272
pendent democratic institutions, and transparent ac-
countable governance.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation
with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies
as necessary, shall prepare and submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the state of democ-
racy in each country in the Western Hemisphere (other
than the United States and Canada). For each such coun-
try, the report shall provide the following:
(1) A description of its system of government,
including schedule of elections, manner of judicial
appointments, and responsibilities of each branch of
government.
(2) An assessment of—
(A) the state of the rule of law;
(B) the power and independence of each
branch of government and institutions;
(C) the transparence and accountability in
governance; and
(D) the effect on human rights, particu-
larly civil and political rights, caused by the
presence (or lack thereof) of any of the factors
in subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
273
(E) the effect on economic development
caused by the presence (or lack thereof) of any
of the factors in subparagraphs (A) through
(C).
(3) A description of efforts to strengthen the
rule of law, independent institutions, or transparent
governance in the country, whether through local ef-
forts or through efforts funded or implemented by
the United States, the Organization of American
States (OAS), or others.
SEC. 711. REPORT CONCERNING INTERNAL AND INTRA-RE-
GIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES
REGION OF AFRICA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) The Great Lakes region of Central Africa
has a history of colonial based ethnic divisions, polit-
ical violence, and civil wars which have perpetuated
conditions conducive to chronic poverty and turmoil
over the past decade. The countries of the Great
Lakes region are heavily embroiled in the conflicts
within their neighbors borders. At different times,
the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
has involved more outside countries than any other
contemporary war in Africa’s history, (including An-
274
gola, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Sudan,
Chad, Namibia, and Central African Republic).
(2) The region is hallmarked by genocide, the
recruitment of child soldiers, war crimes, systematic
rape of women and violence directed against chil-
dren, corruption, and the illegal exploitation of nat-
ural resources on a global scale. Civil wars, conflicts
over natural resources, and structural violence in the
Great Lakes have resulted in—
(A) the death of approximately three mil-
lion people through direct and indirect causes of
the war in the DRC since 1998;
(B) the deaths of at least 800,000 people
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda;
(C) the deaths of an estimated 300,000
people through direct and indirect causes of the
war in Burundi since 1993;
(D) the deaths of thousands in Uganda;
(E) the forced abduction, sexual servitude,
and armed recruitment of thousands of chil-
dren;
(F) the displacement of millions of Ugan-
dan, Burundian, Congolese, Rwandan, and Su-
danese refugees;
275
(G) the death and abduction of humani-
tarian aid workers throughout the region; and
(H) grave disruptions in the delivery of
emergency assistance and food aid to millions of
civilians in northern Uganda, eastern Congo,
and Burundi dependent on such assistance for
survival.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the United States should—
(1) exhaust all diplomatic means and utilize all
foreign policy instruments to help peacefully resolve
conflicts in the Great Lakes region by supporting
both national and regional political, economic, and
social initiatives conducive to fostering African-led
peace, reconstruction, and political and economic in-
stitutional and structural transformation processes
in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo;
(2) urge all rebel forces to stop the abduction
of children, urge all armed forces to stop the use of
child soldiers, and seek the release of all forcibly-
held children;
(3) make available technical assistance re-
sources to seek, track, and stop funding for all
armed extremist paramilitary and militarist rebel or-
276
ganizations from all sources and condemn all govern-
ments and organizations who do assist such groups;
(4) monitor and support negotiations conducted
by third-party institutions for an immediate end of
armed actions between: The LRA and the Ugandan
Government; the RCD factions and MLC and the
government of Democratic Republic of the Congo
under the terms of the Lusaka Accords; the FDD
and the Burundian Government under the terms of
the Arusha Accords;
(5) explore the possibility of facilitating the cre-
ation of mechanisms for an international monitoring
team to enforce cease-fires as the first step in the
process toward a permanent peace in the region;
(6) continue supporting the Sudan Peace Proc-
ess, the Danforth Initiative, the Lusaka Accords,
and the Arusha Accords which includes peace talks,
donor coordination, regional support, civilian protec-
tion and monitoring, and cease-fire verification;
(7) make available sufficient resources to meet
the immediate relief needs of the towns and cities in
the Great Lakes region supporting large displaced
populations, including food, clean water, medicine,
shelter, and clothing;
277
(8) make available increased resources for as-
sistance to released and returned abducted children
and child soldiers in the Great Lakes Region and en-
sure that amnesty is provided when appropriate;
(9) work with other donors and the Govern-
ments of Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo to increase resources and
technical support to both regional and national com-
batant demobilization entities such as the Uganda
Amnesty Commission in Uganda and equivalent en-
tities in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo for the increased demobilization of
rebel combatants;
(10) examine ways in which development assist-
ance (DA) can help those living in protective villages
in northern Uganda, eastern Congo, and other de-
militarized areas in Rwanda and Burundi to return
to and cultivate farmland;
(11) condition military assistance to any nation
which acts to destabilize the DRC by violating inter-
national agreements regarding sustained troop with-
drawals and respect for the territorial integrity of
the DRC; and
(12) direct the Secretary of State to appoint a
special envoy to the Great Lakes region to oversee
278
cross-cutting security and economic policies in the
region.
(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not
later than April 1 of each subsequent year, the Secretary
should submit to the appropriate congressional committees
a report on the comprehensive actions taken by the United
States in promoting peaceful and immediate solutions to
the internal and intra-regional conflicts in the Great
Lakes region, including taking steps to bring an end to
the illegal exploitation and international trade of natural
resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo; sup-
porting bilateral and multilateral peace keeping initiatives;
the promotion of regional economic integration; the pro-
motion of broad based democratic political processes based
on the rule of law; the promotion of women and other pre-
viously disadvantaged communities as equal political and
economic stakeholders in societies; and humanitarian as-
sistance efforts in the region, including efforts to advance
each area addressed in subsection (a).
SEC. 712. REPORT CONCERNING OBSERVER STATUS FOR
TAIWAN AT THE SUMMIT OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ASSEMBLY.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and not later than April 1 of each year
279
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report
to the Congress, in unclassified form, describing the
United States plan to endorse and obtain observer status
for Taiwan at the annual week-long summit of the World
Health Assembly (WHA) held by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) in May of each year in Geneva, Switzer-
land. Each report shall include the following:
(1) An account of the efforts the Department of
State has made, following the previous year’s meet-
ing of the World Health Assembly to enourage WHO
member states to promote Taiwan’s bid to obtain
observer status.
(2) The steps the Department of State will take
to endorse and obtain observer status at the forth-
coming annual meeting of the World Health Assem-
bly in Geneva, Switzerland.
Subtitle B—Other Matters
SEC. 721. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR,
JUSTICE, AND REHABILITATION.
The Congress—
(1) recalls that the United Nations Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry concluded in Janu-
ary 2000 that ‘‘the Indonesian Army was responsible
for the intimidation, terror, killings and other acts
280
of violence’’ during East Timor’s vote for independ-
ence in 1999;
(2) reiterates that justice for crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes committed in East Timor
during the vote for independence in 1999 is crucial
for peace, reconciliation, and the ongoing nation-
building process in East Timor and Indonesia;
(3) finds that the ad hoc Human Rights Court
on East Timor established by the Indonesian Gov-
ernment in 2001 has inadequately brought to justice
the perpetrators of these crimes as eleven of four-
teen defendants have been acquitted as a result of
poor indictments and the absence of an adequate
witness protection program, and four of the five sen-
tences imposed have been less than the minimum al-
lowed under the Indonesian Human Rights Law;
(4) supports the work of the Joint United Na-
tions-East Timor Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which
filed indictments against high-ranking Indonesian
officers who were allegedly involved in the crimes,
including Gen. Wiranto, Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri,
Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, Maj. Gen. Adam
Damiri, Col. Suratman, Col. Noer Muis, Col. Yayat
Sudrajat and former Governor Abilio Soares, and ex-
presses its strong disappointment that the Indo-
281
nesian Government has stated its intention to ignore
the indictments;
(5) calls on the State Department and the
United States Mission to the United Nations to push
for a comprehensive United Nations review of the
Indonesian ad hoc Human Rights Court on East
Timor, including a review of the conduct of trials,
the indictment strategy by the prosecutors and its
adherence to the international standards, and urges
the State Department to consider alternative mecha-
nisms of justice for East Timor, including the estab-
lishment of an ad hoc international tribunal; and
(6) urges the Indonesian Government to fully
cooperate with the joint United Nations-East Timor
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and encourages the
United States to urge the Indonesian Government to
fully cooperate with the SCU.
SEC. 722. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING HUMAN
RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN INDONESIA.
