a conventional conflict through coercive threats, in-
cluding limited nuclear use. We think that this label 
is dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they 
can control escalation through the use of nuclear 
weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is 
escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate es-
calation.’’. 
(4) General Scaparrotti noted in his March 27, 
2017, testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee that ‘‘Moscow’s provocative rhetoric and 
nuclear threats increase the likelihood of misunder-
standing and miscalculation.’’. 
(5) The Russian Federation continues to con-
duct ongoing influence campaigns aimed at under-
mining democracies around the world. According to 
an assessment by the intelligence community, ‘‘Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 
campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 
election’’, which included the use of the Russian 
military intelligence organization. The intelligence 
community also assessed that Russia would apply 
lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide, 
including against United States allies and their elec-
tion systems. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
(6) The Russian Federation continues its ag-
gression on its periphery. In 2008, the Russian Fed-
eration fomented conflict in Georgia. The Russian 
Federation has also illegally occupied and attempted 
to annex Crimea. Further, the Russian Federation is 
directing combined Russian-Separatist units in east-
ern Ukraine, actively inciting violence and pro-
longing the most significant conflict in Europe. 
(7) The investment of over $5 billion in the Eu-
ropean Reassurance Initiative (ERI), now the Euro-
pean Deterrence Initiative (EDI), has proven suc-
cessful in significantly enhancing the ability of 
United States forces, NATO allies, and regional 
partners to deter Russian aggression. EDI has not 
only assured our European allies and partners but 
supported essential investments in NATO’s military 
capacity, interoperability, and agility. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Russian Federation should return to 
compliance with the INF Treaty in a verifiable man-
ner as soon as possible; 
(2) the risks of miscalculation in a crisis are ex-
acerbated by the Russian Federation’s shift to a 
military doctrine of ‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’, low-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
ering the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weap-
ons and thereby increasing the risk of using nuclear 
weapons, potentially escalating in to a massive nu-
clear exchange; 
(3) strengthening effective and credible conven-
tional deterrence, particularly on the northeastern 
flank of NATO, is a political and military priority; 
(4) NATO’s formal adoption at the 2014 Wales 
Summit of the goal for each member state to allo-
cate at least two percent of its gross domestic prod-
uct to its national defense budget within a decade 
should be commended, as increased defense spending 
by NATO member states is strongly encouraged to 
maintain the alliance’s strategic vitality through the 
enhancement of its collective capacity; 
(5) reaffirming support for the principle of col-
lective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty for NATO allies is vital to a strong and 
meaningful alliance and is not conditional; 
(6) subversive and destabilizing activities by the 
Russian Federation targeting NATO allies and part-
ners causes concern and should be condemned; 
(7) strengthened deterrence efforts by NATO 
allies, including NATO’s Enhanced Forward Pres-
ence, should be commended and enhancing defense 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
cooperation efforts with NATO allies and partners 
should be encouraged; 
(8) European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in-
vestments are long-term and, as such, Congress ex-
pects future budgets to reflect United States com-
mitment by planning for funding in the base budget, 
and further EDI should build on United States pres-
ence by increasing the United States permanent 
force posture; and 
(9) credible deterrence requires steadfast co-
operation and joint action with NATO allies and 
partners and other United States allies and partners 
in Europe. 
SEC. 3. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De-
fense, in consultation with each of the Secretaries of the 
military departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
commanders of each of the regional and functional com-
batant commands, shall develop and implement a com-
prehensive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Fed-
eration. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the strategy required 
by subsection (a). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by this 
subsection shall include the following elements: 
(A) An evaluation of strategic objectives 
and motivations of the Russian Federation. 
(B) A detailed description of Russian 
threats to the national security of the United 
States, including threats that may pose chal-
lenges below the threshold of armed conflict. 
(C) A discussion of how the strategy com-
plements the National Defense Strategy and 
the National Military Strategy. 
(D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and 
means inherent to the strategy. 
(E) A discussion of the strategy’s objec-
tives with respect to deterrence, escalation con-
trol, and conflict resolution. 
(F) A description of the military activities 
across geographic regions and military func-
tions and domains that are inherent to the 
strategy. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
(G) A description of the posture, forward 
presence, and readiness requirements inherent 
to the strategy. 
