I 
116TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 8698 
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that disparate impacts 
on certain populations constitute a sufficient basis for rights of action 
under such Act, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OCTOBER 27, 2020 
Ms. TLAIB (for herself, Mr. KENNEDY, and Ms. HAALAND) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and 
in addition to the Committee on Education and Labor, for a period to 
be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consider-
ation of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee 
concerned 
A BILL 
To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify that dis-
parate impacts on certain populations constitute a suffi-
cient basis for rights of action under such Act, and 
for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Justice for All Act 
of 2020’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) This Act is made necessary by a decision of 
the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275 (2001) that significantly impairs statutory 
protections against discrimination that Congress has 
erected over a period of almost 4 decades. The 
Sandoval decision undermines these statutory pro-
tections by stripping victims of discrimination (de-
fined under regulations that Congress required Fed-
eral departments and agencies to promulgate to im-
plement title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C. 2000d et seq.)) of the right to bring action 
in Federal court to redress the discrimination. 
(2) The Sandoval decision contradicts settled 
expectations created by title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 (also known as the ‘‘Patsy Takemoto Mink 
Equal Opportunity in Education Act’’) (20 U.S.C. 
1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 
(42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), and section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) (collec-
tively referred to in this Act as the ‘‘covered civil 
rights provisions’’). The covered civil rights provi-
sions were designed to establish and make effective 
the rights of persons to be free from discrimination 
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on the part of entities that are subject to 1 or more 
of the covered civil rights provisions, as appropriate 
(referred to in this Act as ‘‘covered entities’’). In 
1964 Congress adopted title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 to ensure that Federal dollars would not 
be used to subsidize or support programs or activi-
ties that discriminated on racial, color, or national 
origin grounds. In the years that followed, Congress 
extended these protections by enacting laws barring 
discrimination in federally funded education activi-
ties on the basis of sex in title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, and discrimination in feder-
ally funded activities on the basis of age in the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975 and disability in section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
(3) All of the statutes cited in this section were 
designed to protect persons subject to discrimina-
tion. As Congress has consistently recognized, effec-
tive enforcement of the statutes and protection of 
the rights guaranteed under the statutes depend 
heavily on the efforts of private attorneys general. 
Congress acknowledged that it could not secure com-
pliance solely through administrative efforts and en-
forcement actions initiated by the Attorney General. 
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Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 
(1968) (per curiam). 
(4) The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
individuals suffering discrimination under these stat-
utes have a private right of action in the Federal 
courts, and that this is necessary for effective pro-
tection of the law, although Congress did not make 
such a right of action explicit in the statute involved. 
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 
(1979). 
(5) Furthermore, for effective enforcement of 
the statutes cited in this section, it is necessary that 
the private right of action include a means to chal-
lenge all forms of discrimination that are prohibited 
by the statutes, including practices that have a dis-
parate impact and are not justified as necessary to 
achieve the legitimate goals of programs or activities 
supported by Federal financial assistance. 
(6) By reinstating a private right of action to 
challenge disparate impact discrimination under title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d 
et seq.) and confirming that right for other civil 
rights statutes, Congress is not acting in a manner 
that would expose covered entities to unfair findings 
of discrimination. The legal standard for a disparate 
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impact claim has never been structured so that a 
finding of discrimination could be based on numer-
ical imbalance alone. 
(7) In contrast, a failure to reinstate or confirm 
a private right of action would leave vindication of 
the rights to equality of opportunity solely to Fed-
eral agencies. Action by Congress to specify a pri-
vate right of action is necessary to ensure that per-
sons will have a remedy if they are denied equal ac-
cess to education, housing, health, environmental 
protection, transportation, and many other programs 
and services by practices of covered entities that re-
sult in discrimination. 
(8) As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Sandoval, courts have dismissed numerous claims 
brought under the regulations promulgated pursuant 
to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 
U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) that challenged actions with 
an unjustified discriminatory effect. Although the 
Sandoval Court did not address title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et 
seq.), lower courts have similarly dismissed claims 
under such title. 
