I
106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 3050
To provide for the posthumous advancement of Rear Admiral (retired) Hus-
band E. Kimmel and Major General (retired) Walter C. Short on the
retired lists of their respective services.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 7, 1999
Mr. SPRATT (for himself, Mr. SPENCE, and Mr. SKELTON) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services
A BILL
To provide for the posthumous advancement of Rear Admiral
(retired) Husband E. Kimmel and Major General (re-
tired) Walter C. Short on the retired lists of their respec-
tive services.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. POSTHUMOUS ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMI-
RAL (RETIRED) HUSBAND E. KIMMEL AND
MAJOR 
GENERAL 
(RETIRED) 
WALTER 
C.
SHORT ON RETIRED LISTS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:
(1) The late Rear Admiral (retired) Husband
E. Kimmel, formerly serving in the grade of admiral
as the Commander in Chief of the United States
Fleet and the Commander in Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet, had an excellent and unassailable
record throughout his career in the United States
Navy prior to the December 7, 1941, attack on
Pearl Harbor.
(2) The late Major General (retired) Walter C.
Short, formerly serving in the grade of lieutenant
general as the Commander of the United States
Army Hawaiian Department, had an excellent and
unassailable record throughout his career in the
United States Army prior to the December 7, 1941,
attack on Pearl Harbor.
(3) Numerous investigations following the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor have documented that then
Admiral Kimmel and then Lieutenant General Short
were not provided necessary and critical intelligence
that was available, that foretold of war with Japan,
that warned of imminent attack, and that would
have alerted them to prepare for the attack, includ-
ing such essential communiques as the Japanese
Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of September 24,
1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japa-
nese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador
in the United States from December 6–7, 1941,
known as the Fourteen-Part Message.
(4) On December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel
and Lieutenant General Short were relieved of their
commands and returned to their permanent ranks of
rear admiral and major general.
(5) Admiral William Harrison Standley, who
served as a member of the investigating commission
known as the Roberts Commission that accused Ad-
miral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of
‘‘dereliction of duty’’ only six weeks after the attack
on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the report main-
taining that ‘‘these two officers were martyred’’ and
‘‘if they had been brought to trial, both would have
been cleared of the charge’’.
(6) On October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of
Inquiry—
(A) exonerated Admiral Kimmel on the
grounds that his military decisions and the dis-
position of his forces at the time of the Decem-
ber 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor were prop-
er ‘‘by virtue of the information that Admiral
Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither
the probability nor the imminence of an air at-
tack on Pearl Harbor’’;
(B) criticized the higher command for not
sharing with Admiral Kimmel ‘‘during the very
critical period of 26 November to 7 December
1941, important information . . . regarding the
Japanese situation’’; and
(C) concluded that the Japanese attack
and its outcome was attributable to no serious
fault on the part of anyone in the naval service.
(7) On June 15, 1944, an investigation con-
ducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at the direction of the
Secretary of the Navy produced evidence, subse-
quently confirmed, that essential intelligence con-
cerning Japanese intentions and war plans was
available in Washington but was not shared with Ad-
miral Kimmel.
(8) On October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Har-
bor Board of Investigation determined that—
(A) Lieutenant General Short had not
been kept ‘‘fully advised of the growing tense-
ness of the Japanese situation which indicated
an increasing necessity for better preparation
for war’’;
(B) detailed information and intelligence
about Japanese intentions and war plans were
available in ‘‘abundance’’, but were not shared
with Lieutenant General Short’s Hawaii com-
mand; and
(C) Lieutenant General Short was not pro-
vided ‘‘on the evening of December 6th and the
early morning of December 7th, the critical in-
formation indicating an almost immediate break
with Japan, though there was ample time to
have accomplished this’’.
(9) The reports by both the Naval Court of In-
quiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Inves-
tigation were kept secret, and Rear Admiral (re-
tired) Kimmel and Major General (retired) Short
were denied their requests to defend themselves
through trial by court-martial.
(10) The joint committee of Congress that was
established to investigate the conduct of Admiral
Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short completed, on
May 31, 1946, a 1,075-page report which included
the conclusions of the committee that the two offi-
cers had not been guilty of dereliction of duty.
(11) The Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in es-
tablishing a promotion system for the Navy and the
Army, provided a legal basis for the President to
honor any officer of the Armed Forces of the United
States who served his country as a senior com-
mander during World War II with a placement of
that officer, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, on the retired list with the highest grade held
while on the active duty list.
