211
retary of Defense, or the Secretary of En-
ergy, such Director or Secretary, as the
case may be, may waive the provision of
subparagraph (A) if inclusion of the As-
sistant Secretary would not be in the na-
tional security interests of the United
States.
(iii) TRANSMISSION
OF
WAIVER
TO
CONGRESS.—Any waiver of participation
under clause (i) or (ii) shall be transmitted
in writing to the appropriate committees of
Congress.
(3) RELATIONSHIP
TO
THE
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The Assistant Secretary shall be the
principal policy community representative to the in-
telligence community on verification and compliance
matters.
(4) REPORTING
RESPONSIBILITIES.—The As-
sistant Secretary shall have responsibility within the
Department of State for—
(A) all reports required pursuant to section
306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
(22 U.S.C. 2577);
(B) so much of the report required under
paragraphs (4) through (6) of section 403(a) of
212
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22
U.S.C. 2593a(a)(4) through (6)) as relates to
verification or compliance matters; and
(C) other reports being prepared by the
Department of State as of the date of enact-
ment of this Act relating to arms control, non-
proliferation, or disarmament verification or
compliance matters.
SEC. 1113. ENHANCED ANNUAL (‘‘PELL’’) REPORT.
(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Section 403(a) of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a(a)) is
amended—
(1) in paragraph (4)—
(A) by inserting ‘‘or commitments, includ-
ing the Missile Technology Control Regime,’’
after ‘‘agreements’’ the first time it appears;
(B) by inserting ‘‘or commitments’’ after
‘‘agreements’’ the second time it appears;
(C) by inserting ‘‘or commitment’’ after
‘‘agreement’’; and
(D) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end;
(2) by striking the period at the end of para-
graph (5) and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
213
‘‘(6) a specific identification, to the maximum
extent practicable in unclassified form, of each and
every question that exists with respect to compliance
by other countries with arms control, nonprolifera-
tion, and disarmament agreements with the United
States.’’.
(b) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT.—Section 403 of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(d) Each report required by this section shall in-
clude a discussion of each significant issue described in
subsection (a)(6) that was contained in a previous report
issued under this section during 1995, or after December
31, 1995, until the question or concern has been resolved
and such resolution has been reported in detail to the ap-
propriate committees of Congress (as defined in section
1102(1) of the Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Se-
curity Assistance Act of 1999).’’.
SEC. 1114. REPORT ON START AND START II TREATIES
MONITORING ISSUES.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a detailed report in classified form. Such report shall
include the following:
214
(1) A comprehensive identification of all moni-
toring activities associated with the START Treaty
and the START II Treaty.
(2) The specific intelligence community assets
and capabilities, including analytical capabilities,
that the Senate was informed, prior to the Senate
giving its advice and consent to ratification of the
treaties, would be necessary to accomplish those ac-
tivities.
(3) An identification of the extent to which
those assets and capabilities have, or have not, been
attained or retained, and the corresponding effect
this has had upon United States monitoring con-
fidence levels.
(4) An assessment of any Russian activities re-
lating to the START Treaty which have had an im-
pact upon the ability of the United States to monitor
Russian adherence to the Treaty.
(b) COMPARTMENTED ANNEX.—Exceptionally sen-
sitive, compartmented information in the report required
by this section may be provided in a compartmented annex
submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives.
215
SEC. 1115. STANDARDS FOR VERIFICATION.
(a) VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE.—Section 306(a)
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C.
2577(a)) is amended in the matter preceding paragraph
(1) by striking ‘‘adequately’’.
(b) ASSESSMENTS UPON REQUEST.—Section 306 of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2577)
is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and
(d) as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
lowing:
‘‘(b) ASSESSMENTS UPON REQUEST.—Upon the re-
quest of the chairman or ranking minority member of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives, in case of an arms control, nonprolifera-
tion, or disarmament proposal presented to a foreign coun-
try by the United States or presented to the United States
by a foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit
a report to the Committee on the degree to which elements
of the proposal are capable of being verified.’’.
SEC. 1116. CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SEIS-
MOLOGY.
The United States Government shall, to the max-
imum extent practicable, make available to the public in
216
real time, or as quickly as possible, all raw seismological
data provided to the United States Government by any
international organization that is directly responsible for
seismological monitoring.
