770 
† HR 2810 EAS 
launched missile system with a maximum range of 
5,500 kilometers. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on the cost and schedule for, and feasibility 
of, modifying United States missile systems in existence as 
of such date of enactment for ground launch with a range 
of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including the Toma-
hawk Cruise Missile, the Standard Missile-3, the Standard 
Missile-6, the Long-Range Stand-Off Cruise Missile, and 
the Army Tactical Missile System, as compared with the 
cost and schedule for, and feasibility of, developing a new 
ground-launched missile using new technology with the 
same range. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—None of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or other-
wise made available for fiscal year 2018 for a research and 
development program for a dual-capable road-mobile 
ground-launched missile system with a maximum range of 
5,500 kilometers may be obligated or expended until the re-
port required by subsection (b) is received by the congres-
sional defense committees. 
(d) INF TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘INF Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the United States
771 
† HR 2810 EAS 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter- 
Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, 
and entered into force June 1, 1988. 
SEC. 1636. CERTIFICATION THAT THE NUCLEAR POSTURE 
REVIEW 
ADDRESSES 
DETERRENT 
EFFECT 
AND OPERATION OF UNITED STATES NU-
CLEAR FORCES IN CURRENT AND FUTURE SE-
CURITY ENVIRONMENTS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that, between the publi-
cation of the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 and the date 
of the enactment of this Act— 
(1) North Korea has— 
(A) conducted at least three nuclear tests; 
(B) tested missiles that may be capable of 
reaching United States territory in the Pacific 
Ocean; and 
(C) continued to develop a missile that 
could strike targets in the United States home-
land; 
(2) the Russian Federation has— 
(A) not complied with either the spirit or 
the letter of bilateral treaties with the United 
States related to nuclear weapons;
772 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(B) continued to expand and diversify its 
arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons; 
(C) threatened to add allies of the United 
States hosting missile defense shields to its list of 
nuclear targets; and 
(D) demonstrated willful disregard for the 
sovereign territory of a neighboring country; 
(3) Iran has— 
(A) according to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, exceeded limits on sensitive ma-
terials under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by 
Iran and by the People’s Republic of China, 
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States; and 
(B) continued to advance a ballistic missile 
program that has been condemned by the United 
Nations; 
(4) the People’s Republic of China has— 
(A) built up military outposts on artificial 
islands in the South China Sea; 
(B) mass-produced missiles capable of strik-
ing United States aircraft carriers and military 
installations in the Pacific;
773 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(C) expanded its delivery systems to include 
ballistic missile submarines, which can hold the 
United States homeland at risk and potentially 
can destabilize the strategic stability of Southeast 
Asia; and 
(D) continued to test anti-satellite weapons, 
according to the Department of State; and 
(5) advances in technology and capabilities re-
lated to the cyber domain, applications of artificial 
intelligence, and space have further complicated the 
delicate balance of deterrence that has been in place 
since the Cold War. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) given the developments in the international 
security environment described in subsection (a), it is 
critical to the national security of the United States 
to maintain a nuclear force that is effective for both 
deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies of the 
United States; 
(2) an effective force for deterrence and assur-
ance should be flexible, in order to respond to different 
contingencies, as well as resilient, to operate as 
planned under stress; and
774 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(3) in order to do so, the United States should 
continue to pursue the timely modernization of all 
three legs of the nuclear triad, the Long-Range Stand- 
Off weapon, tactical nuclear capabilities, and nuclear 
command and control systems, as well as weapons 
and infrastructure maintained by the National Nu-
clear Security Administration. 
(c) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 
days after completing the first Nuclear Posture Review after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
a certification that the Nuclear Posture Review accounts 
for— 
(1) with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the 
United States as of such date of enactment— 
(A) the ability of such capabilities to deter 
adversaries of the United States that possess nu-
clear weapons or may possess such weapons in 
the future; 
(B) the ability of the United States to oper-
ate in a major regional conflict that involves nu-
clear weapons; 
(C) the ability and preparedness of forward- 
deployed members of the Armed Forces to operate 
in a nuclear environment; and
775 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(D) weapons, equipment, and training or 
conduct that would improve the abilities de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C); 
(2) with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the 
United States projected over the 10-year period begin-
ning on such date of enactment— 
(A) the projected ability of such capabilities 
to deter adversaries of the United States that 
possess nuclear weapons or may possess such 
weapons in the future; 
(B) the projected ability of the United 
States to operate in a major regional conflict 
that involves nuclear weapons; 
(C) the projected ability and preparedness 
of forward-deployed members of the Armed 
Forces to operate in a nuclear environment; and 
(D) weapons, equipment, and training or 
conduct that would improve the abilities de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C); and 
(3) any actions that could be taken by the Sec-
retary of Defense or the Administrator for Nuclear 
Security in the near and medium terms to decrease 
the risk posed by possible additional changes to the se-
curity environment related to nuclear weapons in the 
future.
