702 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
technologies and scientific knowledge; and 
(G) providing intelligence and military as-
sistance. 
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 
pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 
increasingly authoritarian governance model at home 
through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, 
and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These 
policies frequently and deliberately undermine United 
States interests and are contrary to core United 
States values and the values of other nations, both in 
the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra-
tegic decision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
the United States has been compelled to reexamine 
and revise its strategy towards the PRC. 
(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the 
President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, has elevated the 
‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’’ as cen-
tral to the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. 
His program demands— 
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 
(B) concentration of military power; 
(C) a strong role for the CCP in the state 
and the economy;
703 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 
control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 
and 
(E) the denial of any values and individual 
rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP. 
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern-
ance, ‘‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’’, as su-
perior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models 
of the United States and other democracies. This ap-
proach to governance is lauded by the CCP as essen-
tial to securing the PRC’s status as a global leader, 
and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 
speech, President Xi said, ‘‘We firmly believe that as 
socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further 
. . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our 
socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . 
[and] our country’s road of development will have in-
creasingly greater influence on the world.’’. 
(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish re-
gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use 
that dominant position to propel the PRC to become 
the ‘‘leading world power,’’ shaping an international 
order that is conducive to the CCP’s interests. Achiev-
ing these objectives require turning the PRC into a 
wealthy nation under strict CCP rule and using a
704 
† HR 4521 EAS 
strong military and advanced technological capability 
to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other 
countries’ interests. 
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
national order, which is built upon the rule of law 
and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
ducting global information and influence operations, 
seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le-
gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, 
and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of 
multinational organizations for the benefit of the 
PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense 
of the interests of the United States and the inter-
national community. In December 2018, President Xi 
suggested that the CCP views its ‘‘historic mission’’ as 
not only to govern China, but also to profoundly in-
fluence global governance to benefit the CCP. 
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 
follow its model of ‘‘socialism with Chinese character-
istics’’. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, 
President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a 
model of development for other countries by utilizing 
‘‘Chinese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solv-
ing problems’’.
705 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model 
and attempting to weaken other models of governance 
by— 
(A) undermining democratic institutions; 
(B) subverting financial institutions; 
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the 
policies of the PRC; and 
(D) using disinformation to disguise the na-
ture of the actions described in subparagraphs 
(A) through (C). 
(11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the 
global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, 
President Xi said that for the PRC to reach ‘‘pros-
perity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to ‘‘endeavor to be 
a major world center for science and innovation’’. The 
PRC has invested the equivalent of billions of dollars 
into education and research and development, and 
has established joint scientific research centers and 
science universities. 
(12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufac-
turing and technological superpower’’ and to promote 
‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is coming 
at the expense of human rights and longstanding 
international rules and norms with respect to eco-
nomic competition, and presents a challenge to
706 
† HR 4521 EAS 
United States national security and the security of 
allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the 
PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli-
cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, 
and a significant role of the state in internet govern-
ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct 
and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev-
eryday lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘Military-Civil 
Fusion’’ mandates that civil and commercial re-
search, which increasingly drives global innovation, is 
leveraged to develop new military capabilities. 
(13) The PRC and the CCP are committing 
crimes against humanity and are engaged in an on-
going genocide, in violation of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
done at Paris December 9, 1948, against the predomi-
nantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and reli-
gious minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au-
tonomous Region, including through campaigns of 
imprisonment, torture, rape, and coercive birth pre-
vention policies. 
(14) The PRC is using legal and illegal means 
to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing 
and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-
rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to
707 
† HR 4521 EAS 
ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP 
engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
dermine a free and open international market, such 
as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans-
fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda-
tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi-
ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and 
foreign companies. 
(15) The policies referred to in paragraph (14) 
are designed to freeze United States and other foreign 
firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-
tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza-
tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation 
of its World Trade Organization commitments. In 
May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims to 
keep the ‘‘initiatives of innovation and development 
security . . . in [China’s] own hands’’. 
