(9) to seek ways to increase Chinese language 
proficiency among mid-career professionals that do 
not rely on funding linked to the Government of 
China; 
(10) to ensure that existing tools are suffi-
ciently screening for the risk of Chinese influence 
operations; and 
(11) to create more flexible tools, as needed, 
with the goals of— 
(A) screening investments from the Gov-
ernment of China or sources backed by the 
Government of China to protect against the 
takeover of United States companies by Chinese 
state-owned or state-driven entities; and 
(B) protecting institutions or business sec-
tors critically important to United States na-
tional security and the viability of democratic 
institutions. 
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO COUNTER ‘‘SHARP POWER’’ POLIT-
ICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND TO PRO-
TECT UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
nation with all relevant Federal agencies shall develop a 
long-term strategy— 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
00:23 Apr 09, 2019
Jkt 089200
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1811.IH
H1811
SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
(1) to carry out the policy statements set forth 
in section 3(c); 
(2) to effectively counter the ‘‘sharp power’’ po-
litical influence operations of the Chinese Com-
munist Party globally and in the United States; 
(3) to ensure that United States citizens, par-
ticularly Chinese Americans and members of the 
Chinese, Uyghur, and Tibetan diaspora who are who 
are often the victims and primary targets of malign 
political influence operations, are protected; 
(4) to ensure that— 
(A) the United States Government strategy 
to protect the communities described in para-
graph (3) is clearly communicated by relevant 
Federal officials; and 
(B) secure outlets are created for reporting 
on intimidation and surveillance; 
(5) to ensure that Chinese nationals who are le-
gally studying, living, or working temporarily in the 
United States know that intimidation or surveillance 
by the Government of China and the Communist 
Party of China is an unacceptable invasion of their 
rights while they reside in the United States; and 
(6) to provide secure outlets for reporting on in-
timidation and surveillance. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
00:23 Apr 09, 2019
Jkt 089200
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1811.IH
H1811
SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, or 
an appropriate high-ranking official, shall— 
(1) submit an unclassified report containing the 
strategy required under subsection (a) to the appro-
priate congressional committees; or 
(2) describe the strategy required under sub-
section (a) through unclassified testimony before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 5. REPORT ON THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPER-
ATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Because it is important for Amer-
ican policymakers and the American people to be informed 
about the influence operations described in section 3, not 
later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, and in consultation with 
the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, 
shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate con-
gressional committees that describes the political influence 
operations of the Government of China and the Com-
munist Party of China affecting the United States and 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
00:23 Apr 09, 2019
Jkt 089200
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1811.IH
H1811
SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
not more than 5 allies and partners most impacted by the 
Government of China’s influence operations in their coun-
tries (as determined by the Director of National Intel-
ligence), including efforts— 
(1) to exert influence over United States gov-
ernmental or nongovernmental institutions or indi-
viduals, or government officials among United States 
allies and partners; 
(2) to coerce or threaten United States citizens 
or legal permanent residents or their families and 
associates living in China or elsewhere; 
(3) to undermine democratic institutions and 
the freedoms of speech, expression, the press, asso-
ciation, assembly, religion, or academic thought; 
(4) to otherwise suppress information in public 
fora, in the United States and abroad; or 
(5) to develop or obtain property, facilities, in-
frastructure, business entities, or other assets for 
use in facilitating the activities described in para-
graphs (1) through (4). 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall also include recommendations for the 
President and Congress relating to— 
(1) the need for additional resources or authori-
ties to counter political influence operations in the 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
00:23 Apr 09, 2019
Jkt 089200
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1811.IH
H1811
SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS
United States directed by the Government of China 
or the Communist Party of China, including oper-
ations carried out in concert with allies; 
(2) whether a permanent office to monitor and 
respond to political influence operations of the Gov-
ernment of China and the Communist Party of 
China should be established within the Department 
of State or the Office of the Director of National In-
telligence; and 
(3) whether regular public reports on the polit-
ical influence operations of the Government of China 
and the Communist Party of China are needed to in-
form Congress and the American people of the scale 
and scope of such operations. 
Æ 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
00:23 Apr 09, 2019
Jkt 089200
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\H1811.IH
H1811
SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with BILLS