776 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(d) FORM OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification re-
quired by subsection (c) may be submitted to the congres-
sional defense committees in classified form. 
SEC. 1637. PLAN TO MANAGE INTEGRATED TACTICAL WARN-
ING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM AND 
MULTI-DOMAIN SENSORS. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the 
Air Force shall develop a plan to manage the Air Force 
missile warning elements of the Integrated Tactical Warn-
ing and Attack Assessment System as a weapon system con-
sistent with Air Force Policy Directive 10–9, entitled ‘‘Lead 
Command Designation and Responsibilities for Weapon 
Systems’’ and dated March 8, 2007. 
(b) MULTI-DOMAIN SENSOR MANAGEMENT AND EX-
PLOITATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The plan required by sub-
section (a) shall include a long-term plan to manage 
all available sensors for multi-domain exploitation 
against modern and emergent threats in order to pro-
vide comprehensive support for integrated tactical 
warning and attack assessment, missile defense, and 
space situational awareness.
777 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(2) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.—In 
developing the plan required by paragraph (1), the 
Secretary shall— 
(A) coordinate with the Secretary of the 
Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Director of 
the Missile Defense Agency, and the Director of 
the National Reconnaissance Office; and 
(B) solicit comments on the plan, if any, 
from the Commander of the United States Stra-
tegic Command and the Commander of the 
United States Northern Command. 
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 14 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees— 
(1) the plan required by subsection (a); and 
(2) the comments from the Commander of the 
United States Strategic Command and the Com-
mander of the United States Northern Command, if 
any, on the plan required by subsection (b)(1). 
SEC. 1638. CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT 
TO 
STRATEGIC 
RADIATION 
HARDENED 
TRUSTED FOUNDRY. 
Not later than December 31, 2020, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to the congressional defense committees
778 
† HR 2810 EAS 
a certification that a strategic radiation hardened trusted 
foundry, consistent with Department of Defense Instruction 
5200.44, is operational and capable of supplying necessary 
microelectronic components for necessary radiation envi-
ronments involved with the acquisition of delivery systems 
for nuclear weapons. 
SEC. 1639. REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POSTURE RE-
VIEW. 
(a) INCORPORATION
OF STAKEHOLDER VIEWS.—In 
preparing the Nuclear Posture Review, the Secretary of De-
fense shall fully incorporate input and views from all rel-
evant stakeholders in the United States Government, includ-
ing the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Ad-
ministrator for Nuclear Security, and the heads of compo-
nents of the Department of State, the Department of En-
ergy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration 
with responsibility for negotiating and verifying compli-
ance with international arms control initiatives. 
(b) AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary of Defense shall en-
sure that— 
(1) the Nuclear Posture Review is submitted, in 
its entirety, to the President and the congressional de-
fense committees; and 
(2) an unclassified version of the Nuclear Pos-
ture Review is made available to the public.
779 
† HR 2810 EAS 
SEC. 1640. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NUCLEAR POSTURE RE-
VIEW. 
It is the sense of Congress that the Nuclear Posture 
Review should— 
(1) take into account the obligations of the 
United States under treaties ratified by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate; and 
(2) examine the tools required to sustain the 
stockpile stewardship program under section 4201 of 
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2521) in 
the future to ensure the safety, security, and effective-
ness of the nuclear arsenal of the United States. 
Subtitle E—Missile Defense 
Programs 
SEC. 1651. IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM AND ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE 
DEFENSE PROGRAM CO-DEVELOPMENT AND 
CO-PRODUCTION. 
(a) IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise 
made available for fiscal year 2018 for procurement, 
Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense 
Agency, not more than $92,000,000 may be provided 
to the Government of Israel to procure Tamir inter-
780 
† HR 2810 EAS 
ceptors for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense 
system through co-production of such interceptors in 
the United States by industry of the United States. 
(2) CONDITIONS.— 
(A) 
AGREEMENT.—Funds 
described 
in 
paragraph (1) for the Iron Dome short-range 
rocket defense program shall be available subject 
to the terms and conditions in the Agreement Be-
tween the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of 
the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome De-
fense System Procurement, signed on March 5, 
2014, as amended to include co-production for 
Tamir interceptors. In negotiations by the Mis-
sile Defense Agency and the Missile Defense Or-
ganization of the Government of Israel regarding 
such production, the goal of the United States is 
to maximize opportunities for co-production of 
the Tamir interceptors described in paragraph 
(1) in the United States by industry of the 
United States. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 
days prior to the initial obligation of funds de-
scribed in paragraph (1), the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary
781 
† HR 2810 EAS 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees— 
(i) a certification that the amended bi-
lateral international agreement specified in 
subparagraph (A) is being implemented as 
provided in such agreement; and 
(ii) an assessment detailing any risks 
relating to the implementation of such 
agreement. 
