581 
(1) In its 2011 ‘‘Annual Report to Congress on 
Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China’’, the Department of De-
fense stated that, ‘‘China’s defense industry has ben-
efitted from integration with a rapidly expanding ci-
vilian economy and science and technology sector, 
particularly elements that have access to foreign 
technology. Progress within individual defense sec-
tors appears linked to the relative integration of 
each, through China’s civilian economy, into the 
global production and R&D chain . . . Information 
technology 
companies 
in 
particular, 
including 
Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintain close ties 
to the PLA.’’. 
(2) In a 2011 report titled ‘‘The National Secu-
rity Implications of Investments and Products from 
the People’s Republic of China in the Telecommuni-
cations Sector’’, the United States China Commis-
sion stated that ‘‘[n]ational security concerns have 
accompanied the dramatic growth of China’s telecom 
sector. . . . Additionally, large Chinese companies— 
particularly those ‘national champions’ prominent in 
China’s ‘going out’ strategy of overseas expansion— 
are directly subject to direction by the Chinese Com-
582 
munist Party, to include support for PRC state poli-
cies and goals.’’. 
(3) The Commission further stated in its report 
that ‘‘[f]rom this point of view, the clear economic 
benefits of foreign investment in the U.S. must be 
weighed against the potential security concerns re-
lated to infrastructure components coming under the 
control of foreign entities. This seems particularly 
applicable in the telecommunications industry, as 
Chinese companies continue systematically to ac-
quire significant holdings in prominent global and 
U.S. telecommunications and information technology 
companies.’’. 
(4) In its 2011 Annual Report to Congress, the 
United States China Commission stated that ‘‘[t]he 
extent of the state’s control of the Chinese economy 
is difficult to quantify . . . There is also a category 
of companies that, though claiming to be private, are 
subject to state influence. Such companies are often 
in new markets with no established SOE leaders and 
enjoy favorable government policies that support 
their development while posing obstacles to foreign 
competition. Examples include Chinese telecoms 
giant Huawei and such automotive companies as
583 
battery maker BYD and vehicle manufacturers 
Geely and Chery.’’. 
(5) General Michael Hayden, who served as Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and Direc-
tor of the National Security Agency, stated in July 
2013 that Huawei had ‘‘shared with the Chinese 
state intimate and extensive knowledge of foreign 
telecommunications systems it is involved with.’’. 
(6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a 
February 2015 Counterintelligence Strategy Part-
nership Intelligence Note stated that, ‘‘[w]ith the ex-
panded use of Huawei Technologies Inc. equipment 
and services in U.S. telecommunications service pro-
vider networks, the Chinese Government’s potential 
access to U.S. business communications is dramati-
cally increasing. Chinese Government-supported tele-
communications equipment on U.S. networks may be 
exploited through Chinese cyber activity, with Chi-
na’s intelligence services operating as an advanced 
persistent threat to U.S. networks.’’. 
(7) The Federal Bureau of Investigation fur-
ther stated in its February 2015 counterintelligence 
note that, ‘‘China makes no secret that its cyber 
warfare strategy is predicated on controlling global 
communications network infrastructure.’’.
584 
(8) At a hearing before the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives on 
September 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Robert Work, responding to a question about the 
use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, stat-
ed, ‘‘In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abso-
lutely not. And I know of no other—I don’t believe 
we operate in the Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems 
in the Pentagon.’’. 
(9) At such hearing, the Commander of the 
United States Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rog-
ers, responding to a question about why such 
Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used, 
stated, ‘‘as we look at supply chain and we look at 
potential vulnerabilities within the system, that it is 
a risk we felt was unacceptable.’’. 
(10) In March 2017, ZTE Corporation pled 
guilty to conspiring to violate the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act by illegally ship-
ping United States-origin items to Iran, paying the 
United 
States 
Government 
a 
penalty 
of 
$892,360,064 dollars for activity between January 
2010 and January 2016. 
(11) The Treasury Department’s Office of For-
eign Assets Control issued a subpoena to Huawei as
585 
part of a Federal investigation of alleged violations 
of trade restrictions on Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and 
Syria. 
