113 
TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives of 
seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that assist-
ance provided by it or at its request or under its su-
pervision or control is not used in such a way as to 
further any military purpose.’’. 
(2) The United States, via assessed contributions, 
is the largest financial contributor to the regular 
budget of the IAEA. 
(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 
called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 
primarily through voluntary contributions by member 
states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to provide 
nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for peaceful pur-
poses to countries worldwide. 
(4) The United States is the largest financial 
contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 
Fund. 
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(5) A March 2009 report by the Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither [the 
Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to systemati-
cally limit TC assistance to countries the United 
States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism— 
Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under 
U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions.’’. 
(6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 
[Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 
$55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 
2007.’’. These four countries have received continued 
assistance since 2007. 
(7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera-
tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 
provided to certain countries and because nuclear 
equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual- 
use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also 
useful in contributing to nuclear weapons develop-
ment.’’. 
(8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The State 
Department] reported in 2007 that three TC projects 
in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian nuclear 
power plant at Bushehr.’’. 
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(9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro-
liferation concerns associated with the [Technical Co-
operation Program] are difficult for the United States 
to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [because] 
there is no formal mechanism for obtaining TC 
project information during the proposal development 
phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State docu-
mentation on how proliferation concerns of TC pro-
posals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. 
policies and IAEA procedures [including monitoring 
proliferation risks] related to TC program fellow-
ships.’’. 
(10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA officials 
told us that the [Technical Cooperation Program] 
does not attempt to exclude countries on the basis of 
their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of ter-
rorism or other political considerations’’ and that, ac-
cording to the Deputy Director General for the Tech-
nical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are no good coun-
tries and there are no bad countries’’ with respect to 
provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA. 
(11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given the 
limited information available on TC projects and the 
dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and ex-
pertise, we do not believe [the State Department] can 
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116 
assert with complete confidence that TC assistance 
has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] pro-
grams in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism’’. 
(12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do not 
share [the State Department’s confidence in IAEA’s 
internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from con-
tributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga-
nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 
for the United States proportionate share for pro-
grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, inter alia. 
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 
(Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the funds 
made available by such Act for the IAEA from being 
made available for programs and projects of the 
IAEA in Cuba. 
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 
the United States to withhold a proportionate share 
of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regarding 
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117 
the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro Pi 
Nuclear Research Center. 
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to consider 
directing [the State Department] to withhold a share 
of future annual contributions to the [Technical Co-
operation Fund] that is proportionate to the amount 
of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated 
state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of con-
cern, noting that such a withholding is a matter of 
fundamental principle and intended to foster a more 
consistent U.S. policy toward such nations’’. 
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the 
Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 
water-related projects and its enrichment of uranium, 
in violation of United Nations Security Council Reso-
lutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 
(2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010). 
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation pro-
vided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall 
only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other 
humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but that no 
such technical cooperation shall be provided that re-
lates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear activities 
. . .’’. 
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119 
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 
not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 
prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible assur-
ance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material 
and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA’s] 
request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, 
access to additional locations related, inter alia, to 
the manufacturing of centrifuges, research and devel-
opment on uranium enrichment, and uranium min-
ing and milling, as also required by the Security 
Council.’’. 
(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 
of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con-
nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 
about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 
progress on these issues.’’. 
(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions 
adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on Sep-
tember 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 2004, 
June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 11, 2005, 
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September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 
2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures and breaches 
of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards 
Agreement’’ and continues to block IAEA inspections 
of its nuclear facilities, in violation of its NPT Safe-
guards Agreement. 
(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran re-
cently denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz 
to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a request by 
the IAEA to place one or more additional surveillance 
cameras at the enrichment site at Natanz. 
(26) In April of 2008, United States Government 
officials publicly revealed that Syria was building at 
the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s assistance, 
a secret nuclear reactor that was based on a North 
Korean model capable of producing plutonium for nu-
clear weapons and that was weeks away from becom-
ing operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly 
destroyed the reactor in September 2007. 
(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay-
den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour 
could have produced enough plutonium for 1 or 2 
bombs within a year of becoming operational. 
