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oping countries for the six years since the end of the
cold war, 58 percent higher than the $7,515,000,000
a year in such agreements for the six years prior to
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
(8) Since the end of the cold war, 84 percent
of United States arms transfers have been to devel-
oping countries are to countries with an undemo-
cratic form of government whose citizens, according
to the Department of State Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices do not have the ability to
peaceably change their form of government.
(9) Although a goal of United States foreign
policy should be to work with foreign governments
and international organizations to reduce militariza-
tion and dictatorship and therefore prevent conflicts
before they arise, during 4 recent deployments of
United States Armed Forces—to the Republic of
Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti—
such Armed Forces faced conventional weapons that
had been provided or financed by the United States
to undemocratic governments.
(10) The proliferation of conventional arms and
conflicts around the globe are multilateral problems,
and the fact that the United States has emerged as
the world’s primary seller of conventional weapons,
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combined with the world leadership role of the Unit-
ed States, signifies that the United States is in a po-
sition to seek multilateral restraints on the competi-
tion for and transfers of conventional weapons.
(11) The Congress has the constitutional re-
sponsibility to participate with the executive branch
in decisions to provide military assistance and arms
transfers to a foreign government, and in the formu-
lation of a policy designed to reduce dramatically the
level of international militarization.
(12) A decision to provide military assistance
and arms transfers to a government that is undemo-
cratic, does not adequately protect human rights, is
currently engaged in acts of armed aggression, or is
not fully participating in the United Nations Reg-
ister of Conventional Arms, should require a higher
level of scrutiny than does a decision to provide such
assistance and arms transfers to a government to
which these conditions do not apply.
SEC. 3003. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this title is to provide clear policy
guidelines and congressional responsibility for determining
the eligibility of foreign governments to be considered for
United States military assistance and arms transfers.
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SEC. 3004. PROHIBITION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AS-
SISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO CER-
TAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.
(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections
(b) and (c), beginning on and after October 1, 1998, Unit-
ed States military assistance and arms transfers may not
be provided to a foreign government for a fiscal year un-
less the President certifies to the Congress for that fiscal
year that such government meets the following require-
ments:
(1) PROMOTES
DEMOCRACY.—Such govern-
ment—
(A) was chosen by and permits free and
fair elections;
(B) promotes civilian control of the mili-
tary and security forces and has civilian institu-
tions controlling the policy, operation, and
spending of all law enforcement and security in-
stitutions, as well as the armed forces;
(C) promotes the rule of law, equality be-
fore the law, and respect for individual and mi-
nority rights, including freedom to speak, pub-
lish, associate, and organize; and
(D) promotes the strengthening of politi-
cal, legislative, and civil institutions of democ-
racy, as well as autonomous institutions to
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monitor the conduct of public officials and to
combat corruption.
(2) RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS.—Such govern-
ment—
(A) does not engage in gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, includ-
ing—
(i) extra judicial or arbitrary execu-
tions;
(ii) disappearances;
(iii) torture or severe mistreatment;
(iv) prolonged arbitrary imprisonment;
(v) systematic official discrimination
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, national origin, or political affili-
ation; and
(vi) grave breaches of international
laws of war or equivalent violations of the
laws of war in internal conflicts;
(B) vigorously investigates, disciplines, and
prosecutes those responsible for gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights;
(C) permits access on a regular basis to
political prisoners by international humani-
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tarian organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross;
(D) promotes the independence of the judi-
ciary and other official bodies that oversee the
protection of human rights;
(E) does not impede the free functioning of
domestic and international human rights orga-
nizations; and
(F) provides access on a regular basis to
humanitarian organizations in situations of con-
flict or famine.
(3) NOT ENGAGED IN CERTAIN ACTS OF ARMED
AGGRESSION.—Such government is not currently en-
gaged in acts of armed aggression in violation of
international law.
(4) FULL PARTICIPATION IN U.N. REGISTER OF
CONVENTIONAL
ARMS.—Such government is fully
participating in the United Nations Register of Con-
ventional Arms.
(b) REQUIREMENT
FOR
CONTINUING
COMPLI-
ANCE.—Any certification with respect to a foreign govern-
ment for a fiscal year under subsection (a) shall cease to
be effective for that fiscal year if the President certifies
to the Congress that such government has not continued
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to comply with the requirements contained in paragraphs
(1) through (4) of such subsection.
(c) EXEMPTIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The prohibition contained in
subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a for-
eign government for a fiscal year if—
(A) subject to paragraph (2), the President
submits a request for an exemption to the Con-
gress containing a determination that it is in
the national security interest of the United
States to provide military assistance and arms
transfers to such government; or
(B) the President determines that an
emergency exists under which it is vital to the
interest of the United States to provide military
assistance and arms transfers to such govern-
ment.
