H. R. 1119—319
necessary steps have been taken to ensure that the elections
scheduled for 1998 take place; and
(6) the United States should take all necessary steps to
encourage other donor nations to suspend assistance as part
of a multilateral effort.
SEC. 1232. CONGRATULATING GOVERNOR CHRISTOPHER PATTEN OF
HONG KONG.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) His Excellency Christopher F. Patten, the former Gov-
ernor of Hong Kong, was the twenty-eighth and last British
Governor of the dependent territory of Hong Kong before that
territory reverted back to the People’s Republic of China on
July 1, 1997.
(2) Christopher Patten was a superb administrator and
an inspiration to the people whom he governed.
(3) During Christopher Patten’s five years as Governor
of Hong Kong, the economy flourished under his stewardship,
growing by more than 30 percent in real terms.
(4) Christopher Patten presided over a capable and honest
civil service.
(5) During the tenure of Christopher Patten as Governor
of Hong Kong, common crime declined and the political climate
was positive and stable.
(6) The legacy of Christopher Patten to Hong Kong is
the expansion of democracy in Hong Kong’s legislative council
and a tireless devotion to the rights, freedoms, and welfare
of the people of Hong Kong.
(7) Christopher Patten fulfilled the commitment of the Brit-
ish Government to ‘‘put in place a solidly based democratic
administration’’ in Hong Kong before July 1, 1997.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that
Christopher F. Patten, the last British Governor of the dependent
territory of Hong Kong—
(1) served his country with great honor and distinction
in that capacity; and
(2) deserves special thanks and recognition from the United
States for his tireless efforts to develop and nurture democracy
in Hong Kong.
TITLE XIII—ARMS CONTROL AND
RELATED MATTERS
Sec. 1301. Presidential report concerning detargeting of Russian strategic missiles.
Sec. 1302. Limitation on retirement or dismantlement of strategic nuclear delivery
systems.
Sec. 1303. Assistance for facilities subject to inspection under the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Sec. 1304. Transfers 
of 
authorizations 
for 
high-priority 
counterproliferation
programs.
Sec. 1305. Advice to the President and Congress regarding the safety, security, and
reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile.
Sec. 1306. Reconstitution of commission to assess the ballistic missile threat to the
United States.
Sec. 1307. Sense of Congress regarding the relationship between United States
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and environmental
laws.
Sec. 1308. Extension of counterproliferation authorities for support of United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq.
H. R. 1119—320
Sec. 1309. Annual report on moratorium on use by Armed Forces of antipersonnel
landmines.
SEC. 1301. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT CONCERNING DETARGETING OF
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC MISSILES.
(a) REQUIRED REPORT.—Not later than January 1, 1998, the
President shall submit to Congress a report concerning detargeting
of Russian strategic missiles. The report shall address each of
the following:
(1) Whether a Russian ICBM that was formerly, but is
no longer, targeted at a site in the United States would be
automatically retargeted at a site in the United States in the
event of the accidental launch of the missile.
(2) Whether missile detargeting would prevent or signifi-
cantly reduce the possibility of an unauthorized missile launch
carried out by the Russian General Staff and prevent or signifi-
cantly reduce the consequences to the United States of such
a launch.
(3) Whether missile detargeting would pose a significant
obstacle to an unauthorized launch carried out by an oper-
ational level below the Russian General Staff if missile opera-
tors at such an operational level acquired missile launch codes
or had the technical expertise to override missile launch codes.
(4) The plausibility of an accidental launch of a Russian
ICBM, compared to the possibility of a deliberate missile
launch, authorized or unauthorized, resulting from Russian
miscalculation, overreaction, or aggression.
(5) The national security benefits derived from detargeting
United States and Russian ICBMs.
(6) The relative consequences to the United States of an
unauthorized or accidental launch of a Russian ICBM that
has been detargeted and one that has not been detargeted.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of subsection (a):
(1) The term ‘‘Russian ICBM’’ means an intercontinental
ballistic missile of the Russian Federation.
(2) The term ‘‘accidental launch’’ means a missile launch
resulting from mechanical failure.
SEC. 1302. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
(a) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Funds available to the Department
of Defense may not be obligated or expended during fiscal year
1998 for retiring or dismantling, or for preparing to retire or
dismantle, any of the following strategic nuclear delivery systems
below the specified levels:
(1) 71 B–52H bomber aircraft.
(2) 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines.
(3) 500 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(4) 50 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(b) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—If the START II Treaty enters into
force during fiscal year 1998, the Secretary of Defense may waive
the application of the limitation under subsection (a) to the extent
that the Secretary determines necessary in order to implement
the treaty.
