H. R. 5682—10
(ii) the separation plan presented in the national 
parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater 
detail on May 11, 2006; 
(iii) a safeguards agreement between the Govern-
ment of India and the IAEA; 
(iv) an Additional Protocol between the Govern-
ment of India and the IAEA; 
(v) an agreement for cooperation between the 
Government of India and the United States Govern-
ment arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or any subsequent 
arrangement under section 131 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
2160); 
(vi) the terms and conditions of any approved 
licenses regarding the export or reexport of nuclear 
material or dual-use material, equipment, or tech-
nology; and 
(vii) United States laws and regulations regarding 
such licenses; 
(B) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after 
the date of the enactment of this title; 
(C) significant changes in the production by India of 
nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile mate-
rial produced; and 
(D) changes in the purpose or operational status of 
any unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India. 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE REPORT.—Not later 
than 180 days after the date on which an agreement for 
cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into 
force, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report including—
(A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities 
and nuclear materials that the Government of India has 
placed or intends to place under IAEA safeguards; 
(B) a comprehensive listing of—
(i) all licenses that have been approved by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of 
Energy for exports and reexports to India under parts 
110 and 810 of title 10, Code of Federal Regulations; 
(ii) any licenses approved by the Department of 
Commerce for the export or reexport to India of 
commodities, related technology, and software which 
are controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on 
the Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control 
List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of 
Federal Regulation, or any successor regulation; 
(iii) any other United States authorizations for 
the export or reexport to India of nuclear materials 
and equipment; and 
(iv) with respect to each such license or other 
form of authorization described in clauses (i), (ii), and 
(iii)—
(I) the number or other identifying information 
of each license or authorization; 
(II) the name or names of the authorized end 
user or end users;
H. R. 5682—11
(III) the name of the site, facility, or location 
in India to which the export or reexport was made; 
(IV) the terms and conditions included on such 
licenses and authorizations; 
(V) any post-shipment verification procedures 
that will be applied to such exports or reexports; 
and 
(VI) the term of validity of each such license 
or authorization; 
(C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce 
between India and other countries, including any such 
trade that—
(i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or 
decisions of the NSG; or 
(ii) would not meet the standards applied to 
exports or reexports of such material, equipment, or 
technology of United States origin; 
(D) either—
(i) an assessment that India is in full compliance 
with the commitments and obligations contained in 
the agreements and other documents referenced in 
clauses (i) through (vi) of paragraph (1)(A); or 
(ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance 
issues arising with regard to the adherence by India 
to its commitments and obligations, including—
(I) the measures the United States Govern-
ment has taken to remedy or otherwise respond 
to such compliance issues; 
(II) the responses of the Government of India 
to such measures; 
(III) the measures the United States Govern-
ment plans to take to this end in the coming 
year; and 
(IV) an assessment of the implications of any 
continued 
noncompliance, 
including 
whether 
nuclear commerce with India remains in the 
national security interest of the United States; 
(E)(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and 
actively participating in United States and international 
efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and 
contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability 
(including the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess 
nuclear fuel), and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
destruction, including a description of the specific measures 
that India has taken in this regard; and 
(ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively 
participating in such efforts, a description of—
(I) the measures the United States Government 
has taken to secure India’s full and active participation 
in such efforts; 
(II) the responses of the Government of India to 
such measures; and 
(III) the measures the United States Government 
plans to take in the coming year to secure India’s 
full and active participation;
H. R. 5682—12
(F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear 
cooperation with India is in any way assisting India’s 
nuclear weapons program, including through—
(i) the use of any United States equipment, tech-
nology, 
or 
nuclear 
material 
by 
India 
in 
an 
unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons 
related complex; 
(ii) the replication and subsequent use of any 
United States technology by India in an unsafeguarded 
nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-
related complex, or for any activity related to the 
research, development, testing, or manufacture of 
nuclear explosive devices; and 
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner 
as to facilitate the increased production by India of 
highly 
enriched 
uranium 
or 
plutonium 
in 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; 
(G) a detailed description of—
(i) United States efforts to promote national or 
regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, 
securing, limiting, and reducing their fissile material 
stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, 
pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-
off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Mate-
rial Cut-off Treaty; 
(ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such 
efforts; and 
(iii) assistance that the United States is providing, 
or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan 
to promote the objectives in clause (i), consistent with 
its obligations under international law and existing 
agreements; 
(H) an estimate of—
(i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in 
India during the previous year; 
(ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely 
been used or allocated for the production of nuclear 
explosive devices; and 
(iii) the rate of production in India of—
(I) fissile material for nuclear explosive 
devices; and 
(II) nuclear explosive devices; 
(I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India’s 
nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the 
previous year and the proportion of such production that 
can be attributed to India’s declared civil reactors; 
(J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has 
affected the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive 
devices; 
(K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made 
toward the achievement of India’s—
(i) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative; 
(ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Inter-
diction Principles of such Initiative; 
(iii) public announcement of its decision to conform 
its export control laws, regulations, and policies with
H. R. 5682—13
the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Proce-
dures, Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement; and 
(iv) effective implementation of the decision 
described in clause (iii); and 
(L) the disposal during the previous year of spent 
nuclear fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program, and 
any plans or activities relating to future disposal of such 
spent nuclear fuel. 