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121 
(28) The IAEA Director General reported to the 
IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 2008 that 
the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore features that 
resembled those of an undeclared nuclear reactor, add-
ing that ‘‘Syria has not yet provided the requested 
documentation in support of its declarations con-
cerning the nature or function of the destroyed build-
ing, nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations 
which the IAEA has requested to visit.’’. 
(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 
to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 
that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 
Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter-
mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 
Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 
in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 
that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 
not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 
material.’’. 
(30) Commercial satellite photos published on 
February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the Govern-
ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi-
tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 
to the Dair Alzour facility. 
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(31) The IAEA Director General reported to the 
IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 that 
‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] since 
June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues 
related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three lo-
cations allegedly functionally related to it. As a con-
sequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to make 
progress towards resolving the outstanding issues re-
lated to those sites.’’. 
(b) PROHIBITION.—No funds from any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used 
to support any assistance provided by the IAEA through 
its Technical Cooperation program to any country, includ-
ing North Korea that— 
(1) is a country the government of which has 
been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur-
poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
or other provision of law, is a government that has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism; 
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its ob-
ligations regarding— 
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123 
(A) its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA; 
(B) the Additional Protocol; 
(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 
(D) any relevant United Nations Security 
Council Resolution; or 
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or non-
compliance with the obligations specified in para-
graph (2). 
(c) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold from the 
United States voluntary contribution to the IAEA an 
amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the pe-
riod from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical 
Cooperation Program to countries described in subsection 
(b). 
(d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not been 
withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assistance 
provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 
countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to 
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(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall 
direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influence of 
the United States at the IAEA to establish an 
Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the 
IAEA. 
(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compliance 
shall— 
(i) function as an independent body 
composed of technical experts who shall 
work in consultation with IAEA inspectors 
to assess compliance by IAEA Member 
States and provide recommendations to the 
IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen-
alties to be imposed on IAEA Member 
States that fail to fulfill their obligations 
under IAEA Board resolutions; 
(ii) base its assessments and rec-
ommendations on IAEA inspection reports; 
and 
(iii) take into consideration informa-
tion provided by IAEA Board Members that 
are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states as rec-
ognized by the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
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126 
tion of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 
(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’). 
(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 
shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 
Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 
the IAEA. 
(2) 
COMMITTEE
ON
SAFEGUARDS
AND 
VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the United 
States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at 
the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards 
and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and 
seek to put into force a workplan of concrete measures 
that will— 
(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to 
monitor and enforce compliance by Member 
States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency; and 
(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond 
the verification mechanisms and authorities con-
tained in the Additional Protocol to the Safe-
guards Agreements between the IAEA and Mem-
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127 
ber States of the IAEA, to detect with a high de-
gree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities 
by a Member State. 
(3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall di-
rect the United States Permanent Representative 
to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that 
a Member State of the IAEA that is under inves-
tigation for a breach of or noncompliance with 
its IAEA obligations or the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations has 
its privileges suspended, including— 
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
case; 
(ii) being prevented from receiving any 
technical assistance; and 
(iii) being prevented from hosting 
meetings. 
(B) TERMINATION
OF
PENALTIES.—The 
penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall 
be terminated when such investigation is con-
cluded and such Member State is no longer in 
such breach or noncompliance. 
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128 
(4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The President shall di-
rect the United States Permanent Representative to 
the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member 
State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, 
in noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the 
IAEA all nuclear materials and technology received 
from the IAEA, any Member State of the IAEA, or 
any Member State of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty. 
(b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
(1) 
VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 
contributions of the United States to the IAEA should 
primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nu-
clear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nu-
clear Verification. 
(2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Presi-
dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in-
fluence of the United States at the IAEA to— 
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspec-
tions are prioritized for countries that have 
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newly established nuclear programs or are initi-
ating nuclear programs; and 
(B) block the allocation of funds for any 
other IAEA development, environmental, or nu-
clear science assistance or activity to a coun-
try— 
(i) the government of which the Sec-
retary of State has determined, for purposes 
of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
Export Control Act, or other provision of 
law, is a government that has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international 
terrorism and the government of which the 
Secretary has determined has not disman-
tled and surrendered its weapons of mass 
destruction programs under international 
verification; 
(ii) that is under investigation for a 
breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations; or 
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130 
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
(3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part 
of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to 
Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by 
country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards 
inspections and nuclear security activities. 