(9) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) has received different treat-
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ment by the Supreme Court. In Alexander v. Choate, 
469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Court proceeded on the 
assumption that the statute itself prohibited some 
actions that had a disparate impact on disabled indi-
viduals—an assumption borne out by congressional 
statements made during passage of the Act. In 
Sandoval, the Court appeared to accept this prin-
ciple of Alexander. Moreover, the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly recognized congressional approval of the reg-
ulations promulgated to implement section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in Consolidated Rail 
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). Rely-
ing on the validity of the regulations, Congress in-
corporated the regulations into the statutory require-
ments of section 204 of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12134). Nonetheless, 
Sandoval creates the potential for uncertainty in the 
application of critical protections of Section 504, 
particularly in the lower courts. 
(10) The right to maintain a private right of 
action under a provision added to a statute under 
this Act will be effectuated by a waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the same manner as sovereign immu-
nity is waived under the remaining provisions of that 
statute. 
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(11) Numerous provisions of Federal law ex-
pressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, 
and Federal agencies and courts have correctly in-
terpreted these prohibitions on sex discrimination to 
include discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
gender identity, and sex stereotypes. In particular, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
correctly interpreted title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 in Macy v. Holder, Baldwin v. Foxx, and 
Lusardi v. McHugh. 
(12) In forbidding discrimination based on sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum 
of disparate treatment resulting from sex-related 
characteristics. The Supreme Court correctly recog-
nized in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services that among these char-
acteristics are sex-stereotypes, including masculinity 
and femininity. Congress reaffirmed in the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 that discrimina-
tion on the basis of ‘‘sex’’ includes but is not limited 
to discrimination on the basis of ‘‘pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.’’ 
(13) The absence of explicit prohibitions of dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity under Federal statutory law has cre-
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ated uncertainty for employers and other entities 
covered by Federal nondiscrimination laws and 
caused unnecessary hardships for LGBTQ individ-
uals. 
(14) The Supreme Court correctly recognized in 
Hobby Lobby v. Burwell that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) ‘‘provides no . . . 
shield’’ to those who ‘‘cloak’’ discrimination as ‘‘reli-
gious practice to escape legal sanction.’’ This Act re-
affirms that crucial limitation on RFRA, that Con-
gress did not intend for it to be used—and indeed 
it cannot be used—to provide a defense against alle-
gations of discrimination on the basis of any pro-
tected trait. 
(15) Chapter 1 of title 9, United States Code 
(commonly known as the ‘‘Federal Arbitration 
Act’’), represented an exercise of legislative power 
that required courts to recognize private voluntary 
agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes at a 
time when the courts were refusing to do so on 
grounds that arbitration represented a usurpation of 
the authority of the courts to resolve legal disputes. 
(16) The Federal Arbitration Act did not, and 
should not have been interpreted to, supplant or nul-
lify the legislatively created rights and remedies that 
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Congress, exercising its power under article I of the 
Constitution of the United States, has granted to 
the people of the United States for resolving dis-
putes in State and Federal courts. 
(17) Recent court decisions, including AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) 
and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Res-
taurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), have interpreted 
the Federal Arbitration Act to broadly preempt 
rights and remedies established under substantive 
State and Federal law. As a result, these decisions 
have enabled business entities to avoid or nullify 
legal duties created by congressional enactment, re-
sulting in millions of people in the United States 
being unable to vindicate their rights in State and 
Federal courts. 
(18) States have a compelling interest in enact-
ing rights and remedies to protect the welfare of 
their citizens, and the Federal Arbitration Act 
should not be, and should not have been, interpreted 
to preempt State legislation that enacted rights and 
remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens. 
(19) The Supreme Court misinterpreted Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act in establishing the 
Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense in Faragher v. 