SEC. 1117. PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES COMPANIES.
(a) REIMBURSEMENT.—During the 2-year period be-
ginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the
United States National Authority (as designated pursuant
to section 101 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1998 (as contained in division I of
Public Law 105–277)) shall, upon request of the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, reimburse the
Federal Bureau of Investigation for all costs incurred by
the Bureau for such period in connection with implemen-
tation of section 303(b)(2)(A) of that Act, except that
such reimbursement may not exceed $2,000,000 for such
2-year period.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days prior to the
expiration of the 2-year period described in subsection (a),
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
prepare and submit to the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on how
activities under section 303(b)(2)(A) of the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 will be
217
fully funded and implemented by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation notwithstanding the expiration of the 2-year
period described in subsection (a).
SEC. 1118. REQUIREMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL OF SUM-
MARIES.
Whenever a United States delegation engaging in ne-
gotiations on arms control, nonproliferation, or disar-
mament submits to the Secretary of State a summary of
the activities of the delegation or the status of those nego-
tiations, a copy of each such summary shall be further
transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representa-
tives promptly.
CHAPTER 2—MATTERS RELATING TO THE
CONTROL OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
SEC. 1121. SHORT TITLE.
This chapter may be cited as the ‘‘National Security
and Corporate Fairness under the Biological Weapons
Convention Act’’.
SEC. 1122. DEFINITIONS.
In this chapter:
(1) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The
term ‘‘Biological Weapons Convention’’ means the
1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
218
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their De-
struction.
(2) COMPLIANCE PROTOCOL.—The term ‘‘com-
pliance protocol’’ means that segment of a bilateral
or multilateral agreement that enables investigation
of questions of compliance entailing written data or
visits to facilities to monitor compliance.
(3) INDUSTRY.—The term ‘‘industry’’ means any cor-
porate or private sector entity engaged in the research,
development, production, import, and export of peaceful
pharmaceuticals and bio-technological and related prod-
ucts.
SEC. 1123. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The threat of biological weapons and their
proliferation is one of the greatest national security
threats facing the United States.
(2) The threat of biological weapons and mate-
rials represents a serious and increasing danger to
people around the world.
(3) Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive
to produce, can be made with readily available exper-
tise and equipment, do not require much space to
make and can therefore be readily concealed, do not
219
require unusual raw materials or materials not read-
ily available for legitimate purposes, do not require
the maintenance of stockpiles, or can be delivered
with low-technology mechanisms, and can effect
widespread casualties even in small quantities.
(4) Unlike other weapons of mass destruction,
biological materials capable of use as weapons can
occur naturally in the environment and are also used
for medicinal or other beneficial purposes.
(5) Biological weapons are morally reprehen-
sible, prompting the United States Government to
halt its offensive biological weapons program in
1969, subsequently destroy its entire biological
weapons arsenal, and maintain henceforth only a ro-
bust defensive capacity.
(6) The Senate gave its advice and consent to
ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention in
1974.
(7) The Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency explained, at the time of the Sen-
ate’s consideration of the Biological Weapons Con-
vention, that the treaty contained no verification
provisions because verification would be ‘‘difficult’’.
220
(8) A compliance protocol has now been pro-
posed to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention.
(9) The resources needed to produce, stockpile,
and store biological weapons are the same as those
used in peaceful industry facilities to discover, de-
velop, and produce medicines.
(10) The raw materials of biological agents are
difficult to use as an indicator of an offensive mili-
tary program because the same materials occur in
nature or can be used to produce a wide variety of
products.
(11) Some biological products are genetically
manipulated to develop new commercial products,
optimizing production and ensuring the integrity of
the product, making it difficult to distinguish be-
tween legitimate commercial activities and offensive
military activities.
(12) Only a small culture of a biological agent
and some growth medium are needed to produce a
large amount of biological agents with the potential
for offensive purposes.
(13) The United States pharmaceutical and bio-
technology industries are a national asset and re-
source that contribute to the health and well-being
221
of the American public as well as citizens around the
world.
(14) One bacterium strain can represent a large
proportion of a company’s investment in a pharma-
ceutical product and thus its potential loss during an
arms control monitoring activity could conceivably be
worth billions of dollars.
(15) Biological products contain proprietary ge-
netic information.
(16) The proposed compliance regime for the
Biological Weapons Convention entails new data re-
porting and investigation requirements for industry.
(17) A compliance regime which contributes to
the control of biological weapons and materials must
have a reasonable chance of success in reducing the
risk of production, stockpiling, or use of biological
weapons while protecting the reputations, intellectual
property, and confidential business information of le-
gitimate companies.
SEC. 1124. TRIAL INVESTIGATIONS AND TRIAL VISITS.
(a) NATIONAL SECURITY TRIAL INVESTIGATIONS
AND TRIAL VISITS.—The President shall conduct a series
of national security trial investigations and trial visits,
both during and following negotiations to develop a com-
pliance protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention,
222
with the objective of ensuring that the compliance proce-
dures of the protocol are effective and adequately protect
the national security of the United States. These trial in-
vestigations and trial visits shall be conducted at such
sites as United States Government facilities, installations,
and national laboratories.
(b) UNITED STATES INDUSTRY TRIAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS AND TRIAL VISITS.—The President shall take all
appropriate steps to conduct or sponsor a series of United
States industry trial investigations and trial visits, both
during and following negotiations to develop a compliance
protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, with the
objective of ensuring that the compliance procedures of the
protocol are effective and adequately protect the national
security and the concerns of affected United States indus-
tries and research institutions. These trial investigations
and trial visits shall be conducted at such sites as aca-
demic institutions, vaccine production facilities, and phar-
maceutical and biotechnology firms in the United States.
(c) PARTICIPATION BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND
OTHER APPROPRIATE PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of
Defense and, as appropriate, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation shall make available specialized
personnel to participate—
223
(1) in each trial investigation or trial visit con-
ducted pursuant to subsection (a); and
(2) in each trial investigation or trial visit con-
ducted pursuant to subsection (b), except for any in-
vestigation or visit in which the host facility requests
that such personnel not participate,
for the purpose of assessing the information security im-
plications of such investigation or visit. The Secretary of
Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall add to the report required
by subsection (d)(2) a classified annex containing an as-
sessment of the risk to proprietary and classified informa-
tion posed by any investigation or visit procedures in the
compliance protocol.
(d) STUDY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall conduct
a study on the need for investigations and visits
under the compliance protocol to the Biological
Weapons Convention, including—
(A) an assessment of risks to national se-
curity and United States industry and research
institutions of such on-site activities; and
(B) an assessment of the monitoring re-
sults that can be expected from such investiga-
tions and visits.
224
(2) REPORT.—Not later than the date on which
a compliance protocol to the Biological Weapons
Convention is submitted to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification, the President shall sub-
mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a report, in both unclassified and classified
form, setting forth—
(A) the findings of the study conducted
pursuant to paragraph (1); and
(B) the results of trial investigations and
trial visits conducted pursuant to subsections
(a) and (b).
Subtitle B—Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion, Safety, and Related Mat-
ters
SEC. 
1131. 
CONGRESSIONAL 
NOTIFICATION 
OF 
NON-
PROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.
Section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3282(c)) is amended to read as fol-
lows:
‘‘(c)(1) The Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Department
of Energy, the Commission, and, with regard to subpara-
graph (B), the Director of Central Intelligence, shall keep
the Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental
225
Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives fully and cur-
rently informed with respect to—
‘‘(A) their activities to carry out the purposes
and policies of this Act and to otherwise prevent
proliferation, including the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, or their means of
delivery; and
‘‘(B) the current activities of foreign nations
which are of significance from the proliferation
standpoint.
‘‘(2) For the purposes of this subsection with respect
to paragraph (1)(B), the phrase ‘fully and currently in-
formed’ means the transmittal of credible information not
later than 60 days after becoming aware of the activity
concerned.’’.
SEC. 1132. EFFECTIVE USE OF RESOURCES FOR NON-
PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsection
(b), no assistance may be provided by the United States
Government to any person who is involved in the research,
development, design, testing, or evaluation of chemical or
biological weapons for offensive purposes.
(b) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition contained in sub-
section (a) shall not apply to any activity conducted pursu-
226
ant to title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
SEC. 1133. DISPOSITION OF WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL.
(a) REPORT ON REDUCTION OF THE STOCKPILE.—
Not later than 120 days after signing an agreement be-
tween the United States and Russia for the disposition
of excess weapons plutonium, the Secretary of Energy,
with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, shall
submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and to the
Committee on International Relations and the Committee
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a
report—
(1) detailing plans for United States implemen-
tation of such agreement;
(2) identifying, in classified form, the number
of United States warhead ‘‘pits’’ of each type
deemed ‘‘excess’’ for the purpose of dismantlement
or disposition; and
(3) describing any implications this may have
for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Pro-
gram.
(b) SUBMISSION
OF
THE FABRICATION FACILITY
AGREEMENT PURSUANT TO LAW.—Whenever the Presi-
dent submits to Congress the agreement to establish a
227
mixed oxide fuel fabrication or production facility in Rus-
sia pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), it is the sense of the Congress
that the Secretary of State should be prepared to certify
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
the Committee on International Relations of the House
Representatives that—
(1) arrangements for the establishment of that
facility will further United States nuclear non-
proliferation objectives and will outweigh the pro-
liferation risks inherent in the use of mixed oxide
fuel elements;
(2) a guaranty has been given by Russia that
no fuel elements produced, fabricated, reprocessed,
or assembled at such facility, and no sensitive nu-
clear technology related to such facility, will be ex-
ported or supplied by Russia to any country in the
event that the United States objects to such export
or supply; and
(3) a guaranty has been given by Russia that
the facility and all nuclear materials and equipment
therein, and any fuel elements or special nuclear ma-
terial produced, fabricated, reprocessed, or assem-
bled at that facility, including fuel elements exported
or supplied by Russia to a third party, will be sub-
228
ject to international monitoring and transparency
sufficient to ensure that special nuclear material is
not diverted.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—
(1) PRODUCED.—The terms ‘‘produce’’ and
‘‘produced’’ have the same meaning that such terms
are given under section 11 u. of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
(2) PRODUCTION
FACILITY.—The term ‘‘pro-
duction facility’’ has the same meaning that such
term is given under section 11 v. of the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954.
(3) SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.—The term
‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the meaning that
such term is given under section 11 aa. of the Atom-
ic Energy Act of 1954.
SEC. 1134. PROVISION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION TO CON-
GRESS.
(a) REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE INFORMATION.—The
head of each department and agency described in section
602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (22
U.S.C. 3282(c)) shall promptly provide information to the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representa-
229
tives in meeting the requirements of subsection (c) or (d)
of section 602 of such Act.
(b) ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES.—Not later than Feb-
ruary 1, 2000, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of En-
ergy, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chair-
man of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall issue di-
rectives, which shall provide access to information, includ-
ing information contained in special access programs, to
implement their responsibilities under subsections (c) and
(d) of section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3282(c) and (d)). Copies of such direc-
tives shall be forwarded promptly to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives
upon the issuance of the directives.
SEC. 1135. AMENDED NUCLEAR EXPORT REPORTING RE-
QUIREMENT.
Section 1523 of the Strom Thurmond National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law
105–261; 112 Stat. 2180; 42 U.S.C. 2155 note) is
amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘Congress’’ and inserting ‘‘the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
230
the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(c) CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.—The notification
required pursuant to this section shall include—
‘‘(1) a detailed description of the articles or
services to be exported or reexported, including a
brief description of the capabilities of any article to
be exported or reexported;
‘‘(2) an estimate of the number of officers and
employees of the United States Government and of
United States Government civilian contract per-
sonnel expected to be required in such country to
carry out the proposed export or reexport;
‘‘(3) the name of each licensee expected to pro-
vide the article or service proposed to be sold and a
description from the licensee of any offset agree-
ments proposed to be entered into in connection with
such sale (if known on the date of transmittal of
such statement);
‘‘(4) the projected delivery dates of the articles
or services to be exported or reexported; and
‘‘(5) the extent to which the recipient country
in the previous two years has engaged in any of the
231
actions specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
section 129(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
SEC. 1136. ADHERENCE TO THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL REGIME.
