I 
109TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3396 
To facilitate lasting peace, democracy, and economic recovery in Somalia. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 21, 2005 
Mr. SMITH of Washington (for himself, Mr. PETRI, Mr. PAYNE, and Mr. 
MCDERMOTT) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on International Relations 
A BILL 
To facilitate lasting peace, democracy, and economic recovery 
in Somalia. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘Somalia Comprehensive Peace and Economic Recovery 
Act of 2005’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
Sec. 3. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 4. Fighting terrorism and and extremism in Somalia. 
Sec. 5. Supporting peace, democracy, and stability in Somaliland.
Sec. 6. Investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia. 
Sec. 7. Bilateral assistance to support peace and democracy in Somalia. 
Sec. 8. Multilateral efforts to support peace and democracy in Somalia. 
Sec. 9. Sanctions to support peace and human rights in Somalia. 
Sec. 10. Assistance for local efforts to promote human rights, the rule of law, 
and democracy in Somalia. 
Sec. 11. Report. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) In 1991, General Mohamed Siad Barre, 
who came to power in Somalia through a military 
coup in 1969, was ousted from power by several So-
mali armed groups. 
(2) Following the collapse of central authority 
in Mogadishu, the capital, rival Somali groups en-
gaged in armed struggle for personal political power 
and prevented food and medicine from reaching in-
nocent civilians suffering from drought and famine. 
An estimated 300,000 people died from violence, 
starvation, and disease as Somalia was wracked by 
continued internal chaos. 
(3) On November 9, 1992, President George 
H.W. Bush authorized Operation Restore Hope, 
using the United States Armed Forces to safeguard 
nongovernmental organizations and their efforts to 
provide humanitarian assistance to the suffering So-
mali civilian population. The United States-led Uni-
fied Task Force (UNITAF), formed to establish a 
safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Somalia, saved lives and helped create 
a relatively peaceful environment for humanitarian 
activity in Somalia. 
(4) In May 1993, UNITAF handed over its op-
erations to the United Nations. The subsequent 
United Nations effort was known as the United Na-
tions Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The relative 
success of UNITAF gave the people of Somalia hope 
for peace and stability, although the United States- 
led operation failed to disarm the armed factions in 
Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia. 
(5) On October 3, 1993, after a seventeen-hour 
battle between United States Armed Forces and So-
mali factions in Mogadishu in which 18 United 
States Army Rangers and hundreds of Somalis were 
killed, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of 
United States troops from Somalia. In March 1994, 
United States Armed Forces withdrew from Soma-
lia, and one year later, the United Nations withdrew 
the remaining peacekeepers after a series of attacks 
on peacekeeping troops by Somali armed factions. 
(6) Since the withdrawal of United Nations 
forces in March 1995, Somalia has been without a 
central government. The small East African country 
once again descended into lawlessness. Since then,
Somalia has been splintered into several regions con-
trolled by clan-led administrations. 
(7) According to the United Nations, an esti-
mated 400,000 Somalis have been internally dis-
placed and more than 300,000 have fled their coun-
try. Somali children are 26 times more likely to die 
before their 5th birthday than children in the devel-
oped world. More than one in ten infants die before 
the age of one year. Infant mortality is the 10th 
highest in the world. The country has one of the 
highest incidences of tuberculosis in the world. 
Meanwhile, cholera epidemics are rampant. 
(8) There have been 13 Somali reconciliation or 
peace conferences to bring an end to the fighting in 
Somalia. Some conferences were under the auspices 
of or supported by the United Nations, or govern-
ments in the Horn of Africa. These efforts have 
largely failed to bring about lasting peace in Soma-
lia. 
(9) In 1996, the Government of Ethiopia con-
vened a peace conference in the resort town of 
Sodere. Many political actors and armed factions 
participated, although a few boycotted the peace 
conference. The Sodere peace conference collapsed 
when the Government of Egypt convened another
Somali peace conference in Cairo in 1997. The Cairo 
peace conference failed when another peace con-
ference was convened by Somali factions in Bosaso, 
Somalia in 1998. 
