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† HR 4521 EAS 
regular military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises, 
and coordinated policies related to shared interests 
such as protecting cyberspace and advancing mari-
time security; 
(4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 
leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the 
economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including 
expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro-
duction and equitable access, and to address shared 
challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-
nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in-
vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
the important cooperation among Quad nations that 
is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 
(5) building upon their partnership to help fi-
nance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines by 
the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, the 
United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-
operation, including through partnerships with other 
multilateral development banks, should also venture to 
finance development and infrastructure projects in the 
Indo-Pacific region that are sustainable and offer a
804 
† HR 4521 EAS 
viable alternative to the investments of the People’s 
Republic of China in that region under the Belt and 
Road Initiative; 
(6) in consultation with other Quad countries, 
the President should establish clear deliverables for the 
3 new Quad Working Groups established on March 
12, 2021, which are— 
(A) the Quad Vaccine Experts Working 
Group; 
(B) the Quad Climate Working Group; and 
(C) the Quad Critical and Emerging Tech-
nology Working Group; and 
(7) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group could— 
(A) sustain and deepen engagement between 
senior officials of the Quad countries on a full 
spectrum of issues; and 
(B) be modeled on the successful and long- 
standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 
between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal 
and informal parliamentary exchanges.
805 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-
TARY WORKING GROUP. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments 
of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the 
United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of 
reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra- 
Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on 
the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups de-
scribed in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer cooperation 
on shared interests and values. 
(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern-
ments of the Quad countries enter into a written 
agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be 
established a United States Group, which shall rep-
resent the United States at the Quad Intra-Par-
liamentary Working Group. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 
Members of Congress. 
(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of 
Congress appointed to the United States Group 
under subparagraph (A)—
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(i) half shall be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
from among Members of the House, not less 
than 4 of whom shall be members of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs; and 
(ii) half shall be appointed by the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based 
on recommendations of the majority leader 
and minority leader of the Senate, from 
among Members of the Senate, not less than 
4 of whom shall be members of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations (unless the ma-
jority leader and minority leader determine 
otherwise). 
(3) MEETINGS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than 
annually with representatives and appropriate 
staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and 
India, and any other country invited by mutual 
agreement of the Quad countries. 
(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in 
subparagraph (A) may be held— 
(i) in the United States;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) in another Quad country during 
periods when Congress is not in session; or 
(iii) virtually. 
(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.— 
(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of 
the House of Representatives shall designate the 
chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation 
of the United States Group from the House from 
among members of the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs. 
(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the 
chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation 
of the United States Group from the Senate from 
among members of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. 
(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 
appropriated $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
years 2022 through 2025 for the United States 
Group. 
(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year 
for which an appropriation is made for the 
United States Group, half of the amount
808 
† HR 4521 EAS 
appropriated shall be available to the dele-
gation from the House of Representatives 
and half of the amount shall be available to 
the delegation from the Senate. 
(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The 
amounts available to the delegations of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate 
under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouch-
ers to be approved by the chairperson of the 
delegation from the House of Representa-
tives and the chairperson of the delegation 
from the Senate, respectively. 
(6) PRIVATE
SOURCES.—The United States 
Group may accept gifts or donations of services or 
property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the 
Senate. 
(7) CERTIFICATION
OF
EXPENDITURES.—The 
certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from 
the House of Representatives or the chairperson of the 
delegation from the Senate of the United States Group 
shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting offi-
cers in the auditing of the accounts of the United 
States Group.
809 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fis-
cal year for which an appropriation is made for the 
United States Group, which shall include a descrip-
tion of its expenditures under such appropriation. 
SEC. 3205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 
ASEAN. 
It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to 
COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in build-
ing capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics 
and other public health challenges; 
(2) support high-level United States participa-
tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year; 
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States- 
ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and sup-
port the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) 
goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable 
long-term economic growth and cooperation with the 
United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster
810 
† HR 4521 EAS 
management, food security, human rights, and trade 
facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun-
tries; 
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 
greater integration and unity within the ASEAN 
community, as well as to foster greater integration 
and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and 
security partners, including Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and 
India; 
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic ini-
tiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which 
demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC 
and builds upon economic relationships in the region; 
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mari-
time and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and 
international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with 
international law, including through the adoption of 
a code of conduct in the South China Sea that rep-
resents the interests of all parties and promotes peace 
and stability in the region; 
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
811 
† HR 4521 EAS 
ing the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China— 
(A) to cease any current activities, and 
avoid undertaking any actions in the future, 
that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
late disputes through the use of coercion, intimi-
dation, or military force; 
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, 
and other features, and refrain from new efforts 
to militarize, including the construction of new 
garrisons and facilities and the relocation of ad-
ditional military personnel, material, or equip-
ment; 
(C) to oppose actions by any country that 
prevent other countries from exercising their sov-
ereign rights to the resources in their exclusive 
economic zones and continental shelves by enforc-
ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea 
that lack support in international law; and 
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
ministrative and military districts in contested 
areas in the South China Sea; 
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
tions that cause permanent physical damage to the 
marine environment and support the efforts of the
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† HR 4521 EAS 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the re-
gion; 
(9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 
common approach to reaffirm the decision of the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of 
the Republic of the Philippines in the case against the 
People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime 
claims; 
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United 
States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt 
human smuggling and trafficking in persons and 
urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mech-
anisms to provide assistance and support to refugees 
and migrants; 
(11) support the Mekong-United States Partner-
ship; 
(12) support newly created initiatives with 
ASEAN countries, including the United States- 
ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy 
Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN 
Innovation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN 
Health Futures;
813 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(13) encourage the President to communicate to 
ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule 
of law and open and transparent government, 
strengthening civil society, and protecting human 
rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing 
politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary 
killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
speech and expression; 
(14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN 
that address corruption in the public and private sec-
tors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery 
criminalization in the private sector, and build bene-
ficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN- 
USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South 
East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC); 
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
Initiative as an example of a people-to-people part-
nership that provides skills, networks, and leadership 
training to a new generation that will create and fill 
jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, 
and rise to address the regional and global challenges 
of the future; 
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar to 
the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for
814 
† HR 4521 EAS 
other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-peo-
ple partnerships with an emphasis on civil society 
leaders; 
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that 
have fully upheld and implemented all United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions and international 
agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro-
grams and encourage all other ASEAN governments 
to do the same; and 
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the 
United States Government to articulate and imple-
ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
ports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a 
source of well-functioning and problem-solving re-
gional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community. 
SEC. 3206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED 
STATES–ASEAN 
COOPERATION 
ON 
TECH-
NOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States and ASEAN should com-
plete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chi-
nese equipment critical to strategic technologies and 
critical infrastructure;
815 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) the United States and ASEAN should share 
information about and collaborate on screening Chi-
nese investments in strategic technology sectors and 
critical infrastructure; 
(3) the United States and ASEAN should work 
together on appropriate import restriction regimes re-
garding Chinese exports of surveillance technologies; 
(4) the United States should urge ASEAN to 
adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime tar-
geting cyber attacks; 
(5) the United States should urge ASEAN to 
commit to the September 2019 principles signed by 
28 countries regarding ‘‘Advancing Responsible State 
Behavior in Cyberspace’’, a set of commitments that 
support the ‘‘rules-based international order, affirm 
the applicability of international law to state-on-state 
behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible 
state behavior in peacetime, and the development and 
implementation of practical confidence building 
measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming 
from cyber incidents’’; and 
(6) the United States and ASEAN should explore 
how Chinese investments in critical technology, in-
cluding artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pa-
cific security over the coming decades.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3207. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the Director of National In-
telligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Represent-
atives a report on the expanded influence of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com-
munist Party in international organizations. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall include analysis of the following: 
(1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Com-
munist Party in international organizations and how 
that influence has expanded over the last 10 years, in-
cluding— 
(A) tracking countries’ voting patterns that 
align with Chinese government voting patterns; 
(B) the number of PRC nationals in leader-
ship positions at the D–1 level or higher; 
(C) changes in PRC voluntary and manda-
tory funding by organization;
817 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party 
phrases and initiatives in international organi-
zation language and programming; 
(E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy 
for its own foreign policy initiatives, including 
the Belt and Road Initiative; 
(F) the number of Junior Professional Offi-
cers that the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China has funded by organization; 
(G) tactics used by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China or the CCP to ma-
nipulate secret or otherwise non-public voting 
measures, voting bodies, or votes; 
(H) the extent to which technology compa-
nies incorporated in the PRC, or which have 
PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide equip-
ment and services to international organizations; 
and 
(I) efforts by the PRC’s United Nations 
Mission to generate criticism of the United 
States in the United Nations, including any ef-
forts to highlight delayed United States pay-
ments or to misrepresent total United States vol-
untary and assessed financial contributions to
818 
† HR 4521 EAS 
the United Nations and its specialized agencies 
and programs. 
(2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the ex-
panded influence of the PRC government and the Chi-
nese Communist Party in international organiza-
tions, including an analysis of PRC Government and 
Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and 
rhetoric. 
(3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC 
government and the Chinese Communist Party to 
achieve expanded influence in international organiza-
tions, including— 
(A) incentive programs for PRC nationals 
to join and run for leadership positions in inter-
national organizations; 
(B) coercive economic and other practices 
against other members in the organization; and 
(C) economic or other incentives provided to 
international organizations, including donations 
of technologies or goods. 
(4) The successes and failures of the PRC govern-
ment and Chinese Communist Party influence efforts 
in international organizations, especially those re-
lated to human rights, ‘‘internet sovereignty’’, the de-
velopment of norms on artificial intelligence, labor,
819 
† HR 4521 EAS 
international standards setting, and freedom of navi-
gation. 
(c) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
(d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘inter-
national organizations’’ includes the following: 
(1) The African Development Bank. 
(2) The Asian Development Bank. 
(3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
(4) The Bank of International Settlements. 
(5) The Caribbean Development Bank. 
(6) The Food and Agriculture Organization. 
(7) The International Atomic Energy Agency. 
(8) The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. 
(9) The International Bureau of Weights and 
Measures. 
(10) The International Chamber of Commerce. 
(11) The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion. 
(12) The International Criminal Police Organi-
zation. 
(13) The International Finance Corporation.
820 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(14) The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development. 
(15) The International Hydrographic Organiza-
tion. 
(16) The International Labor Organization. 
(17) The International Maritime Organization. 
(18) The International Monetary Fund. 
(19) The International Olympic Committee. 
(20) The International Organization for Migra-
tion. 
(21) The International Organization for Stand-
ardization. 
(22) The International Renewable Energy Agen-
cy. 
(23) 
The 
International 
Telecommunications 
Union. 
(24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. 
(25) The Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons. 
(26) The United Nations. 
(27) The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. 
(28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization.
821 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(29) The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization. 
(30) The United Nations Institute for Training 
and Research. 
(31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Or-
ganization. 
(32) The Universal Postal Union. 
(33) The World Customs Organization. 
(34) The World Health Organization. 
(35) The World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion. 
(36) The World Meteorological Organization. 
(37) The World Organization for Animal Health. 
(38) The World Tourism Organization. 
(39) The World Trade Organization. 
(40) The World Bank Group. 
SEC. 3208. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND 
PARTNERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
nation with the heads of other participating executive 
branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to 
facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United 
States Government regulatory and technical agencies and 
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun-
822 
† HR 4521 EAS 
tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu-
tions and organizations— 
(1) to promote best practices in regulatory for-
mation and implementation; 
(2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory 
outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other rel-
evant principles; 
(3) to seek better harmonization and alignment 
of regulations and regulatory practices; 
(4) to build consensus around industry and tech-
nical standards in emerging sectors that will drive fu-
ture global economic growth and commerce; and 
(5) to promote United States standards regard-
ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-
tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in 
keeping with the values of free and open societies, in-
cluding the rule of law. 
(b) PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.—In facilitating 
expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall 
prioritize— 
(1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with 
countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmo-
nization of standards, or communication and dia-
logue between technical agencies is achievable and best
823 
† HR 4521 EAS 
advances the economic and national security interests 
of the United States; 
(2) multilateral coordination and collaboration 
where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of 
standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory 
matters is achievable and best advances the economic 
and national security interests of the United States, 
including with— 
(A) the European Union; 
(B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; 
(C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN); 
(D) the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD); and 
(E) multilateral development banks; and 
(3) regulatory practices and standards-setting 
bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging 
technologies. 
(c) PARTICIPATION
BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
TIES.—With regard to the program described in subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including through 
the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (e), 
the participation of private sector representatives, and other 
relevant organizations and individuals with relevant exper-
825 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3209. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States to lead new technology policy partner-
ships focused on the shared interests of the world’s tech-
nology-leading democracies. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall es-
tablish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Of-
fice (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Office’’), which shall 
be housed in the Department of State. 
(c) LEADERSHIP.— 
(1) AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.—The Office shall be 
headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, 
who shall— 
(A) be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
(B) have the rank and status of ambas-
sador; and 
(C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 
otherwise directed. 
(2) OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Com-
merce and the Secretary of the Treasury shall each 
appoint, from within their respective departments at 
the level of GS–14 or higher, liaisons between the Of-
fice and the Department of Commerce or the Depart-
826 
† HR 4521 EAS 
ment of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the 
following duties: 
(A) Collaborate with the Department of 
State on relevant technology initiatives and 
partnerships. 
(B) Provide technical and other relevant ex-
pertise to the Office, as appropriate. 
(d) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the liaisons referred 
to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative 
or expert detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined 
by the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology. 