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City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. 
v. Ellerth. This affirmative defense often leaves vic-
tims of sexual harassment with no remedy or re-
course after incidence of sexual or other harassment. 
Violations of the law, and injuries to a victim and 
their rights, are not cured by the existence of an 
anti-harassment policy or the lack of future harm, 
and in a hostile work environment taking preventa-
tive measures is not a requirement that falls on the 
victim. 
(20) Bringing a lawsuit to vindicate civil rights 
is financially risky, and law firms, whether large or 
small, are unlikely to take such cases on. Congress 
enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act 
of 1976 in order to make lawsuits to vindicate civil 
rights more accessible to potential plaintiffs. The 
Supreme Court correctly recognized in City of River-
side v. Rivera that the effectuation of congressional 
intent requires viable civil rights lawsuits, which are 
dependent on the availability of private enforcement 
mechanisms and the corresponding availability of at-
torney’s fees. 
(21) However, the Supreme Court incorrectly 
held that the ‘‘catalyst theory’’ is not a permissible 
basis for the award of attorney’s fees in Buckhannon 
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v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human 
Resources. In doing so, the Court deprived plaintiffs 
who effectively win a lawsuit through a settlement, 
from receiving pre-trial attorney’s fees. Congress en-
acted fee-shifting provisions in civil rights laws to 
encourage private enforcement of those laws, and 
fees must be awarded when a lawsuit vindicates the 
rights Congress sought to secure. In disapproving of 
the ‘‘catalyst theory’’ the Court incentivized poten-
tial defendants to draw out the pre-trial process and 
settle at the last second, making the lawsuit too ex-
pensive for the average victim to undertake and too 
risky for the average attorney to accept a civil rights 
case. 
(22) The Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other 
civil rights laws that followed it, were written, in 
part, to banish rampant disparate treatment on the 
basis of race from American society. Congress 
sought to overcome the pervasive, racist ideology 
that Black traits were inferior by prohibiting dis-
crimination, and intended the Act to be interpreted 
broadly—encompassing race and all its attributes, 
especially those traits historically associated with 
race. 
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(23) ‘‘Blackness’’ and its associated physical 
traits, such as dark skin and kinky and curly hair, 
have too often been equated with inferiority and 
‘‘unprofessionalism’’. Professionalism was, and still 
is, closely linked to European features and manner-
isms, which entails that those who do not naturally 
fall into Eurocentric norms must alter their appear-
ances, sometimes drastically and permanently, in 
order to be deemed professional. Such norms are, on 
their face, proxies for race. 
(24) Federal courts have correctly interpreted, 
e.g. that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, and 
thus protect individuals from discrimination against 
afros. However, the courts have yet to accept that 
the Act outlaws dress codes and grooming policies 
that prohibit any natural presentation of Black hair, 
including afros, braids, twists, and locks. Although 
purportedly ‘‘race-neutral’’, these policies have a dis-
parate impact on Black individuals as they are more 
likely to deter, burden, or punish Black individuals 
than any other group. Therefore, hair discrimination 
targeting hairstyles associated with race is racial dis-
crimination. 
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SEC. 3. PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION. 
(a) CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.—Section 601 of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘No’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) No’’; 
(2) by inserting ‘‘religion, sex (as such term is 
defined in section 208),’’ before ‘‘or national origin’’; 
and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(b)(1)(A) Discrimination (including exclusion from 
participation and denial of benefits) based on disparate 
impact is established under this title only if— 
‘‘(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex (as defined in section 208), 
or national origin (referred to in this title as a ‘per-
son aggrieved’) demonstrates that an entity subject 
to this title (referred to in this title as a ‘covered en-
tity’) has a policy or practice that causes a disparate 
impact on the basis of race, color, sex (as such term 
is defined in section 208), or national origin and the 
covered entity fails to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged policy or practice is related to and necessary 
to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the pro-
gram or activity alleged to have been operated in a 
discriminatory manner; or 
‘‘(ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (con-
sistent with the demonstration required under title 
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VII with respect to an ‘alternative employment prac-
tice’) that a less discriminatory alternative policy or 
practice exists, and the covered entity refuses to 
adopt such alternative policy or practice. 
