A106 and soclalam, have planted weeds of dis- trust, fear, and abusive practices among our people. These rank and horrible weeds, ene- mies of a free people, must be pruned swiftly wherever and whenever they are found. The Communists prey primarily on the minority, the so-called down-trodden, and the less informed of our citizens. Thus, we who appreciate democratic government, must realize that active participation in govern- ment institution, and a deep sense of re- sponsibility to our country, our State and our community, are the best means of stamping out any subversive tendencies that might show thetr evil heads. The citizens of this country are all kinds of people. The foundation of our democ- racy, with the Constitution as its basis, rests upon the individual, Each individual must be taught the history of this country, its tra- ditions, its democratic systems; for, upon this and this alone, rests the source of our strength as a free nation. Let us study more, let us worship more, let us keep our priceless jewel, the Constitution, untarnished. We must protect this heritage of ours. The Constitution should have a special meaning for each of us. To the worker in Carolina's cotton mills, to the farmer in the Kansas wheat field, to the longshoreman on the Greak Lakes, to the miner in Pennsylvania’s dark mines, to the clerk in the 6-and-10, to the broker on Wall Street, to the Congressman in Washington, to the lawyer in his office, to the fisherman on Maine’s windy winter coast, to the trucker in California's sunny flelds, and to the busy housewife in her bright cheerful kitchen— to each of these, the Constitution should have a special meaning. To every beating, pulsing heart in this great teeming Nation of ours, the Constitution speaks a special language. It is the last best hope on earth for a democratic way of life. It is the light- ed torch, the way of life, that has long been the hope and dream of all mankind. In the tmmortal words of Kipling: “Lord, God of Hosts, be with us yet, lest we forget— lest we forget.” The Ordeal of Dean Acheson EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. BRIEN MceMAHON OF CONNECTICUT IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. McMAHON. Mr, President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Recorp an article entitled “The Ordeal of Dean Ache- son,” written by Francis Downing and published in the December 29, 1950, is- sue of the Commonweal. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Recorp, as follows: THE OrndrAL oF DEAN ACHESON (By Francis Downing) It may be a fact that Dean Acheson has, in the words of the Republicans, “lost the confidence of the country,” and !t may be that the removal of Mr. Acheson is in the cards. It may be admitted that if Mr. Ache- son !s compelled to leave office the Republi- cans will have won a victory. What kind of victory they will have won, that their victory will be our victory, that the victory will have enhanced the prestige and valor of the United States, that our position in world affairs, our foreign policy, will be wiser, safer, sounder, more signifi- cant—all these are things not made plain to me. They are not made plain to me because the attacks of the Republicans—including the latest resolution of the otherwise sen- sible Senator Ives—proceed from partisan- ship and a fundamental dishonesty. To put 1t clearly, they proceed from no criticism that rests on any plain bill of indictment. Stripped of the frenzied and floating vocabu- lary in which they are made, the criticisms come down to this: We are “in a mess”; Mr, Acheson is “soft on communism”; Mr. Ache- son did not, or does not “get tough.” TI did not invent these charges. The first two are the words of Senator Tarr. The first phrase, “in a mess"—surely a subtle description of things, the obvious product of a careful and dispassionate, unvulgar mind—Mr, Tarr used on a CBS broadcast, Replying to the question put by the reporters on “Capital Cloakroom”: “What can we do now?” Senator Tarr said, “I don’t know.” Preferring to discuss the mistake of stop- ping General Patton in Europe, or the mis- takes made at Yalta (things for which, even granting Tari’s case, Mr. Acheson was not responsible) and being brought back to the question: How do we get out of our present situation? Senator Tarr said, “I don't know.” This is the position on foreign policy of a man so seemingly distinguished that he ts one of the leaders of the Republican Party, is called “Mr, Republican,” and is seriously regarded among the candidates for the presi- dency. What does he offer? Remove Mr. Acheson. What then? “I don't know.” I submit that this is irrational, irresponsible, and undistinguished. I submit that no in- telligent political party has a right to call on Mr. Truman for consultation with it, to call for a bipartisan foreign policy, and say that jt 1s as free from knowledge about what we ought to do—as free even from ideas—as this man indicates it 1s. On another network, Mr. Harold Stassen, also a flying contender for the Republican nomination, attacked “blundering interna- tionaliste” without naming them. He made it