H. R. 1—225 
‘‘(B) Systems to scan containers in accordance with 
paragraph (1) do not have a sufficiently low false alarm 
rate for use in the supply chain. 
‘‘(C) Systems to scan containers in accordance with 
paragraph (1) cannot be purchased, deployed, or operated 
at ports overseas, including, if applicable, because a port 
does not have the physical characteristics to install such 
a system. 
‘‘(D) Systems to scan containers in accordance with 
paragraph (1) cannot be integrated, as necessary, with 
existing systems. 
‘‘(E) Use of systems that are available to scan con-
tainers in accordance with paragraph (1) will significantly 
impact trade capacity and the flow of cargo. 
‘‘(F) Systems to scan containers in accordance with 
paragraph (1) do not adequately provide an automated 
notification of questionable or high-risk cargo as a trigger 
for further inspection by appropriately trained personnel. 
‘‘(5) EXEMPTION
FOR
MILITARY
CARGO.—Notwithstanding 
any other provision in the section, supplies bought by the 
Secretary of Defense and transported in compliance section 
2631 of title 10, United States Code, and military cargo of 
foreign countries are exempt from the requirements of this 
section. 
‘‘(6) REPORT ON EXTENSIONS.—An extension under para-
graph (4) for a port or ports shall take effect upon the expiration 
of the 60-day period beginning on the date the Secretary pro-
vides a report to Congress that— 
‘‘(A) states what container traffic will be affected by 
the extension; 
‘‘(B) provides supporting evidence to support the Sec-
retary’s certification of the basis for the extension; and 
‘‘(C) explains what measures the Secretary is taking 
to ensure that scanning can be implemented as early as 
possible at the port or ports that are the subject of the 
report. 
‘‘(7) REPORT ON RENEWAL OF EXTENSION.—If an extension 
under paragraph (4) takes effect, the Secretary shall, after 
one year, submit a report to Congress on whether the Secretary 
expects to seek to renew the extension. 
‘‘(8) SCANNING TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS.—In implementing 
paragraph (1), the Secretary shall— 
‘‘(A) establish technological and operational standards 
for systems to scan containers; 
‘‘(B) ensure that the standards are consistent with 
the global nuclear detection architecture developed under 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and 
‘‘(C) coordinate with other Federal agencies that admin-
ister scanning or detection programs at foreign ports. 
‘‘(9) INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS.—In 
carrying out this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with 
appropriate Federal departments and agencies and private 
sector stakeholders, and ensure that actions under this section 
do not violate international trade obligations, and are consistent 
with the World Customs Organization framework, or other 
international obligations of the United States.’’.
H. R. 1—226 
(b) DEADLINE FOR CONTAINER SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCE-
DURES.—Section 204(a)(4) of the SAFE Port Act (6 U.S.C. 944(a)(4)) 
is amended by— 
(1) striking ‘‘(1) DEADLINE
FOR
ENFORCEMENT.—’’ and 
inserting the following: 
‘‘(1) DEADLINE FOR ENFORCEMENT.— 
‘‘(A) ENFORCEMENT OF RULE.—’’; and 
(2) adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(B) INTERIM REQUIREMENT.—If the interim final rule 
described in paragraph (2) is not issued by April 1, 2008, 
then— 
‘‘(i) effective not later than October 15, 2008, all 
containers in transit to the United States shall be 
required to meet the requirements of International 
Organization for Standardization Publicly Available 
Specification 17712 standard for sealing containers; 
and 
‘‘(ii) the requirements of this subparagraph shall 
cease to be effective upon the effective date of the 
interim final rule issued pursuant to this subsection.’’. 
TITLE 
XVIII—PREVENTING 
WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERA-
TION AND TERRORISM 
SEC. 1801. FINDINGS. 
The 9/11 Commission has made the following recommendations: 
(1) STRENGTHEN ‘‘COUNTER-PROLIFERATION’’ EFFORTS.—The 
United States should work with the international community 
to develop laws and an international legal regime with uni-
versal jurisdiction to enable any state in the world to capture, 
interdict, and prosecute smugglers of nuclear material. 
(2) EXPAND THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.—In 
carrying out the Proliferation Security Initiative, the United 
States should— 
(A) use intelligence and planning resources of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance; 
(B) make participation open to non-NATO countries; 
and 
(C) encourage Russia and the People’s Republic of 
China to participate. 