The Congress—
(1) notes with grave concern that members of
the Indonesian security forces, particularly the Army
Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Police Mobile
Brigade (Brimob), continue to commit many serious
human rights violations, including extrajudicial
282
killings, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention, par-
ticularly in areas of conflict such as Aceh, Papua,
the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi;
(2) notes with grave concern that the Govern-
ment of Indonesia largely fails to hold soldiers and
police accountable for extrajudicial killings and other
serious human rights abuses, both past and present;
(3) condemns the intimidation and harassment
of human rights and civil society organizations and
activists by members of Indonesian security forces
and by military-backed militia groups, particularly in
Aceh and Papua;
(4) notes with concern the Indonesian military’s
resistance to civilian control and oversight, its lack
of budgetary transparency, and its continuing em-
phasis on internal security within Indonesia;
(5) urges the Indonesian government and mili-
tary to provide full, active, and unfettered coopera-
tion with the investigation of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the United States Department of
Justice into the August 31, 2002 attack near
Timika, Papua, which killed three people (including
two Americans, Rick Spier and Ted Burgon), and
injured 12 others, and which appears likely to have
283
been perpetrated at least in part by members of the
Indonesian military;
(6) commends the December 2002 signing of
the Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hos-
tilities in Aceh, but condemns the recent outbreaks
of violence and militia activity that appear calculated
to subvert that cease-fire agreement;
(7) notes with grave concern the continued de-
tention of Muhammad Nazar, and the fact that
those responsible for the murders of other prominent
members of civil society in Aceh, such as Jafar
Siddiq Hamzah, Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad, Tengku
Safwan 
Idris, 
Nashiruddin 
Daud, 
and 
Zaini
Sulaiman, still have not been apprehended, pros-
ecuted, or punished;
(8) commends the ‘‘Zone of Peace’’ initiative in
Papua, which has brought together civic, religious,
governmental, and police representatives to discuss
productive means of avoiding conflict, but expresses
concern at the refusal of the Indonesian military to
participate in that effort; and
(9) encourages the Government of Indonesia to
expedite the reunification of separated East Timor-
ese children with their families, and to hold legally
accountable those individuals and organizations re-
284
sponsible for taking those children and for obstruct-
ing reunification efforts.
SEC. 723. AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998.
Section 207(a) of the International Religious Free-
dom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6435(a)) is amended by in-
serting ‘‘and for each subsequent fiscal year’’ after
‘‘2003’’.
SEC. 724. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) The Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
and
Uzbekistan are providing the United States with as-
sistance in the war in Afghanistan, from military
basing and overflight rights to the facilitation of hu-
manitarian relief.
(2) In turn, the United States victory over the
Taliban in Afghanistan provides important benefits
to the Central Asian nations by removing a regime
that threatened their security and by significantly
weakening the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a
terrorist organization that had previously staged
armed raids from Afghanistan into the region.
285
(3) The United States has consistently urged
the nations of Central Asia to open their political
systems and economies and to respect human rights,
both before and since the attacks of September 11,
2001.
(4) 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are members of the
United Nations and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), both of which
confer a range of obligations with respect to human
rights on their members.
(5) While the United States recognizes marked
differences among the social structures and commit-
ments to democratic and economic reform of the
Central Asian nations, the United States notes nev-
ertheless, according to the State Department Coun-
try Reports on Human Rights Practices, that all five
governments of such nations, to differing degrees,
restrict freedom of speech and association, restrict
or ban the activities of human rights organizations
and other nongovernmental organizations, harass or
prohibit independent media, imprison political oppo-
nents, practice arbitrary detention and arrest, and
engage in torture and extrajudicial executions.
286
(6) By continuing to suppress human rights
and to deny citizens peaceful, democratic means of
expressing their convictions, the nations of Central
Asia risk fueling popular support for violent and ex-
tremist movements, thus undermining the goals of
the war on terrorism.
(7) President George W. Bush has made the
defense of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on
the power of the state, respect for women and pri-
vate property, free speech, equal justice, religious
tolerance strategic goals of United States foreign
policy in the Islamic world, arguing that ‘‘a truly
strong nation will permit legal avenues of dissent for
all groups that pursue their aspirations without vio-
lence’’.
(8) Congress has expressed its desire to see
deeper reform in Central Asia in past resolutions
and other legislation, most recently conditioning as-
sistance to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on their
progress in meeting commitments to the United
States on human rights and democracy.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that—
(1) 
the 
governments 
of 
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
and
287
Uzbekistan should accelerate democratic reforms
and fulfill their human rights obligations, including,
where appropriate, by—
(A) releasing from prison anyone jailed for
peaceful political activism or the nonviolent ex-
pression of their political or religious beliefs;
(B) fully investigating any credible allega-
tions of torture and prosecuting those respon-
sible;
(C) permitting the free and unfettered
functioning of independent media outlets, inde-
pendent political parties, and nongovernmental
organizations, including by easing registration
processes;
(D) permitting the free exercise of reli-
gious beliefs and ceasing the persecution of
members of religious groups and denominations
that do not engage in violence or political
change through violence;
(E) holding free, competitive, and fair elec-
tions; and
(F) making publicly available documenta-
tion of their revenues and punishing those en-
gaged in official corruption;
288
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of Defense should—
(A) continue to raise at the highest levels
with the governments of the nations of Central
Asia specific cases of political and religious per-
secution, and to urge greater respect for human
rights and democratic freedoms at every diplo-
matic opportunity;
(B) take progress in meeting the goals
specified in paragraph (1) into account when
determining the scope and nature of United
States diplomatic and military relations and as-
sistance with each of such governments;
(C) ensure that the provisions of foreign
operations appropriations Acts are fully imple-
mented to ensure that no United States assist-
ance benefits security forces in Central Asia
that are implicated in violations of human
rights;
(D) 
press 
the 
Government 
of
Turkmenistan to implement the helpful rec-
ommendations contained in the 2003 resolution
on Turkmenistan of the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights and the so-called
‘‘Moscow Mechanism’’ Report of the Organiza-
289
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), respect the right of all prisoners to
due process and a fair trial and release demo-
cratic activists and their family members from
prison;
(E) urge the Government of Russia not to
extradite to Turkmenistan members of the po-
litical opposition of Turkmenistan;
(F) 
work 
with 
the 
Government 
of
Kazakhstan to create a political climate free of
intimidation and harassment, including releas-
ing political prisoners and permitting the return
of political exiles, and to reduce official corrup-
tion, including by urging the Government of
Kazakhstan to cooperate with the ongoing
United States Department of Justice investiga-
tion;
(G) support through United States assist-
ance programs individuals, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and media outlets in Central Asia
working to build more open societies, to support
the victims of human rights abuses, and to ex-
pose official corruption; and
(H) press the Government of Uzbekistan
to implement fully the recommendations made
290
to the Government of Uzbekistan by the United
Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Torture; and
(3) increased levels of United States assistance
to the governments of the nations of Central Asia
made possible by their cooperation in the war in Af-
ghanistan can be sustained only if there is substan-
tial and continuing progress toward meeting the
goals specified in paragraph (1).
SEC. 725. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO AUTHORIZATION OF
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
FOR CENTER FOR CULTURAL AND TECH-
NICAL INTERCHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST.
Section 112(3) of the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (116 Stat. 1358; Public Law
107–228) is amended by striking ‘‘$15,000,000’’ and in-
serting ‘‘$18,000,000’’.
SEC. 726. UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INDUS-
TRY AND SECURITY.
(a) UNDER SECRETARY.—There shall be in the De-
partment of Commerce an Under Secretary of Commerce
for Industry and Security who shall serve as the head of
the Bureau of Industry and Security and perform such
duties as the Secretary of Commerce shall prescribe. The
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security
291
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
(b) INCUMBENT.—The individual serving on the date
of the enactment of this Act as the Under Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration shall serve as the
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security
until such time as a successor is appointed under sub-
section (a).
(c) COMPENSATION.—Section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘Under Secretary of
Commerce for Export Administration’’ and inserting
‘‘Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Secu-
rity’’.
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 15(a) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2414(a)) is amended—
(1) by striking the first sentence; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘in car-
rying out such functions’’ and inserting ‘‘of Com-
merce for Industry and Security in carrying out the
functions of the Under Secretary’’.
SEC. 727. CONCERNING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
292
(1) The proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction presents a direct threat to the stability, se-
curity, and safety of nations around the globe.
(2) Combatting the spread of such weapons is
a responsibility borne by all nations.
(3) United States efforts to stop the further
spread of these weapons can be further enhanced by
cooperative efforts between the United States and
the European Union.
(4) There are many different components in
this effort that require a comprehensive approach,
immediate attention, and vigorous action, including
the ‘‘10+10 over 10 Initiative’’ agreed to by the
United States and many members of the European
Union.
(5) Stopping the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction is made more difficult when states willingly
participate in, or contribute to, their development or
their sale or transfer to other nations.
(6) Stopping the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction is made more difficult when private compa-
nies willingly participate in, or contribute to, their
development or their sale or transfer to other na-
tions.
293
(7) United States security and safety is under-
mined when companies engage in such commerce.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Congress call on the
European Union to—
(1) develop an aggressive and robust regulatory
system designed to—
(A) investigate allegations of companies
contributing to the development of weapons of
mass destruction or their sale or transfer to
other nations;
(B) isolate and comdemn companies found
to participate in, or contribute to, the develop-
ment of such weapons or their sale or transfer
to other nations; and
(C) develop a punitive response designed to
punish such companies, thereby preventing fur-
ther actions on their part and discouraging
other companies from engaging in such actions;
(2) condemn, by name, states known to be con-
tributing to the development or spread of weapons of
mass destruction; and
(3) develop appropriate punitive measures de-
signed to discourage further actions.
