H. R. 5009—706 
Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Central 
Intelligence Agency 
SEC. 6311. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SPECIAL VICTIM INVESTIGATOR. 
Section 32(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 3533(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘No individual appointed as the Special Victim Investigator may, 
at the time of such appointment, be a current employee of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.’’. 
Subtitle C—Reports and Other Matters 
SEC. 6321. EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON 
STRIKES UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST 
TERRORIST TARGETS OUTSIDE AREAS OF ACTIVE HOS-
TILITIES. 
Section 1723 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1811) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘until 2022’’ and inserting 
‘‘until 2027’’; and 
(2) in subsection (b)— 
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
‘‘The report’’ and inserting ‘‘Each report’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking the semicolon and 
inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘The report’’ and inserting 
‘‘Each report’’. 
SEC. 6322. BUDGET TRANSPARENCY FOR OPEN-SOURCE INTEL-
LIGENCE ACTIVITIES. 
(a) BUDGET SUMMARIES
TO DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the head of each element of the intelligence community 
shall submit to the Director of National Intelligence a complete 
and comprehensive summary of all budget information with respect 
to the element’s open-source intelligence activities. 
(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report com-
piling the information in the summaries submitted to the Director 
pursuant to subsection (a). 
(c) OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘open-source intelligence’’ means intelligence derived exclu-
sively from publicly or commercially available information that 
addresses specific intelligence priorities, requirements, or gaps. 
SEC. 6323. REPORT ON THE MISSION EFFECT OF CIVILIAN HARM. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
H. R. 5009—707 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
acting through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the elements of 
the intelligence community determined appropriate by the Director, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
examining the extent to which civilian harm that occurs during 
counterterrorism operations informs analyses of the intelligence 
community on the mission success of campaigns to degrade, disrupt, 
or defeat foreign terrorist organizations. 
(c) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (b) shall include 
the following: 
(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for 
measuring the effect of civilian harm. 
(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence commu-
nity apply such methodology when assessing the degree to 
which a terrorist group is degraded, disrupted, or defeated. 
(3) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively 
as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on the mission 
of degrading, disrupting, or defeating a terrorist group, or an 
explanation of why such framework cannot be generated. 
(4) A framework to enable analysts to assess, as objectively 
as possible, the effect that civilian harm has had on other 
United States foreign policy goals, programs, and activities 
in any country where counterterrorism operations take place. 
(5) The extent to which dissenting opinions of analysts 
of the intelligence community are included or highlighted in 
final written products presented to senior policymakers of the 
United States. 
(6) Recommendations to improve the quality of future intel-
ligence community analyses by accounting for the effects of 
civilian harm on efforts to successfully degrade, disrupt, or 
defeat a foreign terrorist group. 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) may be submitted 
in classified form, but if so submitted, the report shall include 
an unclassified summary of key findings that is consistent with 
the protection of intelligence sources and methods. 
TITLE LXIV—COUNTERING FOREIGN 
THREATS 
Subtitle A—People’s Republic of China 
SEC. 6401. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STATUS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence
H. R. 5009—708 
community as the Director of National Intelligence considers appro-
priate, conduct an assessment of the current status of the bio-
technology capability of the People’s Republic of China, which shall 
include how the People’s Republic of China is supporting the bio-
technology sector, such as foreign direct investment, subsidies, 
talent recruitment, or other efforts to gain superiority. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on For-
eign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Agri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Home-
land Security, the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date 
on which the Director of National Intelligence completes the 
assessment required by subsection (a), the Director shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
findings of the assessment. 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to paragraph 
(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 6402. REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate; and 
(3) Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall, acting through the National Intelligence Council and in 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Intel-
ligence and Analysis and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
on the economic outlook of the People’s Republic of China, which 
shall include alternative analyses of the economic projections of 
the People’s Republic of China. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under subsection (b) shall 
include the following:
H. R. 5009—709 
(1) Assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
economy of the People’s Republic of China, including the poten-
tial effects of debt, demographics, and China’s international 
relationships. 
(2) Potential challenges for the People’s Republic of China 
to sustain economic growth and the potential for global effects 
as a result. 
(3) The implications of the economic future of the People’s 
Republic of China on the country’s foreign and defense policy. 
