297
sions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assist-
ance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
‘‘SEC. 102. NUCLEAR REPROCESSING TRANSFERS AND ILLE-
GAL EXPORTS FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DE-
VICES.
‘‘(a) PROHIBITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES
INVOLVED
IN TRANSFER
OF NUCLEAR REPROCESSING
EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, OR TECHNOLOGY.—Except as
provided in subsection (b), no funds made available to carry
out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may be
used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (in-
cluding assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961), providing military assistance or
grant military education and training, providing assist-
ance under chapter 6 of part II of that Act, or extending
military credits or making guarantees, to any country
which the President determines—
‘‘(1) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment,
materials, or technology to any other country on or
after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment, ma-
terials, or technology from any other country on or
after August 4, 1977 (except for the transfer of reproc-
essing technology associated with the investigation,
under international evaluation programs in which
298
the United States participates, of technologies which
are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocessing), or
‘‘(2) is a non-nuclear-weapon state which, on or
after August 8, 1985, exports illegally (or attempts to
export illegally) from the United States any material,
equipment, or technology which would contribute sig-
nificantly to the ability of such country to manufac-
ture a nuclear explosive device, if the President deter-
mines that the material, equipment, or technology
was to be used by such country in the manufacture
of a nuclear explosive device.
For purposes of paragraph (2), an export (or attempted ex-
port) by a person who is an agent of, or is otherwise acting
on behalf of or in the interests of, a country shall be consid-
ered to be an export (or attempted export) by that country.
‘‘(b) EXCEPTION.—(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a),
the President in any fiscal year may furnish assistance
which would otherwise be prohibited under that subsection
if he determines and certifies in writing during that fiscal
year to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the
termination of such assistance would be seriously preju-
dicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense
299
and security. The President shall transmit with such certifi-
cation a statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.
‘‘(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) shall take
effect on the date on which the certification is received by
the Congress. However, if, within 30 calendar days after
receiving this certification, the Congress enacts a joint reso-
lution stating in substance that the Congress disapproves
the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the certification,
then upon the enactment of that resolution the certification
shall cease to be effective and all deliveries of assistance fur-
nished under the authority of that certification shall be sus-
pended immediately.
‘‘(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall
be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 601(b) of the International Security Assist-
ance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
‘‘SEC. 103. DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
‘‘As used in this chapter, the term ‘nuclear explosive
device’ has the meaning given that term in section 231(4)
of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.’’.
(b) REPEALS.—Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 are hereby repealed.
(c) REFERENCES IN LAW.—Any reference in law as
of the effective date of this part to section 669 or 670 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, on and after such
300
date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or 102 of
the Arms Export Control Act, or section 226 of this Act,
as the case may be.
SEC. 228. REWARD.
Section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Authori-
ties Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a)) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (3)
as subparagraphs (A) through (C), respectively;
(2) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘act of
international terrorism’ includes any act substantially con-
tributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special nu-
clear material (as defined in section 231(8) of the Nuclear
Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994) or any nuclear explo-
sive device (as defined in section 231(4) of that Act) by an
individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined
in section 231(5) of that Act).’’.
SEC. 229. REPORTS.
(a) CONTENT OF ACDA ANNUAL REPORT.—Section 51
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended by
section 717 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fis-
cal Years 1994 and 1995, is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
301
(A) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of para-
graph (5);
(B) by striking the period at the end of
paragraph (6) and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(C) by adding after paragraph (6) the fol-
lowing new paragraph:
‘‘(7) a discussion of any material noncompliance
by foreign governments with their binding commit-
ments to the United States with respect to the preven-
tion of the spread of nuclear explosive devices (as de-
fined in section 231(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994) by non-nuclear-weapon states
(as defined in section 231(5) of that Act) or the acqui-
sition by such states of unsafeguarded special nuclear
material (as defined in section 231(8) of that Act),
including—
‘‘(A) a net assessment of the aggregate mili-
tary significance of all such violations;
‘‘(B) a statement of the compliance policy of
the United States with respect to violations of
those commitments; and
‘‘(C) what actions, if any, the President has
taken or proposes to take to bring any nation
committing such a violation into compliance
with those commitments.’’; and
302
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section:
‘‘(c) REPORTING CONSECUTIVE NONCOMPLIANCE.—If
the President in consecutive reports submitted to the Con-
gress under this section reports that any designated nation
is not in full compliance with its binding nonproliferation
commitments to the United States, then the President shall
include in the second such report an assessment of what
actions are necessary to compensate for such violations.’’.