(2) DISAPPROVAL.—A request for an exemption
to provide military assistance and arms transfers to
a foreign government shall not take effect, or shall
cease to be effective, if a law is enacted disapproving
such request.
(d) NOTIFICATIONS TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit
to the Congress initial certifications under sub-
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section (a) and requests for exemptions under sub-
section (c)(1)(A) in conjunction with the submission
of the annual request for enactment of authoriza-
tions and appropriations for foreign assistance pro-
grams for a fiscal year and shall, where appropriate,
submit additional or amended certifications and re-
quests for exemptions at any time thereafter in the
fiscal year.
(2) DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO EMER-
GENCY SITUATIONS.—The President, when, in his
determination, it is not contrary to the national in-
terest to do so, shall submit to the Congress at the
earliest possible date reports containing determina-
tions with respect to emergencies under subsection
(c)(1)(B). Each such report shall contain a descrip-
tion of—
(A) the nature of the emergency;
(B) the type of military assistance and
arms transfers provided to the foreign govern-
ment; and
(C) the cost to the United States of such
assistance and arms transfers.
SEC. 3005. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representa-
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tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate should hold hearings on—
(1) controversial certifications submitted under
section 2004(a);
(2) all requests for exemptions submitted under
section 2004(c)(1)(A); and
(3) all determinations with respect to emer-
gencies under section 2004(c)(1)(B).
SEC. 3006. UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
ARMS TRANSFERS DEFINED.
For purposes of this title, the terms ‘‘United States
military assistance and arms transfers’’ and ‘‘military as-
sistance and arms transfers’’ mean—
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military
assistance), including the transfer of excess defense
articles under section 516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to inter-
national military education and training); or
(3) the transfer of defense articles, defense
services, or design and construction services under
the Arms Export Control Act (excluding any trans-
fer or other assistance under section 23 of such
Act), including defense articles and defense services
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licensed or approved for export under section 38 of
that Act.
DIVISION I—MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
TITLE XXXI—MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS
SEC. 3101. ASSISTANCE FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
None of the funds made available to carry out chap-
ter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.) for fiscal years 1998 and 1999
may be made available for the Russian Federation if the
Russian Federation, on or after the date of the enactment
of this Act, transfers an SS-N-22 missile system to the
People’s Republic of China.
DIVISION J—EUROPEAN
SECURITY ACT OF 1997
TITLE XXXII—NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)
SEC. 3201. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ‘‘European Security
Act of 1997’’.
SEC. 3202. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
The Congress declares the following to be the policy
of the United States:
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(1) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGE-
MENT.—(A) The emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe that will be invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Ma-
drid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last
such countries invited to join NATO.
(B) The United States should seek to ensure
that the NATO leaders assembled in Madrid agree
on a process whereby all other emerging democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join
NATO will be considered for membership in NATO
as soon as they meet the criteria for such member-
ship.
(2) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS
WITH RUSSIA.—(A) NATO enlargement should be
carried out in such a manner as to underscore the
Alliance’s defensive nature and demonstrate to Rus-
sia that NATO enlargement will enhance the secu-
rity of all countries in Europe, including Russia. Ac-
cordingly, the United States and its NATO Allies
should make this intention clear in the negotiations
with Russia, including those regarding adaptation of
the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty of November 19, 1990.
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(B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia
NATO’s defensive and security-enhancing intentions,
it is essential that neither fundamental United
States security interests in Europe nor the effective-
ness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance
be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments
should be made to Russia that would have the effect
of—
(i) extending rights or imposing respon-
sibilities on new NATO members different from
those applicable to current NATO members, in-
cluding with respect to the deployment of nu-
clear weapons and the stationing of troops and
equipment from other NATO members;
(ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend
the territory of new NATO members by, for ex-
ample, restricting the construction of defense
infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO
to deploy necessary reinforcements;
(iii) providing any international organiza-
tion, or any country that is not a member of
NATO, with authority to review, delay, veto, or
otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of
the North Atlantic Council or the implementa-
tion of such decisions, including with respect to
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the deployment of NATO forces or the admis-
sion of additional members to NATO; or
(iv) impeding the development of enhanced
relations between NATO and other European
countries that do not belong to the Alliance.
(C) In order to enhance security and stability in
Europe, the United States should seek commitments
from the Russian Federation—
(i) to demarcate and respect all its borders
with neighboring states;
(ii) to station its armed forces on the terri-
tory of other states only with the consent of
such states and in strict accordance with inter-
national law; and
(iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and
conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
(D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Con-
ventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
proceed, the United States should engage in close
and continuous consultations not only with its
NATO allies, but also with the emerging democ-
racies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and
the newly independent states of the Caucasus region.
(3) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.—(A) As