(A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 
restricting 
foreign 
competition, 
conducting 
forced technology transfers, and using both licit 
and illicit means to access research and devel-
opment around technologies in order to advan-
tage Chinese companies in specific technology 
fields; 
(B) providing significant government fund-
ing for research and development in the PRC in 
specific technologies to build future competitive-
ness; 
(C) seeking to ensure global adoption of 
Chinese technologies, and the success of Chi-
nese firms, especially in emerging and strategic 
markets, through significant foreign direct in-
vestment, low-cost financing and comprehensive 
services 
for 
foreign 
development 
projects, 
through initiatives such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative, which includes the Digital Silk Road 
and the Health Silk Road, as well as the Smart 
City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 
the use of Chinese exports by offering far 
cheaper rates and bundling these deals into 
larger development and aid packages; 
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(D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led 
standards for digital technologies and products 
through compensating Chinese firms that sub-
mit standards and flooding forums with tech-
nical experts; and 
(E) leveraging the international standard 
setting bodies to advance the vision of the PRC 
regarding standards and technologies. 
(11) As a result of these practices in support of 
Chinese companies, the PRC is increasing its influ-
ence in AI, 5G, and a wide range of other science 
and technology disciplines that constitute long-term 
economic and security threats to the United States, 
its allies, and like-minded partners. According to 
market research firm Dell’Oro Group, Huawei’s 
share of worldwide telecommunications revenue 
equipment grew from 20 percent in 2014 to 31 per-
cent in 2020. 
(12) While the United States semiconductor in-
dustry is the worldwide industry leader with approxi-
mately 50 percent of global market share and sales 
of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the situation may be 
changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new semiconductor 
fabrication plants that opened worldwide were lo-
cated outside of the United States, with 4 of these 
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plants built in China. The Government of the PRC 
plans to spend $150,000,000,000 on its computer 
chip industry during the next 10 years. 
(13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, 
facial recognition, and biometrics, to increase control 
over its population, facilitating mass surveillance, 
scalable censorship, and technology-enabled social 
control, including against ethnic and religious mi-
norities 
including 
Tibetans, 
Uyghurs, 
ethnic 
Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim mi-
nority groups. 
(14) The PRC uses its economic power to co-
erce and censor companies, individuals and coun-
tries. 
(15) In the past decade, the Government of the 
PRC— 
(A) blocked exports of rare earth elements 
to Japan; 
(B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of 
German cars; 
(C) cut off tourism to South Korea; 
(D) restricted banana imports from the 
Philippines; and 
(E) imposed large tariffs on Australian 
barley exports. 
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(16) The Government of the PRC— 
(A) has banned United States technology 
companies, including Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter; 
(B) has pressured movie studios based in 
the United States to alter content in movies 
that it deemed objectionable; and 
(C) has retaliated against a range of 
American companies for actual or perceived 
support for a range of political positions, in-
cluding recognizing territorial claims of coun-
tries in border disputes with China, recognizing 
Tibet, and more. 
(17) Third countries have become particular 
targets of Chinese investments in technology. These 
third country investments provide access to innova-
tion, data that allows Chinese companies to refine 
their own systems, and influence over the policies of 
these governments. The terms on which Chinese in-
vestments are made often are attractive in the short- 
term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, 
or influence over, major industries in those coun-
tries. 
(18) After decades of being the world leader in 
key technologies, the United States is at risk of fall-
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ing behind the PRC in key technologies of the fu-
ture. While private-sector research and development 
investments have steadily increased in the United 
States, Federal Government spending has declined 
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from ap-
proximately 1.2 percent in 1976 to approximately 
0.7 percent in 2018. The decline has been even 
steeper in the physical sciences. The Federal Gov-
ernment plays a unique and critical role in Amer-
ica’s innovation ecosystem. Government research and 
development spending spurs private-sector invest-
ments, and the United States Government remains 
the largest source of basic research funding, which 
is foundational to game-changing technological 
achievements. 
(19) During the past several years, the PRC 
has quadrupled its research and development spend-
ing and is on the brink of surpassing the United 
States in total investments in key technologies, with 
its growth in research and development spending 
doubling the United States Government’s spending 
increase in this area. Chinese patent publications 
have surged in the fields of artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and deep learning. 
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(20) The United States is highly dependent on 
China for key components of critical technologies in 
its supply chains, such as rare earths. 
(21) The United States remains a leader in the 
science and technology areas of engineering and biol-
ogy as well as key components, including tele-
communications equipment and semiconductors. The 
United States does not have a domestic manufac-
turer of radio access network equipment for 5G net-
works, but is well-positioned to lead in 6G tele-
communications, which depend on software and 
semiconductors, areas of United States strength. 
(22) Other countries have unique knowledge, 
expertise, and capabilities in numerous cutting edge 
technologies, including semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment, such as extreme ultraviolet lithography 
machines for semiconductor fabrication and machine 
tools for fabrication of custom components. In order 
to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 
States must partner with such countries. 