(3) SUPPORT
THE
COOPERATIVE
THREAT
REDUCTION
PRO-
GRAM.—The United States should expand, improve, increase 
resources for, and otherwise fully support the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program. 
SEC. 1802. DEFINITIONS. 
In this title: 
(1) The terms ‘‘prevention of weapons of mass destruction 
proliferation and terrorism’’ and ‘‘prevention of WMD prolifera-
tion and terrorism’’ include activities under— 
(A) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 
(Public Law 104–201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note);
H. R. 1—227 
(B) the programs for which appropriations are author-
ized by section 3101(a)(2) of the Bob Stump National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public 
Law 107–314; 116 Stat. 2729); 
(C) programs authorized by section 504 of the Freedom 
for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open 
Markets Support Act of 1992 (the FREEDOM Support Act) 
(22 U.S.C. 5854) and programs authorized by section 1412 
of the Former Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992 
(22 U.S.C. 5902); and 
(D) a program of any agency of the Federal Government 
having a purpose similar to that of any of the programs 
identified in subparagraphs (A) through (C), as designated 
by the United States Coordinator for the Prevention of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism 
and the head of the agency. 
(2) The terms ‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’ and ‘‘WMD’’ 
mean chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and chemical, 
biological, and nuclear materials used in the manufacture of 
such weapons. 
(3) The term ‘‘items of proliferation concern’’ means— 
(A) equipment, materials, or technology listed in— 
(i) the Trigger List of the Guidelines for Nuclear 
Transfers of the Nuclear Suppliers Group; 
(ii) the Annex of the Guidelines for Transfers of 
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Soft-
ware, and Related Technology of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group; or 
(iii) any of the Common Control Lists of the Aus-
tralia Group; and 
(B) any other sensitive items. 
Subtitle A—Repeal and Modification of 
Limitations on Assistance for Prevention 
of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 
SEC. 1811. REPEAL AND MODIFICATION OF LIMITATIONS ON ASSIST-
ANCE FOR PREVENTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC-
TION PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM. 
Consistent with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, 
Congress repeals or modifies the limitations on assistance for 
prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and ter-
rorism as follows: 
(1) SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1991.—Sub-
sections (b) and (c) of section 211 of the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 1991 (title II of Public Law 102–228; 22 
U.S.C. 2551 note) are repealed. 
(2) COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1993.—Section 
1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title 
XII of Public Law 103–160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)) is repealed. 
(3) RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION FACILITIES.— 
Section 1305 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note) 
is repealed.
H. R. 1—228 
(4) AUTHORITY
TO
USE
COOPERATIVE
THREAT
REDUCTION 
FUNDS OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION—MODIFICATION OF 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT; CONGRESSIONAL NOTICE REQUIRE-
MENT.—Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108–136; 22 U.S.C. 5963) 
is amended— 
(A) in subsection (a)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘the President may’’ and inserting 
‘‘the Secretary of Defense may’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘if the President’’ and inserting 
‘‘if the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of State,’’; 
(B) in subsection (d)(1)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘The President may not’’ and 
inserting ‘‘The Secretary of Defense may not’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘until the President’’ and inserting 
‘‘until the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of State,’’; 
(C) in subsection (d)(2)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘Not later than 10 days after’’ and 
inserting ‘‘Not later than 15 days prior to’’; 
(ii) by striking ‘‘the President shall’’ and inserting 
‘‘the Secretary of Defense shall’’; and 
(iii) by striking ‘‘Congress’’ and inserting ‘‘the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate’’; and 
(D) in subsection (d) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(3) In the case of a situation that threatens human life or 
safety or where a delay would severely undermine the national 
security of the United States, notification under paragraph (2) 
shall be made not later than 10 days after obligating funds under 
the authority in subsection (a) for a project or activity.’’. 
Subtitle B—Proliferation Security 
Initiative 
SEC. 1821. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE IMPROVEMENTS 
AND AUTHORITIES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress, consistent 
with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, that the President 
should strive to expand and strengthen the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (in this subtitle referred to as ‘‘PSI’’) announced by the 
President on May 31, 2003, with a particular emphasis on the 
following: 
(1) Issuing a presidential directive to the relevant United 
States Government agencies and departments that directs such 
agencies and departments to— 
(A) establish clear PSI authorities, responsibilities, and 
structures; 
(B) include in the budget request for each such agency 
or department for each fiscal year, a request for funds 
necessary for United States PSI-related activities; and