IV 
109TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 133 
Stating the policy of the Congress concerning actions to support the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the occasion 
of the Seventh NPT Review Conference. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
APRIL 14, 2005 
Mr. SPRATT (for himself, Mr. LEACH, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. 
SHAYS, and Mrs. TAUSCHER) submitted the following concurrent resolu-
tion; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Stating the policy of the Congress concerning actions to 
support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) on the occasion of the Seventh NPT 
Review Conference. 
Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons of 1968 (NPT) codifies one of the most impor-
tant international security agreements of all time, where-
by states without nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire 
them, while states with nuclear weapons commit to even-
tually eliminate them, and allowances are made for the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear-weapon 
states under strict and verifiable control; 
Whereas the NPT has 188 signatory states;
•HCON 133 IH 
Whereas the NPT has encouraged many countries to offi-
cially abandon nuclear weapons and their nuclear weap-
ons programs, including Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, 
Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
and Ukraine; 
Whereas at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 
1995, the signatory states agreed to extend the NPT in-
definitely, to reaffirm the principles and objectives of the 
NPT, to strengthen the NPT review process, and to im-
plement further specific and practical steps on non-
proliferation and disarmament; 
Whereas at the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the parties 
agreed to specific steps toward nonproliferation and dis-
armament, including entry into force of the Comprehen-
sive Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of a verifiable treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for weapons 
purposes, and verifiable reductions of the alert status and 
number of strategic and substrategic nuclear weapon ar-
senals; 
Whereas President George W. Bush on March 7, 2005, called 
‘‘the NPT . . . a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons 
proliferation and . . . a critical contribution to inter-
national security,’’ and stated that ‘‘the United States is 
firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT’’; 
Whereas in 1995, the United States reaffirmed its negative 
security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon states of the 
NPT, stating ‘‘The United States reaffirms that it will 
not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon 
state-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or 
any other attack on the United States, its territories, its 
armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state to-
•HCON 133 IH 
ward which it has a security commitment carried out, or 
sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in associa-
tion or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.’’; 
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
calls upon all states ‘‘to promote the universal adoption 
and full implementation, and where necessary, strength-
ening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, 
whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, bio-
logical or chemical weapons’’; 
Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concluded that 
‘‘Almost 60 States currently operate or are constructing 
nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 pos-
sess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which 
would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weap-
ons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative 
constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply’’, and 
it warned that ‘‘We are approaching a point at which the 
erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irre-
versible and result in a cascade of proliferation.’’; 
Whereas the threat of terrorists obtaining a nuclear weapon 
or nuclear materials has grown significantly since the in-
ception of the NPT as a result of inadequate security and 
accounting at nuclear facilities throughout the former So-
viet republics and in dozens of other countries; 
Whereas despite the fact that Article IV of the NPT makes 
clear that access to peaceful nuclear cooperation by non- 
nuclear-weapon states requires their conduct to be ‘‘in 
conformity with Articles I and II’’ of the Treaty, some 
parties to the Treaty have nevertheless abused this right 
by pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities;
•HCON 133 IH 
Whereas North Korea ejected international inspectors in 
2002 and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 
2003, and has declared its possession of nuclear weapons 
and its intention to bolster its nuclear arsenal; 
Whereas Iran continues to assert its right to pursue nuclear 
power and related technology, its intent to resume enrich-
ment processes that it has temporarily suspended 
through an agreement with the European Union, and has 
not fully cooperated with the ongoing investigation by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its nu-
clear activities; 
Whereas the A.Q. Khan network sold nuclear technology, in-
cluding a weapon design, to states including Iran, Libya, 
and North Korea, and represents a new and dangerous 
form of proliferation; 
Whereas the Additional Protocol to the NPT would allow in-
spections of suspected nuclear facilities in addition to de-
clared nuclear facilities; 
Whereas on February 13, 2004, President Bush stated ‘‘Na-
tions that are serious about fighting proliferation will ap-
prove and implement the Additional Protocol.’’; 
Whereas the global nuclear threat cannot be reduced without 
stronger international support and cooperation to achieve 
universal compliance with tighter nuclear nonproliferation 
rules and standards; 
Whereas sustained leadership from the United States is es-
sential to implement existing legal and political commit-
ments established by the NPT and to realize a more ef-
fective global nuclear nonproliferation system; and 
Whereas the United States and other countries should pursue 
a balanced and comprehensive set of initiatives to
•HCON 133 IH 
strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation system, be-
ginning with the NPT Review Conference in 2005: Now, 
therefore, be it 
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Non- 
Proliferation Treaty Enhancement Resolution of 2005’’. 
SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
The Congress— 
(1) reaffirms its support for the objectives of 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and expresses its support for ap-
propriate measures to strengthen the NPT; 
(2) calls on all parties participating in the Sev-
enth Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to make good 
faith efforts to— 
(A) establish more effective controls on 
critical technologies that can be used to produce 
materials for nuclear weapons; 
(B) ensure universal adoption of the Addi-
tional Protocol to the NPT and support the au-
thority and ability of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compli-
ance with nonproliferation rules and standards;
•HCON 133 IH 
(C) conduct vigorous diplomacy and use 
collective economic leverage to halt uranium en-
richment and other nuclear fuel cycle activities 
in Iran, and verifiably dismantle North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons capacity; 
(D) conduct diplomacy to address the un-
derlying regional security problems in North-
east Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, 
which would facilitate nuclear nonproliferation 
efforts in those regions; 
(E) accelerate programs to eliminate nu-
clear weapons, including their fissile material, 
and to safeguard nuclear weapons-grade fissile 
materials to the highest standards in order to 
prevent access by terrorists or other states, de-
crease and ultimately end the use of highly en-
riched uranium in civilian reactors, and 
strengthen national and international export 
controls and material security measures as re-
quired by United Nations Resolution 1540; 
(F) establish procedures to ensure that a 
state cannot retain access to controlled nuclear 
materials, equipment, technology, and compo-
nents acquired for peaceful purposes or avoid 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations for
•HCON 133 IH 
violations of the NPT by withdrawing from the 
NPT, whether or not such withdrawal is con-
sistent with Article X of the NPT; 
(G) implement the disarmament obliga-
tions and commitments of the parties that are 
related to the NPT by— 
(i) further reducing the size of their 
nuclear stockpiles (including reserves); 
(ii) taking all steps to improve com-
mand and control of nuclear weapons in 
order to eliminate the chances of an acci-
dental or unauthorized use of nuclear 
weapons; 
(iii) continuing the moratorium on nu-
clear test explosions, and, for those parties 
who have not already done so, taking steps 
to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty; 
(iv) 
pursuing 
an 
agreement 
to 
verifiably halt the production of fissile ma-
terials for weapons; 
(v) reaffirming existing pledges to 
non-nuclear-weapon state members of the 
NPT that they will not be subjected to nu-
clear attack or threats of attack; and
•HCON 133 IH 
(vi) undertaking a rigorous and accu-
rate accounting of substrategic nuclear 
weapons and negotiating an agreement to 
verifiably reduce such stockpiles; and 
(3) affirms its support for the Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative, and urges additional nations to join 
the Initiative. 
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