(b) REPORTING ON DEMARCHES.—(1) It is the sense
of the Congress that the Department of State should, in the
course of implementing its reporting responsibilities under
section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
include a summary of demarches that the United States has
issued or received from foreign governments with respect to
activities which are of significance from the proliferation
standpoint.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘demarche’’
means any official communication by one government to
another, by written or oral means, intended by the originat-
ing government to express—
(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible fu-
ture action or activity of the recipient government, or
of a person within the jurisdiction of that govern-
ment, 
contributing 
to 
the 
global 
spread 
of
303
unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear
explosive devices;
(B) a request for the recipient government to
counter such action or activity; or
(C) both the concern and request described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
SEC. 230. TECHNICAL CORRECTION.
Section 133 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2160c) is amended by striking ‘‘20 kilograms’’ and
inserting ‘‘5 kilograms’’.
SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this part—
(1) the term ‘‘foreign person’’ means—
(A) an individual who is not a citizen of
the United States or an alien admitted for per-
manent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other
nongovernment entity which is created or orga-
nized under the laws of a foreign country or
which has its principal place of business outside
the United States;
(2) the term ‘‘goods or technology’’ means—
(A) nuclear materials and equipment and
sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms are
defined in section 4 of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
304
liferation Act of 1978), all export items des-
ignated by the President pursuant to section
309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, and all technical assistance requiring au-
thorization under section 57 b. of the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954; and
(B) in the case of exports from a country
other than the United States, any goods or tech-
nology that, if exported from the United States,
would be goods or technology described in sub-
paragraph (A);
(3) the term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ means the safe-
guards set forth in an agreement between a country
and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as au-
thorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency;
(4) the term ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’ means
any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that is
designed to produce an instantaneous release of an
amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear mate-
rial that is greater than the amount of energy that
would be released from the detonation of one pound
of trinitrotoluene (TNT);
(5) the term ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon state’’ means
any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as
305
defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washing-
ton, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
(6) the term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the
meaning given that term in section 11 aa. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014aa);
(7) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means—
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien admitted for perma-
nent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other
nongovernment entity which is not a foreign per-
son; and
(8) the term ‘‘unsafeguarded special nuclear ma-
terial’’ means special nuclear material which is held
in violation of IAEA safeguards or not subject to
IAEA safeguards (excluding any quantity of material
that could, if it were exported from the United States,
be exported under a general license issued by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission).
SEC. 232. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this part, and the amendments made
by this part, shall take effect 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
306
PART C—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY
SEC. 241. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.
It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain
and enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of
IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to
halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United
States should seek to negotiate with other nations and
groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—
(1) build international support for the principle
that nuclear supply relationships must require pur-
chasing nations to agree to full-scope international
safeguards;
(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within
the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehen-
sive review of its own procedures for declassifying in-
formation relating to the design or production of nu-
clear explosive devices and to investigate any meas-
ures that would reduce the risk of such information
contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation;
(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce
weapons-grade nuclear material for large-scale com-
mercial uses until such time as safeguards are devel-
oped that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis,
307
the diversion of significant quantities of such mate-
rial for nuclear explosive purposes;
(4) pursue greater financial support for the im-
plementation and improvement of safeguards from all
IAEA member nations with significant nuclear pro-
grams, particularly from those nations that are cur-
rently using or planning to use weapons-grade nu-
clear material for commercial purposes;
(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual fi-
nancial contributions by all members of the IAEA,
including the United States;
(6) pursue the elimination of international com-
merce in highly enriched uranium for use in research
reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to
develop and to use low-enriched alternative nuclear
fuels;
(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states
to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for pur-
poses of naval propulsion;
(8) pursue an international open skies arrange-
ment that would authorize the IAEA to operate sur-
veillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to
satellite information for safeguards verification pur-
poses;
308
(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA
member nations to share intelligence material with
the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without
compromising 
national 
security 
or 
intelligence
sources or methods;
(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear
facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nu-
clear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export
and to require safeguards over that facility or tech-
nology, regardless of its destination; and
(11) seek agreement among the parties to the
Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and
to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from
the Treaty.