(10) In February 2000, the Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development (IGAD) approved a 
peace plan proposed by the Government of Djibouti. 
In May 2000, the Somali reconciliation conference 
opened in Arta, Djibouti, in which 400 delegates 
took part for several months of deliberation. The 
Arta process was boycotted by several powerful war-
lords, as well as the government of Somaliland, the 
current government located in the northwest region 
of Somalia, and the government of Puntland, the 
current government based in the self-declared north-
east region of Somalia. 
(11) On August 13, 2000, participants at the 
Arta conference agreed to the creation of a Transi-
tional National Government and a Transitional Na-
tional Assembly for Somalia. On August 26, 2000, 
participants nominated Abdulqassim Salad Hasan as 
president of the Transitional National Government. 
(12) In October 2002, the Inter-Governmental 
Authority for Development launched another peace 
process, led by the Government of Kenya. An esti-
mated 350 delegates from different regions of Soma-
lia participated in the opening session of the con-
ference in the Kenyan town of Eldoret. The Govern-
ment of Somaliland boycotted the conference. 
(13) In the first phase of the Kenyan peace 
process, the parties signed a temporary cease-fire, 
and agreed to respect and honor the outcome of the 
conference. The parties further agreed to establish a 
federal system of government for Somalia and com-
mitted themselves to fight terrorism. 
(14) In September 2003, the parties to the 
Kenyan peace process agreed on a Transitional Na-
tional Charter for Somalia, paving the way for a na-
tional unity government for Somalia. 
(15) In August 2004, a new Somali Transi-
tional Parliament was inaugurated in Kenya. The 
275-member parliament consists of the major polit-
ical factions in Somalia and is representative of all 
the major clans of Somalia. 
(16) In October 2004, the Somali Transitional 
Parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the 
new president of Somalia. The swearing in ceremony 
was attended by 11 heads of government from Afri-
ca and representatives from regional organizations 
and the United Nations.
(17) In November 2004, President Abdullahi 
Yusuf Ahmed appointed Professor Ali Mohamed 
Gedi as the Prime Minister of Somalia. 
(18) The Government of Kenya has and con-
tinues to play key roles through its Special Envoy 
for Somalia, Ambassador Kiplagat, in an effort to 
achieve a lasting peace in Somalia. 
(19) The Governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia 
are important players in the Somali peace process 
and their continued cooperation and coordination 
with the regional effort is important to ensuring 
peace in Somalia. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States to support the 
people of Somalia to achieve lasting peace, democracy, rule 
of law, respect for human rights, broad-based economic 
recovery and growth, and eradicate radicalism and ter-
rorism from their country and the region. 
SEC. 4. FIGHTING TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM IN SOMA-
LIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Since the collapse of central authority in 
Somalia in 1991, Somalia continues to attract ter-
rorist and extremist groups, posing serious threats 
to regional stability and peace. Terrorists who car-
ried out the United States Embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 and the bomb-
ing of the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, in 
November 2002 reportedly used Somalia as a base 
of operation. 
(2) The United States Government, in its in-
dictment against Osama bin Laden and his associ-
ates for the United States Embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 stated that ‘‘at 
various times from or about 1992 until in or about 
1993, the defendant Osama bin Laden, working to-
gether with members of the Fatwah committee of 
Al-Qaeda, disseminated Fatwahs to other members 
and associates of Al-Qaeda that the United States 
forces in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, 
should be attacked’’. 
(3) In late September 2001, the United States 
Government added Al-Ittihad to a list of terrorism- 
related entities whose assets were ordered frozen by 
executive order. The United States Government also 
ordered the assets of the Somali-owned al-Barakaat 
company frozen because of its alleged links to Al- 
Qaeda. 
(4) Many experts believe that Somalia is still 
being used by terrorist groups as a transit or safe
haven, contributing to the destabilization of the East 
Africa region. 