(a) CLARIFICATION
OF REQUIREMENT
FOR CON-
TROL.—Section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2797c) is amended—
(1) by inserting ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—’’ before
‘‘For purposes of’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(b) INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING DEFINED.—
For purposes of subsection (a)(3), as it relates to any
international understanding concluded with the United
States after January 1, 2000, the term ‘international un-
derstanding’ means—
‘‘(1) any specific agreement by a country not to
export, transfer, or otherwise engage in the trade of
any MTCR equipment or technology that contributes
to the acquisition, design, development, or produc-
tion of missiles in a country that is not an MTCR
adherent and would be, if it were United States-ori-
gin equipment or technology, subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States under this Act; or
‘‘(2) any specific understanding by a country
that, notwithstanding section 73(b) of this Act, the
232
United States retains the right to take the actions
under section 73(a)(2) of this Act in the case of any
export or transfer of any MTCR equipment or tech-
nology that contributes to the acquisition, design,
development, or production of missiles in a country
that is not an MTCR adherent and would be, if it
were United States-origin equipment or technology,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
under this Act.’’.
(b) CLARIFICATION
OF
APPLICABILITY.—Section
73(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2797b(b)) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and mov-
ing such subparagraphs 2 ems to the right;
(2) by striking ‘‘Subsection (a)’’ and inserting
the following:
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), subsection (a)’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(2) LIMITATION.—Notwithstanding paragraph
(1), subsection (a) shall apply to an entity subordi-
nate to a government that engages in exports or
transfers described in section 498A(b)(3)(A) of the
233
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2295a(b)(3)(A)).’’.
(c) ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.—Section 73(c) of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(c)) is amend-
ed by inserting before the period at the end the following:
‘‘, and if the President certifies to the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives that—
‘‘(1) for any judicial or other enforcement ac-
tion taken by the MTCR adherent, such action
has—
‘‘(A) been comprehensive; and
‘‘(B) been performed to the satisfaction of
the United States; and
‘‘(2) with respect to any finding of innocence of
wrongdoing, the United States is satisfied with the
basis for such finding’’.
(d) POLICY REPORT.—Section 73A of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b–1) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘Following any action’’ and in-
serting the following:
‘‘(a) POLICY REPORT.—Following any action’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT REPORT.—At such
times that a report is transmitted pursuant to subsection
234
(a), the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly
prepare and submit to the Congress a separate report con-
taining any credible information indicating that the coun-
try described in subsection (a) has engaged in any activity
identified under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section
73(a)(1) within the previous two years.’’.
(e) MTCR DEFINED.—The term ‘‘MTCR’’ means
the Missile Technology Control Regime, as defined in sec-
tion 74(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2797c(a)(2)).
SEC. 1137. AUTHORITY RELATING TO MTCR ADHERENTS.
Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2797 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
73A the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 73B. AUTHORITY RELATING TO MTCR ADHERENTS.
‘‘Notwithstanding section 73(b), the President may
take the actions under section 73(a)(2) under the cir-
cumstances described in section 74(b)(2).’’.
SEC. 1138. TRANSFER OF FUNDING FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY CENTERS IN THE FORMER SO-
VIET UNION.
(a) AUTHORIZATION.—For fiscal year 2001 and sub-
sequent fiscal years, funds made available under ‘‘Non-
proliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Pro-
grams’’ accounts in annual foreign operations appropria-
235
tions Acts are authorized to be available for science and
technology centers in the independent states of the former
Soviet Union assisted under section 503(a)(5) of the
FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5853(a)(5)) or sec-
tion 1412(b)(5) of the Former Soviet Union Demilitariza-
tion Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law 102–484; 22
U.S.C. 5901 et seq.), including the use of those and other
funds by any Federal agency having expertise and pro-
grams related to the activities carried out by those centers,
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and
Health and Human Services and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.
(b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts made avail-
able under any provision of law for the activities described
in subsection (a) shall be available until expended and may
be used notwithstanding any other provision of law.
SEC. 1139. RESEARCH AND EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES BY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTERS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Support for science and tech-
nology centers in the independent states of the former So-
viet Union, as authorized by section 503(a)(5) of the
FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5853(a)(5)) and sec-
tion 1412(b) of the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization
Act of 1992 (title XIV of Public Law 102–484, 22 U.S.C.
5901 et seq.), is authorized for activities described in sub-
236
section (b) to support the redirection of former Soviet
weapons scientists, especially those with expertise in weap-
ons of mass destruction (nuclear, radiological, chemical,
biological), missile and other delivery systems, and other
advanced technologies with military applications.