(c) MEMBERSHIP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA 
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States at the IAEA to block the membership on the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member State 
of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Ad-
ditional Protocol and— 
(A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or 
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131 
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga-
tions or the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. 
(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to 
modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect 
the principles described in paragraph (1). 
(d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to 
the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure that the 
IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small Quantities 
Protocol in order to— 
(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities 
Protocol; 
(2) require that any IAEA Member State that 
has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to 
sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, 
provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its 
nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest 
inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 
(3) require that any IAEA Member State that 
does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible 
to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or 
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132 
assistance from any IAEA Member State and subject 
to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3). 
(e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN AND SYRIA.— 
(1) UNITED
STATES
ACTION.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort 
to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA 
Board of Governors that, in addition to the restric-
tions already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineli-
gible to receive any nuclear material, technology, 
equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member 
State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not re-
lated to safeguards inspections or nuclear security 
until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that 
Iran or Syria, as the case may be— 
(A) is providing full access to IAEA inspec-
tors to its nuclear-related facilities; 
(B) has fully implemented and is in com-
pliance with the Additional Protocol; and 
(C) has permanently ceased and dismantled 
all activities and programs related to nuclear-en-
richment and reprocessing. 
(2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is 
determined to have violated the prohibition on assist-
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133 
ance to Iran or Syria described in paragraph (1) be-
fore the IAEA Board of Governors determines that 
Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has satisfied the 
conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through 
(C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be 
subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), 
shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, tech-
nology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
Member State, and shall be ineligible to receive any 
IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections 
or nuclear security until such time as the IAEA 
Board of Governors makes such determination with 
respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be. 
(f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years there-
after, the President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on the implementation of this 
section. 
SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 
SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 
It is the sense of Congress that the national security 
interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov-
ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 
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should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu-
rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 
TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 
SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations have contributed greatly toward the promotion 
of peace and stability for over 6 decades and the ma-
jority of peacekeeping personnel who have served 
under the United Nations flag have done so with 
honor and courage, the record of United Nations 
peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by oper-
ational failures and unconscionable acts of mis-
conduct; 
(2) in response to such failures, successive Secre-
taries General of the United Nations have launched 
numerous reform efforts, including the high-level 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by 
former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, 
the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the Preven-
tion of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal 
Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jor-
dan, and the 2009 New Partnership Agenda, known 
as the ‘‘New Horizon’’ reports; 
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(3) despite the fact that the United Nations has 
had over a decade to implement many of these re-
forms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in 
the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations re-
peatedly have expressed their commitment ‘‘to imple-
menting fundamental, systematic changes as a matter 
of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms continue to 
be blocked or delayed by Members States who argu-
ably benefit from maintenance of the status quo; 
(4) further, audits of procurement practices in 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, con-
ducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
and the now-defunct United Nations Procurement 
Task Force have uncovered ‘‘significant’’ corruption 
schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peace-
keeping personnel; and 
(5) if the reputation of and confidence in United 
Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fun-
damental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in 
the areas of planning, management, procurement, 
training, conduct, and discipline, must be imple-
mented without further delay. 
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SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA-
TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 
reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 
following areas: 
(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 
(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and 
number of United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations have increased substantially over the past 
decade, independent audits of each such oper-
ation should be conducted annually, with a view 
toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and ensuring 
that all operations are efficient and cost effective. 
(B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPARENCY.— 
The logistics established within the United Na-
tions Department of Field Support should be 
streamlined and strengthened to ensure that all 
peacekeeping missions are resourced appro-
priately, transparently, and in a timely fashion 
while individual accountability for waste, fraud 
and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping 
missions is uniformly enforced. 
