I 
114TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5370 
To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation with the People’s 
Republic of China, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 26, 2016 
Mr. SHERMAN (for himself and Mr. FORTENBERRY) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in ad-
dition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be 
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee con-
cerned 
A BILL 
To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation 
with the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘U.S.-China Nuclear 
Cooperation and Nonproliferation Act of 2016’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
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(1) A report issued in 2001 by the Department 
of Defense found that ‘‘China supplied Pakistan 
with nuclear material and expertise and has provided 
critical assistance in the production of Pakistan’s 
nuclear facilities’’. China is also alleged to have pro-
vided Pakistan with 50 kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium, and designs for a nuclear weapon. 
(2) An unclassified report submitted to Con-
gress in 2011 by the Director of National Intel-
ligence found that Chinese entities ‘‘continue to sup-
ply a variety of missile-related items to multiple cus-
tomers, including Iran and Pakistan’’. Previous re-
ports by the Director of National Intelligence have 
confirmed that Chinese entities have provided sup-
port for the missile program of North Korea. 
(3) China has failed to bring to justice Li 
Fangwei, also known as Karl Lee, who has been in-
dicted in the United States on charges of providing 
sensitive missile technology to Iran. According to a 
report from the Congressional Research Service, 
‘‘concerns persist about Chinese willingness as well 
as ability to detect and prevent illicit transfers’’ of 
dual-use and sensitive nuclear and missile items. 
(4) At a May 12, 2015, hearing, members of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
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raised concerns that China may have diverted to its 
nuclear submarine program reactor cooling pumps 
produced by the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, thereby 
bolstering the stealth of its submarines, and vio-
lating the Previous Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
(as that term is defined in section 3(4)). 
(5) Similarly, at a July 16, 2015, hearing be-
fore two subcommittees of the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, wit-
nesses testified that China had likely diverted tech-
nology from its civilian nuclear program to its mili-
tary programs, and had failed to undertake suffi-
cient efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive dual 
use and other controlled items. 
(6) China has announced plans to provide Paki-
stan with nuclear reactors, in addition to those 
China had already agreed to construct prior to 2004, 
in violation of its 2004 commitments to the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG). 
(7) Five members of the Chinese People’s Lib-
eration Army have been indicted in the United 
States on charges of hacking into the computer net-
works of Westinghouse and stealing United States 
intellectual property, including the design of nuclear 
power plants. 
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(8) China has announced plans to export nu-
clear power plants based on technology acquired le-
gally from Westinghouse, one of China’s primary 
commercial partners under its current and previous 
nuclear cooperation agreements with the United 
States. While China has committed not to export 
United States-origin technology without a marketing 
license from Westinghouse, there is no definition of 
‘‘United States-origin technology’’ in statute or reg-
ulation, thereby complicating efforts by the United 
States to control the transfer of United States-origin 
nuclear technology. 
(9) China General Nuclear Power Company, a 
state-owned nuclear power provider, has been in-
dicted in the United States on charges of unlawfully 
producing special nuclear material outside the 
United States without the authorization of the De-
partment of Energy. 
(10) China’s plans to reprocess United States- 
origin spent nuclear fuel raises the risk that China 
could divert plutonium to military purposes, thereby 
enabling it to produce additional nuclear weapons 
that threaten the United States and its allies. 
(11) Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz told the 
Wall Street Journal, in Beijing on March 17, 2016, 
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that the United States does not ‘‘support large-scale 
reprocessing’’, and China’s plan to proceed with a 
commercial-scale reprocessing facility ‘‘certainly isn’t 
a positive in terms of nonproliferation’’. 
(12) China’s pursuit of commercial plutonium 
reprocessing will increase the likelihood that Japan 
expands its own commercial reprocessing program, 
and that South Korea will increase efforts to initiate 
such a program of its own. Growing stockpiles of 
plutonium in East Asia increase the chances of mili-
tary diversion and theft, thereby raising the risk of 
nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and inter-
state nuclear conflict. It is in the interest of the 
United States to prevent the stockpiling of pluto-
nium in East Asia. 
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives. 
(2) CHINA.—The term ‘‘China’’ means the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
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(3) CHINESE
PERSON.—The term ‘‘Chinese 
person’’ means— 
(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
tional of China; and 
(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Government of China. 
