H. R. 1735—403 
SEC. 1661. SENSES OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION 
AND COLLABORATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND 
UNITED KINGDOM ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND ON 60TH 
ANNIVERSARY OF FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM. 
(a) COLLABORATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES
AND UNITED 
KINGDOM.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) cooperation and collaboration under the 1958 Mutual 
Defense Agreement and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement are 
fundamental elements of the security of the United States 
and the United Kingdom as well as international stability; 
(2) the recent renewal of the Mutual Defense Agreement 
and the continued work under the Polaris Sales Agreement 
underscore the enduring and long-term value of the agreements 
to both countries; and 
(3) the vital efforts performed under the purview of both 
the Mutual Defense Agreement and the Polaris Sales Agree-
ment are critical to sustaining and enhancing the capabilities 
and knowledge base of both countries regarding nuclear deter-
rence, nuclear nonproliferation and counterproliferation, and 
naval nuclear propulsion. 
(b) 60TH ANNIVERSARY
OF FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE PRO-
GRAM.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) November 2015 marks the 60th anniversary of the 
Fleet Ballistic Missile Program of the Navy, which evolved 
from the Special Project Office established under President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, and has provided credible, reliable, 
and affordable strategic deterrence solutions to the warfighter 
by producing more than 3,600 missiles over six different genera-
tions; 
(2) The current Trident II D5 missile system has provided 
a reliable deterrent for nearly 25 years onboard Ohio-class 
ballistic missile submarines and has demonstrated reliability 
that is second-to-none as evidenced by more than two decades 
of annual, operationally representative flight testing; 
(3) Congress congratulates the men and women of Strategic 
Systems Programs, their industry partners, and the Marines, 
Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen who stand watch ensuring the 
safety, security, and credibility of the strategic weapons of 
the United States; and 
(4) Strategic Systems Programs, and the strategic weapon 
system the programs provide, are a vital and esteemed corner-
stone of the security and defense of the United States and 
will remain so well into the future. 
SEC. 1662. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEWS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Secretary of Defense should develop a plan 
regarding how the Secretary plans to implement the rec-
ommendations of the two nuclear enterprise reviews, one of 
which was led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn 
Creedon and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta and one of which was 
led by General Larry Welch (retired) and Admiral John Harvey, 
Jr. (retired); and 
(2) such plan should include a timeline for when each 
recommendation will be implemented and how any additional
H. R. 1735—404 
manpower resulting from such recommendations will be allo-
cated. 
SEC. 1663. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON MILESTONE A DECI-
SION ON LONG-RANGE STANDOFF WEAPON. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Congress that, 
to support the nuclear deterrence requirements of the United States 
Strategic Command and ensure the credibility and reliability of 
the nuclear-capable air launched cruise missiles of the United 
States, Congress supports efforts by the Secretary of Defense to 
validate military requirements and make a Milestone A decision 
on the long-range standoff weapon. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than May 31, 2016, the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
report on the outcome of Milestone A decision for the long-range 
standoff weapon. 
SEC. 1664. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON POLICY ON THE NUCLEAR TRIAD. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems plays 
a critical role in ensuring the national security of the United 
States; and 
(2) retaining all three legs of the nuclear triad is among 
the highest priorities of the Department of Defense and will 
best maintain strategic stability at a reasonable cost, while 
hedging 
against 
potential 
technical 
problems 
and 
vulnerabilities. 
(b) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
(1) to operate, sustain, and modernize or replace the triad 
of strategic nuclear delivery systems consisting of— 
(A) heavy bombers equipped with nuclear gravity 
bombs and air-launched nuclear cruise missiles; 
(B) 
land-based 
intercontinental 
ballistic 
missiles 
equipped with nuclear warheads that are capable of car-
rying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles; 
and 
(C) ballistic missile submarines equipped with sub-
marine launched ballistic missiles and multiple nuclear 
warheads; 
(2) to operate, sustain, and modernize or replace a capa-
bility to forward-deploy nuclear weapons and dual-capable 
fighter-bomber aircraft; 
(3) to deter potential adversaries and assure allies and 
partners of the United States through strong and long-term 
commitment to the nuclear deterrent of the United States and 
the personnel, systems, and infrastructure that comprise such 
deterrent; 
(4) to ensure that the members of the Armed Forces who 
operate the nuclear deterrent of the United States have the 
training, resources, and national support required to execute 
the critical national security mission of the members; and 
(5) to achieve a modern and responsive nuclear infrastruc-
ture to support the full spectrum of deterrence requirements.
H. R. 1735—405 
SEC. 1665. REPORT RELATING TO THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
EXTENDING THE LIFE OF THE MINUTEMAN III INTER-
CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE. 