clear, however, that he did not mean the Republicans since he called them “freedom-< ists,” and alleged they have “a common-sense foreign policy.” What does this consist in? Stassen would reverse the administration’s Asiatic policy. What does that mean? How do you reverse it? What do you do that Mr. Acheson did not do, or not do that Mr, Acheson has done? Mr. Stassen gave no reply to that. He was making a speech to Re- publicans and they applauded, But nobody asked him these questions. He did say that he was in favor of the open door in China; and he did say that that meant we should not open the back door of Chixta to Russia, He did say that we should “make essential de- cisions,” and that we should develop “a dy~ namic opposition to communism,” at the same time as he said we should stop “hand- outs at home and abroad.” All these confus- ing and conflicting and undefined things Mr. Stassen added to Mr. Tarr’s self-confessed ignorance, But I point out that none of these things, nor all of them, is the basis of a foreign policy, and that all of them and none of them is a bill of particulars against Dean Acheson, All the Republicans, including these two, have kind words for General MacArthur, or they did until recently, but there is no evi- dence that Dean Acheson has ever opposed General MacArthur, much less attacked him. I have no professional brief for Mr. Ache- son, If he ought to be removed, all I insist is that somebody make out an honest, docu~ mented case against him, Neither Mr. Tart, nor Stassen, nor Ivzs, not to speak of KNow~ LAND—none of these men is clear enough, nor quiet enough, nor legal enough to make out the copy. Any American on trial, whose APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD words and conduct are impeached, has a legal and a moral right to more than rhetoric; he has a right to the indictment to which he is expected, and indeed required, to plead. American agoldiers have been moving slowly and perilously out of a Chinese trap in Korea. Does someone become so bold, or 60 morally crass, a8 to blame Dean Acheson for that? But given that situation, Mr. Attlee flies to Washington to try to temper impulse, or Anger, to oppose even a limited war lest we aggravate the Chinese into remaining Rus~- sia’s ally. Mr. Attlee wanted, according to James Reston of the Times, “a negotiated settlement on all outstanding questions in- luding Formosa, recognition, representation in the United Nations, etc.” And who, do you suppose, opposed ‘the British Prime Minister on all this? Why Mr. Acheson opposed him. Obviously this is one more sign that our Secretary of State is “soft on communism.” What arguments did Mr. Acheson make to the British proposal? Let Mr. Reston answer: “Mr. Acheson replied that he did not nec- essarily differ from Mr. Attlee’s estimate of the future relations between Peiping and Moscow. Maybe one day they would split, He profoundly hoped so. The next 3 years, however, were the critical years, and there- fore he did not believe it was wise to enter into negotiations under which he might merely exchange the important strategic 1s- land of Formosa for a few Communist prom~- ises in Korea that probably wouldn’t be kept.” The fact of the matter is that we moved into Korea wholly unprepared for the con- sequences which are now upon us, and morally supported with some reluctance by our allies, and by them physically supported with very little because they had very little to give. Senator Tarr and his anti-Acheson Republicans, the fact is, had been unwilling to rearm South Korea, had sniped at the eco- nomics which the Marshall plan required, and had been hostile to our State Depart- ment's military assistance plan, ambiguous in their attitude toward German rearma- ment while attacking Acheson—as Time still is doing—for failure to get the Germans re- armed, though France's hostility to {t was almost a declaration of open warfare. This, I submit, is a statement of the facts, and a description of the total atmosphere in which Mr. Acheson was working. That Mr. Acheson's estimate of the mean- ing of the Communist movement in China may have been wrong is, and will continue to be, & matter of historical dispute. But that this proved something loosely called softness toward communism 1s certainly not valid. It was not Dean Acheson who recognized Peip- ing; it was the British. The British, among others, wanted the Peiping government rec- Ognized and seated in the UN. It was Mr, Acheson who, up until this moment, at any rate, opposed this. It was Mr. Acheson who suggested that we should devise a foreign policy whose essence would be that we should jead from strength. But the strength from which he had to lead could not tumble over @ chattering child. It was not Mr. Acheson who swaggered ir- responsibly and stridently through a deli- cately suspended diplomatic universe, nor proceeded in the belief that any bluster could, in the last analysis, depend for sup- port on the atom and hydrogen bombs. Whatever else he did he acted as a diplomat is supposed to act; he thought that some things could be negotiated in a world in which Republicans attacked him for not be- ing tough while Wallaceites, Communists, and alleged liberals attacked him for failing to negotiate, a world in which a division among the western powers was building up, in which what is now, at last, out in the open, was then being softly whispered, All this had the effect of making the actions of Mr. Acheson provocative,