(C) REVIEW
OF
MANDATES
AND
CLOSING 
OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations should 
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137 
conduct a comprehensive review of all United 
Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with 
a view toward identifying objectives that are 
practical and achievable, and report its findings 
to the Security Council. In particular, the review 
should consider the following: 
(i) Except in extraordinary cases, in-
cluding genocide, the United Nations De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations should 
not be tasked with activities that are im-
practical or unachievable without the co-
operation of the Member State(s) hosting a 
United Nations peacekeeping operation, or 
which amount to de-facto Trusteeship out-
side of the procedures established for such 
under Chapter XII of the United Nations 
Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expec-
tations and obfuscating the primary respon-
sibility of the Member States themselves in 
creating and maintaining conditions for 
peace. 
(ii) Long-standing operations that are 
static and cannot fulfill their mandate 
should be downsized or closed. 
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(iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
that the withdrawal from a country of an 
otherwise static United Nations peace-
keeping operation would result in the re-
sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar-
ing arrangement that reduces the level of as-
sessed contributions, similar to that cur-
rently 
supporting 
the 
United 
Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be ex-
plored and instituted. 
(D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping oper-
ations become larger and increasingly complex, 
the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand-
ard of qualifications for senior leaders and man-
agers, with particular emphasis on specific skills 
and experience, and current senior leaders and 
managers who do not meet those standards 
should be removed. 
(E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING.—Pre-de-
ployment training on interpretation of the man-
date of the operation, specifically in the areas of 
use of force, civilian protection and field condi-
tions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 
human rights should be mandatory, and all per-
sonnel, regardless of category or rank, should be 
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139 
required to sign an oath that each has received 
and understands such training as a condition of 
participation in the operation. 
(F) GRATIS
MILITARY
PERSONNEL.—The 
General Assembly should seek to strengthen the 
capacity the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraor-
dinary burden currently placed upon the limited 
number of headquarters staff by lifting restric-
tions on the utilization of gratis military per-
sonnel by the Department so that the Depart-
ment may accept secondments from Member 
States of military personnel with expertise in 
mission planning, logistics, and other oper-
ational specialties. 
(2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 
(A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CON-
DUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 
has the status of a binding rule and applies 
equally to all personnel serving in United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat-
egory or rank, including military personnel, 
should be adopted and incorporated into legal 
documents governing participation in such an 
operation, including all contracts and Memoran-
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140 
dums of Understanding, promulgated and effec-
tively enforced. 
(B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CON-
DUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, should receive training on the Code of Con-
duct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping 
operation, in addition to periodic follow-on 
training. In particular— 
(i) all personnel, regardless of category 
or rank, should be provided with a personal 
copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
translated into the national language of 
such personnel, regardless of whether such 
language is an official language of the 
United Nations; 
(ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
each pledges to abide by the Code of Con-
duct, and that each understands the con-
sequences of violating the Code of Conduct, 
including immediate termination of partici-
pation in and permanent exclusion from all 
current and future peacekeeping operations, 
as well as the assumption of personal liabil-
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141 
ity and victims compensation, where appro-
priate, as a condition of appointment to 
any such operation; and 
(iii) peacekeeping operations should 
continue and enhance educational outreach 
programs to reach local communities where 
peacekeeping personnel of such operations 
are based, including explaining prohibited 
acts on the part of United Nations peace-
keeping personnel and identifying the indi-
vidual to whom the local population may 
direct complaints or file allegations of ex-
ploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis-
conduct. 
(C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the Conduct 
and Discipline Teams already deployed to sup-
port United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, Timor 
Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present 
in each operation to monitor compliance with 
the Code of Conduct, and should report simulta-
neously to the Head of Mission, the United Na-
tions Department of Field Support, the United 
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142 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
and the Associate Director of the Office of Inter-
nal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Oper-
ations (established under section 1114(b)(9)). 
(D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, pro-
fessional, and independent investigative body 
should be established and introduced into United 
Nations 
peacekeeping 
operations. 
