105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 2386
AN ACT
To implement the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act
concerning the stability and security of Taiwan and Unit-
ed States cooperation with Taiwan on the development
and acquisition of defensive military articles.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States-Taiwan
Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability and security of Taiwan and
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait are key
elements for the continued peace and stability of the
greater Asia-Pacific region, and the indefinite con-
tinuation of such stability and security and balance
of power is in the vital national security interest of
the United States.
(2) The People’s Republic of China is currently
engaged in a comprehensive military modernization
campaign that is enhancing the power-projection ca-
pabilities of the People’s Liberation Army, including
the introduction of advanced ballistic and cruise mis-
siles that could alter the current balance of power in
the Taiwan Strait and in the greater Asia-Pacific re-
gion.
(3) The current lack of transparency in the
People’s Republic of China military infrastructure
and its associated defense establishment and the
opaqueness of the comprehensive efforts of the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army to modernize its ballistic and
cruise missile programs could spark a regional arms
race that would destabilize the East Asia and West-
ern Pacific regions and threaten vital United States
national security interests.
(4) In March 1996, the People’s Liberation
Army created a temporary, but de facto, blockade of
both the international shipping lanes of the Taiwan
Strait and the international airspace around Taiwan
by conducting live-fire military exercises which in-
cluded the launch of several advanced, nuclear-capa-
ble M–9 ballistic missiles to target areas close to
major ports in both the northern and southern areas
of Taiwan.
(5) In March 1996, the locations of People’s
Liberation Army military activities and M–9 missile
target areas nearby to Taiwan’s two largest ports,
Keelung and Kaohsiung, created a de facto blockade
of the Taiwan Strait, international waters and air-
space, interfered with United States and inter-
national shipping and aviation, and impinged upon
the national security interests of the United States,
requiring the immediate deployment of two United
States aircraft carrier battle groups to the South
China Sea.
(6) The actions of the People’s Liberation Army
in such close proximity to Taiwan were deliberate at-
tempts to disrupt Taiwan’s social and economic sta-
bility and were carried out as attempts to intimidate
the people of Taiwan during the period leading up
to Taiwan’s historic first democratic presidential
election.
(7) The early development and deployment of
an effective United States theater missile defense
system to the Asia-Pacific region, and the adjust-
ment of United States policy to include Taiwan, in-
cluding the Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu,
under the protection of such defense system, would
be prudent and appropriate responses to—
(A) the refusal by the People’s Republic of
China to renounce the use of force to determine
the future of Taiwan;
(B) the nature of the military threat of the
People’s Republic of China posed by the in-
creased focus of the People’s Liberation Army
on advanced missile development; and
(C) the demonstrated intent of the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to use
live-fire military exercises and ballistic missile
tests against the people and Government of
Taiwan as tools of so-called coercive diplomacy.
(8) The early deployment of a United States
theater anti-ballistic missile system in the Asia-Pa-
cific region would maintain a balance of power in the
Taiwan Strait and deter the People’s Republic of
China from resorting to military intimidation tactics
to coerce or manipulate the people and freely elected
Government of Taiwan in the future.
(9) While Taiwan is currently acquiring a local
aircraft and ballistic and cruise missile defense capa-
bility in the form of the Modified Air Defense Sys-
tem (MADS), a larger portion of Taiwan’s territory
and population would be protected if this system
were expanded to include a defense of the Taichung
region, Kaohsiung, the Penghu Islands, Kinmen,
and Matsu from limited ballistic missile attacks and
a deterrent against the threat and use of force
against Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army to
achieve the political goals of the core leadership of
the People’s Republic of China.
(10) Taiwan has requested further United
States cooperation on missile defense, including the
conduct of a joint architecture study of the require-
ments for the establishment and operation of a mis-
sile defense system for Taiwan, including the
Penghu Islands, Kinmen, and Matsu.
(11) On June 9, 1898, the ‘‘Convention Re-
specting an Extension of Hong Kong Territory’’ was
agreed to between representatives of the govern-
ments of Great Britain and China to lease the New
Territories for the period of 99 years beginning on
July 1, 1898.
(12) On December 19, 1984, the ‘‘Sino-British
Joint Declaration’’, agreed to between representa-
tives of the governments of Great Britain and China,
established the terms for the return to China on
July 1, 1997, of the Hong Kong area (including the
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New Terri-
tories (hereafter in this resolution referred to as
‘‘Hong Kong’’).
(13) No treaties exist between the People’s Re-
public of China and Taiwan which determine the fu-
ture status of Taiwan.
(14) The People’s Republic of China attempts
to apply to Taiwan the formula commonly known as
‘‘one country, two systems’’ in an effort to annex
Taiwan to China.
(15) The People’s Republic of China has re-
fused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan
and held military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in