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report examining the costs associated 
with extending the life of the Minuteman III intercontinental bal-
listic missile compared to the costs associated with procuring a 
new ground-based strategic deterrent. 
Subtitle E—Missile Defense Programs and 
Other Matters 
SEC. 1671. PROHIBITIONS ON PROVIDING CERTAIN MISSILE DEFENSE 
INFORMATION TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) PROHIBITIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 3 of title 10, United States Code, 
as amended by section 1642, is further amended by adding 
at the end the following new section: 
‘‘§ 130h. Prohibitions on providing certain missile defense 
information to Russian Federation 
‘‘(a) CERTAIN
‘HIT-TO-KILL’ TECHNOLOGY
AND
TELEMETRY 
DATA.—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or other-
wise made available for any fiscal year for the Department of 
Defense may be used to provide the Russian Federation with ‘hit- 
to-kill’ technology and telemetry data for missile defense intercep-
tors or target vehicles. 
‘‘(b) OTHER SENSITIVE MISSILE DEFENSE INFORMATION.—None 
of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made avail-
able for any fiscal year for the Department of Defense may be 
used to provide the Russian Federation with— 
‘‘(1) information relating to velocity at burnout of missile 
defense interceptors or targets of the United States; or 
‘‘(2) classified or otherwise controlled missile defense 
information. 
‘‘(c) EXCEPTION.—The prohibitions in subsection (a) and (b) 
shall not apply to the United States providing to the Russian 
Federation information regarding ballistic missile early warning. 
‘‘(d) SUNSET.—The prohibitions in subsection (a) and (b) shall 
expire on January 1, 2017.’’. 
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the 
beginning of such chapter, as amended by section 1642, is 
further amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
130g the following new item: 
‘‘130h. Prohibitions on providing certain missile defense information to Russian Fed-
eration.’’. 
(b) CONFORMING REPEAL.—Section 1246 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 113–66; 127 
Stat. 922), as amended by section 1243 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 
Stat. 3568), is further amended— 
(1) by striking subsection (c); and 
(2) in the heading, by striking ‘‘AND LIMITATIONS’’ and 
all that follows through ‘‘FEDERATION’’.
H. R. 1735—406 
SEC. 1672. PROHIBITION ON INTEGRATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYS-
TEMS OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTO MISSILE DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS OF UNITED STATES. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
or otherwise made available for fiscal years 2016 or 2017 for the 
Department of Defense may be obligated or expended to integrate 
a missile defense system of the Russian Federation into any missile 
defense system of the United States. 
SEC. 1673. PROHIBITION ON INTEGRATION OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYS-
TEMS OF CHINA INTO MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS OF 
UNITED STATES. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act 
or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2016 for the Department 
of Defense may be obligated or expended to integrate a missile 
defense system of the People’s Republic of China into any missile 
defense system of the United States. 
SEC. 1674. LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PATRIOT 
LOWER TIER AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF 
THE ARMY. 
(a) LIMITATION.—Except as provided by subsection (c), none 
of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise 
made available for fiscal year 2016 for any program described 
in subsection (b) may be obligated or expended unless— 
(1) the Secretary of the Army certifies to the congressional 
defense committees that the analysis of alternatives regarding 
the Patriot lower tier air and missile defense capability of 
the Army has been submitted to such committees; 
(2) a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date 
on which the Secretary makes the certification under paragraph 
(1); and 
(3) the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Tech-
nology, and Logistics certifies to such committees that such 
obligation or expenditure of funds on such programs is con-
sistent with the findings of the analysis of alternatives 
described in paragraph (1) to modernize the Patriot lower tier 
air and missile defense capability of the Army. 
(b) PROGRAM DESCRIBED.—A program described in this sub-
section are the following components and capabilities of the Patriot 
air and missile defense system: 
(1) Radar capability development, radar improvements, the 
digital sidelobe canceller, or the radar digital processor of the 
lower tier air and missile defense program of the Army. 
(2) The enhanced launcher electronic system. 
(c) WAIVER.—The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics may waive the limitations in subsection 
(a) if the Under Secretary— 
(1) determines that such waiver— 
(A) is caused by the delay of the analysis of alternatives 
described in paragraph (1) of such subsection; and 
(B) is necessary to avoid an unacceptable risk to mis-
sion performance; 
(2) notifies the congressional defense committees of such 
waiver; and
H. R. 1735—407 
(3) pursuant to such waiver, obligates or expends funds 
only in amounts necessary to avoid such unacceptable risk 
to mission performance. 