(e) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-
clude responsibilities such as— 
(1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out tech-
nology partnerships with countries and relevant polit-
ical and economic unions that are committed to— 
(A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and 
respect for human rights; 
(B) the safe and responsible development 
and use of new and emerging technologies and 
the establishment of related norms and stand-
ards; 
(C) a secure internet architecture governed 
by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-
ized government control;
827 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) robust international cooperation to pro-
mote an open internet and interoperable techno-
logical products and services that are necessary 
to freedom, innovation, transparency, and pri-
vacy; and 
(E) multilateral coordination, including 
through diplomatic initiatives, information shar-
ing, and other activities, to defend the principles 
described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) 
against efforts by state and non-state actors to 
undermine them; 
(2) harmonizing technology governance regimes 
with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competi-
tive research and development initiatives, and collabo-
rating to pursue such opportunities in key tech-
nologies, including— 
(A) artificial intelligence and machine 
learning; 
(B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
vanced wireless networking technologies; 
(C) semiconductor manufacturing; 
(D) biotechnology; 
(E) quantum computing;
828 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
cial recognition technologies and censorship soft-
ware; and 
(G) fiber optic cables; 
(3) coordinating with such countries regarding 
shared technology strategies, including technology con-
trols and standards, as well as strategies with respect 
to the development and acquisition of key technologies 
to provide alternatives for those countries utilizing 
systems supported by authoritarian regimes; 
(4) supporting and expanding adherence to 
international treaties and frameworks governing the 
responsible use of new and emerging technologies; 
(5) coordinating the adoption of shared data pri-
vacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards 
among the United States and partner countries and 
relevant economic and political unions, including 
complementary data protection regulations; 
(6) coordinating with other technology partners 
on export control policies, including as appropriate 
through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Con-
trols for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies, done at The Hague December 1995, the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and 
the Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain
829 
† HR 4521 EAS 
security; and investment in or licensing of critical in-
frastructure and dual-use technologies; 
(7) coordinating with members of technology 
partnerships on other policies regarding the use and 
control of emerging and foundational technologies 
through appropriate restrictions, investment screen-
ing, and appropriate measures with respect to tech-
nology transfers; 
(8) coordinating policies, in coordination with 
the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of 
supply chains in critical technology areas, including 
possible diversification of supply chain components to 
countries involved in technology partnerships with the 
United States, while also maintaining transparency 
surrounding subsidies and product origins; 
(9) sharing information regarding the technology 
transfer threat posed by authoritarian governments 
and the ways in which autocratic regimes are uti-
lizing technology to erode individual freedoms and 
other foundations of open, democratic societies; 
(10) administering the establishment of— 
(A) the common funding mechanism for de-
velopment and adoption of measurably secure 
semiconductors and measurably secure semi-
conductors supply chains created in and in ac-
830 
† HR 4521 EAS 
cordance with the requirements of section 9905 of 
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
(Public Law 116–283); and 
(B) the multilateral telecommunications se-
curity fund created in and in accordance with 
the requirements of section 9202 of such Act; and 
(11) collaborating with private companies, trade 
associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes 
of paragraphs (1) through (10). 
(f) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary of 
State may— 
(1) appoint employees without regard to the pro-
visions of title 5, United States Code, regarding ap-
pointments in the competitive service; and 
(2) fix the basic compensation of such employees 
without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
chapter 53 of such title regarding classification and 
General Schedule pay rates. 
(g) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
the next 3 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Director for National Intelligence, shall submit an 
unclassified report to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding—
831 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) the activities of the Office, including any co-
operative initiatives and partnerships pursued with 
United States allies and partners, and the results of 
those activities, initiatives, and partnerships; and 
(2) the activities of the Government of the Peo-
ples’ Republic of China, the Chinese Communist 
Party, and the Russian Federation in key technology 
sectors and the threats they pose to the United States, 
including— 
(A) artificial intelligence and machine 
learning; 
(B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
vanced wireless networking technologies; 
(C) semiconductor manufacturing; 
(D) biotechnology; 
(E) quantum computing; 
(F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
cial recognition technologies and censorship soft-
ware; and 
(G) fiber optic cables. 
(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING INTER-
NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.—It is the sense of 
Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology 
should seek to establish an International Technology Part-
832 
† HR 4521 EAS 
nership for the purposes described in this section with for-
eign countries that have— 
(1) a democratic national government and a 
strong commitment to democratic values, including 
an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech, 
and respect for and promotion of human rights; 
(2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
tors; and 
(3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
pressed interest in international cooperation and co-
ordination with the United States on important de-
fense and intelligence issues. 
SEC. 3210. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-
ARDS-SETTING BODIES. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G 
Act of 2021’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the United States and its allies and partners 
should maintain participation and leadership at 
international standards-setting bodies for 5th and fu-
ture generation mobile telecommunications systems 
and infrastructure;
833 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) the United States should work with its allies 
and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th 
and future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
tems and infrastructure; and 
(3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between 
the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
tional security interest of the United States. 
(c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP 
OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SET-
TING BODIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 
(A) establish an interagency working group 
to provide assistance and technical expertise to 
enhance the representation and leadership of the 
United States at international bodies that set 
standards for equipment, systems, software, and 
virtually defined networks that support 5th and 
future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
tems and infrastructure, such as the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project; and 
(B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
vate sector to increase productive engagement.
834 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The inter-
agency working group described in paragraph (1)— 
(A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of 
State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and 
(B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of 
each Federal department or agency the President 
determines appropriate. 
(3) BRIEFINGS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
subsequently thereafter as provided under sub-
paragraph (B), the interagency working group 
described in paragraph (1) shall provide a strat-
egy to the appropriate congressional committees 
that addresses— 
(i) promotion of United States leader-
ship at international standards-setting bod-
ies for equipment, systems, software, and 
virtually defined networks relevant to 5th 
and future generation mobile telecommuni-
cations systems and infrastructure, taking 
into account the different processes followed 
by the various international standard-set-
ting bodies;
835 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) diplomatic engagement with allies 
and partners to share security risk informa-
tion and findings pertaining to equipment 
that supports or is used in 5th and future 
generation mobile telecommunications sys-
tems and infrastructure and cooperation on 
mitigating such risks; 
(iii) China’s presence and activities at 
international standards-setting bodies rel-
evant to 5th and future generation mobile 
telecommunications systems and infrastruc-
ture, including information on the dif-
ferences in the scope and scale of China’s 
engagement at such bodies compared to en-
gagement by the United States or its allies 
and partners and the security risks raised 
by Chinese proposals in such standards-set-
ting bodies; and 
(iv) engagement with private sector 
communications and information service 
providers, equipment developers, academia, 
Federally funded research and development 
centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
to propose and develop secure standards for 
equipment, systems, software, and virtually
836 
† HR 4521 EAS 
defined networks that support 5th and fu-
ture generation mobile telecommunications 
systems and infrastructure. 
(B) SUBSEQUENT
BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
ceiving a request from the appropriate congres-
sional committees, or as determined appropriate 
by the chair of the interagency working group es-
tablished pursuant to paragraph (1), the inter-
agency working group shall provide such com-
mittees an updated briefing that covers the mat-
ters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of sub-
paragraph (A). 
SEC. 3211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANC-
TIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRA-
TEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used 
as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, 
are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign 
policy and national security interests. 
(2) Congress has authorized and mandated a 
broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to ad-
dress malign behavior and incentivize behavior 
change by individuals and entities in the PRC.
837 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) The sanctions and other restrictions author-
ized and mandated by Congress address a range of 
malign PRC behavior, including— 
(A) intellectual property theft; 
(B) cyber-related economic espionage; 
(C) repression of ethnic minorities; 
(D) other human rights abuses; 
(E) abuses of the international trading sys-
tem; 
(F) illicit assistance to and trade with the 
Government of the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea; and 
(G) drug trafficking, including trafficking 
in fentanyl and other opioids; 
(4) The sanctions and other restrictions described 
in this section include the following: 
(A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of 
Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note). 
(B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and 
Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 
U.S.C. 1708). 
(C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 
2301 et seq.).
838 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public 
Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note). 
(E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human 
Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 
116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note). 
(F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights 
Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 22 
U.S.C. 6901 note). 
(G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 
(50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.). 
(H) Export control measures required to be 
maintained with respect to entities in the tele-
communications sector of the People’s Republic 
of China, including under section 1260I of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92). 
(I) Section 311 of the Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 
(Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942). 
(J) The prohibition on the export of covered 
munitions and crime control items to the Hong 
Kong Police Force under the Act entitled ‘‘An 
Act to prohibit the commercial export of covered 
munitions and crime control items to the Hong 
Kong Police Force’’, approved November 27,
839 
† HR 4521 EAS 
2019 (Public Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), as 
amended by section 1252 of the William M. 
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116– 
283). 
(5) Full implementation of the authorities de-
scribed in paragraph (4) is required under the respec-
tive laws described therein and pursuant to the Take 
Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, section 3). 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the executive branch has not fully imple-
mented the sanctions and other restrictions described 
in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory and con-
stitutional requirements to do so; and 
(2) the President’s full implementation and exe-
cution of the those authorities is a necessary and es-
sential component to the success of the United States 
in the strategic competition with China. 
SEC. 3212. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH 
G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the 
President, acting through the Secretary of State, should ini-
tiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on matters rel-
840 
† HR 4521 EAS 
evant to economic and democratic freedoms, including the 
following: 
(1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
ment. 
(2) Building support for international infra-
structure standards, including those agreed to at the 
G20 summit in Osaka in 2018. 
(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights. 
(4) The security of 5G telecommunications. 
(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
nies, and other policies and practices. 
(6) Predatory international sovereign lending 
that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris 
Club principles. 
(7) International influence campaigns. 
(8) Environmental standards. 
(9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
ners that are not in the G7 and G20. 
SEC. 3213. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-
NERSHIP. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States—
841 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 
United States Indo-Pacific strategy; 
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its de-
mocracy as key elements for the continued peace and 
stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a 
vital national security interest of the United States; 
(3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan 
under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) 
and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’; 
(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 
asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 
identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept; 
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spend-
ing in order to fully resource its defense strategy; 
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop 
and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including 
anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, un-
dersea warfare, advanced command, control, commu-
nications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and resilient command and control 
capabilities, into its military forces; 
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in the United Nations, the
842 
† HR 4521 EAS 
World Health Assembly, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, the International Criminal Police 
Organization, and other international bodies as ap-
propriate; 
(8) to advocate for information sharing with 
Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer; 
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among 
the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 
partners; 
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
tially through new agreements or resumption of talks 
related to a possible Trade and Investment Frame-
work Agreement; 
(11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
ance of a bilateral free trade agreement; 
(12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
logical cooperation, including improving supply 
chain security; 
(13) to support United States educational and 
exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
tory, and politics in Taiwan; and 
(14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
tween the United States and Taiwan.
843 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND 
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES- 
TAIWAN
CULTURAL
EXCHANGE
FOUNDATION.—The 
Secretary of State should consider establishing an 
independent nonprofit that— 
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between 
the future leaders of Taiwan and the United 
States; and 
(B) works with State and local school dis-
tricts and educational institutions to send high 
school and university students to Taiwan to 
study the Chinese language, culture, history, pol-
itics, and other relevant subjects. 
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 
and educational institutions, including public univer-
sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei Eco-
nomic and Cultural Representative Office in the 
United States to establish programs to promote an in-
crease in educational and cultural exchanges. 
SEC. 3214. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
844 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96– 
8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States pol-
icy ‘‘to preserve and promote extensive, close, and 
friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations be-
tween the people of the United States and the people 
on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China main-
land and all other peoples of the Western Pacific 
area’’. 
(2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initia-
tive Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United 
States has grown its strategic partnership with Tai-
wan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 people. 
(3) Despite a concerted campaign by the People’s 
Republic of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplo-
matic partners and from international organizations, 
including the World Health Organization, Taiwan 
has emerged as a global leader in the coronavirus 
global pandemic response, including by donating 
more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other med-
ical equipment to the United States. 
(4) The creation of a United States fellowship 
program with Taiwan would support— 
(A) a key priority of expanding people-to- 
people exchanges, which was outlined in Presi-
845 
† HR 4521 EAS 
dent Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Security 
Strategy; 
(B) President Joseph R. Biden’s commit-
ment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy and a 
critical economic and security partner,’’ as ex-
pressed in his March 2021 Interim National Se-
curity Strategic Guidance; and 
(C) April 2021 guidance from the Depart-
ment of State based on a review required under 
the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of 
title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260) 
to ‘‘encourage U.S. government engagement with 
Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial re-
lationship’’. 
(c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are— 
(1) to further strengthen the United States-Tai-
wan strategic partnership and broaden understanding 
of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily assigning 
officials of agencies of the United States Government 
to Taiwan for intensive study in Mandarin and 
placement as Fellows with the governing authorities 
on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution; 
(2) to provide for eligible United States per-
sonnel to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese lan-
guage skills and to expand their understanding of the
846 
† HR 4521 EAS 
political economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific re-
gion; and 
(3) to better position the United States to ad-
vance its economic, security, and human rights inter-
ests and values in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) AGENCY
HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency head’’ 
means in the case of the executive branch of United 
States Government, or a legislative branch agency de-
scribed in paragraph (2), the head of the respective 
agency. 
(2) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United States Gov-
ernment’’ includes the Government Accountability Of-
fice, Congressional Budget Office, or the Congressional 
Research Service of the legislative branch as well as 
any agency of the executive branch. 
(3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate;
847 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
(4) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’— 
(A) means an employee of a branch of the 
United States Government on loan to the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan, without a change of 
position from the agency at which he or she is 
employed; and 
(B) a legislative branch employee from the 
Government Accountability Office, Congressional 
Budget Office, or the Congressional Research 
Service. 
(5) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term ‘‘imple-
menting partner’’ means any United States organiza-
tion described in 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986 that— 
(A) performs logistical, administrative, and 
other functions, as determined by the Depart-
ment of State and the American Institute of Tai-
wan in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
gram; and
848 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) enters into a cooperative agreement 
with the American Institute in Taiwan to ad-
minister the Taiwan Fellowship Program. 
(e) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PRO-
GRAM.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State 
shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Program’’ (re-
ferred to in this subsection as the ‘‘Program’’) to pro-
vide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 
years for eligible United States citizens. The Depart-
ment of State, in consultation with the American In-
stitute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, 
may modify the name of the Program. 