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD So that now such a reliable reporter as Mr. Restan cam write that, “Indeed, the hard truth of it is—whether ft ts fair or not—that the United States is being charged by tnflu- en.ial officials within the western coalition with having adopted a provocative diplomacy toward Pelping, with having stirred up forces that the United States could not handle and with proposing now to enter into a policy of limited war efter limited negotiations. Mr. Acheson is being blamed for our going into Korea as he would have heen biamed had we stayed out of it. MacArthur’s per- sonal intelligence officer makes a fatal mts- take in Koreas, the Chinese pour in, we sadly and grimly retreat, and no one of the anti- Acheson crowd—not «4 single solitary one of them—rebukes MacArthur, or calls for Major General Willoughby’'s scalp, while their spir- itual adviser and helpmate, Time magazine, after admitting the fact, and even calling it blameworthy, decides that the Willoughby lapse was not crucial. This whole attack on Mr. Acheson, now put. on the presumed ground that he has loet our confidence, is so ruthless and shameful in character that it has won even the recent rebuke of Governor Dewey. Dean Acheson will fall, I have no doubt of that, pecked st by the cawing and sound- filled crows. But that he deserves better enemies tn a more honorable contest I have no doubt of either. The Pay-As-You-Go Debate EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY OF MINNESOTA IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Recorp an edi- torial which appeared in the New York Times of January 9, 1951. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Recors, as follows: Tne Pay-As-You-Go D&sATE Senator Miuurmr, of Colorado, senior Re- publican on the tax-writing Senate Finance Committee, has taken issue with Senators Doveras, of inois, and Humpurey, of Min- nesota, on the question whether an #80,000,- 000,000 budget for 1951-52 could be financed out of taxes. When a nation is suddenly precipitated into a fighting war without adequate time to prepare itself, pay-as-you-go from the start is, tt is true, a luxury that can’t be afforded. As Russell Leffingwell once put tt, it would be “utter nonsense” for a country to send tts boys off “to fight with thetr bare fists in order to finance a war prudently.” In such a situ- ation a country raises the money to equip tts fighting men by the quickest and eastest means—which is usualty by tnftationary bor- rowing. Similarly, when & wer Or rearma- ment effort is undertaken at a thne when the economy 1s depressed, as ours was at the outbreak of the Second World War, borrow- ing may be a virtue as @ desirable instru- ment of refiation. But neither af those conditions obteins today. We are not plunging into all-out war in one leap, but moving into a stage of preparedness from which we could proceed to full mobilization. And we are doing so when the domestic foe moat to be feared is inflation. The only real approach to inflation at this stage of economic expan. sion is on the demand side, through a reduc- tion of purchasing power. And the most ef- fective means for applying this remedy is through increased taxes. We should pro- ceed without delay to round out the tax pro- gram on which we have thus far made only a beginning. If we do this we can keep tax receipts not only abreast of but aheud of Government expenditures, at least through the calendar year 1951, even with no rise in the national gross product. It is academic to tatk about an $80,000,- 000,000 rate of spending before 1952 at the earliest It will be time to worry about that problem when it arrives. Meanwhile tt ts worth recalling that under the impact of the Second World War defense effort the gross national product, whose dimensions determine the yield of any given tax struc- ture, expanded from $101,000,000,000 tn 1940 to $194,300,000,000 8 years later. Our job now, fiscally sperking, ts to get tax receipts out in front of expenditures at the start of the rearmament effort, and to keep them there so long as humanly possible. Condemnation of Communist Chimese as Aggressors in Korea EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. JACOB K. JAVITS OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 8, 1951 Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, the need for such action on the part of the United Nations continues very urgent in the interests of ali those who support and are deeply concerned with its effective- ness and future usefulness. The moral force of the UN and the preservation of this force so very important to world peace are further dealt with in the most realistic terms in the appended editorial from the Evening Star, Washington, D. C., January 9, 1951: WitHpraw From Korra? If Marshal