‘‘(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a par-
ticular policy or practice causes a disparate impact as de-
scribed in subparagraph (A)(i), the person aggrieved shall 
demonstrate that each particular challenged policy or 
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the per-
son aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements 
of a covered entity’s decisionmaking process are not capa-
ble of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process 
may be analyzed as 1 policy or practice. 
‘‘(ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific 
policy or practice does not cause the disparate impact, the 
covered entity shall not be required to demonstrate that 
such policy or practice is necessary to achieve the goals 
of its program or activity. 
‘‘(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is nec-
essary to achieve the goals of a program or activity may 
not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional 
discrimination under this title. 
‘‘(3) In this subsection, the term ‘demonstrates’ 
means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.’’. 
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(b) EDUCATION AMENDMENTS
OF 1972.—Section 
901 of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 
1681) is amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub-
section (e); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(c)(1)(A) Subject to the conditions described in 
paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (a), discrimina-
tion (including exclusion from participation and denial of 
benefits) based on disparate impact is established under 
this title only if— 
‘‘(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the 
basis of sex (as such term is defined in section 208 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (referred to in this 
title as a ‘person aggrieved’) demonstrates that an 
entity subject to this title (referred to in this title as 
a ‘covered entity’) has a policy or practice that 
causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex and 
the covered entity fails to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged policy or practice is related to and necessary 
to achieve the nondiscriminatory goals of the pro-
gram or activity alleged to have been operated in a 
discriminatory manner; or 
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‘‘(ii) the person aggrieved demonstrates (con-
sistent with the demonstration required under title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq.) with respect to an ‘alternative em-
ployment practice’) that a less discriminatory alter-
native policy or practice exists, and the covered enti-
ty refuses to adopt such alternative policy or prac-
tice. 
‘‘(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a par-
ticular policy or practice causes a disparate impact as de-
scribed in subparagraph (A)(i), the person aggrieved shall 
demonstrate that each particular challenged policy or 
practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the per-
son aggrieved demonstrates to the court that the elements 
of a covered entity’s decisionmaking process are not capa-
ble of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process 
may be analyzed as 1 policy or practice. 
‘‘(ii) If the covered entity demonstrates that a specific 
policy or practice does not cause the disparate impact, the 
covered entity shall not be required to demonstrate that 
such policy or practice is necessary to achieve the goals 
of its program or activity. 
‘‘(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is nec-
essary to achieve the goals of a program or activity may 
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not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional 
discrimination under this title. 
‘‘(3) In this subsection, the term ‘demonstrates’ 
means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.’’. 
(c) AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975.—Section 
303 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 
6102) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘Pursuant’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) 
Pursuant’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(b)(1)(A) Subject to the conditions described in sub-
sections (b) and (c) of section 304, discrimination (includ-
ing exclusion from participation and denial of benefits) 
based on disparate impact is established under this title 
only if— 
‘‘(i) a person aggrieved by discrimination on the 
basis of age (referred to in this title as a ‘person ag-
grieved’) demonstrates that an entity subject to this 
title (referred to in this title as a ‘covered entity’) 
has a policy or practice that causes a disparate im-
pact on the basis of age and the covered entity fails 
to demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice 
is related to and necessary to achieve the non-
discriminatory goals of the program or activity al-
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‘‘(2) A demonstration that a policy or practice is nec-
essary to achieve the goals of a program or activity may 
not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional 
discrimination under this title. 
‘‘(3) In this subsection, the term ‘demonstrates’ 
means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.’’. 