SEC. 1675. INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF AIR AND MISSILE 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) INTEROPERABILITY
OF MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS.—The 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logis-
tics and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting 
through the Missile Defense Executive Board, shall ensure the 
interoperability and integration of the covered air and missile 
defense capabilities of the United States, including by carrying 
out operational testing. 
(b) ANNUAL DEMONSTRATION.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Except as provided by paragraph (2), 
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Secretary 
of the Army shall jointly ensure that not less than one intercept 
or flight test is carried out each year that demonstrates inter-
operability and integration among the covered air and missile 
defense capabilities of the United States. 
(2) WAIVER.—The Director and the Secretary may waive 
the requirement in paragraph (1) with respect to an intercept 
or flight test carried out during the year covered by the waiver 
if the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics— 
(A) determines that such waiver is necessary for such 
year; and 
(B) submits to the congressional defense committees 
notification of such waiver, including an explanation for 
how such waiver will not negatively affect demonstrating 
the interoperability and integration among the covered air 
and missile defense capabilities of the United States. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the term ‘‘covered air and 
missile defense capabilities’’ means Patriot air and missile defense 
batteries and associated interceptors and systems, Aegis ships and 
associated ballistic missile interceptors (including Aegis Ashore 
capability), AN/TPY–2 radars, or terminal high altitude area 
defense batteries and interceptors. 
SEC. 1676. INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF ALLIED MISSILE 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) ASSESSMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, each covered commander shall 
submit to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment on opportunities for the 
integration and interoperability of covered air and missile 
defense capabilities of the United States with such capabilities 
of allies of the United States located in the area of responsibility 
of the commander, particularly with respect to such allies who 
acquired such capabilities through foreign military sales by 
the United States. Each assessment shall include an assess-
ment of the key technology, security, command and control, 
and policy requirements necessary to achieve such an 
integrated and interoperable air and missile defense capability 
in a manner that ensures burden sharing and furthers the 
force multiplication goals of the United States.
H. R. 1735—408 
(2) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
on which a covered commander submits to the Secretary and 
the Chairman an assessment under paragraph (1), the Sec-
retary shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
a report containing such assessment, without change. 
(b) INTEGRATION, INTEROPERABILITY, AND COMMAND-AND-CON-
TROL.—The Secretary and the Chairman, in coordination with the 
Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary 
of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations, shall carry out 
the planning, risk assessments, policy development, and concepts 
of operations necessary for each covered commander to ensure that 
the integration (to the extent that specific integration arrangements 
are agreeable to the partner nation or among the partner nations 
involved in such arrangements), interoperability, and command- 
and-control of air and missile defense capabilities described in sub-
section (a)(1) occur by not later than December 31, 2017. 
(c) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December 
31, 2017, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff shall jointly submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report that describes the progress made by the Sec-
retary, the Chairman, and the covered commanders with respect 
to carrying out subsection (b), including an identification of each 
required action that has not been taken as of the date of the 
report. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘covered air and missile defense capabilities’’ 
means Patriot air and missile defense batteries and associated 
interceptors and systems, Aegis ships and associated ballistic 
missile interceptors (including Aegis Ashore capability), AN/ 
TPY–2 radars, or terminal high altitude area defense batteries 
and interceptors. 
(2) The term ‘‘covered commander’’ means the following: 
(A) The Commander of the United States European 
Command. 
(B) The Commander of the United States Central Com-
mand. 
(C) The Commander of the United States Pacific Com-
mand. 
SEC. 1677. MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY IN EUROPE. 
(a) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the relevant combat-
ant command, should ensure that arrangements are in place, 
including support from other members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the host nations, to provide anti-air 
defense capability at the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland 
by not later than June 1, 2019. 
(b) REQUEST TO NATO.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to NATO 
a request for NATO Security Investment Programme support 
for an air defense capability at the Aegis Ashore sites in 
Romania and Poland. 
(2) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than April 1, 2016, the Sec-
retary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees
H. R. 1735—409 
as to whether NATO has agreed in principle to providing the 
support described in paragraph (1). 
(3) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES.—In this 
subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate. 
(c) REPORT ON AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees a report describing— 
(A) the plan and budget profile to provide the air 
defense capability described in subsection (b)(1); 
(B) an assessment of any changes to the hosting agree-
ments between the respective host nations and the United 
States; 
(C) an evaluation of the feasibility, benefit, and cost 
of using the evolved sea sparrow missile, the standard 
missile 2, or other options as determined by the Secretary 
to provide such air defense capability; and 
(D) an assessment of the air and ballistic missile threat 
to the military installations of the United States in Europe, 
including the Naval Shore Facility in Devesulu, Romania, 
and the planned facility in Redzikowo, Poland. 