Tito, of Yugoslavia, has made a correct evaluation in declaring thet the posi- tion of our American and allied United Na- tions forces in Korea has now become ‘“‘stra- tegically futile,” then Senator Tarr is on sound ground tn advocating—as Tito also has advocated—that thowe forces be with- @rawn from the country and assigned to tasks of a more fruitful nature. The case for such a withdrawal—again as- suming that the UN position is tn fact “‘stra- tegically futile’—can be argued very per- scasively. Certainly, if nothing of value can be accomplished by a slow, fighting re- treat to a defensive line designed to hold a bridgehead for a protracted period, the speedy evacuation of our troops would seem to be called for as a matter of common sense, They can be employed to good effect else- where. Our American divisions, for ex- ample, still are essential to the security of Japan, and elements of them can be used effectively in connection with the training of the Army we are now beginning to build up here at home. With that said, however, certain reserva- tions must be added. In the first place, there is at least some reason to believe that it may not be “strategically futile’ for the United Nations to try to haid on in Korea as long as possible. True enough, short of an all-out war with Red China—which the Tree world does not want and which proba- bly would set of @ giobal explosion—there A107 is virtually no hope that the UN can roll back the numericslly superior Communists and umty the Korean people under an inde- pendent and democratic government of their own choosing. Even so, in both a political and military sense, a strong argument can be made against the idea that our allied forces should be withdrawn forthwith, ro- gardless of whether or not they are capable of fighting a long delaytng action at mint- mum cost to themsetves. In support of this argument, ag ayainst the Taft-Tito view, such considerations os the following may be cited: (1) If it can bold on by a alow, fighting retreat involving rela- tively small casualiies, the United Nations ought to do so in order to win enough time to provide a safe haven for the great numbers of free Koreans who are in fitght from the Ageressors and whose fate will be grim if they are abandoned in a swift and sudden allied withdrawal. (2) There is a possibil- ity—-though exceedingly remote—-that a long delaying action, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, might persuade Peiping to reconsider its rejection of a cease-fire almed at promoting an honorable negotiated settle- ment. (3) Before it quits Korea—if it must guit—the UN should punish the agyression there to the greatest extent possible. And (4) the longer the Chinese Communists can be pinned down tn that theater, and the more their losses in men and material, the better the chance. of upsetting their time- table of attack elsewhere in Asia, notably in Indochina. Needless to say, if these and similar politi- cal-military considerations make sense, or if the UN command under General MacArthur and our own security agencies in this coun- try regard them as valid, then it is too early to dismiss as strategically futile the effort of our allied forces to retreat slowly and hold on as long as they can in Korea. Actu- ally, of course, the pressures being exerted by Red China's massive armies may make this whole subject rather academic by oblig- ing us in the near future to undertake a hasty evacuation in order to avoid a qdis- astrous Dunkirk. In that case, however, the world will have reason to recognize the with- drawal as @ fighting withdrawal made with honor against odds too heavy, and in a the- ater relatively not important enough, to justily a battle to the finish. Finally, if this withdrawal must be made— whether soon or a considerable time from now—the United States and the United Na- tions as a whole should carry it out In a way that will serve notice on all peoples that it represents a lost battle, not a lost war, and that the struggle to uphold freedom, decency, and the rule of law in the world will con- tinue unabated regardless of the set-back in Korea, To that end, one of the first things that the UN ought to do—and !t can bardly delay much longer without stultifying it- self—-is to brand Red China as a criminal aggressor. That, at least, will keep the his- torical record straight. Father Louis J. Mendelis: Citation fer Mission Work LXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. HERBERT R. O’CONOR OF MARYLAND IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. O’CONOR. Mr. President, selec- tion of any citizen as the outstanding figure nationally in any worvh while field