In 
par-
ticular— 
(i) the investigative body should in-
clude professionals with experience in inves-
tigating sex crimes and the illegal exploi-
tation of resources, as appropriate, as well 
as experts who can provide guidance on 
standards of proof and evidentiary require-
ments necessary for any subsequent legal ac-
tion; 
(ii) provisions should be included in 
all Memorandums of Understanding, in-
cluding a Model Memorandum of Under-
standing, that obligate Member States that 
contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper-
ation to designate a military prosecutor 
who will participate in any investigation 
into credible allegations of misconduct 
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143 
brought against an individual of such Mem-
ber State, so that evidence is collected and 
preserved in a manner consistent with the 
military law of such Member State; 
(iii) the investigative body should be 
regionally based to ensure rapid deployment 
and should be equipped with modern 
forensics equipment for the purpose of posi-
tively identifying perpetrators and, where 
necessary, for determining paternity; and 
(iv) the investigative body should re-
port directly to the Associate Director of the 
Office of Internal Oversight Services for 
Peacekeeping Operations, while providing 
copies of any reports to the Department of 
Field Support, the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
and the Member State concerned. 
(E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Dis-
cipline Unit in the headquarters of the United 
Nations Department of Field Support should be 
appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked 
with— 
(i) promulgating measures to prevent 
misconduct; 
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144 
(ii) receiving reports by field personnel 
and coordinating the Department’s response 
to allegations of misconduct; 
(iii) gathering follow-up information 
on completed investigations, particularly by 
focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
individual concerned taken by the United 
Nations or by the Member State that is con-
tributing troops to which such individual 
belongs, and sharing such information with 
the Security Council, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mis-
sion, and the community hosting the peace-
keeping operation; and 
(iv) contributing pertinent data on 
conduct and discipline to the database re-
quired pursuant to subparagraph (H). 
(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS AS-
SISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations 
should provide immediate medical assistance to 
victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the re-
sponsibility for providing longer-term treatment, 
care, or restitution lies solely with the individual 
found guilty of the misconduct. In particular: 
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(i) The United Nations should not as-
sume responsibility for providing long-term 
treatment or compensation under the Sex-
ual Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assist-
ance Mechanism by utilizing assessed con-
tributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, thereby shielding individuals 
from personal liability and reinforcing an 
atmosphere of impunity. 
(ii) If an individual responsible for 
misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
assistance, responsibility for providing as-
sistance to a victim should be assigned to 
the Member State that contributed the con-
tingent to which such individual belonged 
or to the manager concerned. 
(iii) In the case of misconduct by a 
member of a military contingent, appro-
priate funds shall be withheld from the 
troop contributing country concerned. 
(iv) In the case of misconduct by a ci-
vilian employee or contractor of the United 
Nations, appropriate wages shall be gar-
nished from such individual or fines shall 
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146 
be imposed against such individual, con-
sistent with existing United Nations Staff 
Rules, and retirement funds shall not be 
shielded from liability. 
(G) MANAGERS
AND
COMMANDERS.—The 
manner in which managers and commanders 
handle cases of misconduct by those serving 
under them should be included in their indi-
vidual performance evaluations, so that man-
agers and commanders who take decisive action 
to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, 
while those who create a permissive environment 
or impede investigations are penalized or re-
lieved of duty, as appropriate. 
(H) DATABASE.—A centralized database, 
including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi-
ometric data, should be created and maintained 
within the United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, the Department of Field 
Support, and other relevant United Nations bod-
ies without further delay to track cases of mis-
conduct, including the outcome of investigations 
and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that per-
sonnel who have engaged in misconduct or other 
criminal activities, regardless of category or 
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147 
rank, are permanently barred from participation 
in future peacekeeping operations. 
(I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.—If 
a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate 
with the directives contained herein or acts to 
shield its nationals from personal liability, that 
Member State should be barred from contributing 
troops or personnel to future peacekeeping oper-
ations. 
(J) 
WELFARE.—Peacekeeping 
operations 
should continue to seek to maintain a minimum 
standard of welfare for mission personnel to 
ameliorate conditions of service, while adjust-
ments are made to the discretionary welfare pay-
ments currently provided to Member States that 
contribute troops to offset the cost of operation- 
provided recreational facilities, as necessary and 
appropriate. 
SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION. 