SEC. 242. IAEA INTERNAL REFORMS.
In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in
the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the
IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with
other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA
Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—
(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nu-
clear facilities that are capable of producing, process-
ing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable
for use in a nuclear explosive device;
309
(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet and
to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion
of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particu-
lar attention to facilities in which there are bulk
quantities of plutonium; and
(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA
to meet those detection goals in a particular facility,
require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable
to do so;
(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations
of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for informa-
tion on possible safeguards violations, and to establish
a ‘‘hot line’’ for the reporting of such violations and
other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material;
(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in
the manufacture of equipment or material that is es-
pecially designated or prepared for the processing,
use, or production of special fissionable material or,
in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nu-
clear explosive device;
(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research
and development activities and facilities;
(6) implement special inspections of undeclared
nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safe-
guards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA
310
to conduct challenge inspections on demand at sus-
pected nuclear sites;
(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include
tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste
containing special fissionable material, and increase
the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;
(8) revise downward the IAEA’s official mini-
mum amounts of nuclear material (‘‘significant
quantity’’) needed to make a nuclear explosive device
and establish these amounts as national rather than
facility standards;
(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA in-
spectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;
(10) promote the use of near real time material
accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facilities
that use, produce, or store significant quantities of
special fissionable material;
(11) develop with other IAEA member nations
an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of
visa applications by IAEA inspectors;
(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds,
technical assistance, and political support necessary
to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection; and
(13) make public the annual safeguards imple-
mentation report of the IAEA, establishing a public
311
registry of commodities in international nuclear com-
merce, including dual-use goods, and creating a pub-
lic repository of current nuclear trade control laws,
agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial
actions by IAEA member nations.
SEC. 243. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—The President shall, in the
report required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978, describe—
(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections
241 and 242, and
(2) the progress that has been made and the ob-
stacles that have been encountered in seeking to meet
the objectives set forth in sections 241 and 242.
(b) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—Each report under para-
graph (1) shall describe—
(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that
the President has taken during the period since the
enactment of this Act in pursuit of each of the objec-
tives set forth in sections 241 and 242;
(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in
the pursuit of those initiatives;
(3) any additional initiatives that have been
proposed by other countries or international organi-
312
zations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA
safeguards;
(4) all activities of the Federal Government in
support of the objectives set forth in sections 241 and
242;
(5) any recommendations of the President on ad-
ditional measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA
safeguards; and
(6) any initiatives that the President plans to
take in support of each of the objectives set forth in
sections 241 and 242.
SEC. 244. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this part—
(1) the term ‘‘highly enriched uranium’’ means
uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the iso-
tope U–235;
(2) the term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
(3) the term ‘‘near real time material account-
ancy’’ means a method of accounting for the location,
quantity, and disposition of special fissionable mate-
rial at facilities that store or process such material,
in which verification of peaceful use is continuously
achieved by means of frequent physical inventories
and the use of in-process instrumentation;
313
(4) the term ‘‘special fissionable material’’ has
the meaning given that term by Article XX(1) of the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on
October 26, 1956;
(5) the term ‘‘the Treaty’’ means the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at
Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
and
(6) the terms ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’, ‘‘non-nuclear-
weapon state’’, ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’, and ‘‘spe-
cial nuclear material’’ have the meanings given those
terms in section 231 of this Act.
PART D—REPEAL OF DUPLICATIVE PROVISIONS
SEC. 251. REPEAL.
Effective 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act—
(1) title VIII of the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, the amend-
ments made by that title, and the items relating to
such title in the table of contents of that Act, are re-
pealed; and
(2) with respect to any provisions of law re-
pealed by title VIII of that Act, such title shall be
deemed not to have been enacted.
314
Amend the title so as to read: ‘‘A bill to provide au-
thority to control exports, and for other purposes.’’.
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Union Calendar No. 304
103D CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 3937
[Report No. 103–531, Parts I, II, III, and IV]
A BILL
Entitled the ‘‘Export Administration Act of 1994’’.
JUNE 17, 1994
Committees on the Judiciary and Public Works and
Transportation discharged; committed to the Commit-
tee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and
ordered to be printed