A108 of endeavor is always a matter for heart- felt commendation. Such an honor has come to one of Maryland’s best known and best loved clergymen, the Reverend Louis J. Mendelis, pastor of St. Alphon- sus Catholic Church in downtown Bal- timore. A National Catholic News Service story in the last issue of the Catholic Review, quoting from an article in the Priest magazine, published in Huntington, Ind., summarizes the extraordinary record Father Mendelis has compiled in con- tributing to the dissemination of reli- gious teachings during the past 10 years. 1 ask unanimous consent that the news item from the Catholic Review be pub- lished in the Appendix of the Recorp. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the REcorpD, as follows: Prigst Is CITED FoR CHARITIES Huntincton, Inp.—During the past 10 years St. Alphonsus parish in downtown Bal- timore has contributed more than $500,000 to the missions. The 1950 total of $66,608.66 breaks down to $2,563 43 for the general mission fund; 44,270.23 for specific causes, $19,775 In mass stipends. The $50,000 mark has been passed every year since 1943-44. The peak was reached in 1945-46, with $80,785.18. The $500,000 figure, throughout the decade, is divided as follows: Ordinary, $28,192.15; spe- cific causes, $329,382.08; mass intentions, $176,849. The editors of the Priest magazine, pub- lished here, which carries this information in its current issue, believe that St. Alphon- sus Parish has set a national record. “If we could give an annual award to one of Amer- ica's priests in the name of the Priest,” they state, ‘we would certainly nominate Father Louis J. Mendelis, pastor of St. Alphonsus, Baltimore, as its first winner.” Truman Blasts Specious Reasoning We Can Become Island to Ourselves EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. LOUIS B. HELLER OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Thursday, January 4, 1951 Mr. HELLER. Mr. Speaker, under leave granted to extend my remarks in the Recorp, I include the following edi- torial from the Brooklyn Eagle of Tues- day, January 9, 1951: TRUMAN BLASTS SPECIOUS REASONING WE Can Become Is,aNp TO OURSELVES President Truman in his State of the Union message summons the spiritual and material resources of the American people to meet one of the darkest crises in the his- tory of the Republic. He demands that the new challenge to the free world be met in a way that conforms to the Nation's tradi- tionse—honorably and courageously—that there shall be no concessions to the aggres- gors, and no evasions of duty. The tone of the President's message was one of confidence. It reflected none of the doubts and qualms and the fears that have been finding such disturbing expression in Congress and elsewhere since the war in Korea changed from triumph to disaster. The Nation's enemy and the enemy of freedom throughout the world is Russia. President Truman has no hesitancy in place ing upon Russia the brand of an aggressor nation and the responsibility for the fear of war and the necessity of preparing for full- scale war. He left no doubt as to the course we must follow for our own security and that ef the free world. All of the genius and the energy of the American people must be devoted to the purpose of building invincible power with two possible results in view. One is the possibility that Russia, witnessing this de- velopment of strength, may be restrained from taking the risks involved in war. The other ts effective resistance if Russia, in an hour of rashness, decides to strike. The means to the desired ends are familiar. There is to be no ceparture from the charted course, although Congress is urged to debate the issues in a responsible way, to maintain unity of purpose without any lessening of the vitality Of the two-party system. We bring to the new challenge to our se- curity our traditional assets—moral courage, our sincere concern for the preservation of peace, absence of any desire for national advantage, and a production capacity un- equaled by any nation on earth. There is no reason why we should retreat before the threat of world conquest by Russia. President Truman demolished the specious reasoning of those who still cling to the de- lusion that we can become an island to our- selves, made safe by two oceans and island defense lines. With the continent of Eu- rope under hostile control and its mines and fields and industries producing for Russia, our own survival would hang delicately in the balance and, at best, our economy and way of life would be transformed. We can- not, either as a matter of honor or of ex- pediency, throw our allies to the wolves, regardless of whether they are in Europe or in Asia. In its general outlines, the Nation’s pro- gram for the crisis remains unchanged. Basic is the accumulation of the strength which alone impresses the aggressor. The President concedes that the members of the North Atlantic Alliance, including the United States, have not been sufficiently effective in preparing for war. Europe is a part of our own defensive sys- tem. It must continue to be helped in the bullding of its defenses. In Asia, freedom is equally sacred and must be safeguarded. Korea remains as a tragic symbol of both the danger to freedom and the obligation to de- fend it. It was to be anticipated that issues con- cerned with war and security would be of transcendent importance in the President's message. It dealt also with such domestic issues as improved agricultural laws, labor laws to make sure that we have steady pro- duction in this emergency, housing, the training of doctors and nurses and