(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents. 
TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY 
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACEFUL MEANS 
Sec. 101. Findings. 
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 103. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 104. Report. 
TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations. 
TITLE 
I—INTERNATIONAL 
RE-
GIME FOR THE ASSURED SUP-
PLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR 
PEACEFUL MEANS 
SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 
1945, the United States has believed that an in-
crease in the number of countries that possess nu-
clear weapons and the means to create such weapons 
makes the world less secure and stable by increasing 
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A 
world in which nuclear weapons are used again is 
less secure for all concerned, and could well trigger 
a global arms race, as more countries will be tempt-
ed to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to pre-
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
22:21 Feb 09, 2007
Jkt 059200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H885.IH
H885
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
vent attacks by countries that possess nuclear weap-
ons. 
(2) It is therefore in the general security inter-
est of all countries, and in the vital national security 
interest of the United States, that the number of 
countries that possess a nuclear weapons capability 
necessarily be kept to a minimum and ultimately re-
duced. 
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reproc-
essing facilities produce nuclear material that can ei-
ther be used for peaceful purposes in electricity-gen-
erating reactors, or can be used to produce uranium 
and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these 
facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing 
their possessor to be just months away from the pro-
duction of a nuclear explosive device. 
(4) It is also therefore in the general security 
interest of all countries that the number of countries 
that operate uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re-
processing facilities also be kept to a minimum, con-
sistent with the global demand for nuclear power re-
actor fuel. 
(5) The financing and construction of addi-
tional uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocess-
ing facilities around the world is indefensible on eco-
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
22:21 Feb 09, 2007
Jkt 059200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H885.IH
H885
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
nomic grounds alone, given current and future sup-
plies of uranium and existing providers of uranium 
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing services to 
the world market. 
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment 
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional 
countries, therefore, is often based upon consider-
ations other than economic calculations. The posses-
sion of such facilities is often elevated to a matter 
of national pride—a demonstration to the world that 
the country that possesses this technology has ar-
rived at a level of technological development com-
parable to that of the United States, the Russian 
Federation, France, the United Kingdom, and the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium en-
richment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be 
perceived as a demonstration of the developing 
world’s independence from technological domination 
by the more developed states. Article IV of the Trea-
ty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an ‘‘in-
alienable right . . . to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination . . . in conformity’’ with the 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
22:21 Feb 09, 2007
Jkt 059200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H885.IH
H885
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
NPT’s obligation for such countries not to acquire, 
possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear ex-
plosive devices. 
(8) Many countries have claimed that Article IV 
of the NPT guarantees the right to develop a com-
plete nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrich-
ment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. It is also 
commonly understood by many countries that this 
right must never to be compromised nor surren-
dered, so long as the countries permitted by the 
NPT to possess nuclear weapons—the United 
States, the Russian Federation, France, the United 
Kingdom, and the People’s Republic of China—con-
tinue to possess nuclear weapons, uranium enrich-
ment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, and other 
related technologies. 
(9) It has been long recognized that the pro-
liferation of national uranium enrichment and spent- 
fuel reprocessing facilities would increase the likeli-
hood of the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. 
Concerned governments, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and individual experts have for decades recog-
nized the need to address this problem through mul-
tilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of 
nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
22:21 Feb 09, 2007
Jkt 059200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H885.IH
H885
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide 
fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and 
even multilateral participation in international ura-
nium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facili-
ties, as a means of reducing incentives of countries 
to develop and construct such facilities themselves. 
(10) Until recently, such efforts have produced 
little more than reports. However, the revelations of 
a nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment tech-
nology and equipment, combined with the attempt 
by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology 
and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear 
weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with 
a new urgency. 
(11) Iran has used the specter of a potentially 
unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor 
fuel as a pretext for developing its own uranium en-
richment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, 
which would enable Iran to also produce weapons- 
grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
(12) Several initiatives have been proposed over 
the last year to address these concerns. The United 
States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium 
of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities pro-
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
22:21 Feb 09, 2007
Jkt 059200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H885.IH
H885
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS