642 
‘‘(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives. 
‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under 
paragraph (1) shall describe the implementation of 
improvements to the processing of applications for 
special immigrant visas under section 1244(a), in-
cluding information relating to— 
‘‘(A) enhancing existing systems for con-
ducting background and security checks of per-
sons applying for special immigrant status, 
which shall— 
‘‘(i) support immigration security; and 
‘‘(ii) provide for the orderly processing 
of such applications without delay; 
‘‘(B) the financial, security, and personnel 
considerations and resources necessary to carry 
out this subtitle; 
‘‘(C) the number of aliens who have ap-
plied for special immigrant visas under section 
1244 during each month of the preceding fiscal 
year; 
‘‘(D) the reasons for the failure to expedi-
tiously process any applications that have been 
pending for longer than 9 months;
643 
‘‘(E) the total number of applications that 
are pending due to the failure— 
‘‘(i) to receive approval from the Chief 
of Mission; 
‘‘(ii) for U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services to complete the adjudica-
tion of the Form I–360; 
‘‘(iii) to conduct a visa interview; or 
‘‘(iv) to issue the visa to an eligible 
alien; 
‘‘(F) the average wait times for an appli-
cant at each of the stages described in subpara-
graph (E); 
‘‘(G) the number of denials or rejections at 
each of the stages described in subparagraph 
(E); and 
‘‘(H) a breakdown of reasons for denials at 
by the Chief of Mission based on the categories 
already made available to denied special immi-
grant visa applicants in the denial letter sent to 
them by the Chief of Mission. 
‘‘(g) PUBLIC QUARTERLY REPORTS.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, and 
every 3 months thereafter, the Secretary of State and the
644 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall publish a report on the website 
of the Department of State that describes the efficiency 
improvements made in the process by which applications 
for special immigrant visas under section 1244(a) are 
processed, including information described in subpara-
graphs (C) through (H) of subsection (f)(2).’’. 
SEC. 1219. IMPROVEMENT OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMI-
GRANT VISA PROGRAM. 
Section 602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act 
of 2009 (8 U.S.C. 1101 note) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (2)— 
(A) in subparagraph (D)— 
(i) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(ii) REVIEW
PROCESS
FOR
DENIAL 
BY CHIEF OF MISSION.— 
‘‘(I) IN GENERAL.—An applicant 
who has been denied Chief of Mission 
approval shall— 
‘‘(aa) receive a written deci-
sion; and 
‘‘(bb) be provided 120 days 
from the date of receipt of such 
opinion to request reconsider-
ation of the decision to provide
645 
additional information, clarify ex-
isting information, or explain any 
unfavorable information. 
‘‘(II) SENIOR
COORDINATOR.— 
The Secretary of State shall des-
ignate, in the Embassy of the United 
States in Kabul, Afghanistan, a senior 
coordinator responsible for overseeing 
the efficiency and integrity of the 
processing of special immigrant visas 
under this section, who shall be 
given— 
‘‘(aa) sufficiently high secu-
rity clearance to review Chief of 
Mission denials in cases that ap-
pear to have relied upon insuffi-
cient or incorrect information; 
and 
‘‘(bb) responsibility for en-
suring that an applicant de-
scribed in subclause (I) receives 
the information described in sub-
clause (I)(aa).’’; 
(2) in paragraph (4)—
646 
(A) in the heading, by striking ‘‘PROHIBI-
TION ON FEES’’ and inserting ‘‘APPLICATION 
PROCESS’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘The Secretary’’ and in-
serting the following: 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 
days after the date of enactment of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2014, the Secretary of State and the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, shall improve the 
efficiency by which applications for special im-
migrant visas under paragraph (1) are proc-
essed so that all steps incidental to the issuance 
of such visas, including required screenings and 
background checks, are completed not later 
than 6 months after the date on which an eligi-
ble alien applies for such visa. 
‘‘(B) PROHIBITION
ON
FEES.—The Sec-
retary’’; and 
(4) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(12) REPORT ON IMPROVEMENTS.—Not later 
than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
647 
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report, with a classified 
annex, if necessary, that describes the implementa-
tion of improvements to the processing of applica-
tions for special immigrant visas under this sub-
section, including information relating to— 
‘‘(A) enhancing existing systems for con-
ducting background and security checks of per-
sons applying for special immigrant status, 
which shall— 
‘‘(i) support immigration security; and 
‘‘(ii) provide for the orderly processing 
of such applications without delay; 
‘‘(B) the financial, security, and personnel 
considerations and resources necessary to carry 
out this section; 
‘‘(C) the number of aliens who have ap-
plied for special immigrant visas under this 
subsection during each month of the preceding 
fiscal year; 
‘‘(D) the reasons for the failure to expedi-
tiously process any applications that have been 
pending for longer than 9 months;
648 
‘‘(E) the total number of applications that 
are pending due to the failure— 
‘‘(i) to receive approval from the Chief 
of Mission; 
‘‘(ii) for U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services to complete the adjudica-
tion of the Form I–360; 
‘‘(iii) to conduct a visa interview; or 
‘‘(iv) to issue the visa to an eligible 
alien; 
‘‘(F) the average wait times for an appli-
cant at each of the stages described in subpara-
graph (E); 
‘‘(G) the number of denials or rejections at 
each of the stages described in subparagraph 
(E); and 
‘‘(H) a breakdown of reasons for denials 
by the Chief of Mission based on the categories 
already made available to denied special immi-
grant visa applicants in the denial letter sent to 
them by the Chief of Mission. 
‘‘(13) PUBLIC
QUARTERLY
REPORTS.—Not 
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2014, and every 3 months thereafter, the Sec-
649 
retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
shall publish a report on the website of the Depart-
ment of State that describes the efficiency improve-
ments made in the process by which applications for 
special immigrant visas under this subsection are 
processed, including information described in sub-
paragraph (C) through (H) of paragraph (12).’’. 
SEC. 1220. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) PURPOSE.—Expressing the Sense of the House 
or Representatives that the Special Immigration Visa pro-
grams authorized in the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and the Afghan Allies Protection 
Act of 2009 are critical to the United States national secu-
rity, and that these programs must be reformed and ex-
tended in order to meet the Congressional intent with 
which they were created. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Congress created the Special Immigration 
Visa program for the purposes of protecting and aid-
ing the many brave Iraqis and Afghans whose lives, 
and the lives of their families, were endangered as 
a result of their faithful and valuable service to the 
United States during Operations Enduring Freedom 
and Iraqi Freedom.
650 
(2) The Iraq Special Immigrant Visa program 
is set to expire at the end of fiscal year 2013. 
(3) The Afghanistan Special Immigrant Visa 
program is set to expire at the end of fiscal year 
2014. 
(4) Despite the pending expiration of the Spe-
cial Immigrant Visa programs, many brave Iraqis, 
Afghans, and their families, continue to face ongoing 
and serious threats as a result of their employment 
by or on behalf of the United States Government. 
(5) Between FY08–FY12, only 22 percent of 
the available Iraqi SIVs (5,500 visas out of 25,000 
visas) have been issued and 12 percent of the avail-
able Afghan SIVs (1,051 visas out of 8,500 visas) 
have been issued. 
(6) As the Washington Post reported in Octo-
ber 2012, over 5,000 documentarily complete Af-
ghan SIV applications remained in a backlog. 
(7) The implementation of the Special Immigra-
tion Visa programs has been protracted and ineffi-
cient. 
(8) The application and approval process for 
the Special Immigration Visa program is unneces-
sarily opaque and difficult to navigate.
651 
(9) Applicants in both Iraq and Afghanistan 
often have effusive recommendations from numerous 
military personnel, have served the United States 
war efforts for many years, and have served val-
iantly, in some instances literally taking a bullet for 
a United States service member, and yet are denied 
approval for a Special Immigration Visa with little 
to no transparency. 
(10) Overly narrow provisions contained in the 
Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 leave many de-
serving Afghans and their families in need of United 
States assistance, but unable to access the Special 
Immigration Visa program. 
(11) The United States has a responsibility to 
follow through on its promise to protect those Iraqis 
and Afghans who have risked their lives to aid our 
troops and protect America’s security. 
(12) The extension and reform of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Special Immigrant Visa programs is a 
matter of national security. 
(13) The extension and reform of the Afghan 
Special Immigrant Visa program is essential to the 
United States mission in Afghanistan.
652 
(c) SENSE OF THE HOUSE.—It is the sense of the 
House of Representatives that the Iraq and Afghanistan 
Special Immigrant Visa programs should be— 
(1) reformed by— 
(A) ensuring applications are processed in 
a timely, and transparent fashion; 
(B) providing parity between the two Spe-
cial Immigrant Visa programs so that Afghan 
principal applicants, like Iraqi principal appli-
cants, are able to include their spouse, children, 
siblings, and parents; and 
(C) expanding eligibility for the Special 
Immigrant Visa programs to Afghan or Iraqi 
men and women employed by, or on behalf of, 
a media or nongovernmental organization 
headquartered in the United States, or an orga-
nization or entity closely associated with the 
United States mission in Iraq or Afghanistan 
that has received United States Government 
funding through an official and documented 
contract, award, grant, or cooperative agree-
ment; and 
(2) extended in—
653 
(A) Iraq through the year 2018, without 
authorizing any additional Special Immigrant 
Visas as authorized in the original statue; and 
(B) Afghanistan through the year 2018, 
without authorizing any additional Special Im-
migrant Visas as authorized in the original 
statue. 
Subtitle C—Matters Relating to 
Afghanistan Post 2014 
SEC. 1221. MODIFICATION OF REPORT ON PROGRESS TO-
WARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHAN-
ISTAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1230 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 
110–181; 122 Stat. 385), as most recently amended by 
section 1214(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 
1986), is further amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (f), (g), and 
(h) as subsections (h), (i), and (j), respectively; and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol-
lowing new subsections: 
‘‘(f) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: REDEPLOYMENT 
OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM AFGHANI-
STAN.—The report required under subsection (a) shall in-
654 
clude a detailed description of the following matters relat-
ing to the redeployment of United States Armed Forces 
from Afghanistan: 
‘‘(1) The number and a description of United 
States Armed Forces redeployed, vehicles and equip-
ment redeployed, and bases closed during the report-
ing period. 
‘‘(2) A summary of tasks and functions con-
ducted by the United States Armed Forces or the 
Department of Defense that have been transferred 
to other United States Government departments and 
agencies, Afghan Government ministries and agen-
cies, other foreign governments, or nongovernmental 
organizations, or discontinued during the reporting 
period. The summary shall include a discussion of 
the formal and informal arrangements and working 
groups that have been established to coordinate and 
execute the transfer of such tasks and functions. 
‘‘(g) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED: ASSESSMENT OF 
CAPABILITY OF ANSF TO PROVIDE OPERATIONS AND 
MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall include a detailed assessment of the 
capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
to provide operations and maintenance functions for infra-
655 
structure projects constructed for the ANSF after Janu-
ary 1, 2015, including— 
‘‘(1) a description of training provided to the 
ANSF by the United States and the International 
Security Assistance Force; 
‘‘(2) a comprehensive evaluation of operations 
and maintenance capabilities and skills; and 
‘‘(3) the Government of Afghanistan’s financial 
wherewithal to perform or contract out such func-
tions.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made this 
section apply with respect to any report required to be 
submitted under section 1230 of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110– 
181; 122 Stat. 385) on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
SEC. 1222. COMPLETION OF ACCELERATED TRANSITION OF 
UNITED STATES COMBAT AND MILITARY AND 
SECURITY OPERATIONS TO THE GOVERN-
MENT OF AFGHANISTAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 
States that, in coordination with the Government of Af-
ghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
member countries, and other allies in Afghanistan, the 
President shall—
656 
(1) complete the accelerated transition of 
United States combat operations to the Government 
of Afghanistan by not later than December 31, 
2013; 
(2) complete the accelerated transition of 
United States military and security operations to the 
Government of Afghanistan and redeploy United 
States Armed Forces from Afghanistan (including 
operations involving military and security-related 
contractors) by not later than December 31, 2014; 
and 
(3) pursue robust negotiations leading to a po-
litical settlement and reconciliation of the internal 
conflict in Afghanistan, to include the Government 
of Afghanistan, all interested parties within Afghani-
stan and with the observance and support of rep-
resentatives of donor nations active in Afghanistan 
and regional governments and partners in order to 
secure a secure and independent Afghanistan and 
regional security and stability. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that should the President determine the necessity 
to maintain United States troops in Afghanistan to carry 
out missions after December 31, 2014, and such presence
657 
and missions should be authorized by a separate vote of 
Congress not later than June 1, 2014. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed so as to limit or prohibit any au-
thority of the President to— 
(1) modify the military strategy, tactics, and 
operations of United States Armed Forces as such 
Armed Forces redeploy from Afghanistan; 
(2) attack Al Qaeda forces wherever such forces 
are located; 
(3) provide financial support and equipment to 
the Government of Afghanistan for the training and 
supply of Afghanistan military and security forces; 
or 
(4) gather, provide, and share intelligence with 
United States allies operating in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. 
SEC. 1223. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PLAN. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives, and the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate a Department of Defense 
plan regarding covered defense intelligence assets in rela-
658 
tion to the drawdown of the United States Armed Forces 
in Afghanistan. Such plan shall include— 
(1) a description of the covered defense intel-
ligence assets; 
(2) a description of any such assets to remain 
in Afghanistan after December 31, 2014, to con-
tinue to support military operations; 
(3) a description of any such assets that will be 
or have been reallocated to other locations outside of 
the United States in support of the Department of 
Defense; 
(4) the defense intelligence priorities that will 
be or have been addressed with the reallocation of 
such assets from Afghanistan; 
(5) the necessary logistics, operations, and 
maintenance plans to operate in the locations where 
such assets will be or have been reallocated, includ-
ing personnel, basing, and any host country agree-
ments; and 
(6) a description of any such assets that will be 
or have been returned to the United States. 
(b) COVERED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ASSETS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered defense intel-
ligence assets’’ means Department of Defense intelligence 
assets and personnel supporting military operations in Af-
659 
ghanistan at any time during the one-year period ending 
on the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 1224. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
CERTAIN AUTHORITIES FOR AFGHANISTAN. 
(a) REINTEGRATION ACTIVITIES AND INFRASTRUC-
TURE PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this Act may be obligated 
or expended to carry out the provisions of law de-
scribed in paragraph (2) until 15 days after the date 
on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the 
specified congressional committees the certification 
described in subsection (d). 
(2) PROVISIONS
OF
LAW.—The provisions of 
law referred to in paragraph (1) are the following: 
(A) Section 1216 of the Ike Skelton Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 
4392; relating to authority to use funds for re-
integration activities in Afghanistan). 
(B) Section 1217 of the Ike Skelton Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 
4393; relating to authority for program to de-
660 
velop and carry out infrastructure projects in 
Afghanistan). 
(b) COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PRO-
GRAM IN AFGHANISTAN.—Of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act to carry out section 1201 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
(Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1619; relating to the Com-
manders’ Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan), 
$45,000,000 may not be obligated or expended until 15 
days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense sub-
mits to the specified congressional committees the certifi-
cation described in subsection (d). 
(c) AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, $2,615,000,000 may 
not be obligated or expended until 15 days after the date 
on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the specified 
congressional committees the certification described in 
subsection (d). 
(d) CERTIFICATION DESCRIBED.—The certification 
referred to in subsections (a), (b), and (c) is a certification 
of the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of State, that the United States and Afghanistan 
have signed a bilateral security agreement that—
661 
(1) protects the Department of Defense, its 
military and civilian personnel, and contractors from 
liability to pay any tax, or similar charge, associated 
with efforts to carry out missions in the territory of 
Afghanistan that have been agreed to by both the 
Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan; 
(2) ensures exclusive jurisdiction for the United 
States over United States Armed Forces located in 
Afghanistan; 
(3) ensures that there is no infringement on the 
right of self-defense of the United States military 
mission or United States military personnel in Af-
ghanistan; 
(4) ensures that the United States military in 
Afghanistan is permitted to take the efforts deemed 
necessary to protect other United States Govern-
ment offices and personnel in Afghanistan as may be 
required; 
(5) ensures that the United States military mis-
sion in Afghanistan has sufficient access to bases 
and basing rights as may be necessary to carry out 
the activities in Afghanistan that the President has 
assigned to the military; and
662 
(6) ensures that the United States has the free-
dom of movement to carry out those military mis-
sions as may be required to continue the effort to 
defeat al Qaeda and its associated forces. 