the needs of elementary and secondary education.” The message dealt adequately with the demands of the crisis. It is to be hoped that it will have the effect of causing the Amert- can people to close ranks in the face of the effort by the Russian Communist dictator- ship to take over the world step by step. United States Foreign Policy EXTENSION OF REMARKS or HON. STYLES BRIDGES OFr NEW HAMPSHIRE IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Thursday, January 11 (legislative day of Monday, January 8), 1951 Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Recorp an article APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD dealing with the question of United States foreign policy, entitled “Giant in a Snare,” appearing in the current issue of Time magazine. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Recorp, as follows: GIANT IN A Snare Despite the skill, authority, and sincerity of the participants, the great debate on United States foreign policy etill rang hollow. Through last week all sides had been more clear and forceful about what they didn’t want than about what they did want. The “internationalists” warned of the dire conse- quences of losing allies, and the “‘isolation- ists” of the dire consequences of trying to save allies. Nobody held out any happier hope than averting the worst. There seemed to be no architects of foreign policy around— just building inspectors. On every wall calamity toetered: Korea, the strained United States budget, laggard Western European defense, the danger of German rearmament, the weakness of the Middle East and Africa, the Mmitations of United States atomic bombing, the possi- bility of atomic attacks on the United States. No doubt the inspectors were right. Disaster lurked in all these places, and in others too. The United States horizon, however, could not be ringed with nothing but catastrophe. Some of that smoke was in the eyes of the beholders. THAT HELPLESS FEELING Odd, perhaps unparalleled in history, was this obsession with danger by leaders of a nation as strong as the United States. The beaten and the besieged naturally think in terms of survival, not of opportunity. For them, there is good reason to forget that, in human affairs, to concentrate on survival is an almost sure way not to survive. No such excuse Js available for the unbeaten, for those with wide freedom of action, for those who stand at the summit of power and respon- sibility. The United States still stands there. Five years ago, none doubted the United States strength. Now doubts are everywhere. No neighborhood saloon lacks a master strategist who can prove that the United States is helpless against the Reds in Korea or Indochina, or Iran, or France. Such calamity-howling Clausewitzes are twice as thick in the Senate as in the saloons, twice as thick in the State Department as in the Senate, and twice as thick in the Pentagon as in the State Department. Has the relative strength of the United States in the world changed that much in 5 years? Actually, communism has made two—and only two—major gains; the atomic bomb and China. These two gains, great as they are, do not cut the United States down from the world’s first power to impotence. The United States has made some gains of its own during the past 5 years. Basic na- tional unity has never been stronger. Mounting production has benefited all sec- tions of the United States people (not a conclusive argument lor capitalism, but cer- tainly a timely reminder that capitalism is not finished). United States grants have helped put Western Europe on its postwar feet. And the United States has finally made up its mind about communism, which it had not done 6 years ago. The United States ts still a giant. What makes it feel helpless? The answer might be to find what is wong with the great debate. THE ABSENTEE PIED PIPER In recent decades, the United States has taken more and more pride in not wanting much from the rest of the world, It gives thanks that it is not as other great powers were, exploiters, conquerors, oppressors, In the case of the United States, the boast is not altogether pharisaical. Nor is it altogether virtuous. The peculiar history of the United
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD States accounts for ite lack of drive to dom!i- nate other lands. It expanded by picking up (rather easily) almost empty areas on ita borders. Its rise is a story of internal growth, which now shows no sign of slackening— thus confounding the European economists, both Marxist and conservative, who are cer- tain that industrialized nations must reach out for foreign markets. For better or worse, United States business just hasn't reached out. The United States also lacks another kind of drive that has marked some great nations, Having absorbed on the basis of mutual tolerance the people of so many lands and creeds, the United States has not and cannot have a master-race complex or ea lawgiver complex. Nevertheless, the United States is very much in the world. The made-in-America tag is on the revolution of mass production that is disturbing the world far more pro- foundly