(2) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute 
in Taiwan should use amounts appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (h)(1) to enter into an 
annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with 
an appropriate implementing partner. 
(B) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of 
State, in consultation with the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the imple-
menting partner, should award to eligible United 
States citizens, subject to available funding—
849 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(i) approximately 5 fellowships during 
the first 2 years of the Program; and 
(ii) approximately 10 fellowships dur-
ing each of the remaining years of the Pro-
gram. 
(3) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLEMENTING 
PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the American Institute in 
Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of 
State, should— 
(A) begin negotiations with the Taipei Eco-
nomic and Cultural Representative Office, or 
with another appropriate entity, for the purpose 
of entering into an agreement to facilitate the 
placement of fellows in an agency of the gov-
erning authorities on Taiwan; and 
(B) begin the process of selecting an imple-
menting partner, which— 
(i) shall agree to meet all of the legal 
requirements required to operate in Tai-
wan; and 
(ii) shall be composed of staff who dem-
onstrate significant experience managing 
exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion.
850 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(4) CURRICULUM.— 
(A) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of 
each fellowship under this subsection, each fellow 
should study— 
(i) the Mandarin Chinese language; 
(ii) the people, history, and political 
climate on Taiwan; and 
(iii) the issues affecting the relation-
ship between the United States and the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
(B) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year 
of each fellowship under this subsection, each fel-
low, subject to the approval of the Department of 
State, the American Institute in Taiwan, and 
the implementing partner, and in accordance 
with the purposes of this section, should work 
in— 
(i) a parliamentary office, ministry, or 
other agency of the governing authorities on 
Taiwan; or 
(ii) an organization outside of the gov-
erning authorities on Taiwan, whose inter-
ests are associated with the interests of the 
fellow and the agency of the United States
851 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Government from which the fellow had been 
employed. 
(5) FLEXIBLE
FELLOWSHIP
DURATION.—Not-
withstanding any requirement under this subsection, 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the 
implementing partner, may award fellowships that 
have a duration of less than two years, and may alter 
the curriculum requirements under paragraph (4) for 
such purposes. 
(6) SUNSET.—The fellowship program under this 
subsection shall terminate 7 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act. 
(f) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS.—A United 
States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under sub-
section (e) if he or she— 
(A) is an employee of the United States 
Government; 
(B) has received at least one exemplary per-
formance review in his or her current United 
States Government role within at least the last 
three years prior to beginning the fellowship; 
(C) has at least 2 years of experience in any 
branch of the United States Government;
852 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) has a demonstrated professional or edu-
cational background in the relationship between 
the United States and countries in the Indo-Pa-
cific region; and 
(E) has demonstrated his or her commit-
ment to further service in the United States Gov-
ernment. 
(2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each re-
cipient of a fellowship under subsection (e) shall 
agree, as a condition of such fellowship— 
(A) to maintain satisfactory progress in 
language training and appropriate behavior in 
Taiwan, as determined by the Department of 
State, the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
appropriate, its implementing partner; 
(B) to refrain from engaging in any intel-
ligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf 
of the United States Government; and 
(C) to continue Federal Government em-
ployment for a period of not less than 4 years 
after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not 
less than 2 years for a fellowship that is 1 year 
or shorter. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING PART-
NER.—
853 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The imple-
menting partner, in close coordination with the 
Department of State and the American Institute 
in Taiwan, shall— 
(i) make efforts to recruit fellowship 
candidates who reflect the diversity of the 
United States; 
(ii) select fellows for the Taiwan Fel-
lowship Program based solely on merit, 
with appropriate supervision from the De-
partment of State and the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan; and 
(iii) prioritize the selection of can-
didates willing to serve a fellowship lasting 
1 year or longer. 
(B) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing part-
ner should provide each fellow in the first year 
(or shorter duration, as jointly determined by the 
Department of State and the American Institute 
in Taiwan for those who are not serving a 2- 
year fellowship) with— 
(i) intensive Mandarin Chinese lan-
guage training; and
854 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) courses in the political economy of 
Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pa-
cific. 
(C) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAINING.—The 
Department of State, in coordination with the 
American Institute in Taiwan and, as appro-
priate, the implementing partner, may waive 
any of the training required under subparagraph 
(B) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin lan-
guage skills, knowledge of the topic described in 
subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other related rea-
sons approved by the Department of State and 
the American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the 
training requirements are waived for a fellow 
serving a 2-year fellowship, the training portion 
of his or her fellowship may be shortened to the 
extent appropriate. 
(D) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The implementing 
partner, in consultation with the Department of 
State and the American Institute in Taiwan, 
may maintain an office and at least 1 full-time 
staff member in Taiwan— 
(i) to liaise with the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan and the governing authori-
ties on Taiwan; and
855 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) to serve as the primary in-country 
point of contact for the recipients of fellow-
ships under this section and their depend-
ents. 
(E) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The implementing 
partner may perform other functions in associa-
tion in support of the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
gram, including logistical and administrative 
functions, as prescribed by the Department of 
State and the American Institute in Taiwan. 
(4) NONCOMPLIANCE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to 
comply with the requirements under this sub-
section shall reimburse the American Institute in 
Taiwan for— 
(i) the Federal funds expended for the 
fellow’s participation in the fellowship, as 
set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C); and 
(ii) interest accrued on such funds 
(calculated at the prevailing rate). 
(B) FULL
REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow 
who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of para-
graph (2) shall reimburse the American Institute 
in Taiwan in an amount equal to the sum of—
856 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(i) all of the Federal funds expended 
for the fellow’s participation in the fellow-
ship; and 
(ii) interest on the amount specified in 
clause (i), which shall be calculated at the 
prevailing rate. 
(C) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
low who violates paragraph (2)(C) shall reim-
burse the American Institute in Taiwan in an 
amount equal to the difference between— 
(i) the amount specified in subpara-
graph (B); and 
(ii) the product of— 
(I) the amount the fellow received 
in compensation during the final year 
of the fellowship, including the value of 
any allowances and benefits received 
by the fellow; multiplied by 
(II) the percentage of the period 
specified in paragraph (2)(C) during 
which the fellow did not remain em-
ployed by the Federal Government. 
(5) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days 
after the selection of the first class of fellows under 
this section, and annually thereafter for 7 years, the
857 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Department of State shall offer to brief the appro-
priate committees of Congress regarding the following 
issues: 
(A) An assessment of the performance of the 
implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes 
of this section. 
(B) The names and sponsoring agencies of 
the fellows selected by the implementing partner 
and the extent to which such fellows represent the 
diversity of the United States. 
(C) The names of the parliamentary offices, 
ministries, other agencies of the governing au-
thorities on Taiwan, and nongovernmental insti-
tutions to which each fellow was assigned during 
the second year of the fellowship. 
(D) Any recommendations, as appropriate, 
to improve the implementation of the Taiwan 
Fellowship Program, including added flexibilities 
in the administration of the program. 
(E) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellow-
ship Program’s value upon the relationship be-
tween the United States and Taiwan or the 
United States and Asian countries. 
(6) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—
858 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of 
any implementing partner shall be audited an-
nually in accordance with generally accepted au-
diting standards by independent certified public 
accountants or independent licensed public ac-
countants who are certified or licensed by a regu-
latory authority of a State or another political 
subdivision of the United States. 
(B) LOCATION.—Each audit under sub-
paragraph (A) shall be conducted at the place or 
places where the financial records of the imple-
menting partner are normally kept. 
(C) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The imple-
menting partner shall make available to the ac-
countants conducting an audit under subpara-
graph (A)— 
(i) all books, financial records, files, 
other papers, things, and property belonging 
to, or in use by, the implementing partner 
that are necessary to facilitate the audit; 
and 
(ii) full facilities for verifying trans-
actions with the balances or securities held 
by 
depositories, 
fiscal 
agents, 
and 
custodians.
859 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) REPORT.— 
(i) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 6 
months after the end of each fiscal year, the 
implementing partner shall provide a re-
port of the audit conducted for such fiscal 
year under subparagraph (A) to the Depart-
ment of State and the American Institute in 
Taiwan. 
(ii) CONTENTS.—Each audit report 
shall— 
(I) set forth the scope of the audit; 
(II) 
include 
such 
statements, 
along with the auditor’s opinion of 
those statements, as may be necessary 
to present fairly the implementing 
partner’s assets and liabilities, surplus 
or deficit, with reasonable detail; 
(III) include a statement of the 
implementing partner’s income and ex-
penses during the year; and 
(IV) include a schedule of— 
(aa) all contracts and cooper-
ative agreements requiring pay-
ments greater than $5,000; and
860 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(bb) any payments of com-
pensation, salaries, or fees at a 
rate greater than $5,000 per year. 
(iii) COPIES.—Each audit report shall 
be produced in sufficient copies for distribu-
tion to the public. 
(g) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERNMENT 
SERVICE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.— 
(A) DETAIL
AUTHORIZED.—With the ap-
proval of the Secretary of State, an agency head 
may detail, for a period of not more than 2 
years, an employee of the agency of the United 
States Government who has been awarded a fel-
lowship under this section, to the American In-
stitute in Taiwan for the purpose of assignment 
to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-
ganization described in subsection (e)(4)(B)(ii). 
(B) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter 
into a written agreement with the Federal Gov-
ernment before receiving a fellowship, in which 
the fellow shall agree— 
(i) to continue in the service of the 
sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship 
for a period of at least 4 years (or at least
861 
† HR 4521 EAS 
2 years if the fellowship duration is 1 year 
or shorter) unless the detailee is involun-
tarily separated from the service of such 
agency; and 
(ii) to pay to the American Institute 
in Taiwan any additional expenses in-
curred by the Federal Government in con-
nection with the fellowship if the detailee 
voluntarily separates from service with the 
sponsoring agency before the end of the pe-
riod for which the detailee has agreed to 
continue in the service of such agency. 
(C) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to 
under subparagraph (B)(ii) may not be required 
of a detailee who leaves the service of the spon-
soring agency to enter into the service of another 
agency of the United States Government unless 
the head of the sponsoring agency notifies the 
detailee before the effective date of entry into the 
service of the other agency that payment will be 
required under this subsection. 
(2) STATUS
AS
GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE.—A 
detailee— 
(A) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving 
allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
other benefits, to be an employee of the spon-
soring agency; 
(B) is entitled to pay, allowances, and bene-
fits from funds available to such agency, which 
is deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5, 
United States Code; and 
(C) may be assigned to a position with an 
entity described in section (f)(4)(B)(i) if accept-
ance of such position does not involve— 
(i) the taking of an oath of allegiance 
to another government; or 
(ii) the acceptance of compensation or 
other benefits from any foreign government 
by such detailee. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
SPONSORING
AGEN-
CY.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Federal agency from 
which a detailee is detailed should provide the 
fellow allowances and benefits that are consistent 
with Department of State Standardized Regula-
tions or other applicable rules and regulations, 
including— 
(i) a living quarters allowance to cover 
the cost of housing in Taiwan;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) a cost of living allowance to cover 
any possible higher costs of living in Tai-
wan; 
(iii) a temporary quarters subsistence 
allowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is 
unable to find housing immediately upon 
arriving in Taiwan; 
(iv) an education allowance to assist 
parents in providing the fellow’s minor chil-
dren with educational services ordinarily 
provided without charge by public schools 
in the United States; 
(v) moving expenses to transport per-
sonal belongings of the fellow and his or her 
family in their move to Taiwan, which is 
comparable to the allowance given for 
American Institute in Taiwan employees 
assigned to Taiwan; and 
(vi) an economy-class airline ticket to 
and from Taiwan for each fellow and the 
fellow’s immediate family. 
(B) MODIFICATION
OF
BENEFITS.—The 
American Institute in Taiwan and its imple-
menting partner, with the approval of the De-
partment of State, may modify the benefits set
864 
† HR 4521 EAS 
forth in subparagraph (A) if such modification 
is warranted by fiscal circumstances. 
(4) NO
FINANCIAL
LIABILITY.—The American 
Institute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and 
any governing authorities on Taiwan or nongovern-
mental entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is de-
tailed during the second year of the fellowship may 
not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any 
other benefit normally provided to the detailee. 
(5) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed 
under paragraph (1)(A) without reimbursement to the 
United States by the American Institute in Taiwan. 
(6) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may 
be paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the 
allowances and benefits listed in paragraph (3). 
(h) FUNDING.— 
(1) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.— 
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan— 
(A) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of 
which— 
(i) $500,000 shall be used to launch the 
Taiwan Fellowship Program through a 
competitive cooperative agreement with an 
appropriate implementing partner;
865 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) $2,300,000 shall be used to fund a 
cooperative agreement with the appropriate 
implementing partner; and 
(iii) $100,000 shall be used for man-
agement expenses of the American Institute 
in Taiwan related to the management of the 
Taiwan Fellowship Program; and 
(B) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000, of which— 
(i) $2,300,000 shall be used to fund a 
cooperative agreement with an appropriate 
implementing partner; and 
(ii) $100,000 shall be used for manage-
ment expenses of the American Institute in 
Taiwan related to the management of the 
Taiwan Fellowship Program. 
(2) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing part-
ner selected to implement the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or dona-
tions of services or property in carrying out such pro-
gram, subject to the review and approval of the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan. 
(i) STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than one year 
prior to the sunset of the fellowship program under sub-
section (e), the Comptroller General of the United States
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† HR 4521 EAS 
shall conduct a study and submit to the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House a report that includes— 
(A) an analysis of the United States Gov-
ernment participants in this program, including 
the number of applicants and the number of fel-
lowships undertaken, the place of employment, 
and as assessment of the costs and benefits for 
participants and for the United States Govern-
ment of such fellowships; 
(B) an analysis of the financial impact of 
the fellowship on United States Government of-
fices which have provided Fellows to participate 
in the program; and 
(C) recommendations, if any, on how to im-
prove the fellowship program. 