294
SEC. 
728. 
INTERNATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL 
BIO-
TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State shall
provide to other countries, as appropriate, the scientific
evidence on the benefits, safety, and potential uses of agri-
cultural biotechnology.
(b) SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.—The Secretary of State
shall—
(1) chair an interagency task force comprised of
representatives of the Department of Commerce, the
Department of Agriculture, and the United States
Agency for International Development to develop
and disseminate accurate written scientific informa-
tion on the potential benefits of agricultural bio-
technology for human and animal nutrition, the en-
vironment, food and feed production, agricultural
sustainability, and bioenergy development;
(2) coordinate the development and dissemina-
tion of scientifically-based facts regarding, the safety
and regulation of biotechnology-derived food and
feed products;
(3) instruct the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) to develop a pro-
gram to demonstrate the potential benefits of agri-
cultural biotechnology to develop products that can
be grown under local soil and climate conditions and
295
better meet the health and nutritional needs of local
populations in the developing world; and
(4) ensure that personnel undertaking these ac-
tivities are knowledgeable of, and disseminate infor-
mation on, the United States regulatory safeguards
that assure food and environmental safety.
SEC. 729. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT BURDENSHARING.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the Secretary of State should actively en-
courage the international community to accept refu-
gees for resettlement on a more equitable basis;
(2) the Secretary of State should raise the issue
of refugee resettlement burdensharing at the United
Nations and other multilateral and bilateral meet-
ings;
(3) developed countries should be encouraged to
increase the percentage of the world’s refugees ac-
cepted for resettlement; and
(4) the Secretary of State should encourage de-
veloping stable countries in regions with refugee
flows to accept for resettlement as many of their
neighbors as possible.
296
SEC. 730. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MIGRATION
ISSUES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
MEXICO.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:
(1) During President Bush’s first meeting with
President Fox in Guanajuato, Mexico, the Presi-
dents stated in the Joint Communique of February
16, 2001 that ‘‘we are instructing our Governments
to engage, at the earliest opportunity, in formal high
level negotiations aimed at achieving short and long-
term agreements that will allow us to constructively
address migration and labor issues between our two
countries.’’.
(2) During President Fox’s official visit to
Washington, D.C., the Joint Statement of Sep-
tember 6, 2001, summarized the meeting as follows:
‘‘The Presidents reviewed the progress made by our
joint working group on migration chaired by Secre-
taries Powell, CastaZeda, and Creel and Attorney
General Ashcroft and noted this represented the
most fruitful and frank dialogue we have ever had
on a subject so important to both nations. They
praised implementation of the border safety initia-
tive, and recognized that migration-related issues are
deeply felt by our publics and vital to our prosperity,
well-being, and the kind of societies we want to
297
build. They renewed their commitment to forging
new and realistic approaches to migration to ensure
it is safe, orderly, legal and dignified, and agreed on
the framework within which this ongoing effort is
based. This includes: matching willing workers with
willing employers; serving the social and economic
needs of both countries; respecting the human dig-
nity of all migrants, regardless of their status; recog-
nizing the contribution migrants make to enriching
both societies; shared responsibility for ensuring mi-
gration takes place through safe and legal channels.
Both stressed their commitment to continue our dis-
cussions, instructing the high-level working group to
reach mutually satisfactory results on border safety,
a temporary worker program and the status of un-
documented Mexicans in the United States. They re-
quested that the working group provide them pro-
posals with respect to these issues as soon as pos-
sible. The Presidents recognized that this is an ex-
traordinarily challenging area of public policy, and
that it is critical to address the issue in a timely
manner and with appropriate thoroughness and
depth.’’.
(3) On September 7, 2001, during President
Fox’s historic State Visit to Washington, the United
298
States and Mexico issued a joint statement instruct-
ing our cabinet-level working group to provide us
with specific proposals to forge a new and realistic
framework that will ensure a safe, legal, orderly, and
dignified migration flow between our countries. We
have today agreed that our Cabinet level migration
group should continue the work we charged it with
in Guanajuato and Washington.
(4) When the Presidents met in Monterrey,
Mexico, the Presidents stated in a Joint Statement
on March 22, 2002, as follows: ‘‘Slightly more than
one year ago, in Guanajuato, we talked about migra-
tion as one of the major ties that join our societies.
We launched then the frankest and most productive
dialogue our countries have ever had on this impor-
tant and challenging subject. Those talks have con-
tinued over the past year, and have yielded a clearer
assessment of the scope and nature of this issue.
This bond between our nations can render countless
benefits to our respective economies and families.
(5) Over the past year, important progress has
been made to enhance migrant safety and particu-
larly in saving lives by discouraging and reducing il-
legal crossings in dangerous terrain.
299
(6) At the conclusion of the Mexico-United
States Binational Commission (BNC) meeting in
Mexico City in November 2002, Secretary of State
Powell’s press conference was summarized by the
State Department as follows: The BNC’s migration
working group ‘‘affirmed our strong commitment to
advancing our bilateral migration agenda,’’ he
stressed, adding that ‘‘there should be no doubt in
anyone’s mind that this is a priority for President
Bush, just as it is a priority for [Mexican] President
[Vicente] Fox.’’.
(7) Secretary Powell said no schedule had been
established for a migration accord, but he confirmed
that the United States and Mexico want to come up
with a series of migration initiatives over the course
of the next six months to a year.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that—
(1) that the United States and Mexico should
as soon as is practicable conclude negotiations in an
attempt to reach a migration accord that is as com-
prehensive as possible and which addresses the key
issues of concern for both nations; and
(2) that as part of any migration agreement be-
tween the United States and Mexico, the issues of
300
the extradition of violent criminals and law enforce-
ment cooperation between the two nations be ad-
dressed.
SEC. 731. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING UNITED
STATES ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN REFU-
GEES.
The Congress—
(1) recognizes the importance of United States
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees as
an essential component to the peace process in the
Middle East;
(2) acknowledges the hardships endured by
many innocent Palestinian refugees in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip and in other neighboring coun-
tries;
(3) notes that the United Nations High Com-
mission for Refugees (UNHCR) is the international
body that seeks to find ‘‘lasting solutions’’ to the
plight of refugees throughout the world, with the
sole exception of the Palestinians, for whose exclu-
sive benefit a special agency, the United Nations Re-
lief and Works Agency (UNRWA), was established
in 1950 and which makes no effort to permanently
resettle Palestinian refugees, even those who reside
under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority,
301
in order to ensure the perpetuation of the problem
of Palestinian refugees;
(4) recognizes that the United States has been
the world’s leading donor to UNRWA, having pro-
vided over $2,500,000,000 to UNRWA since 1950,
including the provision of $110,000,000, in fiscal
year 2002, and that such organization has provided
important humanitarian assistance to the Pales-
tinian people;
(5) notes that the United States contribution to
UNRWA is nearly 10 times that of the entire Arab
world, and calls on Arab states to assume a greater
share of the burden for financing UNWRA;
(6) expresses its outrage over credible reports
that UNRWA facilities have been used for terrorist
training and bases for terrorist operations, with little
attempt by the UNRWA to stop or oppose such at-
tacks or alert relevant law enforcement authorities
about such terrorist activities;
(7) expresses deep concern over the textbooks
and educational materials used in the UNRWA edu-
cational system that promote anti-Semitism, denial
of the existence and the right to exist of the state
of Israel, and exacerbate stereotypes and tensions
between the Palestinians and Israelis;
302
(8) strongly urges the Secretary General of the
United Nations to immediately take steps to com-
prehensively reform the UNRWA so that it actively
works to oppose terrorist attacks and actively works
to promote reconciliation and understanding between
the Israelis and Palestinians;
(9) strongly urges UNRWA to meet the re-
quirements, in letter and spirit, of section 301(c) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including by
comprehensively ensuring that no UNRWA assist-
ance is rendered to anyone who has been involved
with terrorism at any time and that all UNRWA
beneficiaries be informed at the earliest possible
time, and at regular intervals thereafter, that any-
one involved with terrorism thereafter will be ineli-
gible for UNRWA benefits;
(10) strongly urges the Secretary of State to
make UNRWA reforms a priority at the United Na-
tions by actively campaigning within the United Na-
tions to support such reforms, including comprehen-
sive and independently verifiable audits of UNRWA
activities and educational reform that would remove
from the curriculum all textbooks and educational
materials that promote hatred of Jews and Israel
and denial of Israel’s right to exist and replace them
303
with teaching materials that promote Israeli-Pales-
tinian reconciliation and mutual understanding; and
(11) notes the General Accounting Office
(GAO) audit required by section 580 of the FY
2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Public
Law 108–7), and strongly encourages the GAO to
conduct, as part of this audit, an investigation and
inspection of all recent United States assistance to
UNRWA to ensure that taxpayer funds are being
spent effectively and are not directly or indirectly
supporting terrorism, anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish
teachings, or the glorification or incitement of vio-
lence.
SEC. 732. UNITED STATES POLICY ON WORLD BANK GROUP
LOANS TO IRAN.