(c) FUNDING LIMITATION ON EARLY DEACTIVATION.—(1) If the
limitation under subsection (a) ceases to apply by reason of a
waiver under subsection (b), funds available to the Department
of Defense may nevertheless not be obligated or expended during
H. R. 1119—321
fiscal year 1998 to implement any agreement or understanding
to undertake substantial early deactivation of a strategic nuclear
delivery system specified in subsection (a) until 30 days after the
date on which the President submits to Congress a report concern-
ing such actions.
(2) For purposes of this subsection and subsection (d), a
substantial early deactivation is an action during fiscal year 1998
to deactivate a substantial number of strategic nuclear delivery
systems specified in subsection (a) by—
(A) removing nuclear warheads from those systems; or
(B) taking other steps to remove those systems from combat
status.
(3) A report under this subsection shall include the following:
(A) The text of any understanding or agreement between
the United States and the Russian Federation concerning
substantial early deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery sys-
tems under the START II Treaty.
(B) The plan of the Department of Defense for implement-
ing the agreement.
(C) An assessment of the Secretary of Defense of the ade-
quacy of the provisions contained in the agreement for monitor-
ing and verifying compliance of Russia with the terms of the
agreement and, based upon that assessment, the determination
of the President specifically as to whether the procedures for
monitoring and verification of compliance by Russia with the
terms of the agreement are adequate or inadequate.
(D) A determination by the President as to whether the
deactivations to occur under the agreement will be carried
out in a symmetrical, reciprocal, or equivalent manner and
whether the agreement will require early deactivations of
strategic forces by the United States to be carried out substan-
tially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces by
Russia.
(E) An assessment by the President of the effect of the
proposed early deactivation on the stability of the strategic
balance and relative strategic nuclear capabilities of the United
States and the Russian Federation at various stages during
deactivation and upon completion, including a determination
by the President specifically as to whether the proposed early
deactivations will adversely affect strategic stability.
(d) FURTHER LIMITATION ON STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS.—
(1) Amounts available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year
1998 to implement an agreement that results in a substantial
early deactivation during fiscal year 1998 of strategic forces may
not be obligated for that purpose if in the report under subsection
(c)(3) the President determines any of the following:
(A) That procedures for monitoring and verification of
compliance by Russia with the terms of the agreement are
inadequate.
(B) That the agreement will require early deactivations
of strategic forces by the United States to be carried out
substantially more rapidly than deactivations of strategic forces
by Russia.
(C) That the proposed early deactivations will adversely
affect strategic stability.
(2) The limitation in paragraph (1), if effective by reason of
a determination by the President described in paragraph (1)(B),
H. R. 1119—322
shall cease to apply 30 days after the date on which the President
notifies Congress that the early deactivations under the agreement
are in the national interest of the United States.
(e) CONTINGENCY PLAN
FOR SUSTAINMENT
OF SYSTEMS.—(1)
Not later then February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall
submit to Congress a plan for the sustainment beyond October
1, 1999, of United States strategic nuclear delivery systems and
alternative Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty force structures in
the event that a strategic arms reduction agreement subsequent
to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty does not enter into force
before 2004.
(2) The plan shall include a discussion of the following matters:
(A) The actions that are necessary to sustain the United
States strategic nuclear delivery systems, distinguishing
between the actions that are planned for and funded in the
future-years defense program and the actions that are not
planned for and funded in the future-years defense program.
(B) The funding necessary to implement the plan, indicat-
ing the extent to which the necessary funding is provided
for in the future-years defense program and the extent to
which the necessary funding is not provided for in the future-
years defense program.
(f) START TREATIES DEFINED.—In this section:
(1) The term ‘‘Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty’’ means
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), signed at Moscow
on July 31, 1991, including related annexes on agreed
statements and definitions, protocols, and memorandum of
understanding.
(2) The term ‘‘START II Treaty’’ means the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following
protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such
documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to
as the ‘‘START II Treaty’’ (contained in Treaty Document
103–1):
(A) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination
of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion
of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strate-
gic Offensive Arms (also known as the ‘‘Elimination and
Conversion Protocol’’).
(B) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of
Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known
as the ‘‘Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol’’).
(C) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strate-
gic Offensive Arms (also known as the ‘‘Memorandum on
Attribution’’).
H. R. 1119—323
SEC. 1303. ASSISTANCE FOR FACILITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION
UNDER THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.
(a) ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.—Upon the request of the owner
or operator of a facility that is subject to a routine inspection
or a challenge inspection under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Secretary of Defense may provide technical assistance to that
owner or operator related to compliance of that facility with the
Convention. Any such assistance shall be provided through the
On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense.
(b) REIMBURSEMENT REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary may pro-
vide assistance under subsection (a) only to the extent that the
Secretary determines that the Department of Defense will be
reimbursed for costs incurred in providing the assistance. The
United States National Authority may provide such reimbursement
from amounts available to it. Any such reimbursement shall be
credited to amounts available for the On-Site Inspection Agency.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The terms ‘‘Chemical Weapons Convention’’ and
‘‘Convention’’ mean the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction, ratified by the United
States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force on April 29,
1997.