than the reaction of Soviet commu- nism. Two hundred years ago, only a few individuals could achieve material comfort. After the industrial revolution, only a few nations could achieve it. But the techniques of mass production unleashed by the Amer- feans 40 years ago promise comfort for all— and the promise is an honest one, technically redeemable. This promise runs through the world (especially through Asia) like a Pied Piper, leading men to drop ancient ways of life and follow it. But the American ts not on the ground to organize the energy released by this promise. Neither hope of profit nor love of domination takes the American to the spot. He is content to be a Pied Piper on television. The Communist, however, is on the ground; he leads those lured by the absentee Pied Piper back to misery and slavery. The United States, without meaning to, has let loose the most dynamic force in the world. The United States cannot silence the Pied Piper of progress. It can only try to redeem the promise of his pipes. Failure to understand this at home and abroad frustrates the making of United States policy and accounts for both the wave of antiforeign sentiment sweeping the United Btates and the wave of anti-American senti- ment in Europe and Asia. THE HAND WASHERS Though foreigners would gasp to hear it, the American thinks of himself as a stable, passive element in a disturbed world. The foreigner knows better: He knows that Amer- ica is @ prime mover in the world’s convul- sions. When the American takes a step in international economic affairs the non- American, who does not understand the peculiar United States economic background, suspects him of hypocritically looking for profit or trying to impose the American way of life. Bimilarly, the United States from time to time gets into these unreal great debates over internationalism versus isola- tionism, because the American 1s caught be- tween his own feeling of passivity and the dynamic reality: That Americanism 1s a highly explosive force acting on the world. Thus the great debate of 1918-20 frittered out in an ignominious United States with- drawal from responsibility. The great de- bate of 1998-41 was getting nowhere when it was adjourned—but not really settled—by Pearl Harbor. Even before that war was over United States leaders at Yalta were washing their hands of responsibility. They agreed to lines that excluded from United States influ- ence millions of Poles, Czechs, Germans, Hun- garians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and Chinese, Roosevelt, who grew up in the tra- dition of the high-walled American citadel, wanted to call World War II “The Survival War.” The symbol of the citadel, the wall, the de- fensive line, dominates the thought of even the most thoroughgoing American interna- tlonalists. The American does not ece him- self leaping the seas, like the Athenian or the Briton, to bring order and progress to distant lands, and from there look on to other dis- tant opportunities. When the American leaps the seas he digs a ditch. He makes a perimeter and says, “Don’t step over this.” This accounts for an ingrained habit of United States foreign policy makers: Draw- ing loops on maps to show what we will hold. Last week the United States political alr was fuller of loops than a Wyoming rodeo. Secretary Acheson had the biggest loop, al- though it was frayed and limp and the knot kept slipping. It went around Western Eu- rope, but maybe not Germany, and maybe not Spain, and probably not Africa. A sepa- rate strand encircled Greece and Turkey. All of Secretary Acheson's friends agreed that Iran should be inside the loop, but nobody was doing much about putting it there. India was probably inside, although it had not been persuaded that it ought to be. China, including Formosa, never had been there. Japan was. Korea wasn’t until the Communists attacked it, and then !t was and now most of it isn't again. Ex-President Hoover's loop is smaller. It leaves out continental Europe, takes in Eng- land and Formosa and Japan. Ex-Ambassa- dor Kennedy's takes in only the Western Hemisphere. Instead of a big loop, Senator Tarr has a lot of little loops, each protecting an tsland. Senator Tarr even has some doubts that Malaye, which is only about 200 miles across and has some 1,000 miles of coastline, can be protected by sea power. No reasonable American will argue against Senator Tart's main thesis that the United States should emphasize ita sea and air power. But Tart's definition of sea power is the most modest since Nonh’s. The British Empire, based on sea power, managed to hold secure great land masses a8 much as 1,500 miles from salt water, because the British regarded the sea not as a moat, but as a road. THE BORDERERS The citadel or loop mentality also explains the present confusion at Lake Success over what to do about the Korean War. The trou- ble goes back 1o the drafting of the UN charter. UN's goal should have been to es- tablish and maintain international justice. Instead of this bold positive program, UN's goal became the prevention of aggression, narrowly defined. Aggression, for instance, did