(12) In the bipartisan Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives ‘‘Investigative Report on the United States Na-
tional Security Issues Posed by Chinese Tele-
communication Companies Huawei and ZTE’’ re-
leased in 2012, it was recommended that ‘‘U.S. gov-
ernment systems, particularly sensitive systems, 
should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment, in-
cluding in component parts. Similarly, government 
contractors—particularly those working on contracts 
for sensitive U.S. programs—should exclude ZTE or 
Huawei equipment in their systems.’’. 
(13) Christopher Wray, who serves as Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated in 
February 2018 during a hearing of the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate that he was 
‘‘deeply concerned about the risks of allowing any 
company or entity that is beholden to foreign gov-
ernments that don’t share our values to gain posi-
tions of power inside our telecommunications net-
works. That provides the capacity to exert pressure 
or control over our telecommunications infrastruc-
586 
ture. It provides the capacity to maliciously modify 
or steal information. And it provides the capacity to 
conduct undetected espionage.’’ Admiral Mike Rog-
ers, who served as Director of the National Security 
Agency, agreed with Director Wray’s characteriza-
tion, and added that Government programs need ‘‘to 
look long and hard at companies like this’’. 
(14) Director of National Intelligence Dan 
Coats, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director 
Christopher Wray, Director of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency General Robert Ashley, Director of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Robert 
Cardillo, Director of the National Security Agency 
Admiral Michael Rogers, and Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Michael Pompeo all indicated by 
show of hands in February 2018 at a hearing of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that 
they would not ‘‘use products or services from 
Huawei or ZTE’’. 
(15) General Paul Nakasone, who served as the 
Commanding General of United States Army Cyber 
Command, stated during his confirmation hearing to 
be National Security Agency director in March 2018 
before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate that he ‘‘would not’’ use any Huawei, China
587 
Unicom, or China Telecom products nor would he 
recommend his family do so. 
(b) PROHIBITION
ON
CERTAIN
TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS OR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SERVICES OR EQUIP-
MENT.— 
(1) PROHIBITION
ON
AGENCY
USE
OR
PRO-
CUREMENT.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), 
beginning not later than January 1, 2021, the head 
of an agency may not procure or obtain, may not ex-
tend or renew a contract to procure or obtain, and 
may not enter into a contract (or extend or renew 
a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, 
system, or service that uses covered telecommuni-
cations or video surveillance equipment or services as 
a substantial or essential component of any system, 
or as critical technology as part of any system. The 
prohibitions described in this paragraph include the 
obligation or expenditure of loans or grant funds to 
procure or obtain, extend or renew a contract to pro-
cure or obtain, or enter into a contract (or extend 
or renew a contract) to procure or obtain covered 
telecommunications equipment or services. 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN.—By not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, each agency shall develop a plan to imple-
588 
ment paragraph (1) throughout the agency’s supply 
chain and shall submit such plan to the appropriate 
congressional committees. Each such plan shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a 
classified annex. The plan for an agency shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, how the agency plans 
to deal with the impact of white label technology on 
its supply chain whereby the original manufacturer 
of technology is not readily apparent to a purchaser 
or user. 
(3) WAIVER.—The head of an agency may, on 
a one time basis, waive the requirement under para-
graph (1) with respect to an entity that requests 
such a waiver. Such a waiver may be provided for 
a period of not more than two years if the entity 
seeking the waiver— 
(A) can demonstrate a compelling justifica-
tion for additional time to implement such 
paragraph; 
(B) submits to the head of the agency, who 
then submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees within 30 days, a full and complete 
laydown of the presence of covered tele-
communications or video surveillance equipment 
or services in the entity’s supply chain and a
589 
phase-out plan to eliminate such covered tele-
communications or video surveillance equipment 
or services from its systems; 
(C) does not permit real-time access to its 
networks to an entity located or substantially 
located in a covered foreign country; and 
(D) provides a written guarantee to the 
head of the agency that it will not procure such 
covered telecommunications or video surveil-
lance equipment or services again. 