(a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
CONTINGENT
UPON
PRESIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATION
OF 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 
(1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OP-
ERATIONS.— 
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148 
(A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
certifies that the requirements described in para-
graph (2) have been satisfied, the President shall 
direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United 
Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expan-
sion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations. 
(B) EXCEPTION
AND
NOTIFICATION.—The 
requirements described under paragraph (2) may 
be waived with respect to a particular peace-
keeping operation if the President determines 
that failure to deploy new or additional peace-
keepers in such situation will significantly con-
tribute to the widespread loss of human life, 
genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national 
security interest of the United States. If the 
President makes such a determination, the Presi-
dent shall, not later than 15 days before the exer-
cise of such waiver, notify the appropriate con-
gressional committees of such determination and 
resulting waiver. 
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149 
(2) CERTIFICATION
OF
PEACEKEEPING
OPER-
ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in 
paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Sec-
retary to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of re-
forms, related to peacekeeping operations have been 
adopted by the United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations or the General Assembly, as ap-
propriate: 
(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 
has the status of a binding rule and applies 
equally to all personnel serving in United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat-
egory or rank, has been adopted by the General 
Assembly and duly incorporated into all con-
tracts and a Model Memorandum of Under-
standing, and mechanisms have been established 
for training such personnel concerning the re-
quirements of the Code and enforcement of the 
Code. 
(B) All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have 
been trained concerning the requirements of the 
Code of Conduct and each has been given a per-
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150 
sonal copy of the Code, translated into the na-
tional language of such personnel. 
(C) All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, are required to sign an oath that each has 
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 
pledges to abide by the Code, and that each un-
derstands the consequences of violating the Code, 
including immediate termination of participa-
tion in and permanent exclusion from all cur-
rent and future peacekeeping operations, as well 
as the assumption of personal liability for vic-
tims compensation as a condition of the appoint-
ment to such operation. 
(D) All peacekeeping operations have de-
signed and implemented educational outreach 
programs to reach local communities where 
peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 
based to explain prohibited acts on the part of 
United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
identify the individual to whom the local popu-
lation may direct complaints or file allegations 
of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis-
conduct. 
(E) The creation of a centralized database, 
including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi-
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151 
ometric data, has been completed and is being 
maintained in the United Nations Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 
misconduct, including the outcomes of investiga-
tions and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that 
personnel, regardless of category or rank, who 
have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
activities are permanently barred from partici-
pation in future peacekeeping operations. 
(F) A Model Memorandum of Under-
standing between the United Nations and each 
Member State that contributes troops to a peace-
keeping operation has been adopted by the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Op-
erations that specifically obligates each such 
Member State to— 
(i) uphold the uniform Code of Con-
duct which shall apply equally to all per-
sonnel serving in United Nations peace-
keeping operations, regardless of category or 
rank; 
(ii) designate a competent legal author-
ity, preferably a prosecutor with expertise 
in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse 
where appropriate, to participate in any 
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152 
investigation into an allegation of mis-
conduct brought against an individual of 
such Member State; 
(iii) refer to its competent national or 
military authority for possible prosecution, 
if warranted, any investigation of a viola-
tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi-
nal activity by an individual of such Mem-
ber State; 
(iv) report to the Department of Field 
Support and the Department of Peace-
keeping Operations on the outcome of any 
such investigation; 
(v) undertake to conduct on-site court 
martial proceedings, where practical and 
appropriate, relating to allegations of mis-
conduct alleged against an individual of 
such Member State; and 
(vi) assume responsibility for the pro-
vision of appropriate assistance to a victim 
of misconduct committed by an individual 
of such Member State. 
(G) A professional and independent inves-
tigative and audit function has been established 
within the United Nations Department of Peace-
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keeping Operations and the Office of Internal 
Oversight Services to monitor United Nations 
peacekeeping operations. 
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Union Calendar No. 221 
112TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. R. 2829 
[Report No. 112–323] 
A BILL 
To promote transparency, accountability, and re-
form within the United Nations system, and for 
other purposes. 
DECEMBER 8, 2011 
Reported with an amendment, committed to the Com-
mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 
and ordered to be printed 
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