not include the undermining of one state by the arms and agents of another state, as in the Chinese civil war. It meant only the crossing of a border by the official army of the aggressor. The North Koreans were defiant enough to transgress even this restricted legal loop. ‘The UN instantly reacted. But when Mac- Arthur was chasing the Korean Reds toward the thirty-elghth parallel, an outcry arose that showed how deeply the border-crossing fetish had sunk into the western mind. Mac- Arthur, it was held, would himself become an @ or if he crossed the parallel in pursuit of the criminal} force. Here was a conception brand new to the long end fruity annals of jurisprudence. Under this conception, if the policeman finds that the dagger has penetrated the victim's fiesh, it ts permitted that he setze the crim- inal by the wrist and force him to withdraw the knife but he may not take the dagger away, much less arrest the criminal. At the time, the UN did not fall for this— quite. But worse was to come. As Mac- Arthur approached the Chinese-Korean border, eome of the border-minded began to how! as if the whole Eighth Army was marching up their spines. Then the Chinese poured over the border—but that did not count because it was not official; the Chinese Communist Government said that there was nobody killing Americans in Korea but us yolunteers. Since then, the Korean war has been well looped up. There was the heroic and brilliant A109 loop around Hungnam, and the less brillant one around Seoul, and next, apparently, will be a loop around Pusan. Perimeters, how- ever, even brilliant and heroic ones, have only two military purposes: to get out of and to move forward from. Where is the United States going to move from its Pusan perimeter (or from any of the other perime- ters drawn by the participants in the great debate) ? THE NONPROVOKERS When its forces were hit in Korea, the UN reacted as no law-enforcement agency ever had before. It politely invited the Chinese Government to come to Lake Suc- cess. Then appeared the unforgettable Gen- eral Wu the only man in history (so far) to have the exquisite pleasure of telling a world organization of 60 nations representing 1,845,000,000 people to go climb a flagpole. General Wu was not much interested in boarders, loops, or perimeters. He placed his government in the vanguard of “all the op- pressed nations and peoples of the East," who are strugling either against foreign rule or their own governments. He clearly im- plied Chinese Communist help to the Reds of Japan, Indochina, and the Philippines. General Wu's country is flat on its back. It has no heavy industry and not enough food for tts people. But Wu, unlike the participants in the United States great debate, did not seam worried about his coun- try overextending itself. He was looking for opportunities, not for survival. What's more, the free world’s analysts conceded to China a very good chance of making good on Wu's threats to Japan and southeast Asia. Since then, the UN and the United States have totally ignored the plain military and political opportunity to hit lawbreaker China in the flank with air and sea power. To do 80 would be to cross the border of China, just seized by a gang of cuthroate who have no respect for anybody else’s borders. The UN has been concentrating on the danger of provoking the Communists. Judging by the Communist reaction to UN politeness, noth- ing provokes a Red as much as nonprovoca- tion. Another factor inhibiting action against the mainland of China ts that it is not in- cluded tn anybody’s conception of the free world's citadel, or perimeter, or loop. In other words, the loops do not keep the enemy out; they keep the forces of the free world in. The United States seems to be trying to adjust to the world as it 1s, instead of leading the world where it wants to go and etriking at the enemy who stands in the way. As long as the United States is passive, every specific problem from Indonesia to France is “im- possible.” If the United States takes the initiative, most of the problems will be seen as opportunities, The closest Secretary Acheson has come to recognizing this is to say that the United States 1s trying to create “situations of strength.” But a situation of strength needs to be used to create new and greater situations of strength. SAMPLES OF ACTION Here are some specific examples of how the passive United Btates attitude paralyzes policy: Item: The Berlin airlift was a heaven- sent situation of strength. The United States accepted the gratitude and enthusi- asm of the Germans, made no real effort to develop these into permanent assets. The airlift has become tn German minds fust a sentimental folk memory, like Santa Claus. Everybody ts in favor of Santa Claus, but how many divisions can he raise? Item: Marshal? plan aid to France (as to other countries) created a magnificent situa- tion of strength. The passivists stood back and admired it, a monument of American generosity, and made no effective political use of it. Untted States policy in France bas failed and is still failing to get what the United States wants—a France that cen