I 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3643
To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage, 
or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full Saudi 
cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NOVEMBER 21, 2003
Mr. WEINER (for himself, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. ISRAEL, Mr. NADLER, Ms. 
BERKLEY, Mr. FOLEY, Mrs. MCCARTHY of New York, Mrs. MALONEY, 
Mr. HILL, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. WAXMAN, 
Mr. SANDLIN, Mr. STRICKLAND, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. EMANUEL, Mr. 
BISHOP of Georgia, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. RUSH, Mr. 
DEUTSCH, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. GARRETT of New Jersey, Mr. ANDREWS, 
and Mr. FERGUSON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
the Committee on International Relations 
A BILL 
To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite, 
encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, 
and to secure full Saudi cooperation in the investigation 
of terrorist incidents.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Saudi Arabia Account-
ability Act of 2003’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1373 (2001) mandates that all states ‘‘refrain from 
providing any form of support, active or passive, to 
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts’’, take 
‘‘the necessary steps to prevent the commission of 
terrorist acts’’, and ‘‘deny safe haven to those who 
finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts’’. 
(2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded 
in an October 2002 report on terrorist financing 
that ‘‘[f]or years, individuals and charities based in 
Saudi Arabia have been the most important source 
of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years, Saudi officials 
have turned a blind eye to this problem’’. 
(3) The Middle East Media Research Institute 
concluded in a July 3, 2003, report on Saudi sup-
port for Palestinian terrorists that ‘‘for decades, the 
royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
been the main financial supporter of Palestinian 
groups fighting Israel’’. The report notes specifically 
that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled 
over $4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian 
intifada that began in September 2000. 
(4) Much of this Saudi money has been directed 
to Hamas and to the families of suicide bombers, di-
rectly funding and rewarding suicide bombers. In 
December 2000, former Palestinian Prime Minister 
Mahmoud Abbas wrote to the Saudis to complain 
about their support for Hamas. 
(5) The New York Times, citing United States 
and Israeli sources, reported on September 17, 
2003, that at least 50 percent of the current oper-
ating budget of Hamas comes from ‘‘people in Saudi 
Arabia’’. 
(6) Many Saudi-funded religious institutions 
and the literature they distribute teach a message of 
hate and intolerance that provides an ideological 
basis for anti-Western terrorism. The effects of 
these teachings are evidenced by the fact that 
Osama bin Laden himself and 15 of the 19 Sep-
tember 11th hijackers were Saudi citizens. 
(7) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar 
Towers housing complex at Dahran, Saudi Arabia, 
which killed 19 United States Air Force personnel 
and wounded approximately 400 people, the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States 
officials to question individuals held in detention by 
the Saudis in connection with the attack. 
(8) During an October 2002 hearing on financ-
ing of terrorism before the Committee on the Judici-
ary of the Senate, the Undersecretary for Enforce-
ment of the Department of the Treasury testified 
that the Government of Saudi Arabia had taken only 
‘‘baby steps’’ toward stemming the financing of ter-
rorist activities. 
(9) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism 
before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology 
and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Ju-
diciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, General 
Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that 
Saudi Arabia is, in many cases, the ‘‘epicenter’’ of 
financing for terrorism. 
(10) A joint committee of the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, that 
quotes various United States Government personnel 
who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate 
in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his net-
work both before and after the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks. 
(11) There are indications that, since the May 
12, 2003, suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia is making a more serious ef-
fort to combat terrorism.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) it is imperative that the Government of 
Saudi Arabia immediately and unconditionally—
(A) provide complete, unrestricted, and un-
obstructed cooperation to the United States, in-
cluding the unsolicited sharing of relevant intel-
ligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in 
the investigation of groups and individuals that 
are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting, 
or committing an act of terror against United 
States citizens anywhere in the world, including 
within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; 
(B) permanently close all charities, schools, 
or other organizations or institutions in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train, in-
cite, encourage, or in any other way aid and 
abet terrorism anywhere in the world (hereafter 
in this Act referred to as ‘‘Saudi-based terror 
organizations’’), including by means of pro-
viding support for the families of individuals 
who have committed acts of terrorism; 
(C) end funding or other support by the 
Government of Saudi Arabia for charities, 
schools, and any other organizations or institu-
tions outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that
train, incite, encourage, or in any other way aid 
and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (here-
after in this Act referred to as ‘‘offshore terror 
organizations’’), including by means of pro-
viding support for the families of individuals 
who have committed acts of terrorism; and 
(D) block all funding from private Saudi 
citizens and entities to any Saudi-based terror 
organization or offshore terrorism organization; 
and 
(2) the President, in deciding whether to make 
the certification under section 4, should judge 
whether the Government of Saudi Arabia has contin-
ued and sufficiently expanded the efforts to combat 
terrorism that it redoubled after the May 12, 2003, 
bombing in Riyadh. 
SEC. 4. SANCTIONS. 
(a) RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS AND DIPLOMATIC 
TRAVEL.—Unless the President makes the certification 
described in subsection (c), the President shall take the 
following actions: 
(1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, and prohibit the issuance of a license 
for the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of—
(A) any defense articles or defense services 
on the United States Munitions List under sec-
tion 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2778) for which special export controls 
are warranted under such Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 
et seq.); and 
(B) any item identified on the Commerce 
Control List maintained under part 774 of title 
15, Code of Federal Regulations. 
(2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned 
to Washington, District of Columbia, New York, 
New York, the Saudi Consulate General in Houston, 
or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles to a 25-mile 
radius of Washington, District of Columbia, New 
York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in 
Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, re-
spectively. 
(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
tion of subsection (a) if the President—
(1) determines that it is in the national security 
interest of the United States to do so; and 
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains the reasons for 
such determination.
(c) CERTIFICATION.—The President shall transmit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a certification of 
any determination made by the President after the date 
of the enactment of this Act that the Government of Saudi 
Arabia—
(1) is fully cooperating with the United States 
in investigating and preventing terrorist attacks; 
(2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based ter-
ror organizations; 
(3) has ended any funding or other support by 
the Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore 
terror organization; and 
(4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all 
funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to 
offshore terrorist organizations. 
SEC. 5. REPORT. 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than 6 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
every 12 months thereafter until the President makes the 
certification described in section 4(c), the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on the progress made by the Government 
of Saudi Arabia toward meeting the conditions described 
in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section 4(c).