H. Res. 206 
In the House of Representatives, U. S., 
March 13, 2019. 
Whereas money laundering and other financial crimes are se-
rious threats to our national and economic security; 
Whereas the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has 
reported ‘‘The estimated amount of money laundered 
globally in one year is 2 — 5% of global GDP, or $800 
billion — $2 trillion in current US dollars’’; 
Whereas the scale, efficiency, and complexity of the U.S. fi-
nancial system make it a prime target for those who seek 
to conceal, launder, and move the proceeds of illicit activ-
ity; 
Whereas money launderers, terrorist financiers, corrupt indi-
viduals and organizations, and their facilitators have 
proven to adapt quickly in order to avoid detection; 
Whereas given the global nature of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, and the increasing interrelatedness 
within the financial system, a secure national and multi-
lateral framework is essential to the integrity of the U.S. 
financial system; 
Whereas extensive collaboration among financial regulators, 
the Department of the Treasury, law enforcement, and 
the private sector is required to curtail the illicit flow of 
money throughout the United States;
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Whereas despite how extensive and effective these efforts are 
in the United States, there is still substantial room for 
improvement; 
Whereas financial compliance, reporting, investigation, and 
collaboration, as well as courageous whistleblowers and 
investigative reporting have had significant impact in 
shining sunlight on the people and institutions behind 
dark money and markets; 
Whereas in 2016, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
the international standards setting body, evaluated the 
United States’ anti-money laundering/combating the fi-
nancing of terrorism measures and determined the 
United States has significant gaps in its framework; 
Whereas in 2016, the FATF found that in the United States, 
‘‘Minimal measures are imposed on designated non-finan-
cial businesses and professions (DNFBPs), other than 
casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones’’; 
Whereas in 2016, the FATF recommended, ‘‘The U.S. should 
conduct a vulnerability analysis of the minimally covered 
DNFBP sectors to address the higher risks to which 
these sectors are exposed, and consider what measures 
could be introduced to address them’’; 
Whereas dealers in arts and antiquities are not, by definition, 
covered ‘‘financial institutions’’ required to comply with 
the Bank Secrecy Act; 
Whereas Federal authorities have cautioned that art collec-
tors and dealers to be particularly careful trading Near 
Eastern antiquities, warning that artifacts plundered by 
terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant are entering the marketplace;
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Whereas, according to the Antiquities Coalition, ‘‘because the 
United States is the largest destination for archaeological 
and ethnological objects from around the world, the dis-
covery of recently looted and trafficked artifacts in our 
country not only makes Americans and our institutions 
accessories to crimes, but also threatens our relations 
with other countries’’; 
Whereas the real-estate industry, both commercial and resi-
dential, is exempt from having to develop and implement 
a four-pillar anti-money laundering program pursuant to 
the Bank Secrecy Act; 
Whereas it was asserted in a 2018 Conference Report by the 
Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center 
at the Schar School of Policy and Government of George 
Mason University, money laundering in real estate 
(MLRE) has damaging effects on local economies by neg-
atively impacting property prices and dislocating resi-
dents; 
Whereas in 2017, in response to evidence about significant 
money laundering through real estate in the United 
States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) issued Geographic Targeting Orders (GTOs) 
requiring limited beneficial ownership disclosure in cer-
tain transactions involving high-end luxury real estate 
and ‘‘found that about 30 percent of the transactions 
covered by the GTOs involve a beneficial owner or pur-
chaser representative that is also the subject of a pre-
vious suspicious activity report’’; 
Whereas the influx of illicit money, including from Russian 
oligarchs, has flowed largely unimpeded into the United 
States through these anonymous shell companies and into 
U.S. investments, including luxury high-end real estate;
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(2) supports efforts to close loopholes that allow 
corruption, terrorism, and money laundering to infiltrate 
our country’s financial system; 
(3) encourages transparency to detect, deter, and 
interdict individuals, entities, and networks engaged in 
money laundering and other financial crimes; 
(4) urges financial institutions to comply with the 
Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering laws and 
regulations; and 
(5) affirms that financial institutions and individ-
uals should be held accountable for money laundering 
and terror financing crimes and violations. 
Attest: 
Clerk.