H. R. 6395—548 
and all official statements provided to the United States 
by United States allies in 2019 or 2020 relating to United 
States withdrawal from the Treaty. 
(F) An assessment of the impact of such withdrawal 
on— 
(i) United States leadership in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO); and 
(ii) 
cohesion 
and 
cooperation 
among 
NATO 
member states. 
(G) A description of options to continue confidence- 
building measures similar to those provided for under the 
Treaty with other state parties to the Treaty that are 
United States allies and which, if any, the United States 
may consider pursuing. 
(H) An assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency 
of the impact of such withdrawal on— 
(i) its ability to assess Russian military capabilities 
and the balance of forces in Europe; and 
(ii) the ability of Russia to assess United States 
military capabilities in the United States and in 
Europe. 
(I) A description of the means the United States will 
use to influence future decisions regarding certifications 
of new sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar sensors, 
under the Treaty that could pose additional risk to deployed 
United States military forces and assets, and an assess-
ment of their potential effectiveness. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
annex. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
(2) OBSERVATION FLIGHT.—The term ‘‘observation flight’’ 
has the meaning given such term in Article II of the Open 
Skies Treaty. 
(3) OPEN SKIES TREATY; TREATY.—The term ‘‘Open Skies 
Treaty’’ or ‘‘Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open Skies, done 
at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force January 
1, 2002. 
SEC. 1233. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS RELATING TO 
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OVER 
CRIMEA. 
(a) PROHIBITION.—None of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 
2021 for the Department of Defense may be obligated or expended 
to implement any activity that recognizes the sovereignty of the 
Russian Federation over Crimea.
H. R. 6395—549 
(b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of State, may waive the prohibition under sub-
section (a) if the Secretary of Defense— 
(1) determines that a waiver is in the national security 
interest of the United States; and 
(2) on the date on which the waiver is invoked, submits 
a notification of the waiver and a justification of the reason 
for seeking the waiver to— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1234. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOP-
MENTS INVOLVING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than June 1 of each year, 
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other 
relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report, in both classified and unclassified form, 
on the security and military strategies and capabilities of the Rus-
sian Federation (in this section referred to as ‘‘Russia’’). 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment of the security priorities and objectives 
of Russia, including those priorities and objectives that would 
affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
Middle East, and the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) A description of the goals and factors shaping Russian 
security strategy and military strategy, including military 
spending and investment priorities and their alignment with 
the security priorities and objectives described in paragraph 
(1). 
(3) A description of developments in Russian military doc-
trine and training. 
(4) An assessment of the force structure of the Russian 
military. 
(5) An assessment of the force structure and capabilities 
of Russian military forces stationed in each of the Arctic, 
Kaliningrad, and Crimea, including a description of any changes 
to such force structure or capabilities during the one-year period 
ending on the date of such report and with a particular 
emphasis on the anti-access and area denial capabilities of 
such forces. 
(6) An assessment of Russian military strategy and objec-
tives for the Arctic region. 
(7) A description of the status of testing, production, deploy-
ment, and sale or transfer to other states or non-state actors 
of cruise missile systems by the Russian Federation. 
(8) A description of Russia’s current missile defense 
strategy and capabilities, including efforts to develop missile 
defense capabilities. 
(9) An assessment of the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
used by Russia in operations in Ukraine. 
(10) An assessment of Russia’s diplomatic, economic, and 
intelligence operations in Ukraine. 
(11) A summary of all significant Russian military-to-mili-
tary cooperation with foreign militaries, major training and
H. R. 6395—550 
exercises, and foreign military deployments, including listing 
for each deployment the estimated number of forces deployed, 
the types of capabilities deployed (including any advanced 
weapons), the length of deployment as of such date, and, if 
known, any military-to-military agreement such as a basing 
agreement with the host nation. 
(12) An assessment of the proliferation activities of Russia 
and Russian entities, as a supplier of materials, technologies, 
or expertise relating to nuclear weapons or other weapons 
of mass destruction or missile systems. 
(13) Developments in Russia’s nuclear program, including 
the size and state of Russia’s stockpile, an analysis of the 
nuclear strategy and associated doctrine of Russia and of the 
capabilities, range, and readiness of all Russian nuclear sys-
tems and delivery methods. 
(14) A description of Russia’s anti-access and area denial 
capabilities. 
(15) A description of Russia’s modernization program for 
its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance program and its applications 
for Russia’s precision guided weapons. 
(16) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the 
Secretary of State, developments regarding United States-Rus-
sian engagement and cooperation on security matters. 
(17) A description of Russia’s asymmetric capabilities, 
including its strategy and efforts to develop and deploy elec-
tronic warfare, space and counterspace, and cyber warfare 
capabilities, including details on the number of malicious cyber 
incidents and associated activities against Department of 
Defense networks that are known or suspected to have been 
conducted or directed by the Government of the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(18) An assessment of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy 
and capabilities, including— 
(A) Russia’s information warfare strategy and capabili-
ties, including the use of misinformation, disinformation, 
and propaganda in social and traditional media; 
(B) Russia’s financing of political parties, think tanks, 
media organizations, and academic institutions; 
(C) Russia’s malicious cyber activities; 
(D) Russia’s use of coercive economic tools, including 
sanctions, market access, and differential pricing, especially 
in energy exports; and 
(E) Russia’s use of criminal networks and corruption 
to achieve political objectives. 
(19) An assessment of attempts by Russia, or any foreign 
person acting as an agent of or on behalf of Russia, during 
the preceding year to knowingly disseminate Russian-supported 
disinformation or propaganda, through social media applica-
tions or related Internet-based means, to members of the Armed 
Forces with probable intent to cause injury to the United States 
or advantage the Government of the Russian Federation. 
(20) The current state and summary of United States mili-
tary-to-military cooperation with Russia’s armed forces during 
the one-year period ending on the date that is one month 
before the date of submission of the report, including a sum-
mary of topics discussed.
H. R. 6395—551 
(21) A description of any military-to-military cooperation 
planned for the 12-month period beginning on the date of 
submission of the report and an assessment by the Secretary 
of Defense of the benefits the Department of Defense expects 
to gain from such military-to-military cooperation as well as 
any concerns regarding such cooperation. 
(22) A description of changes to United States policy on 
military-to-military contacts with Russia resulting from Rus-
sia’s annexation of Crimea. 
(23) A description and assessment of efforts by the Russian 
Federation and associated agents, entities, and proxies to sup-
port or encourage attacks against Armed Forces and personnel 
of the United States engaged in named contingency operations 
or combat. 
(24) Other military and security developments involving 
Russia that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to 
United States national security. 
(c) NONDUPLICATION.—If any information required under sub-
section (b) has been included in another report or notification pre-
viously submitted to Congress as required by law, the Secretary 
of Defense may provide a list of such reports and notifications 
at the time of submitting the report required by subsection (a) 
in lieu of including such information in the report required by 
subsection (a). 
(d) PUBLISHING REQUIREMENT.—Upon submission of the report 
required under subsection (a) in both classified and unclassified 
form, the Secretary of Defense shall publish the unclassified form 
on the website of the Department of Defense. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(f) REPEAL.—Section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 
‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3566) is hereby repealed. 
(g) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on January 31, 2026. 
SEC. 1235. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SECURITY 
ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE. 
Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1068) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (c)— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘50 percent of the 
funds available for fiscal year 2020 pursuant to subsection 
(f)(5)’’ and inserting ‘‘50 percent of the funds available 
for fiscal year 2021 pursuant to subsection (f)(6)’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2)(B)— 
(i) in clause (iv), by striking ‘‘; and’’ at the end 
and inserting a semicolon; 
(ii) in clause (v), by striking the period at the 
end and inserting a semicolon; and 
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
H. R. 6395—552 
‘‘(vi) transformation of command and control struc-
tures and roles in line with North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization principles; and 
‘‘(vii) improvement of human resources manage-
ment, 
including 
to 
support 
career 
management 
reforms, enhanced social support to military personnel 
and their families, and professional military education 
systems.’’; 
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2020’’ 
and inserting ‘‘fiscal year 2021’’; and 
(D) in paragraph (5) to read as follows: 
‘‘(5) LETHAL ASSISTANCE.—Of the funds available for fiscal 
year 2021 pursuant to subsection (f)(6), $75,000,000 shall be 
available only for lethal assistance described in paragraphs 
(2), (3), (11), (12), (13), and (14) of subsection (b).’’; 
(2) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(6) For fiscal year 2021, $250,000,000.’’; and 
(3) in subsection (h), by striking ‘‘December 31, 2022’’ and 
inserting ‘‘December 31, 2023’’. 
SEC. 1236. REPORT ON CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS 
OF MILITARY FORCES OF UKRAINE AND RESOURCE PLAN 
FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report on the capability and capacity requirements of the 
military forces of the Government of Ukraine, which shall include 
the following: 
(1) An identification of the capability gaps and capacity 
shortfalls of the military of Ukraine, including— 
(A) an assessment of the requirements of the Ukrainian 
navy to accomplish its assigned missions; and 
(B) an assessment of the requirements of the Ukrainian 
air force to accomplish its assigned missions. 
(2) An assessment of the relative priority assigned by the 
Government of Ukraine to addressing such capability gaps and 
capacity shortfalls. 
(3) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity short-
falls that— 
(A) could be addressed in a sufficient and timely 
manner by unilateral efforts of the Government of Ukraine; 
or 
(B) are unlikely to be addressed in a sufficient and 
timely manner solely through unilateral efforts. 
(4) An assessment of the capability gaps and capacity short-
falls described in paragraph (3)(B) that could be addressed 
in a sufficient and timely manner by— 
(A) the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative of the 
Department of Defense; 
(B) Department of Defense security assistance author-
ized by section 333 of title 10, United States Code; 
(C) the Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Mili-
tary Sales programs of the Department of State; or 
(D) the provision of excess defense articles pursuant 
to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
H. R. 6395—553 
(5) An assessment of the human resource requirements 
of the Office of Defense Cooperation at the United States 
Embassy in Kyiv and any gaps in its capacity to transfer 
and facilitate security assistance to Ukraine. 
(6) Any recommendations the Secretaries deem appropriate 
concerning coordination of security assistance efforts of the 
Department of Defense and Department of State with respect 
to Ukraine. 
(b) RESOURCE PLAN.—Not later than February 15, 2022, the 
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on resourcing 
United States security assistance with respect to Ukraine, which 
shall include the following: 
(1) A plan to resource the following initiatives and pro-
grams with respect to Ukraine in fiscal year 2023 and the 
four succeeding fiscal years to assist Ukraine in meeting the 
most critical capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of the mili-
tary forces of Ukraine: 
(A) The Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative of the 
Department of Defense. 
(B) Department of Defense security assistance author-
ized by section 333 of title 10, United States Code. 
(C) The Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Mili-
tary Sales programs of the Department of State. 
(D) The provision of excess defense articles pursuant 
to the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). 
(2) With respect to the Ukrainian navy: 
(A) A capability development plan, with milestones, 
describing the manner in which the United States will 
assist the Government of Ukraine in meeting the require-
ments described in subsection (a)(1)(A). 
(B) A plan for United States cooperation with third 
countries and international organizations that have the 
resources and ability to provide immediate assistance to 
the Ukrainian navy, while maintaining interoperability 
with United States platforms to the extent feasible. 
(C) A plan to prioritize Excess Defense Articles for 
the Ukrainian navy to the maximum extent practicable 
during the time period described in paragraph (1). 
(D) An assessment of the extent to which United States 
security assistance to the Ukrainian navy is in the national 
security interests of the United States. 
(3) With respect to the Ukrainian air force— 
(A) a capability development plan, with milestones, 
detailing how the United States will assist the Government 
of Ukraine in meeting the requirements described in sub-
section (a)(1)(B); 
(B) a plan for United States cooperation with third 
countries and international organizations that have the 
resources and ability to provide immediate assistance to 
the Ukrainian air force, while maintaining interoperability 
with United States platforms to the extent feasible; 
(C) a plan to prioritize excess defense articles for the 
Ukraine air force to the maximum extent practicable during 
the time period described in paragraph (1);
H. R. 6395—554 
(D) an assessment of the extent to which United States 
security assistance to the Ukrainian air force is in the 
national security interests of the United States. 
(4) An assessment of the progress on defense institutional 
reforms in Ukraine, including in the Ukrainian navy and air 
force, in the time period described in paragraph (1) that will 
be essential for— 
(A) enabling effective use and sustainment of capabili-
ties developed under security assistance authorities 
described in this section; 
(B) enhancing the defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; 
(C) achieving the Government of Ukraine’s stated goal 
of meeting NATO standards; and 
(D) allowing Ukraine to achieve its full potential as 
a strategic partner of the United States. 
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) and the 
resource plan required under subsection (b) shall each be submitted 
in a classified form with an unclassified summary. 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1237. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION SUPPORT OF RACIALLY 
AND ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
and the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 
of State and in consultation with the head of any other relevant 
Federal department or agency, shall jointly submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress a report on Russian Federation sup-
port of foreign racially and ethnically motivated violent extremist 
groups and networks, including such support— 
(1) provided by agents and entities of the Russian Federa-
tion acting at the direction or for the benefit of the Government 
of the Russian Federation; and 
(2) as it relates to undermining stability and security and 
fomenting or sustaining conflict. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A list of each foreign racially or ethnically motivated 
violent extremist group or network known to meet, or suspected 
of meeting, any of the following criteria: 
(A) The group or network has been targeted or 
recruited by the security services of the Russian Federation. 
(B) The group or network has received support 
(including training, disinformation or amplification on 
social media platforms, financial support, and any other 
support) from the Russian Federation or an agent or entity 
of the Russian Federation acting at the direction or for 
the benefit of the Government of the Russian Federation.
H. R. 6395—555 
(C) The group has leadership or a base of operations 
located within the Russian Federation and operates or 
maintains a chapter or network of the group outside the 
Russian Federation. 
(2) For each such group or network— 
(A) an overview of the membership, ideology, and 
activities; 
(B) a description of the leadership, plans, intentions, 
and capabilities; 
(C) a description of the composition and characteristics, 
including an assessment whether and to what extent the 
members of the group or network are also part of a military, 
security service, or police force; 
(D) a description of financing and other forms of mate-
rial support received from the Russian Federation; 
(E) an assessment whether and to what extent the 
group or network is engaged in or facilitating military 
or paramilitary training; 
(F) an assessment of trends and patterns relating to 
communications, travel, and training carried out between 
such group or network and the Russian Federation; and 
(G) an opportunity analysis with respect to mitigating 
and disrupting the transnational nexus between such group 
or network and the Russian Federation. 
(3) An assessment of the manner in which Russian Federa-
tion support of such groups or networks aligns with the stra-
tegic interests of the Russian Federation with respect to geo-
political competition. 
(4) An assessment of the impact and role of such groups 
or networks in destabilizing or influencing conflict zones or 
regional tensions, including by— 
(A) assisting Russian Federation-backed separatist 
forces in the Donbas region of Ukraine; 
(B) destabilizing security on the Crimean peninsula 
of Ukraine; 
(C) undermining stability and security in the Balkans; 
or 
(D) threatening the support for the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in Southeastern Europe. 
(5) A description of any relationship or affiliation between 
such groups or networks and ultranationalist or extremist polit-
ical parties within or outside the Russian Federation, and an 
assessment of the manner in which the Russian Federation 
may use such a relationship or affiliation to advance the stra-
tegic interests of the Russian Federation. 
(6) A description of the use by the Russian Federation 
of social media platforms to support or amplify the presence 
or messaging of such groups or networks outside of the Russian 
Federation, and an assessment of efforts by the United States, 
partners, and allies to counter such support or amplification. 
(7) An assessment of the nature and extent of the threat 
that Russian Federation support of such groups or networks 
poses to United States counterterrorism efforts and other 
national security interests. 
(8) Recommendations, consistent with a whole-of-govern-
ment approach to countering Russian Federation information 
warfare and malign influence operations—
H. R. 6395—556 
(A) to mitigate the security threat posed by such groups 
or networks; or 
(B) to reduce or counter Russian Federation support 
for such groups or networks. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1238. AUTHORIZATION OF REWARDS FOR PROVIDING INFORMA-
TION ON FOREIGN ELECTION INTERFERENCE. 
Section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ‘‘foreign election inter-
ference,’’ before ‘‘transnational organized crime’’; 
(2) in subsection (b)— 
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘or (10)’’ and inserting 
‘‘(10), or (13)’’; 
(B) in paragraph (11), by striking ‘‘or’’ after the semi-
colon at the end; 
(C) in paragraph (12)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘sections’’ and inserting ‘‘section’’; 
(ii) by striking ‘‘or (b)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘or 
2914(b)(1)’’; and 
(iii) by striking the period at the end and inserting 
‘‘; or’’; and 
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(13) the identification or location of a foreign person that 
knowingly engaged or is engaging in foreign election inter-
ference.’’; and 
(3) in subsection (k)— 
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as 
paragraphs (5) through (10), respectively; 
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new 
paragraphs: 
‘‘(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign person’ means— 
‘‘(A) an individual who is not a United States person; 
or 
‘‘(B) a foreign entity. 