(16) The PRC is advancing its global objectives 
through a variety of avenues, including its signature 
initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which 
is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and includes 
the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The 
PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly 
beneficial plan for all countries. However, it eventu-
ally seeks to advance an economic system with the
708 
† HR 4521 EAS 
PRC at its center, making it the most concrete geo-
graphical representation of the PRC’s global ambi-
tions. BRI increases the economic influence of state- 
owned Chinese firms in global markets, enhances the 
PRC’s political leverage with government leaders 
around the world, and provides greater access to stra-
tegic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI, 
the PRC seeks political deference through economic 
dependence. 
(17) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re-
gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace 
the United States from the region. As a Pacific 
power, the United States has built and supported en-
during alliances and economic partnerships that se-
cure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of 
law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo- 
Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili-
tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests. 
(18) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep 
the United States military from operating in the 
Western Pacific and to erode United States security 
guarantees. 
(19) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive 
control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air 
space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually
709 
† HR 4521 EAS 
exercising greater influence beyond the region. This 
includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy 
exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op-
erations in areas permitted under international law. 
(20) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’ 
with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately 
be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called ‘‘re-
unification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal 
inherently coercive. In January 2019, President Xi 
stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise to renounce 
the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking all 
necessary means’’. Taiwan’s embodiment of demo-
cratic values and economic liberalism challenges 
President Xi’s goal of achieving national rejuvena-
tion. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan’s dominant 
strategic position in the First Island Chain and to 
project power into the Second Island Chain and be-
yond. 
(21) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat-
ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com-
merce, damages the environment, bolsters PLA power 
projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates 
other regional claimants in an effort to advance its 
unlawful claims and control the waters around neigh-
710 
† HR 4521 EAS 
boring countries. Despite President Xi’s September 
2015 speech, in which he said the PRC did not intend 
to militarize the South China Sea, during the 2017 
19th Party Congress, President Xi announced that 
‘‘construction on islands and reefs in the South China 
Sea have seen steady progress’’. 
(22) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA 
to attain a level of capacity and capability superior 
to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
duct of modern military operations by shifting its 
military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate [for] 
China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force ‘‘commen-
surate with China’s international status’’. Ultimately, 
this transformation could enable China to impose its 
will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of 
military force. In 2017, President Xi established the 
following developmental benchmarks for the advance-
ment of the PLA: 
(A) A mechanized force with increased 
informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020. 
(B) The complete modernization of China’s 
national defense by 2035. 
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into 
a world-class force by 2050.
711 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(23) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies 
described in this section undermine United States in-
terests, such as— 
(A) upholding a free and open international 
order; 
(B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
national institutions with liberal norms and val-
ues; 
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power 
in the Indo-Pacific; 
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies; 
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes; 
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce 
through open and transparent markets; and 
(G) promoting individual freedom and 
human rights. 
(24) The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten-
sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be-
havior and therefore increased the need for United 
States global leadership and a competitive posture. 
The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the 
COVID–19 pandemic by— 
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 
Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called 
‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong;
712 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the 
East and South China Seas; 
(C) contributing to increased tensions with 
India; and 
(D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
scure the PRC government’s efforts to cover up 
the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion 
about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
credit the United States, its allies, and global 
health efforts. 
(25) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re-
ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included— 
(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of 
the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope 
of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well 
as cases of person-to-person transmission; 
(B) claims that the virus originated in 
United States biological defense research at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland; 
(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating 
a possible link between the virus and other 
United States biological facilities; and
713 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) efforts to block access to qualified inter-
national infectious disease experts who might 
contradict the CCP’s narrative. 
(26) In response to the PRC’s strategy and poli-
cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra-
tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro-
mote our vital interests and values. 
(27) The United States’ policy of strategic com-
petition with respect to the PRC is part of a broader 
strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and the world 
which centers around cooperation with United States 
allies and partners to advance shared values and in-
terests and to preserve and enhance a free, open, 
democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse 
region. 
(28) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive 
framework for promoting United State security inter-
ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa-
cific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years— 
(A) to support greater security and defense 
cooperation between the United States and allies 
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
714 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) to advance democracy and the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo- 
Pacific region; 
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be-
tween the United States and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement 
through programs such as the Young Southeast 
Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth 
Volunteers program; and 
(E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 3003. DEFINITIONS. 
In this division: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
(2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
(3) INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—The terms ‘‘Indo-Pa-
cific’’ and ‘‘Indo-Pacific region’’ mean the 37 coun-
715 
† HR 4521 EAS 
tries and the surrounding waterways that are under 
the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command. These countries are: Australia, Ban-
gladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, 
Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malay-
sia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mon-
golia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. 