SEC. 6403. INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
CIES ON SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 
ORIGINATING IN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, and the heads of such other departments and agencies 
as the Director considers appropriate, develop a strategy to ensure 
robust intelligence sharing relating to the illicit trafficking and 
diversion of synthetic opioid chemicals, including precursor and 
pre-precusor chemicals, from the People’s Republic of China and 
other source countries. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy developed pursuant to subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment of existing intelligence sharing between 
the intelligence community, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Homeland Security, any other relevant Federal 
agencies, including any mechanisms that allow appropriate 
Federal Government employees with and without security clear-
ances to share and receive information and any gaps identified. 
(2) A plan to ensure robust intelligence sharing, including 
by addressing gaps identified pursuant to paragraph (1) and 
identifying additional capabilities and resources needed; 
(3) A detailed description of the measures used to ensure 
the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy rights 
in carrying out this strategy. 
(c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this sub-
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Committee on Finance, the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Homeland Security, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall, with inputs from such other departments and 
agencies as the Director considers appropriate, provide the
H. R. 5009—710 
appropriate committees of Congress a briefing on the strategy 
under development pursuant to subsection (a). 
SEC. 6404. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA TO EVADE UNITED STATES TRANSPARENCY AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial 
Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in coordination with the heads of such elements of the intel-
ligence community as the Director determines appropriate, submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on plans and 
intentions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
to evade the following: 
(1) Identification under section 1260H of the William M. 
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283; 10 U.S.C. 113 note). 
(2) Restrictions or limitations imposed by any of the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Section 805 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31). 
(B) Section 889 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115– 
232; 41 U.S.C. 3901 note prec.). 
(C) The list of specially designated nationals and 
blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the Department of the Treasury (commonly 
known as the ‘‘SDN list’’). 
(D) The Entity List maintained by the Bureau of 
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce 
and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 
15, Code of Federal Regulations. 
(E) Commercial or dual-use export controls under the 
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et 
seq.) and the Export Administration Regulations. 
(F) Executive Order 14105 (88 Fed. Reg. 54867; 
relating to addressing United States investments in certain 
national security technologies and products in countries 
of concern), or successor order. 
(G) Import restrictions on products made with forced 
labor implemented by U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
pursuant to Public Law 117–78 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
H. R. 5009—711 
(c) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to subsection (b) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
SEC. 6405. ASSESSMENT ON RECRUITMENT OF MANDARIN SPEAKERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a com-
prehensive assessment on the recruitment and training of individ-
uals who speak Mandarin Chinese for each element of the intel-
ligence community. 
(b) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
Subtitle B—The Russian Federation 
SEC. 6411. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION SPONSORSHIP OF ACTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives. 
(2) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘foreign 
terrorist organization’’ means an organization that has been 
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary 
of State, pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189). 
(3) SPECIALLY DESIGNATED GLOBAL TERRORIST ORGANIZA-
TION.—The term ‘‘specially designated global terrorist organiza-
tion’’ means an organization that has been designated as a 
specially designated global terrorist by the Secretary of State 
or the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to Executive Order 
13224 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and 
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten 
to commit, or support terrorism). 
(4) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term ‘‘state sponsor 
of terrorism’’ means a country the government of which the 
Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided 
support for acts of international terrorism, for purposes of— 
(A) section 1754(c)(1)(A)(i) of the Export Control 
Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4813(c)(1)(A)(i));
H. R. 5009—712 
(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2371); or 
(C) section 40(d) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2780(d)). 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of the Treasury, conduct and submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that includes the following: 
(1) A summary of key instances in which the Russian 
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has pro-
vided financial, material, technical, or lethal support to foreign 
terrorist organizations, specially designated global terrorist 
organizations (including the Russian Imperial Movement), state 
sponsors of terrorism, or for acts of international terrorism. 
(2) A summary of key instances in which the Russian 
Federation, or an official of the Russian Federation, has will-
fully aided or abetted the international proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related mate-
rials to foreign terrorist organizations, specially designated 
global terrorist organizations, or state sponsors of terrorism. 
(3) An assessment of threats to the homeland based on 
the summaries provided pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2). 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 30 days after submittal of the 
report required by subsection (b), the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall provide a classified briefing to the appropriate congres-
sional committees on the findings of the report. 
SEC. 6412. ASSESSMENT OF LIKELY COURSE OF WAR IN UKRAINE. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in collaboration with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency 
and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of the 
likely course of the war in Ukraine through December 31, 2025. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall 
include an assessment of each of the following: 
(1) The ability of the military of Ukraine to defend against 
Russian aggression if the United States continues or discon-
tinues military and economic assistance to Ukraine and main-
tains or withdraws policy restrictions on the use of United 
States weapons during the period described in such subsection. 
