108TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. CON. RES. 398
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert
the international community to Iran’s covert nuclear ac-
tivities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear
weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
•HCON 398 EH
Whereas Iran’s covert activities to develop the means to
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be re-
vealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot
Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel
Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until
February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facil-
ity was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant
could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nu-
clear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly
enriched uranium for as many as 25–30 nuclear weapons
per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obli-
gations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA
to report all nuclear material imported into Iran—specifi-
cally, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from
China in 1991—the processing and use of that material,
and the facilities involved in the use and processing of
the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obliga-
tions under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce
nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving
questions about its nuclear activities;
•HCON 398 EH
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board
of Governors in August 2003 that, after further inves-
tigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activi-
ties as required by its Safeguards Agreement and contin-
ued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared ura-
nium enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12,
2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium en-
richment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, dis-
close all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with
the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the
Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the
application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of
all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third
countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency
in resolving questions about Iran’s nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director Gen-
eral of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had con-
ducted research on uranium conversion processes at the
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nu-
clear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Min-
isters of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom
issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it
had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and re-
processing activities as defined by the IAEA;
•HCON 398 EH
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspec-
ified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied
international concerns about its nuclear development pro-
gram;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment
centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between
1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported
uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a
laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30
kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, an-
other violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had
irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reproc-
essed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its
legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safe-
guards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement
for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with
the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all
enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to
produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not
to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic ac-
tivities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and con-
fronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities;
•HCON 398 EH
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that
Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities
from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obliga-
tions under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran’s subsequent pledge to, once again,
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February
24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in decep-
tion regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to
disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using
more advanced enrichment centrifuge technology im-
ported from foreign sources, and noncredible explanations
involving experiments to create a highly toxic isotope of
polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear
weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons devel-
opment program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations
of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and of Iran’s previous
assurances to the IAEA and the international community
for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran’s commitment to the IAEA and to
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would
suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly
emphasized that this suspension is temporary and contin-
ued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment cen-
trifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and
expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it
chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to
•HCON 398 EH
the IAEA its research into more sophisticated ‘‘P2’’ ura-
nium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other
projects which it has no intention of declaring to the
IAEA, are contrary to—
(1) Iran’s commitment to the IAEA in a letter on
October 16, 2003, by the Vice President of Iran and
President of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization that
Iran would present a ‘‘full picture of its nuclear activi-
ties’’ and ‘‘full transparency’’;
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21,
2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding
issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors
of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full trans-
parency and to ‘‘leave no stone unturned’’ to assure the
IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed
to a nuclear weapons program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and tech-
nology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nu-
clear black market that Iran has used, raising the ques-
tion of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon
design that it has refused to reveal to international in-
spectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation has recently announced that it will soon con-
clude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear
fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the
need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear
weapons development program;