(d) FAIR HOUSING ACT.—The Fair Housing Act 
(title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 
et seq.) is amended— 
(1) in section 802, by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(p) ‘Sex’ has the meaning given such term in section 
208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
‘‘(q) ‘Source of income’ includes— 
‘‘(1) any income from a profession, occupation, 
or job; 
‘‘(2) any form of Federal, State, or local hous-
ing assistance provided to a family or provided to a 
housing owner on behalf of a family, or private as-
sistance, grant, loan or rental assistance program, 
including low-income housing assistance certificates, 
rental subsidies from nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and vouchers issued under the United States 
Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437 et seq.); 
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‘‘(3) any income received during a taxable year 
as Social Security benefits, as defined in section 
86(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or as 
supplemental security income benefits under title 
XVI of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1381 et 
seq.); 
‘‘(4) any gift, inheritance, pension, annuity, or 
other consideration or benefit; 
‘‘(5) any income received pursuant to court 
order, including spousal support and child support; 
‘‘(6) any payment from a trust, guardian, or 
conservator; 
‘‘(7) any income from the sale or pledge of 
property or an interest in property; and 
‘‘(8) any other lawful source of income. 
‘‘(r) ‘Race’, ‘color’, ‘religion’, ‘sex’, ‘sexual orienta-
tion’, ‘gender identity’, ‘handicap’, ‘familial status’, 
‘source of income’, or ‘national origin’, used with respect 
to an individual, includes— 
‘‘(1) the race, color, religion, sex, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, handicap, familial status, 
source of income, or national origin, respectively, of 
another person with whom the individual is associ-
ated or has been associated; and 
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‘‘(2) a perception or belief, even if inaccurate, 
concerning the race, color, religion, sex, sexual ori-
entation, gender identity, handicap, familial status, 
source of income, or national origin, respectively, of 
the individual.’’; 
(2) in section 804, by inserting ‘‘(as defined in 
section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source 
of income,’’ after ‘‘sex’’ each place that term ap-
pears; 
(3) in section 805, by inserting ‘‘(as defined in 
section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source 
of income,’’ after ‘‘sex’’ each place that term ap-
pears; 
(4) in section 806, by inserting ‘‘(as defined in 
section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), source 
of income,’’ after ‘‘sex’’; 
(5) in section 807 (42 U.S.C. 3607), by adding 
at the end the following: 
‘‘(c) Nothing in this title shall be construed to— 
‘‘(1) prohibit an entity from providing housing 
assistance under section 8(o)(19) of the United 
States 
Housing 
Act 
of 
1937 
(42 
U.S.C. 
1437f(o)(19)) in a nondiscriminatory manner; or 
‘‘(2) limit the ability of the owner of a dwelling 
to determine, in a commercially reasonable and non- 
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discriminatory manner, the ability of a person to af-
ford to purchase or rent the dwelling.’’; and 
(6) in section 808(e)(6) (42 U.S.C. 3608(e)(6)), 
by inserting ‘‘source of income,’’ after ‘‘handicap,’’. 
(e) PREVENTION OF INTIMIDATION IN FAIR HOUS-
ING CASES.—Section 901 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 
(42 U.S.C. 3631) is amended by inserting ‘‘(as such term 
is defined in section 208 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
source of income (as defined in section 802),’’ after ‘‘sex’’ 
each place that term appears. 
SEC. 4. RIGHT OF RECOVERY. 
(a) CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.—Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) is 
amended by inserting after section 602 the following: 
‘‘SEC. 602A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED. 
‘‘(a) CLAIMS BASED ON PROOF OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION.—In an action brought by a person ag-
grieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) 
prohibited under this title (including its implementing reg-
ulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable and 
legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
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except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(b) CLAIMS BASED ON THE DISPARATE IMPACT 
STANDARD OF PROOF.—In an action brought by a person 
aggrieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
engaged in unlawful discrimination based on disparate im-
pact prohibited under this title (including its implementing 
regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(c) SETTLEMENT.—In any settlement agreement or 
consent decree to resolve an action brought or which may 
be brought under this title, attorney’s fees of the plaintiff 
shall be included.’’. 