(4) COVERED COMPONENTS.—With respect to a 
covered component of an entity for which such entity 
reasonably believes will not need to be replaced dur-
ing the 5-year period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act, such entity shall provide a 
written assurance to the head of the agency for 
which such covered component is in use that such 
entity shall replace such covered component, at the 
end of such covered component’s reasonable lifecycle, 
with a comparable component that is manufactured 
by a person other than Huawei Technologies Com-
pany, 
Hytera 
Communications 
Corporation, 
Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, 
Dahua Technology Company, or ZTE Corporation
590 
(or any subsidiary, successor entity, or affiliate of 
such entities). 
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(A) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional 
committees’’ means the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and House of Represent-
atives, the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives, the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, 
the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform of the House of Representatives, and 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs of the Senate. 
(B) The term ‘‘agency’’ has the meaning 
given that term in section 551 of title 5, United 
States Code. 
(C) The term ‘‘covered foreign country’’ 
means the People’s Republic of China. 
(D) The term ‘‘covered telecommunications 
or video surveillance equipment or services’’ 
means any of the following: 
(i) Telecommunications or video sur-
veillance equipment produced by Huawei 
Technologies Company, Hytera Commu-
nications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision
591 
Digital Technology Company, Dahua Tech-
nology Company, or ZTE Corporation (or 
any subsidiary, successor entity, or affiliate 
of such entities). 
(ii) Telecommunications or video sur-
veillance services provided by such entities 
or using such equipment. 
(iii) Telecommunications or video sur-
veillance equipment or services produced or 
provided by an entity that the head of the 
relevant agency reasonably believes to be 
an entity owned or controlled by, or other-
wise connected to, the government of a 
covered foreign country. 
(E) The term ‘‘covered component’’ means 
any component that— 
(i) is part of any equipment, system, 
or service that uses covered telecommuni-
cations or video surveillance equipment or 
services; 
(ii) is produced by Huawei Tech-
nologies Company, Hytera Communica-
tions Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision 
Digital Technology Company, Dahua Tech-
nology Company, or ZTE Corporation (or
592 
any subsidiary, successor entity, or affiliate 
of such entities); and 
(iii) cannot route or redirect data 
traffic or visibility into any data or packets 
such equipment, system, or service trans-
mits or manipulates. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National In-
telligence, in coordination with the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretaries 
of State, Homeland Security, and Defense, shall de-
velop a report outlining the national security risks of 
use of Huawei, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE 
technology, especially as it relates to evidence of ma-
licious software or hardware that enables unauthor-
ized network access or control and the type and level 
of risk, and a plan to share such report, based on 
appropriate access to classified information, with 
U.S. allies, partners, and U.S. cleared defense con-
tractors and telecommunications services providers. 
(2) UNCLASSIFIED
VERSION.—In addition to 
the classified report required by paragraph (1), an 
unclassified version of the report shall be made 
available for U.S. allies and partners as well as im-
pacted telecommunication companies State and local
594 
SEC. 882. INCREASING COMPETITION AT THE TASK ORDER 
LEVEL. 
Section 3306(c) of title 41, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘except as 
provided in paragraph (3),’’ in subparagraphs (B) 
and (C) after the subparagraph designation; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraphs: 
‘‘(3) EXCEPTIONS
FOR
CERTAIN
INDEFINITE 
DELIVERY, INDEFINITE QUANTITY MULTIPLE-AWARD 
CONTRACTS AND CERTAIN FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHED-
ULE CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES ACQUIRED ON AN 
HOURLY RATE.—If an executive agency issues a so-
licitation for one or more contracts for services to be 
acquired on an hourly rate basis under the authority 
of sections 4103 and 4106 of this title or section 
152(3) of this title and section 501(b) of title 40 
and the executive agency intends to make a contract 
award to each qualifying offeror and the contract or 
contracts will feature individually competed task or 
delivery orders based on hourly rates— 
‘‘(A) the contracting officer need not con-
sider price as an evaluation factor for contract 
award; and
595 
‘‘(B) if, pursuant to subparagraph (A), 
price is not considered as an evaluation factor 
for contract award— 
‘‘(i) the disclosure requirement of sub-
paragraph (C) of paragraph (1) shall not 
apply; and 
‘‘(ii) cost or price to the Federal Gov-
ernment shall be considered in conjunction 
with the issuance pursuant to sections 
4106(c) and 152(3) of this title of any 
task or delivery order under any contract 
resulting from the solicitation. 