(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—The Secretary of
State (or a designee), in consultation with the Secretary
of the Treasury, shall communicate directly with the gov-
ernments of countries represented on the decision-making
boards and councils of the international financial institu-
tions of the World Bank Group and consistently convey
the strong opposition of the United States Government to
any further activity in Iran by the international financial
institutions of the World Bank Group.
304
(b) REPORTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act and one year thereafter, the
Secretary of State shall submit a report on the efforts of
the Secretary to carry out subsection (a) to the chairman
and ranking minority member of the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(c) WORLD BANK GROUP DEFINED.—As used in this
section, the term ‘‘World Bank Group’’ means the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, the International
Financial Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment
Guaranty Agency.
SEC. 733. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO SOVIET NU-
CLEAR TESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) In 1991, immediately after achieving inde-
pendence, Kazakhstan closed and sealed the world’s
second largest nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk
which had been inherited from the former Soviet
Union and at which more than 500 nuclear tests
had been conducted from 1949 to 1991.
(2) The cumulative power of explosions from
those tests, conducted above ground, on the ground,
and underground is believed to be equal to the power
305
of 20,000 explosions of the type of bomb dropped on
Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945.
(3) More than 1,500,000 people in Kazakhstan
suffered because of decades of Soviet nuclear weap-
ons testing in the region.
(4) A horrifying array of disease will continue
to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands and
their descendants for many generations to come as
a result of these tests.
(5) Since its independence, Kazakhstan has
constructed a stable and peaceful state, voluntarily
disarmed the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal,
joined 
the 
Strategic 
Arms 
Reduction 
Treaty
(START), and became an example of responsible
nonproliferation of such weapons.
(6) Kazakhstan is also doing its best to help
those who were exposed to the horrific nuclear ex-
periments of the 20th century but it faces daunting
challenges.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the Secretary of State should work to establish
a joint working group with the Government of Kazakhstan
to assist in assessing the environmental damage and
health effects caused by Soviet nuclear testing in
Semipalatinsk.
306
SEC. 734. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN.
The Congress—
(1) recalls that Article 4 of the United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women (20 December 1993) outlines that states
should condemn violence against women and should
not invoke any custom, tradition, or religious consid-
eration to avoid their obligations with respect to its
elimination;
(2) recalls that Chapter 4, Section 125, of the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth
World Conference on Women (15 September 1995)
states that governments condemn violence against
women and refrain from invoking any custom, tradi-
tion, or religious consideration to avoid their obliga-
tions with respect to its elimination as set out in the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against
Women;
(3) recalls that the United States has supported
both the United Nations Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence and the Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action; and
(4) reinforces the position of the United States
that the United States condemns violence against
women and refrains from invoking any custom, tra-
307
dition, or religious consideration to avoid this na-
tion’s obligations with respect to its elimination as
set out in the Declaration on the Elimination of Vio-
lence against Women.
SEC. 735. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE TIMELY
ISSUANCE OF VISAS FOR RUSSIAN WEAPONS
SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN ARMS CONTROL
AND NONPROLIFERATION EXCHANGES WITH
THE UNITED STATES.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:
(1) The United States visa approval system has
in the past lacked proper oversight, coordination,
and supervision. A more systematic, stringent, and
rigorous evaluation system for visa approvals is
clearly in the best interests of the United States.
(2) Many distinguished scholars, professors, re-
searchers, and foreign associates of United States
national academies have been prevented by visa
delays from entering the United States for engage-
ments at major conferences, meetings, and teaching
invitations at American universities.
(3) Research collaborators for United States
laboratories have also been prevented from entering
the United States. Their absence halts projects and
308
compromises United States commitments in long-
standing international cooperative agreements aimed
at reducing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
(4) Visa restrictions came within one day of
forcing the cancellation of an important meeting in
Washington, D.C. of the National Academy of
Sciences Committee on United States Russian Co-
operation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
(5) Russian weapons scientists involved in nu-
clear non-proliferation cooperative efforts with the
United States are critical to American efforts to en-
sure that nuclear weapons-grade materials remain
under control and out of the hands of terrorists.
(6) In a December 2002 statement, the Presi-
dents of the National Academy of Sciences, the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine found that a United States approach to
visas that welcomes qualified foreign scientists, engi-
neers, health professionals, and students serves na-
tional goals in three distinct ways:
(A) It harnesses international cooperation
for counterterrorism.
(B) It builds stronger allies through sci-
entific and technical cooperation.
309
(C) It maintains United States global lead-
ership in science and technology.
(7) The Presidents of the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and
the Institute of Medicine have found that current
United States policy toward granting visas, to for-
eign scientists is harmful to the United States sci-
entific community and to the longterm well-being of
the United States. They stated on December 13,
2002, that ‘‘To make our nation safer, it is ex-
tremely important that our visa policy not only keep
out foreigners who intend to do us harm, but also
facilitate the acceptance of those who bring us con-
siderable benefit. Recent efforts by our government
to constrain the flow of international visitors in the
name of national security are having serious unin-
tended consequences for American science, engineer-
ing, and medicine. The long-term security of the
United States depends on admitting scholars who
benefit our nation. In short, the United States sci-
entific, engineering, and health communities cannot
hope to maintain their present position of inter-
national leadership if they become isolated from the
rest of the world. We view this as an urgent matter,
one that must be promptly addressed if the United
310
States is to meet both its national security and eco-
nomic development goals.’’.
(8) Currently, consular officials send many visa
applications back to the United States for sequential
security clearances by several agencies, which may
lead to long delays in visa processing. Consular offi-
cers are subject to criminal penalties if they grant
a visa to a person who subsequently commits a ter-
rorist act in the United States. However, there are
currently no incentives for consular officers to facili-
tate scientific exchanges, which may advance the na-
tional interest of the United States.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that—
(1) to the extent possible and consistent with
national security objectives, the United States
should expedite the processing of granting visas to
Russian weapons scientists, especially those partici-
pating in bilateral weapon disarmament talks, nego-
tiations, and exchanges, to enable them to partici-
pate in cooperative nonproliferation activities with
their counterparts in the United States, and
(2) the Department of State is encouraged to
consider streamlining the process of granting visas
for such scientists as follows:
311
(A) Reinstate a procedure of pre-security
clearance for scientists and engineers with the
proper credentials.
(B) Involve the United States scientific
and technical community in determining areas
of particular security concern.
SEC. 736. DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANI-
ZATIONS.
(a) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—Section 219(a)(4) of
the 
Immigration 
and 
Nationality 
Act 
(8 
U.S.C.
1189(a)(4)) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (A)—
(A) by striking ‘‘Subject to paragraphs (5)
and (6), a’’ and inserting ‘‘A’’; and
(B) by striking ‘‘for a period of 2 years be-
ginning on the effective date of the designation
under paragraph (2)(B)’’ and inserting ‘‘until
revoked under paragraph (5) or (6) or set aside
pursuant to subsection (c)’’;
(2) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting
the following:
‘‘(B) REVIEW OF DESIGNATION UPON PE-
TITION.—
‘‘(i) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary
shall review the designation of a foreign
312
terrorist organization under the procedures
set forth in clauses (iii) and (iv) if the des-
ignated organization files a petition for
revocation within the petition period de-
scribed in clause (ii).
‘‘(ii) PETITION
PERIOD.—For pur-
poses of clause (i)—
‘‘(I) if the designated organiza-
tion has not previously filed a petition
for revocation under this subpara-
graph, the petition period begins 2
years after the date on which the des-
ignation was made; or
‘‘(II) if the designated organiza-
tion has previously filed a petition for
revocation under this subparagraph,
the petition period begins 2 years
after the date of the determination
made under clause (iv) on that peti-
tion.
‘‘(iii) PROCEDURES.—Any foreign ter-
rorist organization that submits a petition
for revocation under this subparagraph
must provide evidence in that petition that
the relevant circumstances described in
313
paragraph (1) have changed in such a
manner as to warrant revocation with re-
spect to the organization.
‘‘(iv) DETERMINATION.—
‘‘(I) IN
GENERAL.—Not later
than 180 days after receiving a peti-
tion for revocation submitted under
this subparagraph, the Secretary shall
make a determination as to such rev-
ocation.
‘‘(II) 
CLASSIFIED
INFORMA-
TION.—The Secretary may consider
classified information in making a de-
termination in response to a petition
for revocation. Classified information
shall not be subject to disclosure for
such time as it remains classified, ex-
cept that such information may be
disclosed to a court ex parte and in
camera for purposes of judicial review
under subsection (c).
‘‘(III) PUBLICATION OF DETER-
MINATION.—A determination made by
the Secretary under this clause shall
be published in the Federal Register.
314
‘‘(IV) PROCEDURES.—Any rev-
ocation by the Secretary shall be
made in accordance with paragraph
(6).’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(C) OTHER REVIEW OF DESIGNATION.—
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—If in a 4-year pe-
riod no review has taken place under sub-
paragraph (B), the Secretary shall review
the designation of the foreign terrorist or-
ganization in order to determine whether
such designation should be revoked pursu-
ant to paragraph (6).
‘‘(ii) PROCEDURES.—If a review does
not take place pursuant to subparagraph
(B) in response to a petition for revocation
that is filed in accordance with that sub-
paragraph, then the review shall be con-
ducted pursuant to procedures established
by the Secretary. The results of such re-
view and the applicable procedures shall
not be reviewable in any court.