SEC. 3215. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State and other 
United States Government departments and agencies shall 
engage with the democratically elected government of Tai-
wan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan 
and end the outdated practice of referring to the government 
in Taiwan as the ‘‘Taiwan authorities’’. Notwithstanding 
the continued supporting role of the American Institute in
867 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and 
protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United 
States Government shall not place any restrictions on the 
ability of officials of the Department of State and other 
United States Government departments and agencies to 
interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the 
Taiwan government. 
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this para-
graph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or al-
tering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
wan’s international status. 
SEC. 3216. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction, sec-
tion of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs 
Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, explic-
itly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limita-
tions on activities of United States personnel, limits the 
ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan)and government representatives from the 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 
(TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Repub-
lic of China sovereignty, including—
868 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); 
and 
(2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of 
military units. 
(b) OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘official purposes’’ means— 
(1) the wearing of official uniforms; 
(2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or 
functions; and 
(3) appearances on Department of State social 
media accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section 
shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic re-
lations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering 
the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s inter-
national status. 
SEC. 3217. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PAN-
DEMIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) it is critical to understand the origins of the 
COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better 
prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health 
threats in the future;
869 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic 
on all Americans, the American people deserve to 
know what information the United States Govern-
ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as ap-
propriate; 
(3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the 
United States Government and 13 other foreign gov-
ernments that the international team of experts dis-
patched to the People’s Republic of China by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was ‘‘significantly de-
layed and lacked access to complete, original data 
and samples’’; 
(4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Direc-
tor-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative 
team had encountered ‘‘difficulties’’ in accessing nec-
essary raw data, that ‘‘we have not yet found the 
source of the virus,’’ and that ‘‘all hypotheses remain 
on the table’’; and 
(5) it is critical for independent experts to have 
full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
ronmental data, live virus samples, research, and per-
sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak rel-
evant to determining how this pandemic emerged.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of En-
ergy, and other relevant executive departments, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
sisting of— 
(1) an assessment of the most likely source or or-
igin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed 
review of all information the United States possesses 
that it has identified as potentially relevant to the 
source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including 
zoonotic transmission and spillover, the Wuhan Insti-
tute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin, 
transmission, or spillover, based on the information 
the United States Government has to date; 
(2) an identification of the leading credible theo-
ries of the etiology of the SARS–CoV–2 virus by the 
United States Government, the steps the United 
States has taken to validate those theories, and any 
variance in assessment or dissent among or between 
United States intelligence agencies, executive agencies, 
and executive offices of the most likely source or ori-
gin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, and the basis for such 
variance or dissent;
871 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) a description of all steps the United States 
Government has taken to identify and investigate the 
source of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a 
timeline of such efforts; 
(4) a detailed description of the data to which 
the United States and the WHO have requested and 
have access to in order to determine the origin of the 
source of the SARS–CoV–2 virus; 
(5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate 
with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investiga-
tion to determine the source and transmission of 
SARS–CoV–2 virus, including into a possible lab 
leak, or to create or spread misinformation or 
disinformation regarding the source and transmission 
of SARS–CoV–2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including 
by national and local governmental and health enti-
ties; 
(6) a detailed account of information known to 
the United States Government regarding the WIV and 
associated facilities, including research activities on 
coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any re-
ported illnesses of persons associated with the labora-
tory with symptoms consistent with COVID–19 and 
the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research rel-
evant to coronaviruses;
872 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC 
that require disclosure and cooperation in the event of 
a viral outbreak like SARS–CoV–2; and 
(8) an overview of United States engagement 
with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that in-
cludes— 
(A) a detailed accounting of United States 
engagement with the WIV and similar labs in 
the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a 
detailed accounting of United States Govern-
ment-sponsored research and funding and diplo-
matic engagements such as ‘‘track 1.5’’ and 
‘‘track 2’’ engagements; and 
(B) an assessment of any additional scru-
tiny of United States Government funding to 
support gain-of-function research in the PRC 
after the moratorium on such funding was lifted 
in 2017, and whether United States Government 
funding was used to support gain-of-function re-
search in the PRC, during the moratorium on 
gain-of-function research (2014–2017). 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classi-
fied annex.
873 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions of the Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the Senate; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives; and 
(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 3218. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND 
ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-
LAND COUNTRIES. 
(a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State and Sec-
retary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em-
ployed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of 
providing increased diplomatic support and promoting in-
874 
† HR 4521 EAS 
creased economic and commercial engagement between the 
United States and Pacific Island countries. 
(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to 
be appropriated or otherwise made available to the 
Department of State and the Department of Com-
merce 
for 
fiscal 
year 
2022, 
not 
more 
than 
$10,000,000, respectively, shall be available to carry 
out the purposes of this section. 
(2) TERMINATION.—The availability of funds in 
paragraph (1) shall expire on October 1, 2026. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
5 years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-
merce shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report on the activities of the Department of State 
and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in 
Pacific island countries, which shall include— 
(1) a detailed description of the additional diplo-
matic, economic, and commercial engagement and ac-
tivities in the Pacific island countries provided by 
Locally Employed Staff; and 
(2) an assessment of the impact of the activities 
with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security 
interests of the United States.
875 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(d) EXCEPTION
FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.—The Sec-
retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of 
American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car-
rying out this section. 
(e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES
OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on 
Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 3219. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-
SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State 
allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in 
bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) re-
sources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of 
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
876 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in 
the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) 
budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the 
DE budget and only 4 percent of the total Depart-
ment of State-USAID budget. 
(2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and per-
sonnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 per-
cent of the total, while FA resources averaged only 4 
percent of the total. 
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 
process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure 
that its personnel footprint matches the demands of 
great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pa-
cific. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps 
must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging 
challenges of the 21st century, including those posed 
by the PRC in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere; 
(2) the increase must be designed to meet the ob-
jectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on 
strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of 
states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based inter-
national order; and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) the increase must be implemented with a 
focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and 
public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative 
increase of at least 200 foreign service officer general-
ists, to— 
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade 
and open investment environments for United 
States companies, and engaged in increased com-
mercial diplomacy in key markets; 
(B) better articulate and explain United 
States policies, strengthen civil society and 
democratic principles, enhance reporting on Chi-
nese the PRC’s global activities, promote people- 
to-people exchanges, and advance United States 
influence; and 
(C) increase capacity at small- and me-
dium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo- 
Pacific and other regions around the world, as 
necessary. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.— 
(1) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
ensure Department of State funding levels and per-
sonnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region’s 
high degree of importance and significance to United 
States political, economic, and security interests.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of per-
sonnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective 
to the Department of State’s total budget. 
(3) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
increase the number of resident Defense attache´s in 
the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in locations 
where the People’s Republic of China has a resident 
military attache´ but the United States does not, to as-
sure coverage of all appropriate posts. 
(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress an 
action plan with the following elements: 
(1) Identification of requirements to advance 
United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific 
and the personnel and budgetary resources needed to 
meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource envi-
ronment. 
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the Depart-
ment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms 
of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and 
security assistance. 
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions 
at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
879 
† HR 4521 EAS 
responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 
description of increases at each post or bureau, a 
breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of 
how such increases in personnel will advance United 
States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 
that the Department will meet in implementing the 
action plan. 
(5) A description of any barriers to imple-
menting the action plan. 
(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 90 
days after the submission of the action plan described in 
subsection (c) until September 30, 2030, the Secretary shall 
submit an update and brief the appropriate committees of 
Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with 
supporting data and including a detailed assessment of 
benchmarks reached. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, 
$2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance 
resources to carry out the purposes of part 1 and chapter 
4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and 
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the 
Indo-Pacific region.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.— 
Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f) 
include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
2018 (Public Law 115–409). 
(h) SECRETARY OF STATE CERTIFICATION.—Not later 
than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of State shall certify, to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress, whether or not the benchmarks de-
scribed in the action plan in subsection (c) have been met. 
This certification is non-delegable. 
SEC. 3219A. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN 
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
establish, within the Bureau of International Organi-
zation Affairs of the Department of State, a Special 
Representative for Advancing United States Leader-
ship in the United Nations (referred to in this section 
as the ‘‘Special Representative’’). The Special Rep-
resentative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy As-
sistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Or-
ganization Affairs of the Department of State. The 
Special Representative shall report directly to the As-
881 
† HR 4521 EAS 
sistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Or-
ganization Affairs, in coordination and consultation 
with the Representative of the United States to the 
United Nations. 
(b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative 
shall assume responsibility for— 
(1) promoting United States leadership and par-
ticipation in the United Nations system, with a focus 
on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exer-
cising increased influence in and determining the 
agenda of the United Nations system; 
(2) highlighting how investments in the United 
Nations advance United States interests and enable 
stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to 
account; 
(3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need 
for United Nations employees to uphold the principals 
of impartiality enshrined in the United Nations char-
ter, rules, and regulations; 
(4) monitoring and developing and imple-
menting plans to counter undue influence, especially 
by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations 
system; 
(5) assessing how United States decisions to 
withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts United
882 
† HR 4521 EAS 
States influence at the United Nations and multilat-
eral global initiatives; 
(6) promoting the participation and inclusion of 
Taiwan in the United Nations system; 
(7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations 
jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other 
qualified nationals to promote for these positions; 
(8) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
tions secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and 
developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like- 
minded states are assembled to ensure leadership 
races are not won by countries that do not share 
United States interests; 
(9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant 
by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of 
the United Nations system; 
(10) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
ment of United States nationals in the United Na-
tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and 
(11) increasing the number of qualified United 
States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
tions.
883 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(c) SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State shall make any 
necessary adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau 
of International Organization Affairs, including the respec-
tive roles and responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to 
ensure appropriate support for the mission and work of the 
Special Representative. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal years 
2022 through 2026 to carry out the responsibilities under 
subsection (b). 
SEC. 3219B. ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of 
the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-
portunities, as well as many challenges to United 
States interests and values as a result of the growth 
in authoritarian governance in the region and by 
broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the 
changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to 
human rights principles and obligations; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China poses a par-
ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally 
recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic 
and trade practices, disregards international laws
884 
† HR 4521 EAS 
and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign 
influence operations, and enables global digital 
authoritarianism; 
(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(referred to in this section as ‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the 
United States’ commitment in the Indo-Pacific region 
by— 
(A) expanding its defense cooperation with 
its allies and partners; 
(B) investing in democracy and the protec-
tion of human rights; 
(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; 
and 
(D) supporting people-to-people engagement 
and other shared priorities; and 
(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 
Strategy Report concludes that ARIA ‘‘enshrines a 
generational whole-of-government policy framework 
that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and 
open Indo-Pacific region’’. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia 
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) 
is amended— 
(1) 
in 
section 
201(b), 
by 
striking 
‘‘$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
885 
† HR 4521 EAS 
through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for each 
of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026’’; 
(2) in section 215(b), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in-
serting ‘‘2026’’; 
(3) in section 306(a)— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘5 years’’ 
and inserting ‘‘8 years’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2026’’; 
(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 
inserting ‘‘2026’’; 
(5) in section 410— 
(A) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 
(B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
ceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 
inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 
(6) in section 411, by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in-
serting ‘‘2026’’. 
SEC. 3219C. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NEED FOR RECI-
PROCITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States—
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) to clearly differentiate, in official statements, 
media communications, and messaging, between the 
people of China and the Communist Party of China; 
(2) that any negotiations toward a trade agree-
ment with the People’s Republic of China should be 
concluded in a manner that addresses unfair trading 
practices by the People’s Republic of China; 
(3) that such an agreement should, to the extent 
possible— 
(A) ensure that the People’s Republic of 
China commits to structural changes in its trade 
and economic policies; 
(B) hold the People’s Republic of China ac-
countable to those commitments; and 
(C) promote access to reciprocal direct in-
vestment; and 
(4) to seek and develop a relationship with the 
People’s Republic of China that is founded on the 
principles of basic reciprocity across sectors, includ-
ing economic, diplomatic, educational, and commu-
nications sectors. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with other relevant Federal de-
887 
† HR 4521 EAS 
partments and agencies, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report on the man-
ner in which the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China creates barriers to the work of United States 
diplomats and other officials, journalists, and busi-
nesses, and nongovernmental organizations based in 
the United States, in the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A summary of obstacles that United 
States diplomats and other officials, journalists, 
and businesses encounter in carrying out their 
work in the People’s Republic of China. 
(B) A summary of the obstacles Chinese 
diplomats and other officials, journalists, and 
businesses encounter while working in the United 
States. 
(C) A description of the efforts that officials 
of the United States have made to rectify any 
differences in the treatment of diplomats and 
other officials, journalists, and businesses by the 
United States and by the People’s Republic of 
China, and the results of those efforts. 
(D) An assessment of the adherence of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, in
888 
† HR 4521 EAS 
its treatment of United States citizens, to the re-
quirements of— 
(i) the Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and 
entered into force March 19, 1967 (21 
U.S.T. 77); and 
(ii) the Consular Convention, signed at 
Washington September 17, 1980, and en-
tered into force February 19, 1982, between 
the United States and the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(E) An assessment of any impacts of the 
People’s Republic of China’s internet restrictions 
on reciprocity between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(F) A summary of other notable areas where 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China or entities affiliated with that Govern-
ment are able to conduct activities or invest-
ments in the United States but that are denied 
to United States entities in the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(G) Recommendations on efforts that the 
Government of the United States could undertake 
to improve reciprocity in the relationship be-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
tween the United States and the People’s Repub-
lic of China. 
(3) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.— 
(A) FORM.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified index. 
(B) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified por-
tion of the report required by paragraph (1) 
shall be posted on a publicly available internet 
website of the Department of State. 
(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(c) RECIPROCITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘reciprocity’’ means the mutual and equitable exchange of 
privileges between governments, countries, businesses, or in-
dividuals. 
SEC. 3219D. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY ASIAN DE-
VELOPMENT BANK. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Through the Asian Development Bank, coun-
tries are eligible to borrow from the Bank until they
890 
† HR 4521 EAS 
can manage long-term development and access to cap-
ital markets without financial resources from the 
Bank. 