(2) The term ‘‘facility that is subject to a routine inspection’’
means a declared facility, as defined in paragraph 15 of part
X of the Annex on Implementation and Verification of the
Convention.
(3) The term ‘‘challenge inspection’’ means an inspection
conducted under Article IX of the Convention.
(4) The term ‘‘United States National Authority’’ means
the United States National Authority established or designated
pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 4, of the Convention.
SEC. 1304. TRANSFERS OF AUTHORIZATIONS FOR HIGH-PRIORITY
COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.
(a) AUTHORITY.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary
of Defense may transfer amounts of authorizations made available
to the Department of Defense in this division for fiscal year 1998
to any counterproliferation program, project, or activity described
in subsection (b).
(2) A transfer of authorizations may be made under this section
only upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that such
action is necessary in the national interest.
(3) Amounts of authorizations so transferred shall be merged
with and be available for the same purposes as the authorization
to which transferred.
(b) PROGRAMS TO WHICH TRANFERS MAY BE MADE.—The
authority under subsection (a) applies to any counterproliferation
program, project, or activity of the Department of Defense identified
as an area for progress in the most recent annual report of the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee established by sec-
tion 1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note).
(c) LIMITATION
ON
TOTAL
AMOUNT.—The total amount of
authorizations transferred under the authority of this section may
not exceed $50,000,000.
H. R. 1119—324
(d) OTHER LIMITATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS.—The provisions
of subsection (b), (c), and (d) of section 1001 shall apply to a
transfer under this section in the same manner as they apply
to a transfer under subsection (a) of that section.
(e) CONSTRUCTION WITH GENERAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The
authority provided by this section is in addition to the transfer
authority provided in section 1001.
SEC. 1305. ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS REGARDING
THE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND RELIABILITY OF UNITED
STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons
on earth. The United States and its allies continue to rely
on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries from using
weapons of mass destruction. The safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile are essential to ensure its credibility
as a deterrent.
(2) On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
(3) Effective as of September 30, 1996, the United States
is prohibited by section 507 of the Energy and Water Develop-
ment Appropriations Act, 1993 (Public Law 102–377; 42 U.S.C.
2121 note) from conducting underground nuclear tests ‘‘unless
a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which
time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted’’.
(4) Section 1436(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100–456; 42 U.S.C. 2121
note) requires the Secretary of Energy to ‘‘establish and support
a program to assure that the United States is in a position
to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent
effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in
the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban on
nuclear explosive testing is negotiated and ratified.’’.
(5) Section 3138(d) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 42 U.S.C. 2121
note) required the President to submit an annual report to
Congress which sets forth ‘‘any concerns with respect to the
safety, security, effectiveness, or reliability of existing United
States nuclear weapons raised by the Stockpile Stewardship
Program of the Department of Energy’’.
(6) President Clinton declared in July 1993 that ‘‘to assure
that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test
ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence
in the safety, reliability, and the performance of our weapons’’.
This decision was incorporated in a Presidential Directive.
(7) Section 3138 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 42 U.S.C. 2121
note) also requires that the Secretary of Energy establish a
‘‘stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States
in nuclear weapons’’.
(8) The plan of the Department of Energy to maintain
the safety and reliability of the United States nuclear weapons
stockpile is known as the Stockpile Stewardship and Manage-
ment Program. The ability of the United States to maintain
and certify the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability
H. R. 1119—325
of the nuclear weapons stockpile without testing will require
utilization of new and sophisticated computational capabilities
and diagnostic technologies, methods, and procedures. Current
diagnostic technologies and laboratory testing techniques are
insufficient to certify the safety and reliability of the United
States nuclear weapons stockpile into the future. Whereas in
the past laboratory and diagnostic tools were used in conjunc-
tion with nuclear testing, in the future they will provide, under
the Department of Energy’s stockpile stewardship plan, the
sole basis for assessing past test data and for making judgments
on phenomena observed in connection with the aging of the
stockpile.
(9) Section 3159 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o)
requires that the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories
and the nuclear weapons production plants submit a report
to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs
if they identify a problem that has significant bearing on con-
fidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon or
nuclear weapon type, that the Assistant Secretary must trans-
mit that report, along with any comments, to the congressional
defense committees and to the Secretary of Energy and the
Secretary of Defense, and that the Joint Nuclear Weapons
Council advise Congress regarding its analysis of any such
problems.
(10) On August 11, 1995, President Clinton directed ‘‘the
establishment of a new annual reporting and certification
requirement [to] ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe
and reliable under a comprehensive test ban’’.
(11) On the same day, the President noted that the Sec-
retary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy have the respon-
sibility, after being ‘‘advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council,
the Directors of DOE’s nuclear weapons laboratories, and the
Commander of United States Strategic Command’’, to provide
the President with the information regarding the certification
referred to in paragraph (10).