‘‘(4) FOREIGN ELECTION INTERFERENCE.—The term ‘foreign 
election interference’ means conduct by a foreign person that— 
‘‘(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting rights, or cam-
paign finance law; or 
‘‘(ii) is performed by any person acting as an agent 
of or on behalf of, or in coordination with, a foreign 
government or criminal enterprise; and 
‘‘(B) includes any covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or 
unlawful act or attempted act, or knowing use of informa-
tion acquired by theft, undertaken with the specific intent 
to significantly influence voters, undermine public con-
fidence in election processes or institutions, or influence,
H. R. 6395—557 
undermine confidence in, or alter the result or reported 
result of, a general or primary Federal, State, or local 
election or caucus, including— 
‘‘(i) the campaign of a candidate; or 
‘‘(ii) a ballot measure, including an amendment, 
a bond issue, an initiative, a recall, a referral, or a 
referendum.’’; and 
(C) in paragraph (10), as so redesignated, in subpara-
graph (A), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon and 
inserting ‘‘or’’. 
Subtitle E—Matters Relating to Europe 
and NATO 
SEC. 1241. DETERMINATION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH 
RESPECT TO TURKEY’S ACQUISITION OF THE S–400 AIR 
DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
it is in the national security interest of the United States— 
(1) to deter aggression against North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies by the Russian Federation or any 
other adversary; 
(2) to continue to work with NATO allies to ensure they 
meet their alliance defense commitments, including through 
adequate and efficient investments in national defense; 
(3) to work to maintain and strengthen the democratic 
institutions and practices of all NATO allies, in accordance 
with the goals of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(4) to ensure that Turkey remains a critical NATO ally 
and important military partner for the United States, contrib-
uting to key NATO and United States missions and providing 
support for United States military operations and logistics 
needs; 
(5) to assist NATO allies in acquiring and deploying 
modern, NATO-interoperable military equipment and reducing 
their dependence on Russian or former Soviet-era defense arti-
cles; 
(6) to promote opportunities to strengthen the capacity 
of NATO member states to counter Russian malign influence; 
and 
(7) to enforce fully the Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.), including by 
imposing sanctions with respect to any person that the Presi-
dent determines knowingly engages in a significant transaction 
with a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf 
of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Government of 
the Russian Federation, as described in section 231 of that 
Act (22 U.S.C. 9525). 
(b) DETERMINATION.—The acquisition by the Government of 
Turkey of the S–400 air defense system from the Russian Federation 
beginning on July 12, 2019, constitutes a significant transaction 
as described in section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525). 
(c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose
H. R. 6395—558 
five or more of the sanctions described in section 235 of the Coun-
tering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 
9529) with respect to each person that knowingly engaged in the 
acquisition of the S-400 air defense system referred to in subsection 
(b). 
(d) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF GOODS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this section, the authorities and requirements to impose sanc-
tions under this section shall not include the authority or 
a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. 
(2) GOOD DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘good’’ 
means any article, natural or man-made substance, material, 
supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test 
equipment, and excluding technical data. 
(e) TERMINATION.—On and after the date that is one year 
after the date on which the President imposes sanctions under 
subsection (c) with respect to a person, the President may terminate 
the application of such sanctions with respect to that person if 
the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
a certification that— 
(1) the Government of Turkey and any person acting on 
its behalf no longer possesses the S–400 air defense system 
or a successor system; 
(2) no S-400 air defense system or successor system is 
operated or maintained inside Turkey by nationals of the Rus-
sian Federation or persons acting on behalf of the Government 
of the Russian Federation or the defense sector of the Russian 
Federation; and 
(3) the President has received reliable assurances from 
the Government of Turkey that the Government of Turkey 
will not knowingly engage, or allow any foreign person to 
engage on its behalf, in pursuing any activity subject to sanc-
tions under section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525) to reacquire the S- 
400 air defense system or a successor system. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1242. CLARIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING 
TO CONSTRUCTION OF NORD STREAM 2 OR TURKSTREAM 
PIPELINE PROJECTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a)(1) of section 7503 of the Pro-
tecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public 
Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2300; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraph (A)— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘or pipe-laying activities’’ after ‘‘pipe- 
laying’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(2) in subparagraph (B)— 
(A) in clause (i)— 
(i) by inserting ‘‘, or facilitated selling, leasing, 
or providing,’’ after ‘‘provided’’; and
H. R. 6395—559 
(ii) by striking ‘‘; or’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) in clause (ii), by striking the period at the end 
and inserting a semicolon; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(iii) provided for those vessels underwriting serv-
ices or insurance or reinsurance necessary or essential 
for the completion of such a project; 
‘‘(iv) provided services or facilities for technology 
upgrades or installation of welding equipment for, or 
retrofitting or tethering of, those vessels if the services 
or facilities are necessary or essential for the comple-
tion of such a project; or 
‘‘(v) provided services for the testing, inspection, 
or certification necessary or essential for the comple-
tion or operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline; and’’; 
and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(C) the consultations carried out pursuant to sub-
section (i) and describes the nature of the consultations 
and any concerns raised by the government of Norway, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or any member country 
of the European Union.’’. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (e) of such section is amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(6) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERN-
MENTAL ENTITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not apply 
with respect to— 
‘‘(A) the European Union; 
‘‘(B) the government of Norway, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, or any member country of the European 
Union; or 
‘‘(C) any entity of the European Union or a government 
described in subparagraph (B) that is not operating as 
a business enterprise.’’. 
(c) WAIVER.—Subsection (f) of such section is amended to read 
as follows: 
‘‘(f) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President may waive 
the application of sanctions under this section with respect to 
a person if the President— 
‘‘(1) determines that the waiver is in the national interests 
of the United States; and 
‘‘(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report on the waiver and the reasons for the waiver.’’. 
(d) 
CONSULTATIONS; 
REPORT.—Such 
section 
is 
further 
amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (k); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following: 
‘‘(i) CONSULTATIONS.—Before imposing sanctions under this sec-
tion, the Secretary of State shall consult with the relevant govern-
ments of Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and member 
countries of the European Union with respect to the imposition 
of such sanctions. 
‘‘(j) REPORT
ON IMPACT
OF SANCTIONS.—Not later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021, and annually thereafter until all sanctions imposed under 
this section have terminated under subsection (h), the Secretary
H. R. 6395—560 
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
detailing the impact of the imposition of sanctions under this section 
that includes information on— 
‘‘(1) whether the goals of the sanctions have been met; 
‘‘(2) the diplomatic impact of the sanctions, including on 
relationships with the governments of Norway, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, and member countries of the European 
Union; and 
‘‘(3) the economic impact of the sanctions, including the 
impact on United States persons.’’. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—Subsection (k) of such section, as redesig-
nated by subsection (b), is further amended— 
(1) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following: 
‘‘(5) PIPE-LAYING ACTIVITIES.—The term ‘pipe-laying activi-
ties’ means activities that facilitate pipe-laying, including site 
preparation, trenching, surveying, placing rocks, backfilling, 
stringing, bending, welding, coating, and lowering of pipe.’’. 
(f) WIND-DOWN PERIOD.—The President may not impose sanc-
tions with respect to a person identified in the first report submitted 
under section 7503(a) of the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security 
Act of 2019, as amended by this section, after the date of the 
enactment of this Act for operations subject to sanctions by reason 
of the amendments made by this section if the President certifies 
in that report that the person has, not later than 30 days after 
such date of enactment, engaged in good faith efforts to wind 
down such operations. 
SEC. 1243. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAINING FOR EASTERN 
EUROPEAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN THE COURSE 
OF MULTILATERAL EXERCISES. 
Subsection (h) of section 1251 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (10 U.S.C. 333 note) is 
amended— 
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ‘‘December 31, 2021’’ 
and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2023’’; and 
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘the period beginning 
on October 1, 2015, and ending on December 31, 2021’’ and 
inserting ‘‘the period beginning on October 1, 2015, and ending 
on December 31, 2023’’. 
SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR THE NORTH 
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the success of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) is critical to achieving United States national security 
objectives in Europe and around the world; 
(2) NATO remains the strongest and most successful mili-
tary alliance in the world, founded on a commitment by its 
members to uphold the principles of democracy, individual lib-
erty, and the rule of law, and its contributions to the collective 
defense are indispensable to the security, prosperity, and 
freedom of its members; 
(3) the United States reaffirms its ironclad commitment 
to NATO as the foundation of transatlantic security and to 
uphold its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, 
including Article 5 of the Treaty;
H. R. 6395—561 
(4) the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies long- 
term strategic competition with Russia as a principal priority 
and highlights the essential role that a strong NATO alliance 
must play in implementing that strategy and addressing shared 
security concerns; 
(5) the United States should deepen defense cooperation 
with non-NATO European partners, reaffirm the open-door 
policy of NATO, and encourage security sector cooperation 
between NATO and non-NATO defense partners that com-
plements and strengthens collective defense, interoperability, 
and allies’ commitment to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
(6) bolstering NATO cohesion and enhancing security rela-
tionships with non-NATO European partners to counter Rus-
sian aggression, including Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics 
and its willingness to use military power to alter the status 
quo, strengthens the United States security interests for the 
long-term strategic competition; 
(7) the continued prioritization of funding for the European 
Deterrence Initiative, including for purposes of strengthening 
allied and partner capability and power projection along the 
eastern flank of NATO, remains critically important; 
(8) the United States and NATO should continue to 
cooperate on other major shared challenges, such as the COVID- 
19 pandemic; and 
(9) the policy of the United States should be to work 
with its NATO and other allies and partners to build permanent 
mechanisms to strengthen supply chains, enhance supply chain 
security, fill supply chain gaps, and maintain commitments 
made at the June 2020 NATO Defense Ministerial, particularly 
regarding pandemic response preparations. 
SEC. 1245. LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES FORCE STRUCTURE REDUC-
TIONS IN GERMANY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Federal Republic of Germany continues to be a 
strong ally within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and a critical ally of the United States; 
(2) the presence of the United States Armed Forces in 
Germany serves as a strong deterrent to Russian Federation 
military aggression and expansion in Europe and as an essen-
tial support platform for carrying out vital national security 
engagements in the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan; 
(3) the presence of approximately 34,500 members of the 
United States Armed Forces deployed to Germany, and the 
ability to increase that level as necessary in response to global 
security challenges, is essential to supporting NATO’s oper-
ations and its collective deterrence against threats; 
(4) reducing the number of members of the United States 
Armed Forces in Germany during a time of growing threats 
in Europe would constitute a grave strategic mistake that would 
undermine United States national security interests and 
weaken NATO; and 
(5) the United States should continue— 
(A) to maintain and strengthen its bilateral relation-
ship with Germany; and
H. R. 6395—562 
(B) to maintain a robust military presence in Germany 
so as to deter aggression against the United States and 
its allies and partners. 
(b) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Defense may not reduce the 
total number of members of the Armed Forces serving on active 
duty who are stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany below 
34,500 until 120 days after the date on which the Secretary, in 
consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments 
and agencies, submits to the appropriate congressional committees 
a written assessment that contains the following: 
(1) An analysis of whether the reduction in the total 
number of Armed Forces serving on active duty who are sta-
tioned in Germany would be in the national security interest 
of the United States and would not detract from United States 
military posture and alignment in the European theater. 
(2) An analysis of the impact of such a reduction on the 
security of the United States as well as the security of allies 
and partners of the United States in Europe. 
(3) An analysis of the impact of such a reduction on the 
deterrence and defense posture of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 
(4) An analysis of the impact of such a reduction on the 
ability of the Armed Forces to execute contingency plans of 
the Department of Defense, including ongoing operations 
executed by United States Central Command and United States 
Africa Command. 
(5) An analysis of the impact of such a reduction on military 
families or additional costs for relocation of associated infra-
structure. 
(6) An analysis of the impact of such a reduction on military 
training and major military exercises, including on interoper-
ability and joint activities with allies and partners. 
(7) A description of the consultations made with United 
States allies and partners in Europe, including a description 
of the consultations with each member of NATO, regarding 
such a reduction. 
(8) A description of the capabilities that would be impacted 
in Germany and any actions designed to mitigate such a reduc-
tion. 
(9) A detailed description of the requirements for the 
Department of Defense to effectuate any relocation and 
redeployment of members of the Armed Forces from Germany 
and associated relocation of military families. 
(10) A detailed analysis of the impact of the reduction 
and redeployment of military capabilities on the ability of the 
United States to meet commitments under the North Atlantic 
Treaty as well as the ability to support operations in the 
Middle East and Africa. 
(11) A detailed analysis of the impact of such reduction 
and redeployment on the implementation of the National 
Defense Strategy and on Joint Force Planning. 
(12) A detailed analysis of the cost implications of such 
a reduction and redeployment, to include the cost of any associ-
ated new facilities to be constructed or existing facilities to 
be renovated at the location to which the members of the 
Armed Forces are to be moved and stationed and the costs 
associated with rotational deployments.
H. R. 6395—563 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(d) SUNSET.—The limitation in subsection (b) shall terminate 
on September 30, 2021. 
SEC. 1246. REPORT ON UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCE POSTURE 
IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
with the Commander of United States European Command, shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on United 
States military force posture in the Southeastern Europe region, 
including the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A description and assessment of the strategic signifi-
cance of Russia’s and China’s military posture and activities 
in the region. 
(2) A description of the current presence, including the 
permanently stationed, rotational, and continuous rotational 
presence, and any agreements in place governing United States 
Armed Forces in the region. 
(3) An assessment of the strategic and operational signifi-
cance of the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea for contin-
gency plans of the Department of Defense. 
(4) An assessment of United States military force posture 
needs in the region to implement the Department of Defense 
Black Sea strategy in accordance with the provisions of the 
Report of the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives to Accompany H.R. 2500 (116th Congress; 
House Report 116-120). 
(5) An assessment of the value, cost, and feasibility of 
increasing permanently stationed or rotational deployments of 
the United States Armed Forces in the region, to include assess-
ments of posture in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and other rel-
evant locations, and an assessment of available infrastructure 
and any infrastructure improvements that would be necessary 
to support such an increase. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in a classified form and include an unclassified summary. 
SEC. 1247. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR COORDINATED 
ACTION TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF BALTIC ALLIES. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) maintaining the security of the Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania is critical to achieving United States 
national security objectives; 
(2) the Baltic states play a crucial role in strategic efforts 
to deter Russia, maintain the collective security of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, and strengthen 
bilateral and multilateral defense; and
H. R. 6395—564 
(3) the United States should continue to pursue efforts 
consistent with a comprehensive, multilateral assessment of 
the military requirements of the Baltic states focused on secu-
rity sector assistance, coordination, and planning designed to 
ensure the security of the Baltic states and address current 
and future security challenges. 
SEC. 1248. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ROLE OF THE KOSOVO FORCE 
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Kosovo Force of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion continues to play an indispensable role in maintaining 
security and stability in the Western Balkans, which are the 
essential predicates for the success of diplomatic efforts between 
Kosovo and Serbia; 
(2) the participation of the United States Armed Forces 
in the Kosovo Force is foundational to the credibility and suc-
cess of mission of the Kosovo Force; 
(3) with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and 
other European partners contributing over 80 percent of the 
troops for the mission, the Kosovo Force is a primary example 
of the long-term benefits of burden sharing to United States 
national security interests; and 
(4) together with the allies and partners of the United 
States, the United States should— 
(A) maintain its commitment to the Kosovo Force; 
(B) take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Kosovo 
Force has the necessary personnel, capabilities, and 
resources to perform its critical mission; and 
(C) continue to support the gradual transition of the 
Kosovo Security Force to a multi-ethnic army for the 
Republic of Kosovo that is interoperable with North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization members through an inclusive 
and transparent process that— 
(i) respects the rights and concerns of all citizens 
of Kosovo; 
(ii) promotes regional security and stability; and 
(iii) supports the aspirations of Kosovo for full 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Subtitle F—Matters Relating to the Indo- 
Pacific Region 
SEC. 1251. PACIFIC DETERRENCE INITIATIVE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish an 
initiative, to be known as the ‘‘Pacific Deterrence Initiative’’ (in 
this section referred to as the ‘‘Initiative’’), to carry out prioritized 
activities to enhance the United States deterrence and defense 
posture in the Indo-Pacific region, assure allies and partners, and 
increase capability and readiness in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(b) PURPOSE.—The Initiative required under subsection (a) shall 
carry out the following prioritized activities to improve the design 
and posture of the joint force in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily 
west of the International Date Line:
H. R. 6395—565 
(1) Modernize and strengthen the presence of the United 
States Armed Forces, including those with advanced capabili-
ties. 
(2) Improve logistics and maintenance capabilities and the 
pre-positioning of equipment, munitions, fuel, and materiel. 
(3) Carry out a program of exercises, training, experimen-
tation, and innovation for the joint force. 
(4) Improve infrastructure to enhance the responsiveness 
and resiliency of the United States Armed Forces. 
(5) Build the defense and security capabilities, capacity, 
and cooperation of allies and partners. 
(c) FUNDING.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
by this Act for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021, 
$2,234,958,000 is authorized to be made available to carry out 
the Initiative required under subsection (a), as specified in the 
funding tables in division D of this Act. 
(d) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than February 15, 2021, and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary, in consultation with the Com-
mander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report on future year 
activities and resources for the Initiative that includes the following: 
(1) A description of the activities and resources for the 
first fiscal year beginning after the date of submission of the 
report and the plan for not fewer than the four following 
fiscal years, organized by the activities described in paragraphs 
(1) through (5) of subsection (b). 