(3) SUBMITTAL WITH OTHER ANNUAL REPORTS.—
(A) REPORT
ON
PROLIFERATION
PREVENTION.—Each 
annual report submitted under paragraph (2) after the 
initial report may be submitted together with the annual 
report on proliferation prevention required under section 
601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 
U.S.C. 3281(a)). 
(B) REPORT
ON
PROGRESS
TOWARD
REGIONAL
NON-
PROLIFERATION.—The information required to be submitted 
under paragraph (2)(F) after the initial report may be 
submitted together with the annual report on progress 
toward regional nonproliferation required under section 
620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2376(c)). 
(4) FORM.—Each report submitted under this subsection 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
classified annex. 
SEC. 105. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS. 
Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in 
violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT. 
SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS. 
A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease 
to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated 
a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this 
title. 
SEC. 107. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS. 
Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the 
purposes of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
2797b). 
SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT. 
Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Act of 1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg 
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 
and 2001 (as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 
106–113 and contained in appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A–
486)) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semi-
colon at the end; 
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph 
(D); and 
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
subparagraph: 
‘‘(C) so much of the reports required under section 
104 of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful
H. R. 5682—14
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to 
verification or compliance matters; and’’. 
SEC. 109. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through 
the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, 
is authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation 
program to pursue jointly with scientists from the United States 
and India a program to further common nuclear nonproliferation 
goals, including scientific research and development efforts, with 
an emphasis on nuclear safeguards (in this section referred to 
as ‘‘the program’’). 
(b) CONSULTATION.—The program shall be carried out in con-
sultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. 
(c) NATIONAL ACADEMIES RECOMMENDATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy shall enter into 
an agreement with the National Academies to develop rec-
ommendations for the implementation of the program. 
(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The agreement entered into under 
paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year 
of—
(A) recommendations for research and related pro-
grams designed to overcome existing technological barriers 
to nuclear nonproliferation; and 
(B) an assessment of whether activities and programs 
funded under this section are achieving the goals of the 
activities and programs. 
(3) PUBLIC
AVAILABILITY.—The recommendations and 
assessments prepared under this subsection shall be made pub-
licly available. 
(d) 
CONSISTENCY
WITH
NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY.—All United States activities related to the program shall 
be consistent with United States obligations under the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized 
to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out 
this section for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011. 
SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS. 
In this title: 
(1) The term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means a protocol addi-
tional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated 
between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional 
Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 
540. 
(2) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(3) The term ‘‘dual-use material, equipment, or technology’’ 
means material, equipment, or technology that may be used 
in nuclear or nonnuclear applications. 
(4) The term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ has the meaning given 
the term in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Preven-
tion Act of 1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
H. R. 5682—15
(5) The term ‘‘Indian person’’ means—
(A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India; 
(B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
organization, or group, that is organized under the laws 
of India or has its principal place of business in India; 
and 
(C) any Indian governmental entity, including any 
governmental entity operating as a business enterprise. 
(6) The terms ‘‘Missile Technology Control Regime’’, 
‘‘MTCR’’, and ‘‘MTCR adherent’’ have the meanings given the 
terms in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
2797c). 
(7) The term ‘‘nuclear materials and equipment’’ means 
source material, special nuclear material, production and utili-
zation facilities and any components thereof, and any other 
items or materials that are determined to have significance 
for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109 b. 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)). 
(8) The terms ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ and 
‘‘NPT’’ mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483). 
(9) The terms ‘‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’’ and ‘‘NSG’’ refer 
to a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least 
annually since 1992, of Participating Governments that have 
promulgated and agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear 
Transfers (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and 
Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equip-
ment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology (currently 
IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2). 
(10) The terms ‘‘nuclear weapon’’ and ‘‘nuclear explosive 
device’’ mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous 
release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear 
material that is greater than the amount of energy that would 
be released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene 
(TNT). 
(11) The term ‘‘process’’ includes the term ‘‘reprocess’’. 
(12) The terms ‘‘reprocessing’’ and ‘‘reprocess’’ refer to the 
separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products 
from spent nuclear fuel. 
(13) The term ‘‘sensitive nuclear technology’’ means any 
information, including information incorporated in a production 
or utilization facility or important component part thereof, that 
is not available to the public and which is important to the 
design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of 
a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or 
a facility for the production of heavy water. 