(4) PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY; PLA.—The 
terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 
the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 
(5) PRC; 
CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 
‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 3004. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States, 
in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue 
the following objectives: 
(1) The United States global leadership role is 
sustained and its political system and major founda-
tions of national power are postured for long-term po-
litical, economic, technological, and military competi-
tion with the PRC.
716 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re-
mains favorable to the United States and its allies. 
The United States and its allies maintain unfettered 
access to the region, including through freedom of 
navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent 
with international law and practice, and the PRC 
neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors. 
(3) The allies and partners of the United 
States— 
(A) maintain confidence in United States 
leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
cific region; 
(B) can withstand and combat subversion 
and undue influence by the PRC; and 
(C) align themselves with the United States 
in setting global rules, norms, and standards 
that benefit the international community. 
(4) The combined weight of the United States 
and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to 
dominate other states outweigh the potential benefits. 
(5) The United States leads the free and open 
international order, which is comprised of resilient 
states and institutions that uphold and defend prin-
ciples, such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual
717 
† HR 4521 EAS 
freedom, and human rights. The international order 
is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization 
by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 
(6) The key rules, norms, and standards of inter-
national engagement in the 21st century are main-
tained, including— 
(A) the protection of human rights, commer-
cial engagement and investment, and technology; 
and 
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
are in alignment with the values and interests of 
the United States, its allies and partners, and 
the free world. 
(7) The United States assures that the CCP does 
not— 
(A) subvert open and democratic societies; 
(B) distort global markets; 
(C) manipulate the international trade sys-
tem; 
(D) coerce other nations via economic and 
military means; or 
(E) use its technological advantages to un-
dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na-
tional security interests.
718 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(8) The United States deters military confronta-
tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce 
the risk of conflict. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in 
pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic 
foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 
growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 
improve the ability of the United States to pursue its 
vital economic, foreign policy, and national security 
interests; 
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 
with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
development, military, informational, and techno-
logical realms that maximizes the United States’ 
strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harm-
ing United States interests and the values of United 
States allies and partners; 
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international 
system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of 
law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and 
a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes, human rights, and good and trans-
parent governance;
719 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific 
and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-
lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-
terests and values and bolster partner countries’ con-
fidence that the United States is and will remain a 
strong, committed, and constant partner; 
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United 
States allies and partners in boosting their own capa-
bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect 
shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex-
ternal pressure; 
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 
healthy competition in United States-China economic 
relations by— 
(A) advancing policies that harden the 
United States economy against unfair and ille-
gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
ercion of United States businesses; and 
(B) tightening United States laws and regu-
lations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s at-
tempts to harm United States economic competi-
tiveness; 
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led 
growth in emerging markets around the world, in-
720 
† HR 4521 EAS 
cluding through the use of United States Government 
tools that— 
(A) support greater private sector invest-
ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 
that are grounded in the rule of law; 
(B) promote open markets; 
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
frameworks; 
(D) improve the management of key eco-
nomic sectors; 
(E) combat corruption; and 
(F) foster and support greater collaboration 
with and among partner countries and the 
United States private sector to develop secure 
and sustainable infrastructure; 
(8) to lead in the advancement of international 
rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade 
and open and integrated markets; 
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in 
support of United States companies and businesses in 
partner countries that seek fair competition; 
(10) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such 
as next-generation telecommunications, artificial in-
721 
† HR 4521 EAS 
telligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and 
biotechnology, by— 
(A) providing necessary investment and 
concrete incentives for the private sector to accel-
erate development of such technologies; 
(B) modernizing export controls and invest-
ment screening regimes and associated policies 
and regulations; 
(C) enhancing United States leadership in 
technical standards-setting bodies and avenues 
for developing norms regarding the use of emerg-
ing critical technologies; 
(D) reducing United States barriers and in-
creasing incentives for collaboration with allies 
and partners on the research and co-development 
of critical technologies; 
(E) collaborating with allies and partners 
to protect critical technologies by— 
