SEC. 107. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY 
IN SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador, should continue to 
serve as a critical component of United States regional 
counterterrorism efforts. 
(b) NEGOTIATION.—The Secretary of State shall ne-
gotiate with the appropriate agency entities to ensure that 
counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism 
within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, and 
border security courses are instituted as part of the core 
curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Acad-
emy in San Salvador. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary to— 
(1) complete all physical aspects of the ILEA 
facility in San Salvador; and 
(2) implement the ILEA Global Network. 
SEC. 108. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES. 
(a) DECLARATION REGARDING TERRORISM.—The 
Secretary of State shall direct the United States Rep-
resentative to the Organization of American States (OAS) 
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
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at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting 
of Member States of the OAS convened after the date of 
the enactment of this Act calling on countries to system-
atically deny the use of their territories by terrorists or 
terrorist organizations. 
(b) REDUCTION
IN UNITED STATES CONTRIBU-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
reduce by 50 percent the amount of the United 
States assessed contribution to the OAS for fiscal 
year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal year. 
(2) USE OF FUNDS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount reduced 
pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than ten 
percent of such amount shall be added to 
United States voluntary contributions to each 
of the organizations specified in subparagraph 
(B) and the remaining amount shall be used to 
establish and maintain the Western Hemisphere 
Regional Coordination Centers under section 
301. 
(B) ORGANIZATIONS SPECIFIED.—The or-
ganizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are 
the following: 
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(i) The OAS Inter-American Com-
mittee Against Terrorism (CICTE). 
(ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug 
Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). 
SEC. 109. AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE-
WARDS PROGRAM. 
Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Au-
thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the 
end; 
(2) in paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period 
at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of 
any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant 
to red notices duly issued by Interpol, if such reward 
would help advance United States interests or the 
interests of United States allies in the global strug-
gle against international terrorism.’’. 
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TITLE 
II—NONPROLIFERATION 
OF 
NUCLEAR, 
CHEMICAL, 
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
IN 
THE 
WESTERN 
HEMI-
SPHERE 
SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) Venezuela and Iran have established exten-
sive political, military, and economic cooperation. 
(2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo 
Chavez, has publicly supported Iran’s development 
of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observ-
ers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program. 
(3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was 
seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear 
program in Venezuela. 
(4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of 
only three countries to vote against a resolution by 
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the 
United Nations Security Council for violating its ob-
ligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty. 
(5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the 
Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated 
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that his government was prepared to discuss pro-
viding technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear 
program. 
(6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel 
El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela’s National As-
sembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran 
will ‘‘practically give away’’ its civilian nuclear tech-
nology and that ‘‘if relations with Iran lead to shar-
ing nuclear technology with us, we would then give 
it away to our brothers in Latin America once we 
are successful.’’. 
(7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken 
steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program 
and that cooperation in this area was being dis-
cussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus. 
(8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of 
uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region. 
(9) In 1985 the Brazilian government an-
nounced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear 
weapons program run by the military since 1975. 
(10) In August 2005 a former high-ranking 
Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military 
had continued to develop elements of a nuclear 
weapons program into the 1990s. 
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(11) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General 
Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for 
Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manu-
facture nuclear weapons. 
(12) The centrifuges at Brazil’s Resende ura-
nium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to 
produce highly enriched uranium in quantities suffi-
cient to produce several nuclear weapons annually. 
(13) Brazil has denied inspectors from the 
IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment cen-
trifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is pro-
tecting commercial secrets. 
(14) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved 
only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification 
methods to indirect inspections without direct in-
spection of the centrifuges, which many non-
proliferation experts fear could be used as a prece-
dent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA 
inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear fa-
cilities. 
(15) A prototype nuclear reactor is being devel-
oped at the Armar Research Center for use in Bra-
zil’s nuclear-powered submarine program. 
(16) On February 24, 2008, the Governments 
of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations 
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regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor 
and construction of a uranium enrichment plant. 
(17) Until 1990 the Argentine Government con-
ducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program. 
(18) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran 
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Ar-
gentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched 
uranium. 
(19) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three 
agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reac-
tor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants 
for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication. 
(20) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nu-
clear program was reduced, but not terminated, fol-
lowing pressure by the United States. 
(21) Several countries in Latin America, includ-
ing Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and im-
plemented an Additional Protocol which provides 
IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear fa-
cilities. 
(22) Some Western Hemisphere countries have 
not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also re-
ferred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention. 
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(23) Several countries in Latin America have 
not signed and ratified The Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bac-
teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, also referred to as The Biological 
Convention. 
SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PRO-
LIFERATION 
OF 
WEAPONS-RELATED 
NU-
CLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATE-
RIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—To enhance the prevention of the 
proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and bi-
ological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the 
policy of the United States to— 
(1) promote the negotiation and implementation 
by all countries of— 
(A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA); and 
(B) an Additional Protocol to the safe-
guards agreement; 
(2) secure guarantees by all countries of unre-
stricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-re-
lated materials and facilities in territories under the 
control of the host country; 
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(3) promote the implementation by all countries 
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 
and 
(4) promote the accession to and ratification 
and implementation of— 
(A) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their De-
struction (also referred to as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention); 
(B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 
(C) the 2005 United Nations International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nu-
clear Terrorism; and 
(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development and Stockpiling of Bacterio-
logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction (also referred to as the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention). 
