106TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 1838
AN ACT
To assist in the enhancement of the security of
Taiwan, and for other purposes.
106TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 1838
AN ACT
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Security En-
hancement Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between
the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous
benefit to both societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a
major political transformation, and Taiwan is today
a true multiparty democracy with a political system
separate from and totally unlike that of the People’s
Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free
market principles and is separate and distinct from
the People’s Republic of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United
States Government withdrew diplomatic recognition
of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate gov-
ernment of China, neither at that time nor since has
the United States Government adopted a formal po-
sition as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than
to state that status must be decided by peaceful
means. Any determination of the ultimate status of
Taiwan must have the express consent of the people
on Taiwan.
(5) The People’s Republic of China refuses to
renounce the use of force against democratic Tai-
wan.
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act has been instru-
mental in maintaining peace, security, and stability
in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific since
its enactment in 1979.
(7) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–
8) states that—
(A) peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait area are in the political, security, and
economic interests of the United States and are
of international concern;
(B) the decision of the United States to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by
peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including boycotts
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and secu-
rity of the Western Pacific region and of grave
concern to the United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the ca-
pacity to resist any form of coercion that jeop-
ardizes the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people of Taiwan; and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of
the human rights of all people on Taiwan are
objectives of the United States.
(8) The Taiwan Relations Act establishes on
the part of the United States a continuing connec-
tion with and concern for Taiwan and its people.
Continued adherence to the Act will help Taiwan to
maintain its democracy free of coercion and to safe-
guard its people from the use of force against them.
Furthermore, the maintenance by Taiwan of forces
adequate for its defense is in the interest of the
United States in that it helps to maintain peace in
the Western Pacific region.
(9) The military modernization and weapons
procurement efforts by the People’s Republic of
China, as documented in the February 1, 1999, re-
port by the Secretary of Defense on ‘‘The Security
Situation in the Taiwan Strait’’, could threaten
cross-Strait stability and United States interests in
the Asia-Pacific region.
(10) The Taiwan Relations Act provides explicit
guarantees that the United States will make avail-
able defense articles and services necessary in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
(11) The Taiwan Relations Act requires timely
reviews by United States military authorities of Tai-
wan’s defense needs in connection with recommenda-
tions to the President and the Congress.
(12) Congress and the President are committed
by the Taiwan Relations Act to determine the nature
and quantity of Taiwan’s legitimate self-defense
needs.
(13) It is the policy of the United States to re-
ject any attempt to curb the provision by the United
States of defense articles and services legitimately
needed for Taiwan’s self-defense.
(14) In accordance with the Taiwan Relations
Act, the United States has, since 1979, sold defen-
sive weapons to Taiwan, and such sales have helped
Taiwan maintain its autonomy and freedom. The
Congress supports the continued provision of addi-
tional defense articles and defense services in ac-
cordance with the Taiwan Relations Act.
(15) It is in the national interest of the United
States to eliminate ambiguity and convey with clar-
ity continued United States support for Taiwan, its
people, and their ability to maintain their democracy
free from coercion and their society free from the
use of force against them. Lack of clarity could lead
to unnecessary misunderstandings or confrontations
between the United States and the People’s Republic
of China, with grave consequences for the security of
the Western Pacific region.
(16) A possible consequence of such ambiguity
and lack of clarity was the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s decision to conduct military exercises and live
fire missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in March
1996, necessitating House Concurrent Resolution
148, approved by the House of Representatives by a
vote of 369–14 on March 19, 1996, and by the Sen-
ate by a vote of 97–0 on March 21, 1996, which
stated that ‘‘the United States, in accordance with
the Taiwan Relations Act and the constitutional
process of the United States, and consistent with its
friendship with and commitment to the democratic
government and people of Taiwan, should assist in
defending them against invasion, missile attack, or
blockade by the People’s Republic of China.’’. Imme-
diately following Congressional passage of House
Concurrent Resolution 148, the United States de-
ployed on an emergency basis two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the Taiwan Strait, after which the
People’s Republic of China ceased further planned
military exercises.
(17) An earlier consequence of such ambiguity
and lack of clarity was the expressed surprise by the
People’s Republic of China that Congress and the
American people fully supported President Lee
Teng-hui’s private visit to his alma mater, Cornell
University, necessitating House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 53, approved by the House of Representatives
by a vote of 390–0 on May 2, 1995, and by the Sen-
ate by a vote of 97–1 on May 9, 1995, which stated
such support explicitly.
