(6) Through manipulation of traditional rival-
ries among peoples in areas outside their full con-
trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used
divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their
population, and Congress finds that internationally
sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical
role in reducing the tactic’s effectiveness and human
suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly
utilizing and organizing militias, Popular Defense
Forces, and other irregular troops for raiding and
slaving parties in areas outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt
the ability of those populations to sustain them-
selves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of
bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the
war through selective starvation and to minimize the
Government of Sudan’s accountability internation-
ally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly
stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
lethality of the war against the areas outside its con-
trol.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air
transport flights under the United Nations relief op-
eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov-
ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the
receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the
United States and other donor countries as a dev-
astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the
Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out-
side of the Government’s control.
(10) The United States and other donors’ ef-
forts in delivering relief and assistance through
means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad-
dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov-
ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations
to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected
areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-
dressed in the near term, the population in areas of
Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of
their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in
Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions
have been excluded completely from relief distribu-
tion by OLS, consequently placing their populations
at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per
day, and with a primary focus on providing only for
the immediate food needs of the recipients, the cur-
rent international relief operations are neither sus-
tainable nor desirable in the long term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend them-
selves against attack in areas outside the Govern-
ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com-
promised by the disengagement of the front-line
sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of
the Government of Sudan that success on the battle-
field will be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of
pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-
tion to the war, including—
(A) the maintenance or strengthening of
sanctions against the Government of Sudan;
(B) the support or creation of viable demo-
cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
Sudan outside government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-
people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in
areas outside of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms
to provide relief to those areas;
(E) cooperation among the trading part-
ners of the United States and within multilat-
eral institutions toward those ends; and
(F) the use of any and all possible unilat-
eral and multilateral economic and diplomatic
means to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to end
their hostilities and again assume a constructive
stance toward facilitating a comprehensive solu-
tion to the ongoing war in Sudan.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov-
ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic
Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) IGAD.—The term ‘‘IGAD’’ means the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.
(3) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United
Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the
World Food Program, and participating NGOs
known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW TACTICS BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby—
(1) condemns—
(A) violations of human rights on all sides
of the conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall
human rights record, with regard to both the
prosecution of the war and the denial of basic
human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-
ting and tolerating the practice; and
(D) the Government of Sudan’s increasing
use and organization of ‘‘murahalliin’’, Popular
Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese
Army units into organized and coordinated
raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal,
the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue
Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on
air transport relief flights by the Government of
Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a
tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys-
tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and
economies of the Dinka and Nuba peoples in a policy
of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby—
(1) declares its support for the efforts by execu-
tive branch officials of the United States to lead in
a reinvigoration of the IGAD-sponsored peace proc-
ess;
(2) calls on IGAD member states, the European
Union, the Organization of African Unity, Egypt,
and other key states to support the peace process;
and
(3) urges Kenya’s leadership in the implementa-
tion of the process.
(b) RELATION TO UNITED STATES DIPLOMACY.—It
is the sense of Congress that any such diplomatic efforts
toward resolution of the conflict in Sudan are best made
through IGAD and that the President must not create any
process or diplomatic facility or office which could be
viewed as a parallel or competing diplomatic track.
(c) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The
Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel
of the Department of State for the support of—
(1) the secretariat of IGAD;
(2) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov-
ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;
(3) any peace settlement planning to be carried
out by the National Democratic Alliance and IGAD
Partners’ Forum (IPF); and
(4) other United States diplomatic efforts with
respect to Sudan.
SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting
through the United States Permanent Representative to
the United Nations, should—
(1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations
Security Council to investigate the practice of slav-
ery in Sudan and provide recommendations on meas-
ures for its eventual elimination;
(2) sponsor a condemnation of the human
rights practices of the Government of Sudan at the
United Nations conference on human rights in Gene-
va in 2000;
(3) press for implementation of the rec-
ommendations of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to human rights
monitors in Sudan;
(4) press for UNICEF, International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, or the International Fed-
eration of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or
other appropriate international organizations or
agencies to maintain a registry of those individuals
who have been abducted or are otherwise held in
bondage or servitude in Sudan;
(5) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations
General Assembly condemning the human rights vio-
lations of the Government of Sudan; and
(6) sponsor a resolution of condemnation in the
United Nations each time the Government of Sudan
conducts an aerial bombardment of a civilian target.
SEC. 7. SUPPORTING SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN.