(b) EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972.—Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et 
seq.) is amended by inserting after section 902 the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘SEC. 902A. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PERSONS AGGRIEVED. 
‘‘(a) CLAIMS BASED ON PROOF OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION.—In an action brought by a person ag-
grieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
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practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) 
prohibited under this title (including its implementing reg-
ulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable and 
legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(b) CLAIMS BASED ON THE DISPARATE IMPACT 
STANDARD OF PROOF.—In an action brought by a person 
aggrieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
engaged in unlawful discrimination based on disparate im-
pact prohibited under this title (including its implementing 
regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(c) SETTLEMENT.—In any settlement agreement or 
consent decree to resolve an action brought or which may 
be brought under this title, attorney’s fees of the plaintiff 
shall be included.’’. 
(c) AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1975.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 305 of the Age Dis-
crimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104) is amend-
ed by adding at the end the following: 
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(A) ELIMINATING WAIVER OF RIGHT TO 
FEES IF NOT REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT.—Sec-
tion 305(e)(1) of the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975 (42 U.S.C. 6104(e)) is amended— 
(i) by striking ‘‘to enjoin a violation’’ 
and inserting ‘‘to redress a violation’’; and 
(ii) by striking the second sentence 
and inserting the following: ‘‘The Court 
shall award the costs of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert 
fees), to the prevailing plaintiff.’’. 
(B) ELIMINATING
UNNECESSARY
MAN-
DATES: TO
EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE
REM-
EDIES; AND TO DELAY SUIT LONGER THAN 180 
DAYS
TO
OBTAIN
AGENCY
REVIEW.—Section 
305(f) of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 
(42 U.S.C. 6104(f)) is amended by striking 
‘‘With respect to actions brought for relief 
based on an alleged violation of the provisions 
of this title,’’ and inserting ‘‘Actions brought 
for relief based on an alleged violation of the 
provisions of this title may be initiated in a 
court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to 
section 305(e), or before the relevant Federal 
department or agency. With respect to such ac-
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tions brought initially before the relevant Fed-
eral department or agency,’’. 
(C) ELIMINATING DUPLICATIVE ‘‘REASON-
ABLENESS’’ REQUIREMENT; CLARIFYING THAT 
‘‘REASONABLE FACTORS OTHER THAN AGE’’ IS 
DEFENSE TO A DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM, NOT 
AN
EXCEPTION
TO
ADA
COVERAGE.—Section 
304(b)(1) of the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975 (42 U.S.C. 6103(b)(1)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘involved—’’ and all that follows 
through the period and inserting ‘‘involved such 
action reasonably takes into account age as a 
factor necessary to the normal operation or the 
achievement of any statutory objective of such 
program or activity.’’. 
(d) REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973.—Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) is amend-
ed by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(e)(1) In an action brought by a person aggrieved 
by discrimination on the basis of disability (referred to in 
this section as a ‘person aggrieved’) under this section 
against an entity subject to this section (referred to in 
this section as a ‘covered entity’) who has engaged in un-
lawful intentional discrimination (not a practice that is 
unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under 
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this section (including its implementing regulations), the 
person aggrieved may recover equitable and legal relief 
(including compensatory and punitive damages), attor-
ney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, except that 
punitive damages are not available against a government, 
government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(2) In an action brought by a person aggrieved 
under this section against a covered entity who has en-
gaged in unlawful discrimination based on disparate im-
pact prohibited under this section (including its imple-
menting regulations), the person aggrieved may recover 
equitable and legal relief (including compensatory and pu-
nitive damages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), 
and costs, except that punitive damages are not available 
against a government, government agency, or political 
subdivision. 