‘‘(iii) PUBLICATION OF RESULTS OF
REVIEW.—The Secretary shall publish any
315
determination made pursuant to this sub-
paragraph in the Federal Register.’’.
(b) ALIASES.—Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189) is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as
subsections (c) and (d), respectively; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
lowing new subsection (b):
‘‘(b) AMENDMENTS TO A DESIGNATION.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may amend
a designation under this subsection if the Secretary
finds that the organization has changed its name,
adopted a new alias, dissolved and then reconsti-
tuted itself under a different name or names, or
merged with another organization.
‘‘(2) PROCEDURE.—Amendments made to a
designation in accordance with paragraph (1) shall
be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of subsection (a)(2)
shall apply to an amended designation upon such
publication. Paragraphs (2)(A)(i), (4), (5), (6), (7),
and (8) of subsection (a) shall also apply to an
amended designation.
‘‘(3) ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD.—The adminis-
trative record shall be corrected to include the
316
amendments as well as any additional relevant infor-
mation that supports those amendments.
‘‘(4) CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.—The Sec-
retary may consider classified information in amend-
ing a designation in accordance with this subsection.
Classified information shall not be subject to disclo-
sure for such time as it remains classified, except
that such information may be disclosed to a court ex
parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review
under subsection (c).’’.
(c) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—
Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1189) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ‘‘sub-
section (b)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (c)’’;
(B) in paragraph (6)(A)—
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i),
by striking ‘‘or a redesignation made under
paragraph (4)(B)’’ and inserting ‘‘at any
time, and shall revoke a designation upon
completion of a review conducted pursuant
to subparagraphs (B) and (C) of para-
graph (4)’’; and
317
(ii) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘or redes-
ignation’’;
(C) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘, or the
revocation of a redesignation under paragraph
(6),’’; and
(D) in paragraph (8)—
(i) by striking ‘‘, or if a redesignation
under this subsection has become effective
under paragraph (4)(B),’’; and
(ii) by striking ‘‘or redesignation’’;
and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated—
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘of the
designation in the Federal Register,’’ and all
that follows through ‘‘review of the designa-
tion’’ and inserting ‘‘in the Federal Register of
a designation, an amended designation, or a de-
termination in response to a petition for revoca-
tion, the designated organization may seek judi-
cial review’’;
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘,
amended designation, or determination in re-
sponse to a petition for revocation’’ after ‘‘des-
ignation’’;
318
(C) in paragraph (3), by inserting ‘‘,
amended designation, or determination in re-
sponse to a petition for revocation’’ after ‘‘des-
ignation’’; and
(D) in paragraph (4), by inserting ‘‘,
amended designation, or determination in re-
sponse to a petition for revocation’’ after ‘‘des-
ignation’’ each place that term appears.
(d) SAVINGS PROVISION.—For purposes of applying
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on
or after the date of enactment of this Act, the term ‘‘des-
ignation’’, as used in that section, includes all redesigna-
tions made pursuant to section 219(a)(4)(B) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(B))
prior to the date of enactment of this Act, and such redes-
ignations shall continue to be effective until revoked as
provided in paragraph (5) or (6) of section 219(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
SEC. 737. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO REGARDING
SECURITY FOR TAIWAN.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) For over half a century a close relationship
has existed between the United States and Taiwan
which has been of enormous economic, cultural, and
strategic advantage to both countries.
319
(2) Taiwan today is a full-fledged democracy
with a vibrant economy and a vigorous multi-party
political system that respects human rights and the
rule of law.
(3) Taiwan is an ally of the United States, as
most recently evidenced by Taiwan’s provision of hu-
manitarian and financial assistance to Afghanistan
at the request of the United States and its support
for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(4) The security of the 23 million people in Tai-
wan is threatened by the deployment by the People’s
Republic of China of over 400 short–range ballistic
missiles targeted at Taiwan, and the purchase by the
PRC of advanced weaponry systems, including Su–
27 and Su–30 fighter planes, Kilo submarines, and
Sovremenny destroyers.
(5) Taiwan was threatened by missile exercises
conducted by the PRC in August 1995 and again in
March 1996 when Taiwan was conducting its first
free and direct presidential elections.
(6) Section 2(b)(4) of the Taiwan Relations Act
(22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(4)) considers any effort to de-
termine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat
320
to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States.
(7) Section 2(b)(6) of the Taiwan Relations Act
(22 U.S.C. 3301(b)(6)) requires the United States
to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force
or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the
people on Taiwan.
(8) In his January 17, 2001, confirmation hear-
ing as Secretary of State, General Colin Powell stat-
ed that ‘‘We will stand by Taiwan and will provide
for the defense needs of Taiwan in accordance with
the Taiwan Relations Act and the subsequent com-
muniques.’’.
(9) President Bush stated on April 24, 2001,
that the United States will do whatever it takes to
help Taiwan defend itself.
(10) In his testimony before the International
Relations Committee of the House of Representa-
tives and the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Senate in February and March of 2002, Admiral
Dennis Blair of the United States Pacific Command
testified that ‘‘China continued to build and exercise
its force of short–range ballistic missiles ranging
Taiwan. It still seeks to develop a range of military
321
options to influence and intimidate Taiwan, and has
not abandoned the option of using force to resolve
Taiwan’s status.’’.
(11) The July 2002 U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission report to Congress
stated that ‘‘China is enhancing its capability to
carry out attacks across the Taiwan Strait with its
special operations forces, air forces and navy and
missiles forces with little notice,’’ and ‘‘the Commis-
sion recommends that the U.S. along with its allies
should continue to call upon China to renounce the
threat of or the use of force against Taiwan.’’.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
(1) grave concerns exist concerning the deploy-
ment by the People’s Republic of China of hundreds
of ballistic missiles directed toward Taiwan, which
threaten the security and stability in the Taiwan
Strait;
(2) the President should direct all appropriate
United States officials to raise these concerns with
the appropriate officials from the People’s Republic
of China, and should seek a public, immediate, and
unequivocal renunciation from the leaders of the
322
People’s Republic of China of any threat or use of
force against Taiwan;
(3) the President should affirm with the leaders
of the People’s Republic of China that there will not
be a quid pro quo between the dismantling of mis-
siles aimed at Taiwan by the People’s Republic of
China, and arms sales to Taiwan by the United
States;
(4) China should dismantle the missiles that
threaten Taiwan, otherwise the President should au-
thorize the sale of the Aegis system to Taiwan,
which would enable Taiwan to defend itself against
the threat of a missile attack by China; and
(5) the future of Taiwan should be determined
peacefully and with the express consent of the people
of Taiwan.
SEC. 738. SENSE OF CONGRESS IN APPRECIATION OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND
REGARDING RESTORING STABILITY AND SE-
CURITY IN IRAQ.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) The United States, with the support of
forces from Great Britain and other countries, his-
323
torically and courageously liberated Iraq in three
weeks.
(2) Conditions on the ground in parts of Iraq
continue to pose a grave threat to American troops,
thereby complicating efforts to restore law and order
and essential public services for Iraqis. Such efforts
are further complicated by the absence of effective
communications with the Iraqi people.
(3) Ultimately, maintaining law and order in
Iraq and preserving its territorial integrity will re-
quire the creation of a professionally trained Iraqi
police force and a reformed Iraqi military; however,
that will take a significant amount of time and in
the meantime international armed forces and police
must assume these responsibilities.
(4) Approximately 145,000 United States
troops are currently deployed in Iraq, meaning that
American troops comprise roughly 90 percent of Co-
alition forces. If, as the Department of Defense has
stated, an additional 10,000 international troops
join the Coalition effort in Iraq by September,
Americans will still comprise roughly 85 percent of
Coalition forces.
(5) Maintaining the existing force level in Iraq
currently requires $3,900,000,000 each month.
324
(6) The Department of Defense has stated that
it will require one year to train a new Iraqi Army
of 12,000 soldiers and three years to train 40,000
soldiers.
(7) The Coalition Provisional Authority has
stated that it will require at least one year to recruit
and train a police force of 40,000 officers capable of
assuming minimal policy functions in Iraq, that it
will require five years to recruit and train a full
force of 75,000 officers, and that at least 5500 addi-
tional international police are needed to train, assist,
and jointly patrol with the existing Iraqi police force.
(8) President Bush has noted that ‘‘The rise of
Iraq, as an example of moderation and democracy
and prosperity, is a massive and long-term under-
taking,’’ and it is clear that increasing the number
of troops and police from countries other than the
United States will reduce risks to American soldiers
and the financial cost to the United States.
(9) Secretary Rumsfeld testified that ‘‘We cer-
tainly want assistance from NATO and from NATO
countries’’ and it is clear that involving the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, as is being done in Af-
ghanistan and has been done in Kosovo and Bosnia,
allows the Coalition to maintain a robust military
325
presence while decreasing the exposure and risk to
American troops.