(2) The likely course of the war during such period based 
on the scenarios described in paragraph (1).
H. R. 5009—713 
(3) The ability and willingness of other countries to con-
tinue or discontinue military and economic assistance to 
Ukraine based on the assessments required by paragraphs 
(1) and (2), including the ability of such countries to make 
up for any shortfall in United States assistance. 
(4) The effects of a potential defeat of Ukraine by the 
Russian Federation on United States national security and 
foreign policy interests, including the potential for further 
aggression from the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic 
of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. 
(d) FORM.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 6413. UKRAINE LESSONS LEARNED WORKING GROUP. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(B) the congressional defense committees. 
(2) CONGRESSIONAL
DEFENSE
COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘congressional defense committees’’ has the meaning given that 
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code. 
(3) WORKING GROUP.—The term ‘‘Working Group’’ means 
the working group described in subsection (b). 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence and 
the Secretary of Defense shall jointly establish a working group 
to identify and share lessons that the United States intelligence 
community has learned from the Ukraine conflict. 
(c) MEMBERSHIP.—The composition of the Working Group may 
include any officer or employee of a department or agency of the 
United States Government determined appropriate by the Director 
of National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense. 
(d) CHAIR.—The Working Group shall be jointly chaired by— 
(1) an officer or employee of the Department of Defense 
chosen by the Secretary of Defense; and 
(2) an officer or employee of an element of the intelligence 
community chosen by the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the head of the element concerned. 
(e) DUTIES.—The sole duties of the Working Group shall be 
exclusively the following: 
(1) Identify tactical and operational intelligence lessons 
derived from the Ukraine conflict. 
(2) Develop a repeatable process for promulgating such 
lessons to elements of the Department of Defense responsible 
for the development of joint and service-specific doctrine, 
acquisitions decisions, and capability development. 
(3) Provide recommendations on intelligence collection 
priorities to support the elements of the Department of Defense 
described in paragraph (2) in implementing the lessons identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (1). 
(f) MEETINGS.—The Working Group shall meet not later than 
60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(g) TERMINATION.—
H. R. 5009—714 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the Working 
Group shall terminate on the date that is 2 years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) EXTENSION.—The Director of National Intelligence and 
the Secretary of Defense may extend the termination date 
under paragraph (1) to a date not later than 4 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act if the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly— 
(A) determine than an extension is appropriate and 
agree to such extension; and 
(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a notification of the extension that includes a description 
of the justification for the extension. 
(h) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING AND SUMMARY.— 
(1) BRIEFING.—Not later than 270 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Working Group shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the 
activities of the Working Group. 
(2) SUMMARY.—Not later than the date that is 30 days 
before the date on which the Working Group terminates pursu-
ant to subsection (g), the Working Group shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a summary of Working 
Group activities and conclusions. 
Subtitle C—International Terrorism 
SEC. 6421. ASSESSMENT AND REPORT ON THE THREAT OF ISIS- 
KHORASAN TO THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on 
the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on the 
Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in coordination with such elements of the intelligence community 
as the Director considers relevant, shall— 
(1) conduct an assessment of the threats to the United 
States and United States citizens posed by ISIS-Khorasan; 
and 
(2) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
written report on the findings of the assessment. 
(c) REPORT ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) 
shall include the following: 
(1) A description of the ideology, stated intentions, and 
capabilities of ISIS-Khorasan as related to the United States 
and the interests of the United States, including capabilities 
that threaten the homeland.
H. R. 5009—715 
(2) A list of all terrorist attacks worldwide attributable 
to ISIS-Khorasan or for which ISIS-Khorasan claimed credit, 
beginning on January 1, 2015. 
(3) The recruiting and training strategy of ISIS-Khorasan, 
including— 
(A) the geographic regions in which ISIS-Khorasan 
is physically present; 
(B) regions from which ISIS-Khorasan is recruiting; 
and 
(C) its ambitions for operationalizing recruited individ-
uals worldwide and in the United States. 
(4) An assessment of any known travel of members of 
ISIS-Khorasan within the Western Hemisphere and specifically 
across any border of the United States. 