(i) crafting multilateral export control 
measures; 
(ii) building capacity for defense tech-
nology security; 
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in sup-
ply chains; and 
(iv) ensuring diversification; and
722 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(F) designing major defense capabilities for 
export to allies and partners; 
(11) to enable the people of the United States, in-
cluding the private sector, civil society, universities 
and other academic institutions, State and local legis-
lators, and other relevant actors to identify and re-
main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence 
of the CCP in the United States; 
(12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks 
referred to in paragraph (11), while still preserving 
opportunities for economic engagement, academic re-
search, and cooperation in other areas where the 
United States and the PRC share interests; 
(13) to collaborate with advanced democracies 
and other willing partners to promote ideals and 
principles that— 
(A) advance a free and open international 
order; 
(B) strengthen democratic institutions; 
(C) protect and promote human rights; and 
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
porting; 
(14) to develop comprehensive and holistic strate-
gies and policies to counter PRC disinformation cam-
paigns;
723 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 
United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 
multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of 
these organizations against co-optation by illiberal 
and authoritarian nations; 
(16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental free-
doms and human rights in the United States relation-
ship with the PRC; 
(17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant 
and growing capabilities to build a network of like- 
minded states that sustains and strengthens a free 
and open order and addresses regional and global 
challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-
countable for— 
(A) violations and abuses of human rights; 
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and 
(C) undermining and abrogating treaties, 
other international agreements, and other inter-
national norms related to human rights; 
(18) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re-
pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at-
tain unfair economic advantages and to pressure 
other nations to defer to its political and strategic ob-
jectives;
724 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(19) to maintain United States access to the 
Western Pacific, including by— 
(A) increasing United States forward-de-
ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) modernizing the United States military 
through investments in existing and new plat-
forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater 
force structure and enabling capabilities, joint 
operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-
ally resilient and politically sustainable posture; 
and 
(C) operating and conducting exercises with 
allies and partners— 
(i) to mitigate the PLA’s ability to 
project power and establish contested zones 
within the First and Second Island Chains; 
(ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA 
to coerce its neighbors; 
(iii) to maintain open sea and air 
lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, 
the East China Sea, and the South China 
Sea; and 
(iv) to project power from the United 
States and its allies and partners to dem-
725 
† HR 4521 EAS 
onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
gistics; 
(20) to deter the PRC from— 
(A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including 
by developing more combat-credible forces that 
are integrated with allies and partners in con-
tact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat 
any PRC theory of victory in the First or Sec-
ond Island Chains of the Western Pacific and be-
yond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy; 
(B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 
armed conflict; or 
(C) initiating armed conflict; 
(21) to strengthen United States-PRC military- 
to-military communication and improve de-escalation 
procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the 
risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level 
visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and 
military officials and other measures, in alignment 
with United States interests; and 
(22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
including through bilateral or multilateral means and 
at the United Nations, as appropriate.
726 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3005. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol-
icy described in section 3004(b) requires the following ac-
tions: 
(1) Strategic competition with the PRC will re-
quire the United States— 
(A) to marshal sustained political will to 
protect its vital interests, promote its values, and 
advance its economic and national security ob-
jectives for decades to come; and 
(B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
persuade the American people and United States 
allies and partners of— 
(i) the challenges posed by the PRC; 
and 
(ii) the need for long-term competition 
to defend shared interests and values. 
(2) The United States must coordinate closely 
with allies and partners to compete effectively with 
the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 
to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 
and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior of 
the PRC. 
(3) The President of the United States must lead 
and direct the entire executive branch to treat the 
People’s Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical
752 
† HR 4521 EAS 
nese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated 
pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain 
available until expended and shall be in addition to 
amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter 
such influence. 
(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of 
funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter 
the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party glob-
ally shall be subject to prior consultation with, and con-
sistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification proce-
dures of— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(c) POLICY
GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND
AP-
PROVAL.— 
(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State shall 
designate an existing senior official of the Department 
at the rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide 
policy guidance, coordination, and approval for the 
obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection 
(a).
