and possess specially configured aircraft capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons—contributes to the cohe-
sion of NATO and provides reassurance to allies and 
partners who feel exposed to regional threats. 
(b) LIMITATION
ON
REDUCTIONS
IN
NUCLEAR 
FORCES BASED IN EUROPE.—In light of the policy ex-
pressed in subsection (a), no action may be taken to effect 
or implement the reduction of nuclear forces of the United 
States that are based in Europe unless— 
(1) the reduction in such nuclear forces is re-
quested by the government of the host nation in the 
manner provided in the agreement between the 
United States and the host nation regarding the 
forces; or 
(2) the President certifies that— 
(A) the nuclear policy and nuclear posture 
of NATO has changed, reducing the need for 
such nuclear forces to be based in Europe; 
(B) NATO member states have considered 
the reduction in the High Level Group and 
NATO has decided to support such reduction; 
(C) the remaining nuclear forces of the 
United States that are based in Europe after 
such reduction provide a commensurate or bet-
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ter level of safety, security, reliability, and 
credibility as before such reduction; 
(D) such reduction is compensated by 
other measures (such as nuclear modernization, 
conventional forces, and missile defense) which 
together provide a commensurate or better de-
terrence capability and assurance of NATO 
member states in a manner consistent with the 
NATO Strategic Concept; and 
(E) the Russian Federation has made com-
mensurate reductions to its deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons. 
(c) REPORT.—Upon any decision to reduce the nu-
clear forces of the United States that are based in Europe, 
the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a re-
port containing— 
(1) the certification required by subsection 
(b)(2); 
(2) justification for such reduction; and 
(3) an assessment of how NATO member 
states, in light of such reduction, assess the credi-
bility of the deterrence capability of the United 
States in support of its commitments undertaken 
pursuant to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
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signed at Washington, District of Columbia, on April 
4, 1949, and entered into force on August 24, 1949 
(63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964). 
(d) NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENT.—The Presi-
dent may not commence a reduction in the nuclear forces 
of the United States that are based in Europe for which 
the certification required by subsection (b)(2) is made 
until the expiration of a 180-day period beginning on the 
date on which the President submits the report under sub-
section (c) containing the certification. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Defense 
and the Administrator for Nuclear Security a total of 
$300,000,000 for fiscal year 2011 for— 
(1) developing the F–35 Lightning II aircraft 
into a dual-capable aircraft by outfitting it with a 
nuclear-capable delivery system; and 
(2) supporting the life extension program for 
the B61 gravity bomb. 
SEC. 6. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR LONG-RANGE MIS-
SILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Missile defense promotes the collective secu-
rity of the United States and NATO and improves 
linkages among member nations of NATO by de-
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fending all members of NATO against the full range 
of missile threats. 
(2) The Director of National Intelligence, ap-
pearing before the Senate Select Committee on In-
telligence on February 2, 2010, testified that, ‘‘The 
Iranian regime continues to flout UN Security 
Council restrictions on its nuclear program . . . We 
judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery as its 
preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. 
Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic 
missiles in the Middle East and it continues to ex-
pand the scale, reach, and sophistication of its bal-
listic missile forces—many of which are inherently 
capable of carrying a nuclear payload.’’. 
(3) The Unclassified Report on Military Power 
of Iran, dated April 2010, states that, ‘‘With suffi-
cient foreign assistance, Iran could probably develop 
and test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
capable of reaching the United States by 2015. Iran 
could also have an intermediate-range ballistic mis-
sile (IRBM) capable of threatening Europe.’’. 
(4) However, phase 3 of the proposed phased, 
adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe is 
planned to provide coverage of all of Europe by 
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2018 and phase 4 is planned to provide additional 
coverage of the United States by 2020. 
(5) According to the February 2010 Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review, the United States will con-
tinue the development and assessment of a two-stage 
ground-based interceptor as part of a hedging strat-
egy and, as further noted by the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy during testimony before the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives on October 1, 2009, ‘‘We keep the de-
velopment of the two-stage [ground-based inter-
ceptor] on the books as a hedge in case things come 
earlier, in case there’s any kind of technological 
challenge with the later models of the SM–3.’’. 