‘‘(4) DEFINITION.—In paragraph (3), the term 
‘qualifying offeror’ means an offeror that— 
‘‘(A) is determined to be a responsible 
source; 
‘‘(B) submits a proposal that conforms to 
the requirements of the solicitation; 
‘‘(C) meets all technical requirements; and 
‘‘(D) is otherwise eligible for award.’’. 
SEC. 883. INDIVIDUAL ACQUISITION FOR COMMERCIAL 
LEASING SERVICES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—For the purpose of section 863 
of Public Law 110–417, an individual acquisition for com-
mercial leasing services shall not be construed as a pur-
596 
chase of property or services if such individual acquisition 
is made on a no cost basis and pursuant to a multiple 
award contract awarded in accordance with requirements 
for full and open competition. 
(b) AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the United 
States shall— 
(1) conduct biennial audits of the General Serv-
ices Administration National Broker Contract to de-
termine— 
(A) whether brokers selected under the 
program provide lower lease rental rates than 
rates negotiated by General Services Adminis-
tration staff; and 
(B) the impact of the program on the 
length of time of lease procurements; 
(2) conduct a review of whether the application 
of section 863 of Public Law 110–417 to acquisi-
tions for commercial leasing services resulted in 
rental cost savings for the Government during the 
years in which such section was applicable prior to 
the date of enactment of this section; and 
(3) not later than September 30, 2019, and 
September 30, 2021, submit to the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of
597 
Representatives and the Committee on Environment 
and Public Works of the Senate a report that— 
(A) summarizes the results of the audit 
and review required by paragraphs (1) and (2); 
(B) includes an assessment of whether the 
National Broker Contract provides greater effi-
ciencies and savings than the use of General 
Services Administration staff; and 
(C) includes recommendations for improv-
ing General Services Administration lease pro-
curements. 
(c) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on 
December 31, 2022. 
SEC. 884. PROCUREMENT ADMINISTRATIVE LEAD TIME 
DEFINITION AND PLAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for 
Federal Procurement Policy shall develop, make available 
for public comment, and finalize— 
(1) a definition of the term ‘‘Procurement ad-
ministrative lead time’’ or ‘‘PALT’’, to be applied 
Government-wide, that describes the amount of time 
from the date on which a solicitation for a contract 
or task order is issued to the date of an initial 
award of the contract or task order; and
598 
(2) a plan for measuring and publicly reporting 
data on PALT for Federal Government contracts 
and task orders in amounts greater than the sim-
plified acquisition threshold. 
(b) REQUIREMENT
FOR DEFINITION.—Unless the 
Administrator determines otherwise, the amount of time 
in the definition of PALT developed under subsection (a) 
shall— 
(1) begin on the date on which an initial solici-
tation is issued by a Federal department or agency 
for a contract or task order; and 
(2) end on the date of the award of the contract 
or task order. 
(c) COORDINATION.—In developing the definition of 
PALT, the Administrator shall coordinate with— 
(1) the senior procurement executives of Fed-
eral agencies; 
(2) the Secretary of Defense; and 
(3) the Administrator of the General Services 
Administration on modifying the existing data sys-
tem of the Federal Government to determine the 
date on which the initial solicitation is issued. 
(d) USE OF EXISTING PROCUREMENT DATA SYS-
TEM.—In developing the plan for measuring and publicly 
reporting data on PALT required by subsection (a), the
599 
Administrator shall, to the maximum extent practicable, 
rely on the information contained in the Federal procure-
ment data system established pursuant to section 
1122(a)(4) of title 41, United States Code, including any 
modifications to that system. 
SEC. 885. REPORT ON FUNDING OF PRODUCT SUPPORT 
STRATEGIES. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—For each of the fiscal years 
2020, 2021, and 2022, the Secretary of Defense shall in-
clude with the budget for the Department of Defense, as 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 
31, United States Code, a report regarding the funding 
for product support strategies for major weapon systems. 
The Secretary may submit this report separately, or as 
part of the annex required by section 347 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public 
Law 115–91). 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include for each 
major weapon system— 
(1) a current estimate of the total funding re-
quired for the product support strategy for the 
lifecycle of the weapon system; 
(2) a current estimate of the funding required 
for the product support strategy per year, by appro-