(4) PREVIOUS NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREE-
MENT.—The term ‘‘Previous Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreement’’ means the Agreement for Cooperation 
Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 
Energy, concluded July 23, 1985. 
(5) 
UNITED
STATES.—The 
term 
‘‘United 
States’’ means the several States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and any territory or possession of the 
United States. 
(6) 
UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘United States person’’ means any United States 
citizen, any alien lawfully admitted to the United 
States for permanent residence, any entity organized 
under the laws of the United States or any jurisdic-
tion within the United States, and any person in the 
United States. 
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(7) UNITED STATES-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERA-
TION AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘United States-China 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’’ means the Agree-
ment for Cooperation Between the United States 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China that was submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees under section 123 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) on 
April 21, 2015, and which entered into force on Oc-
tober 29, 2015. 
SEC. 4. NOTICE REGARDING TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR 
TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. 
The Secretary of Energy shall, not later than 5 days 
after receiving an application for the proposed transfer of 
nuclear technology to China under section 57b. of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), includ-
ing an application for specific authorization to be provided 
for in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of that 
Act (42 U.S.C. 2160), notify the appropriate congres-
sional committees of the receipt of such application. The 
notice shall describe with particularity the items contained 
in the proposed transfer of nuclear technology. 
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SEC. 5. APPROVAL FOR TRANSFER OF UNITED STATES-ORI-
GIN TECHNOLOGY WHEREVER LOCATED. 
(a) APPROVAL.—Section 57b. of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘b. It shall be unlawful’’ and in-
serting ‘‘b.(1) It shall be unlawful’’; 
(2) by striking ‘‘(1) as specifically’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘(A) as specifically’’; 
(3) by striking ‘‘(2) upon authorization’’ and 
inserting ‘‘(B) upon authorization’’; and 
(4) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(2) The requirements for authorization under para-
graph (1) shall apply to any United States-origin tech-
nology that may be used in the development or production 
of special nuclear material, and items derived from such 
United States-origin technology, regardless of the nation-
ality of the ownership of such technology or the location 
of the technology outside the United States.’’. 
(b) DEFINITION OF UNITED STATES-ORIGIN TECH-
NOLOGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall issue, 
as part of the regulations issued pursuant to section 57b. 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), 
a definition of items covered by the term ‘‘United States- 
origin technology’’ in paragraph (2) of such section, in-
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cluding items derived from such technology. The term 
shall include items developed by United States persons or 
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
and items developed with the participation of the United 
States Government, including large, passive light water re-
actors. 
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR APPROVAL OF RE-
TRANSFERS 
OF 
UNITED 
STATES-ORIGIN 
TECHNOLOGY. 
In addition to the requirements applicable to trans-
fers of items under section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), any request for authoriza-
tion to transfer United States-origin technology (as de-
fined pursuant to section 5(b) of this Act) from China, 
or with the significant participation of Chinese persons not 
located in the United States, to a country other than the 
United States or China, shall be denied unless the appli-
cant can demonstrate— 
(1) significant ongoing participation by United 
States persons in the transfer; 
(2) in the case of nuclear reactors and reactor 
components, significant United States content in-
volved in, or attendant to, the proposed transfer; 
and 
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(3) in the case of the transfer of technology de-
veloped with the participation of the United States 
Government, timely and adequate reimbursement of 
the United States Government for any grants or 
loans provided by the United States Government to 
entities involved in the development of the tech-
nology. 
SEC. 7. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CHINA-PAKISTAN NU-
CLEAR COOPERATION. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to oppose the provision by China of assist-
ance in the construction of any nuclear reactor in 
Pakistan other than the first 2 reactors constructed 
at Chasma, which were consistent with the condi-
tions concerning China’s participation in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group; and 
(2) to assist Pakistan with the acquisition and 
development of sufficient electrical power to meet its 
domestic requirements for electrical power through 
means other than nuclear power. 
SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) NOTIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINA-
TION.— 
(1) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days 
after the President makes a determination described 
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in paragraph (2), the President shall notify the ap-
propriate congressional committees of that deter-
mination. 