(b) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED.—Activities supported
under subsection (a) include—
(1) any research activity involving the participa-
tion of former Soviet weapons scientists and civilian
scientists and engineers, if the participation of the
weapons scientists predominates; and
(2) any program of international exchanges
that would provide former Soviet weapons scientists
exposure to, and the opportunity to develop relations
with, research and industry partners.
TITLE XII—SECURITY
ASSISTANCE
SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Security Assistance
Act of 1999’’.
237
Subtitle A—Transfers of Excess
Defense Articles
SEC. 1211. EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.
(a) TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED COSTS.—Sec-
tion 105 of Public Law 104–164 (110 Stat. 1427) is
amended by striking ‘‘1999 and 2000’’ and inserting
‘‘2000 and 2001’’.
(b) EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR GREECE AND
TURKEY.—Section 516(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(b)(2)) is amended by insert-
ing after ‘‘four-year period beginning on October 1,
1996,’’ the following: ‘‘and thereafter for the four-period
beginning on October 1, 2000,’’.
SEC. 1212. EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR CERTAIN
OTHER COUNTRIES.
(a) USES FOR WHICH FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.—
Notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)), during each of the fiscal
years 2000 and 2001, funds available to the Department
of Defense may be expended for crating, packing, han-
dling, and transportation of excess defense articles trans-
ferred under the authority of section 516 of that Act to
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
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Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan.
(b) CONTENT OF CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—
Each notification required to be submitted under section
516(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2321j(f)) with respect to a proposed transfer of a defense
article described in subsection (a) shall include an esti-
mate of the amount of funds to be expended under sub-
section (a) with respect to that transfer.
SEC. 1213. INCREASE IN ANNUAL LIMITATION ON TRANS-
FER OF EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.
Section 516(g)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(g)(1)) is amended by striking
‘‘$350,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$425,000,000’’.
Subtitle B—Foreign Military Sales
Authorities
SEC. 1221. TERMINATION OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING.
Section 617 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2367) is amended by adding at the end the
following new sentence: ‘‘Such expenses for orderly termi-
nation of programs under the Arms Export Control Act
may include the obligation and expenditure of funds to
complete the training or studies outside the countries of
origin of students whose course of study or training pro-
gram began before assistance was terminated, as long as
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the origin country’s termination was not a result of activi-
ties beyond default of financial responsibilities.’’.
SEC. 1222. SALES OF EXCESS COAST GUARD PROPERTY.
Section 21(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2761(a)(1)) is amended in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) by inserting ‘‘and the Coast Guard’’
after ‘‘Department of Defense’’.
SEC. 1223. COMPETITIVE PRICING FOR SALES OF DEFENSE
ARTICLES.
Section 22(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2762(d)) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘Procurement contracts’’ and
inserting ‘‘(1) Procurement contracts’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(2) Direct costs associated with meeting additional
or unique requirements of the purchaser shall be allowable
under contracts described in paragraph (1). Loadings ap-
plicable to such direct costs shall be permitted at the same
rates applicable to procurement of like items purchased
by the Department of Defense for its own use.’’.
SEC. 1224. NOTIFICATION OF UPGRADES TO DIRECT COM-
MERCIAL SALES.
Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2776(c)) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new paragraph:
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‘‘(4) The provisions of subsection (b)(5) shall apply
to any equipment, article, or service for which a numbered
certification has been transmitted to Congress pursuant
to paragraph (1) in the same manner and to the same
extent as that subsection applies to any equipment, article,
or service for which a numbered certification has been
transmitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (b)(1).
For purposes of such application, any reference in sub-
section (b)(5) to ‘a letter of offer’ or ‘an offer’ shall be
deemed to be a reference to ‘a contract’.’’.
SEC. 1225. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF DEFENSE ARTICLES.
Section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2753) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
‘‘(g) Any agreement for the sale or lease of any article
on the United States Munitions List entered into by the
United States Government after the date of enactment of
this subsection shall state that the United States Govern-
ment retains the right to verify credible reports that such
article has been used for a purpose not authorized under
section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such article
may only be used for purposes more limited than those
authorized under section 4, for a purpose not authorized
under such agreement.’’.