(2) The Bank uses the gross national income per 
capita benchmark used by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to trigger the grad-
uation process. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation 
discussion income is a gross national income per cap-
ita exceeding $7,065. 
(3) The People’s Republic of China exceeded the 
graduation discussion income threshold in 2016. 
(4) Since 2016, the Asian Development Bank has 
continued to approve loans and technical assistance 
to 
the 
People’s 
Republic 
of 
China 
totaling 
$7,600,000,000. The Bank has also approved non-sov-
ereign commitments in the People’s Republic of China 
totaling $1,800,000,000 since 2016. 
(5) The World Bank calculates the People’s Re-
public of China’s most recent year (2019) gross na-
tional income per capita as $10,390. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to oppose any additional lending from the 
Asian Development Bank to the People’s Republic of China 
as a result of the People’s Republic of China’s successful
891 
† HR 4521 EAS 
graduation from the eligibility requirements for assistance 
from the Bank. 
(c) OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct 
the United States Executive Director of the Asian Develop-
ment Bank to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
United States to oppose any loan or extension of financial 
or technical assistance by the Asian Development Bank to 
the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 3219E. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BY INTER-
NATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China is the world’s 
second largest economy and a major global lender. 
(2) In February 2021, the People’s Republic of 
China’s foreign exchange reserves totaled more than 
$3,200,000,000,000. 
(3) The World Bank classifies the People’s Re-
public of China as having an upper-middle-income 
economy. 
(4) On February 25, 2021, President Xi Jinping 
announced ‘‘complete victory’’ over extreme poverty in 
the People’s Republic of China.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(5) The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China utilizes state resources to create and promote 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New 
Development Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative. 
(6) The People’s Republic of China is the world’s 
largest official creditor. 
(7) Through the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, countries are eligible to 
borrow from the Bank until they can manage long- 
term development and access to capital markets with-
out financial resources from the Bank. 
(8) The World Bank reviews the graduation of a 
country from eligibility to borrow from the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
once the country reaches the graduation discussion in-
come, which is equivalent to the gross national in-
come. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation discussion 
income is a gross national income per capita exceed-
ing $7,065. 
(9) The People’s Republic of China exceeded the 
graduation discussion income threshold in 2016. 
(10) Since 2016, the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development has approved projects 
totaling $8,930,000,000 to the People’s Republic of 
China.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(11) The World Bank calculates the People’s Re-
public of China’s most recent year (2019) gross na-
tional income per capita as $10,390. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to oppose any additional lending from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to 
the People’s Republic of China as a result of the People’s 
Republic of China’s successful graduation from the eligi-
bility requirements for assistance from the Bank. 
(c) OPPOSITION TO LENDING TO PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA.—The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct 
the United States Executive Director of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States— 
(1) to oppose any loan or extension of financial 
or technical assistance by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to the People’s Re-
public of China; and 
(2) to end lending and assistance to countries 
that exceed the graduation discussion income of the 
Bank. 
(d) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
mittee on Financial Services and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that in-
cludes— 
(1) an assessment of the status of borrowing by 
the People’s Republic of China from the World Bank; 
(2) a list of countries that have exceeded the 
graduation discussion income at the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
(3) a list of countries that have graduated from 
eligibility for assistance from the Bank; and 
(4) a description of the efforts taken by the 
United States to graduate countries from such eligi-
bility once they exceed the graduation discussion in-
come. 
SEC. 3219F. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINESE AND RUS-
SIAN GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE 
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) notes with growing concern that the People’s 
Republic of China and Russia have, at the United 
Nations, aligned with one another in blocking Secu-
rity Council action on Syria, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, 
Venezuela, and other countries credibly accused of 
committing human rights abuses;
895 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) recognizes that it is not only the use of the 
veto on the United Nations Security Council, but also 
the threat of the use of a veto, that can prevent the 
Security Council from taking actions aimed at pro-
tecting human rights; 
(3) condemns efforts by China and Russia to un-
dermine United Nations Security Council actions 
aimed at censuring governments credibly accused of 
committing or permitting the commission of human 
rights violations; and 
(4) denounces the tactical alignment between the 
People’s Republic of China and Russia within the 
United Nations Security Council to challenge the pro-
tection of human rights and the guarantee of humani-
tarian access. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States to— 
(1) reaffirm its commitment to maintain inter-
national peace and security, develop friendly relations 
among nations, and cooperate in solving inter-
national problems and promoting respect for human 
rights; 
(2) highlight efforts by the People’s Republic of 
China and Russia to undermine international peace
896 
† HR 4521 EAS 
and security, protect human rights, and guarantee 
humanitarian access to those in need; 
(3) increase the role and presence of the United 
States at the United Nations and its constituent bod-
ies to advance United States interests, including by 
counteracting malign Chinese and Russian influence; 
and 
(4) urge allies and like-minded partners to work 
together with the United States to overcome Chinese 
and Russian efforts to weaken the United Nations Se-
curity Council by preventing it from carrying out its 
core mandate. 
SEC. 3219G. DETERRING PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAI-
WAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Finan-
cial Services, the Committee on Energy and Com-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
merce, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States— 
(1) to strenuously oppose any action by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China to use force to change the sta-
tus quo of Taiwan; and 
(2) that, in order to deter the use of force by the 
People’s Republic of China to change the status quo 
of Taiwan, the United States should coordinate with 
allies and partners to identify and develop significant 
economic, diplomatic, and other measures to deter 
and impose costs on any such action by the People’s 
Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence by ar-
ticulating such policies publicly, as appropriate and 
in alignment with United States interests. 
(c) WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT REVIEW.—Not later than 
14 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall convene the heads of all relevant Federal de-
partments and agencies to conduct a whole-of-government 
review of all available economic, diplomatic, and other 
measures to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic 
of China to change the status quo of Taiwan. 
(d) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90
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† HR 4521 EAS 
days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, the Director of National Intelligence, 
and any other relevant heads of Federal departments and 
agencies shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress 
on all available economic, diplomatic, and other strategic 
measures to deter PRC use of force to change the status quo 
of Taiwan and provide a detailed description and review 
of— 
(1) efforts to date by the United States Govern-
ment to deter the use of force by the People’s Republic 
of China to change the status quo of Taiwan; and 
(2) progress to date of all coordination efforts be-
tween the United States Government and its allies 
and partners with respect to deterring the use of force 
to change the status quo of Taiwan. 
(e) COORDINATED CONSEQUENCES WITH ALLIES AND 
PARTNERS.—The Secretary of State shall coordinate with 
United States allies and partners to identify and develop 
significant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to 
deter the use of force by the People’s Republic of China to 
change the status quo of Taiwan.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3219H. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OP-
ERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to sharp 
power operations and the united front campaign supported 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward per-
sons or entities in Taiwan. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements: 
(1) Development of a response to PRC propa-
ganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-in-
trusions targeting Taiwan, including— 
(A) assistance in building the capacity of 
the Taiwan government and private-sector enti-
ties to document and expose propaganda and 
disinformation supported by the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Com-
munist Party, or affiliated entities; 
(B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan gov-
ernment’s ability to develop a whole-of-govern-
ment strategy to respond to sharp power oper-
ations, including election interference; and
900 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and 
other Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation 
campaigns. 
(2) Development of a response to political influ-
ence operations that includes an assessment of the ex-
tent of influence exerted by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Com-
munist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, fi-
nancial institutions, media organizations, and other 
entities. 
(3) Support for exchanges and other technical as-
sistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s abil-
ity to respond to sharp power operations. 
(4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership, 
through the Global Cooperation and Training Frame-
work, with like-minded governments to share data 
and best practices with the Government of Taiwan on 
ways to address sharp power operations supported by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
SEC. 3219I. STUDY AND REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS 
TO 
ADDRESS 
CHINESE 
FENTANYL 
TRAF-
FICKING. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
901 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) In January 2020, the DEA named China as 
the primary source of United States-bound illicit 
fentanyl and synthetic opioids. 
(2) While in 2019 China instituted domestic con-
trols on the production and exportation of fentanyl, 
some of its variants, and two precursors known as 
NPP and 4–ANPP, China has not yet expanded its 
class scheduling to include many fentanyl precursors 
such as 4–AP, which continue to be trafficked to sec-
ond countries in which they are used in the final pro-
duction of United States-bound fentanyl and other 
synthetic opioids. 
(3) The DEA currently maintains a presence in 
Beijing but continues to seek Chinese approval to 
open offices in the major shipping hubs of Guangzhou 
and Shanghai. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate;
902 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
House of Representative; and 
(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
(2) CHINA.—The term ‘‘China’’ means the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
(3) DEA.—The term ‘‘DEA’’ means the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. 
(4) PRECURSORS.—The term ‘‘precursors’’ means 
chemicals used in the illicit production of fentanyl 
and related synthetic opioid variants. 
(c) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND 
SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a written report— 
(1) detailing a description of United States Gov-
ernment efforts to gain a commitment from the Chi-
nese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl pre-
cursors such as 4–AP to controls; and 
(2) a plan for future steps the United States 
Government will take to urge China to combat illicit 
fentanyl production and trafficking originating in 
China.
903 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(d) ESTABLISHMENT OF DEA OFFICES IN CHINA.— 
Not later than 180 days after enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State and Attorney General shall provide to 
the appropriate committees of Congress a classified briefing 
on— 
(1) outreach and negotiations undertaken by the 
United States Government with the Chinese Govern-
ment aimed at securing its approval for the establish-
ment of DEA offices in Shanghai and Guangzhou, 
China; and 
(2) additional efforts to establish new partner-
ships with provincial-level authorities to counter the 
illicit trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and 
their precursors. 
(e) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 
subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 
SEC. 3219J. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-
BEAN. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 
a comprehensive United States strategy for public 
and private investment, trade, and development in 
Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required 
by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing exports of 
United States goods and services to Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real 
dollar value by the date that is 10 years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act. 
(3) CONSULTATIONS.—In developing the strategy 
required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult 
with— 
(A) Congress; 
(B) each agency that is a member of the 
Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee; 
(C) the relevant multilateral development 
banks, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the respective United States Exec-
utive Directors of such banks; 
(D) each agency that participates in the 
Trade Policy Staff Committee established; 
(E) the President’s Export Council; 
(F) each of the development agencies; 
(G) any other Federal agencies with respon-
sibility for export promotion or financing and 
development; and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(H) the private sector, including businesses, 
nongovernmental organizations, and African and 
Latin American and Caribbean diaspora groups. 
(4) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to Congress the strategy 
required by subsection (a). 
(B) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than 3 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall submit to Congress a report 
on the implementation of the strategy required 
by paragraph (1). 
(b) SPECIAL AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN
EXPORT
STRATEGY
COORDINATORS.—The 
President shall designate an individual to serve as Special 
Africa Export Strategy Coordinator and an individual to 
serve as Special Latin America and the Caribbean Export 
Strategy Coordinator— 
(1) to oversee the development and implementa-
tion of the strategy required by subsection (a); and 
(2) to coordinate developing and implementing 
the strategy with— 
(A) the Trade Promotion Coordinating 
Committee;
906 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) the Assistant United States Trade Rep-
resentative for African Affairs or the Assistant 
United States Trade Representative for the West-
ern Hemisphere, as appropriate; 
(C) the Assistant Secretary of State for Af-
rican Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs, as appropriate; 
(D) the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States; 
(E) the United States International Devel-
opment Finance Corporation; and 
(F) the development agencies. 
(c) TRADE MISSIONS TO AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the sense of Congress that, not 
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Commerce and other high-level officials 
of the United States Government with responsibility for ex-
port promotion, financing, and development should conduct 
joint trade missions to Africa and to Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
(d) TRAINING.—The President shall develop a plan— 
(1) to standardize the training received by 
United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi-
cers, economic officers of the Department of State, 
and economic officers of the United States Agency for
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† HR 4521 EAS 
International Development with respect to the pro-
grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of 
the United States, the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi-
ness Administration, and the United States Trade 
and Development Agency; and 
(2) to ensure that, not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act— 
(A) all United States and Foreign Commer-
cial Service officers that are stationed overseas 
receive the training described in paragraph (1); 
and 
(B) in the case of a country to which no 
United States and Foreign Commercial Service 
officer is assigned, any economic officer of the 
Department of State stationed in that country 
receives that training. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES.—The term ‘‘devel-
opment agencies’’ means the United States Depart-
ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Millennium Challenge Cor-
poration, the United States International Develop-
ment Finance Corporation, the United States Trade 
and Development Agency, the United States Depart-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
ment of Agriculture, and relevant multilateral devel-
opment banks. 
(2) MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS.—The 
term ‘‘multilateral development banks’’ has the mean-
ing given that term in section 1701(c)(4) of the Inter-
national Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 
262r(c)(4)) and includes the African Development 
Foundation. 
(3) TRADE
POLICY
STAFF
COMMITTEE.—The 
term ‘‘Trade Policy Staff Committee’’ means the 
Trade Policy Staff Committee established pursuant to 
section 2002.2 of title 15, Code of Federal Regula-
tions. 
(4) TRADE
PROMOTION
COORDINATING
COM-
MITTEE.—The term ‘‘Trade Promotion Coordinating 
Committee’’ means the Trade Promotion Coordi-
nating Committee established under section 2312 of 
the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 
4727). 
(5) UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COMMERCIAL 
SERVICE.—The term ‘‘United States and Foreign 
Commercial Service’’ means the United States and 
Foreign Commercial Service established by section 
2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 
U.S.C. 4721).
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† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3219K. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-
MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF 
INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 
ACT OF 2018. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 
2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be considered to be a 
Federal credit program that is subject to the Federal Credit 
Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of 
applying the requirements of such Act to such support. 
(b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 1433 
of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-
ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking 
‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$100,000,000,000’’. 
Subtitle B—International Security 
Matters 
SEC. 3221. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) COMPANY.—The term ‘‘company’’ means any 
corporation, company, limited liability company, 
limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
tion, or other similar entity. 