(b) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 
States to— 
(1) field long-range missile defenses in Europe 
that provide territorial defense of all NATO allies 
from intercontinental and intermediate-range bal-
listic missiles by the time such threats materialize; 
(2) ensure that the standard missile-3 block IIA 
interceptors provide full coverage of Europe against 
medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
launched from the Middle East and that the stand-
ard missile-3 block IIB interceptors provide addi-
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tional coverage of the United States against inter-
continental ballistic missiles launched from the Mid-
dle East; and 
(3) continue the development and testing of the 
two-stage ground-based interceptor to maintain it— 
(A) in the event that the long-range bal-
listic missile threat materializes sooner than the 
planned availability of the standard missile-3 
block IIA or block IIB interceptor missiles; 
(B) in the event of technical challenges as-
sociated with the standard missile-3 interceptor 
missile; and 
(C) as a complement to the missile defense 
capabilities deployed in Alaska and California 
for the defense of the United States. 
(c) RESERVATION OF FUNDS.—Of the funds appro-
priated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations 
made available for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 for the Mis-
sile Defense Agency, $300,000,000 shall be available only 
for long-range missile defense in Europe as described sub-
section (d). 
(d) USE OF FUNDS.—Funds reserved under sub-
section (c) may be obligated and expended by the Sec-
retary of Defense— 
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(1) to accelerate the research, development, 
test, evaluation, procurement, and fielding of a 
standard missile-3 block IIA or block IIB interceptor 
capable of intercepting intermediate or interconti-
nental ballistic missiles; 
(2) on the research, development, test, evalua-
tion, procurement, and fielding of a two-stage 
ground-based interceptor; and 
(3) on an additional flight test of a two-stage 
ground-based interceptor. 
SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND 
NEW START TREATY WITH RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The United States and the Russian Federa-
tion signed the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Measures 
for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms (commonly known as the ‘‘New 
START Treaty’’) on April 8, 2010. 
(2) The preamble of the New START Treaty 
states, ‘‘Recognizing the existence of the inter-
relationship between strategic offensive arms and 
strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship 
will become more important as strategic nuclear 
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arms are reduced, and that current strategic defen-
sive arms do not undermine the viability and effec-
tiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Par-
ties.’’. 
(3) Officials of the United States have stated 
that the New START Treaty does not restrain the 
program for missile defense of the United States at 
bases in California and Alaska, nor does it restrain 
the phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in 
Europe. 
(4) However, a statement from the office of the 
Russian president states, ‘‘The Treaty between the 
Russian Federation and the United States of Amer-
ica on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, can 
operate and be viable only if the United States of 
America refrains from developing its missile defence 
capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively.’’. 
(5) Additionally, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia would have the 
right to withdraw from the treaty ‘‘if the U.S.’s 
build-up of its missile defense strategic potential in 
numbers and quality begins to considerably affect 
the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces.’’. 
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(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) there are no limitations on any phases of 
the phased, adaptive approach to missile defense re-
sulting from ratification of the New START treaty 
between the United States and Russia, signed on 8 
April 2010; 
(2) the United States should deploy all four 
phases of the phased, adaptive approach for missile 
defense in Europe to protect the United States, de-
ployed forces, and NATO allies against short, me-
dium, and long-range ballistic missile threats con-
sistent with the announced time lines of such 
threats; and 
(3) the ground-based midcourse defense system 
in Alaska and California should be maintained, 
evolved, and expanded because it is the only missile 
defense capability as of the date of the enactment of 
this Act that would protect the United States from 
the growing threat of a long-range ballistic missile 
attack. 
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SEC. 8. AIR FORCE SCHOLARSHIPS FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR 
PEACE NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
EURO-NATO JOINT JET PILOT TRAINING PRO-
GRAM. 
(a) SCHOLARSHIPS AUTHORIZED.—Chapter 901 of 
title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following new section: 
‘‘§ 9325. Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Pro-
gram: participation scholarships for Part-
nership for Peace nations 
‘‘(a) 
ESTABLISHMENT
OF
SCHOLARSHIP
PRO-
GRAM.—Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force shall establish and 
maintain a scholarship program to allow personnel of the 
air forces of countries that are signatories of the Partner-
ship for Peace Framework Document to receive under-
graduate pilot training and necessary related training 
through the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training 
(ENJJPT) program. 
‘‘(b) TRANSPORTATION, SUPPLIES, AND
ALLOW-
ANCE.—Under such conditions as the Secretary of the Air 
Force may prescribe, the Secretary may provide to a per-
son receiving a scholarship under the scholarship pro-
gram— 
‘‘(1) transportation incident to the training re-
ceived under the ENJJPT program; 
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