unilaterally from the security zone in return for se-
curity guarantees, whereas Syria has never recog-
nized Lebanon’s independence, or exchanged ambas-
sadors with Lebanon, and effectively dictates the
major policies and actions of the Government of
Lebanon.
(5) Various Lebanese factions signed a peace
settlement in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989 as a step
toward ending the civil war. This accord provided for
the phased redeployment and withdrawal of Syrian
forces from Lebanon beginning in 1992.
(6) The Government of Syria has refused to
carry out any redeployment as envisioned by the
Taif Accord. Syrian domination over Lebanese poli-
tics and political leaders is at the root of the Leba-
nese Government’s failure to press Syria for a with-
drawal of Syria’s occupying forces.
(7) In addition to its armed forces, Syria main-
tains a massive intelligence service presence in Leb-
anon to enforce its control over the Lebanese people.
(8) Syrian domination is so pervasive that Leb-
anon has effectively become a Syrian satellite state.
This relationship with Syria does not reflect the will
of the majority of the Lebanese public. Moreover,
Syria has sought to change Lebanon’s demographic
balance by the population transfer of as many as
1,000,000 Syrian laborers to Lebanon.
(9) Syrian domination has prevented Lebanon
from developing direct contacts with Israel and par-
ticipating in the multilateral track of the Middle
East peace process.
(10) Syrian domination has been associated
with a deterioration in Lebanon’s human rights situ-
ation. Syria has engineered Lebanese election results
to its liking, Syrian intelligence units have been im-
plicated in the disappearance of Lebanese citizens,
and the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Parliament has
imposed curbs on Lebanon’s media, once the freest
in the Arab world.
(11) Syrian domination has failed to curtail
international 
narcotics 
traffickers 
or 
terrorist
groups, including Hizballah and the Kurdish Work-
ers Party, that operate in Lebanon under Syrian
control.
(12) Syrian domination has prevented the Leb-
anese Army from entering southern Lebanon to re-
store order and stability in that region. Con-
sequently, southern Lebanon has been a staging
area for military provocations against Israel by ter-
rorist groups supported by Syria and Iran.
(13) The United States Congress is concerned
about the potential for a miscalculation between
Israel and Syria that could inadvertently lead to
large-scale hostilities, especially in southern Leb-
anon. In this regard the Congress views with grave
concern Syria’s acquisition of weapons of mass de-
struction, especially chemical and biological weapons
and missile delivery systems. Syrian surface-to-sur-
face missiles can reach major urban centers in
Israel, Turkey, and Jordan.
(14) The United States Congress has expressed
itself repeatedly in resolutions that insist that Syria
make good on its commitments to withdraw its mili-
tary and security forces from Lebanon.
(15) It is not in the interest of the United
States that freedom and democracy depart irrevers-
ibly from Lebanon. Lebanon has a constructive role
to play in the search for Middle East peace. It can
only do so when it is free, sovereign, and governed
by a truly representative government.
(16) The withdrawal of Syrian and other for-
eign forces from Lebanon would not only promote
regional stability, but also would create the nec-
essary conditions for the restoration of Lebanon’s
independence, freedom, and democracy. Truly free
elections are not possible with the presence of for-
eign military and security forces and terrorist
groups in Lebanon.
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
The Congress calls for the following:
(1) A complete, immediate, and unconditional
withdrawal of all Syrian military, intelligence, and
security forces and their proxies and all Palestinian
and other terrorist forces from Lebanon, to be fol-
lowed by the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces.
(2) Following the withdrawals described in
paragraph (1) and restoration of a freely elected,
democratic government in Lebanon, the deployment
of the Lebanese Army to southern Lebanon to re-
store order and stability in that region, and for dis-
banding all armed groups in Lebanon with the ex-
ception of the legitimate national armed forces.
(3) At the same time as the deployment de-
scribed in paragraph (2), the assurance by the Gov-
ernment of Lebanon for the safety and well-being of
all members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and
their families.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO FUTURE
PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA AND
ISRAEL.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
should not ratify or in any other way affirm, support, rec-
ognize, or participate in any peace agreement between
Syria and Israel that does not provide for the full and
verifiable withdrawal of Syrian military, intelligence, and
security forces and their proxies from Lebanon.
SEC. 5. WITHDRAWAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREAT-
MENT FOR IMPORTS FROM SYRIA AND LEB-
ANON.
(a) WITHDRAWAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law (except subsection (b)), nondiscriminatory
treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) shall not apply
with respect to any goods that—
(1) are the product of Syria or Lebanon; and
(2) are entered into the customs territory of the
United States on or after the 15th day after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) RESTORATION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREAT-
MENT.—The President may restore nondiscriminatory
treatment to goods that—
(1) are the product of Lebanon beginning 30
days after the President certifies to the Congress
that Syrian military, security, and intelligence forces