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Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of March
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with
‘‘serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in
October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final
picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme
considered essential by the Board’s November 2003 reso-
lution’’, and also noted that the Agency has discovered
that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associ-
ated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment pro-
gram; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radio-
active materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ‘‘with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the de-
velopment of its enrichment technology to its current ex-
tent, and that a number of other questions remain unre-
solved, including the sources of all HEU contamination
in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work under-
taken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the
nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the
planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support
claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experi-
ments’’;
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a
protest against the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution
of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed
to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension
calls into serious question Iran’s commitment to full
transparency about its nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran’s pattern of deception and concealment in deal-
ing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France,
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Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international
community, its receipt from other countries of the means
to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also vio-
lated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not
to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weap-
ons: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That the Congress—
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms
Iran’s continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
the international community about its nuclear pro-
grams and activities;
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
including the United States, to use all appropriate
means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from ac-
quiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nu-
clear and other cooperation with Iran (including the
provision of dual use items), until Iran fully imple-
ments the Additional Protocol between Iran and the
IAEA for the application of safeguards;
(3) declares that Iran, through its many
breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted
with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially
•HCON 398 EH
with uranium conversion and enrichment and pluto-
nium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facili-
ties;
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran’s
nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-
weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in
the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director
General of the IAEA, along with the statement by
the Government of Iran that it will not disclose
other research programs, constitute ample evidence
of Iran’s continuing policy of noncompliance with
the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safe-
guards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(5) demands that Iran immediately and perma-
nently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and
permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities,
including manufacturing and importing related
equipment;
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commit-
ments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA in-
spectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully
with the investigation of its nuclear activities and
demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all
its nuclear programs;
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(7) contrasts Iran’s behavior with Libya’s, in
which Libya’s decision to renounce and dismantle its
nuclear weapons program and to provide full, com-
plete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear
activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly under-
stand and verify with high confidence the extent and
scope of Libya’s program;
(8) calls upon the members of the European
Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multi-
lateral trade agreements until such time that Iran
has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear
weapons development activity, including a permanent
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing activities;
(9) further calls upon the European Union to
consider what further measures, including sanctions,
may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obli-
gations and commitments to the IAEA;
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the non-
compliance of the Government of Iran regarding its
obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA,
and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions
and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and
the international community regarding Iran’s mili-
tary nuclear activities—
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(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese
commercial entities not proceed with the devel-
opment of Iran’s Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure
that French and Malaysian commercial entities
not proceed with their agreement for further co-
operation in expanding Iran’s liquid natural gas
production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with
their commercial entities to ensure that these
entities refrain from or cease all investment and
investment-related activities that support Iran’s
energy industry; and
(D) calls on the President to enforce the
provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 to discourage foreign commercial enti-
ties from investing in Iran’s energy industry;
(11) deplores any effort by any country to pro-
vide any nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever
to Iran, and calls upon Russia to suspend nuclear
cooperation with Iran and not conclude a nuclear
fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr reactor, until
the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
(12) calls upon the governments of the coun-
tries whose nationals and corporations are impli-