(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
Subtitle D—Other Foreign Threats 
SEC. 6431. ASSESSMENT OF VISA-FREE TRAVEL TO AND WITHIN 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY NATIONALS OF COUNTRIES 
OF CONCERN. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Security, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.—The term ‘‘countries of con-
cern’’ means— 
(A) the Russian Federation; 
(B) the People’s Republic of China; 
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
(D) the Syrian Arab Republic; 
(E) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 
(F) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and 
(G) the Republic of Cuba. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a written assessment of the impacts to national security 
caused by travel without a visa to and within countries in the 
Western Hemisphere by nationals of countries of concern and 
nationals of any other country the Director determines it appro-
priate to consider. 
(c) FORM.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
H. R. 5009—716 
SEC. 6432. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 
REVIEW OF VISITORS AND ASSIGNEES. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on For-
eign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
(2) COUNTRY OF RISK.—The term ‘‘country of risk’’ means— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China; 
(B) the Russian Federation; 
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; and 
(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
(3) COVERED ASSIGNEE; COVERED VISITOR.—The terms ‘‘cov-
ered assignee’’ and ‘‘covered visitor’’ mean a foreign national 
from a country of risk who— 
(A) is not an employee of either the Department of 
Energy or the management and operations contractor oper-
ating a National Laboratory on behalf of the Department 
of Energy; and 
(B) has requested access to the premises, information, 
or technology of a National Laboratory. 
(4) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the Director 
of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the 
Department of Energy (or their designee). 
(5) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘‘foreign national’’ has 
the meaning given the term ‘‘alien’’ in section 101(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)). 
(6) NATIONAL LABORATORY.—The term ‘‘National Labora-
tory’’ has the meaning given the term in section 2 of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 15801). 
(7) NONTRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.—The term 
‘‘nontraditional intelligence collection’’ means a risk posed by 
an individual not employed by a foreign intelligence service, 
who is seeking access to information about a capability, 
research, or organizational dynamics of the United States to 
inform a foreign adversary or non-state actor. 
(b) POLICY FOR REVIEW OF COVERED VISITOR AND COVERED 
ASSIGNEE ACCESS REQUESTS.—(1) The Director shall, in consulta-
tion with the applicable Under Secretary of the Department of 
Energy that oversees the National Laboratory, or their designee, 
promulgate a policy to assess the counterintelligence risk that cov-
ered visitors or covered assignees pose to the research or activities 
undertaken at a National Laboratory. 
(2) Prior to being granted access to the premises, information, 
or technology of a National Laboratory, a covered visitor or covered 
assignee should be appropriately screened by the National Labora-
tory and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the 
Department in accordance with the policy promulgated under para-
graph (1).
H. R. 5009—717 
(c) ADVICE WITH RESPECT TO COVERED VISITORS OR COVERED 
ASSIGNEES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall provide advice to a 
National Laboratory on covered visitors and covered assignees 
when 1 or more of the following conditions are present: 
(A) The Director has reason to believe that a covered 
visitor or covered assignee poses a nontraditional intel-
ligence collection risk. 
(B) The Director is in receipt of information indicating 
that a covered visitor or covered assignee poses a counter-
intelligence risk to a National Laboratory. 
(2) ADVICE DESCRIBED.—Advice provided to a National Lab-
oratory in accordance with paragraph (1) shall include a 
description of the assessed risk. 
(3) RISK
MITIGATION.—When appropriate, the Director 
shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, or the 
Secretary’s designee, provide recommendations to mitigate the 
assessed risk as part of the advice provided in accordance 
with paragraph (1). 
(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and quarterly thereafter, the 
Secretary of Energy shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report, which shall include— 
(1) the number of covered visitors or covered assignees 
permitted to access the premises, information, or technology 
of each National Laboratory during the previous quarter; 
(2) the number of instances in which the Director provided 
advice to a National Laboratory in accordance with subsection 
(c) during the previous quarter; and 
(3) the number of instances in which a National Laboratory 
took action inconsistent with advice provided by the Director 
in accordance with subsection (c) during the previous quarter. 
(e) FUNDING.—The Secretary of Energy may expend such sums 
as are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes detailed 
in this section. 
SEC. 6433. ASSESSMENT OF THE LESSONS LEARNED BY THE INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAEL- 
HAMAS WAR. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infra-
structure, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(b) ASSESSMENT SUBMITTED TO APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF 
CONGRESS.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of 
the intelligence community as the Director considers appro-
priate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
H. R. 5009—718 
a written assessment of the lessons learned from the Israel- 
Hamas war. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) 
shall include the following: 
(A) Lessons learned from advances in warfare, 
including the use by adversaries of a complex tunnel net-
work. 