(e) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘specified congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1225. LIMITATION ON FUNDS TO ESTABLISH PERMA-
NENT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR BASES 
IN AFGHANISTAN. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
this Act may be obligated or expended by the United 
States Government to establish any military installation 
or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent 
stationing of United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan.
663 
Subtitle D—Matters Relating to 
Iran 
SEC. 1231. REPORT ON UNITED STATES MILITARY PART-
NERSHIP WITH GULF COOPERATION COUN-
CIL COUNTRIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a re-
port on the United States military partnership with Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) An explanation of the steps that the De-
partment of Defense is taking to improve the inter-
operability of United States-Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil countries missile defense systems. 
(2) An outline of the defense agreements with 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including cave-
ats and restrictions on United States operations. 
(3) An outline of United States efforts in Gulf 
Cooperation Council countries that are funded by 
overseas contingency operations funding, an expla-
nation of overseas contingency operations funding 
for such efforts, and a plan to transition overseas
664 
contingency operations funding for such efforts to 
long-term, sustainable funding sources. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
a classified annex, if necessary. 
SEC. 1232. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN ANNUAL REPORT ON 
MILITARY POWER OF IRAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1245(b)(3) of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 
(Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2542) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 
the end; 
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period 
at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
paragraphs: 
‘‘(E) a description of the strategy and 
structure of the global Iranian Threat Network 
and an assessment of the capability of such 
Network and how such Network operates to re-
inforce Iran’s grand strategy; 
‘‘(F) a description of the gaps in intel-
ligence of the Department of Defense with re-
spect to Iran and a prioritization of those gaps 
in intelligence by operational need; and
665 
‘‘(G) an analysis of how sanctions on Iran 
are effecting its military capability and its abil-
ity to export terrorism to proxy groups within 
its Threat Network.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment 
of this Act and shall apply with respect to reports required 
to be submitted under section 1245 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as so 
amended, on or after that date. 
SEC. 1233. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DEFENSE OF THE 
ARABIAN GULF. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In response to U.S. Central Command re-
quirements, the United States Navy has maintained, 
on average, more than one aircraft carrier in the 
Arabian Gulf for more than five years. 
(2) In February 2013, the senior leadership of 
the Department of Defense elected to reduce the 
number of aircraft carriers deployed to the Arabian 
Gulf in light of budget constraints and limitation of 
the overall carrier force structure to support the two 
aircraft carrier requirement. 
(3) In reference to the decision to indefinitely 
delay the deployment of the USS Harry Truman,
666 
CVN 75, and the USS Gettysburg, its cruiser escort, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin 
Dempsey stated, ‘‘We’re trying to stretch our readi-
ness out by keeping this particular carrier in home-
port in our global response force, so if something 
happens elsewhere in the world, we can respond to 
it. Had we deployed it and ‘consumed’ that readi-
ness, we could have created a situation where down-
stream we wouldn’t have a carrier present in certain 
parts of the world at all.’’. 
(4) Highlighting the risks of having only one 
aircraft carrier in the region and relying on land- 
based aircraft, General Dempsey stated, ‘‘When you 
have carrier-based aircraft, you have complete au-
tonomy and control over when you use them. When 
you use land-based aircraft, you often have to have 
host-nation permission to use them.’’. 
(5) Addressing the perception of the United 
States commitment to the region, General James 
Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, tes-
tified in March 2013, ‘‘Perhaps the greatest risk to 
U.S. interests in the region is a perceived lack of an 
enduring U.S. commitment to collective interests 
and the security of our regional partners.’’. He went 
on to testify that, ‘‘The drawdown of our forces can
667 
be misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of 
commitment to the region.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) maintaining only one aircraft carrier battle 
group in the Arabian Gulf constrains United States’ 
options and could put at risk the ability to have di-
versified platforms from which to defend the Ara-
bian Gulf and, if necessary, to conduct military oper-
ations to prevent Iran from threatening the United 
States, United States allies, or Iran’s neighbors with 
nuclear weapons; 
(2) it is in the interests of the United States to 
maintain both land-based and sea-based capabilities 
in the region to project force; 
(3) land-based locations in the region could re-
strict United States military options and critically 
impact the operational capability if required to con-
duct a defense of the Arabian Gulf because the 
United States has not finalized bilateral security 
agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries; 
(4) as a result of these and other critical limita-
tions associated with maintaining one aircraft car-
rier battle group in the Arabian Gulf, United States
668 
military commanders have expressed concerns about 
the operational constraints, the increasing uncer-
tainty 
among 
United 
States 
allies, 
and 
the 
emboldening of potential adversaries such as Iran; 
(5) regarding the ability of the United States 
Navy to maintain a two aircraft carrier presence in 
the Arabian Gulf, the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, stated, ‘‘We need 11 
carriers to do the job. That’s been pretty clearly 
written, and that’s underwritten in our defense stra-
tegic guidance.’’. 
(6) the United States should construct and suf-
ficiently sustain a fleet of at least eleven aircraft 
carriers and associated battle force ships in order to 
meet current and future requirements and to sup-
port at least a two aircraft carrier battle group pres-
ence in the Arabian Gulf, in addition to meeting 
other operational requirements; and 
(7) the United States should finalize bilateral 
agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries that support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf 
requirements, at the earliest possible date.
669 
SEC. 1234. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAMS AT TRAINING LOCATIONS IN SOUTH-
WEST ASIA. 
Section 544(c)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347c(c)(1)) is amended— 
(1) in the first sentence, by inserting after 
‘‘programs’’ the following: ‘‘and integrated air and 
missile defense programs’’; and 
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘post- 
undergraduate flying and tactical leadership’’ and 
inserting ‘‘such’’. 
SEC. 1235. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CONDEMNING THE 
GOVERNMENT OF IRAN FOR ITS STATE-SPON-
SORED PERSECUTION OF ITS BAHA’I MINOR-
ITY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In 1982, 1984, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 
1996, 2000, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2013, 
Congress declared that it deplored the religious per-
secution by the Government of Iran of the Baha’i 
community and would hold the Government of Iran 
responsible for upholding the rights of all Iranian 
nationals, including members of the Baha’i faith. 
(2) The United States Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2012 Report stated, 
‘‘The Baha’i community has long been subject to
670 
particularly severe religious freedom violations in 
Iran. Baha’is, who number at least 300,000, are 
viewed as ‘heretics’ by Iranian authorities and may 
face repression on the grounds of apostasy.’’. 
(3) The United States Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2012 Report stated, 
‘‘Since 1979, Iranian government authorities have 
killed more than 200 Baha’i leaders in Iran and dis-
missed more than 10,000 from government and uni-
versity jobs.’’. 
(4) The United States Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2012 Report stated, 
‘‘Baha’is may not establish places of worship, 
schools, or any independent religious associations in 
Iran.’’. 
(5) The United States Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2012 Report stated, 
‘‘Baha’is are barred from the military and denied 
government jobs and pensions as well as the right to 
inherit property. Their marriages and divorces also 
are not recognized, and they have difficulty obtain-
ing death certificates. Baha’i cemeteries, holy places, 
and community properties are often seized or dese-
crated, and many important religious sites have been 
destroyed.’’.
671 
(6) The United States Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom 2012 Report stated, 
‘‘The Baha’i community faces severe economic pres-
sure, including denials of jobs in both the public and 
private sectors and of business licenses. Iranian au-
thorities often pressure employers of Baha’is to dis-
miss them from employment in the private sector.’’. 
(7) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated, ‘‘The 
government prohibits Baha’is from teaching and 
practicing their faith and subjects them to many 
forms of discrimination that followers of other reli-
gions do not face.’’. 
(8) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated, ‘‘Accord-
ing to law, Baha’i blood is considered ‘mobah’, 
meaning it can be spilled with impunity.’’. 
(9) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated that 
‘‘members of religious minorities, with the exception 
of Baha’is, can serve in lower ranks of government 
employment’’, and ‘‘Baha’is are barred from all lead-
ership positions in the government and military’’. 
(10) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated, ‘‘Baha’is
672 
suffered frequent government harassment and perse-
cution, and their property rights generally were dis-
regarded. The government raided Baha’i homes and 
businesses and confiscated large amounts of private 
and commercial property, as well as religious mate-
rials belonging to Baha’is.’’. 
(11) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated, ‘‘Baha’is 
also are required to register with the police’’. 
(12) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated that 
‘‘[p]ublic and private universities continued to deny 
admittance to and expelled Baha’i students’’ and 
‘‘[d]uring the year, at least 30 Baha’is were barred 
or expelled from universities on political or religious 
grounds’’. 
(13) The Department of State 2011 Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report stated, ‘‘Baha’is 
are regularly denied compensation for injury or 
criminal victimization.’’. 
(14) On March 6, 2012, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a report (A/ 
HRC/19/66), 
which 
stated 
that 
‘‘the 
Special 
Rapporteur continues to be alarmed by communica-
673 
tions that demonstrate the systemic and systematic 
persecution of members of unrecognized religious 
communities, particularly the Baha’i community, in 
violation of international conventions’’ and expressed 
concern regarding ‘‘an intensive defamation cam-
paign meant to incite discrimination and hate 
against Baha’is’’. 
(15) On May 23, 2012, the United Nations 
Secretary-General issued a report, which stated that 
‘‘the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or 
belief * * * pointed out that the Islamic Republic of 
Iran had a policy of systematic persecution of per-
sons belonging to the Baha’i faith, excluding them 
from the application of freedom of religion or belief 
by simply denying that their faith had the status of 
a religion’’. 
(16) On August 22, 2012, the United Nations 
Secretary-General issued a report, which stated, 
‘‘The international community continues to express 
concerns about the very serious discrimination 
against ethnic and religious minorities in law and in 
practice, in particular the Baha’i community. The 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed alarm 
about the systemic and systematic persecution of
674 
members of the Baha’i community, including severe 
socioeconomic pressure and arrests and detention. 
He also deplored the Government’s tolerance of an 
intensive defamation campaign aimed at inciting dis-
crimination and hate against Baha’is.’’. 
(17) On September 13, 2012, the United Na-
tions Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a re-
port (A/67/369), which stated, ‘‘Reports and inter-
views submitted to the Special Rapporteur also con-
tinue to portray a disturbing trend with regard to 
religious freedom in the country. Members of both 
recognized and unrecognized religions have reported 
various levels of intimidation, arrest, detention and 
interrogation that focus on their religious beliefs.’’, 
and stated, ‘‘At the time of drafting the report, 105 
members of the Baha’i community were reported to 
be in detention.’’. 