(2) DETERMINATION.—A determination de-
scribed in this paragraph is a determination that the 
Government of China, persons acting on behalf of 
the Government of China, or Chinese persons have, 
since the entry into force of the United States China 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement— 
(A) retransferred any United States nu-
clear items to a third country without the per-
mission of the United States Government; 
(B) diverted or attempted to divert United 
States nuclear items to military use; 
(C) stolen or attempted to steal United 
States nuclear items; 
(D) failed to undertake measures necessary 
to prevent transfers of goods, services, and 
technology described in section 2(a) of the Iran, 
North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
(Public Law 106–178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or 
to make substantial progress in efforts to pre-
vent such transfers; 
(E) failed to undertake measures to en-
force the sanctions provided for in United Na-
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tions Security Council Resolution 2270, adopted 
on March 2, 2016, and previous resolutions 
concerning North Korea; 
(F) refused to adhere to the Nuclear Sup-
plier Group guidelines regarding the export of 
any new civilian nuclear reactors, regardless of 
any prior or future contract obligations; or 
(G) otherwise violated the terms and condi-
tions of the United States-China Nuclear Co-
operation Agreement, or any authorization 
issued by the United States Government con-
cerning transfers of United States nuclear 
items. 
(b) PLAN OF CORRECTIVE ACTION.—Not later than 
60 days after the President makes a determination de-
scribed in subsection (a), the President shall provide to 
the appropriate congressional committees a plan of correc-
tive action to— 
(1) address the activity described in subsection 
(a) that was the subject of the determination; 
(2) mitigate any damage to the national secu-
rity of the United States because of such activity; 
and 
(3) prevent further such activity. 
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(c) MEASURES
AUTHORIZED.—At any time the 
President may, if the President determines it is necessary 
to address activity described in subsection (a) that was 
the subject of a determination under that subsection, im-
pose any measures authorized by law, including— 
(1) measures authorized by the International 
Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); 
and 
(2) suspension of cooperation with China under 
the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agree-
ment. 
(d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘United 
States nuclear items’’ means any items that are trans-
ferred to China under— 
(1) the United States-China Nuclear Coopera-
tion Agreement; 
(2) section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)); or 
(3) part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regu-
lations. 
SEC. 9. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED MINUTE. 
The President may not bring into effect the proce-
dures described in the section of the Agreed Minute to 
the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
that appear under the heading ‘‘Technology and Informa-
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tion Exchanges’’ unless the President, at least 60 days 
of continuous session of Congress before those procedures 
become effective— 
(1) provides to the appropriate congressional 
committees the details concerning the implementa-
tion of those provisions; and 
(2) certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that those procedures protect the na-
tional security of the United States to an extent that 
is equal to or greater than those procedures provided 
for under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
SEC. 10. REPROCESSING UNDER THE UNITED STATES- 
CHINA 
NUCLEAR 
COOPERATION 
AGREE-
MENT. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should encourage countries 
in East Asia to forgo the commencement of spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing activities, as part of a mutual effort to 
prevent the spread of separated plutonium in the region. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF REPROCESSING CONSENT 
RIGHTS UNDER AGREEMENT.—The President shall not 
agree to the reprocessing, recycling, or other alteration in 
form or content of nuclear material, as described in Article 
6.2 of the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation 
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Agreement, at any facility to which the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not ap-
plied, unless, for each proposed facility at which such ac-
tivity will take place, the President certifies to the appro-
priate congressional committees that— 
(1) the President has made a formal request to 
the IAEA to apply safeguards to the facility; 
(2) the IAEA has refused the request described 
in paragraph (1); and 
(3) the arrangements and procedures under 
which such reprocessing, recycling, or other alter-
ation in form or content will occur— 
(A) include a requirement that nuclear ma-
terial transferred pursuant to the United 
States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
and nuclear material used in or produced 
through the use of such material— 
(i) not be commingled with any other 
nuclear material; 
(ii) be clearly marked as United 
States-obligated nuclear material; 
(iii) be stored in separate facilities 
from any other nuclear material; and 
(iv) be available for inspection imme-
diately and without prior notice upon re-
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quest by the IAEA or either party to the 
Agreement; and 
(B) are sufficient to detect in a timely 
manner— 
(i) the diversion for military purposes 
of nuclear material transferred pursuant to 
the United States-China Nuclear Coopera-
tion Agreement and nuclear material used 
in or produced through the use of such 
material; and 
(ii) the transfer to facilities or loca-
tions not agreed to by the United States of 
nuclear material transferred pursuant to 
the United States-China Nuclear Coopera-
tion Agreement and nuclear material used 
in or produced through the use of such 
material. 