(10) Rebuilding Iraq’s neglected infrastructure
and economy and administering Iraq—including pro-
viding basic services and paying public sector sala-
ries—is likely to require tens of billions of dollars
over several years and projected Iraqi oil revenues
will be insufficient to meet these costs.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
(1) it is in the national security interests of the
United States to remain engaged in Iraq in order to
ensure a peaceful, stable, unified Iraq with a rep-
resentative government;
(2) the President should consider requesting
formally and expeditiously that the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) raise a force for de-
ployment in post-war Iraq similar to what it has
done in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo and the
Congress urges NATO allies and other nations to
provide troops and police to Coalition efforts in Iraq;
and
(3) the President should consider calling on the
United Nations to urge its member states to provide
military forces and civilian police to promote sta-
326
bility and security in Iraq and resources to help re-
build and administer Iraq.
SEC. 739. ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES CITIZENS BY PALES-
TINIAN TERRORISTS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Since Yasser Arafat renounced violence in
the Oslo Peace Accords on September 13, 1993, at
least 41 United States citizens have been murdered
by Palestinian terrorists and one United States cit-
izen miscarried after being stabbed in a Palestinian
terrorist attack.
(2) On December 1, 1993, in a drive-by shoot-
ing north of Jerusalem, Hamas killed United States
citizen Yitzhak Weinstock, 19, whose family came
from Los Angeles.
(3) On October 9, 1994, Hamas kidnapped and
murdered 
United 
States 
citizen 
Nachshon
Wachsman, 19, whose family came from New York
City.
(4) On April 9, 1995, an Islamic Jihad bomb
attack on a bus near Kfar Darom killed United
States citizen Alisa Flatow, 20, from West Orange,
New Jersey.
327
(5) On August 21, 1995, in a Hamas bus
bombing in Jerusalem, United States citizen Joan
Davenny, from New Haven, Connecticut, was killed.
(6) On September 9, 1995, Mara Frey of Chi-
cago was stabbed in Ma’ale Michmash resulting in
her unborn child’s death.
(7) On February 25, 1996, three United States
citizens, Sara Duker of Teaneck, New Jersey, Mat-
thew Eisenfeld of West Hartford, Connecticut, and
Ira Weinstein of New York City, were killed in a
Hamas bus bombing in Jerusalem.
(8) On May 13, 1996, United States citizen
David Boim, 17, of New York City, was killed in a
drive-by shooting near Beit El, north of Jerusalem.
(9) On June 9, 1996, United States citizen
Yaron Ungar was killed in a drive by-shooting near
Beit Shemesh.
(10) On July 30, 1997, United States citizen
Leah Stern of Passaic, New Jersey, was killed in a
Hamas bombing in Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda
market.
(11) On September 4, 1997, a Hamas bombing
on Ben-Yehuda Street, Jerusalem, killed Yael
Botwin, 14, of Los Angeles.
328
(12) On April 19, 1998, an attack near the
Israeli town of Maon killed United States citizen
Dov Dribben, 28.
(13) On October 8, 2000, Rabbi Hillel
Lieberman, 36, of New York City, was stabbed and
killed near Nablus.
(14) On October 30, 2000, United States cit-
izen Esh-Kodesh Gilmore, 25, was shot in Jeru-
salem.
(15) On December 31, 2000, Rabbi Binyamin
Kahane, 34, and his wife, Talia Hertzlich Kahane,
both formerly of New York City, were killed in a
drive-by shooting near Ofra.
(16) On May 9, 2001, Jacob ‘‘Koby’’ Mandell,
13, of Silver Spring, Maryland, was killed in an at-
tack near Tekoah.
(17) On May 29, 2001, Sarah Blaustein, 53, of
Lawrence, New York, was killed in a drive-by shoot-
ing near Efrat.
(18) On August 9, 2001, two United States
citizens, Judith L. Greenbaum, 31, and Malka Roth,
15, were killed in the Jerusalem Sbarro pizzeria
bombing.
329
(19) On November 4, 2001, Shoshana Ben-
Yishai, 16, of New York City, was shot and killed
during an attack on a Jerusalem bus.
(20) On January 15, 2002, Avraham Boaz, 72,
of New York City, was killed in a shooting near
Bethlehem.
(21) On January 18, 2002, United States cit-
izen Aaron Elis, 32, was killed in a shooting in
Hadera.
(22) On February 15, 2002, United States cit-
izen Lee Akunis, was shot and killed near Ramallah.
(23) On February 16, 2002, Keren Shatsky,
14, of New York City and Maine, and Rachel
Thaler, 16, of Baltimore, Maryland, were killed in a
bombing in Karnei Shomron.
(24) On February 25, 2002, United States cit-
izen Moran Amit, 25, was stabbed and killed in Abu
Tor Peace Forest, Jerusalem.
(25) On March 24, 2002, Esther Kleinman, 23,
formerly of Chicago, was shot and killed near Ofra.
(26) On March 27, 2002, United States citizen
Hannah Rogen, 90, was killed in a bombing at a
hotel Passover seder in Netanya.
330
(27) On June 18, 2002, Moshe Gottlieb, 70, of
Los Angeles, was killed in a bus bombing in Jeru-
salem.
(28) On June 19, 2002, United States citizen
Gila Sara Kessler, 19, was killed in a bombing at a
Jerusalem bus stop.
(29) On July 31, 2002, five United States citi-
zens were killed in a bombing of a Hebrew Univer-
sity cafeteria: Marla Bennett, 24, of San Diego,
Benjamin Blutstein, 25, of Susquehanna Township,
Pennsylvania, Janis Ruth Coulter, 36, of Massachu-
setts, David Gritz, 24, of Peru, Massachusetts (and
of dual French-United States citizenship), and Dina
Carter, 37, of North Carolina.
(30) On March 5, 2003, Abigail Leitel, 14, who
was born in Lebanon, New Hampshire, died in a bus
bombing in Haifa.
(31) On March 7, 2003, United States citizens
Rabbi Eli Horowitz, 52, who grew up in Chicago,
and Dina Horowitz, 50, who grew up in Florida,
were killed in their home.
(32) On June 11, 2003, United States citizen
Alan Beer, 47, who grew up in Cleveland, was killed
in bus bombing in Jerusalem.
331
(33) On June 20, 2003, United States citizen
Tzvi Goldstein, 47, originally from New York City,
was shot and killed in an attack while driving
through the West Bank.
(34) At least another 79 United States citizens
have been injured in Palestinian terrorist attacks.
(b) STATEMENTS OF POLICY.—Congress—
(1) condemns the attacks on United States citi-
zens by Palestinian terrorists;
(2) calls on the Palestinian Authority to work
with Israel to protect all innocent individuals, re-
gardless of citizenship, from terrorist atrocities;
(3) offers its condolences to the families and
loved ones of United States citizens who were killed
by Palestinian terrorist attacks; and
(4) calls on the Secretary of State to include a
listing of the killing of every United States citizen
by terrorists in the ‘‘Chronology of Significant Ter-
rorist Incidents’’, as included in the Department of
State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report issued
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
332
SEC. 740. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT CONCERNING
WASTEWATER TREATMENT AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMIS-
SION, UNITED STATES AND MEXICO.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The failure by the International Boundary
and Water Commission, United States and Mexico,
to complete negotiations on a new Treaty Minute
with Mexico, as directed by Congress in Public Law
106–457, has endangered the health of the residents
of San Diego County.
(2) The continued flow of Mexican sewage on
San Diego, California, beaches has caused extensive
and persistent beach closings thereby causing eco-
nomic hardship to the local economy.
(3) The International Boundary and Water
Commission has shown insignificant progress in ne-
gotiations with Mexico.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the United States Section of the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission shall make
treaty negotiations with Mexico on the establishment of
a public-private partnership to construct and operate a
wastewater treatment facility in Mexico as outlined in
Public Law 106–457 a priority.
333
(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The United States Sec-
tion of the International Boundary and Water Commis-
sion, United States and Mexcio, shall submit monthly re-
ports to the appropriate congressional committees con-
cerning progress in negotiations on a new Treaty Minute
with Mexico.
SEC. 741. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ALLOCATION
OF RESOURCES FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE AS THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR
THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Department
of State should direct significant resources to their new
role as the central authority for the United States under
the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption.
SEC. 742. TRANSFER OF VIETNAM-ERA CESSNA L–19D BIRD
DOG AIRCRAFT TO ARMY AVIATION HERIT-
AGE FOUNDATION.
(a) AUTHORITY TO CONVEY.—The Secretary of
State may convey, without consideration, to the Army
Aviation Heritage Foundation, a nonprofit organization
incorporated in the State of Georgia, all right, title, and
interest of the United States in and to a Vietnam-era
Cessna L–19D Bird Dog aircraft (serial No. 24020, Na-
tional registration number N32FL)(in this section re-
334
ferred to as the ‘‘aircraft’’) that is excess to the needs
of the Department of State. The conveyance shall be made
by means of a conditional deed of gift
(b) CONDITION OF AIRCRAFT.—The aircraft shall be
conveyed in its current ‘‘as is’’ condition. The Secretary
is not required to repair or alter the condition of the air-
craft before conveying ownership of the aircraft.
(c) CONDITION
ON CONVEYANCE.—The Secretary
shall include in the instrument of conveyance of the air-
craft the following conditions:
(1) The Army Aviation Heritage Foundation
may not convey any ownership interest in, or trans-
fer possession of, the aircraft to any other party
without the prior approval of the Secretary.