753 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated pur-
suant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for— 
(A) on an annual basis, the identification of 
specific strategic priorities for using the funds 
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), 
such as geographic areas of focus or functional 
categories of programming that funds are to be 
concentrated within, consistent with the national 
interests of the United States and the purposes 
of this division; 
(B) the coordination and approval of all 
programming conducted using the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by subsection (a), based 
on a determination that such programming di-
rectly counters the malign influence of the Chi-
nese Communist Party, including specific activi-
ties or policies advanced by the Chinese Com-
munist Party, pursuant to the strategic objec-
tives of the United States, as established in the 
2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 Na-
tional Defense Strategy, and other relevant na-
tional and regional strategies as appropriate; 
(C) ensuring that all programming ap-
proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such 
acts by the Chinese Communist Party described
777 
† HR 4521 EAS 
‘‘(H) In the case of a covered transaction 
involving an institution of higher education (as 
defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of 
Education.’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(8) INCLUSION OF OTHER AGENCIES ON COM-
MITTEE.—In considering including on the Committee 
under paragraph (2)(K) the heads of other executive 
departments, agencies, or offices, the President shall 
give due consideration to the heads of relevant re-
search and science agencies, departments, and offices, 
including the Secretary of Health and Human Serv-
ices, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, 
and the Director of the National Science Founda-
tion.’’. 
(5) CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING TO 
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—Subsection (m)(3) of such 
section is amended— 
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘; 
and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the 
period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(D) an evaluation of whether there are for-
eign malign influence or espionage activities di-
1024 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) the relative capacity of the Indo-Pacific 
countries of Oceania to absorb United States for-
eign assistance for diplomatic and development 
needs through partner governments and civil so-
ciety institutions; and 
(C) any other factor that the Secretary or 
Administrator determines may constitute a bar-
rier to deploying or increasing United States 
foreign assistance to the Indo-Pacific countries of 
Oceania; 
(4) assessments of the presence of, degree of inter-
national development by, partner country indebted-
ness to, and political influence of malign foreign gov-
ernments, such as the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China, and non-state actors; 
(5) assessments of new foreign economic assist-
ance modalities that could assist in strengthening 
United States foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific 
countries of Oceania, including the deployment of 
technical assistance and asset recovery tools to part-
ner governments and civil society institutions to help 
develop the capacity and expertise necessary to 
achieve self-sufficiency; 
(6) an evaluation of the existing budget and re-
source management processes for the Department of
1032 
† HR 4521 EAS 
national structures to support countries of the 
Oceania region in the deployment and mainte-
nance of large-scale use of maritime domain 
awareness technology systems for the purposes of 
combating IUU fishing and supporting fisheries 
resource management; 
(F) an evaluation of the utility of using for-
eign assistance, security assistance, and develop-
ment assistance provided by the United States to 
countries of the Oceania region to support the 
large-scale deployment and operations of mari-
time domain awareness systems to increase mar-
itime security across the region; and 
(G) an assessment of the role of large-scale 
deployment and operations of maritime domain 
awareness systems throughout Oceania to sup-
porting United States economic and national se-
curity interests in the Oceania region, including 
efforts related to countering IUU fishing, im-
proving maritime security, and countering ma-
lign foreign influence. 
SEC. 3296. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace 
Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strategies to rea-
1033 
† HR 4521 EAS 
sonably and safely expand the number of Peace Corps vol-
unteers in Oceania, with the goals of— 
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to 
all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 
(2) working with regional and international 
partners of the United States to expand the presence 
of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
communities in support of climate resilience initia-
tives. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall— 
(1) assess the factors contributing to the current 
absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oce-
ania; 
(2) examine potential remedies that include 
working with United States Government agencies and 
regional governments, including governments of 
United States allies— 
(A) to increase the health infrastructure and 
medical evacuation capabilities of the countries 
of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace 
Corps volunteers while in those countries; 
(B) to address physical safety concerns that 
have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to 
operate in Oceania; and
1718 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 74408. VAT BLUE 6 DYE. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.22.94 
Vat Blue 6 (15,30-Dichloro- 
2,17-diazaheptacyclo 
[16.12.0.03,16.04,13.06, 
11.019,28.021,26] triaconta- 
1(30),3,6,8,10,13,15,18,21, 
23,25,28-dodecaene-5,12,20,27- 
tetrone) (CAS No. 130–20–1) 
(provided for in subheading 
3204.15.80) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74409. VAT BLUE 20 DYE. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.22.95 
Vat Blue 20 (Anthra[9,1,2- 
cde]benzo[rst]pentaphene-5,10- 
dione) (CAS No. 116–71–2) 
(CIN 59800) (provided for in 
subheading 3204.15.80) ...........
