I
103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 3680
To amend the Revised Statutes to restore standards for proving intentional
discrimination.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 22, 1993
Mr. OWENS (for himself and Mr. HASTINGS) introduced the following bill;
which was referred jointly to the Committees on Education and Labor
and the Judiciary
A BILL
To amend the Revised Statutes to restore standards for
proving intentional discrimination.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Civil Rights Standards
Restoration Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds that—
(1) the Supreme Court enunciated a method of
proving intentional discrimination under Federal law
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
(2) such method has been applied to establish
intentional discrimination in cases and proceedings
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
U.S.C. 2000e et seq.), title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
621 et seq.), and other Federal laws; and
(3) the standards established in St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, No. 92–602 (1993), regard-
ing the effect of a finding of pretext on proof of un-
lawful intentional discrimination, are contrary to—
(A) such method established by the Su-
preme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine; and
(B) congressional intent regarding such
Federal laws.
SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to restore the standards (regarding the
effect of a finding of pretext on proof of unlawful in-
tentional discrimination) enunciated by the Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
as part of a method of proving intentional discrimi-
nation; and
(2) to ensure the application of such restored
standards in all cases and proceedings under Fed-
eral law (including title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
and other Federal laws) to which such method
applies.
SEC. 4. STANDARDS FOR PROVING INTENTIONAL DISCRIMI-
NATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
The Revised Statutes are amended by inserting after
section 1979 (42 U.S.C. 1983) the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 1979A. STANDARDS FOR PROVING INTENTIONAL DIS-
CRIMINATION IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
‘‘(a) STANDARDS.—In a case or proceeding brought
under Federal law in which a complaining party meets its
burden of proving a prima facie case of unlawful inten-
tional discrimination and the respondent meets its burden
of clearly and specifically articulating a legitimate, non-
discriminatory explanation for the conduct at issue
through the introduction of admissible evidence, unlawful
intentional discrimination shall be established where the
complaining party persuades a trier of fact, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that—
‘‘(1) a discriminatory reason more likely moti-
vated the respondent; or
‘‘(2) the respondent’s proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.
‘‘(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This section shall
apply only to those cases and proceedings in which the
method of proof articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
applies and shall not be construed to specify the exclusive
means by which the complaining party may establish un-
lawful intentional discrimination under Federal law.’’.
Æ