(23) The private sector in the United States 
and partner countries, including Japan, Korea, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the 
European Union has considerable expertise in both 
technology and in standard setting, given the role of 
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the private sector in international standard setting 
bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in 
shaping United States technology policy. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) emerging technology governance regimes 
driven by undemocratic governments that do not re-
flect democratic values are gaining traction inter-
nationally through coercive, diplomatic, and unfair 
economic, trade, and development practices; 
(2) the United States is failing to lead inter-
national efforts or prioritize multilateral coordina-
tion, institutions, and legal compatibility in the area 
of technology governance, ceding leadership to au-
thoritarian regimes and risking the growth of anti- 
democratic norms and standards around tech-
nologies; and 
(3) promoting greater coordination, common 
functional problem-solving institutional mechanisms, 
and more compatible legal regimes among demo-
cratic nations is essential to create an international 
technology governance architecture that benefits all 
nations and effectively counters and contains non-
democratic governance regimes. 
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SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to lead in 
the creation of a new multilateral diplomatic architecture 
for technology policy composed of the world’s tech-leading 
democracies. 
SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OF-
FICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall 
establish an interagency-staffed International Technology 
Partnership Office (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Of-
fice’’), which shall be housed in the Department of State. 
(b) LEADERSHIP.— 
(1) SPECIAL AMBASSADOR.—The Office shall be 
headed by the Special Ambassador for Technology, 
who shall— 
(A) be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
(B) have the rank and status of ambas-
sador; and 
(C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 
otherwise directed by the Secretary of State. 
(2) DIRECTORS.—The Secretary of Commerce 
and the Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, 
from within their respective departments, directors 
for International Technology Partnership, who also 
shall serve as liaisons between the Office and the 
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Department of Commerce or the Department of the 
Treasury, as applicable. 
(c) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the individuals re-
ferred to in subsection (b), the Office shall include a rep-
resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, 
as determined by the Special Ambassador for Technology. 
(d) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-
clude— 
(1) creating an international technology part-
nership of democratic countries to develop har-
monized technology governance regimes and to fill 
gaps where United States capabilities are currently 
insufficient, with a specific focus on key tech-
nologies, including— 
(A) artificial intelligence and machine 
learning; 
(B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
vanced wireless networking technologies; 
(C) semiconductor chip manufacturing; 
(D) biotechnology; 
(E) quantum computing; 
(F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
cial recognition technologies and censorship 
software; and 
(G) fiber optic cables; 
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(2) vigorously identifying existing and, as need-
ed, new multilateral mechanisms to advance the ob-
jectives of the International Technology Partnership 
around technology governance that advances demo-
cratic values; 
(3) coordinating with such countries regarding 
shared technology strategies, including technology 
controls and standards, as informed by the reports 
required under section 8; and 
(4) developing strategies with partner countries 
for coordinated, development and financial support 
for the acquisition by key countries of the tech-
nologies listed in paragraph (1), or comparable tech-
nologies, in order to provide alternatives for those 
countries to systems supported by authoritarian re-
gimes. 
(e) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary 
of State may— 
(1) hire support staff for the Office; and 
(2) hire individuals to serve as experts or con-
sultants for the Office, in accordance with section 
3109 of title 5, United States Code. 
(f) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 
the following three years, the Secretary of State shall sub-
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mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
index if necessary, regarding the activities of the Office 
undertaken to carry out the purposes described in sub-
section (d), including information on any cooperative ac-
tivities, initiatives, or partnerships pursued with United 
States allies and partners, and the results of such activi-
ties, initiatives, or partnerships. 
SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) PARTNERSHIP CRITERIA.—The Special Ambas-
sador for Technology (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘Special Ambassador’’) shall seek to establish an Inter-
national Technology Partnership with foreign countries 
that have— 
(1) democratic national government and a 
strong commitment to democratic values, including 
an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech, 
and respect for and promotion of human rights, in-
cluding the right to privacy; 
(2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
tors; and 
(3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
pressed interest in international cooperation and co-
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ordination with the United States on important de-
fense and intelligence issues. 
(b) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNIONS.—The Inter-
national Technology Partnership may include relevant po-
litical and economic unions. 