(B) Lessons learned from attacks by adversaries 
against maritime shipping routes in the Red Sea. 
(C) Lessons learned from the use by adversaries of 
rockets, missiles, and unmanned aerial systems, including 
attacks by Iran. 
(D) Analysis of the impact of the Israel-Hamas war 
on the global security environment, including the war in 
Ukraine. 
(3) FORM.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) ASSESSMENT SUBMITTED
TO
THE CONGRESSIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMITTEES.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, in consultation with such other heads of elements of 
the intelligence community as the Director considers appro-
priate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a written assessment of the intelligence lessons learned from 
the Israel-Hamas war. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) 
shall include the following: 
(A) Lessons learned from the timing and scope of the 
October 7, 2023 attack by Hamas against Israel, including 
lessons related to United States intelligence cooperation 
with Israel and other regional partners, both bilaterally 
and in facilitating regional intelligence sharing. 
(B) An assessment of the state, strength, and limita-
tions of intelligence relationships between Israel and 
regional partners, especially with respect to Hamas and 
Gaza. 
(C) A review of any failures in national and regional 
intelligence analysis, collection, and sharing that occurred 
before the October 7, 2023 attack, and any lessons learned 
for future intelligence activities. 
(3) FORM.—The assessment required by paragraph (1) may 
be submitted in classified form. 
SEC. 6434. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESS-
MENT ON TREN DE ARAGUA. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee 
on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and
H. R. 5009—719 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Homeland Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, in consultation with such other heads of elements of the 
intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an intelligence 
assessment on the transnational criminal organization known as 
‘‘Tren de Aragua’’. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The intelligence assessment required by sub-
section (b) shall include the following: 
(1) A description of the key leaders, organizational struc-
ture, subgroups, and presence in countries in the Western 
Hemisphere of Tren de Aragua. 
(2) A description of the illicit practices used by Tren de 
Aragua to generate revenue, including the sale of illicit drugs, 
kidnapping, and human trafficking, and an estimate of the 
annual revenue generated by those illicit practices. 
(3) A description of the level at which Tren de Aragua 
receives support from the regime of Nicola´s Maduro in Ven-
ezuela. 
(4) A description of any known cooperation between Tren 
de Aragua and any other transnational criminal organizations 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
(5) Any other information the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency considers relevant. 
(d) FORM.—The intelligence assessment required by subsection 
(b) may be submitted in classified form. 
SEC. 6435. ASSESSMENT OF MADURO REGIME’S ECONOMIC AND SECU-
RITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATE SPONSORS OF TER-
RORISM AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a written 
assessment of the economic and security relationships of the regime 
of Nicola´s Maduro of Venezuela with foreign terrorist organizations 
and state sponsors of terrorism (as designated by the Department 
of State), including formal and informal support to and from such 
countries and organizations. 
(c) FORM.—The assessment required by subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
H. R. 5009—720 
SEC. 6436. CONTINUED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF IRANIAN 
EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING FOREIGN MILITARY AND 
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) UPDATE REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an update 
to the report submitted under section 6705 of the Damon Paul 
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (22 U.S.C. 9412) to reflect 
current occurrences, circumstances, and expenditures. 
(c) FORM.—The update submitted pursuant to subsection (b) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 6437. ANALYSES AND IMPACT STATEMENTS REGARDING PRO-
POSED INVESTMENT INTO THE UNITED STATES. 
Section 102A(z) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3024(z)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (2)(A) by inserting ‘‘, including with respect 
to counterintelligence’’ before the semicolon; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
‘‘(A) The term ‘a review or an investigation of any proposed 
investment into the United States for which the Director has 
prepared analytic materials’ includes a review, investigation, 
assessment, or analysis conducted by the Director pursuant 
to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913 (85 Fed. Reg. 
19643; relating to Establishing the Committee for the Assess-
ment of Foreign Participation in the United States Tele-
communications Services Sector), or successor order. 
‘‘(B) The term ‘investment’ includes any activity reviewed, 
investigated, assessed, or analyzed by the Director pursuant 
to section 7 or 10(g) of Executive Order 13913, or successor 
order.’’. 
TITLE LXV—EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
SEC. 