‘‘(3) Equitable and legal relief (including compen-
satory and punitive damages), attorney’s fees (including 
expert fees), and costs shall be available in all cases 
brought for the failure to provide reasonable accommoda-
tions or reasonable modifications, or the failure to comply 
with requirements of effective communication, accessible 
design, maintenance of accessible features, or program ac-
cessibility. 
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‘‘(4) In any settlement agreement or consent decree 
to resolve an action brought or which may be brought 
under this section, attorney’s fees of the plaintiff shall be 
included.’’. 
(e) FAIR HOUSING ACT.—The Fair Housing Act 
(title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968; 42 U.S.C. 3601 
et seq.), as amended by this Act, is further amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 823. DISPARATE IMPACT. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— 
‘‘(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Discrimination (includ-
ing exclusion from participation and denial of bene-
fits) based on disparate impact is established under 
this title only if— 
‘‘(A) a person aggrieved by discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, sex, or national ori-
gin demonstrates that an entity subject to this 
title (referred to in this title as a ‘covered enti-
ty’) has a policy or practice that causes a dis-
parate impact on the basis of race, color, sex, 
or national origin and the covered entity fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged policy or prac-
tice is related to and necessary to achieve the 
nondiscriminatory goals of the program or ac-
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tivity alleged to have been operated in a dis-
criminatory manner; or 
‘‘(B) the person aggrieved demonstrates 
that a less discriminatory alternative policy or 
practice exists, and the covered entity refuses to 
adopt such alternative policy or practice. 
‘‘(2) DEMONSTRATION.— 
‘‘(A) CAUSATION.—With respect to dem-
onstrating that a particular policy or practice 
causes a disparate impact as described in sub-
section (a)(1), the person aggrieved shall dem-
onstrate that each particular challenged policy 
or practice causes a disparate impact, except 
that if the person aggrieved demonstrates to the 
court that the elements of a covered entity’s de-
cisionmaking process are not capable of separa-
tion for analysis, the decisionmaking process 
may be analyzed as 1 policy or practice. 
‘‘(B) 
NO
REQUIREMENT
TO
DEM-
ONSTRATE.—If the covered entity demonstrates 
that a specific policy or practice does not cause 
the disparate impact, the covered entity shall 
not be required to demonstrate that such policy 
or practice is necessary to achieve the goals of 
its program or activity. 
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‘‘(b) NECESSITY OF INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
TO ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS NOT A DEFENSE.—A dem-
onstration that a policy or practice is necessary to achieve 
the goals of a program or activity may not be used as 
a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination 
under this title. 
‘‘(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘dem-
onstrates’ means meets the burdens of production and per-
suasion. 
‘‘SEC. 824. RELIEF FOR CLAIMS BASED ON DIFFERING 
STANDARDS OF PROOF. 
‘‘(a) CLAIMS BASED ON PROOF OF INTENTIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION.—In an action brought by a person ag-
grieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not a 
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) 
prohibited under this title (including its implementing reg-
ulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable and 
legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(b) CLAIMS BASED ON THE DISPARATE IMPACT 
STANDARD OF PROOF.—In an action brought by a person 
aggrieved under this title against a covered entity who has 
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engaged in unlawful discrimination based on disparate im-
pact prohibited under this title (including its implementing 
regulations), the person aggrieved may recover equitable 
and legal relief (including compensatory and punitive dam-
ages), attorney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs, 
except that punitive damages are not available against a 
government, government agency, or political subdivision. 
‘‘(c) RELIEF AVAILABLE.—Equitable and legal relief 
(including compensatory and punitive damages), attor-
ney’s fees (including expert fees), and costs shall be avail-
able in all cases brought for the failure to permit reason-
able accommodations, make reasonable modifications, or 
design and construct accessible dwellings as required by 
section 804(f)(3)(C). 
‘‘(d) SETTLEMENT.—In any settlement agreement or 
consent decree to resolve an action brought or which may 
be brought under this title, attorney’s fees of the plaintiff 
shall be included.’’. 
SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION BY LAW EN-
FORCEMENT. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 
(1) The term ‘‘governmental body’’ means any 
department, agency, special purpose district, or 
other instrumentality of Federal, State, local, or In-
dian tribal government. 
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(2) The term ‘‘Indian tribe’’ has the meaning 
given the term in section 102 of the Federally Rec-
ognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (25 U.S.C. 
479a). 
(3) The term ‘‘law enforcement agency’’ means 
any Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal govern-
mental body engaged in the prevention, detection, or 
investigation of violations of criminal, immigration, 
or customs laws. 
(4) The term ‘‘law enforcement agent’’ means 
any Federal, State, local, or Indian tribal official re-
sponsible for enforcing criminal, immigration, or 
customs laws, including police officers and other 
agents of a law enforcement agency. 
(5) The term ‘‘profiling’’ means the practice of 
a law enforcement agent or agency relying, to any 
degree, on actual or perceived race, ethnicity, na-
tional origin, religion, sex (as defined in section 208 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), gender identity, or 
sexual orientation in selecting which individual to 
subject to routine or spontaneous investigatory ac-
tivities or in deciding upon the scope and substance 
of law enforcement activity following any initial in-
vestigatory procedure, except when there is trust-
worthy information, relevant to the locality and 
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timeframe, that links a person with a particular 
characteristic described in this paragraph to an 
identified criminal incident or scheme. 
(6) The term ‘‘routine or spontaneous investiga-
tory activities’’ means the following activities by a 
law enforcement agent: 
(A) Interviews. 
(B) Traffic stops. 
(C) Pedestrian stops. 
(D) Frisks and other types of body 
searches. 
(E) Consensual or nonconsensual searches 
of the persons, property, or possessions (includ-
ing vehicles) of individuals using any form of 
public or private transportation, including mo-
torists and pedestrians. 
(F) Data collection, analysis, assessments, 
and predicated investigations. 
(G) Inspections and interviews of entrants 
into the United States that are more extensive 
than those customarily carried out. 
(H) Immigration-related workplace inves-
tigations. 
(I) Such other types of law enforcement 
encounters compiled for or by the Federal Bu-
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reau of Investigation or the Department of Jus-
tice Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
(7) The term ‘‘State’’ means each of the 50 
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, and any other territory or possession 
of the United States. 
(8) The term ‘‘unit of local government’’ 
means— 
(A) any city, county, township, town, bor-
ough, parish, village, or other general purpose 
political subdivision of a State; 
(B) any law enforcement district or judicial 
enforcement district that— 
(i) is established under applicable 
State law; and 
(ii) has the authority to, in a manner 
independent of other State entities, estab-
lish a budget and impose taxes; or 
(C) any Indian tribe that performs law en-
forcement functions, as determined by the Sec-
retary of the Interior. 
(b) PROHIBITION OF PROFILING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—No law enforcement agent 
or law enforcement agency shall engage in profiling. 
(2) ENFORCEMENT.— 
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(A) REMEDY.—The United States, or an 
individual injured by profiling, may enforce this 
title in a civil action for equitable or legal relief, 
filed in a State court of general jurisdiction or 
in a district court of the United States. 
(B) PARTIES.—In any action brought 
under this title, relief may be obtained 
against— 
(i) any governmental body that em-
ployed any law enforcement agent who en-
gaged in profiling; 
(ii) any agent of such body who en-
gaged in profiling; and 
(iii) any person with supervisory au-
thority over such agent. 
(C) NATURE OF PROOF.—Proof that the 
routine or spontaneous investigatory activities 
of law enforcement agents in a jurisdiction have 
had a disparate impact on individuals with a 
particular characteristic described in subsection 
(a)(5) shall constitute prima facie evidence of a 
violation of this section. 
(D) ATTORNEY’S FEES.—In any action or 
proceeding to enforce this section against any 
governmental body, the court may allow a pre-
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