(H) A description of the roles of the 
United States Armed Forces in implementing 
the strategy, including— 
(i) the role of United States nuclear 
capabilities; 
(ii) the role of United States space ca-
pabilities; 
(iii) the role of United States cyber 
capabilities; 
(iv) the role of United States conven-
tional ground forces; 
(v) the role of United States naval 
forces; 
(vi) the role of United States air 
forces; and 
(vii) the role of United States special 
operations forces. 
(I) An assessment of contributions of 
United States allies and partners in countering 
Russian threats and a description of the roles 
of allies and partners in implementing and sus-
taining the strategy. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL PRECI-
SION STRIKE WEAPON STOCKPILES IN THE 
UNITED 
STATES 
EUROPEAN 
COMMAND’S 
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop and implement a strategy to increase 
conventional precision strike weapon stockpiles in 
the United States European Command’s areas of re-
sponsibility. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by this 
subsection shall include necessary increases in the 
quantities of such stockpiles that the Secretary de-
termines will enhance deterrence and warfighting ca-
pability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
forces. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the 
strategy required by subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
SEC. 5. PLAN TO COUNTER THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop and implement a plan to counter the 
military capabilities of the Russian Federation. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by this 
subsection shall include the following: 
(A) Accelerating programs to improve the 
capability of United States military forces to 
operate in a Global Positioning System (GPS)- 
denied or GPS-degraded environment. 
(B) Accelerating programs of the Depart-
ment of the Army to counter Russian un-
manned aircraft systems, electronic warfare, 
and long-range precision strike capabilities. 
(C) Countering unconventional capabilities 
and hybrid threats from the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(D) Any other elements that the Secretary 
determines to be appropriate. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the 
plan required by subsection (a). 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the strategy for the Department of Defense 
to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by 
adversarial state and non-state actors required by 
section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) has 
not yet been submitted to the congressional defense 
committees and should be submitted without further 
delay; and 
(2) concerns persist over the growing sophis-
tication of unconventional and hybrid state-spon-
sored threats by the Russian Federation as dem-
onstrated through its advancement and integration 
of conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber 
and information operations, intelligence operations, 
and other activities to undermine United States na-
tional security objectives as well as the objectives of 
United States allies and partners in Europe. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
SEC. 6. PLAN TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO THE NATIONAL SE-
CURITY FORCES OF UNITED STATES ALLIES 
AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER CYBERSPACE 
OPERATIONS 
AND 
INFORMATION 
OPER-
ATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the establishment by the Commander of the 
United States European Command of the inter-
agency Russian Information Group to counter Rus-
sian information operations against the United 
States and United States allies and partners should 
be supported and cooperation and synchronization of 
efforts and activities with the Department of State’s 
Global Engagement Center and with the NATO 
Strategic Communications Center of Excellence 
should be encouraged; 
(2) the Secretary of Defense should, to the ex-
tent appropriate, prioritize the transfer of funds as 
authorized under section 1287(e) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 
(Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2546) to the De-
partment of State’s Global Engagement Center spe-
cifically for the purpose of countering Russia state- 
sponsored propaganda aimed at undermining the na-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
tional security interests of the United States and 
United States allies and partners; and 
(3) the Secretary of Defense should prioritize 
providing funding to the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Center of Excellence and the NATO Stra-
tegic Communication Center of Excellence or pur-
poses of enhancing cooperation with NATO allies to 
counter cyberspace operations of the Russian Fed-
eration against the national security interests of the 
Untied States and United States and allies and 
partners. 
(b) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop and implement a plan to provide training to 
the national security forces of United States allies and 
partners for the purpose of building the capacity of such 
forces to counter cyberspace operations and information 
operations of the Russian Federation. 
(c) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the 
plan required by subsection (b). 
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
SEC. 7. REPORT ON MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING FOR-
WARD PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES MILI-
TARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL IN EUROPE. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the con-
gressional defense committees a report on the strategy of 
the Department of Defense maintaining and expanding 
forward presence of United States military forces and per-
sonnel in Europe. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following with respect to United 
States European Command areas of responsibility: 
(1) An assessment of the additional perma-
nently stationed forces in Europe required to meet 
United States strategic requirements and the oper-
ational requirements of the geographic combatant 
commander. 
(2) An assessment of the infrastructure capac-
ity of existing European locations and their ability 
to accommodate additional forces. 
(3) An overview of new locations in Europe that 
might be considered for permanently stationed forces 
and the estimated cost and scope of infrastructure 
investments, to include improvements to training 
areas, which would be required at those locations to 
support permanently stationed forces, including an 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
assessment of what infrastructure investments might 
be provided by the host-nation as well as new con-
struction or modernization of existing facilities that 
would be funded by the United States. 
(4) A detailed list of investments in equipment, 
supplies, logistics, storage, and maintenance, at cur-
rent and new locations in Europe, required to sup-
port additional permanently stationed forces. 
(5) An assessment of the readiness advantages 
and disadvantages associated with stationing addi-
tional permanent forces at European locations. 
(6) A discussion of potential challenges with 
stationing additional permanent forces or developing 
new locations for permanently stationed forces as a 
result of treaty obligations, international agree-
ments, or other legally binding instruments. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 8. REPORT ON IMPROVING TRAINING AREAS IN THE 
UNITED 
STATES 
EUROPEAN 
COMMAND’S 
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
Secretaries of the military departments, the Commander 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
of the United States European Command, and the Com-
mander of the United States Special Operations Com-
mand, shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on the location, capabilities, and capacities 
of training areas in the United States European Com-
mand’s areas of responsibility, including air and ground 
ranges, range complexes, military training routes, and spe-
cial-use areas. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) An inventory of such training areas that are 
utilized by United States Armed Forces or with re-
spect to which United States Armed Forces have ac-
cess. 
(2) An overview of the capabilities and capacity 
of such training areas to support permanent and ro-
tational forward presence of United States Armed 
Forces. 
(3) An assessment of any capability gaps of 
such training areas that limit the ability to meet 
training standards of United States Armed Forces. 
(4) Details of current and planned investments 
in training infrastructure to mitigate identified capa-
bility gaps, help meet United States training stand-
ards, and support additional permanent or rotational 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
forces in Europe, to be funded by the NATO, the 
United States, or United States allies or partners. 
SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING MARITIME 
CAPABILITIES. 
Congress notes the 2016 Force Structure Assessment 
(FSA) that increased the requirement for fast attack sub-
marine (SSN) from 48 to 66 and supports an acquisition 
plan that enhances maritime capabilities that address this 
requirement. 
SEC. 10. PLAN TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISCALCULATION 
AND 
UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
THAT 
COULD PRECIPITATE A NUCLEAR WAR. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) the Russian Federation has adopted a dan-
gerous nuclear doctrine that includes a strategy of 
‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’, which could lower the 
threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict; and 
(2) such nuclear doctrine exacerbates the risks 
of miscalculation and unintended consequences that 
could precipitate a nuclear war. 
(b) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Com-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
mander of the United States Strategic Command, 
and the Commander of the United States European 
Command, shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a plan that includes options to reduce 
the risk of miscalculation and unintended con-
sequences that could precipitate a nuclear war. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under this 
subsection shall include— 
(A) an assessment of the value of military- 
to-military dialog to reduce such risk; and 
(B) any other recommendations the Sec-
retary determines to be appropriate. 
SEC. 11. PLAN TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BY REASON OF 
NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION WITH THE INF TREATY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 2018, the 
President shall submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees a plan to impose sanctions with respect to the 
Russia Federation by reason of non-compliance by the 
Russian Federation with the INF Treaty. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required under subsection 
(a) should include expanding asset freezes and travel bans, 
prohibiting financial transactions, prohibiting government- 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
to-government contracts, and any other sanctions that the 
President determines to be appropriate. 
(c) TERMINATION.—The plan required under sub-
section (a) shall provide for termination of sanctions de-
scribed in the plan beginning on the date on which the 
President submits to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a certification that the Russian Federation has 
verifiably returned to compliance with the INF Treaty. 
(d) COOPERATION.—The Secretary of State shall 
seek to cooperate with United States allies and partners 
to maximize the effect of sanctions described in the plan 
required under subsection (a). 
SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES.— 
The term ‘‘congressional defense committees’’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 101 of title 
10, United States Code. 
(2) INF TREATY.—The term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ 
means the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS
signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and en-
tered into force June 1, 1988. 
(3) NATO.—The term ‘‘NATO’’ means the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Æ 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
04:08 Jul 04, 2017
Jkt 069200
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\H3025.IH
H3025
rfrederick on DSK3GLQ082PROD with BILLS