In the Senate of the United States, 
December 23, 2009. 
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representa-
tives (H.R. 730) entitled ‘‘An Act to strengthen efforts in the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear 
forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of 
nuclear material, and for other purposes.’’, do pass with the 
following 
AMENDMENT: 
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics and 
Attribution Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 
American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 
of the most serious threats to the national security of 
the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu-
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tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance. 
Because of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, 
there could be little forensic evidence except the radio-
active material in the weapon itself. 
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 
both existing techniques and those under development, 
it may be possible to identify the source and pathway 
of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto-
nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate-
rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 
forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post- 
detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 
and the challenges are compounded by the pressures 
and time constraints of performing forensics after a 
nuclear or radiological attack. 
(3) A robust and well-known capability to iden-
tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in-
tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter 
prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of 
effective attribution could compel improved security 
at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit-
ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate-
rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 
necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam-
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ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 
samples, and compare samples against known signa-
tures of nuclear and radiological material. 
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 
detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so 
the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost im-
portance. Over the past several decades, the ability of 
the United States to gather atmospheric samples— 
often the preferred method of sample acquisition—has 
diminished. This ability must be restored and modern 
techniques that could complement or replace existing 
techniques should be pursued. 
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 
a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ-
ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 
traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 
a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro-
vide the most useful tools for analysis and character-
ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
programs and radiochemists in United States Na-
tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 
declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 
pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is 
a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and 
credible nuclear forensics program.
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(5) Once samples have been acquired and charac-
terized, it is necessary to compare the results against 
samples of known material from reactors, weapons, 
and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca-
demic, commercial, and other facilities containing 
such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
samples are available to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and 
some countries maintain internal sample databases. 
Access to samples in many countries is limited by na-
tional security concerns. 
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
necessary to have the capability to positively identify 
the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po-
tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 
must be aware of that capability. International co-
operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 
sources of nuclear or radiological material. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should— 
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter-
national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 
under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral
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agreements, an international framework for deter-
mining the source of any confiscated nuclear or radi-
ological material or weapon, as well as the source of 
any detonated weapon and the nuclear or radiological 
material used in such a weapon; 
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu-
clear or radiological materials and samples of con-
trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent 
required by the agreements entered into under para-
graph (1); and 
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
change and dissemination of sensitive information 
needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det-
onation. 
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-
TION OFFICE. 
(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by 
Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ 
after the semicolon; 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as 
paragraph (14); and
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(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(10) lead the development and implementation 
of the national strategic five-year plan for improving 
the nuclear forensic and attribution capabilities of the 
United States required under section 1036 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010; 
‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De-
tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 
Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 
planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 
forensics and attribution activities— 
‘‘(A) to ensure an enduring national tech-
nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 
the collective response of the United States to nu-
clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and 
‘‘(B) to coordinate and implement the na-
tional strategic five-year plan referred to in 
paragraph (10); 
‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex-
pertise Development Program, which— 
‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintain-
ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway
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from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in 
nuclear and geochemical science specialties di-
rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in-
cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear 
physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, 
and analytical chemistry; 
‘‘(B) shall— 
‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 
study student scholarships, with a duration 
of up to 4 years per student, which shall in-
clude, if possible, at least 1 summer intern-
ship at a national laboratory or appro-
priate Federal agency in the field of tech-
nical nuclear forensics during the course of 
the student’s undergraduate career; 
‘‘(ii) make available for doctoral study 
student fellowships, with a duration of up 
to 5 years per student, which shall— 
‘‘(I) include, if possible, at least 2 
summer internships at a national lab-
oratory or appropriate Federal agency 
in the field of technical nuclear 
forensics during the course of the stu-
dent’s graduate career; and
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‘‘(II) require each recipient to 
commit to serve for 2 years in a post- 
doctoral position in a technical nuclear 
forensics-related specialty at a national 
laboratory 
or 
appropriate 
Federal 
agency after graduation; 
‘‘(iii) 
make 
available 
to 
faculty 
awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years 
each, to ensure faculty and their graduate 
students have a sustained funding stream; 
and 
‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 
reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 
programs while encouraging the participa-
tion of undergraduate students, graduate 
students, and university faculty from his-
torically Black colleges and universities, 
Hispanic-serving institutions, Tribal Col-
leges and Universities, Asian American and 
Native American Pacific Islander-serving 
institutions, Alaska Native-serving institu-
tions, and Hawaiian Native-serving institu-
tions; and 
‘‘(C) shall—