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74410. VAT VIOLET 1. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.22.96 
Vat Violet 1 
(Benzo[rst]phenanthro [10,1,2- 
cde] pentaphene-9,18-dione, 
dichloro-) (CAS No. 1324–55– 
6) (CIN 60010) (provided for 
in subheading 3204.15.80) ......
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74411. VAT BROWN 1 DYE. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading:
1726 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 74429. REACTIVE ORANGE 12. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.16 
Reactive Orange 12 powder 
(trisodium 7-[[4-[(4-amino-6- 
chloro-1,3,5-triazin-2- 
yl)amino]-2-(carbamoylamino) 
phenyl]diazenyl]naphthalene- 
1,3,6-trisulfonate) (CAS No. 
70161–14–7) (provided for in 
subheading 3204.16.50) ...........
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74430. PIGMENT RED 177. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.17 
Pigment Red 177 (1-amino-4- 
(4-amino-9,10-dioxoanthracen- 
1-yl)anthracene-9,10-dione) 
(CAS No. 4051–63–2) (pro-
vided for in subheading 
3204.17.04) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74431. PIGMENT YELLOW 110. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.18 
Pigment Yellow 110 (4,5,6,7- 
tetrachloro-3-[4-[(4,5,6,7-tetra-
chloro-3-oxoisoindol-1- 
yliden-
e)amino]phenyl]iminoisoindol- 
1-one) (CAS No. 5590–18–1) 
(provided for in subheading 
3204.17.04) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74432. PIGMENT YELLOW 147. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading:
1727 
† HR 4521 EAS 
‘‘ 
9902.23.19 
Pigment Yellow 147 (1-[[4- 
[(9,10-dioxoanthracen-1- 
yl)amino]-6-phenyl-1,3,5- 
triazin-2-yl]amino]anthracene- 
9,10-dione) (CAS No. 4118– 
16–5) (provided for in sub-
heading 3204.17.60) .................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74433. PIGMENT ORANGE 64. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.20 
Pigment Orange 64 (5-[(6- 
methyl-2-oxo-1,3- 
dihydrobenzimidazol-5- 
yl)diazenyl]-1,3-diazinane- 
2,4,6-trione) (CAS No. 72102– 
84–2) (provided for in sub-
heading 3204.17.60) .................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74434. PIGMENT BLUE 29. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.21 
Pigment Blue 29 (aluminum 
sodium orthosilicate 
trisulfane-1,3-diide (6:8:6:1)) 
(CAS No. 57455–37–5) (pro-
vided for in subheading 
3204.17.60) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74435. PIGMENT VIOLET 15. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.23.22 
Pigment Violet 15 
(hexaaluminum;hexasodium; 
tetrathietane;hexasilicate) 
(CAS No. 12769–96–9) (pro-
vided for in subheading 
3204.17.60) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74436. PIGMENT BLUE 14. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading:
1757 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 74525. THIFENSULFURON-METHYL AND TRIBENURON- 
METHYL FORMULATIONS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.24.14 
Formulations of methyl 2-[[(4- 
methoxy-6-methyl-1,3,5- 
triazin-2-yl)-methylcarbamoyl] 
sulfamoyl]benzoate 
(Tribenuron-methyl) (CAS No. 
101200–48–0) and 3-[(4- 
methoxy-6-methyl-1,3,5- 
triazin-2- 
yl)carbamoylsulfamoyl] 
thiophene-2-carboxylic acid 
(Thifensulfuron) (CAS No. 
79277–67–1) and application 
adjuvants (provided for in 
subheading 3808.93.15) ...........
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74526. METSULFURON-METHYL FORMULATIONS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.24.15 
Formulations of methyl 2-[(4- 
methoxy-6-methyl-1,3,5- 
triazin-2-yl) 
carbamoylsulfamoyl]benzoate 
(Metsulfuron-methyl) (CAS 
No. 74223–64–6) and applica-
tion adjuvants (provided for 
in subheading 3808.93.15) ......