6501. 
INTELLIGENCE 
STRATEGY 
TO 
COUNTER 
FOREIGN 
ADVERSARY EFFORTS TO UTILIZE BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN 
WAYS THAT THREATEN UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECU-
RITY. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
H. R. 5009—721 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Com-
mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Homeland Security, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
as biotechnologies become increasingly important with regard to 
the national security interests of the United States, and with the 
addition of biotechnologies to the biosecurity mission of the National 
Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center, the intelligence 
community must articulate and implement an intelligence strategy 
to identify and assess threats relating to biotechnologies. 
(c) INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY FOR BIOTECHNOLOGIES CRITICAL 
TO NATIONAL SECURITY.— 
(1) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the heads of such other 
elements of the intelligence community as the Director of 
National Intelligence considers appropriate, develop and submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to address 
threats relating to biotechnologies. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy developed and submitted 
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) Identification and assessment of threats associated 
with biotechnologies critical to the national security of the 
United States, including materials that involve a depend-
ency on foreign adversary nations. 
(B) A determination of how best to counter foreign 
adversary efforts to utilize biotechnologies that threaten 
the national security of the United States, including threats 
identified pursuant to paragraph (1). 
(C) A plan to support efforts of other Federal depart-
ments and agencies to secure United States supply chains 
of the biotechnologies critical to the national security of 
the United States, by coordinating— 
(i) across the intelligence community; 
(ii) the support provided by the intelligence 
community to other relevant Federal departments and 
agencies and policymakers; 
(iii) the engagement of the intelligence community 
with private sector entities, in coordination with other 
relevant Federal departments and agencies, as may 
be applicable; and 
(iv) how the intelligence community, in coordina-
tion with other relevant Federal departments and 
agencies, supports and coordinates comparative assess-
ments of United States competitiveness in biotech-
nologies critical to national and economic security. 
(D) Proposals for such legislative or administrative 
action as the Director considers necessary to support the 
strategy.
H. R. 5009—722 
SEC. 6502. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE ROLES, MISSIONS, AND OBJEC-
TIVES OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND 
BIOSECURITY CENTER. 
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3057) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)(4), by striking ‘‘biosecurity and’’ and 
inserting ‘‘counterproliferation, biosecurity, and’’; and 
(2) in subsection (b)— 
(A) in paragraph (1)— 
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘analyzing 
and’’; 
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘Establishing’’ 
and inserting ‘‘Coordinating the establishment of’’; 
(iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ‘‘Dissemi-
nating’’ and inserting ‘‘Overseeing the dissemination 
of’’; 
(iv) in subparagraph (E), by inserting ‘‘and coordi-
nating’’ after ‘‘Conducting’’; and 
(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking ‘‘Conducting’’ 
and inserting ‘‘Coordinating and advancing’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (2)— 
(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘and analysis’’; 
(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through 
(E) as subparagraphs (D) through (F), respectively; 
(iii) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(C) Overseeing and coordinating the analysis of intel-
ligence on biosecurity and foreign biological threats in sup-
port of the intelligence needs of Federal departments and 
agencies responsible for public health, including by pro-
viding analytic priorities to elements of the intelligence 
community and by coordinating net assessments.’’; 
(iv) in subparagraph (D), as redesignated by clause 
(ii), by inserting ‘‘on matters relating to biosecurity 
and foreign biological threats’’ after ‘‘public health’’; 
(v) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by clause 
(ii), by inserting ‘‘and authorities’’ after ‘‘capabilities’’; 
and 
(vi) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(G) Enhancing coordination between elements of the 
intelligence community and private sector entities on 
information relevant to biosecurity, biotechnology, and for-
eign biological threats, and coordinating such information 
with relevant Federal departments and agencies, as 
applicable.’’. 
SEC. 
6503. 
ENHANCING 
CAPABILITIES 
TO 
DETECT 
FOREIGN 
ADVERSARY THREATS RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL DATA. 