(2) A summary of progress made towards achieving the 
purposes of the Initiative. 
(3) A summary of the activity, resource, capability, infra-
structure, and logistics requirements necessary to achieve meas-
urable progress in reducing risk to the joint force’s ability 
to achieve objectives in the region, including through invest-
ments in— 
(A) active and passive defenses against unmanned 
aerial systems and theater cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic 
missiles; 
(B) advanced long-range precision strike systems; 
(C) command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; 
(D) test range capacity, capability, and coordination; 
(E) dispersed, resilient, and adaptive basing to support 
distributed operations, including expeditionary airfields 
and ports; 
(F) advanced critical munitions; 
(G) pre-positioned forward stocks of fuel, munitions, 
equipment, and materiel; 
(H) distributed logistics and maintenance capabilities; 
(I) strategic mobility assets; 
(J) improved interoperability and information sharing 
with allies and partners; 
(K) information operations capabilities; 
(L) bilateral and multilateral military exercises and 
training with allies and partners; and 
(M) use of security cooperation authorities to further 
build partner capacity. 
(4) A detailed timeline to achieve the requirements identi-
fied under paragraph (3).
H. R. 6395—566 
(5) A detailed explanation of any significant modifications 
to such requirements, as compared to plans previously sub-
mitted under this subsection. 
(6) Any other matter, as determined by the Secretary. 
(e) BUDGET DISPLAY INFORMATION.—The Secretary shall include 
a detailed budget display for the Initiative in the materials of 
the Department of Defense in support of the budget of the President 
(submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United 
States Code) for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter 
that includes the following information: 
(1) The resources necessary for the Initiative to carry out 
the activities required under subsection (b) for the applicable 
fiscal year and not fewer than the four following fiscal years, 
organized by the activities described in paragraphs (1) through 
(5) of that subsection. 
(2) With respect to procurement accounts— 
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, line 
number, line item, and line item title; and 
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts 
specific to the Initiative. 
(3) With respect to research, development, test, and evalua-
tion accounts— 
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, line 
number, program element, and program element title; and 
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts 
specific to the Initiative. 
(4) With respect to operation and maintenance accounts— 
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity 
title, line number, and subactivity group title; and 
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such 
amounts will be used. 
(5) With respect to military personnel accounts— 
(A) amounts displayed by account, budget activity, 
budget subactivity, and budget subactivity title; and 
(B) a description of the requirements for such amounts 
specific to the Initiative. 
(6) With respect to each project under military construction 
accounts (including with respect to unspecified minor military 
construction and amounts for planning and design), the country, 
location, project title, and project amount by fiscal year. 
(7) With respect to the activities described in subsection 
(b)— 
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity 
title, line number, and subactivity group title; and 
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such 
amounts will be used. 
(8) With respect to each military service— 
(A) amounts displayed by account title, budget activity 
title, line number, and subactivity group title; and 
(B) a description of the specific manner in which such 
amounts will be used. 
(9) With respect to the amounts described in each of para-
graphs (2)(A), (3)(A), (4)(A), (5)(A), (6), (7)(A), and (8)(A), a 
comparison between— 
(A) the amount in the budget of the President for 
the following fiscal year;
H. R. 6395—567 
(B) the amount projected in the previous budget of 
the President for the following fiscal year; 
(C) a detailed summary of funds obligated for the Ini-
tiative during the preceding fiscal year; and 
(D) a detailed comparison of funds obligated for the 
Initiative during the previous fiscal year to the amount 
of funds requested for such fiscal year. 
(f) BRIEFINGS REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 2021, and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary shall provide to the congressional 
defense committees a briefing on the budget proposal and programs, 
including the budget display information for the applicable fiscal 
year required by subsection (e). 
(g) REPEAL.—Section 1251 of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1676), 
as most recently amended by section 1253 of the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 (Public 
Law 115–232; 132 Stat. 2054), is repealed. 
SEC. 1252. EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON 
COMMERCIAL EXPORT OF CERTAIN COVERED MUNITIONS 
ITEMS TO THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Act entitled ‘‘An Act to prohibit the 
commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong 
Police Force’’, approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116–77; 
133 Stat. 1173), is amended— 
(1) by amending the title to read as follows: ‘‘An Act to 
prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions and crime 
control items to the Hong Kong Police Force.’’; 
(2) in section 1(2)— 
(A) by amending the paragraph heading to read as 
follows: ‘‘COVERED MUNITIONS AND CRIME CONTROL ITEMS 
’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘covered munitions items’’ and inserting 
‘‘covered munitions and crime control items’’; 
(3) in section 2— 
(A) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘COVERED MUNI-
TIONS ITEMS’’ and inserting ‘‘COVERED MUNITIONS AND 
CRIME CONTROL ITEMS’’; and 
(B) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘covered munitions 
items’’ and inserting ‘‘covered munitions and crime control 
items’’; and 
(4) in section 3, by striking ‘‘one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting ‘‘on December 31, 
2021’’. 
(b) TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE HONG KONG AUTONOMY 
ACT.—The Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116– 
149; 134 Stat. 663) is amended— 
(1) in section 2(10), by striking ‘‘The’’ and inserting ‘‘Except 
as otherwise specifically provided, the’’; and 
(2) in section 7(b)(7), by inserting ‘‘by any person (as defined 
in section 4801(8) of title 50, United States Code)’’ after ‘‘(in 
country)’’. 
SEC. 1253. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER FUNDS FOR BIEN HOA DIOXIN 
CLEANUP. 
(a) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding section 2215 of 
title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense may transfer 
to the Secretary of State, for use by the United States Agency
H. R. 6395—568 
for International Development, amounts to be used for the Bien 
Hoa dioxin cleanup in Vietnam. 
(b) LIMITATION ON AMOUNT.—Not more than $15,000,000 may 
be transferred in fiscal year 2021 under the transfer authority 
in subsection (a). 
(c) ADDITIONAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The transfer authority 
in subsection (a) is in addition to any other transfer authority 
available to the Department of Defense. 
(d) NOTICE ON EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY.—If the Secretary of 
Defense determines to use the transfer authority in subsection 
(a), the Secretary shall notify the congressional defense committee 
of that determination not later than 30 days before the Secretary 
uses the transfer authority. 
SEC. 1254. COOPERATIVE PROGRAM WITH VIETNAM TO ACCOUNT FOR 
VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State, is authorized to carry out a cooperative 
program with the Ministry of Defense of Vietnam to assist in 
accounting for Vietnamese personnel missing in action. 
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the cooperative program under 
subsection (a) is to carry out the following activities: 
(1) Collection, digitization, and sharing of archival informa-
tion. 
(2) Building the capacity of Vietnam to conduct archival 
research, investigations, and excavations. 
(3) Improving DNA analysis capacity. 
(4) Increasing veteran-to-veteran exchanges. 
(5) Other support activities the Secretary of Defense con-
siders necessary and appropriate. 
SEC. 1255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE UNITED STATES-VIETNAM 
DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP. 
In commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the normalization 
of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, 
Congress— 
(1) welcomes the historic progress and achievements in 
United States-Vietnam relations over the last 25 years; 
(2) commends the commitment of Vietnam to resolve inter-
national disputes through peaceful means on the basis of inter-
national law; 
(3) congratulates Vietnam on its chairmanship of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its election as 
a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council, both of which symbolize the positive leadership role 
of Vietnam in regional and global affairs; 
(4) affirms the commitment of the United States— 
(A) to respect the independence and sovereignty of 
Vietnam; and 
(B) to establish and promote friendly relations and 
to work together on an equal footing for mutual benefit 
with Vietnam; 
(5) encourages the United States and Vietnam to elevate 
their comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership 
based on mutual understanding, shared interests, and a 
common desire to promote peace, cooperation, prosperity, and 
security in the Indo-Pacific region;
H. R. 6395—569 
(6) affirms the commitment of the United States to continue 
to address war legacy issues, including through dioxin remedi-
ation, unexploded ordnance removal, accounting for prisoners 
of war and soldiers missing in action, and other activities; 
and 
(7) supports deepening defense cooperation between the 
United States and Vietnam, in support of United States 
interests and international law, including with respect to mari-
time security, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, information 
sharing, human rights, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, military medicine, peacekeeping operations, defense 
trade, and other areas. 
SEC. 1256. PILOT PROGRAM TO IMPROVE CYBER COOPERATION WITH 
VIETNAM, THAILAND, AND INDONESIA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, with the concur-
rence of the Secretary of State, may establish, using existing 
authorities of the Department of Defense, a pilot program in 
Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia— 
(1) to enhance the cyber security, resilience, and readiness 
of the military forces of Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia; 
and 
(2) to increase regional cooperation between the United 
States and Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia on cyber issues. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The activities of the pilot program under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
(1) Provision of training to military officers and civilian 
officials in the ministries of defense of Vietnam, Thailand, 
and Indonesia. 
(2) The facilitation of regular dialogues and trainings 
among the Department of Defense and the ministries of defense 
of Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia with respect to the 
development of infrastructure to protect against foreign cyber 
attacks. 
(3) To undertake, as part of cyber cooperation, training 
that includes curricula expressly relating to human rights, the 
rule of law, and internet freedom. 
(c) REPORTS.— 
(1) DESIGN OF PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than June 1, 
2021, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report on the design of the pilot program under 
subsection (a). 
(2) PROGRESS REPORT.—Not later than December 31, 2021, 
and annually thereafter until the date on which the pilot pro-
gram terminates under subsection (e), the Secretary of Defense, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
pilot program that includes— 
(A) a description of the activities conducted and the 
results of such activities; 
(B) an assessment of reforms relevant to cybersecurity 
and technology in enhancing the cyber security, resilience, 
and readiness of the military forces of Vietnam, Thailand, 
and Indonesia;
H. R. 6395—570 
(C) an assessment of the effectiveness of curricula 
relating to human rights, the rule of law, and internet 
freedom; and 
(D) the content and curriculum of any program made 
available to participants of such program. 
(d) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days before the date 
on which the pilot program under subsection (a) is scheduled to 
commence, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a certification indicating whether such program would 
credibly enable, enhance, or facilitate violations of internet freedom 
or other human rights abuses in Vietnam, Indonesia, or Thailand. 
(e) TERMINATION.—The pilot program under subsection (a) shall 
terminate on December 31, 2024. 
(f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1257. REPORT ON THE COSTS MOST DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE STATIONING OF THE ARMED FORCES IN JAPAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than February 1, 2021, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the costs most directly associated with the stationing of United 
States forces in Japan that are the subject of the current Special 
Measures Agreement negotiations between the United States 
Government and the Government of Japan. The report shall 
include— 
(1) a description of each category of costs, including labor, 
utilities, training relocation, and any other categories the Sec-
retary determines appropriate, that are most directly associated 
with the stationing of the Armed Forces in Japan; 
(2) a detailed description of which of the costs most directly 
associated with the stationing of the Armed Forces in Japan 
are incurred in Japan and which such costs are incurred outside 
of Japan; 
(3) a description of each category of contributions made 
by the Government of Japan that allay the costs to United 
States of stationing the Armed Forces in Japan, as well as 
the corresponding description of each category of costs incurred 
by the United States Government; 
(4) the benefits to United States national security and 
regional security derived from the forward presence of the 
Armed Forces in Japan; 
(5) the impacts to the national security of the United States, 
the security of Japan, and peace and stability in the Indo- 
Pacific region, if a new Special Measures Agreement is not 
reached before March 31, 2021; and 
(6) any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committee’’ 
means—
H. R. 6395—571 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 1258. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS TO REDUCE THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES SERVING 
ON ACTIVE DUTY WHO ARE DEPLOYED TO SOUTH KOREA. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
may be used to reduce the total number of members of the Armed 
Forces serving on active duty who are deployed to South Korea 
below 28,500 until 90 days after the date on which the Secretary 
of Defense certifies to the congressional defense committees the 
following: 
(1) Such a reduction is in the national security interest 
of the United States and will not significantly undermine the 
security of United States allies in the region. 
(2) The Secretary has appropriately consulted with allies 
of the United States, including South Korea and Japan, 
regarding such a reduction. 
SEC. 
1259. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
OF 
GAO 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
ON 
PREPAREDNESS 
OF 
UNITED 
STATES 
FORCES 
TO 
COUNTER NORTH KOREAN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall develop 
a plan to address the recommendations in the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office’s report entitled ‘‘Preparedness of U.S. 
Forces to Counter North Korean Chemical and Biological 
Weapons’’ (GAO–21–104C). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under paragraph (1) 
shall, with respect to each recommendation in the report 
described in paragraph (1) that the Secretary of Defense has 
implemented or intends to implement, include— 
(A) a summary of actions that have been or will be 
taken to implement the recommendation; and 
(B) a schedule, with specific milestones, for completing 
implementation of the recommendation. 
(b) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees the plan 
required under subsection (a). 
(c) DEADLINE FOR IMPLEMENTATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), not 
later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall carry out activities to imple-
ment the plan developed under subsection (a). 
(2) EXCEPTION
FOR
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
CERTAIN
REC-
OMMENDATIONS.— 
(A) DELAYED
IMPLEMENTATION.—The Secretary of 
Defense may initiate implementation of a recommendation 
in the report described in subsection (a)(1) after the date 
specified in paragraph (1) if the Secretary provides the 
congressional defense committees with a specific justifica-
tion for the delay in implementation of such recommenda-
tion on or before such date.
H. R. 6395—572 
(B) NONIMPLEMENTATION.—The Secretary of Defense 
may decide not to implement a recommendation in the 
report described in subsection (a)(1) if the Secretary pro-
vides to the congressional defense committees, on or before 
the date specified in paragraph (1)— 
(i) a specific justification for the decision not to 
implement the recommendation; and 
(ii) a summary of alternative actions the Secretary 
plans to take to address the conditions underlying 
the recommendation. 
SEC. 1260. STATEMENT OF POLICY AND SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE 
TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. 
(a) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
(1) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the 
United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for 
United States-Taiwan relations; 
(2) to fully pursue the deepening of the extensive, close, 
and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan pursu-
ant to the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 
3301 et seq.), the intent of which is to facilitate greater coopera-
tion and the broadening and deepening of United States-Taiwan 
relations; 
(3) that the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) shall be implemented and executed, con-
sistent with the Six Assurances, to address evolving political, 
security, and economic dynamics and circumstances; 
(4) that, as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), the United States decision 
to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic 
of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan 
will be determined by peaceful means, and that any effort 
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
means, including boycotts and embargoes, is a threat to the 
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States; 
(5) that the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior 
of the People’s Republic of China towards Taiwan is contrary 
to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of 
Taiwan; and 
(6) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 
96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), to maintain the capacity to 
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of 
the people on Taiwan. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States should continue to support the 
development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces nec-
essary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capa-
bility, including by— 
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles 
and services through foreign military sales, direct commer-
cial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis 
on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense 
strategy of Taiwan, including anti-ship, coastal defense,
H. R. 6395—573 
anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-
mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command 
and control capabilities; 
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests 
of Taiwan for defense articles and services; 
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises 
with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient 
self-defense capability; 
(D) examining the potential for expanding professional 
military education and technical training opportunities in 
the United States for military personnel of Taiwan; 
(E) increasing exchanges between senior defense offi-
cials and general officers of the United States and Taiwan 
at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent 
with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 
Stat. 341), especially for the purposes of— 
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; 
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military 
forces of the United States and Taiwan; and 
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan; and 
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief; 
(2) the Secretary of State should ensure that any policy 
guidance related to United States-Taiwan relations is fully 
consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection 
(a); 
(3) the Secretary of Defense should ensure that policy guid-
ance related to United States-Taiwan defense relations is fully 
consistent with the statement of policy set forth in subsection 
(a); and 
(4) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the heads of other Federal agencies and departments, as appro-
priate, should issue new guidance as required to carry out 
such policy. 
SEC. 1260A. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
of State, or his or her designee, shall brief the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives on the United States 
commitment to supporting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self- 
defense capability, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act (22 
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and affirmed in the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 3301 note). 
(b) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A description of United States efforts to implement 
section 209(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(22 U.S.C. 3301 note) by conducting regular transfers to Taiwan 
of defense articles tailored to meet the existing and likely 
future threats from the People’s Republic of China, including 
any effort to support Taiwan in the development and integra-
tion into its military forces of asymmetric capabilities, as appro-
priate, including mobile, survivable, and cost-effective capabili-
ties.
H. R. 6395—574 
(2) A description of the role of such transfers of defense 
articles and services in supporting Taiwan in maintaining the 
capabilities, readiness levels, and resourcing necessary to fulfill 
and implement Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept. 
(3) A description of— 
(A) United States efforts to conduct a regularized 
process for consideration of transfers of defense articles 
and services to Taiwan; and 
(B) any barriers to conducting such a process. 
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on December 
31, 2026. 
SEC. 1260B. REPORT ON UNITED STATES-TAIWAN MEDICAL SECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services, shall submit to the Committees 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
a report on the feasibility of establishing a medical security partner-
ship with the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan that shall include 
the following: 
(1) The goals and objectives of developing a medical security 
partnership on issues related to pandemic preparedness and 
control. 
(2) A discussion of current and future plans to cooperate 
on medical security activities. 
(3) An evaluation of the feasibility of cooperating on a 
range of activities under the partnership, including— 
(A) research and production of vaccines and medicines; 
(B) joint conferences with scientists and experts; 
(C) collaboration relating to and exchanges of medical 
supplies and equipment; and 
(D) the use of hospital ships such as the United States 
Naval Ship Comfort and United States Naval Ship Mercy. 
(4) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense determines 
appropriate. 
SEC. 1260C. ESTABLISHMENT OF CAPABILITIES TO ASSESS THE 
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASES OF 
CHINA AND OTHER FOREIGN ADVERSARIES. 
(a) ASSESSMENTS.—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appro-
priate, shall define intelligence and other information requirements, 
sources, and organizational responsibilities for assessing the defense 
technological and industrial bases of foreign adversaries and con-
ducting comparative analyses of such technological and industrial 
bases with respect to their resilience and capacity to support their 
strategic objectives. The requirements, sources, and responsibilities 
shall include— 
(1) examining the competitive military advantages of for-
eign adversaries, including with respect to regulation, raw 
materials, use of energy and other natural resources, education, 
labor, and capital accessibility; 
(2) assessing relative cost, speed of product development, 
age and value of the installed capital base, leadership’s tech-
nical competence and agility, nationally-imposed inhibiting 
conditions by foreign adversaries, the availability of human
H. R. 6395—575 
and material resources, and reliance on the industrial base 
of the United States or United States allies and partners; 
(3) a temporal evaluation of the competitive strengths and 
weaknesses of United States industry, including manufacturing 
surge capacity, versus the directed priorities and capabilities 
of foreign adversary governments; and 
(4) assessing any other issues that the Secretary deter-
mines appropriate. 
(b) METHODOLOGY.—The Secretary of Defense shall incorporate 
inputs pursuant to subsection (a) as part of a methodology to 
continuously assess domestic and foreign defense industries, mar-
kets, and companies of significance to military and industrial advan-
tage to identify supply chain vulnerabilities. 
(c) CONDUCT OF ASSESSMENT WORK BY INDEPENDENT ORGANIZA-
TION.— 
(1) AGREEMENT AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of Defense is 
authorized to enter into an agreement with an independent 
organization to carry out some of the assessment work required 
under subsections (a) and (b). 
(2) NOTIFICATION.—If the Secretary enters such an agree-
ment, the Secretary shall, not later than March 15, 2021, 
provide to the congressional defense committees a report identi-
fying the organization and describing the scope of work under 
the agreement. 
(d) REPORTS.— 
(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than March 15, 2021, the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report on efforts to establish the continuous 
assessment activity required under subsections (a) and (b), 
including a notification if the Secretary engages an independent 
organization, pursuant to subsection (c), to prepare the report 
described in paragraph (2). 
(2) SUBSEQUENT REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than August 1, 2021, the 
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on the first assessment required under sub-
sections (a) and (b) with respect to the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(B) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subparagraph 
(A) shall include— 
(i) the information described in subsection (a); 
(ii) any exclusive or dominant supply of military 
and civilian material, raw materials, or other goods 
(or components thereof) essential to China’s national 
security by the United States or United States allies 
and partners; and 
(iii) the availability of substitutes or alternative 
sources for goods identified under clause (ii). 
(3) INCLUSION
OF
INDEPENDENT
ORGANIZATION’S
ASSESS-
MENT WORK.—If the Secretary enters into an agreement with 
an independent organization under subsection (c), the Secretary 
shall include the assessment work carried out by the organiza-
tion under the agreement without change, but may include 
comments with respect to such assessment work.
H. R. 6395—576 
SEC. 1260D. EXTENSION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECU-
RITY 
DEVELOPMENTS 
INVOLVING 
THE 
PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
Section 1202(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 (10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended in the first 
sentence by striking ‘‘January 31, 2021’’ and inserting ‘‘January 
31, 2022’’. 
SEC. 1260E. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE AGGRESSION OF THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CHINA ALONG THE BORDER WITH 
INDIA AND ITS GROWING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) continued military aggression by the Government of 
China along the border with India is a significant concern; 
(2) the Government of China should work with the Govern-
ment of India toward de-escalating the situation along the 
Line of Actual Control through existing diplomatic mechanisms 
and refrain from attempting to settle disputes through coercion 
or force; and 
(3) attempts by the Government of China to advance base-
less territorial claims, including those in the South China Sea, 
the East China Sea, and with respect to Bhutan, are desta-
bilizing and inconsistent with international law. 
SEC. 1260F. ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL CYBER STRATEGY TO DETER 
CHINA FROM ENGAGING IN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 
AND CYBER THEFT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees an assessment of the effectiveness 
of the National Cyber Strategy to deter industrial espionage and 
large-scale cyber theft of intellectual property and personal informa-
tion conducted by the People’s Republic of China, People’s Republic 
of China persons or entities, or persons or entities acting on behalf 
of the People’s Republic of China against the United States or 
United States persons. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The assessment required by 
subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A discussion of United States interests in preventing 
such industrial espionage and cyber theft and the impact on 
the United States and its economy from such activities. 
(2) A general discussion of— 
(A) the criteria used to determine when the United 
States Government will seek to deter such industrial espio-
nage and cyber theft; and 
(B) the means by which the United States will seek 
to deter such industrial espionage and cyber theft, and 
demonstrate the credibility of United States resolve to 
defend its interests in cyberspace. 
(3) An assessment of China’s adherence to previous agree-
ments related to such industrial espionage and cyber theft 
with the United States and applicability of international laws, 
including known violations. 
(4) An assessment of China’s actions to direct proxies, 
surrogates, or state-sponsored nongovernmental entities to 
engage in such industrial espionage or cyber theft.
H. R. 6395—577 
(5) Recommendations consistent with a whole-of-govern-
ment approach to countering such industrial espionage and 
cyber theft. 
(c) UPDATE.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the submission of the assessment required by subsection 
(a), and biennially thereafter, the President shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees an update of the 
assessment, including— 
(A) an update on the effectiveness of the National 
Cyber Strategy; 
(B) a summary of the lessons learned; and 
(C) a summary of any planned changes or recommenda-
tions to the effectiveness or implementation of the strategy. 
(2) SUNSET.—The requirement to submit the update under 
paragraph (1) shall terminate on December 31, 2025. 
(d) FORM.—The assessment required by subsection (a) and the 
update required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Homeland Security, 
the Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the Committee 
on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, and 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. 
SEC. 1260G. REPORT ON UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the head of each relevant Federal department and agency, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, an 
unclassified report, which may include a classified annex, on the 
national security risks posed by the United Front Work Department 
of the Chinese Communist Party and affiliated organizations in 
the United States and abroad that includes each of the following: 
(1) A description of the extent to which the activities of 
the United Front Work Department poses a threat to the 
national defense and national security of the United States. 
(2) An evaluation of how the United Front Work Depart-
ment’s overseas activities support the Chinese Communist 
Party’s strategy and goals abroad. 
(3) A description of known United Front Work Department 
political influence operations. 
(4) The strategy and capabilities of the United States 
Government to detect, deter, counter, and disrupt United Front 
Work Department influence operations and activities in the
H. R. 6395—578 
United States and other countries, consistent with the protec-
tion of the civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy of all Ameri-
cans; and 
(5) An evaluation of the actions the United States Govern-
ment should consider in response to the activities of the United 
Front Work Department in the United States and other coun-
tries. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 1260H. PUBLIC REPORTING OF CHINESE MILITARY COMPANIES 
OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) DETERMINATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall identify 
each entity the Secretary determines, based on the most recent 
information available, is operating directly or indirectly in the 
United States or any of its territories and possessions, that is 
a Chinese military company. 
(b) REPORTING AND PUBLICATION.— 
(1) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than April 15, 2021, and 
annually thereafter until December 31, 2030, the Secretary 
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives a list of each entity identified 
pursuant to subsection (a) to be a Chinese military company, 
in classified and unclassified forms, and shall include in such 
submission, as applicable, an explanation of any entities deleted 
from such list with respect to a prior list. 
(2) 
CONCURRENT
PUBLICATION.—Concurrent 
with 
the 
submission of each list described in paragraph (1), the Secretary 
shall publish the unclassified portion of such list in the Federal 
Register. 
(3) ONGOING REVISIONS.—The Secretary shall make addi-
tions or deletions to the most recent list submitted under para-
graph (1) on an ongoing basis based on the latest information 
available. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary may consult with the head 
of any appropriate Federal department or agency in making the 
determinations described in subsection (a) and shall transmit a 
copy of each list submitted under subsection (b)(1) to the heads 
of each appropriate Federal department and agency. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) CHINESE MILITARY COMPANY.—The term ‘‘Chinese mili-
tary company’’— 
(A) does not include natural persons; and 
(B) means an entity that is— 
(i)(I) directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or 
beneficially owned by, or in an official or unofficial 
capacity acting as an agent of or on behalf of, the 
People’s Liberation Army or any other organization
H. R. 6395—579 
subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the 
Chinese Communist Party; or 
(II) identified as a military-civil fusion contrib-
utor to the Chinese defense industrial base; and 
(ii) engaged in providing commercial services, 
manufacturing, producing, or exporting. 
(2) MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION CONTRIBUTOR.—The term ‘‘mili-
tary-civil fusion contributor’’ includes any of the following: 
(A) Entities knowingly receiving assistance from the 
Government of China or the Chinese Communist Party 
through science and technology efforts initiated under the 
Chinese military industrial planning apparatus. 
(B) Entities affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, including research 
partnerships and projects. 
(C) Entities receiving assistance, operational direction 
or policy guidance from the State Administration for 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. 
(D) Any entities or subsidiaries defined as a ‘‘defense 
enterprise’’ by the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(E) Entities residing in or affiliated with a military- 
civil fusion enterprise zone or receiving assistance from 
the Government of China through such enterprise zone. 
(F) Entities awarded with receipt of military production 
licenses by the Government of China, such as a Weapons 
and Equipment Research and Production Unit Classified 
Qualification Permit, Weapons and Equipment Research 
and Production Certificate, Weapons and Equipment 
Quality Management System Certificate, or Equipment 
Manufacturing Unit Qualification. 
(G) Entities that advertise on national, provincial, and 
non-governmental military equipment procurement plat-
forms in the People’s Republic of China. 
(H) Any other entities the Secretary determines is 
appropriate. 
(3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY.—The term ‘‘People’s Libera-
tion Army’’ means the land, naval, and air military services, 
the People’s Armed Police, the Strategic Support Force, the 
Rocket Force, and any other related security element within 
the Government of China or the Chinese Communist Party 
that the Secretary determines is appropriate. 
SEC. 1260I. REPORT ON DIRECTED USE OF FISHING FLEETS. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Commander of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees an unclassified report on the use of distant-water fishing 
fleets by foreign governments as extensions of such countries’ official 
maritime security forces, including the manner and extent to which 
such fishing fleets are leveraged in support of naval operations 
and foreign policy more generally. The report shall also consider 
the threats, on a country-by-country basis, posed by such use of 
distant-water fishing fleets to— 
(1) fishing or other vessels of the United States and partner 
countries;
H. R. 6395—580 
(2) United States and partner naval and coast guard oper-
ations; and 
(3) other interests of the United States and partner coun-
tries. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—For 
purposes of this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional 
committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. 
Subtitle G—Sudan Democratic Transition, 
Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency 
Act of 2020 
SEC. 1261. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Democratic Transition, 
Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020’’. 
SEC. 1262. DEFINITIONS. 
Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.—The term 
‘‘international financial institutions’’ means— 
(A) the International Monetary Fund; 
(B) the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development; 
(C) the International Development Association; 
(D) the International Finance Corporation; 
(E) the Inter-American Development Bank; 
(F) the Asian Development Bank; 
(G) the Inter-American Investment Corporation; 
(H) the African Development Bank; 
(I) the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment; 
(J) the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency; and 
(K) any multilateral financial institution, established 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, that could 
provide financial assistance to the Government of Sudan. 
(3) 
SOVEREIGNTY
COUNCIL.—The 
term 
‘‘Sovereignty 
Council’’ means the governing body of Sudan during the transi-
tional period that consists of— 
(A) 5 civilians selected by the Forces of Freedom and 
Change; 
(B) 5 members selected by the Transitional Military 
Council; and
H. R. 6395—581 
(C) 1 member selected by agreement between the 
Forces of Freedom and Change and the Transitional Mili-
tary Council. 
(4) SUDANESE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.—The 
term ‘‘Sudanese security and intelligence services’’ means— 
(A) the Sudan Armed Forces; 
(B) the Rapid Support Forces, 
(C) Sudan’s Popular Defense Forces and other para-
military units; 
(D) Sudan’s police forces; 
(E) the General Intelligence Service, previously known 
as the National Intelligence and Security Services; and 
(F) related entities, such as Sudan’s Military Industry 
Corporation. 
(5) TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.—The term ‘‘transitional period’’ 
means the 39-month period beginning on August 17, 2019 (the 
date of the signing of Sudan’s constitutional charter), during 
which— 
(A) the members of the Sovereignty Council described 
in paragraph (3)(B) select a chair of the Council for the 
first 21 months of the period; and 
(B) the members of the Sovereignty Council described 
in paragraph (3)(A) select a chair of the Council for the 
remaining 18 months of the period. 
SEC. 1263. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to support a civilian-led political transition in Sudan 
that results in a democratic government, which is accountable 
to its people, respects and promotes human rights, is at peace 
internally and with its neighbors, and can be a partner for 
regional stability; 
(2) to support the implementation of Sudan’s constitutional 
charter for the transitional period; and 
(3) to pursue a strategy of calibrated engagement with 
Sudan that includes— 
(A) facilitating an environment for free, fair, and cred-
ible democratic elections and a pluralistic and representa-
tive political system; 
(B) supporting reforms that improve transparency and 
accountability, remove restrictions on civil and political 
liberties, and strengthen the protection of human rights, 
including religious freedom; 
(C) 
strengthening 
civilian 
institutions, 
judicial 
independence, and the rule of law; 
(D) empowering civil society and independent media; 
(E) promoting national reconciliation and enabling a 
just, comprehensive, and sustainable peace; 
(F) promoting the role of women in government, the 
economy, and society, in recognition of the seminal role 
that women played in the social movement that ousted 
former president Omar al-Bashir; 
(G) promoting accountability for genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and sexual and gender-based 
violence; 
(H) encouraging the development of civilian oversight 
over and professionalization of the Sudanese security and
H. R. 6395—582 
intelligence services and strengthening accountability for 
human rights violations and abuses, corruption, or other 
abuses of power; 
(I) promoting economic reform, private sector engage-
ment, and inclusive economic development while combating 
corruption and illicit economic activity, including that 
which involves the Sudanese security and intelligence serv-
ices; 
(J) securing unfettered humanitarian access across all 
regions of Sudan; 
(K) 
supporting 
improved 
development 
outcomes, 
domestic resource mobilization, and catalyzing market- 
based solutions to improve access to health, education, 
water and sanitation, and livelihoods; and 
(L) promoting responsible international and regional 
engagement. 
