I 
118TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 8824 
To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to strengthen United 
States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign 
influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 25, 2024 
Mr. KEATING (for himself, Mr. FOSTER, and Mr. HUIZENGA) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
A BILL 
To require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy 
to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy co-
operation and combat Russian malign influence in the 
nuclear energy sector in Europe. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘The U.S.-European 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act of 2024’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
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(1) On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federa-
tion initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which 
has severely threatened energy security in the 
United States, Europe, and around the world. 
(2) The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has 
been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its 
territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government 
can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrain-
ian citizens. 
(3) Ukraine has operated four nuclear power 
plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed 
water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors, and 
remains dependent on nuclear power for its energy 
security. 
(4) Russia, in its war of aggression against 
Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine’s en-
ergy infrastructure through heavy shelling and tar-
geted attacks, particularly in the winter months 
when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulner-
able. 
(5) Since March 2022, Russian forces have ille-
gally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Sta-
tion, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and 
Russian forces have surrounded the station with 
landmines, further threatening regional security. 
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(6) Russian-designed VVER reactors have been 
built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
(7) Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs 
and fuel services to spread malign influence and 
threaten United States and European energy secu-
rity. 
(8) As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent 
of the total uranium conversion infrastructure world-
wide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrich-
ment capacity at close to 46 percent. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) in countries seeking or developing a nuclear 
power industry, the Department of State should 
prioritize the utilization of products and services 
from the United States, and then prioritize products 
and services from Europe and other allied or partner 
countries, including Canada, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not di-
rectly competing with the United States; and 
(2) the United States and its allies must focus 
on cooperation, including capacity building and 
early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear 
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industry in Europe in a way that maintains non-
proliferation, security, and safety standards and 
aligns with international obligations and treaties 
while combating Russian and Chinese malign influ-
ence. 
SEC. 4. STRATEGY. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the 
heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, 
shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-Euro-
pean nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian ma-
lign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection 
(a) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements: 
(1) An overview and assessment of the Sec-
retary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by 
United States nuclear industry entities in Europe 
and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of 
United States, European, and partner technologies 
and services against Russian and Chinese tech-
nologies in Europe. 
(2) An overview of different nuclear reactor 
types that are currently deployed or under regu-
latory review in Europe, including large light-water 
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reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and 
non-light-water reactors, and— 
(A) what role, if any, each reactor type 
could have in reducing Russia’s influence over 
European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 
2045, and 2050; 
(B) challenges that each reactor type may 
face with rapid deployment, including costs, 
market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, sup-
ply chain constraints, and regulatory require-
ments; 
(C) the impacts of each reactor type on 
maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, 
including the minimization of weapons-usable 
nuclear material; and 
(D) opportunities for the use of United 
States, European, and partner technologies and 
services in the deployment or potential deploy-
ment of each reactor type. 
(3) An overview of different fuel cycles that are 
currently deployed or under consideration in Europe, 
including use of low enriched uranium, including 
high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel re-
processing, along with an analysis of the implica-
tions of each fuel cycle on— 
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