(12) On April 27, 1954, the then Chief of
Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., rec-
ommended that Rear Admiral Kimmel be advanced
in rank in accordance with the provisions of the Of-
ficer Personnel Act of 1947.
(13) On November 13, 1991, a majority of the
members of the Board for the Correction of Military
Records of the Department of the Army found that
the late Major General (retired) Short ‘‘was unjustly
held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster’’ and
that ‘‘it would be equitable and just’’ to advance him
to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list’’.
(14) In October 1994, the then Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Carlisle Trost, withdrew his
1988 recommendation against the advancement of
Rear Admiral (retired) Kimmel (by then deceased)
and recommended that the case of Rear Admiral
Kimmel be reopened.
(15) Although the Dorn Report, a report on the
results of a Department of Defense study that was
issued on December 15, 1995, did not provide sup-
port for an advancement of the late Rear Admiral
(retired) Kimmel or the late Major General (retired)
Short in grade, it did set forth as a conclusion of the
study that ‘‘responsibility for the Pearl Harbor dis-
aster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admi-
ral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it should
be broadly shared’’.
(16) The Dorn Report found—
(A) that ‘‘Army and Navy officials in
Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese
diplomatic communications . . . which provided
crucial confirmation of the imminence of war’’;
(B) that ‘‘the evidence of the handling of
these messages in Washington reveals some in-
eptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and
misestimations, limited coordination, ambiguous
language, and lack of clarification and follow-up
at higher levels’’; and
(C) that ‘‘together, these characteristics re-
sulted in failure . . . to appreciate fully and to
convey to the commanders in Hawaii the sense
of focus and urgency that these intercepts
should have engendered’’.
(17) On July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C.
Richardson (United States Navy, retired) responded
to the Dorn Report with his own study which con-
firmed findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry and
the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation and
established, among other facts, that the war effort
in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence
distribution policy, and the degree to which the com-
manders of the United States forces in Hawaii were
not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii
was directly attributable to the withholding of intel-
ligence from then Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant
General Short.
(18) Rear Admiral (retired) Kimmel and Major
General (retired) Short are the only two officers eli-
gible for advancement under the Officer Personnel
Act of 1947 as senior World War II commanders
who were excluded from the list of retired officers
presented for advancement on the retired lists to
their highest wartime ranks under that Act.
(19) This singular exclusion from advancement
of Rear Admiral (retired) Kimmel and Major Gen-
eral (retired) Short from the Navy retired list and
the Army retired list, respectively, serves only to
perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in
Hawaii were derelict in their duty and responsible
for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and
is a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor
toward two of the finest officers who have served in
the Armed Forces of the United States.
(20) Major General (retired) Walter Short died
on September 23, 1949, and Rear Admiral (retired)
Husband Kimmel died on May 14, 1968, without
having been accorded the honor of being returned to
their wartime ranks as were their fellow veterans of
World War II.
(21) The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl
Harbor Survivors Association, the Admiral Nimitz
Foundation, the Naval Academy Alumni Association,
the Retired Officers Association, the Pearl Harbor
Commemorative Committee, and other associations
and numerous retired military officers have called
for the rehabilitation of the reputations and honor of
the late Rear Admiral (retired) Kimmel and the late
Major General (retired) Short through their post-
humous advancement on the retired lists to their
highest wartime grades.
(b) REQUEST
FOR ADVANCEMENT
ON RETIRED
LISTS.—(1) The President is requested—
(A) to advance the late Rear Admiral (retired)
Husband E. Kimmel to the grade of admiral on the
retired list of the Navy; and
(B) to advance the late Major General (retired)
Walter C. Short to the grade of lieutenant general
on the retired list of the Army.
(2) Any advancement in grade on a retired list re-
quested under paragraph (1) shall not increase or other-
wise modify the compensation or benefits from the United
States to which any person is now or may in the future
be entitled based upon the military service of the officer
advanced.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
(1) the late Rear Admiral (retired) Husband E.
Kimmel performed his duties as Commander in
Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, competently and
professionally, and, therefore, the losses incurred by
the United States in the attacks on the naval base
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on the
island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were
not a result of dereliction in the performance of
those duties by the then Admiral Kimmel; and
(2) the late Major General (retired) Walter C.
Short performed his duties as Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, competently and profes-
sionally, and, therefore, the losses incurred by the
United States in the attacks on Hickam Army Air
Field and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other
targets on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on December
7, 1941, were not a result of dereliction in the per-
formance of those duties by the then Lieutenant
General Short.
Æ