(14) The term ‘‘source material’’ has the meaning given 
the term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(42 U.S.C. 2014(z)). 
(15) The term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the meaning 
given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
H. R. 5682—16
(16) The term ‘‘unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity’’ 
means research on, or development, design, manufacture, 
construction, operation, or maintenance of—
(A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, 
conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, 
plant for the separation of isotopes of source or special 
fissionable material, or separate storage installation with 
respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
safeguards at the relevant reactor, facility, plant, or 
installation that contains source or special fissionable mate-
rial; or 
(B) any existing or future heavy water production plant 
with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used 
in connection with any heavy water produced therefrom. 
TITLE II—UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION 
SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘United States Additional Protocol 
Implementation Act’’. 
SEC. 202. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security 
of the United States and its vital national interests. 
(2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven crit-
ical to limiting such proliferation. 
(3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective, 
each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude 
a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and 
such agreements must be honored and enforced. 
(4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening 
the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards 
system. This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA 
inspectors with more information about, and broader access 
to, nuclear activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon 
State Parties. 
(5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and 
access has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA 
in the form of a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safe-
guards agreements, and universal acceptance of Additional 
Protocols by non-nuclear weapons states is essential to 
enhancing the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
(6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-
weapon State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based 
on the Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains meas-
ures, consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with 
its members, that protect the right of the United States to 
exclude the application of IAEA safeguards to locations and 
activities with direct national security significance or to loca-
tions or information associated with such activities.
H. R. 5682—17
(7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 
States in a manner consistent with United States obligations 
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage 
other parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially 
non-nuclear-weapon State Parties, to conclude Additional Proto-
cols and thereby strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty safeguards system and help reduce the threat of nuclear 
proliferation, which is of direct and substantial benefit to the 
United States. 
(8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 
States is not required and is completely voluntary given its 
status as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States 
has acceded to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its 
commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make 
United States civil nuclear activities available to the same 
IAEA inspections as are applied in the case of non-nuclear-
weapon State Parties. 
(9) In accordance with the national security exclusion con-
tained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United 
States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any 
declaration of any information with respect to, locations, 
information, and activities of direct national security signifi-
cance to the United States. 
(10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform 
to the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, 
from the United States Permanent Representative to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the 
United Nations to the Director General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS. 
In this title: 
(1) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL.—The term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’, 
when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional 
to the Agreement between the United States of America and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, 
signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107–7). 
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on International 
Relations, the Committee on Science, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(3) COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.—The term ‘‘complementary 
access’’ means the exercise of the IAEA’s access rights as set 
forth in Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol. 
(4) EXECUTIVE AGENCY.—The term ‘‘executive agency’’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United 
States Code. 
(5) FACILITY.—The term ‘‘facility’’ has the meaning set forth 
in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol. 
(6) IAEA.—The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
(7) JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘judge of 
the United States’’ means a United States district judge, or
H. R. 5682—18
a United States magistrate judge appointed under the authority 
of chapter 43 of title 28, United States Code. 
(8) LOCATION.—The term ‘‘location’’ means any geographic 
point or area declared or identified by the United States or 
specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
(9) 
NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY.—The 
term 
‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ means the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 
5, 1970 (21 UST 483). 
(10) NUCLEAR-WEAPON
STATE
PARTY
AND
NON-NUCLEAR-
WEAPON
STATE
PARTY.—The terms ‘‘nuclear-weapon State 
Party’’ and ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon State Party’’ have the 
meanings given such terms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
(11) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’, except as otherwise pro-
vided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, 
association, trust, estate, public or private institution, any State 
or any political subdivision thereof, or any political entity within 
a State, any foreign government or nation or any agency, 
instrumentality, or political subdivision of any such government 
or nation, or other entity located in the United States. 
(12) SITE.—The term ‘‘site’’ has the meaning set forth in 
Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol. 
(13) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’, when used 
as a geographic reference, means the several States of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, and the common-
wealths, territories, and possessions of the United States and 
includes all places under the jurisdiction or control of the 
United States, including—
(A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace; 
(B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
(41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United 
States Code; and 
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term 
is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforce-
ment Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)). 
(14) WIDE-AREA
ENVIRONMENTAL
SAMPLING.—The term 
‘‘wide-area environmental sampling’’ has the meaning set forth 
in Article 18g. of the Additional Protocol. 
SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY. 
If any provision of this title, or the application of such provision 
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of 
this title, or the application of such provision to persons or cir-
cumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall 
not be affected thereby. 
Subtitle A—General Provisions 
SEC. 211. AUTHORITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to implement 
and carry out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol 
and shall designate through Executive order which executive agency 
or agencies of the United States, which may include but are not