(c) NOTIFICATION
REQUIRED.—If the President 
issues a certification described in subsection (b), the Presi-
dent shall include with that certification a detailed descrip-
tion of— 
(1) the facility at which the reprocessing, recy-
cling, or other alteration in form and content will 
take place; 
(2) the safeguards applied to the facility; 
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(3) the measures that will be undertaken to se-
cure and prevent the theft or diversion to military 
purposes of any separated plutonium that will result 
from the activities at the facility; 
(4) the amounts of materials to be processed at 
the facility; 
(5) the amount of processed fissile material 
that may be stockpiled as a result of the activities 
at the facility, and the estimated period of time that 
it may be stockpiled prior to its civilian use in a nu-
clear reactor; and 
(6) the risks to the national security of the 
United States that are posed by the potential diver-
sion of nuclear material at the facility. 
SEC. 11. REPORTS. 
(a) INITIAL REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on China’s history of compliance 
with the peaceful use and nonproliferation provisions 
of the Previous Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
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(A) a detailed examination of every sus-
pected or alleged violation of the Previous 
Agreement; 
(B) the response by China to any inquiries 
by the United States regarding any such sus-
pected or alleged violation of the Previous 
Agreement; 
(C) an assessment of the likelihood of fu-
ture violations under the terms of the United 
States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; 
and 
(D) an assessment of the potential advan-
tages that a large civil nuclear infrastructure or 
program may provide to China as it seeks to 
meet its future nuclear weapons requirements. 
(b) ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 15, 
2017, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report on the status of the United States-China 
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and compliance by 
China with the Agreement. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 
paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum— 
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(A) a detailed examination of every sus-
pected or alleged violation of the Agreement by 
China that may have occurred during the pre-
ceding calendar year; 
(B) the response by China to any inquiries 
by the United States regarding any such sus-
pected or alleged violation; 
(C) an accounting of the specific roles 
played in the civil and military nuclear pro-
grams of China by all Chinese persons visiting 
United States nuclear labs and facilities; 
(D) an assessment of whether China or 
any entity acting on its behalf has targeted any 
United States nuclear-related private-sector or 
governmental entities, enterprises, or assets for 
any form of cyber trespass, theft, or attack, or 
has taken specific actions pursuant to such tar-
geting by any entity; 
(E) an assessment of the risks of diversion 
of special nuclear material transferred pursuant 
to the Agreement, the likely consequences of 
such diversion, and steps taken to avert any po-
tential diversion; 
(F) an assessment of the potential military 
utility of diverted civil nuclear technology; 
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(G) an assessment of any civil or criminal 
law enforcement actions taken by China against 
any entities or individuals within its govern-
ment or its jurisdiction that have— 
(i) violated nonproliferation or peace-
ful use requirements of the Agreement or 
any other bilateral or multilateral nuclear 
agreement to which China is a party; 
(ii) committed any cyber trespass, 
theft, or attack on any United States nu-
clear-related private sector or govern-
mental entities, enterprises, or assets; or 
(iii) conducted any cyber trespass or 
cyber exploitation against any private sec-
tor nuclear entities, enterprises, or assets 
for commercial gain; and 
(H) a description of the extent to which 
the Government of China has honored requests 
by the United States for enforcement of legal 
action against any entities or individuals de-
scribed in subparagraph (G), including requests 
by the United States for extradition. 
(c) FORM.—The reports required under subsections 
(a) and (b) may be submitted in classified form, but shall 
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also contain an unclassified executive summary and may 
contain an unclassified annex. 
(d) ANNUAL EXPORTS REPORT.—Not later than 
April 15, 2017, and annually thereafter, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report that— 
(1) identifies all export licenses issued in the 
preceding calendar year pursuant to the United 
States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, in-
cluding, at a minimum for each license, the license 
applicant, the items licensed and their value, the 
proposed end user of the items, and the term of the 
license; and 
(2) assesses China’s progress in strengthening, 
implementing, and enforcing laws to ensure that re-
stricted dual-use technology is not transferred to 
countries of proliferation concern. 
Æ 
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