(2) The Army Aviation Heritage Foundation
shall operate and maintain the aircraft in compli-
ance with all applicable limitations and maintenance
requirements imposed by the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration.
(d) REVERTER UPON BREACH OF CONDITIONS.—If
the Secretary determines at any time that the Army Avia-
tion Heritage Foundation has conveyed an ownership in-
terest in, or transferred possession of, the aircraft to any
other party without the prior approval of the Secretary,
all right, title, and interest in and to the aircraft, including
335
any repair or alteration of the aircraft, shall revert to the
United States, and the United States shall have the right
of immediate possession of the aircraft.
(e) CONVEYANCE
AT NO COST
TO
THE UNITED
STATES.—The conveyance of the aircraft shall be made
at no cost to the United States. Any costs associated with
the conveyance and costs of operation and maintenance
of the aircraft conveyed shall be borne by the Army Avia-
tion Heritage Foundation.
(f) ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The Sec-
retary may require such additional terms and conditions
in connection with a conveyance under this section as the
Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of
the United States.
(g) CLARIFICATION OF LIABILITY.—Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, upon the conveyance of owner-
ship of the aircraft to the Army Aviation Heritage Foun-
dation, the United States shall not be liable for any death,
injury, loss, or damage that results from any use of that
aircraft by any person other than the United States.
SEC. 743. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO DEMOC-
RACY IN IRAN.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) Iran is neither free nor democratic. Men
and women are not treated equally in Iran, women
336
are legally deprived of internationally recognized
human rights, and religious freedom is not respected
under the laws of Iran. Undemocratic institutions,
such as the Guardians Council, thwart the decisions
of elected leaders.
(2) The April 2003 report of the Department of
State states that Iran remained the most active
state sponsor of terrorism in 2002.
(3) That report also states that Iran continues
to provide funding, safe-haven, training and weapons
to known terrorist groups, notably Hizballah,
HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
that—
(1) currently, there is not a free and fully
democratic government in Iran;
(2) the United States supports transparent, full
democracy in Iran;
(3) the United States supports the rights of the
Iranian people to choose their system of government;
and
(4) the United States condemns the brutal
treatment, imprisonment and torture of Iranian ci-
vilians expressing political dissent.
337
SEC. 744. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE EXTRA-
DITION OF VIOLENT CRIMINALS FROM MEX-
ICO TO THE UNITED STATES.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The Mexican Supreme Court ruled in Octo-
ber 2001 that Mexico will not extradite criminals
who face life sentences in the United States.
(2) Due to this ruling, the United States has
been unable to prosecute numerous suspects wanted
for violent crimes that they committed in the United
States if there is a possibility that these criminals
will face life imprisonment.
(3) The person or persons responsible for the
April 29, 2002, murder of Los Angeles County Sher-
iff Deputy David March is believed to have fled to
Mexico to avoid prosecution for a possible life im-
prisonment.
(4) The attorneys general from all 50 States
have asked United States Attorney General John
Ashcroft and Secretary of State Colin Powell to con-
tinue to address this extradition issue with their
counterparts in Mexico.
(5) The Governments of the United States and
Mexico have experienced positive cooperation on nu-
merous matters relevant to their bilateral relation-
ship.
338
(6) The Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs
has been demonstrating to the Mexican Supreme
Court the international ramifications of the Court’s
October 2001 ruling.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States Government should encour-
age the Mexican Government to work closely with the
Mexican Supreme Court to persuade the Court to recon-
sider its October 2001 ruling so that the possibility of life
imprisonment will not have an effect on the timely extra-
dition of criminal suspects from Mexico to the United
States.
DIVISION 
D—DEFENSE 
TRADE
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
REFORM ACT OF 2003
TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Defense Trade and
Security Assistance Reform Act of 2003’’.
SEC. 1002. DEFINITIONS.
Except as otherwise provided, in this division:
(1) DEFENSE ARTICLES.—The term ‘‘defense
articles’’ has the meaning given the term in section
47(7)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (as
amended by section 1107(d) of this Act).
339
(2) DEFENSE SERVICES.—The term ‘‘defense
services’’ has the meaning given the term in section
47(7)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act (as
amended by section 1107(d) of this Act).
(3) DUAL USE.—The term ‘‘dual use’’ means,
with respect to goods or technology, those goods or
technology that are specifically designed or devel-
oped for civil purposes but which also may be used
or deployed in a military mode.
(4) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.—
The term ‘‘Export Administration Regulations’’
means those regulations contained in sections 730–
774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or suc-
cessor regulations).
(5) GOOD.—The term ‘‘good’’ has the meaning
given the term in section 16(3) of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415(3)).
(6) INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULA-
TIONS.—The term ‘‘International Traffic in Arms
Regulations’’ means those regulations contained in
sections 120–130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regu-
lations (or successor regulations).
(7) MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME;
MTCR.—The term ‘‘Missile Technology Control Re-
gime’’ or ‘‘MTCR’’ has the meaning given the term
340
in section 11B(c)(2) of the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401b(c)(2)).
(8) MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL
REGIME
ANNEX; MTCR
ANNEX.—The term ‘‘Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime Annex’’ or ‘‘MTCR Annex’’
has the meaning given the term in section 11B(c)(4)
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2401b(c)(4)).
(9) OPERATION
IRAQI
FREEDOM.—The term
‘‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’’ means operations of
United States Armed Forces, the armed forces of
the United Kingdom, and the armed forces of other
coalition member countries initiated on or about
March 19, 2003—
(A) to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction;
(B) to enforce United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002)
and other relevant Security Council resolutions
with respect to Iraq; and
(C) to liberate the people of Iraq from the
regime of Saddam Hussein.
(10) TECHNOLOGY.—The term ‘‘technology’’
has the meaning given the term in section 16(4) of
341
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
App. 2415(4)).
SEC. 1003. REFERENCES TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.
Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever in
this division an amendment is expressed in terms of an
amendment to a section or other provision, the reference
shall be considered to be made to that section or other
provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751
et seq.).
TITLE XI—TERRORIST-RELATED
PROHIBITIONS 
AND 
EN-
FORCEMENT MEASURES
SEC. 1101. ELIGIBILITY PROVISIONS.
(a) 
INELIGIBILITY
FOR
TERRORIST
RELATED
TRANSACTIONS.—Section 3(c)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(1))
is amended—
(1) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B), by
striking ‘‘or any predecessor Act,’’ and inserting ‘‘,
any predecessor Act, or licensed or approved under
section 38 of this Act, to carry out a transaction
with a country, the government of which the Sec-
retary of State has determined is a state sponsor of
international terrorism for purposes of section
6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
342
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)), or otherwise uses such
defense articles or defense services’’; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(C) In this section, the term ‘transaction’ means the
taking of any action, directly or indirectly, by a foreign
country that would be a transaction prohibited by section
40 of this Act with respect to the United States Govern-
ment and United States persons.’’.
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Section 3(e) (22
U.S.C. 2753(e)) is amended by inserting after ‘‘the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961,’’ the following: ‘‘regardless
of whether the article or service has been sold or otherwise
furnished by the United States Government or licensed
under section 38 of this Act,’’.
SEC. 1102. WEAPONS TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN PERSONS IN
THE UNITED STATES.
Section 38(a)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) is amended
in the first sentence by inserting after ‘‘import and the
export of defense articles and defense services’’ the fol-
lowing: ‘‘, or the transfer of such articles, other than fire-
arms (or ammunition, components, parts, accessories, or
attachments for firearms), and services within the United
States to foreign persons,’’.
343
SEC. 1103. COORDINATION OF LICENSE EXEMPTIONS WITH
UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
CIES.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In view of the historic
difficulties in the enforcement of the Arms Export Control
Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) associated with violations
involving exports of defense articles and defense services
that have been exempted by regulation from the licensing
requirements of section 38 of such Act, it is the sense of
Congress that the establishment of new exemptions by reg-
ulation should only be undertaken after careful coordina-
tion with the appropriate United States law enforcement
agencies.
(b) AMENDMENT.—Section 38(b)(2) (22 U.S.C.
2778(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following
new sentences: ‘‘In promulgating regulations under sub-
section (a)(1) in accordance with the preceding sentence,
any provision in such regulations that permits the export
of defense articles or defense services without a license
shall include a determination by the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that
the compilation and maintenance of sufficient documenta-
tion relating to the export without a license of the articles
or services is ensured, notwithstanding the absence of a
license, to facilitate law enforcement efforts to detect, pre-
344
vent, and prosecute criminal violations of any provision of
this section, section 39, or section 40 of this Act, including
the efforts on the part of countries and factions engaged
in international terrorism to illicitly acquire defense arti-
cles and defense services. No defense article or defense
service designated by the President under subsection
(a)(1) may be exported without a license pursuant to a
regulation under subsection (a)(1) that is promulgated on
or after January 1, 2003, until 30 days after the date
on which the President provides notice of the proposed
regulation to the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives and to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate in accordance with the
procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications
under section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, including a description of the criteria that would
be used to permit the export of the article or service and
any measures to facilitate law enforcement efforts associ-
ated with the Attorney General’s determination required
by the preceding sentence.’’.