241
Subtitle C—Stockpiling of Defense
Articles for Foreign Countries
SEC. 1231. ADDITIONS TO UNITED STATES WAR RESERVE
STOCKPILES FOR ALLIES.
Paragraph (2) of section 514(b) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)) is amended
to read as follows:
‘‘(2)(A) The value of such additions to stockpiles of
defense articles in foreign countries shall not exceed
$60,000,000 for fiscal year 2000.
‘‘(B) Of the amount specified in subparagraph (A),
not more than $40,000,000 may be made available for
stockpiles in the Republic of Korea and not more than
$20,000,000 may be made available for stockpiles in Thai-
land.’’.
SEC. 1232. TRANSFER OF CERTAIN OBSOLETE OR SURPLUS
DEFENSE ARTICLES IN THE WAR RESERVES
STOCKPILE FOR ALLIES.
(a) ITEMS IN THE KOREAN STOCKPILE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 514
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2321h), the President is authorized to transfer to
the Republic of Korea, in return for concessions to
be negotiated by the Secretary of Defense, with the
242
concurrence of the Secretary of State, any or all of
the items described in paragraph (2).
(2) COVERED ITEMS.—The items referred to in
paragraph (1) are munitions, equipment, and mate-
rial such as tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general
purpose bombs, repair parts, ammunition, barrier
material, and ancillary equipment, if such items
are—
(A) obsolete or surplus items;
(B) in the inventory of the Department of
Defense;
(C) intended for use as reserve stocks for
the Republic of Korea; and
(D) as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, located in a stockpile in the Republic of
Korea.
(b) ITEMS IN THE THAILAND STOCKPILE.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 514
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2321h), the President is authorized to transfer to
Thailand, in return for concessions to be negotiated
by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of
the Secretary of State, any or all of the items de-
scribed in paragraph (2).
243
(2) COVERED ITEMS.—The items referred to in
paragraph (1) are munitions, equipment, and mate-
rial such as tanks, trucks, artillery, mortars, general
purpose bombs, repair parts, ammunition, barrier
material, and ancillary equipment, if such items
are—
(A) obsolete or surplus items;
(B) in the inventory of the Department of
Defense;
(C) intended for use as reserve stocks for
Thailand; and
(D) as of the date of the enactment of this
Act, located in a stockpile in Thailand.
(c) VALUATION OF CONCESSIONS.—The value of con-
cessions negotiated pursuant to subsections (a) and (b)
shall be at least equal to the fair market value of the items
transferred. The concessions may include cash compensa-
tion, services, waiver of charges otherwise payable by the
United States, and other items of value.
(d) PRIOR NOTIFICATIONS OF PROPOSED TRANS-
FERS.—Not less than 30 days before making a transfer
under the authority of this section, the President shall
transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives a detailed notification of the
244
proposed transfer, which shall include an identification of
the items to be transferred and the concessions to be re-
ceived.
(e) TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.—No transfer may
be made under the authority of this section more than 3
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Subtitle D—Defense Offsets
Disclosure
SEC. 1241. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Defense Offsets
Disclosure Act of 1999’’.
SEC. 1242. FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:
(1) A fair business environment is necessary to
advance international trade, economic stability, and
development worldwide, is beneficial for American
workers and businesses, and is in the United States
national interest.
(2) In some cases, mandated offset require-
ments can cause economic distortions in inter-
national defense trade and undermine fairness and
competitiveness, and may cause particular harm to
small- and medium-sized businesses.
245
(3) The use of offsets may lead to increasing
dependence on foreign suppliers for the production
of United States weapons systems.
(4) The offset demands required by some pur-
chasing countries, including some close allies of the
United States, equal or exceed the value of the base
contract they are intended to offset, mitigating much
of the potential economic benefit of the exports.
(5) Offset demands often unduly distort the
prices of defense contracts.
(6) In some cases, United States contractors
are required to provide indirect offsets which can
negatively impact nondefense industrial sectors.
(7) Unilateral efforts by the United States to
prohibit offsets may be impractical in the current
era of globalization and would severely hinder the
competitiveness of the United States defense indus-
try in the global market.
(8) The development of global standards to
manage and restrict demands for offsets would en-
hance United States efforts to mitigate the negative
impact of offsets.
(b) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
United States to monitor the use of offsets in international
defense trade, to promote fairness in such trade, and to