H. R. 1757—84
(5) the United States should clearly delineate those NATO
deliberations, including but not limited to discussions on arms
control, further Alliance enlargement, procurement matters,
and strategic doctrine, that are not subject to review or discus-
sion in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council;
(6) the United States should work to ensure that countries
invited to join the Alliance are provided an immediate seat
in NATO discussions; and
(7) the United States already pays more than a propor-
tionate share of the costs of the common defense of Europe
and should obtain, in advance, agreement on an equitable dis-
tribution of the cost of NATO enlargement to ensure that
the United States does not continue to bear a disproportionate
burden.
(b) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA.—
(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—NATO enlargement should be car-
ried out in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance’s
defensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that NATO
enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in
Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the United States and
its NATO allies should make this intention clear in negotiations
with Russia, including negotiations regarding adaptation of
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of
November 19, 1990.
(2) LIMITATIONS ON COMMITMENTS TO RUSSIA.—In seeking
to demonstrate to Russia NATO’s defensive and security-
enhancing intentions, it is essential that neither fundamental
United States security interests in Europe nor the effectiveness
and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance be jeopardized.
In particular, no commitments should be made to Russia that
would have the effect of—
(A) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on
new NATO members different from those applicable to
current NATO members, including rights or responsibilities
with respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and
the stationing of troops and equipment from other NATO
members;
(B) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory
of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the
construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability
of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements;
(C) providing any international organization, or any
country that is not a member of NATO, with authority
to delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and
decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementa-
tion of such decisions, including deliberations and decisions
with respect to the deployment of NATO forces or the
admission of additional members to NATO;
(D) impeding the development of enhanced relations
between NATO and other European countries that do not
belong to the Alliance;
(E) establishing a nuclear weapons-free zone in Central
or Eastern Europe;
(F) requiring NATO to subsidize Russian arms sales,
service, or support to the militaries of those former Warsaw
Pact countries invited to join the Alliance; or
H. R. 1757—85
(G) legitimizing Russian efforts to link concessions in
arms control negotiations to NATO enlargement.
(3) COMMITMENTS FROM RUSSIA.—In order to enhance secu-
rity and stability in Europe, the United States should seek
commitments from Russia—
(A) to demarcate and respect all its borders with
neighboring states;
(B) to achieve the immediate and complete withdrawal
of any armed forces and military equipment under the
control of Russia that are deployed on the territories of
the independent states of the former Soviet Union without
the full and complete agreement of those states;
(C) to station its armed forces on the territory of other
states only with the full and complete agreement of that
state and in strict accordance with international law; and
(D) to take steps to reduce further its nuclear and
conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
(4) CONSULTATIONS.—As negotiations on adaptation of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe proceed, the
United States should engage in close and continuous consulta-
tions not only with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the
South Caucasus.
(c) POLICY WITH RESPECT
TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
COOPERATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—As the United States proceeds with efforts
to develop defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should
seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia on matters
related to missile defense. In particular, the United States
and its NATO allies should seek to cooperate with Russia
in such areas as early warning.
(2) DISCUSSIONS WITH NATO ALLIES.—The United States
should initiate discussions with its NATO allies for the purpose
of examining the feasibility of deploying a ballistic missile
defense capable of protecting NATO’s southern and eastern
flanks from a limited ballistic missile attack.
(3) CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES.—Even as the Congress
seeks to promote ballistic missile defense cooperation with Rus-
sia, it must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regarding
consideration of arms control agreements with Russia that bear
on ballistic missile defense.
SEC. 1703. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 2702(a).
(b) DESIGNATION
OF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE
FOR
NATO ENLARGEMENT ASSISTANCE.—
(1) DESIGNATION
OF
ADDITIONAL
COUNTRIES.—Romania,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria are each designated
as eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
(22 U.S.C. 1928 note) and shall be deemed to have been so
designated pursuant to section 203(d)(1) of such Act.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The designation of countries
pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance under
the program established under section 203(a) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994—
H. R. 1757—86
(A) is in addition to the designation of other countries
by law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of such Act; and
(B) shall not preclude the designation by the President
of other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible
to receive assistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act.
(3) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria—
(A) are to be commended for their progress toward
political and economic reform and meeting the guidelines
for prospective NATO members;
(B) would make an outstanding contribution to further-
ing the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom,
and peace in Europe should they become NATO members;
and
(C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria
should be invited to become full NATO members at the
earliest possible date.
(c) REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Funds described in paragraph (2) are
authorized to be made available to support the implementation
of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for
Peace Information Management System, including—
(A) the procurement of items in support of these pro-
grams; and
(B) the transfer of such items to countries participating
in these programs.
(2) FUNDS DESCRIBED.—Funds described in this paragraph
are funds that are available—
(A) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participa-
tion Act of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for assist-
ance under that Act; or
(B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry
out the Warsaw Initiative.
(d) EXTENSION
OF AUTHORITY REGARDING EXCESS DEFENSE
ARTICLES.—Section 105 of Public Law 104–164 (110 Stat. 1427)
is amended by striking ‘‘1996 and 1997’’ and inserting ‘‘1997, 1998,
and 1999’’.
(e) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE NATO PARTICIPATION
ACT OF 1994.—Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of
1994 (22 U.S.C. 1928 note) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘, without regard to the
restrictions’’ and all that follows through ‘‘section)’’;
(2) by striking paragraph (2);
(3) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘appropriated under the
‘Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund’ account’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘made available for the ‘Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Fund’ ’’; and
(4) in paragraph (8)—
(A) by striking ‘‘any restrictions in sections 516 and
519’’ and inserting ‘‘section 516(e)’’;
(B) by striking ‘‘as amended,’’; and
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(C) by striking ‘‘paragraphs (1) and (2)’’ and inserting
‘‘paragraph (1)’’; and
(5) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as para-
graphs (2) through (7), respectively.
SEC. 1704. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY
ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.
It is the sense of the Congress that no revisions to the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will be approved for
entry into force with respect to the United States that jeopardize
fundamental United States security interests in Europe or the
effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance by—
(1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new
NATO members different from those applicable to current
NATO members, including rights or responsibilities with
respect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the stationing
of troops and equipment from other NATO members;
(2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory
of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the construc-
tion of defense infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO
to deploy necessary reinforcements;
(3) providing any international organization, or any country
that is not a member of NATO, with the authority to delay,
veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of the
North Atlantic Council or the implementation of such decisions,
including deliberations and decisions with respect to the deploy-
ment of NATO forces or the admission of additional members
to NATO; or
(4) impeding the development of enhanced relations
between NATO and other European countries that do not belong
to the Alliance.
SEC. 1705. RESTRICTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO BALLIS-
TIC MISSILE DEFENSE.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 1702(c).
(b) RESTRICTION
ON
ENTRY
INTO
FORCE
OF
ABM/TMD
DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.—An ABM/TMD demarcation agree-
ment shall not be binding on the United States, and shall not
enter into force with respect to the United States, unless, after
the date of the enactment of this Act, that agreement is specifically
approved with the advice and consent of the United States Senate
pursuant to Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution.
(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO DEMARCATION
AGREEMENTS.—
(1) 
RELATIONSHIP
TO
MULTILATERALIZATION
OF
ABM
TREATY.—It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD
demarcation agreement will be considered for advice and con-
sent to ratification unless, consistent with the certification of
the President pursuant to condition (9) of the resolution of
ratification of the CFE Flank Document, the President submits
for Senate advice and consent to ratification any agreement,
arrangement, or understanding that would—
(A) add one or more countries as State Parties to
the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty
from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or
(B) change the geographic scope or coverage of the
ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term