(12) The Joint Nuclear Weapons Council established by
section 179 of title 10, United States Code, is responsible for
providing advice to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary
of Defense regarding nuclear weapons issues, including ‘‘consid-
ering safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons’’.
The Council plays a critical role in advising Congress in matters
relating to nuclear weapons.
(13) It is essential that the President receive well-informed,
objective, and honest opinions, including dissenting views, from
his advisers and technical experts regarding the safety, secu-
rity, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stock-
pile.
(b) POLICY.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United States—
(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable
nuclear weapons stockpile; and
(B) as long as other nations control or actively seek
to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear
deterrent.
(2) NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE.—It is in the security
interest of the United States to sustain the United States
H. R. 1119—326
nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile
stewardship, carried out at the nuclear weapons laboratories
and nuclear weapons production plants.
(3) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic
nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign
leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from act-
ing against the vital interests of the United States;
(B) the United States should continue to maintain
nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement
an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and
(C) the advice of the persons required to provide the
President and Congress with assurances of the safety, secu-
rity, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons
force should be scientifically based, without regard for poli-
tics, and of the highest quality and integrity.
(c) ADDITION
OF PRESIDENT
TO RECIPIENTS
OF REPORTS
BY
HEADS
OF LABORATORIES
AND PLANTS.—Section 3159(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law 104–201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended—
(1) by striking out ‘‘committees and’’ and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘‘committees,’’; and
(2) by inserting before the period at the end the following:
‘‘, and to the President’’.
(d) TEN-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR TRANSMITTAL OF REPORT.—Section
3159(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (Public Law 104–201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o) is amended by striking
out ‘‘As soon as practicable’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘Not
later than 10 days’’.
(e) ADVICE
AND
OPINIONS
REGARDING
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
STOCKPILE.—In addition to a director of a nuclear weapons labora-
tory or a nuclear weapons production plant (under section 3159
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104–201; 42 U.S.C. 7274o)), any member of the Joint
Nuclear Weapons Council or the commander of the United States
Strategic Command may also submit to the President, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the congressional defense
committees advice or opinion regarding the safety, security,
effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(f) EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL VIEWS.—A representative of the
President may not take any action against, or otherwise constrain,
a director of a nuclear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons
production plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council,
or the Commander of United States Strategic Command for present-
ing individual views to the President, the National Security Council,
or Congress regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reli-
ability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term ‘‘representative of the President’’ means the
following:
(A) Any official of the Department of Defense or the
Department of Energy who is appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate.
(B) Any member of the National Security Council.
(C) Any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(D) Any official of the Office of Management and
Budget.
H. R. 1119—327
(2) The term ‘‘nuclear weapons laboratory’’ means any of
the following:
(A) 
Lawrence 
Livermore 
National 
Laboratory,
California.
(B) Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico.
(C) Sandia National Laboratories.
(3) The term ‘‘nuclear weapons production plant’’ means
any of the following:
(A) The Pantex Plant, Texas.
(B) The Savannah River Site, South Carolina.
(C) The Kansas City Plant, Missouri.
(D) The Y–12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
SEC. 1306. RECONSTITUTION OF COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLIS-
TIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.
(a) INITIAL ORGANIZATION REQUIREMENTS.—Section 1321(g) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public
Law 104–201; 110 Stat. 2712) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking out ‘‘not later than 45
days after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting
in lieu thereof ‘‘not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1998’’; and
(2) in paragraph (2)—
(A) by striking out ‘‘30 days’’ and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘‘60 days’’; and
(B) by striking out ‘‘, but not earlier than October
15, 1996’’.
(b) FUNDING.—Section 1328 of such Act (110 Stat. 2714) is
amended by inserting ‘‘and fiscal year 1998’’ after ‘‘for fiscal year
1997’’.
SEC. 1307. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN UNITED STATES OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS 
CONVENTION 
AND 
ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAWS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Chemical Weapons Convention requires the
destruction of the United States stockpile of lethal chemical
agents and munitions by April 29, 2007 (not later than 10
years after the Convention’s entry into force).
(2) The President has substantial authority under existing
law to ensure that—
(A) the technologies necessary to destroy the stockpile
are developed;
(B) the facilities necessary to destroy the stockpile
are constructed; and
(C) Federal, State, and local environmental laws and
regulations do not impair the ability of the United States
to comply with its obligations under the Convention.
(3) The Comptroller General has concluded (in GAO Report
NSIAD 97018 of February 1997) that—
(A) obtaining the necessary Federal and State permits
that are required under Federal environmental laws and
regulations for building and operating the chemical agents
and munitions destruction facilities is among the most
unpredictable factors in the chemical demilitarization pro-
gram; and