(a) SANCTIONS.—Until the President determines,
and so certifies to Congress, that the Government of
Sudan has—
(1) fully committed to and has made verifiable
progress toward a comprehensive, peaceful solution
to the war or has otherwise committed to and made
verifiable progress in a good faith effort with both
northern and southern opposition toward a com-
prehensive solution to the conflict based on the Dec-
laration of Principles reached in Nairobi Kenya, on
July 20, 1994,
(2) made substantial and verifiable progress in
controlling the raiding and slaving activities of all
regular and irregular forces, including Popular De-
fense Forces and other militias and murahalliin,
(3) instituted credible reforms with regard to
providing basic human and civil rights to all Suda-
nese, and
(4) ceased aerial bombardment of civilian tar-
gets,
the following are prohibited, except to the extent provided
in section 203(b) of the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)) and in regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant
to this section:
(A) The importation into the United States
of any goods or services of Sudanese origin,
other than information or informational mate-
rials.
(B) The exportation or reexportation, di-
rectly or indirectly, to Sudan of any goods,
technology (including technical data, software,
or other information), or services from the
United States or by a United States person,
wherever located, or requiring the issuance of a
license by a Federal agency, except for dona-
tions of articles intended to relieve human suf-
fering, such as food, clothing, and medicine.
(C) The facilitation by a United States
person, including but not limited to brokering
activities of the exportation or reexportation of
goods, technology, or services from Sudan to
any destination, or to Sudan from any location.
(D) The performance by any United States
person of any contract, including a financing
contract, or use of any other financial instru-
ment, in support of an industrial, commercial,
public utility, or governmental project in Sudan.
(E) The grant or extension of credits or
loans by any United States person to the Gov-
ernment of Sudan.
(F) Any transaction by a United States
person relating to transportation of cargo to or
from Sudan; the provision of transportation of
cargo to or from the United States by any Su-
danese person or any vessel or aircraft of Suda-
nese registration; or the sale in the United
States by any person holding authority under
subtitle 7 of title 49, United States Code, of
any transportation of cargo by air that includes
any stop in Sudan.
(G) Any transaction by any United States
person or within the United States that evades
or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or
avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the pro-
hibitions set forth in this section.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the sanctions in subsection (a), and in the
President’s Executive Order of November 4, 1997, should
be applied to include the sale of stocks in the United
States or to any United States person, wherever located,
or any other form of financial instruments or derivatives,
in support of a commercial, industrial, public utility, or
government project or transaction in or with Sudan.
(c) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President
may waive the application of any of the sanctions de-
scribed in subsection (a) if he determines and certifies to
Congress that it is important to the national security of
the United States to do so.
(d) REPORT.—Beginning 3 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, and every 3 months thereafter, the
President shall submit a report to Congress on—
(1) the specific sources and current status of
Sudan’s financing and construction of oil exploi-
tation infrastructure and pipelines;
(2) the extent to which that financing was se-
cured in the United States or with involvement of
United States citizens;
(3) such financing’s relation to the sanctions
described in subsection (a) and the Executive Order
of November 4, 1997;
(4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the
Government of Sudan forces in areas outside its con-
trol, including targets, frequency, and best estimates
of damage;
(5) the number, duration, and locations of air
strips or other humanitarian relief facilities to which
access is denied by any party to the conflict; and
(6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace
process or any other ongoing efforts to end the con-
flict, including the specific and verifiable steps taken
by parties to the conflict, the members of the IGAD
Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD toward
a comprehensive solution to the war.
(e) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this
section shall prohibit—
(1) transactions for the conduct of the official
business of the Federal Government or the United
Nations by employees thereof;
(2) transactions in Sudan for journalistic activ-
ity by persons regularly employed in such capacity
by a news-gathering organization; or
(3) legitimate humanitarian operations.
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—
(1) the term ‘‘entity’’ means a partnership, as-
sociation, trust, joint venture, corporation, or other
organization;
(2) the term ‘‘Government of Sudan’’ includes
the Government of Sudan, its agencies, instrumen-
talities and controlled entities, and the Central Bank
of Sudan;
(3) the term ‘‘person’’ means an individual or
entity; and
(4) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means any
United States citizen, permanent resident alien, enti-
ty organized under the laws of the United States
(including foreign branches), or any person in the
United States.
SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).
It is the sense of Congress that the President should
organize and maintain a formal consultative process with
the European Union, its member states, the members of
the United Nations Security Council, and other relevant
parties on coordinating an effort within the United Na-
tions to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power
of the Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for
air transport relief flights.
SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR
RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the progress
made by officials of the executive branch of Government
toward greater utilization of non-OLS agencies for more
effective distribution of United States relief contributions.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President should continue to increase the
use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-
plies in southern Sudan.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de-
tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to-
ward carrying out subsection (b).
SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-
PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a detailed
and implementable contingency plan to provide, outside
United Nations auspices, the greatest possible amount of
United States Government and privately donated relief to
all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Moun-
tains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Govern-
ment of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban
on OLS air transport relief flights.
(b) ELEMENT OF PLAN.—The plan developed under
subsection (a) shall include coordination of other donors
in addition to the United States Government and private
institutions.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 2 months after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a clas-
sified report to Congress on the costs and startup time
such a plan would require in the event of a total ban on
air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial or
incremental ban on such flights if the President has made
the determination required by subsection (a)(2).
(d) 
REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the
plan developed under subsection (a), the President may
reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for
the purposes of the plan.
SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID’S SUDAN TRANSITION
ASSISTANCE FOR REHABILITATION (STAR)
PROGRAM.
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—Congress hereby ex-
presses its support for the President’s ongoing efforts to
diversify and increase effectiveness of United States as-
sistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of the
control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long-
term focus shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for
Rehabilitation (STAR) program with its emphasis on pro-
moting future democratic governance, rule of law, building
indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and enhanc-
ing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people
reconciliation efforts.
(b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amounts made
available to carry out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating
to development assistance) for the period beginning on Oc-
tober 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2002,
$16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable
civil authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in
Sudan, including the provision of technical assistance, and
for people-to-people reconciliation efforts.
SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUN-
TAINS AND OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO BANS
ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that civilians in
the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions
of Sudan are not receiving assistance through OLS due
to restrictions by the Government of Sudan.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President should—
(1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the
humanitarian needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red
Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan;
(2) respond appropriately to those needs based
on such assessment; and
(3) report to Congress on an annual basis on
efforts made under paragraph (2).
SEC. 13. PROTECTING HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS, SEPA-
RATING CIVILIANS FROM COMBATANTS, AND
REDUCING FOOD DIVERSION.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) diversion of food assistance from civilians to
combatants is a hindrance to an effective and com-
prehensive relief effort;
(2) the proximity of combatants to humani-
tarian operations for noncombatants poses a security
risk for both humanitarian relief personnel and for
those they serve;
(3) the lack of a reliable and adequate means
of securing food is a major factor in the ability of
populations in areas outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan to defend themselves from ag-
gression by Government of Sudan forces and related
militias or paramilitary groups, thus resulting in di-
versions of food; and
(4) options to address the situation are very
limited.
(b) AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE DIRECT FOOD ASSIST-
ANCE.—
(1) AUTHORITY.—For the purpose of mini-
mizing diversions of food assistance and to insulate
noncombatants and the relief operations which serve
them from combatants in areas outside the control
of the Government of Sudan, the President is au-
thorized to provide food assistance directly to the
National Democratic Alliance participants or other
groups engaged in the protection of civilian popu-
lations from attacks from regular government forces,
associated militias, or other paramilitary groups sup-
ported by the Government of Sudan.
(2) SUPERSEDES EXISTING LAW.—The author-
ity of paragraph (1) supersedes any other provision
of law.
(c) LIMITATION.—The assistance described in sub-
section (b) may only be provided in such a way that—
(1) does not endanger, compromise, or other-
wise reduce the United States support for existing
unilateral, multilateral, or private humanitarian op-
erations or the beneficiaries of those operations; or
(2) compromise any ongoing or future people-
to-people reconciliation efforts in Sudan.
(d) RELATION TO CURRENT OR FUTURE HUMANI-
TARIAN OPERATIONS.—The assistance described in sub-
section (b) shall be implemented separate from and not
in proximity to current humanitarian efforts, both within
Operation Lifeline Sudan or outside of Operation Lifeline
Sudan, or any other current or future humanitarian oper-
ations which serve noncombatants.
(e) DETERMINATIONS
OF ELIGIBILITY.—In deter-
mining the eligibility of potential recipients described in
subsection (b), the President shall take into account the
groups’ respect for human rights, civil authority, civil in-
stitutions, and the integrity of ongoing humanitarian oper-
ations.
(f) REPORT.—The President shall submit a report to
Congress, in classified form if necessary—
(1) describing the effectiveness in preventing di-
versions of such food assistance;
(2) whether or not the provision of such food
assistance has resulted in or has the potential to in-
advertently allow for the enrichment of any indi-
vidual or organization by the resale or other transfer
of the assistance for other purposes, either to the in-
tended recipients or other parties;
(3) whether such operations have affected ongo-
ing humanitarian operations described in subsections
(c) or operations described in subsection (d); and
(4) the extent to which the provision of assist-
ance in subsection (b) has impacted respect for
human rights and rule of law.
Æ