(5) In June 2003, President George W. Bush 
announced a $100,000,000 East Africa Counter 
Terrorism Initiative to close the capabilities gap in 
combating terrorism and to reduce East Africa’s 
vulnerabilities to terrorism. 
(6) The United States Government welcomes 
the commitment of the Transitional National Gov-
ernment of Somalia to fight terrorism and extre-
mism. It is in the interest of the peoples of Somalia 
and the United States to ensure terrorist groups are 
denied safe haven in Somalia and the region. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States should assist the people 
of Somalia to establish a democratic government 
that is committed and able to fight terrorism and 
extremism; 
(2) the United States should provide training 
and support to the Transitional National Govern-
ment of Somalia to fight terrorism and extremism; 
and 
(3) strengthening civil society and grassroots 
efforts in Somalia will deny terrorist and extremists
groups a fertile ground for recruitment in that coun-
try. 
SEC. 5. SUPPORTING PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND STABILITY 
IN SOMALILAND. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland, 
located in the northwest region of Somalia, declared 
independence from Somalia. The Republic of 
Somaliland has not been recognized as an inde-
pendent country, despite its persistent efforts over 
the past decade. 
(2) Since its declaration of independence, 
Somaliland has been relatively stable and peaceful, 
despite occasional inter-clan conflicts. 
(3) 
In 
December 
2002, 
the 
people 
of 
Somaliland voted in local elections, which were mon-
itored by international observers. The elections were 
deemed by these observers as free and fair. 
(4) In April 2003, Dahir Rayale Kahin was 
elected president of Somaliland in a highly-competi-
tive presidential election, which was monitored by 
international observers. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress recognizes 
and welcomes the many achievements over the past decade 
by the people and government of Somaliland, including in-
creased enrollment in primary schools, relative peace and 
stability, and economic recovery. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the political future of Somaliland should be re-
solved through a peaceful, negotiated process between the 
government of Somaliland and the Transitional National 
Government of Somalia. 
SEC. 6. INVESTIGATION OF WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY IN SOMALIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) According to human rights groups, the 
United Nations, and the international media, more 
than 500,000 people may have died as a result fam-
ine, disease, and war-related causes in Somalia. 
Many of these victims are civilians, especially chil-
dren and the elderly. 
(2) Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians 
in Somalia have been displaced or forced into ref-
ugee camps as a direct result of the brutal campaign 
of violence against civilians by Somalia’s warlords. 
(3) Millions of children in Somalia have been 
deprived of basic health care and education due to 
violence and general instability instigated by Soma-
lia’s warlords.
(b) DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.—Congress declares 
the following: 
(1) War crimes and crimes against humanity 
have been committed against innocent civilians over 
the past decade by Somali warlords in many parts 
of Somalia. 
(2) Individuals responsible for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity should be held accountable 
for their actions. 
(c) INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.—The 
President is authorized to seek the establishment of an 
international commission of inquiry to investigate war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and other violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law in So-
malia. In carrying out this subsection, the President 
should instruct the Permanent United States Representa-
tive to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of 
the United States to seek the establishment of an inter-
national commission described in the preceding sentence. 
(d) STUDY AND REPORT.— 
(1) STUDY.—The Secretary of State shall con-
duct an annual study of acts which may constitute 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other vio-
lations of human rights and international humani-
tarian law by armed factions in all areas of Somalia
since the collapse of central authority in Somalia in 
1991. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
Congress a detailed report that contains the results 
of the study conducted under paragraph (1), includ-
ing a list of warlords who are responsible for crimes 
against humanity in Somalia, a strategy for holding 
the warlords accountable, including freezing finances 
and restricting travel, and a determination by the 
Secretary of the impact of such measures on the 
peace process in Somalia. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be 
appropriated to the President to carry out this sec-
tion $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 and such sums 
as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 
2007 and 2008. 
(2) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pur-
suant to the authorization of appropriations under 
paragraph (1) are— 
(A) authorized to remain available until ex-
pended; and