(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) CAPABILITIES IN EUROPEAN COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSI-
BILITY.— 
(1) ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall ensure that a terminal high altitude area 
defense battery is available for rotational deployment to the 
area of responsibility of the United States European Command 
unless the Secretary notifies the congressional defense commit-
tees that such battery is needed in the area of responsibility 
of another combatant command. 
(2) PRE-POSITIONING SITES.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
examine potential sites in the area of responsibility of the 
United States European Command to pre-position a terminal 
high altitude area defense battery. 
(3) STUDIES.— 
(A) Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall conduct studies 
to evaluate— 
(i) not fewer than three sites in the area of respon-
sibility of the United States European Command for 
the deployment of a terminal high altitude area defense 
battery in the event that the deployment of such a 
battery is determined to be necessary; and 
(ii) not fewer than three sites in such area for 
the deployment of a Patriot air and missile defense 
battery in the event that such a deployment is deter-
mined to be necessary.
H. R. 1735—410 
(B) In evaluating sites under clauses (i) and (ii) of 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall determine which 
sites are best for defending— 
(i) the Armed Forces of the United States; and 
(ii) the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 
(4) AGREEMENTS.—If the Secretary of Defense determines 
that a deployment described in clause (i) or (ii) of paragraph 
(3)(A) is necessary and the appropriate host nation requests 
such a deployment, the President shall seek to enter into the 
necessary agreements with the host nation to carry out such 
deployment. 
(e) IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN DIRECTION.—The Secretary 
shall implement the direction relating to this section contained 
in the classified annex accompanying this Act. 
SEC. 1678. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE 
ROCKET DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by section 1502 for procurement, Defense-wide, and 
available for the Missile Defense Agency, not more than $41,400,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel to procure radars 
for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system as specified 
in the funding table in section 4102, including for coproduction 
of such radars in the United States by industry of the United 
States. 
(b) CONDITIONS.— 
(1) AGREEMENT.—Funds described in subsection (a) to 
produce the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense program 
shall be available subject to the terms and conditions in the 
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State 
of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System Procurement, 
signed on March 5, 2014, subject to an amended agreement 
for coproduction for radar components. In negotiations by the 
Missile Defense Agency and the Missile Defense Organization 
of the Government of Israel regarding such production, the 
goal of the United States is to maximize opportunities for 
coproduction of the radars described in subsection (a) in the 
United States by industry of the United States. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days prior to the 
initial obligation of funds described in subsection (a), the 
Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees— 
(A) a certification that the agreement specified in para-
graph (1) is being implemented as provided in such agree-
ment; and 
(B) an assessment detailing any risks relating to the 
implementation of such agreement. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate.
H. R. 1735—411 
SEC. 1679. ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 
CODEVELOPMENT AND COPRODUCTION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2016 for procurement, 
Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense Agency— 
(1) not more than $150,000,000 may be provided to the 
Government of Israel to procure the David’s Sling Weapon 
System, including for coproduction of parts and components 
in the United States by United States industry; and 
(2) not more than $15,000,000 may be provided to the 
Government of Israel for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor 
Program, including for coproduction of parts and components 
in the United States by United States industry. 
(b) CERTIFICATION.— 
(1) CRITERIA.—Except as provided by subsection (c), the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees a certification that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has demonstrated the 
successful completion of the knowledge points, technical 
milestones, and production readiness reviews required by 
the research, development, and technology agreements for 
the David’s Sling Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper 
Tier Development Program, respectively; 
(B) such funds will be provided on the basis of a 
one-for-one cash match made by Israel for such respective 
systems or in another matching amount that otherwise 
meets best efforts (as mutually agreed to by the United 
States and Israel); 
(C) the United States has entered into a bilateral 
agreement with Israel that establishes— 
(i) in accordance with subparagraph (D), the terms 
of coproduction of parts and components of such respec-
tive systems on the basis of the greatest practicable 
coproduction of parts, components, and all-up rounds 
(if appropriate) by United States industry and mini-
mizes nonrecurring engineering and facilitization 
expenses; 
(ii) complete transparency on the requirement of 
Israel for the number of interceptors and batteries 
of such respective systems that will be procured, 
including with respect to the procurement plans, 
acquisition strategy, and funding profiles of Israel; 
(iii) technical milestones for coproduction of parts 
and components and procurement of such respective 
systems; and 
(iv) joint approval processes for third-party sales 
of such respective systems and the components of such 
respective systems; and 
(D) the level of coproduction described in subparagraph 
(C)(i) for the David’s Sling Weapon System is equal to 
or greater than 50 percent. 
(2) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Under 
Secretary may submit— 
(A) one certification covering both the David’s Sling 
Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor 
Program; or