(3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term ‘‘other 
security forces’’— 
(A) includes national security forces that 
conduct maritime security; and 
(B) does not include self-described militias 
or paramilitary organizations. 
SEC. 3222. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use 
its growing military might in concert with other in-
struments of its national power to displace the United 
States in the Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony 
over the region. 
(2) The military balance of power in the Indo- 
Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to 
the United States because—
911 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and 
expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project 
power and create contested areas across the en-
tire Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) PLA modernization has largely focused 
on areas where it possesses operational advan-
tages and can exploit weaknesses in the United 
States suite of capabilities; and 
(C) current United States force structure 
and presence do not sufficiently counter threats 
in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, 
bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion are concentrated in large bases that are 
highly vulnerable to the PRC’s strike capabili-
ties. 
(3) This shift in the regional military balance 
and erosion of conventional and strategic deterrence 
in the Indo-Pacific region— 
(A) presents a substantial and imminent 
risk to the security of the United States; and 
(B) left unchecked, could— 
(i) embolden the PRC to take actions, 
including the use of military force, to 
change the status quo before the United 
States can mount an effective response; and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(ii) alter the nuclear balance in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
(4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish 
confidence among United States allies and partners 
in the strength of United States commitments, even to 
the extent that these nations feel compelled to band-
wagon with the PRC to protect their interests. The 
PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction 
to PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies, 
searching for indicators of United States resolve. 
(5) Achieving so-called ‘‘reunification’’ of Tai-
wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to 
achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC 
has increased the frequency and scope of its exercises 
and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious 
assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, 
PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and 
flights across the unofficial median line in the Tai-
wan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s full sub-
mission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates the 
timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the defense 
of Taiwan an even more urgent priority. 
(6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to— 
(A) defending the people of Taiwan;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project 
power beyond the First Island Chain, including 
to United States territory, such as Guam and 
Hawaii; 
(C) defending the territorial integrity of 
Japan; 
(D) preventing the PLA from diverting 
military planning, resources, and personnel to 
broader military ambitions; and 
(E) retaining the United States credibility 
as a defender of the democratic values and free- 
market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people 
and government; 
(7) The PRC capitalized on the world’s attention 
to COVID–19 to advance its military objectives in the 
South China Sea, intensifying and accelerating 
trends already underway. The PRC has sent milita-
rized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone, announced the establishment of an ad-
ministrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Is-
lands under the Chinese local government of Sansha, 
aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship, 
encroached on Indonesia’s fishing grounds, sunk a Vi-
etnamese fishing boat, announced new ‘‘research sta-
tions’’ on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, landed spe-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
cial military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to routinize 
such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 mili-
tia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the ex-
clusive economic zone of the Philippines. 
(8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State 
clarified United States policy on the South China Sea 
and stated that ‘‘Beijing’s claims to offshore resources 
across most of the South China Sea are completely 
unlawful’’. 
(9) These actions in the South China Sea enable 
the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper 
into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil 
Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, tes-
tified in 2019, ‘‘In short, China is now capable of 
controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short 
of war with the United States.’’. 
(10) The PLA also continues to advance its 
claims in the East China Sea, including through a 
high number of surface combatant patrols and fre-
quent entry into the territorial waters of the Senkaku 
Islands, over which the United States recognizes Ja-
pan’s administrative control. In April 2014, Presi-
dent Barack Obama stated, ‘‘Our commitment to Ja-
pan’s security is absolute and article five of the U.S.- 
Japan security treaty covers all territory under Ja-
915 
† HR 4521 EAS 
pan’s administration, including the Senkaku is-
lands.’’. 
(11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi-
chael R. Pompeo stated, ‘‘As the South China Sea is 
part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine 
forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China 
Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Ar-
ticle 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.’’. 
(12) The PLA also continues to advance its in-
fluence over the Korean Peninsula, including through 
a series of joint air exercises with the Russian Fed-
eration in the Republic of Korea’s Air Defense Identi-
fication Zone. 
(13) The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit-
ical capability in every branch and every domain, in-
cluding— 
(A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a 
great maritime power or ‘‘blue-water’’ navy that 
can completely control all activity within the 
First Island Chain and project power beyond it 
with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030; 
(B) increasing the size and range of its 
strike 
capabilities, 
including 
approximately 
1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate- 
range missiles capable of targeting United States
916 
† HR 4521 EAS 
allies and partners in the First and Second Is-
land chains, United States bases in the Indo-Pa-
cific, and United States forces at sea; 
(C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, in-
cluding with Russian-origin Su–35 fighters and 
S–400 air defense systems, new J–20 5th genera-
tion stealth fighters, advanced H–6 bomber 
variants, a long-range stealth bomber, and Y–20 
heavy lift aircraft; 
(D) making critical investments in new do-
mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec-
tronic warfare, and space warfare; and 
(E) increasing the size of its nuclear stock-
pile and delivery systems. 
(14) The PRC is pursuing this modernization 
through all means at its disposal, including its Mili-
tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole 
of PRC society in developing and acquiring tech-
nology with military applications to pursue techno-
logical advantage over the United States in artificial 
intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy 
weapons, 
electromagnetic 
railguns, 
counter-space 
weapons, and other emerging capabilities. 
(15) The United States lead in the development 
of science and technology relevant to defense is erod-
917 
† HR 4521 EAS 
ing in the face of competition from the PRC. United 
States research and development spending on defense 
capabilities has declined sharply as a share of global 
research and development. The commercial sector’s 
leading role in innovation presents certain unique 
challenges to the Department of Defense’s reliance on 
technology for battlefield advantage. 
(16) The PRC has vastly increased domestic re-
search and development expenditures, supported the 
growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped into 
a large workforce to invest in fostering science and 
engineering talent. 
(17) The PRC is increasing exports of defense 
and security capabilities to build its defense tech-
nology and industrial base and improve its own mili-
tary capabilities, as well as its influence with coun-
tries that purchase and become dependent on its mili-
tary systems. 
SEC. 3223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING 
SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA-
CIFIC. 
It is the sense of Congress that steps to bolster United 
States security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific must in-
clude—
918 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) supporting Japan in its development of long- 
range precision fires, munitions, air and missile de-
fense capacity, interoperability across all domains, 
maritime security, and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities; 
(2) launching a United States-Japan national 
security innovation fund to solicit and support pri-
vate sector cooperation for new technologies that could 
benefit the United States and Japan’s mutual secu-
rity objectives; 
(3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be-
tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re-
ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United 
States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing; 
(4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accel-
erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, 
which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan 
from invasion, including long-range precision fires, 
munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti- 
armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intel-
ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
resilient command and control capabilities, and in-
creasing the conduct of relevant and practical train-
ing and exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces; and
919 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(5) prioritizing building the capacity of United 
States allies and partners to protect defense tech-
nology. 
SEC. 3224. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to— 
(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United 
States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for 
achieving United States political and military objec-
tives in the region; 
(2) exercise freedom of operations in the inter-
national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific 
maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-
perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-
gion; 
(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the 
Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber 
presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long- 
range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, 
and diversified and resilient basing and rotational 
presence, including support for pre-positioning strate-
gies; 
(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and 
partnerships of the United States to build capacity 
and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, 
modernize communications architecture, address anti-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
access and area denial challenges, and increase joint 
exercises and security cooperation efforts; 
(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the 
United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-
cific region, including longstanding United States 
policy regarding— 
(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security between the United 
States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-
ary 19, 1960; 
(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Trea-
ty between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953; 
(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the United States and the Republic of 
the Philippines, signed at Washington August 
30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea 
is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil-
ippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the 
South China Sea will trigger mutual defense ob-
ligations under Article IV of our mutual defense 
treaty; 
(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-
land, United States Security Treaty, done at 
San Francisco September 1, 1951; and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-
gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 
1962; 
(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies 
in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral secu-
rity and defense cooperation with other regional part-
ners; 
(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the 
United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with 
partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle 
of freedom of operations in international waters and 
airspace in accordance with established principles 
and practices of international law; 
(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ‘‘Six As-
surances’’ provided by the United States to Taiwan 
in July 1982 as the foundations for United States- 
Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent 
possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of 
the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation 
to support the development of capable, ready, and 
modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
922 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(9) enhance security partnerships with India, 
across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the 
PRC against United States and allies’ interests, espe-
cially along the First Island Chain and in the West-
ern Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the United 
States can and is willing to deny them the ability to 
achieve their objectives, including by— 
(A) consistently demonstrating the political 
will of the United States to deepening existing 
treaty alliances and growing new partnerships 
as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-
tegic advantage to the PRC’s growing military 
capabilities and reach; 
(B) maintaining a system of forward-de-
ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the 
most visible sign of United States resolve and 
commitment to the region, and as platforms to 
ensure United States operational readiness and 
advance interoperability with allies and part-
ners; 
(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture 
throughout the region, particularly the Western 
Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for
923 
† HR 4521 EAS 
United States mobile and relocatable launchers 
for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic 
weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region; 
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike net-
works to United States and allied forces, includ-
ing ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea 
and naval capabilities, and integrated air and 
missile defense in the First Island Chain and the 
Second Island Chain, in order to deter and pre-
vent PRC coercion and aggression, and to maxi-
mize the United States ability to operate; 
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to en-
sure that escalation against key United States 
interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeat-
ing; and 
(F) collaborating with allies and partners 
to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-
ing the burdens of mutual defense, including 
through the acquisition and fielding of advanced 
capabilities and training that will better enable 
them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and 
(11) maintain the capacity of the United States 
to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, 
reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts 
of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself
924 
† HR 4521 EAS 
and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-
tacks against them. 
SEC. 3225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PA-
CIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SE-
CURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-
REACH ACTIVITIES. 
(a) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.—In ad-
dition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section 23 
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating 
to foreign military financing assistance), there is author-
ized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in 
accordance with this section— 
(1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 
(2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; 
(3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; 
(4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and 
(5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026. 
(b) SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-
TIATIVE.—There 
is 
authorized 
to 
be 
appropriated 
$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for 
the Department of State for International Narcotics Control 
and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the 
Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(c) DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.—There is au-
thorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 
$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, 
which shall be used— 
(1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with the 
United States’ interpretation of international law re-
lating to freedom of the seas; and 
(2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo- 
Pacific region to better align respective interpreta-
tions of international law relating to freedom of the 
seas, including on the matters of operations by mili-
tary ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent pas-
sage through territorial seas, and transits through 
international straits. 
(d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE.—Using 
amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
fense, is authorized to provide assistance for the purpose 
of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region— 
(1) to provide assistance to national military or 
other security forces of such countries that have mari-
926 
† HR 4521 EAS 
time security missions among their functional respon-
sibilities; 
(2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and 
headquarters level organizations for such forces; and 
(3) to provide assistance and training to other 
relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related 
ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that man-
age and oversee maritime activities and policy that 
the Secretary of State may so designate. 
(e) DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance pro-
vided by the Secretary of State under subsection (g) shall 
be known as the ‘‘Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
tive’’ (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Initiative’’). 
(f) 
PROGRAM
OBJECTIVES.—Assistance 
provided 
through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-
lowing objectives: 
(1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of 
international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region 
that are critical to ensuring the security and free flow 
of commerce and to achieving United States national 
security objectives. 
(2) Improving maritime domain awareness in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.
927 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking ac-
tivities and other forms of maritime trafficking activ-
ity in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-
tions that have been determined to be a security 
threat to the United States. 
(5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a 
country or regional organization to respond to emerg-
ing threats to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
(6) Strengthening United States alliances and 
partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (a) (relating to foreign mili-
tary financing assistance), there is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State for the Indo- 
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and other re-
lated regional programs exactly— 
(A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 
(B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; 
(C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; 
(D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and 
(E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
928 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The ‘‘Indo-Pacific 
Maritime Security Initiative’’ and funds authorized 
for the Initiative shall include existing regional pro-
grams carried out by the Department of State related 
to maritime security, including the Southeast Asia 
Maritime Security Initiative. 
(h) ELIGIBILITY AND PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
use the following considerations when selecting which 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region should receive as-
sistance pursuant to the Initiative: 
(A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-
try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-
pabilities of that country according to the objec-
tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-
tion that includes that country, to conduct— 
(i) maritime intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance; 
(ii) littoral and port security; 
(iii) Coast Guard operations; 
(iv) command and control; and 
(v) management and oversight of mari-
time activities. 
(B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to 
enhance the maritime security capabilities of the
929 
† HR 4521 EAS 
military or security forces of countries in the 
Indo-Pacific region that have maritime missions 
and the government agencies responsible for such 
forces. 
(2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.— 
(A) AUTHORIZED
ELEMENTS
OF
ASSIST-
ANCE.—Assistance provided under paragraph 
(1)(A) may include the provision of equipment, 
training, and small-scale military construction. 
(B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE 
AND
TRAINING.—Assistance and training pro-
vided under subparagraph (A) shall include ele-
ments that promote— 
(i) the observance of and respect for 
human rights; and 
(ii) respect for legitimate civilian au-
thority within the country to which the as-
sistance is provided. 
SEC. 3226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT 
PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot program 
for foreign military financing (FMF) compacts. 
(b) ASSISTANCE.—
930 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of 
two years, with an assessment for any additional or 
permanent programming, to provide assistance under 
this section for each country that enters into an FMF 
Challenge Compact with the United States pursuant 
to subsection (d) to support policies and programs 
that advance the progress of the country in achieving 
lasting security and civilian-military governance 
through respect for human rights, good governance 
(including transparency and free and fair elections), 
and cooperation with United States and international 
counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-crime 
efforts and programs. 
(2) FORM
OF
ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under 
this subsection may be provided in the form of grants, 
cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans 
to the government of an eligible country described in 
subsection (c). 