SEC. 3. TRAINING OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND SALE OF
DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO TAI-
WAN.
(a) TRAINING OF TAIWAN MILITARY OFFICERS.—
The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the mili-
tary departments shall make every effort to reserve addi-
tional positions for Taiwan military officers at the Na-
tional Defense University and other professional military
education schools specified in section 2162(d) of title 10,
United States Code, and for prospective Taiwan military
officers at the United States Military Academy, the United
States Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy.
(b) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES.—The Secretary of
State shall, when considering foreign military sales to
Taiwan—
(1) take into account the special status of Tai-
wan, including the defense needs of Taiwan in re-
sponse to the military modernization and weapons
procurement efforts by the People’s Republic of
China; and
(2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan
has full and timely access to price and availability
data for defense articles and defense services.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
(a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMER-
ICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—Upon the request of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President shall
use funds available to the Department of Defense under
the Arms Export Control Act for the employment of addi-
tional technical staff at the American Institute in Taiwan.
(b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Beginning 60 days after the
next round of arms talks between the United States and
Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President shall sub-
mit a report to Congress, in classified and unclassified
form—
(1) detailing each of Taiwan’s requests for pur-
chase of defense articles and defense services during
the one-year period ending on the date of the report;
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by
Taiwan as justification for those requests; and
(3) describing the decision-making process used
to reject, postpone, or modify any such request.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.—Congress finds that any de-
termination of the nature or quantity of defense articles
or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that
is made on any basis other than section 3(b) of the Taiwan
Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)), whether such alter-
native basis is the August 17, 1982, communique signed
with the People’s Republic of China, or any similar execu-
tive agreement, order, or policy, would violate the intent
of Congress in the enactment of such Act.
(b) COMBINED TRAINING
AND PERSONNEL EX-
CHANGE PROGRAMS.—Not later than 210 days after the
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall implement a plan for the enhancement of programs
and arrangements for operational training and exchanges
of senior officers between the Armed Forces of the United
States and the armed forces of Taiwan for work in threat
analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational methods,
and other areas. At least 30 days prior to such implemen-
tation, the Secretary of Defense shall submit the plan to
Congress, in classified and unclassified form.
(c) REPORT REGARDING MAINTENANCE OF SUFFI-
CIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.—Not later than 45
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu-
ally thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to
the Congress, in classified and unclassified form, an an-
nual report on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Such report shall include an analysis of the military forces
facing Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China, evalu-
ating recent additions to the offensive military capability
of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall in-
clude, but not be limited to, an analysis of the surface
and subsurface naval threats, the ballistic missile threat,
the air threat, and the threat to the military and civilian
communications links in Taiwan. The report shall include
a review of the steps taken by the armed forces of Taiwan
to address its security situation.
(d) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES
AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS.—Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall certify to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations and the Committee on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate that direct secure communications exist be-
tween the armed forces of the United States and the
armed forces of Taiwan.
(e) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—
Nothing in this section supersedes or modifies the applica-
tion of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to the
sale of any defense article or defense service under this
section.
SEC. 6. REPORT REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED
STATES TO RESPOND IN ASIA-PACIFIC CON-
TINGENCIES THAT INCLUDE TAIWAN.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and updated as appropriate,
the Secretary of Defense shall prepare and submit to the
chairmen and ranking minority members of the Com-
mittee on International Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate a report in classified and
unclassified form on the ability of the United States to
successfully respond to a major contingency in the Asia-
Pacific region where United States interests on Taiwan
are at risk.
(b) CONTENTS.—The report described in subsection
(a) shall include—
(1) a description of planning on the national,
operational, and tactical levels to respond to, pros-
ecute, and achieve United States strategic objectives
with respect to a major contingency described in
subsection (a); and
(2) a description of the confidence level of the
Secretary of Defense in United States military capa-
bilities to successfully respond to such a contingency.
(c) PREPARATION OF REPORT.—In preparing the re-
port under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall
use the resources and expertise of the relevant unified
commands, military departments, the combat support
agencies, and the defense components of the intelligence
community, as required, and other such entities within the
Department of Defense as the Secretary considers nec-
essary.
Passed the House of Representatives February 1,
2000.
Attest:
Clerk.