(a) DEFINITION OF BIOLOGICAL DATA.—In this section, the term 
‘‘biological 
data’’ 
means 
information, 
including 
associated 
descriptors, derived from the structure, function, or process of a 
biological system that is either measured, collected, or aggregated 
for analysis. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with relevant heads of Federal departments and 
agencies, shall designate intelligence community experts to conduct
H. R. 5009—723 
a 90-day assessment to determine how best to standardize the 
intelligence community’s use of biological data and the ability of 
the intelligence community to detect foreign adversary threats 
relating to biological data, under which the experts shall— 
(1) examine how best to standardize the processes and 
procedures for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
information relating to foreign adversary use of biological data, 
particularly in ways that threaten or could threaten the 
national security of the United States; 
(2) provide recommendations to implement paragraph (1) 
throughout the intelligence community, including with respect 
to the feasibility and advisability of— 
(A) standardizing the data security practices for 
biological data maintained by the intelligence community, 
including security practices for the handling and processing 
of biological data, including with respect to protecting the 
civil rights, liberties, and privacy of United States persons; 
(B) standardizing intelligence engagements with for-
eign allies and partners with respect to biological data; 
and 
(C) standardizing the creation of metadata relating 
to biological data maintained by the intelligence commu-
nity; and 
(3) provide recommendations to ensure coordination with 
such Federal departments and agencies and entities in the 
private sector as the Director considers appropriate to under-
stand how foreign adversaries are accessing and using biological 
data stored within the United States. 
(c) TIMELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS.— 
The recommendations provided pursuant to paragraphs (2) and 
(3) of subsection (b) shall include timelines for implementation 
not later than 180 days after the date of the completion of the 
assessment required by such subsection. 
(d) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the 
completion of the assessment required by subsection (b), the experts 
designated under that subsection shall brief the congressional intel-
ligence committees on the assessment. 
SEC. 6504. ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY 
CENTER. 
(a) DEFINITION OF COUNTER-ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘counter-artificial intelligence’’ means techniques 
or procedures to extract information about the behavior or 
characteristics of an artificial intelligence system, or to learn how 
to manipulate an artificial intelligence system, in order to subvert 
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intel-
ligence system or adjacent system. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security 
Agency shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Security Center 
(referred to in this section as the ‘‘Center’’) within the Cybersecurity 
Collaboration Center of the National Security Agency. 
(c) FUNCTIONS.—The functions of the Artificial Intelligence 
Security Center shall be as follows: 
(1) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter- 
artificial intelligence techniques.
H. R. 5009—724 
(2) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption prac-
tices for managers of national security systems (as defined 
in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and elements 
of the defense industrial base. 
(3) Such other functions as the Director considers appro-
priate. 
(d) DISESTABLISHMENT.—The Director of the National Security 
Agency may disestablish the Center established in subsection (b) 
not earlier than 3 years after the date of the enactment of this 
Act provided that the Director of the National Security Agency 
submits to the congressional intelligence committees a report docu-
menting the rationale for disestablishment of the Center, including 
resource trades, effectiveness, priority, and any other pertinent 
considerations not later than 6 months prior to the disestablish-
ment. 
SEC. 6505. SENSE OF CONGRESS ENCOURAGING INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY TO INCREASE PRIVATE SECTOR CAPITAL 
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERSHIP WITH FEDERAL PART-
NERS TO SECURE ENDURING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVAN-
TAGES. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) acquisition leaders in the intelligence community should 
further explore the strategic use of private capital partnerships 
to secure enduring technological advantages for the intelligence 
community, including through the identification, development, 
and transfer of promising technologies to full-scale programs 
capable of meeting intelligence community requirements; and 
(2) the intelligence community should undertake consulta-
tion with Federal partners, including the Office of Strategic 
Capital of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office 
of Domestic Finance of the Department of the Treasury, on 
best practices and lessons learned from their experiences inte-
grating these resources so as to accelerate attainment of 
national security objectives. 
SEC. 
6506. 
ENHANCEMENT 
OF 
AUTHORITY 
FOR 
INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY PUBLIC-PRIVATE TALENT EXCHANGES. 
(a) FOCUS AREAS.—Subsection (a) of section 5306 of the Damon 
Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is 
amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘Not later than’’ and inserting the following: 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(2) FOCUS AREAS.—The Director shall ensure that the poli-
cies, processes, and procedures developed pursuant to para-
graph (1) require exchanges under this section that relate to 
intelligence or counterintelligence with a focus on rotations 
described in such paragraph with private-sector organizations 
in the following fields: 
‘‘(A) Finance. 
‘‘(B) Acquisition. 
‘‘(C) Biotechnology. 
‘‘(D) Computing. 
‘‘(E) Artificial intelligence. 
‘‘(F) Business process innovation and entrepreneurship. 
‘‘(G) Cybersecurity.