(b) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DEFINED.—In this sec-
tion, the term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means the Protocol 
Additional to an agreement between a country and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards. 
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SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL 
QUANTITIES PROTOCOL. 
Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets 
aside many of the operative provisions of a general safe-
guards agreement, the ability of the IAEA to verify that 
nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP 
are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly 
impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to— 
(1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an 
SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as 
of January 1, 2008; and 
(2) encourage every country with an SQP to 
withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agree-
ment for the purpose of increasing transparency and 
eliminating any exemption or provision that could 
restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a 
country’s nuclear materials and facilities are not 
being diverted to impermissible uses. 
SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS RE-
GARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY 
COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use all avail-
able political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure 
that each country in the Western Hemisphere— 
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(1) has signed and implemented a comprehen-
sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 
(2) has signed and implemented an Additional 
Protocol to its safeguards agreement; 
(3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA 
personnel to all nuclear-related facilities; 
(4) has implemented the provisions of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 
(5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully imple-
mented the conventions referred to in section 
202(a)(4); 
(6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP 
if that country did not have an SQP as of January 
1, 2008; and 
(7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an 
SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement. 
(b) SANCTIONS.—For any Western Hemisphere 
country that has not satisfied all of the requirements spec-
ified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to— 
(1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian 
foreign assistance to the government of that country; 
and 
(2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of 
articles, including the issuance of any specific license 
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or grant of any other specific permission or author-
ity to export any goods or technology under— 
(A) the Export Administration Act of 
1979; 
(B) the Arms Export Control Act; 
(C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 
(D) any other statute that requires the 
prior review and approval of the United States 
Government as a condition for the export or re- 
export of goods or services. 
SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 
FUEL FABRICATION. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States to oppose the development or acquisi-
tion by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel 
if such country did not have such capacity as of January 
1, 2008. 
(b) PREVENTION OF CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NU-
CLEAR FUEL.—The President shall use all available polit-
ical, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the 
voice, vote, and influence of the United States in all inter-
national organizations and associations of which it is a 
member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any 
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country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such 
country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2008. 
(c) NUCLEAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE 
IAEA.—The President shall direct the United States Per-
manent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 
the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, envi-
ronmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a 
country the government of which— 
(1) the Secretary of State has determined, for 
purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
Control Act, or other provision of law, is a govern-
ment that has repeatedly provided support for acts 
of international terrorism; 
(2) is actively cooperating with a government as 
described in paragraph (1); 
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations; or 
(4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
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SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECU-
RITY INITIATIVE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as 
the PSI, has repeatedly demonstrated its effective-
ness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
(2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the 
National Defense University regarding additional 
measures to enhance global efforts against the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction President 
Bush proposed that ‘‘the work of the Proliferation 
Security Initiative be expanded to address more than 
shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we’ve 
developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct ac-
tion against proliferation networks. We need greater 
cooperation not just among intelligence and military 
services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI par-
ticipants and other willing nations should use the 
Interpol and all other means to bring to justice 
those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down 
their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their as-
sets. We must act on every lead. We will find the 
middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.’’. 
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(3) The number of countries participating in 
PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhanc-
ing its effectiveness. 
(4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere 
formally or informally cooperate with the PSI. 
(5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by 
means of greater coordination of policies, improved 
communications, and enhanced capabilities would 
significantly promote the objectives of the PSI. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING STRENGTH-
ENING
COOPERATION
REGARDING
NONPROLIFERA-
TION.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to establish comprehensive coopera-
tion to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological materials in the Western Hemisphere; 
and 
(2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure 
the formal or informal cooperation by Western 
Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing 
the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative an-
nounced by the President on May 31, 2003. 
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SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
NONPROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIP INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author-
ized, in consultation with relevant United States Govern-
ment agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the govern-
ments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat-
eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international 
agreements under which such governments work in part-
nership to establish an initiative to be known as the 
‘‘Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Ini-
tiative’’ (NPI). 
(b) PURPOSE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The NPI shall— 
(A) encourage the establishment of con-
tacts and cooperative relationships, including 
the sharing of intelligence, between the respon-
sible individuals and agencies of each partici-
pant country with their counterparts in the 
United States Government and in other partici-
pating countries; and 
(B) encourage bilateral and multilateral 
support, cooperation, and coordination of na-
tional programs and efforts to promote effective 
and in-depth cooperation to counter the illicit 
acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear, 
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chemical, or biological materials, technology, or 
facilities. 
(2) COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.—The cooperative 
programs referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall 
include the following: 
(A) Training for government officials and 
agents from participating countries regarding 
the development and operation of NPI pro-
grams. 
(B) Assistance in developing a comprehen-
sive legal and regulatory framework in each 
country, as appropriate, to enable the establish-
ment and effective implementation of export 
controls and the capacity to track nuclear, 
chemical, and biological materials, equipment, 
technology, and facilities. 
(C) Provision of equipment, development of 
infrastructure, and the acquisition of other re-
sources required by participating countries to 
effectively carry out the tasks referred to in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
SEC. 208. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No defense article or defense serv-
ice may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in 
a fiscal year to a foreign country that the President deter-
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