SEC. 1264. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, RULE OF LAW, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the political transition in Sudan, following several months of pop-
ular protests against the regime of Omar al-Bashir, represents 
an opportunity for the United States to support democracy, good 
governance, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms 
in Sudan. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(other than the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and 
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), the President is author-
ized to provide assistance under part I and chapter 4 of part 
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. 
and 2346 et seq.)— 
(1) to provide for democracy and governance programs that 
strengthen and build the capacity of representative civilian 
government institutions, political parties, and civil society in 
Sudan; 
(2) to support the organization of free, fair, and credible 
elections in Sudan; 
(3) to provide technical support for legal and policy reforms 
that improve transparency and accountability and protect 
human rights, including religious freedom, and civil liberties 
in Sudan; 
(4) to support human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in Sudan, including the freedoms of— 
(A) religion or belief; 
(B) expression, including for members of the press; 
(C) assembly; and 
(D) association; 
(5) to support measures to improve and increase women’s 
participation in the political, economic, and social sectors of 
Sudan; and 
(6) to support other related democracy, good governance, 
rule of law, and fundamental freedom programs and activities. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I and chapter 
4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) for fiscal years 2021 and 2022,
H. R. 6395—583 
$20,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each such fiscal 
year to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1265. SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(other than the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and 
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), the President is author-
ized to provide assistance under part I and chapter 4 of part 
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. 
and 2346 et seq.) and under the Better Utilization of Investments 
Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) for 
programs in Sudan— 
(1) to increase agricultural and livestock productivity; 
(2) to promote economic growth, increase private sector 
productivity and advance market-based solutions to address 
development challenges; 
(3) to support women’s economic empowerment and eco-
nomic opportunities for youth and previously marginalized 
populations; 
(4) to improve equal access to quality basic education; 
(5) to support the capacity of universities to equip students 
to participate in a pluralistic and global society through virtual 
exchange and other programs; 
(6) to improve access to water, sanitation, and hygiene 
projects; 
(7) to build the capacity of national and subnational govern-
ment officials to support the transparent management of public 
resources, promote good governance through combating corrup-
tion and improving accountability, increase economic produc-
tivity, and increase domestic resource mobilization; and 
(8) to support other related economic assistance programs 
and activities. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I and chapter 
4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, 
$80,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each such fiscal 
year to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1266. SUPPORT FOR CONFLICT MITIGATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(other than the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and 
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), the President is author-
ized to provide assistance under part I and chapters 4, 5, and 
6 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151 et seq., 2346 et seq., and 2348 et seq.)— 
(1) to support long-term peace and stability in Sudan by 
promoting national reconciliation and enabling a just, com-
prehensive, and sustainable peace, especially in regions that 
have been underdeveloped or affected by war, such as the 
states of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and 
Kassala; 
(2) to support civil society and other organizations working 
to address conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution 
mechanisms and people-to-people reconciliation in Sudan, espe-
cially those addressing issues of marginalization and vulnerable 
groups, equal protection under the law, natural resource
H. R. 6395—584 
management, compensation and restoration of property, vol-
untary return, and sustainable solutions for displaced persons 
and refugees; 
(3) to strengthen civilian oversight of the Sudanese security 
and intelligence services and ensure that such services are 
not contributing to the perpetuation of conflict in Sudan and 
to the limitation of the civil liberties of all people in Sudan; 
(4) to assist in the human rights vetting and professional 
training of security force personnel due to be employed or 
deployed by the Sudanese security and intelligence services 
in regions that have been underdeveloped or affected by war, 
such as the states of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red 
Sea, and Kassala, including members of any security forces 
being established pursuant to a peace agreement relating to 
such regions; 
(5) to support provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment of 2005 and Abyei protocol, as appropriate, unless other-
wise superseded by a new agreement signed in good faith— 
(A) between stakeholders in this region and the 
Governments of Sudan and South Sudan to hold a free, 
fair, and credible referendum on the status of Abyei; and 
(B) between stakeholders in this region and the 
Government of Sudan to support popular consultations on 
the status of the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile; 
and 
(6) to support other related conflict mitigation programs 
and activities. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I and chapters 
4 and 6 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq., and 2348 et seq.) for fiscal 
years 2021 and 2022, $20,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated 
for each such fiscal year to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1267. SUPPORT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY, AND GENOCIDE IN SUDAN. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the Secretary of State should conduct robust diplomatic engagement 
to promote accountability and provide technical support to ensure 
that credible, transparent, and independent investigations of gross 
violations of human rights perpetrated by the Government of Sudan 
under former President Omar al-Bashir and the Transitional Mili-
tary Council since June 30, 1989. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
(other than the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and 
the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), the President is author-
ized to provide assistance under part I and chapter 4 of part 
II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. 
and 2346 et seq.)— 
(1) to build the capacity of civilian investigators within 
and outside of Sudan on how to document, investigate, develop 
findings of, identify, and locate those responsible for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide in Sudan; 
(2) to collect, document, and protect evidence of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide in Sudan and preserve 
the chain of custody for such evidence, including by providing
H. R. 6395—585 
support for Sudanese, foreign, and international nongovern-
mental organizations, and other entities engaged in such inves-
tigative activities; 
(3) to build Sudan’s judicial capacity to support prosecu-
tions in domestic courts and support investigations by hybrid 
or international courts as appropriate; 
(4) to protect witnesses who participate in court proceedings 
or other transitional justice mechanisms; and 
(5) to support other related conflict mitigation programs 
and activities. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I and chapter 
4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, 
$10,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for each such fiscal 
year to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1268. SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to suspend the 
provision of assistance authorized under section 1264, 1265, 1266, 
or 1267 to the Government of Sudan if the President determines 
that conditions in Sudan or the composition of the Government 
of Sudan changes such that it is no longer in the United States 
national interest to continue to provide such assistance. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after making a determina-
tion under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report that describes— 
(1) the political and security conditions in Sudan that led 
to such determination; and 
(2) any planned diplomatic engagement to restart the provi-
sion of such assistance. 
SEC. 1269. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE. 
(a) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress 
that— 
(1) Sudan’s economic challenges are a legacy of decades 
of kleptocracy, economic mismanagement, and war; 
(2) Sudan’s economic recovery will depend on— 
(A) combating corruption and illicit economic activity; 
(B) ending internal conflicts in the states of Darfur, 
South Kordofan, and Blue Nile; and 
(C) promoting inclusive economic growth and develop-
ment; and 
(3) the COVID–19 outbreak constitutes a grave danger 
to Sudan’s economic stability, public health, and food security 
and jeopardizes the transition to a civilian-led government that 
promotes the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people. 
(b) RESPONDING
TO
THE COVID–19 OUTBREAK.—During the 
transitional period, and notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the Secretary of the Treasury may instruct the United States 
Executive Director at each international financial institution to 
use the voice and vote of the United States to support loans or 
other utilization of the funds of the respective institution for Sudan 
for the purpose of addressing basic human needs, responding to 
the COVID–19 outbreak and its impact on the country’s economic 
stability, or promoting democracy, governance, or public financial 
management in Sudan.
H. R. 6395—586 
(c) DEBT RELIEF.—Upon the removal of Sudan from the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism List, and once the Sovereignty Council is 
chaired by a civilian leader, the Secretary of the Treasury and 
the Secretary of State should engage with international financial 
institutions and other bilateral official creditors to advance agree-
ment through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 
to restructure, reschedule, or cancel the sovereign debt of Sudan. 
(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 3 months after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently 
than once every 6 months thereafter during the transitional period, 
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, shall report to the appropriate congressional committees 
regarding the extent to which the transitional government of Sudan 
has taken demonstrable steps to strengthen governance and 
improve fiscal transparency, including— 
(1) establishing civilian control over the finances and assets 
of the Sudanese security and intelligence services; 
(2) developing a transparent budget that accounts for all 
expenditures related to the security and intelligence services; 
(3) identifying the shareholdings in all public and private 
companies not exclusively dedicated to the national defense 
held or managed by the security and intelligence services, and 
publicly disclosing, evaluating, and transferring all such 
shareholdings to the Ministry of Finance of the Government 
of Sudan or to any specialized entity of the Government of 
Sudan established under law for this purpose, which is ulti-
mately accountable to a civilian authority; 
(4) ceasing the involvement of the security and intelligence 
services officials, and their immediate family members, in the 
illicit trade in mineral resources, including petroleum and gold; 
(5) implementing a publicly transparent methodology for 
the Government of Sudan to recover, evaluate, hold, manage, 
or divest any state assets and the profits derived from the 
assets that may have been transferred to the National Congress 
Party, an affiliate of the National Congress Party, or an official 
of the National Congress Party in the individual capacity of 
such an official; 
(6) identifying and monitoring the nature and purpose of 
offshore financial resources controlled by the security and intel-
ligence services; and 
(7) strengthening banking regulation and supervision and 
addressing 
anti-money 
laundering 
and 
counter-terrorism 
financing deficiencies. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—Not-
withstanding section 1262, in this section, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(3) Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Represent-
atives; 
(4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(5) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives.
H. R. 6395—587 
SEC. 1270. COORDINATED SUPPORT TO RECOVER ASSETS STOLEN 
FROM THE SUDANESE PEOPLE. 
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall seek to advance 
the efforts of the Government of Sudan to recover assets stolen 
from the Sudanese people, including with regard to international 
efforts— 
(1) to identify and track assets taken from the people 
and institutions of Sudan through theft, corruption, money 
laundering, or other illicit means; and 
(2) with respect to assets identified pursuant to paragraph 
(1), to work with foreign governments and international 
organizations— 
(A) to share financial investigations intelligence, as 
appropriate; 
(B) to oversee and manage the assets identified pursu-
ant to paragraph (1); 
(C) to advance civil forfeiture litigation, as appropriate, 
including providing technical assistance to help govern-
ments establish the necessary legal framework to carry 
out asset forfeitures; and 
(D) to work with the Government of Sudan to ensure 
that a credible mechanism is established to ensure that 
any recovered assets are managed in a transparent and 
accountable fashion and ultimately used for the benefit 
of the Sudanese people, provided that— 
(i) returned assets are not used for partisan polit-
ical purposes; and 
(ii) there are robust financial management and 
oversight measures to safeguard repatriated assets. 
SEC. 1270A. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDANESE SECURITY 
AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not provide assistance 
(other than assistance authorized under section 1266) to the Suda-
nese security and intelligence services until the President submits 
to Congress a certification that the Government of Sudan has 
met the conditions described in subsection (c). 
(b) EXCEPTION; WAIVER.— 
(1) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of State may, as appropriate 
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, provide assist-
ance for the purpose of professionalizing the Sudanese security 
and intelligence services, through institutions such as the Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies and the United States Institute 
of Peace. 
(2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the limitation on 
the provision of assistance under subsection (a) if, not later 
than 30 days before the assistance is to be provided, the Presi-
dent submits to the appropriate congressional committees— 
(A) a list of the activities and participants to which 
such waiver would apply; 
(B) a justification that the waiver is in the national 
security interest of the United States; and 
(C) a certification that the participants have met the 
requirements of either section 620M of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) for programs funded 
through Department of State appropriations or section 362
H. R. 6395—588 
of title 10, United States Code, for programs funded 
through Department of Defense appropriations. 
(c) CONDITIONS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The conditions described in this sub-
section are that the Sudanese security and intelligence serv-
ices— 
(A) have demonstrated progress in undertaking secu-
rity sector reform, including reforms that professionalize 
such security and intelligence services, improve trans-
parency, and reforms to the laws governing the Sudanese 
security forces, such as of the National Security Act, 2010 
and the Armed Forces Act, 2007; 
(B) support efforts to respect human rights, including 
religious freedom, and hold accountable any members of 
such security and intelligence services responsible for 
human rights violations and abuses, including by taking 
demonstrable steps to cooperate with local or international 
mechanisms of accountability, to ensure that those respon-
sible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
committed in Sudan are brought to justice; 
(C) are under civilian oversight, subject to the rule 
of law, and are not undertaking actions to undermine a 
civilian-led transitional government or an elected civilian 
government; 
(D) have refrained from targeted attacks against reli-
gious or ethnic minority groups, have negotiated in good 
faith during the peace process and constructively partici-
pated in the implementation of any resulting peace agree-
ments, and do not impede inclusive political participation; 
(E) allow unfettered humanitarian access by United 
Nations 
organizations 
and 
specialized 
agencies 
and 
domestic and international humanitarian organizations to 
civilian populations in conflict-affected areas; 
(F) cooperate with the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees and organizations affiliated with the 
United Nations to allow for the protection of displaced 
persons and the safe, voluntary, sustainable, and dignified 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and 
(G) take constructive steps to investigate all reports 
of unlawful recruitment of children by Sudanese security 
forces and prosecute those found to be responsible. 
(2) FORM.—The certification described in subsection (a) con-
taining the conditions described in paragraph (1) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date that 
is the earlier of— 
(1) the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act; or 
(2) the date on which the President determines that a 
successful rotation of military to civilian leadership in the Sov-
ereignty Council has occurred. 
SEC. 1270B. REPORTS. 
(a) REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and annually thereafter for 2 years, the President shall submit 
a report to the appropriate congressional committees that—
H. R. 6395—589 
(1) summarizes reports of gross violations of human rights, 
including sexual and gender-based violence, committed against 
civilians in Sudan, including members of the Sudanese security 
and intelligence services or any associated militias, between 
December 2018 and the date of the submission of the report; 
(2) provides an update on any potential transitional justice 
mechanisms in Sudan to investigate, charge, and prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of gross violations of human rights in 
Sudan since June 30, 1989, including with respect to the June 
3, 2019 massacre in Khartoum; 
(3) provides an analysis of whether the gross violations 
of human rights summarized pursuant to paragraph (1) amount 
to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide; and 
(4) identifies specific cases since the beginning of the transi-
tional period in which members of the Sudanese security and 
intelligence services have been charged and prosecuted for 
actions that constitute gross violations of human rights per-
petrated since June 30, 1989. 
(b) REPORT ON CERTAIN ACTIVITIES AND FINANCES OF SENIOR 
OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 1 year there-
after, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that— 
(1) describes the actions and involvement of any previous 
or current senior officials of the Government of Sudan since 
the establishment of the transitional government in August 
2019 in— 
(A) directing, carrying out, or overseeing gross viola-
tions of human rights; 
(B) directing, carrying out, or overseeing the unlawful 
use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed 
forces in the context of conflicts in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, 
or other countries; 
(C) directing, carrying out, or colluding in significant 
acts of corruption; 
(D) directing, carrying out, or overseeing any efforts 
to circumvent the establishment of civilian control over 
the finances and assets of the Sudanese security and intel-
ligence services; or 
(E) facilitating, supporting, or financing terrorist 
activity in Sudan or other countries; 
(2) identifies Sudanese and foreign financial institutions, 
including offshore financial institutions, in which senior officials 
of the Government of Sudan whose actions are described in 
paragraph (1) hold significant assets, and provides an estimate 
of the value of such assets; 
(3) identifies any information United States Government 
agencies have obtained since August 2019 regarding persons, 
foreign governments, and Sudanese or foreign financial institu-
tions that knowingly facilitate, finance, or otherwise benefit 
from corruption or illicit economic activity in Sudan, including 
the export of mineral resources, and, in particular, if that 
trade is violating any United States restrictions that remain 
in place by legislation or Executive order; 
(4) identifies any information United States Government 
agencies have obtained since August 2019 regarding senior 
officials of the Government of Sudan who are personally
H. R. 6395—590 
involved in the illicit trade in mineral resources, including 
petroleum and gold; and 
(5) identifies any information United States Government 
agencies have obtained since August 2019 regarding individuals 
or foreign governments that have provided funds to individual 
members of the Sovereignty Council or the Cabinet outside 
of the Central Bank of Sudan or the Ministry of Finance. 
(c) REPORT
ON SANCTIONS PURSUANT
TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 
NO. 13400.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees that identifies the senior Sudanese 
government officials that President determines meet the criteria 
to be sanctionable pursuant to Executive Order No. 13400 (71 
Fed. Reg. 25483; relating to blocking property of persons in connec-
tion with the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region). 
(d) FORM.—The reports required under subsections (b) and 
(c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex. 
SEC. 1270C. UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR SUPPORT TO A CIVILIAN- 
LED GOVERNMENT IN SUDAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that 
includes— 
(1) a clear articulation of specific United States goals and 
objectives with respect to a successful completion of the transi-
tional period and a plan to achieve such goals and objectives; 
(2) a description of assistance and diplomatic engagement 
to support a civilian-led government in Sudan for the remainder 
of the transitional period, including any possible support for 
the organization of free, fair, and credible elections; 
(3) an assessment of the legal and policy reforms that 
have been and need to be taken by the government in Sudan 
during the transitional period in order to promote— 
(A) human rights; 
(B) freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and 
association; and 
(C) accountability for human rights abuses, including 
for sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by mem-
bers of the Sudanese security and intelligence services; 
(4) a description of efforts to address the legal and policy 
reforms mentioned in paragraph (3); 
(5) a description of humanitarian and development assist-
ance to Sudan and a plan for coordinating such assistance 
with international donors, regional partners, and local partners; 
(6) a description of monitoring and evaluation plans for 
all forms of assistance to be provided under the strategy in 
accordance with the monitoring and evaluation requirements 
of section 4 of the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability 
Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191), including a detailed descrip-
tion of all associated goals and benchmarks for measuring 
impact; and 
(7) an assessment of security sector reforms undertaken 
by the Government of Sudan, including efforts to demobilize
H. R. 6395—591 
or integrate militias and to foster civilian control of the armed 
services. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit a 
report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— 
(1) a detailed description of the efforts taken to implement 
this subtitle; and 
(2) recommendations for legislative or administrative meas-
ures to facilitate the implementation of this subtitle. 
SEC. 1270D. AMENDMENTS TO THE DARFUR PEACE AND ACCOUNT-
ABILITY ACT OF 2006. 
Section 8(c)(1) of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 
2006 (Public Law 109–344; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by 
striking ‘‘Southern Sudan,’’ and all that following through ‘‘Khar-
toum,’’ and inserting ‘‘Sudan’’. 
SEC. 1270E. REPEAL OF SUDAN PEACE ACT AND THE COMPREHENSIVE 
PEACE IN SUDAN ACT. 
(a) SUDAN PEACE ACT.—Effective January 1, 2020, the Sudan 
Peace Act (Public Law 107–245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed. 
(b) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT.—Effective January 
1, 2020, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public 
Law 108–497; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed. 
Subtitle H—United States Israel Security 
Assistance Authorization Act of 2020 
SEC. 1271. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘United States-Israel Security 
Assistance Authorization Act of 2020’’. 
SEC. 1272. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-ISRAEL RELA-
TIONSHIP. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the strong and enduring relationship between the 
United States and Israel is in the national security interests 
of both countries; 
(2) the United States should continue to provide assistance 
to the Government of Israel for the development and acquisition 
of the advanced capabilities that Israel requires to meet its 
security needs and to enhance United States capabilities; 
(3) such assistance is critical as Israel confronts a number 
of security challenges, including continuing threats from Iran; 
(4) the memorandum of understanding signed by the United 
States and Israel on September 14, 2016, including the provi-
sions of the memorandum relating to missile and rocket defense 
cooperation, continues to be a critical component of the bilateral 
relationship; and 
(5) science and technology innovations present promising 
new opportunities for future United States-Israel economic and 
security cooperation.
H. R. 6395—592 
SEC. 1273. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL. 
Section 513(c) of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (Public 
Law 106–280; 114 Stat. 856) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2002 and 2003’’ and 
inserting ‘‘2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, and 2028’’; 
and 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘equal to—’’ and all that 
follows and inserting ‘‘not less than $3,300,000,000.’’. 
SEC. 1274. EXTENSION OF WAR RESERVES STOCKPILE AUTHORITY. 
(a) DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2005.— 
Section 12001(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
2005 (Public Law 108–287; 118 Stat. 1011) is amended by striking 
‘‘September 30, 2020’’ and inserting ‘‘after September 30, 2025’’. 
(b) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961.—Section 514(b)(2)(A) 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A)) 
is amended by striking ‘‘2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 
and 2020’’ and inserting ‘‘2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025’’. 
SEC. 1275. RULES GOVERNING THE TRANSFER OF PRECISION-GUIDED 
MUNITIONS TO ISRAEL ABOVE THE ANNUAL RESTRIC-
TION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 514(b) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)), and subject to sub-
sections (b) and (c) of this section, the President, acting through 
the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the Secretary 
of State, is authorized to transfer to Israel precision-guided muni-
tions from reserve stocks, including the War Reserve Stockpile 
for Allies-Israel, consistent with— 
(1) all other requirements set forth in the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.); and 
(2) the requirements set forth in the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). 
(b) CONDITIONS.—Except in the case of an emergency, as deter-
mined by the President, a transfer under subsection (a) of this 
section may only occur if the transfer— 
(1) does not affect the ability of the United States to main-
tain a sufficient supply of precision-guided munitions to satisfy 
United States warfighting requirements; 
(2) does not harm the combat readiness of the United 
States; 
(3) does not affect the ability of the United States to meet 
its commitments to allies with respect to the transfer of preci-
sion-guided munitions; and 
(4) is in the national security interest of the United States. 
(c) CERTIFICATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except in the case of an emergency, as 
determined by the President, not later than 15 days before 
making a transfer under subsection (a) of this section, the 
Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary 
of State, shall certify to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees that the transfer meets the conditions specified in sub-
section (b) of this section. 
(2) EMERGENCIES.—In the case of an emergency, as deter-
mined by the President, not later than 5 days after making 
a transfer under subsection (a) of this section, the President 
shall—
H. R. 6395—593 
(A) certify to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the transfer supports the national security interests 
of the United States; and 
(B) provide to the appropriate committees of Congress 
an assessment of the impacts, risks, and mitigation meas-
ures with respect to the matters referred to in paragraphs 
(1) through (4) of subsection (b) of this section. 
(d) ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct 
an assessment with respect to the following matters: 
(A) The current quantity and type of precision-guided 
munitions in the stockpile pursuant to section 12001(d) 
of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005 
(Public Law 108–287; 118 Stat. 1011), as amended. 
(B) The quantity and type of precision-guided muni-
tions necessary for Israel to combat Hezbollah and hostile 
forces that threaten Israel. 
(C) The quantity and type of precision-guided muni-
tions necessary for Israel in the event of a sustained armed 
confrontation with other armed groups and terrorist 
organizations. 
(D) The current United States inventory of precision- 
guided munitions of the type specified in subparagraphs 
(A), (B), and (C) and ability of that inventory to meet 
requirements of current Operation Plans. 
(E) Department of Defense efforts to expand precision- 
guided munitions production and stockpiles to meet oper-
ational requirements. 
(F) Israel’s efforts to expand precision-guided muni-
tions production and stockpiles to meet operational require-
ments. 
(2) REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report on the results of the assessment required by 
paragraph (1), including a description of such results with 
respect to each matter described in that paragraph. 
(B) FORM.—The report required by subparagraph (A) 
shall be submitted in classified form. 
(e) TERMINATION.—The authority of the President to transfer 
precision-guided munitions under this section shall terminate on 
the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
SEC. 1276. ELIGIBILITY OF ISRAEL FOR THE STRATEGIC TRADE 
AUTHORIZATION EXCEPTION TO CERTAIN EXPORT CON-
TROL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS. 
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congres-
sional committees by describing the steps taken to include Israel 
in the list of countries eligible for the strategic trade authorization 
exception under section 740.20(c)(1) of title 15, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as required under section 6(b) of the United States- 
Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 (Public Law 113–296; 128 
Stat. 4076; 22 U.S.C. 8603 note).
H. R. 6395—594 
SEC. 1277. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING TO ENHANCE 
COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL. 
The Secretary of State, acting through the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International Development, may enter 
into memoranda of understanding with Israel to advance common 
goals on energy, agriculture, food security, democracy, human 
rights, governance, economic growth, trade, education, environment, 
global health, water, and sanitation, with a focus on strengthening 
mutual ties and cooperation with nations throughout the world. 
SEC. 1278. COOPERATIVE PROJECTS AMONG THE UNITED STATES, 
ISRAEL, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
Section 106 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2151d) is amended by striking subsections (e) and (f) and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(e) There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for fiscal 
years 2021 through 2023 to finance cooperative projects among 
the United States, Israel, and developing countries that identify 
and support local solutions to address sustainability challenges 
relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage, 
including— 
‘‘(1) establishing public-private partnerships; 
‘‘(2) supporting the identification, research, development 
testing, and scaling of innovations that focus on populations 
that are vulnerable to environmental and resource-scarcity 
crises, such as subsistence farming communities; 
‘‘(3) seed or transition-to-scale funding; 
‘‘(4) clear and appropriate branding and marking of United 
States funded assistance, in accordance with section 641; and 
‘‘(5) accelerating demonstrations or applications of local 
solutions to sustainability challenges, or the further refinement, 
testing, or implementation of innovations that have previously 
effectively addressed sustainability challenges.’’. 
SEC. 1279. JOINT COOPERATIVE PROGRAM RELATED TO INNOVATION 
AND HIGH-TECH FOR THE MIDDLE EAST REGION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States should help foster cooperation in 
the Middle East region by financing and, as appropriate, cooper-
ating in projects related to innovation and advanced tech-
nologies; and 
(2) projects referred to in paragraph (1) should— 
(A) contribute to development and the quality of life 
in the Middle East region through the application of 
research and advanced technology; and 
(B) contribute to Arab-Israeli cooperation by estab-
lishing strong working relationships that last beyond the 
life of such projects. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State, acting through 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, is authorized to seek to establish a program between 
the United States and appropriate regional partners to provide 
for cooperation in the Middle East region by supporting projects 
related to innovation and advanced technologies. 
(c) PROJECT REQUIREMENTS.—Each project carried out under 
the program established pursuant to subsection (b)—
H. R. 6395—595 
(1) shall include the participation of at least one entity 
from Israel and one entity from another regional partner; and 
(2) shall be conducted in a manner that appropriately pro-
tects sensitive information, intellectual property, the national 
security interests of the United States, and the national security 
interests of Israel. 
SEC. 1280. COOPERATION ON DIRECTED ENERGY CAPABILITIES. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than March 15, 2021, the Secretary 
of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
potential areas for directed energy cooperation. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A description of any science and technology effort or 
research, development, test, and evaluation effort associated 
with directed energy. 
(2) A description of activities or efforts recommended for 
potential defense cooperation activities associated with directed 
energy between the United States and Israel in support of 
development of military capabilities of mutual benefit. 
(3) A description of any obstacle or challenge associated 
with an effort described under paragraph (2) and recommenda-
tions to address such obstacle or challenge. 
(4) A description of any authority or authorization of appro-
priations required for the execution of efforts described under 
paragraph (2). 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex, 
as determined necessary by the Secretary of Defense. 
(d) PROGRAM AUTHORITY.—If recommended as a result of the 
report required by subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense, with 
the concurrence of the Secretary of State, may establish a program 
to carry out research, development, test, and evaluation activities, 
on a joint basis with Israel, to promote directed energy capabilities 
of mutual benefit to both the United States and Israel that address 
threats to the United States, deployed forces of the United States, 
and Israel. Any activities carried out under this subsection shall 
be conducted in a manner that appropriately protects sensitive 
information, intellectual property, the national security interests 
of the United States, and the national security interests of Israel. 
Any such program shall take into consideration the recommenda-
tions of the United States-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory 
Group. 
SEC. 1280A. OTHER MATTERS OF COOPERATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Activities authorized under this section shall 
be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and 
aligned with the National Security Strategy of the United States, 
the United States Government Global Health Security Strategy, 
the Department of State Integrated Country Strategies, the USAID 
Country Development Cooperation Strategies, and any equivalent 
or successor plans or strategies, as necessary and appropriate. 
(b) DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated 
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services $4,000,000 
for fiscal years 2021 through 2023 for a bilateral cooperative 
program with the Government of Israel that awards grants
H. R. 6395—596 
for the development of health technologies, which may include 
health technologies listed in paragraph (2), subject to paragraph 
(3), with an emphasis on collaboratively advancing the use 
of technology and personalized medicine in relation to COVID– 
19. 
(2) TYPES
OF
HEALTH
TECHNOLOGIES.—The health tech-
nologies described in this paragraph are technologies such as, 
drugs and vaccines, ventilators, diagnostic tests, and tech-
nologies to facilitate telemedicine. 
(3) RESTRICTIONS
ON
FUNDING.—Amounts appropriated 
pursuant to paragraph (1) are subject to a matching contribu-
tion from the Government of Israel. 
(4) OPTION
FOR
ESTABLISHING
NEW
PROGRAM.—Amounts 
appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) may be expended for 
a bilateral program with the Government of Israel that— 
(A) is in existence on the day before the date of the 
enactment of this Act for the purposes described in para-
graph (1); or 
(B) is established after the date of the enactment of 
this Act by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, in accordance 
with the Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the State of 
Israel on Cooperation in Science and Technology for Home-
land Security Matters, done at Jerusalem May 29, 2008 
(or a successor agreement), for the purposes described in 
paragraph (1). 
(5) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary shall require, as 
a condition of any grant awarded under this subsection, that 
all research publications and results of such research, including 
basic and applied research, shall be made publicly available 
on the website of the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices. 
(c) COORDINATOR
OF UNITED STATES–ISRAEL RESEARCH
AND 
DEVELOPMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President may designate the Assist-
ant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
national Environmental and Scientific Affairs, or another appro-
priate Department of State official, to act as Coordinator of 
United States-Israel Research and Development (referred to 
in this subsection as the ‘‘Coordinator’’). 
(2) AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES.—The Coordinator, in conjunc-
tion with the heads of relevant Federal Government depart-
ments and agencies and in coordination with the Israel Innova-
tion Authority, may oversee civilian science and technology 
programs on a joint basis with Israel. 
(d) OFFICE OF GLOBAL POLICY AND STRATEGY OF THE FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that the 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration should 
seek to explore collaboration with Israel through the Office 
of Global Policy and Strategy. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Commissioner, acting through 
the head of the Office of Global Policy and Strategy, shall 
submit a report describing the benefits to the United States
H. R. 6395—597 
and to Israel of opening an office in Israel for the Office of 
Global Policy and Strategy to— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions of the Senate; 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives. 
(e) UNITED STATES–ISRAEL ENERGY CENTER.—There is author-
ized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Energy $4,000,000 for 
fiscal year 2021 to carry out the activities of the United States- 
Israel Energy Center established pursuant to section 917(d) of 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 
17337(d)). 
(f) UNITED STATES–ISRAEL BINATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION.—It is the sense of Congress that 
grants to promote covered energy projects conducted by, or in 
conjunction with, the United States-Israel Binational Industrial 
Research and Development Foundation should be funded at not 
less than $2,000,000 annually under section 917(b) of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (42 U.S.C. 17337(b)). 
(g) UNITED STATES–ISRAEL COOPERATION ON ENERGY, WATER, 
HOMELAND SECURITY, AGRICULTURE, AND ALTERNATIVE FUEL TECH-
NOLOGIES.—Section 7 of the United States-Israel Strategic Partner-
ship Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8606) is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is authorized 
to be appropriated to carry out this section $2,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2021.’’. 
(h) ANNUAL POLICY DIALOGUE.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the Department of Transportation and Israel’s Ministry of 
Transportation should engage in an annual policy dialogue to imple-
ment the 2016 Memorandum of Cooperation signed by the Secretary 
of Transportation and the Israeli Minister of Transportation. 
(i) COOPERATION ON SPACE EXPLORATION AND SCIENCE INITIA-
TIVES.—The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration shall continue to work with the Israel Space Agency 
to identify and cooperatively pursue peaceful space exploration and 
science initiatives in areas of mutual interest, taking all appropriate 
measures to protect sensitive information, intellectual property, 
trade secrets, and economic interests of the United States. 
(j) RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION RELATING TO 
DESALINATION TECHNOLOGY.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy shall submit a report that describes 
research and development cooperation with international partners, 
such as the State of Israel, in the area of desalination technology 
in accordance with section 9(b)(3) of the Water Desalination Act 
of 1996 (42 U.S.C. 10301 note) to— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of 
the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(4) the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of 
Representatives.
H. R. 6395—598 
(k) RESEARCH AND TREATMENT OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DIS-
ORDER.—It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs should seek to explore collaboration between the Mental 
Illness Research, Education and Clinical Centers of Excellence and 
Israeli institutions with expertise in researching and treating 
posttraumatic stress disorder. 
SEC. 1280B. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. 
Subtitle I—Global Child Thrive Act of 2020 
SEC. 1281. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Global Child Thrive Act 
of 2020’’. 
SEC. 1282. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States Government should continue efforts 
to reduce child mortality rates and increase attention on 
prevention efforts and early childhood development outcomes; 
(2) investments in early childhood development ensure 
healthy and well-developed future generations that contribute 
to a country’s stability, security and economic prosperity; 
(3) efforts to provide training and education on nurturing 
care could result in improved early childhood development out-
comes and support healthy brain development; and 
(4) integration and cross-sector coordination of early child-
hood development programs is critical to ensure the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and continued implementation of such programs. 
SEC. 1283. ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE EARLY CHILDHOOD OUTCOMES 
GLOBALLY. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Amounts authorized to be 
appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out section 135 
in chapter 1 of part 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each of the fiscal years 2021 through 
2025 are authorized to be made available to support early childhood 
development activities in conjunction with relevant, existing 
programming, such as water, sanitation and hygiene, maternal 
and child health, basic education, nutrition and child protection. 
(b) ASSISTANCE
TO IMPROVE EARLY CHILDHOOD OUTCOMES 
GLOBALLY.—Chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 137. ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE EARLY CHILDHOOD OUTCOMES 
GLOBALLY. 
‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— 
‘‘(A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
H. R. 6395—599 
‘‘(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
‘‘(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives; and 
‘‘(D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives. 
‘‘(2) EARLY
CHILDHOOD
DEVELOPMENT.—The term ‘early 
childhood development’ means the development and learning 
of a child younger than 8 years of age, including physical, 
cognitive, social, and emotional development and approaches 
to learning that allow a child to reach his or her full develop-
mental potential. 
‘‘(3) EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.—The term 
‘early childhood development program’ means a program that 
seeks to ensure that every child has the conditions for healthy 
growth, nurturing family-based care, development and learning, 
and protection from violence, exploitation, abuse, and neglect, 
which may include— 
‘‘(A) a health, safe water, sanitation, and hygiene pro-
gram that serves pregnant women, children younger than 
5 years of age, and the parents of such children; 
‘‘(B) a nutrition program, combined with stimulating 
child development activity; 
‘‘(C) age appropriate cognitive stimulation, especially 
for newborns, infants, and toddlers, including an early 
childhood intervention program for children experiencing 
at-risk situations, developmental delays, disabilities, and 
behavioral and mental health conditions; 
‘‘(D) an early learning (36 months and younger), pre-
school, and basic education program for children until they 
reach 8 years of age or complete primary school; or 
‘‘(E) a child protection program, with an emphasis on 
the promotion of permanent, safe, and nurturing families, 
rather than placement in residential care or institutions, 
including for children with disabilities. 
‘‘(4) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The 
term ‘relevant Federal departments and agencies’ means— 
‘‘(A) the Department of State; 
‘‘(B) the United States Agency for International 
Development; 
‘‘(C) the Department of the Treasury; 
‘‘(D) the Department of Labor; 
‘‘(E) the Department of Education; 
‘‘(F) the Department of Agriculture; 
‘‘(G) the Department of Defense; 
‘‘(H) the Department of Health and Human Services, 
including— 
‘‘(i) the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion; and 
‘‘(ii) the National Institutes of Health; 
‘‘(I) the Millennium Challenge Corporation; 
‘‘(J) the Peace Corps; and 
‘‘(K) any other department or agency specified by the 
President for the purposes of this section. 
‘‘(5) RESIDENTIAL CARE.—The term ‘residential care’ means 
care provided in any non-family-based group setting, including 
orphanages, transit or interim care centers, children’s homes, 
children’s villages or cottage complexes, group homes, and
H. R. 6395—600 
boarding schools used primarily for care purposes as an alter-
native to a children’s home. 