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74527. CHLORIMURON-ETHYL FORMULATIONS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.24.16 
Formulations of ethyl 2-[(4- 
chloro-6-methoxypyrimidin-2- 
yl)carbamoylsulfamoyl] ben-
zoate (Chlorimuron-ethyl) 
(CAS No. 90982–32–4) and 
application adjuvants (pro-
vided for in subheading 
3808.93.15) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’.
1758 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 74528. MIXTURES OF BROMOXYNIL OCTANOATE AND 
BROMOXYNIL HEPTANOATE. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.24.17 
Mixtures of 2,6-dibromo-4- 
cyanophenyl octanoate 
(Bromoxynil octanoate) (CAS 
No. 1689–99–2) and 2,6- 
dibromo-4-cyanophenyl 
heptanoate (Bromoxynil 
heptanoate) (CAS No. 56634– 
95–8) (provided for in sub-
heading 3808.93.15) .................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74529. SULFOMETURON-METHYL AND METSULFURON- 
METHYL FORMULATIONS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.24.18 
Formulations of methyl 2- 
[(4,6-dimethylpyrimidin-2- 
yl)carbamoylsulfamoyl] ben-
zoate (Sulfometuron-methyl) 
(CAS No. 74222–97–2) and 
methyl 2-[(4-methoxy-6-meth-
yl-1,3,5-triazin-2- 
yl)carbamoylsulfamoyl] ben-
zoate (Metsulfuron-methyl) 
(CAS No. 74223–64–6) and 
application adjuvants (pro-
vided for in subheading 
3808.93.15) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 
74530. 
CHLORIMURON-ETHYL 
AND 
TRIBENURON- 
METHYL FORMULATIONS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading:
1813 
† HR 4521 EAS 
‘‘ 
9902.25.98 
Infant teethers of silicone, each 
measuring not over 10 cm by 
10 cm, weighing over 0.05 kg 
and containing a silicone-en-
cased disk of stainless steel 
(provided for in subheading 
3924.90.56) ...............................
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74709. LIGHTED DOG FETCH TOYS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.25.99 
Molded balls of thermoplastic 
rubber, with encased light- 
emitting diode (LED) lights, 
each battery-operated, meas-
uring 64 mm in diameter, 
with a hardness of 40 Shore A 
per ASTM D2240 (provided 
for in subheading 3924.90.56) 
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74710. CERTAIN THERMOPLASTIC NYLON 3-GANG 
SWITCH WALLPLATES. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading: 
‘‘ 
9902.26.01 
Thermoplastic nylon 3-gang 
switch wallplates, each meas-
uring approximately 17.14 cm 
by 12.4 cm (provided for in 
subheading 3925.90.00) ...........
Free 
No change 
No change 
On or before 
12/31/2023 ...
’’. 
SEC. 74711. MANUAL PLASTIC DISPOSABLE CUTLERY DIS-
PENSERS. 
Subchapter II of chapter 99 is amended by inserting 
in numerical sequence the following new heading:
2310 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Octanoate) (CAS No. 1689–99–2); methyl 4-{[(3- 
methoxy-4-methyl-5-oxo-4,5-dihydro 
-1H-1,2,4- 
triazol-1-yl) 
carbonyl] 
sulfamoyl}-5-methyl-3- 
thiophenecarboxylate 
(Thiencarbazone-Methyl) 
(CAS No. 317815–83–1); and diethyl 1-(2,4- 
dichlorophenyl)-5-methyl-4,5-dihydro-1H-pyr-
azole -3,5-dicarboxylate (Mefenpyr-diethyl) (CAS 
No. 135590–91–9) (provided for in subheading 
3808.93.15)’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘3.6%’’ and inserting 
‘‘2.6%’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘12/31/2020’’ and inserting 
‘‘12/31/2023’’. 
(64) PRODUCT USED AS LUBRICANT OR MOLD 
RELEASE MATERIAL.—Heading 9902.10.93 is amend-
ed— 
(A) by amending the article description to 
read as follows: ‘‘Ethene, 1,1,2,2-tetrafluoro-, 
oxidized, polymerized, reduced, methyl esters, re-
duced (CAS No. 88645–29–8) (provided for in 
subheading 3904.69.50)’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘2.1%’’ and inserting 
‘‘Free’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘12/31/2020’’ and inserting 
‘‘12/31/2023’’.