(c) OBJECTIVES.—The Special Ambassador, in co-
operation with International Technology Partnership par-
ticipants, shall pursue, as appropriate, through memo-
randa of understanding, executive agreements, free trade 
agreements, and existing multilateral channels— 
(1) coordination of technology policies and 
standards among International Technology Partner-
ship countries through participation in international 
standard setting bodies, such as the United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts, World Trade Orga-
nization, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, 
and the International Telecommunications Union, 
including pre-attendance meetings, education, and 
panels to report on issues; 
(2) coordination of policies with the private sec-
tor to ensure private sector led, politically neutral, 
standards processes; 
(3) the adoption of shared data privacy, data 
sharing, and data archiving standards among the 
United States and partner countries and relevant 
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economic and political unions, including harmonized 
data protection regulations; 
(4) the creation of coordinated policies for the 
use and control of emerging and foundational tech-
nologies through— 
(A) use restrictions and export controls; 
(B) investment screening coordination, in-
cluding the harmonization of technology-trans-
fer laws, regulations, policies, and practices; 
and 
(C) the development of other arrangements 
to regulate and control technology transfer; 
(5) coordination around the resiliency of supply 
chains in critical technology areas, with possible di-
versification of supply chain components among the 
group, while— 
(A) abiding by transparency obligations re-
lated to subsidies and product origin; 
(B) conducting risk analyses of products 
manufactured in third party nations that fail to 
meet established standards similarly; and 
(C) coordinating subsidy policies; 
(6) the coordination of supply chains regarding 
semiconductor fabrication through a fabrication re-
search consortium for the semiconductor industry; 
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(7) the facilitation of partnerships and coopera-
tion between research universities, private-sector 
stake holders, and other entities in member coun-
tries regarding key technologies, including the cre-
ation of memoranda of understanding regarding 
science and technology collaboration with member 
countries and coordinated incentives and subsidies; 
(8) the coordination of investments and co-fi-
nancing in targeted countries with the goal of— 
(A) promoting secure and resilient digital 
infrastructure 
and 
privacy-enhancing 
tech-
nologies that protect democratic values and cre-
ate a clear contrast and alternative to the PRC 
through the United States International Devel-
opment Finance Corporation, the Export-Im-
port Bank of the United States, foreign devel-
opment finance institutions (including the 
World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund), the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, the European Investment 
Bank, partner country development institutions, 
regional banks, other lending institutions, or 
new investment mechanisms; and 
(B) seeking to ensure that all funding pro-
vided by those institutions, for any purpose, 
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should be conditioned upon the protection of 
democratic values, and that financing is forbid-
den to entities involved in the international in-
vestment programs of authoritarian or illiberal 
governments; and 
(9) information sharing among partner coun-
tries to raise awareness of— 
(A) the technology transfer threat posed by 
authoritarian governments; and 
(B) ways in which autocratic regimes are 
utilizing technology to erode democracies. 
(d) WORKING GROUPS.—In carrying out the objec-
tives described in subsection (c) with respect to particular 
technology areas, the Special Ambassador may establish 
working groups within the International Technology Part-
nership, composed of representatives from partner coun-
tries, including relevant political and economic unions, to 
coordinate on discrete strategies and policies related to 
specific technologies. 
SEC. 
7. 
INTERNATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY 
PARTNERSHIP 
FUND. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the 
Treasury of the United States a trust fund, which shall 
be known as the ‘‘International Technology Partnership 
Fund’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Fund’’). 
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(b) DEPOSITS.— 
(1) FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS.—There is au-
thorized to be appropriated $5,000,000,000 for the 
Fund. 
(2) DONATIONS.—In addition to amounts au-
thorized to be appropriated for the Fund pursuant 
to paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Treasury may 
accept donations from International Technology 
Partnership member countries. 
(c) USE
OF FUNDS.—Subject to subsection (d), 
amounts deposited into the Fund may be used by the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the International 
Technology Partnership and other relevant Federal agen-
cies, to support— 
(1) joint research projects between government 
research agencies, universities, technology compa-
nies, and other entities from International Tech-
nology Partnership member countries; and 
(2) technology investments in third country 
markets. 
(d) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The obligation 
of funds under subsection (c) is subject to the notification 
requirement set forth in section 634A of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1). 
(e) PUBLIC-PRIVATE BOARD.— 
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(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an 
International 
Technology 
Partnership 
Advisory 
Board (referred to in this subsection as the 
‘‘Board’’), which shall provide the International 
Technology Partnership Office with advice and rec-
ommendations concerning the implementation of this 
Act. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The Board shall be com-
posed of individuals— 
(A) with demonstrated expertise in the 
fields of emerging technologies and inter-
national trade; and 
(B) from the private sector, academic insti-
tutions, national or international human rights 
organizations, or technology research institu-
tions. 
SEC. 8. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTING REGARDING 
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TECHNOLOGY AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY. 
Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives an unclassified report, with a classified index if nec-
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essary, that outlines a national strategy for technology and 
national security, which— 
(1) assesses the emerging and foundational 
technologies of the future; 
(2) identifies the current capabilities of the 
United States in critical technologies and its compo-
nents, including any gaps in such capabilities; 
(3) identifies the technology capabilities (hori-
zon scanning and technology forecasting) among al-
lied and partner countries; 
(4) identifies governance models for emerging 
and foundational technologies being adopted by 
other countries and other areas of global policy con-
vergence with respect to which the United States 
should better pursue multilateralism or coordination; 
(5) identifies a preliminary set of priority tech-
nology areas on which the International Technology 
Partnership should be focused; 
(6) analyzes the current capabilities of the PRC 
in critical technologies and components, including 
any gaps in such capabilities; and 
(7) includes a set of recommendations for— 
(A) rapidly enhancing United States tech-
nological capabilities; 
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(B) how the United States should collabo-
rate with allied or like-minded countries, identi-
fying existing and, as needed, new multilateral 
mechanisms to fill capability gaps and areas for 
the United States to advance democratic values; 
and 
(C) the criteria for determining which 
countries should be included in the Inter-
national Technology Partnership, including a 
strong commitment to democratic values and a 
history of working closely with the United 
States, as reflected in Department of State re-
ports regarding human rights and media free-
dom. 
Æ 
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