(c) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a can-
didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-
ance for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 if— 
(A) the country is classified as a lower mid-
dle income country in the then-most recent edi-
931 
† HR 4521 EAS 
tion of the World Development Report for Recon-
struction and Development published by the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment and has an income greater than the 
historical ceiling for International Development 
Association eligibility for the fiscal year in-
volved; and 
(B) the Secretary of State determines that 
the country is committed to seeking just and 
democratic governance, including with a dem-
onstrated commitment to— 
(i) the promotion of political plu-
ralism, equality, and the rule of law; 
(ii) respect for human and civil rights; 
(iii) protection of private property 
rights; 
(iv) transparency and accountability 
of government; 
(v) anti-corruption; and 
(vi) the institution of effective civilian 
control, professionalization, and respect for 
human rights by and the accountability of 
the armed forces. 
(2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.— 
Not later than 90 days prior to the date on which the
932 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Secretary of State determines eligible countries for an 
FMF Challenge Compact, the Secretary— 
(A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report that 
contains a list of all eligible countries identified 
that have met the requirements under paragraph 
(1) for the fiscal year; and 
(B) shall consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees on the extent to which such 
countries meet the criteria described in para-
graph (1). 
(d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.— 
(1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may pro-
vide assistance for an eligible country only if the 
country enters into an agreement with the United 
States, to be known as an ‘‘FMF Challenge Compact’’ 
(in this subsection referred to as a ‘‘Compact’’) that 
establishes a multi-year plan for achieving shared se-
curity objectives in furtherance of the purposes of this 
title. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact 
shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for deter-
mining eligibility, and be designed to significantly 
advance the performance of those commitments during 
the period of the Compact.
933 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take into 
account the national strategy of the eligible country 
and shall include— 
(A) the specific objectives that the country 
and the United States expect to achieve during 
the term of the Compact, including both how the 
foreign military financing under the Compact 
will advance shared security interests and ad-
vance partner capacity building efforts as well 
as to advance national efforts towards just and 
democratic governance; 
(B) the responsibilities of the country and 
the United States in the achievement of such ob-
jectives; 
(C) regular benchmarks to measure, where 
appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-
jectives; and 
(D) the strategy of the eligible country to 
sustain progress made toward achieving such ob-
jectives after expiration of the Compact. 
(e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-
PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before com-
mencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible coun-
try, the Secretary of State shall consult with the appro-
priate congressional committees with respect to the proposed
934 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and 
mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact. 
(f) ASSESSMENT
OF PILOT PROGRAM
AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the conclu-
sion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall pro-
vide a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment 
of the success and utility of the pilot program established 
under this subsection in meeting United States objectives 
and a recommendation with respect to whether to continue 
a further foreign military financing compact program on 
a pilot or permanent basis. 
SEC. 3227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fis-
cal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department 
of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise made 
available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (re-
lating to international military education and training 
(IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo- 
Pacific region in accordance with this division.
935 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 
3228. 
PRIORITIZING 
EXCESS 
DEFENSE 
ARTICLE 
TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States Government should prioritize the re-
view of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pacific part-
ners. 
(b) FIVE-YEAR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article 
transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describ-
ing such plan to the appropriate committees of Congress. 
(c) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Section 516(c)(2) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is 
amended by inserting ‘‘, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
Malaysia’’ after ‘‘and to the Philippines’’. 
(d) REQUIRED COORDINATION.—The United States 
Government shall coordinate and align excess defense article 
transfers with capacity building efforts of regional allies 
and partners. 
(e) TAIWAN.—Taiwan shall receive the same benefits 
conferred for the purposes of transfers pursuant to section 
516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2321j(c)(2)).
936 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANS-
FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) AUTHORITY.—The President is authorized to 
transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to 
the amendment made under section 3228(c) two OLIVER 
HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on a grant 
basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j). 
(b) GRANTS NOT COUNTED IN ANNUAL TOTAL OF 
TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.—The value of 
a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis pur-
suant to authority provided by this section shall not be 
counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles 
transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j). 
(c) COSTS OF TRANSFERS.—Any expense incurred by 
the United States in connection with a transfer authorized 
by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwith-
standing section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)). 
(d) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED STATES 
SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent practicable, the 
President shall require, as a condition of the transfer of a 
vessel under this subsection, that the recipient to which the 
vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of 
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces
937 
† HR 4521 EAS 
of that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the 
United States. 
(e) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority to 
transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end 
of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
SEC. 3230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM 
OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-
WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE 
SOUTH CHINA SEA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or 
the use of force to impede freedom of operations in 
international airspace by military or civilian air-
craft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the 
Indo-Pacific region; 
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China to refrain from implementing the de-
clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
which is contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 
provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion;
938 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of 
Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 
both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s 
claims to offshore resources across most of the South 
China Sea are unlawful; and 
(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for 
failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Ar-
bitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a 
state party to the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States to— 
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
ing longstanding United States policy regarding Arti-
cle V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense 
Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the 
United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies 
to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands; 
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 
freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace 
above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the 
militarization of new and reclaimed land features in 
the South China Sea;
939 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the 
PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely— 
(A) that PRC claims in the South China 
Sea, including to offshore resources across most 
of the South China Sea, are unlawful; 
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 
maritime claim vis-a`-vis the Philippines in 
areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived 
from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; 
and 
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 
or maritime claim to James Shoal; 
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation 
or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over 
disputed claims; 
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without in-
timidation, coercion, or force; 
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 
claims in accordance with international law;
940 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and 
maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
torial seas, must be derived from land features and 
otherwise comport with international law; 
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
tions covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, 
regulations which have raised tensions in the region; 
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that 
Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast 
Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle 
for the People’s Republic of China to advance its un-
lawful maritime claims; 
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is suf-
ficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the 
United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
countries, including the People’s Republic of China; 
(11) support the development of regional institu-
tions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, 
the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN 
Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in 
the region and reinforce the role of international law;
941 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 
with other countries in the region for maritime do-
main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
forts by the United States Government to explore the 
development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms 
for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the South China 
Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior 
and deter risky and dangerous activities; 
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 
any other country from exercising its sovereign rights 
to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
and continental shelf by making claims to those areas 
in the South China Sea that have no support in 
international law; and 
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the 
United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 
when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 
allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of oper-
ations in international waters and airspace in ac-
cordance with established principles and practices of 
international law.
942 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF 
INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and 
strengthen existing measures under the United States 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capa-
bilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed- 
on division of responsibility for alliance roles, mis-
sions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
United States strategic imperatives; 
(2) the United States should design for export to 
Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical 
to maintaining a favorable military balance in the 
region, including long-range precision fires, air and 
missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land 
attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys-
tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
capabilities, and command and control systems; 
(3) the United States should pursue, to the max-
imum extent possible, anticipatory technology secu-
rity and foreign disclosure policy on the systems de-
scribed in paragraph (2); and 
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense, should—
943 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contin-
gency requirements and avoid the need for ac-
cessing United States stocks in wartime; and 
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such mu-
nitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ ca-
pacity to produce such munitions. 
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES
OF CONGRESS.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report that describes United States priorities 
for building more capable security partners in the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall—
944 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) provide a priority list of defense and 
military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners must possess for the United States to be 
able to achieve its military objectives in the 
Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) identify, from the list referred to in sub-
paragraph (A), the capabilities that are best pro-
vided, or can only be provided, by the United 
States; 
(C) identify— 
(i) 
actions 
required 
to 
prioritize 
United States Government resources and 
personnel to expedite fielding the capabili-
ties identified in subparagraph (B); and 
(ii) steps needed to fully account for 
and a plan to integrate all means of United 
States foreign military sales, direct com-
mercial sales, security assistance, and all 
applicable authorities of the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense; 
(D) assess the requirements for United 
States security assistance, including Inter-
national Military Education and Training, in 
the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
945 
† HR 4521 EAS 
to deliver critical partner capability require-
ments identified in subparagraph (B); 
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet 
the requirements for United States security as-
sistance, and identify resource gaps; 
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
requirements for United States security assist-
ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative 
and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
cific partner countries; 
(G) identify limitations on the ability of the 
United States to provide such capabilities, in-
cluding those identified under subparagraph (B), 
because of existing United States treaty obliga-
tions, United States policies, or other regula-
tions; 
(H) recommend improvements to the process 
for developing requirements for United States 
partner capabilities; and 
(I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
ommendations for infrastructure and posture, 
based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
946 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) FORM.—The report required under this sub-
section shall be unclassified, but may include a classi-
fied annex. 
SEC. 3232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND IN-
DUSTRIAL BASE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated 
approach, which leverages economies of scale with 
major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
tain its lead in defense technology; 
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer 
of defense-related technologies and services to members 
of the national technology and industrial base (as de-
fined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) 
would advance United States security interests by 
helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and 
skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the de-
pendence on other countries, including countries that 
pose challenges to United States interests around the 
world, for defense-related innovation and investment; 
and 
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to 
continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Can-
ada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
947 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related 
technology and services and leverage the investments 
of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maxi-
mize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 
innovation. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
gressional committees that— 
(A) describes the Department of State’s ef-
forts to facilitate access among the national tech-
nology and industrial base to defense articles 
and services subject to the United States Muni-
tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and 
(B) identifies foreign legal and regulatory 
challenges, as well as foreign policy or other 
challenges or considerations that prevent or frus-
trate these efforts, to include any gaps in the re-
spective export control regimes implemented by 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Australia, or Canada.
948 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) FORM.—This report required under para-
graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 
classified annex. 
SEC. 3233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RE-
SPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-
TIONS OVERSEAS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit 
a report to the appropriate committees of Congress regard-
ing United States diplomatic engagement with other na-
tions that host or are considering hosting any military in-
stallation of the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required 
under subsection (a) shall include— 
(1) a list of countries that currently host or are 
considering hosting any military installation of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China; 
(2) a detailed description of United States diplo-
matic and related efforts to engage countries that are 
considering hosting a military installation of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China, and 
the results of such efforts;
949 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) an assessment of the adverse impact on 
United States interests of the Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China successfully establishing a 
military installation at any of the locations it is cur-
rently considering; 
(4) a description and list of any commercial 
ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that 
the United States Government assesses could be used 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
for military purposes, and any diplomatic efforts to 
engage the governments of the countries where such 
ports are located; 
(5) the impact of the military installations of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
United States interests; and 
(6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experi-
ence of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in 
Djibouti. 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a unclas-
sified summary.
950 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF 
UNITED 
NATIONS 
SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA. 
It is the policy of the United States to sustain max-
imum economic pressure on the Government of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this section 
as the ‘‘DPRK’’) until the regime undertakes complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible actions toward denuclearization, 
including by— 
(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 
implement and enforce existing United Nations sanc-
tions with regard to the DPRK; 
(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and 
in accordance with United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citi-
zens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers 
are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of rev-
enue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions; 
(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 
pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from 
the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent 
with United Nations Security Council resolutions; 
(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities— 
(A) to cease business activities with United 
Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in 
the DPRK; and
951 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who 
enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nu-
clear and ballistic missile programs; and 
(5) enforcing United Nations Security Council 
resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United 
States sanctions, including those pursuant to the 
North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act 
of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering Amer-
ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 
115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear 
Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI 
of division F of Public Law 116–92), and relevant 
United States executive orders. 
SEC. 3235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
HOSTING 
CHINESE 
MILITARY 
INSTALLA-
TIONS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initia-
tive (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s 
Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to ad-
vance its own security interests, including to expand 
its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater 
access for the People’s Liberation Army through over-
seas military installations; and
952 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation 
Army globally through overseas military installations 
will undermine the medium- and long-term security 
of the United States and the security and development 
of strategic partners in critical regions around the 
world, which is at odds with United States goals to 
promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among 
partner nations, including through the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. 
(b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as provided 
in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the 
government of a country that is hosting on its territory a 
military installation of the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence 
of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than 
participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or 
for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief 
operations in such country shall not be eligible for assist-
ance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge 
Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715). 
(c) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President 
may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in sub-
section (b) if the President submits to the appropriate con-
gressional committees—
953 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) a written determination that the waiver is 
important to the national interests of the United 
States; and 
(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is 
important to those interests. 
Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to 
Counter the People’s Republic of 
China 
SEC. 3241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD 
WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships in 
Europe and with like-minded countries around the 
globe to effectively compete with the People’s Republic 
of China; and 
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
partners— 
(A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military challenges posed by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(B) to deter the People’s Republic of China 
from pursuing military aggression;
954 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of ter-
ritorial disputes in accordance with inter-
national law; 
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
economic development while countering efforts by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China to leverage predatory economic practices 
as a means of political and economic coercion in 
the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; 
(E) to promote the values of democracy and 
human rights, including through efforts to end 
the repression by the Chinese Communist Party 
of political dissidents, Uyghurs, and other ethnic 
Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Chris-
tians, and other minorities; 
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chi-
nese Communist Party, in contravention of the 
commitments made under the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong 
Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of the people 
of Hong Kong; and 
(G) to counter the Chinese Communist Par-
ty’s efforts to spread disinformation in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and beyond with respect
955 
† HR 4521 EAS 
to the response of the Chinese Communist Party 
to COVID–19. 
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
SEC. 3245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 
STATES-CANADA RELATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States and Canada have a unique 
relationship based on shared geography, extensive per-
sonal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense 
commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democ-
racy, human rights, and the rules based international 
order established after World War II; 
(2) the United States and Canada can better ad-
dress the People’s Republic of China’s economic, polit-
ical, and security influence through closer cooperation 
on 
counternarcotics, 
environmental 
stewardship, 
transparent practices in public procurement and in-
frastructure 
planning, 
the 
Arctic, 
energy 
and 
connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, 
bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, 
good governance, and human rights; 
(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United 
States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives 
to address border management, commercial and trade 
relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with
956 
† HR 4521 EAS 
respect to the People’s Republic of China, and 
transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy 
security, and environmental stewardship; 
(4) the United States and Canada should en-
hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, 
influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
ganda efforts; 
(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
cations technology, extraction of natural resources, 
and port infrastructure, pose national security risks 
for the United States and Canada; 
(6) the United States should share, as appro-
priate, intelligence gathered regarding— 
(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and 
(B) the PRC government’s intentions with 
respect to 5G expansion; 
(7) the United States and Canada should con-
tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada 
Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development 
Collaboration; and 
(8) the United States and Canada must 
prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in 
the Arctic, including by modernizing the North Amer-
957 
† HR 4521 EAS 
ican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to effec-
tively defend the Northern Hemisphere against the 
range of threats by peer competitors, including long- 
range missiles and high-precision weapons. 