(18) On November 27, 2012, the Third Com-
mittee of the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a draft resolution (A/C.3/67/L.51), which 
noted, ‘‘[I]ncreased persecution and human rights 
violations against persons belonging to unrecognized 
religious minorities, particularly members of the 
Baha’i faith and their defenders, including esca-
675 
lating attacks, an increase in the number of arrests 
and detentions, the restriction of access to higher 
education on the basis of religion, the sentencing of 
twelve Baha’is associated with Baha’i educational in-
stitutions to lengthy prison terms, the continued de-
nial of access to employment in the public sector, ad-
ditional restrictions on participation in the private 
sector, and the de facto criminalization of member-
ship in the Baha’i faith.’’. 
(19) On December 20, 2012, the United Na-
tions General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/ 
RES/67/182), which called upon the government of 
Iran ‘‘[t]o eliminate discrimination against, and ex-
clusion of * * * members of the Baha’i Faith, re-
garding access to higher education, and to eliminate 
the criminalization of efforts to provide higher edu-
cation to Baha’i youth denied access to Iranian uni-
versities,’’ and ‘‘to accord all Baha’is, including 
those imprisoned because of their beliefs, the due 
process of law and the rights that they are constitu-
tionally guaranteed’’. 
(20) On February 28, 2013, the United Na-
tions Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a re-
port (A/HRC/22/56), which stated, ‘‘110 Bahai’s are
676 
currently detained in Iran for exercising their faith, 
including two women, Mrs. Zohreh Nikayin and Mrs. 
Taraneh Torabi, who are reportedly nursing infants 
in prison’’. 
(21) In March and May of 2008, intelligence of-
ficials of the Government of Iran in Mashhad and 
Tehran arrested and imprisoned Mrs. Fariba 
Kamalabadi, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani, Mr. Afif 
Naeimi, Mr. Saeid Rezaie, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, 
Mrs. Mahvash Sabet, and Mr. Vahid Tizfahm, the 
seven members of the ad hoc leadership group for 
the Baha’i community in Iran. 
(22) In August 2010, the Revolutionary Court 
in Tehran sentenced the seven Baha’i leaders to 20- 
year prison terms on charges of ‘‘spying for Israel, 
insulting religious sanctities, propaganda against the 
regime and spreading corruption on earth’’. 
(23) The lawyer for these seven leaders, Mrs. 
Shirin Ebadi, the Nobel Laureate, was denied mean-
ingful or timely access to the prisoners and their 
files, and her successors as defense counsel were 
provided extremely limited access. 
(24) These seven Baha’i leaders were targeted 
solely on the basis of their religion.
677 
(25) Beginning in May 2011, Government of 
Iran officials in four cities conducted sweeping raids 
on the homes of dozens of individuals associated 
with the Baha’i Institute for Higher Education 
(BIHE) and arrested and detained several educators 
associated with BIHE. 
(26) In October 2011, the Revolutionary Court 
in Tehran sentenced seven of these BIHE instruc-
tors and administrators, Mr. Vahid Mahmoudi, Mr. 
Kamran Mortezaie, Mr. Mahmoud Badavam, Ms. 
Nooshin Khadem, Mr. Farhad Sedghi, Mr. Riaz 
Sobhani, and Mr. Ramin Zibaie, to prison terms for 
the crime of ‘‘membership of the deviant sect of Ba-
ha’ism, with the goal of taking action against the se-
curity of the country, in order to further the aims 
of the deviant sect and those of organizations out-
side the country’’. 
(27) Six of these educators remain imprisoned, 
with Mr. Mortezaie serving a 5-year prison term and 
Mr. Badavam, Ms. Khadem, Mr. Sedghi, Mr. 
Sobhani, and Mr. Zibaie serving 4-year prison 
terms. 
(28) Since October 2011, four other BIHE edu-
cators, Ms. Faran Hessami, Mr. Kamran Rahimian, 
Mr. Kayvan Rahimian, and Mr. Shahin Negari have
678 
been sentenced to 4-year prison terms, which they 
are now serving. 
(29) The efforts of the Government of Iran to 
collect information on individual Baha’is have re-
cently intensified as evidenced by a letter, dated No-
vember 5, 2011, from the Director of the Depart-
ment of Education in the county of Shahriar in the 
province of Tehran, instructing the directors of 
schools in his jurisdiction to ‘‘subtly and in a con-
fidential manner’’ collect information on Baha’i stu-
dents. 
(30) The Baha’i community continues to under-
go intense economic and social pressure, including 
an ongoing campaign in the town of Semnan, where 
the Government of Iran has harassed and detained 
Baha’is, closed 17 Baha’i owned businesses in the 
last three years, and imprisoned several members of 
the community, including three mothers along with 
their infants. 
(31) Ordinary Iranian citizens who belong to 
the Baha’i faith are disproportionately targeted, in-
terrogated, and detained under the pretext of na-
tional security.
679 
(32) The Government of Iran is party to the 
International Covenants on Human Rights and is in 
violation of its obligations under the Covenants. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress— 
(1) condemns the Government of Iran for its 
state-sponsored persecution of its Baha’i minority 
and its continued violation of the International Cov-
enants on Human Rights; 
(2) calls on the Government of Iran to imme-
diately release the seven imprisoned leaders, the ten 
imprisoned educators, and all other prisoners held 
solely on account of their religion; and 
(3) calls on the President and Secretary of 
State, in cooperation with responsible nations, to im-
mediately condemn the Government of Iran’s contin-
ued violation of human rights and demand the im-
mediate release of prisoners held solely on account 
of their religion.
680 
Subtitle E—Reports and Other 
Matters 
SEC. 1241. REPORT ON POSTURE AND READINESS OF 
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO RE-
SPOND TO FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on 
September 11, 2012, may have never occurred or 
could have been prevented had there been an inter-
national stabilizing force following NATO-led oper-
ations in order to help stabilize the country, build 
capacity within the security forces, and pursue ter-
rorist groups that threaten the local government as 
well as United States interests; 
(2) the attack also highlighted the limitations of 
the United States military to alert, deploy, and deci-
sively counter a no-notice terrorist attack such as 
the one in Benghazi, or another security contin-
gency, due to the limitations stemming from United 
States military posture in Africa and the Middle 
East and when there is a lack of a layered defense 
at United States diplomatic facilities;
681 
(3) the United States military is more effec-
tively able to respond to terrorist attacks on United 
States facilities outside of the United States if the 
responding United States military assets are forward 
deployed; 
(4) when an intelligence threat assessment de-
termines that a United States facility overseas is 
vulnerable to attack, such facility should have robust 
force protection measures sufficient to safeguard 
personnel and assets until a United States military 
response can arrive; 
(5) the continually evolving terrorist threat to 
United States interests on the Continent of Africa 
and the Middle East necessitates that the United 
States military maintains a forward deployed pos-
ture in Europe, Middle East, and Africa in order to 
be able to respond to terrorist events, or other secu-
rity contingencies, and to effectively evacuate and 
recover United States personnel; 
(6) the United States military, in conjunction 
with the Department of State and the intelligence 
community, should continue to evaluate the assump-
tions underpinning the terrorist threat in order to 
ensure that it is effectively able to respond globally 
to future terrorist attacks;
682 
(7) the United States military should regularly 
re-evaluate the posture and alert status require-
ments of its crisis response elements in order to be 
more responsive to the evolving and global nature of 
the terrorist threat, and all United States military 
crisis response elements should be fully equipped 
with the required supporting capabilities to conduct 
their missions; 
(8) on April 16, 2013, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, testified 
before the House Appropriations Committee that the 
military is, ‘‘* * * adapting our force posture to a 
new normal of combustible violence in North Africa 
and in the Middle East’’; 
(9) The President stated in a press conference 
on May 16, 2013, ‘‘I have directed the Defense De-
partment to ensure that our military can respond 
lightening quick in times of crisis.’’; 
(10) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should 
continue to evaluate the posture of United States 
forces to respond to the global terrorist threat, in-
cluding an evaluation of whether United States Afri-
ca Command should have forces and necessary 
equipment permanently assigned to the command to 
respond more promptly to this ‘‘new normal’’; and
683 
(11) although the Department of State-initiated 
Accountability Review Board found that the Marine 
Security Guard program should be expanded and 
that there should be greater coordination between 
the Department of Defense and the Department of 
State to identify additional resources for security at 
high risk posts, the United States military may be 
challenged to provide additional security to Depart-
ment of State facilities due to budget shortfalls, on- 
going force structure constraints, and increasing 
operational requirements for the Department of De-
fense. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on the 
posture and readiness of United States Armed 
Forces to respond to future terrorist attacks in Afri-
ca and the Middle East. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall include, at a min-
imum, the following:
684 
(A) An assessment of terrorist groups and 
other non-state groups that threaten United 
States interests and facilities in Africa, includ-
ing a description of the key assumptions under-
pinning such assessment. 
(B) A description of the readiness, posture, 
and alert status of relevant United States 
Armed Forces in Europe, the Middle East, Af-
rica, and the United States and any changes 
implemented or planned to be implemented 
since the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on 
September 11, 2012, to respond to the ‘‘new 
normal’’ and President Obama’s directive for 
the military to respond ‘‘lightening quick’’ in 
times of crisis. 
(C) In consultation with the Secretary of 
State, a description of new or modified require-
ments of the Department of State, if any, for— 
(i) United States Marine Security 
Guard Detachments; 
(ii) any other Department of Defense 
assets to provide enhanced security at De-
partment of State facilities; 
(iii) an explanation of how any new 
requirements for Marine Security Detach-
685 
ments or other Department of Defense as-
sets affect the capacity of the Armed 
Forces, including specifically the capacity 
of the Marine Corps, to fulfill Department 
of Defense operational requirements; and 
(iv) an explanation of how any 
unfulfilled requirements for Marine Secu-
rity Detachments would adversely impact 
security at Department of State facilities. 
(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives. 
SEC. 1242. ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) Egypt is undergoing a significant political 
transition and the ultimate outcome of this political 
process and its implications for United States na-
tional security interests remain uncertain;
686 
(2) the United States continues to have consid-
erable concerns about the intentions and actions of 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and whether the 
government of President Morsi is committed to a 
pluralistic, democratic Egypt; 
(3) the United States has a stake in Egypt be-
coming a mature, pluralistic democracy in which the 
rights of Egyptian citizens, including women and mi-
norities, are protected; 
(4) the United States should continue to closely 
monitor President Morsi’s support for the peace 
treaty with the Government of Israel, which has 
been a stabilizing force in the region for over 30 
years; 
(5) the United States military relationship with 
the Egyptian military is long-standing and should 
remain a key pillar to, and component of, United 
States engagement with Egypt; 
(6) the close military-to-military relationship 
between the United States and Egypt has been a 
critical component in enabling counterterrorism co-
operation between the two governments to ensure 
the United States military has freedom of movement 
throughout the region in order to deter aggression 
and respond to threats to United States national se-
687 
curity interests, particularly in light of the security 
situation in Libya and the Sinai; 
(7) the Egyptian military has exercised re-
straint and professionalism during the unrest in 
Egypt over the last two years and hopefully will re-
main a key mechanism through which the United 
States can support the people of Egypt in achieving 
their goals for a representative and democratic polit-
ical system, while promoting peace and security in 
the region; and 
(8) therefore, with appropriate vetting, United 
States military assistance and support to the Egyp-
tian military should continue, even as civilian aid to 
Egypt receives greater scrutiny as a result of the un-
certainty associated with Egypt’s current political 
leadership and economic policies. 
