IV
105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. CON. RES. 170
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to
negotiate a new base rights agreement with the Government of Panama
to permit the United States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond
December 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to act independently
to continue to protect the Panama Canal and to guarantee its regular
operation.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OCTOBER 9, 1997
Mr. CRANE (for himself, Mr. STUMP, Mr. HOSTETTLER, Mr. BARR of Georgia,
Mr. GIBBONS, and Mr. SNOWBARGER) submitted the following concurrent
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Rela-
tions
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President
should seek to negotiate a new base rights agreement
with the Government of Panama to permit the United
States Armed Forces to remain in Panama beyond De-
cember 31, 1999, and to permit the United States to
act independently to continue to protect the Panama
Canal and to guarantee its regular operation.
Whereas the Panama Canal is a vital strategic asset to the
United States and its allies;
Whereas the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality
and Operation of the Panama Canal and the Panama
•HCON 170 IH
Canal Treaty, both signed on September 7, 1977, man-
dates that (1) no United States troops are to remain in
Panama after December 31, 1999; (2) the Canal Zone is
to be incorporated into Panama; (3) United States Pan-
ama-based communications facilities are to be phased
out; (4) all United States training in Panama of Latin
American soldiers is to be halted; and (5) management
and operational control of the Canal is to be turned over
to Panamanian authorities;
Whereas friendly cooperative relations currently exist between
the United States and the Republic of Panama;
Whereas the region has a history of unstable governments
which pose a threat to the future operation of the Pan-
ama Canal, and the United States must have the discre-
tion and the means to defend the Canal and ensure its
continuous operation and availability to the military and
commercial shipping of the United States and its allies
in times of crisis;
Whereas the Panama Canal is vulnerable to disruption and
closure by unforeseen events in Panama, by terrorist
attack, and by air strikes or other attack by foreign
powers;
Whereas the United States fleet depends upon the Panama
Canal for rapid transit ocean to ocean in times of emer-
gency, as demonstrated during World War II, the Korean
War, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the
Persian Gulf War, thereby saving 13,000 miles and three
weeks steaming effort around Cape Horn;
Whereas nearly 15 percent of all United States trade, ap-
proximately 10 percent of Latin America’s trade, and al-
•HCON 170 IH
most 5 percent of the world’s trade transit the Panama
Canal;
Whereas the Republic of Panama has dissolved its defense
forces and has no standing army, or other defense forces,
capable of defending the Panama Canal from aggressors
and, therefore, remains vulnerable to attack from both in-
side and outside of Panama and this may impair or inter-
rupt the operation and accessibility of the Panama Canal;
Whereas the presence of the United States Armed Forces of-
fers the best defense against sabotage or other threat to
the Panama Canal; and
Whereas the 10,000 United States military personnel now
based in the Canal Zone, including the headquarters of
the United States Southern Command, cannot remain
there beyond December 31, 1999, without a new agree-
ment with Panama: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the
President should—
(1) negotiate a new base rights agreement with
the Government of Panama—
(A) to allow the permanent stationing of
United States military forces in Panama beyond
December 31, 1999, and
(B) to ensure that the United States will
be able to act independently after December 31,
1999, to maintain the security of the Panama
•HCON 170 IH
Canal and to guarantee its regular operation;
and
(2) consult with the Congress throughout the
negotiations described in paragraph (1).
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