SEC. 1104. MECHANISMS TO IDENTIFY PERSONS IN VIOLA-
TION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF LAW.
Section 38(g)(1)(A) (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(1)(A)) is
amended—
(1) in clause (iii)—
345
(A) by striking ‘‘or section 2339A’’ and in-
serting ‘‘, section 2339A’’; and
(B) by inserting at the end before the
comma the following: ‘‘, or section 2339C of
such title (relating to financing terrorism)’’;
(2) in clause (x), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end;
(3) in clause (xi), by striking the semicolon at
the end and inserting a comma; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(xii) subclause (I) or (II) of section
1956(c)(7)(B)(v) of title 18, United States
Code;
‘‘(xiii) section 329 of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001;
‘‘(xiv) section 5332 of title 31, United
States Code;
‘‘(xv) section 1960 of title 18, United
States Code;
‘‘(xvi) section 175(b), 175b, 1993, 2339 of
title 18, United States Code;
‘‘(xvii) section 2332a, 2332b, or 2332f of
title 18, United States Code; or
346
‘‘(xviii) section 175 of title 18, United
States Code;’’.
SEC. 1105. COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF UNITED STATES
ARMS EMBARGOES.
(a) FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.—
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(A) governments to which the United
States Government prohibits by law or policy
the transfer of implements of war, including
material, components, parts, and other defense
articles and defense services (as defined in
paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 47 of the
Arms Export Control Act, respectively) continue
to seek to evade these embargoes through in-
creasingly sophisticated illegal acquisitions via
the ‘‘international gray arms market’’ and by
seeking to exploit weaknesses in the export con-
trol system of the United States and its friends
and allies; and
(B) the strict and comprehensive applica-
tion of arms embargoes referred to in subpara-
graph (A) including those embargoes estab-
lished by the United Nations Security Council
is of fundamental importance to the security
347
and foreign policy interests of the United
States.
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
Congress that the United States Government should
continue to provide a leadership role internationally
in ensuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes re-
ferred to in paragraph (1).
(b) SCOPE OF EMBARGOES.—Section 38 (22 U.S.C.
2778) is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(k) Whenever the United States maintains an arms
embargo pursuant to United States law, or through public
notice by the President or Secretary of State pursuant to
the authorities of this Act, no defense article or defense
service subject to sections 120–130 of title 22, Code of
Federal Regulations (commonly known as the ‘Inter-
national Traffic in Arms Regulations’) and no dual use
good or technology subject to sections 730–774 of title 15,
Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the ‘Ex-
port Administration Regulations’) shall be sold or trans-
ferred to the military, police, or intelligence services of the
embargoed government, including any associated govern-
mental agency, subdivision, entity, or other person acting
on their behalf, unless, at a minimum and without preju-
dice to any additional requirements established in United
States law or regulation, the Secretary of State and the
348
Secretary of Defense have concurred in the sale or trans-
fer through issuance of a license.’’.
(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROLS.—The Secretary
shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce to ensure
the establishment of appropriate foreign policy and na-
tional security controls and license requirements under the
Export Administration Regulations in order to ensure the
effective implementation of section 38(k) of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act, as added by subsection (b).
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit
to the appropriate congressional committees a report that
describes the actions taken to implement the requirements
of subsection (c).
SEC. 1106. TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES SUPPORTING
ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
Section 40(l)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2780(l)(1)) is amended
by striking ‘‘any item enumerated on the United States
Munitions List’’ and inserting ‘‘a defense article or de-
fense service (as defined in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
section 47(7), respectively), an item enumerated on the
United States Munitions List (as designated by the Presi-
dent pursuant to section 38(a)), or any other activity for
which a license or other approval is required pursuant to
the regulations promulgated under subsection (a)(1)’’.
349
SEC. 1107. AMENDMENTS TO CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS
AND IMPORTS.
(a) REVISION
OF
STANDARD
FOR
VIOLATION;
AMOUNT
OF
PENALTIES.—Section 38(c) (22 U.S.C.
2778(c)) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘willfully’’ each place it appears
and inserting ‘‘knowingly’’;
(2) by striking ‘‘this section or section 39’’ and
inserting ‘‘this section, section 39, or section 40’’;
and
(3) by striking ‘‘$1,000,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$1,000,000 (in the case of a violation of this sec-
tion or section 39), $2,000,000 (in the case of a vio-
lation involving any country covered by section 40),
and $1,500,000 (in the case of a violation involving
any country other than a country covered by section
40 that is subject by United States law or policy to
an arms embargo)’’.
(b) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Section 38(e) (22 U.S.C.
2778(e)) is amended in the third sentence by striking
‘‘under this section may not exceed $500,000’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘or any other activities subject to control under this
section, section 39, or section 40, may not exceed
$500,000 for each violation of section 38 or section 39,
$1,000,000 for each violation involving any country cov-
ered by section 40, and $750,000 for each violation relat-
350
ing to an arms embargo (other than a violation covered
by section 40)’’.
(c) REVISION OF STANDARD FOR VIOLATION; CRIMI-
NAL PENALTY; CIVIL PENALTIES; ENFORCEMENT.—Sec-
tion 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) is amended—
(1) in subsection (j)—
(A) by striking ‘‘willfully’’ and inserting
‘‘knowingly’’; and
(B) by striking ‘‘$1,000,000’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘$2,000,000’’; and
(2) in subsection (k), by striking ‘‘$500,000’’
and inserting ‘‘$1,000,000’’.
(d) 
DEFINITIONS.—Section 
47(7) 
(22 
U.S.C.
2794(7)) is amended to read as follows:
‘‘(7)(A) ‘defense articles’, with respect to ex-
ports subject to sections 38, 39, and 40 of this Act,
has the meaning given such term in sections 120–
130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (com-
monly known as the ‘International Traffic in Arms
Regulations’), as such regulations were in effect on
January 1, 2003, and includes such additional arti-
cles as may be designated by the President under
section 38(a)(1); and
‘‘(B) ‘defense services’, with respect to exports
subject to sections 38, 39, and 40 of this Act, has
351
the meaning given such term in sections 120–130 of
title 22, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly
known as the ‘International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions’), as such regulations were in effect on Janu-
ary 1, 2003, and includes—
‘‘(i) the provision of assistance (including
aiding, abetting, or training) to foreign persons;
and
‘‘(ii) such other activities as may be des-
ignated by the President pursuant to section
38(a)(1).’’.
SEC. 
1108. 
HIGH 
RISK 
EXPORTS 
AND 
END 
USE
VERIFICATION.
Section 38(g)(7) (22 U.S.C. 2778) is amended by
adding at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘Such
standards shall be coordinated biennially with the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, and the heads of other Fed-
eral departments or agencies, as appropriate.’’.
SEC. 1109. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that, in view of the responsibilities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for protecting the United States
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against terrorist attack, foreign intelligence operations,
high technology crimes, and transnational criminal organi-
zations and enterprises, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion should be provided authority to investigate and en-
force violations of the Arms Export Control Act without
adversely affecting the existing authority of the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection of the Department of
Homeland Security.
(b) COPY OF REGISTRATION.—Section 38(b)(1) (22
U.S.C. 2778(b)) is amended—
(1) by redesignating the second subparagraph
(B) as subparagraph (C); and
(2) in subparagraph (B)—
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ‘‘and
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation’’ after ‘‘Secretary of Treasury’’; and
(B) in the second sentence, by inserting
‘‘and the Director’’ after ‘‘The Secretary’’.
(c) JURISDICTION OF FBI AND BUREAU OF CUS-
TOMS.—Section 38(e) (22 U.S.C. 2778(e)) is amended in
the first sentence by adding at the end before the period
the following: ‘‘, and except further, that the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and the Bureau of Customs and Bor-
der Protection of the Department of Homeland Security
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11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50
U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a li-
cense shall be required, for a period of not less than 3
years, for the export to that foreign person of all items
controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405),
as continued in effect under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations.
(b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to
a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate that he has determined that—
(1) the foreign person has—
(A) ceased all activity related to the origi-
nal imposition of sanctions under section 73(a)
of the Arms Export Control Act or section
11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, as the case may be; and
(B) has instituted a program of trans-
parency measures whereby the United States
will be able to verify for at least a period of 3
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lations of the Senate that it is vital to the national
interest of the United States to do so.
‘‘(b) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Assistance made available
under this Act or any other provision of law to a
Palestinian state may not be provided until 15 days
after the date on which the President has provided
notice thereof to the Committee on International Re-
lations and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives and to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the Senate in accordance with the proce-
dures applicable to reprogramming notifications
under section 634A(a) of this Act.
‘‘(2) SUNSET.—Paragraph (1) shall cease to be
effective beginning ten years after the date on which
notice is first provided under such paragraph.
‘‘(c) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in
this subsection is a certification transmitted by the Presi-
dent to Congress that—
‘‘(1) a binding international peace agreement
exists between Israel and the Palestinians that—
‘‘(A) was freely signed by both parties;
‘‘(B) guarantees both parties’ commitment
to a border between two states that constitutes