(b) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that contains a com-
prehensive plan for United States military assistance 
and cooperation with Egypt.
688 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall include, at a min-
imum, a detailed description of the following: 
(A) How United States security assistance 
and cooperation enables— 
(i) freedom of movement for the 
United States military throughout the re-
gion; and 
(ii) the Government of Egypt to dis-
rupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, af-
filiated groups, and other terrorist organi-
zations, whether based in and operating 
from Egyptian territory or the region. 
(B) The capacity of the Government of 
Egypt to prevent the illicit movement of terror-
ists, criminals, weapons, and other dangerous 
material across Egypt’s borders or administra-
tive boundaries, including through tunnels and 
other illicit points of entry into Gaza. 
(C) The extent to which the Egyptian mili-
tary is— 
(i) supporting the protection of the 
political, economic, and religious freedoms 
and human rights of all citizens and resi-
dents in Egypt, including those involved in
689 
Egyptian civil society and democratic pro-
motion efforts through nongovernmental 
organizations; 
(ii) supporting credible and legitimate 
elections in Egypt; 
(iii) 
supporting 
the 
Egypt-Israel 
Peace Treaty; 
(iv) taking effective steps to eliminate 
smuggling networks and to detect and de-
stroy tunnels between Egypt and Gaza; 
and 
(v) supporting action to combat ter-
rorism in the Sinai. 
(D) A description of the strategic objec-
tives of the United States regarding the provi-
sion of United States security assistance to the 
Government of Egypt. 
(E) A description of biennial outlays of 
United States security assistance to the Govern-
ment of Egypt for the purposes of strategic 
planning, training, provision of equipment, and 
construction of facilities, including funding 
streams. 
(F) A description of vetting and end-user 
monitoring systems in place by both Egypt and
690 
the United States for defense articles and train-
ing provided by the United States, including 
human rights vetting. 
(G) A description of actions that the Gov-
ernment of Egypt is taking to— 
(i) repudiate, combat, and stop incite-
ment to violence against the United States 
and United States citizens and prohibit the 
transmission within its domains of satellite 
television or radio channels that broadcast 
such incitement; and 
(ii) adopt and implement legal re-
forms that protect the religious and demo-
cratic freedoms of all citizens and residents 
of Egypt. 
(H) Recommendations, including with re-
spect to required resources and actions, to 
maximize the effectiveness of United States se-
curity assistance provided to Egypt. 
(3) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and
691 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives. 
(c) GAO REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the submission of the report required under sub-
section (b), the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report that— 
(1) reviews and comments on the report re-
quired under subsection (b); and 
(2) provides recommendations regarding addi-
tional actions with respect to the provision of United 
States security assistance to Egypt, if necessary. 
SEC. 1243. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE MILITARY DEVEL-
OPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(‘‘North Korea’’) has escalated regional tensions 
with hostile rhetoric and provocative actions. 
(2) North Korea threatened a nuclear attack on 
the United States and a resumption of open war 
against the Republic of Korea (‘‘South Korea’’). 
(3) North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs constitute a threat to the national
692 
security of the United States and to regional sta-
bility. 
(4) On April 14, 2009, North Korea halted ne-
gotiations regarding its nuclear weapons program 
when it abandoned the Six-Party Talks with the 
People’s Republic of China (‘‘China’’), Japan, the 
Russian Federation (‘‘Russia’’), South Korea, and 
the United States. 
(5) On May 25, 2009, North Korea detonated 
a nuclear device in an underground explosive test. 
(6) On March 26, 2010, North Korea sank a 
South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, killing 46 
South Korean sailors. 
(7) On November 23, 2010, North Korea 
shelled the border island of Yeonpyeong-do, killing 
four people. This was the first direct artillery attack 
on South Korean territory since the signing of the 
1953 armistice. 
(8) On April 13, 2012, North Korea conducted 
a rocket launch that failed to send a satellite into 
orbit. This launch violated United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1718 and 1874. 
(9) On December 12, 2012, North Korea used 
banned long-range missile technology to launch an 
earth observation satellite into orbit. In response,
710 
(2) President Obama should fully consider all 
courses of action to remove President Bashar al- 
Assad from power; 
(3) the conflict in Syria threatens the vital na-
tional security interests of Israel and the stability of 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, the implications of 
which should be sufficiently weighed by the Presi-
dent when considering policy approaches towards the 
conflict in Syria; 
(4) the sale or transfer of advanced anti-air-
craft weapons systems to Syria poses a grave risk to 
Israel and the United States supports Israel’s right 
to respond to this grave threat as needed; 
(5) the President should fully consider all 
courses of action to reinforce his stated ‘‘redline’’ re-
garding the use of weapons of mass destruction by 
the Assad regime in Syria, which could threaten the 
credibility of the United States with its allies in the 
region and embolden the Assad regime; 
(6) the United States should continue to con-
duct rigorous planning and operational preparation 
to support any efforts to secure the chemical and bi-
ological stockpiles and associated weapons; 
(7) the United States should have a policy that 
supports the stability of countries on Syria’s border,