‘‘(b) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
‘‘(1) to support early childhood development in relevant 
foreign assistance programs, including by integrating evidence- 
based, efficient, and effective interventions into relevant strate-
gies and programs, in coordination with partner countries, other 
donors, international organizations, international financial 
institutions, local and international nongovernmental organiza-
tions, private sector partners, and civil society, including faith- 
based and community-based organizations; and 
‘‘(2) to encourage partner countries to lead early childhood 
development initiatives that include incentives for building local 
capacity for continued implementation and measurable results, 
by— 
‘‘(A) scaling up the most effective, evidence-based, 
national interventions, including for the most vulnerable 
populations and children with disabilities and develop-
mental delays, with a focus on adaptation to country 
resources, cultures, and languages; 
‘‘(B) designing, implementing, monitoring, and evalu-
ating programs in a manner that enhances their quality, 
transparency, 
equity, 
accountability, 
efficiency 
and 
effectiveness in improving child and family outcomes in 
partner countries; and 
‘‘(C) utilizing and expanding innovative public-private 
financing mechanisms. 
‘‘(c) IMPLEMENTATION.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this section, the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development on behalf of the 
President and in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall 
direct relevant Federal departments and agencies— 
‘‘(A) to incorporate, to the extent practical and relevant, 
early childhood development into foreign assistance pro-
grams to be carried out during the following 5 fiscal years; 
and 
‘‘(B) to promote inclusive early childhood development 
in partner countries. 
‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
Administrator, the Secretary, and the heads of other relevant 
Federal departments and agencies as appropriate shall— 
‘‘(A) build on the evidence and priorities outlined in 
‘Advancing Protection and Care for Children in Adversity: 
A U.S. Government Strategy for International Assistance 
2019–2023’, published in June 2019 (referred to in this 
section as ‘APCCA’); 
‘‘(B) to the extent practicable, identify evidence-based 
strategic priorities, indicators, outcomes, and targets, 
particularly emphasizing the most vulnerable populations 
and children with disabilities and developmental delays, 
to support inclusive early childhood development; 
‘‘(C) support the design, implementation, and evalua-
tion of pilot projects in partner countries, with the goal 
of taking such projects to scale;
H. R. 6395—601 
‘‘(D) support inclusive early childhood development 
within all relevant sector strategies and public laws, 
including— 
‘‘(i) the Global Water Strategy required under sec-
tion 136(j); 
‘‘(ii) the whole-of-government strategy required 
under section 5 of the Global Food Security Act of 
2016 (22 U.S.C. 9304 note); 
‘‘(iii) the Basic Education Strategy set forth in 
section 105(c); 
‘‘(iv) the U.S. Government Global Nutrition 
Coordination Plan, 2016–2021; and 
‘‘(v) APCCA; and others as appropriate; 
‘‘(E) improve coordination with foreign governments 
and international and regional organizations with respect 
to official country policies and plans to improve early child-
hood development, maternal, newborn, and child health 
and nutrition care, basic education, water, sanitation and 
hygiene, and child protection plans which promote nur-
turing, appropriate, protective, and permanent family care, 
while reducing the percentage of children living outside 
of family care, including in residential care or on the street; 
and 
‘‘(F) consult with partner countries, other donors, inter-
national organizations, international financial institutions, 
local and international nongovernmental organizations, pri-
vate sector partners and faith-based and community-based 
organizations, as appropriate. 
‘‘(d) ANNUAL
REPORT
ON
THE
IMPLEMENTATION
OF
THE 
STRATEGY.—The Special Advisor for Children in Adversity shall 
include, in the annual report required under section 5 of the Assist-
ance for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in Developing 
Countries Act of 2005 (22 U.S.C. 2152g), which shall be submitted 
to the appropriate congressional committees and made publicly 
available, a description of— 
‘‘(1) the progress made toward integrating early childhood 
development interventions into relevant strategies and pro-
grams; 
‘‘(2) the efforts made by relevant Federal departments and 
agencies to implement subsection (c), with a particular focus 
on the activities described in such subsection; and 
‘‘(3) the progress achieved during the reporting period 
toward meeting the goals, objectives, benchmarks, and time-
frames described in subsection (c) at the program level, along 
with specific challenges or gaps that may require shifts in 
targeting or financing in the following fiscal year. 
‘‘(e) INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.—The Special Advisor for Assist-
ance to Orphans and Vulnerable Children should establish and 
regularly convene an Interagency Working Group on Children in 
Adversity which, among other things, will coordinate— 
‘‘(1) intergovernmental and interagency monitoring, evalua-
tion, and reporting of the activities carried out pursuant to 
this section; 
‘‘(2) early childhood development initiatives that include 
children with a variety of needs and circumstances; and
H. R. 6395—602 
‘‘(3) United States Government early childhood develop-
ment programs, strategies, and partnerships across relevant 
Federal departments and agencies.’’. 
SEC. 1284. SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR ASSISTANCE TO ORPHANS AND 
VULNERABLE CHILDREN. 
Section 135(e)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2152f(e)(2)) is amended— 
(1) by amending subparagraph (A) to read as follows: 
‘‘(A) Coordinate assistance to orphans and other vulner-
able children among the relevant Federal agencies and 
officials.’’; and 
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘the various offices, 
bureaus, and field missions within the United States Agency 
for International Development’’ and inserting ‘‘the relevant Fed-
eral branch agencies and officials’’. 
SEC. 1285. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 
Nothing in the amendments made by this subtitle may be 
construed to restrict or abrogate any other authorization for United 
States Agency for International Development activities or programs. 
Subtitle J—Matters Relating to Africa and 
the Middle East 
SEC. 1291. BRIEFING AND REPORT RELATING TO REDUCTION IN THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
DEPLOYED TO UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND AREA 
OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
(a) BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Department of Defense reduces 
the number of covered United States Armed Forces in fiscal 
year 2021 to a number that is below 80 percent of the number 
deployed as of the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense shall, not later than 30 days after the 
date of such a reduction, provide a briefing to the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under paragraph (1) 
shall include, at a minimum, the following: 
(A) A description of the process and associated analysis 
that led to the decision to reduce the number of covered 
United States Armed Forces. 
(B) A description of the anticipated impact of such 
a reduction on the ability of the Department of Defense 
to achieve its strategic objectives in the AFRICOM AOR, 
including— 
(i) degrading violent extremist organizations; 
(ii) countering the military influence of China and 
Russia; 
(iii) countering transnational threats; 
(iv) maintaining strategic access; 
(v) preparing for and responding to crises; and 
(vi) strengthening security relationships with 
United States allies and partners.
H. R. 6395—603 
(C) An assessment of the impact of such a reduction 
on the ability of the Department of Defense to execute 
the National Defense Strategy. 
(D) A description of any consultation with the Depart-
ment of State or the United States Agency for International 
Development with respect to such a reduction and the 
potential impact that such a reduction would have on diplo-
matic, developmental, or humanitarian efforts in Africa. 
(E) A description of any consultation with United 
States allies and partners with respect to such a reduction. 
(F) Any other matters determined to be relevant by 
the Secretary of Defense. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of a reduction in the number of covered United States Armed 
Forces described in subsection (a)(1), the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives a report that includes the following: 
(A) The average number of covered United States 
Armed Forces by month for each of the fiscal years 2019 
and 2020. 
(B) The anticipated number of covered United States 
Armed Forces in 2021. 
(C) An assessment of the threat posed by violent 
extremist organizations in the AFRICOM AOR and a 
detailed description of the Department of Defense’s plan 
to degrade such organizations. 
(D) A detailed description of the Department of 
Defense’s plan to counter the military influence of China 
and Russia in the AFRICOM AOR. 
(E) A detailed assessment of the anticipated effect 
that such a reduction would have on military and intel-
ligence efforts in the AFRICOM AOR. 
(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified 
annex. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) AFRICOM AOR.—The term ‘‘AFRICOM AOR’’ means 
the United States Africa Command area of responsibility. 
(2) COVERED
UNITED
STATES
ARMED
FORCES.—The term 
‘‘covered United States Armed Forces’’— 
(A) means United States Armed Forces that are 
deployed to the AFRICOM AOR and under the command 
authority and operational control of the Commander of 
United States Africa Command; but 
(B) does not include— 
(i) forces deployed in conjunction with other Com-
mands; 
(ii) forces participating in joint exercises; 
(iii) forces used to assist in emergency situations; 
and 
(iv) forces designated or assigned for diplomatic 
or embassy security.
H. R. 6395—604 
SEC. 1292. NOTIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO WITHDRAWAL OF MEM-
BERS OF THE ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATING IN THE 
MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS IN EGYPT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days before a reduction 
in the total number of members of the Armed Forces assigned 
to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers in Egypt 
to fewer than 430 such members of the Armed Forces, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
a notification that includes the following: 
(1) A detailed accounting of the number of members of 
the Armed Forces to be withdrawn from the Multinational 
Force and Observers in Egypt and the capabilities that such 
members of the Armed Forces provide in support of the mission. 
(2) An explanation of national security interests of the 
United States served by such a reduction and an assessment 
of the effect, if any, such a reduction is expected to have 
on the security of United States partners in the region. 
(3) A description of consultations by the Secretary with 
the other countries that contribute military forces to the Multi-
national Force and Observers, including Australia, Canada, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Fiji, France, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay, with 
respect to the planned force reduction and the results of such 
consultations. 
(4) An assessment of whether other countries, including 
the countries that contribute military forces to the Multi-
national Force and Observers, will increase their contributions 
of military forces to compensate for the capabilities withdrawn 
by the United States. 
(5) An explanation of— 
(A) any anticipated negative impact of such a reduction 
on the ability of the Multinational Force and Observers 
in Egypt to fulfill its mission of supervising the 
implementation of the security provisions of the 1979 
Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel and employing 
best efforts to prevent any violation of the terms of such 
treaty; and 
(B) the manner in which any such negative impact 
will be mitigated. 
(6) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate. 
(b) FORM.—The notification required by subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 
1293. 
REPORT 
ON 
ENHANCING 
SECURITY 
PARTNERSHIPS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICAN COUN-
TRIES. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the
H. R. 6395—605 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities 
and resources required to enhance security partnerships 
between the United States and African countries. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) 
shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the Department of Defense’s 
approach to conducting security cooperation activities in 
Africa, including how it identifies and prioritizes its secu-
rity partnerships in Africa. 
(B) A description of how the Department’s security 
cooperation activities benefit other Federal departments 
and agencies that are operating in Africa. 
(C) Recommendations to improve the ability of the 
Department to achieve sustainable security benefits from 
its security cooperation activities in Africa, which may 
include— 
(i) the establishment of contingency locations; 
(ii) small-scale construction conducted in accord-
ance with existing law; and 
(iii) the acquisition of additional training and 
equipment by African partners to improve their 
organizational, operational, mobility, and sustainment 
capabilities. 
(D) Recommendations to expand and strengthen 
partner capability to conduct security activities, including 
traditional activities of the combatant commands, train 
and equip opportunities, State partnerships with the 
National Guard, and through multilateral activities. 
(E) A description of how the following factors may 
impact the ability of the Department to strengthen security 
partnerships in Africa: 
(i) The economic development and stability of Afri-
can countries. 
(ii) The military, intelligence, diplomatic, develop-
mental, and humanitarian efforts of China and Russia 
on the African continent. 
(iii) The ability of the United States, allies, and 
partners to combat violent extremist organizations 
operating in Africa. 
(F) Any other matters the Secretary determines to 
be relevant. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) may 
be submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassified 
summary. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 1294. PLAN TO ADDRESS GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND CIVILIAN HARM IN BURKINA FASO, CHAD, MALI, AND 
NIGER. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
H. R. 6395—606 
with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a plan to engage with the Governments 
of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger to prevent civilian harm 
and address allegations of gross violations of human rights by 
the security forces of these countries and non-state armed groups, 
and ensure accountability for such violations. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) A description of planned public and private diplomatic 
engagement to support efforts by the Governments of Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger to investigate, prosecute, and 
sentence any individual or group against which there are cred-
ible allegations of gross violations of human rights, including 
by state security forces and non-state armed groups, and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of such engagement. 
(2) An identification of United States assistance and pro-
grams to address gross violations of human rights and civilian 
harm, improve civil-military relations, and strengthen account-
ability of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger through their 
military justice systems, including support for building the 
capacity of provost marshals. 
(3) A description of how such United States assistance 
and programs have been used to address gross violations of 
human rights, civilian harm, and civil-military relations, and 
an assessment of how they can be strengthened to prevent 
and mitigate civilian harm. 
(4) A description of plans to coordinate United States efforts 
with France, the European Union, the United Nations Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union, and the 
G5 Sahel Joint Force to decrease gross violations of human 
rights and minimize civilian harm during military operations 
in the Sahel. 
(5) A description of efforts undertaken by the Governments 
of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger to prevent and decrease 
instances of gross violations of human rights or civilian harm 
perpetrated by state security forces or non-state armed groups 
that have received material support from or conducted joint 
counterterrorism operations with these security forces, and an 
assessment of the effectiveness of these efforts. 
(6) A description of any confirmed incidents or reports 
of civilian harm that may have occurred during United States 
military advise, assist, or accompany operations during the 
preceding calendar year. 
(7) Any other matters that the Secretary considers to be 
relevant. 
(c) FORM.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; 
and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate.
H. R. 6395—607 
(2) CIVILIAN HARM.—The term ‘‘civilian harm’’ means con-
flict-related death, physical injury, loss of property or livelihood, 
or interruption of access to essential services. 
SEC. 1295. STATEMENT OF POLICY AND REPORT RELATING TO THE 
CONFLICT IN YEMEN. 
(a) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
(1) to protect United States citizens and strategic interests 
in the Middle East region; 
(2) to support United Nations-led efforts to end violence 
in Yemen and secure a comprehensive political settlement to 
the conflict in Yemen that results in protection of civilians 
and civilian infrastructure and alleviates the humanitarian 
crisis including by facilitating unfettered access for all Yemenis 
to food, fuel, and medicine; 
(3) to encourage all parties to the conflict in Yemen to 
participate in good faith in the United Nations-led process 
and to uphold interim agreements as part of that process to 
end the conflict, leading to reconstruction in Yemen; 
(4) to support United States allies and partners in 
defending their borders and territories in order to maintain 
stability and security in the Middle East region and encourage 
burden sharing among such allies and partners; 
(5) to assist United States allies and partners in countering 
destabilization of the Middle East region; 
(6) to oppose Iranian arms transfers in violation of United 
Nations Security Council resolutions, including transfers to 
the Houthis; 
(7) to encourage the Government of Saudi Arabia and the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates to assist significantly 
in the economic stabilization and eventual reconstruction of 
Yemen; and 
(8) to encourage all parties to the conflict to comply with 
the law of armed conflict, including to investigate credible 
allegations of war crimes and provide redress to civilian victims. 
(b) REPORT ON CONFLICT IN YEMEN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on United States policy in Yemen. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A detailed description of diplomatic actions taken 
by the United States Government to help ease human 
suffering in Yemen, including— 
(i) United States direct humanitarian assistance 
and United States donations to multilateral humani-
tarian assistance efforts, including to address the 
COVID–19 pandemic; 
(ii) efforts to ensure that humanitarian assistance 
is delivered in line with internationally recognized 
humanitarian principles, and the results of such 
efforts; 
(iii) efforts to facilitate humanitarian and commer-
cial cargo shipments into Yemen and minimize delays
H. R. 6395—608 
associated with such shipments, including access to 
ports for humanitarian and commercial cargo, and the 
results of such efforts; 
(iv) efforts to work with parties to the conflict 
in Yemen to ensure protection of civilians and civilian 
infrastructure, and the results of such efforts; 
(v) efforts to help the Government of Yemen to 
create a mechanism to ensure that salaries and pen-
sions are paid to civil servants as appropriate, and 
the results of such efforts; and 
(vi) efforts to work with the Government of Yemen 
and countries that are members of the Saudi-led coali-
tion in Yemen to address the currency crisis in Yemen 
and the solvency of the Central Bank of Yemen, and 
the results of such efforts. 
(B) An assessment of plans, commitments, and pledges 
for reconstruction of Yemen made by countries that are 
members of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, including 
an assessment of proposed coordination with the Govern-
ment of Yemen and international organizations. 
(C) A description of civilian harm occurring in the 
context of the conflict in Yemen since November 2017, 
including mass casualty incidents and damage to, or 
destruction of, civilian infrastructure and services. 
(D) An estimated total number of civilian casualties 
in the context of the conflict in Yemen since September 
2014, disaggregated by year. 
(E) A detailed description of actions taken by the 
United States Government to support the efforts of the 
United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen to reach a lasting 
political solution in Yemen. 
(F) A detailed assessment of whether and to what 
extent members of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen have 
used United States-origin defense articles and defense serv-
ices in Yemen in contravention of the laws of armed conflict 
when engaging in any military operations against the 
Houthis in Yemen. 
(G) A description of external and cross border attacks 
perpetrated by the Houthis. 
(H) A detailed assessment of the Government of 
Yemen’s willingness and capacity to effectively— 
(i) provide public services to the people of Yemen; 
(ii) service the external debts of Yemen; and 
(iii) facilitate or ensure access to humanitarian 
assistance and key commodities in Yemen. 
(I) A description of support for the Houthis by Iran 
and Iran-backed groups, including the provision of weapons 
and training. 