SEC. 3246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI-
NA’S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANA-
DIAN CITIZENS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive 
treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and 
Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deep-
ly concerning; 
(2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
national leadership by— 
(A) upholding the rule of law and com-
plying with its international legal obligations, 
including those pursuant to the Extradition 
Treaty Between the United States of America 
and Canada, signed at Washington December 3, 
1971; and 
(B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
958 
† HR 4521 EAS 
which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the 
European Union, and reaffirms well-established 
prohibitions under international human rights 
conventions against the arbitrary detention of 
foreign nationals to be used as leverage in state- 
to-state relations; and 
(3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for 
due 
process 
for 
Canadian 
national 
Robert 
Schellenberg. 
SEC. 3247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
CANADA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that 
describes how the United States will enhance cooperation 
with the Government of Canada in managing relations with 
the PRC government. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall— 
(1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
divergence between the United States and Canada in 
managing relations with the People’s Republic of 
China in the areas of technology, trade, economic
959 
† HR 4521 EAS 
practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and 
critical minerals, and illicit narcotics; 
(2) include a description of United States devel-
opment and coordination efforts with Canadian coun-
terparts to enhance the cooperation between the 
United States and Canada with respect to— 
(A) managing economic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(B) democracy and human rights in the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(C) technology issues involving the People’s 
Republic of China; 
(D) defense issues involving the People’s Re-
public of China; and 
(E) international law enforcement and 
transnational organized crime issues. 
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 
work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection of 
an authoritarian governing model around the world; 
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to 
Huawei’s 5G technology; 
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—
960 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
dian priorities for responsible stewardship in the 
Arctic Region; and 
(B) to counter the PRC’s efforts to project 
political, economic, and military influence into 
the Arctic Region; and 
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
ada to track and counter the PRC’s attempts to exert 
influence across the multilateral system, including at 
the World Health Organization. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made 
available to the public, but may include a classified annex, 
if necessary. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently 
than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary 
of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding the development and implementation 
of the strategy required under this section.
961 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-
PETITIVENESS, 
GOVERNANCE, 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Offi-
cer of the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increas-
ing United States economic competitiveness and promoting 
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in 
the areas of investment, equitable and sustainable develop-
ment, commercial relations, anti-corruption activities, and 
infrastructure projects, to— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-
ate; 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives; and
962 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required 
under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to— 
(1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in 
the region to advance the sustainable development of 
equitable economies; 
(2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between 
the countries of the Americas; 
(3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and com-
petitive environment for United States businesses in 
the region; 
(4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
view long term financial sustainability and security 
implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
tors or services, including transportation, commu-
nications, natural resources, and energy; 
(5) establish competitive and transparent infra-
structure project selection and procurement processes 
that promote transparency, open competition, finan-
cial sustainability, adherence to robust global stand-
ards, and the employment of the local workforce;
963 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
democratic governance, fair competition, combatting 
corruption, and ending impunity; 
(7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private sec-
tor-led economic growth in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; and 
(8) maintain transparent and affordable access 
to the internet and digital infrastructure in the West-
ern Hemisphere. 
(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after consulta-
tion with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief 
the congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regard-
ing the implementation of this part, including examples of 
successes and challenges. 
SEC. 3249. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means—
965 
† HR 4521 EAS 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organi-
zation of American States, and Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank. 
(2) DEFENSE
SECTOR.—The report required 
under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of 
the nature, intent, and impact on United States stra-
tegic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, including military edu-
cation and training programs, weapons sales, and 
space-related activities in the military or civilian 
spheres, such as— 
(A) the satellite and space control station 
the People’s Republic of China constructed in 
Argentina; and 
(B) defense and security cooperation carried 
out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, including sales of 
surveillance and monitoring technology to gov-
ernments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba, 
Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of 
such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence 
services. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and 
shall include classified annexes.
966 
† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3250. ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING 
PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-
IBBEAN. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) since 2005, the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China has expanded sovereign lending to 
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean 
with loans that are repaid or collateralized with nat-
ural resources or commodities; 
(2) several countries in Latin American and the 
Caribbean that have received a significant amount of 
sovereign lending from the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China face challenges in repaying such 
loans; 
(3) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China’s predatory economic practices and sovereign 
lending practices in Latin America and the Carib-
bean negatively influence United States national in-
terests in the Western Hemisphere; 
(4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
premier multilateral development bank dedicated to 
the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant 
role supporting the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and service-
able debt structures; and
967 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(5) a tenth general capital increase for the Inter- 
American Development Bank would strengthen the 
Bank’s ability to help the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and serviceable 
debt structures. 
(b) SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.— 
The President shall take steps to support a tenth general 
capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank, 
including advancing diplomatic engagement to build sup-
port among member countries of the Bank for a tenth gen-
eral capital increase for the Bank. 
(c) TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—The Inter-American 
Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended 
by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE. 
‘‘(a) VOTE AUTHORIZED.—The United States Gov-
ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a resolu-
tion to increase the capital stock of the Bank by 
$80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years. 
‘‘(b) SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Governor 
of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the United 
States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the capital 
stock of the Bank.
968 
† HR 4521 EAS 
‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—Any subscription by the 
United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall 
be effective only to such extent and in such amounts 
as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts. 
‘‘(c) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
TIONS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to pay for the in-
crease in the United States subscription to the Bank 
under subsection (b), there is authorized to be appro-
priated $24,014,857,191 for payment by the Secretary 
of the Treasury. 
‘‘(2) ALLOCATION
OF
FUNDS.—Of the amount 
authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1)— 
‘‘(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in 
shares of the Bank; and 
‘‘(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable 
shares of the Bank.’’. 
(d) ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING
IN 
THE AMERICAS.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the 
United States Executive Director to the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence of 
the United States— 
(1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help coun-
tries restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China
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† HR 4521 EAS 
in order to achieve sustainable and serviceable debt 
structures; and 
(2) to establish appropriate safeguards and 
transparency and conditionality measures to protect 
debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank that borrow from the Bank 
for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral 
debt held by such countries and preventing such coun-
tries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt. 
(e) BRIEFINGS.— 
(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 
90 days thereafter for 6 years, the President shall pro-
vide to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and the Committee on Financial Services 
of the House of Representatives a briefing detailing 
efforts to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the 
amendment made by subsection (c). 
(2) PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE AND 
SERVICEABLE
DEBT
STRUCTURES.—Not later than 
180 days after the successful completion of a tenth 
general capital increase for the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a pe-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
riod of 3 years, the President shall provide to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the 
Committee on Finance of the Senate, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the 
Bank to support countries in Latin American and the 
Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable and 
serviceable debt structures. 
SEC. 3251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Department of State $12,000,000 for the 
International Military Education and Training Program 
for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026. 
(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 
take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiv-
ing funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such pro-
grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice 
for international military education and training for Latin 
American and Caribbean partners. 
(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to 
in subsection (a) shall—
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† HR 4521 EAS 
SEC. 3252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-
NOLOGIES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China is exporting its model for internal security and 
state control of society through advanced technology 
and artificial intelligence; and 
(2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
communications supply chains with equipment and 
services from companies with close ties to or that are 
susceptible to pressure from governments or security 
services without reliable legal checks on governmental 
powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private infor-
mation, increased censorship, violations of human 
rights, and harassment of political opponents. 
(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of 
State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean to— 
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 
liberties posed by technologies and services described 
in subsection (a); and
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate 
such risks. 
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Exec-
utive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, 
working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Sec-
retary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Freedom and Busi-
ness and Human Rights Section, shall expand and 
prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology and 
services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share 
digital news and information. 
(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 
State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to— 
(1) support and promote programs that support 
internet freedom and the free flow of information on-
line in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
able access to internet in Latin America and the Car-
ibbean;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(3) provide integrated support to civil society for 
technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and 
applied research programs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; 
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 
Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 
techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 
and prevent government overreach in the digital 
sphere; 
(5) assist independent media outlets and journal-
ists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 
their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 
news reports covering governance and human rights 
topics; 
(6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 
improve transparency and accountability in govern-
ment and the private sector; 
(7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business 
and commercial practices related to the People’s Re-
public of China, including the role of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China in such practices;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 
strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities de-
scribed in paragraph (7); and 
(9) identify local resources to support the pre-
ponderance of activities that would be carried out 
under this subsection. 
(e) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not more than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 
180 days thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of 
the United States Agency for Global Media shall provide 
a briefing regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), 
(d), and (e) to— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Sen-
ate; 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
SEC. 3255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC 
ALLIANCE. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States, European Union, and Eu-
ropean countries are close partners, sharing values 
grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, 
and the rules-based international order established 
after World War II; 
(2) without a common approach by the United 
States, European Union, and European countries on 
connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
port for democracy and human rights, the People’s 
Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
nomic, political, and security leverage in Europe; 
(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment 
of assistance to European countries following the 
COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to 
aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic 
ties to the People’s Republic of China; 
(4) as European states seek to recover from the 
economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United 
States must stand in partnership with Europe to sup-
port our collective economic recovery, reinforce our 
collective national security, and defend shared values;
977 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(5) the United States, European Union, and Eu-
ropean countries should coordinate on joint strategies 
to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the 
People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical 
and pharmaceutical sectors; 
(6) the United States, European Union, and Eu-
ropean countries should leverage their respective eco-
nomic innovation capabilities to support the global 
economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and 
draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and Eu-
ropean Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate 
their trade disputes, including negotiating a United 
States-European Union trade agreement that benefits 
workers and the broader economy in both the United 
States and European Union; 
(8) the United States, European Union, and 
Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address 
economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(9) the United States, European Union, and 
countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to 
counter PRC disinformation, influence operations, 
and propaganda efforts;
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(10) the United States and European nations 
share serious concerns with the repressions being sup-
ported and executed by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China, and should continue implementing 
measures to address the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong 
Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mecha-
nisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s 
authoritarian governance model to countries around 
the world; 
(11) the United States and European nations 
should remain united in their shared values against 
attempts by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China at the United Nations and other multilateral 
organizations to promote efforts that erode the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ‘‘com-
munity of a shared future for mankind’’ and ‘‘democ-
ratization of international relations’’; 
(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
ture investments around the world, particularly in 
5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
structure, could threaten democracy across Europe 
and the national security of key countries; 
(13) as appropriate, the United States should 
share intelligence with European allies and partners
980 
† HR 4521 EAS 
limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; and 
(18) the United States should work with counter-
parts in Europe to— 
(A) evaluate United States and European 
overreliance on goods originating in the People’s 
Republic of China, including in the medical and 
pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strate-
gies to diversify supply chains; 
(B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19- 
related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure 
developing countries by offering relevant United 
States and European expertise and assistance; 
and 
(C) leverage the United States and Euro-
pean private sectors to advance the post-COVID– 
19 economic recovery. 
SEC. 3256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-
OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief 
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of the House
981 
† HR 4521 EAS 
of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States 
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, 
and European partner countries with respect to the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required by subsection 
(a) shall do the following: 
(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Depart-
ment of State official that leads United States efforts 
to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and 
European partner countries to advance a shared ap-
proach with respect to the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) Identify key policy points of convergence and 
divergence between the United States and European 
partners with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China in the areas of technology, trade, and economic 
practices. 
(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests 
with European counterparts on— 
(A) economic challenges with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(B) democracy and human rights challenges 
with respect to the People’s Republic of China; 
(C) technology issues with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China;
982 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; and 
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 
respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
established by the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China. 
(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among 
key regional and functional bureaus within the De-
partment of State and Department of Defense tasked 
with engaging with European partners on the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
(5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the 
briefing and future plans to work with European 
partners to counter the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian 
governance model around the world. 
(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the 
date of the briefing and future plans to support Euro-
pean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to 
Huawei’s 5G technology. 
(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy 
tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the 
Department of State, will coordinate efforts with 
counterpart entities within the European Union to 
counter Chinese propaganda.
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† HR 4521 EAS 
(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the 
Department of State dedicates to engagement between 
the United States and the European Union on the 
People’s Republic of China and provide an assessment 
of out-year resource needs to execute the strategy. 
(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts 
to exert influence across multilateral fora, including 
at the World Health Organization. 
(c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall 
be classified. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days there-
after for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees regarding the de-
velopment and implementation of the elements described in 
subsection (b). 
SEC. 3257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON 
PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 
transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the 
Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and 
the European Development Finance Institutions (called the 
DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on shared objectives 
to foster private sector-led development and provide market-
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† HR 4521 EAS 
based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging 
markets, particularly as related to the People’s Republic of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by inte-
grating efforts such as— 
(1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting 
Europe and Asia; 
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Ini-
tiative Fund; 
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United 
States, Japan, and Australia; and 
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 
leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects 
and emphasizes transparency standards. 
(b) COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The 
United States, European Union, and European countries 
should coordinate efforts to address the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China’s use of the United Nations to 
advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the 
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the 
People’s Republic of China and United Nations funds and 
programs on BRI implementation. 
(c) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to en-
hance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 
Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for
985 
† HR 4521 EAS 
Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
oping countries. 
SEC. 3258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-
TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN 
CHINA AND RUSSIA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on 
Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, 
the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—
986 
† HR 4521 EAS 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Fed-
eral agencies as the Director considers appropriate, 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report and brief the appropriate committees of Con-
gress on cooperation between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Islamic Republic of Iran and between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Fed-
eration. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 
(A) An identification of major areas of dip-
lomatic, energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
tion— 
(i) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
and 
(ii) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation.