide Korea along the thirty-eighth paralle] and assign the Russians to ac- cept the Japanese surrender north of that parallel while we were moving our troops in to accept surrender south of the parallel. Despite extended questioning of representatives of various Government agencies, we were not able in the com- mittee to get a full and satisfactory pic- ture of just how and why this was done, There are certain facts, however, which seem to be established: First. Korea was divided solely on our initiative, without any request or sug- gestion to that effect from Russia. Gecond. It was proposed by the War Department on August 11, 1945, when the Russians did not have a single sol- dier in North Korea. : Third, It was done here in the Penta- gon but we could get no testimony from anyone that it was ever requested or suggested by General MacArthur, although he was commander-in-chiet of the whole theater, including Korea. Fourth. There wae no testimony that the State Department or those officials responsible for winning the peace in Asia and making good en our comumit- ment at Cairo that Korea would in due CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE course be given her , were consulted; or that any consideration. was given by anyone to what the poll- tical and economic effects of a division: of Korea would be, especially a division. at the thirty-eighth parallel. Fifth, The line chosen was just about. the worst possible line that could have been picked. Korea as a whole has a reasonably balanced economy. But di- vision along the thirty-eighth parallel made it impossible for either side to sur- vive without a lot of assistance from the outside. The best agriculture is south of the line; most of the good coal, minerals, water power, and industries are north of it. There are factories on the south side whose power and raw materials come from the north side—or rather did come from the north before we gave it to the Russians. No one was able to explain why the particular line was picked. Someone suggested that it may have been chosen because it is roughly midway between the two biggest cities in Korea and it thus gave one, Pyongyang, to North Korea and the other, Seoul, to South Korea. Perhaps as good an explanation is that the map at which someone in the Pentagon was looking already had a line running horizontally across it, which the map makers had put on it—as they usually put on maps to indicate latitude, Sixth. There is no evidence that any Givision at all was necessary. May I quote from some of the testimony before our committee in June 1949. Because this portion of the hearings was not printed, I shall not identify the au- thors of any of the statements except my own: Mr. Juno. Were the Russians threatening to move into North Korea at the time this ad hoo military decision was made? General . It was almost simultane- ously but they had not moved in. However, the intelligence estimate made at the time was that they would move in, that they could, and that they could overrun the penin- eula before our forces could get there. Mr. Jupp. Of course, they could. They could overrun Berlin, too, if they wanted to, ‘Was General MacArthur not commander-in- chief of the whole theater? General . Yes; he was. Mr. Jupp. © * * Why could the line not bave been set at the Korean border? What reasons were there to believe that the Rus- _aiangs would not stop at the Korean border tf the commander-in-chief set the line there? General ————. I cannot say what other offers were made, if any, as to a border fur- ther north, but my information is that it ‘was offered to the Soviets in the plan that ‘was made as being one they would accept rather than something further south. Mr. June. We cannot have it both weays. If the Soviets were insisting on moving mto Korea, then we should have been alerted at and governed ourselves accordingly. If they did not insist on moving in, then JULY 18 discussed at Yalte. It wae stated that General Marshall and his staff there comsuited with Russian military men to work out coordination between Russian forces and our forces in the expected at- tack upon Japanese troops in Manchuria. We could get no information either way as to whether there wes an understand- ing that Russia intended to enter Korea, and if so, whether there was discussion or agreement on. coordinating her cam- paign and our campaign into Korea. My. Jupp. It is a question that is bound to be asked until tt is cleared up. If it was Giscuased at Yalta how we were going to meet and handle our foint operations not only in Manchuria, but also in Koreas, then our Gov- ernment had months to make some political plans as far as Korea was concerned. * * * if tt was not discussed and no agreement was reached at Yalta, then you faced a dif- ferent situation. Too often you men in the military do brillant jobs winning a war * * * and then because we have not thought ahead—all of us are to blame for it—how we are going to hold on to the fruits of victory, it slips through our fingers. Korea is a tragic example of our fail- ure, while still fighting, to think beyond the military objectives to the political ob- jectives for whieh the war was being fought, supposedly. Just off-hand, with- out preparation, without forethought or planning by our political experts, our military decided to divide Korea, naively supposing it would be temporary; and picked the thirty-eighth parallel, which was about the worst possible from the standpoint of Korea. A third mistake was the use of the term “trusteeship” for the arrangement worked out at Moscow in December 1945 by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom (China was later included) for ruling Korea while a joint United States- U. 8. 8. R. Commission was supposed to form a Korean provisional government. When word got to Korea that such a pro- posal was being comsidered, the effect upon Korean public opinion was so in- flammatory that General Hodge, in com- mand of the occupation, cabled twice urging that the word “trusteeship” not be used. The English word “trusteeship” is translated into the same Korean term as the word which the Japanese used when they established in 1905 a so-called protectorate over Korea. ‘The Koreans remembered vividly that 5 years later the Japanese annexed Korea outright they were enslaved. Naturally they feared that the same thing would happen to a “trusteeship” established by other great powers, especially one includ- ing Russia. It is certain that the Koreans wanted to be under our military government at first—if it were to be merely a transition stage from heing controlled by Japan to real independence. But they did not want to be under us if it were to be merely a transition stage from control by Japan to control by the Soviet Union. Yet the conferees in Moscow went right ahead and ignored the urgent represen- tations of the responsible man on the ground, General Hodge, and announced on December 27, 1945, the establishment