(J) A description of recruitment and use of child sol-
diers by parties to the conflict in Yemen. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form without any designation relating 
to dissemination control, but may contain a classified annex. 
(4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.— 
In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees;
H. R. 6395—609 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 1296. REPORT ON UNITED STATES MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE 
SAUDI-LED COALITION IN YEMEN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
that includes the following: 
(1) A description of all military support, training, and 
defense articles and services provided by the Department of 
Defense to Saudi Arabia, the Government of the United Arab 
Emirates, and other countries participating in the Saudi-led 
coalition since March 2015, including— 
(A) an annual description, by fiscal year or calendar 
year, of all transfers of logistics support, supplies, defense 
articles, and services under sections 2341 and 2342 of 
title 10, United States Code, or any other applicable law; 
(B) a description of the total financial value of such 
transfers and which countries bore the cost described in 
subparagraph (A) of these transfers, including the status 
of any required reimbursement of costs from Saudi Arabia, 
the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the 
Saudi-led coalition to the Department of Defense; and 
(C) a description of the types of training, advice, and 
assistance provided by the Department of Defense, 
including the authorities under which this training was 
provided, and an assessment of the extent to which such 
training has included— 
(i) tactics, techniques, or procedures that could 
be used to restrict the movement of commercial and 
humanitarian shipments or the movement of persons 
into or out of Yemen; 
(ii) tactics, techniques, and procedures to reduce 
civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastruc-
ture; and 
(iii) an emphasis on human rights and the laws 
of armed conflict. 
(2) A description and evaluation of processes used by the 
Department of Defense to determine whether the types of mili-
tary support described in paragraph (1) have— 
(A) affected the movement of persons into or out of 
Yemen, the restriction of the movement of commercial and 
humanitarian shipments into and out of Yemen, or the 
illicit profit from such importation by any of the warring 
parties in the conflict in Yemen; 
(B) contributed to or reduced civilian casualties and 
damage to civilian infrastructure in Yemen; and 
(C) contributed to or reduced violations of the laws 
of armed conflict in Yemen, including any credibly alleged 
violations of torture, arbitrary detention, and other gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights by 
countries that are members of the Saudi-led coalition in 
Yemen and the Republic of Yemen Government.
H. R. 6395—610 
(3) The responsiveness and completeness of any certifi-
cations submitted pursuant to section 1290 of the John S. 
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019 (Public Law 115–232; 132 Stat. 2081), as of the date 
of the submission of the report required by this section. 
(4) The responsiveness and completeness of any reports 
submitted pursuant to section 1274 of the John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public 
Law 115–232; 132 Stat. 2067), as of such date of submission. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Financial 
Services of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1297. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PAYMENT OF AMOUNTS OWED 
BY KUWAIT TO UNITED STATES MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) at least 45 medical institutions in the United States 
have provided medical services to citizens of Kuwait; and 
(2) despite providing care for their citizens, Kuwait has 
not paid amounts owed to such United States medical institu-
tions for such services in over 2 years. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Kuwait is an important partner of the United States 
in the Middle East and both countries should find ways to 
address irritants in the bilateral relationship; 
(2) the United States should seek a resolution with Kuwait 
regarding the outstanding amounts Kuwait owes to United 
States medical institutions for medical services provided to 
citizens of Kuwait, especially during the COVID–19 pandemic; 
and 
(3) Kuwait should immediately pay such outstanding 
amounts owed to such United States medical institutions. 
Subtitle K—Other Matters 
SEC. 1299A. PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES AT KWAJALEIN 
ATOLL, REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 767 of title 10, United States Code, 
is amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘§ 7596. Provision of goods and services at Kwajalein Atoll 
‘‘(a) AUTHORITY.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
Secretary of the Army, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 
State, may provide goods and services, including interatoll transpor-
tation, to the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
and other eligible patrons, as determined by the Secretary of the 
Army, at Kwajalein Atoll. 
‘‘(2) The Secretary of the Army may not provide goods or 
services under this section if doing so would be inconsistent, as
H. R. 6395—611 
determined by the Secretary of State, with the Compact of Free 
Association between the Government of the United States and 
the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands or any 
subsidiary agreement or implementing arrangement. 
‘‘(b) REIMBURSEMENT.—(1) The Secretary of the Army may col-
lect reimbursement from the Government of the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and eligible patrons for the provision of goods 
or services under subsection (a). 
‘‘(2) The amount collected for goods or services under this 
subsection may not be greater than the total amount of actual 
costs to the United States for providing the goods or services. 
‘‘(c) NECESSARY
EXPENSES.—Amounts appropriated to the 
Department of the Army may be used for necessary expenses associ-
ated with providing goods and services under this section. 
‘‘(d) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of the Army shall issue regu-
lations to carry out this section.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the begin-
ning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following 
new item: 
‘‘7596. Provision of goods and services at Kwajalein Atoll.’’. 
(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Secretary 
of the Army shall provide to the congressional defense committees 
a briefing on the use of the authority under section 7596(a) of 
title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a), in fiscal 
year 2021, including a written summary describing the goods and 
services provided on a reimbursable basis and the goods and serv-
ices provided on a nonreimbursable basis. 
SEC. 1299B. REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM DES-
IGNATED COUNTRIES. 
Section 2350j of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(f) REPORT ON CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED FROM DESIGNATED 
COUNTRIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 15 each year, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the burden sharing con-
tributions received under this section from designated coun-
tries. 
‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by paragraph (1) 
shall include the following for the preceding fiscal year: 
‘‘(A) A list of all designated countries from which bur-
den sharing contributions were received. 
‘‘(B) An explanation of the purpose for which each 
such burden sharing contribution was provided. 
‘‘(C) A description of any written agreement entered 
into with a designated country under this section, including 
the date on which the agreement was signed. 
‘‘(D) For each designated country— 
‘‘(i) the amount provided by the designated 
country; and 
‘‘(ii) the amount of any remaining unobligated bal-
ance. 
‘‘(E) The amount of such burden sharing contributions 
expended, by eligible category, including compensation for 
local national employees, military construction projects, and 
supplies and services of the Department of Defense.
H. R. 6395—612 
‘‘(F) Any other matter the Secretary of Defense con-
siders relevant. 
‘‘(3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In 
this subsection, the term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ 
means— 
‘‘(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate; and 
‘‘(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives.’’. 
SEC. 1299C. MODIFICATION TO INITIATIVE TO SUPPORT PROTECTION 
OF 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
ACADEMIC 
RESEARCHERS 
FROM 
UNDUE 
INFLUENCE 
AND 
OTHER 
SECURITY 
THREATS. 
Section 1286 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (10 U.S.C. 2358 note; Public 
Law 115–232) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 1286. INITIATIVE TO SUPPORT PROTECTION OF NATIONAL SECU-
RITY ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS FROM UNDUE INFLU-
ENCE AND OTHER SECURITY THREATS. 
‘‘(a) INITIATIVE REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
consultation with other appropriate government organizations, 
establish an initiative to work with institutions of higher education 
who perform defense research and engineering activities— 
‘‘(1) to support protection of intellectual property, controlled 
information, key personnel, and information about critical tech-
nologies relevant to national security; 
‘‘(2) to limit undue influence, including through foreign 
talent programs, by countries to exploit United States tech-
nology within the Department of Defense research, science 
and technology, and innovation enterprise; and 
‘‘(3) to support efforts toward development of domestic 
talent in relevant scientific and engineering fields. 
‘‘(b) INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS.—The initiative required 
by subsection (a) shall be developed and executed to the maximum 
extent practicable with academic research institutions and other 
educational and research organizations. 
‘‘(c) REQUIREMENTS.—The initiative required by subsection (a) 
shall include development of the following: 
‘‘(1) Information exchange forum and information reposi-
tories to enable awareness of security threats and influence 
operations being executed against the United States research, 
technology, and innovation enterprise. 
‘‘(2) Training developed and delivered in consultation with 
institutions of higher education and appropriate Government 
agencies, and other support to institutions of higher education, 
to promote security and limit undue influence on institutions 
of higher education and personnel, including Department of 
Defense financial support to carry out such activities, that— 
‘‘(A) emphasizes best practices for protection of sen-
sitive national security information; 
‘‘(B) includes the dissemination of unclassified mate-
rials and resources for identifying and protecting against 
emerging threats to institutions of higher education, 
including specific counterintelligence information and
H. R. 6395—613 
advice developed specifically for faculty and academic 
researchers based on actual identified threats; and 
‘‘(C) includes requirements for appropriate senior offi-
cials of institutions of higher education to receive from 
appropriate Government agencies updated and periodic 
briefings that describe the espionage risks to academic 
institutions and associated personnel posed by technical 
intelligence gathering activities of near-peer strategic 
competitors. 
‘‘(3) The capacity of Government agencies and institutions 
of higher education to assess whether individuals affiliated 
with Department of Defense programs have participated in 
or are currently participating in foreign talent programs or 
expert recruitment programs. 
‘‘(4) Opportunities to collaborate with defense researchers 
and research organizations in secure facilities to promote 
protection of critical information and strengthen defense against 
foreign intelligence services. 
‘‘(5) Regulations and procedures— 
‘‘(A) for Government agencies and academic organiza-
tions and personnel to support the goals of the initiative; 
and 
‘‘(B) that are consistent with policies that protect open 
and scientific exchange in fundamental research. 
‘‘(6) Policies to limit or prohibit funding provided by the 
Department of Defense for institutions or individual researchers 
who knowingly violate regulations developed under the initia-
tive, including regulations relating to foreign talent programs. 
‘‘(7) Initiatives to support the transition of the results of 
institution of higher education research programs into defense 
capabilities. 
‘‘(8)(A) A list of academic institutions of the People’s 
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and other countries 
that— 
‘‘(i) have a history of improper technology transfer, 
intellectual property theft, or cyber or human espionage; 
‘‘(ii) operate under the direction of the military forces 
or intelligence agency of the applicable country; 
‘‘(iii) are known— 
‘‘(I) to recruit foreign individuals for the purpose 
of transferring knowledge to advance military or intel-
ligence efforts; or 
‘‘(II) to provide misleading information or other-
wise attempt to conceal the connections of an individual 
or institution to a defense or an intelligence agency 
of the applicable country; or 
‘‘(iv) pose a serious risk of improper technology transfer 
of data, technology, or research that is not published or 
publicly available. 
‘‘(B) The list described in subparagraph (A) shall be devel-
oped and continuously updated in consultation with the Bureau 
of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce, the 
Director of National Intelligence, United States institutions 
of higher education that conduct significant Department of 
Defense research or engineering activities, and other appro-
priate individuals and organizations.
H. R. 6395—614 
‘‘(9)(A) A list, developed and continuously updated in con-
sultation with the National Academies of Science, Engineering, 
and Medicine and the appropriate Government agencies, of 
foreign talent programs that pose a threat to the national 
security interests of the United States, as determined by the 
Secretary. 
‘‘(B) In developing and updating such list, the Secretary 
shall consider— 
‘‘(i) the extent to which a foreign talent program— 
‘‘(I) poses a threat to research funded by the 
Department of Defense; and 
‘‘(II) engages in, or facilitates, cyber attacks, theft, 
espionage, attempts to gain ownership of or influence 
over companies, or otherwise interferes in the affairs 
of the United States; and 
‘‘(ii) any other factor the Secretary considers appro-
priate. 
‘‘(d) PROCEDURES FOR ENHANCED INFORMATION SHARING.— 
‘‘(1) COLLECTION OF INFORMATION.— 
‘‘(A) DEFENSE
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVI-
TIES.—Not later than October 1, 2020, for the purpose 
of maintaining appropriate security controls over research 
activities, technical information, and intellectual property, 
the Secretary, in conjunction with appropriate public and 
private entities, shall establish streamlined procedures to 
collect appropriate information relating to individuals, 
including United States citizens and foreign nationals, who 
participate in defense research and development activities. 
‘‘(B) 
FUNDAMENTAL
RESEARCH
PROGRAMS.—With 
respect to fundamental research programs, the academic 
liaison designated under subsection (g) shall establish poli-
cies and procedures to collect, consistent with the best 
practices of Government agencies that fund academic 
research, appropriate information relating to individuals 
who participate in fundamental research programs. 
‘‘(2) PROTECTION FROM RELEASE.—The procedures required 
by paragraph (1) shall include procedures to protect such 
information from release, consistent with applicable regula-
tions. 
‘‘(3) REPORTING TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND 
REPOSITORIES.—The procedures required by paragraph (1) may 
include procedures developed, in coordination with appropriate 
public and private entities, to report such information to 
existing Government information systems and repositories. 
‘‘(e) ANNUAL REPORT.— 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 30, 2020, and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary, acting through appropriate 
Government officials (including the Under Secretary for 
Research and Engineering), shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the activities carried out under 
the initiative required by subsection (a). 
‘‘(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following: 
‘‘(A) A description of the activities conducted and the 
progress made under the initiative. 
‘‘(B) The findings of the Secretary with respect to the 
initiative.
H. R. 6395—615 
‘‘(C) Such recommendations as the Secretary may have 
for legislative or administrative action relating to the mat-
ters described in subsection (a), including actions related 
to foreign talent programs. 
‘‘(D) Identification and discussion of the gaps in legal 
authorities that need to be improved to enhance the secu-
rity of research institutions of higher education performing 
defense research. 
‘‘(E) A description of the actions taken by such institu-
tions to comply with such best practices and guidelines 
as may be established by under the initiative. 
‘‘(F) Identification of any incident relating to undue 
influence to security threats to academic research activities 
funded by the Department of Defense, including theft of 
property or intellectual property relating to a project funded 
by the Department at an institution of higher education. 
‘‘(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in both unclassified and classified formats, 
as appropriate. 
‘‘(f) PUBLICATION OF UPDATED LISTS.— 
‘‘(1) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Not later than January 1, 
2021, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees the most recently updated 
lists described in paragraphs (8) and (9) of subsection (c). 
‘‘(2) FORM.—Each list submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex. 
‘‘(3) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—Each list submitted under para-
graph (1) shall be published on a publicly accessible internet 
website of the Department of Defense in a searchable format. 
‘‘(4) INTERVENING SUBMITTAL AND PUBLICATION.—The Sec-
retary may submit and publish an updated list described in 
paragraph (1) more frequently than required by that paragraph, 
as the Secretary considers necessary. 
‘‘(g) DESIGNATION OF ACADEMIC LIAISON.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, the Secretary, 
acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Research 
and Engineering, shall designate an academic liaison with prin-
cipal responsibility for working with the academic and research 
communities 
to 
protect 
Department-sponsored 
academic 
research of concern from undue foreign influence and threats. 
‘‘(2) QUALIFICATION.—The Secretary shall designate an 
individual under paragraph (1) who is an official of the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering. 
‘‘(3) DUTIES.—The duties of the academic liaison designated 
under paragraph (1) shall be as follows: 
‘‘(A) To serve as the liaison of the Department with 
the academic and research communities. 
‘‘(B) To execute initiatives of the Department related 
to the protection of Department-sponsored academic 
research of concern from undue foreign influence and 
threats, including the initiative required by subsection (a). 
‘‘(C) To conduct outreach and education activities for 
the academic and research communities on undue foreign
H. R. 6395—616 
influence and threats to Department-sponsored academic 
research of concern. 
‘‘(D) To coordinate and align academic security policies 
with Department component agencies, the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy, the intelligence community, and 
appropriate Federal agencies. 
‘‘(E) To the extent practicable, to coordinate with the 
intelligence community to share, not less frequently than 
annually, with the academic and research communities 
unclassified 
information, 
including 
counterintelligence 
information, on threats from undue foreign influence. 
‘‘(F) Any other related responsibility, as determined 
by the Secretary in consultation with the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering. 
‘‘(h) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION DEFINED.—The term 
‘institution of higher education’ has the meaning given such term 
in section 101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1001).’’. 
SEC. 1299D. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF NON-CONVENTIONAL 
ASSISTED RECOVERY CAPABILITIES. 
Subsection (g) of section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110– 
417; 122 Stat. 4578) is amended by striking ‘‘2021’’ and inserting 
‘‘2023’’. 
SEC. 1299E. ANNUAL BRIEFINGS ON CERTAIN FOREIGN MILITARY 
BASES OF ADVERSARIES. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than February 15 of each year, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of 
Defense, acting through the Under Secretary of Defense for Intel-
ligence and Security, shall provide to the congressional defense 
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate a briefing on— 
(1) covered foreign military bases and the related capabili-
ties of that foreign military; and 
(2) the effects of such bases and capabilities on— 
(A) the military installations of the United States 
located outside the United States; and 
(B) current and future deployments and operations 
of the armed forces of the United States. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing under subsection (a) shall include 
the following: 
(1) An assessment of covered foreign military bases, 
including such bases established by China, Russia, and Iran, 
and any updates to such assessment provided in a previous 
briefing under such subsection. 
(2) Information regarding known plans for any future cov-
ered foreign military base. 
(3) An assessment of the capabilities, including those per-
taining to anti-access and area denial, provided by covered 
foreign military bases to that foreign military, including an 
assessment of how such capabilities could be used against the 
armed forces of the United States in the country and the 
geographic combatant command in which such base is located. 
(4) A description of known ongoing activities and capabili-
ties at covered foreign military bases, and how such activities