(b) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, DAVID’S
SLING
WEAPON
SYSTEM
CO-PRODUC-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2018 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the 
Missile 
Defense 
Agency 
not 
more 
than 
$120,000,000 may be provided to the Government of 
Israel to procure the David’s Sling Weapon System, 
including for co-production of parts and components 
in the United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a certifi-
cation that—
782 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreement and the bilat-
eral co-production agreement for the David’s 
Sling Weapon System; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); and 
(C) the level of co-production of parts, com-
ponents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) in 
the United States by United States industry for 
the David’s Sling Weapon System is not less 
than 50 percent. 
(c) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, ARROW 3 UPPER TIER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM CO- 
PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2) and 
(3), of the funds authorized to be appropriated for fis-
cal year 2018 for procurement, Defense-wide, and 
available for the Missile Defense Agency not more 
than $120,000,000 may be provided to the Govern-
783 
† HR 2810 EAS 
ment of Israel for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor 
Program, including for co-production of parts and 
components in the United States by United States in-
dustry. 
(2) LIMITATION ON FUNDING.—None of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated in paragraph (1) may 
be obligated or expended until 30 days after the suc-
cessful completion of two flight tests at a test range 
in the United States to validate Arrow Weapon Sys-
tem capabilities and interoperability with ballistic 
missile system components of the United States. 
(3) CERTIFICATION.— 
(A) CRITERIA.—Except as provided by 
paragraph (4), the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a cer-
tification that— 
(i) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the 
knowledge points, technical milestones, and 
production readiness reviews required by 
the research, development, and technology 
agreements for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier De-
velopment Program;
784 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(ii) funds specified in paragraph (1) 
will be provided on the basis of a one-for- 
one cash match made by Israel or in an-
other matching amount that otherwise meets 
best efforts (as mutually agreed to by the 
United States and Israel); 
(iii) the United States has entered into 
a bilateral international agreement with 
Israel that establishes, with respect to the 
use of such funds— 
(I) in accordance with clause (iv), 
the terms of co-production of parts and 
components on the basis of the greatest 
practicable co-production of parts, 
components, and all-up rounds (if ap-
propriate) by United States industry 
and minimizes nonrecurring engineer-
ing and facilitization expenses to the 
costs needed for co-production; 
(II) complete transparency on the 
requirement of Israel for the number of 
interceptors and batteries that will be 
procured, including with respect to the 
procurement plans, acquisition strat-
egy, and funding profiles of Israel;
785 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(III) technical milestones for co- 
production of parts and components 
and procurement; 
(IV) a joint affordability working 
group to consider cost reduction initia-
tives; and 
(V) joint approval processes for 
third-party sales; and 
(iv) the level of co-production described 
in clause (iii)(I) for the Arrow 3 Upper 
Tier Interceptor Program is not less than 
50 percent. 
(4) WAIVER.—The Under Secretary may waive 
the certification required by paragraph (3) if the 
Under Secretary certifies to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that the Under Secretary has re-
ceived sufficient data from the Government of Israel 
to demonstrate— 
(A) the funds specified in paragraph (1) are 
provided to Israel solely for funding the procure-
ment of long-lead components and critical hard-
ware in accordance with a production plan, in-
cluding a funding profile detailing Israeli con-
tributions for production, including long-lead
786 
† HR 2810 EAS 
production, of the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Inter-
ceptor Program; 
(B) such long-lead components have success-
fully completed knowledge points, technical mile-
stones, and production readiness reviews; and 
(C) the long-lead procurement will be con-
ducted in a manner that maximizes co-produc-
tion in the United States without incurring non-
recurring engineering activity or cost other than 
such activity or cost required for suppliers of the 
United States to start or restart production in 
the United States. 
(d) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) and paragraph (3) of subsection (c), the Under 
Secretary may submit— 
(1) one certification covering both the David’s 
Sling Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program; or 
(2) separate certifications for each respective sys-
tem. 
(e) TIMING.—The Under Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees the certifications under 
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) and paragraph (3) of sub-
section (c) by not later than 60 days before the funds speci-
fied in paragraph (1) of subsections (b) and (c) for the re-
787 
† HR 2810 EAS 
spective system covered by the certification are provided to 
the Government of Israel. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1652. DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED 
SENSOR ARCHITECTURE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Unless otherwise directed or rec-
ommended by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
(BMDR), the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall 
develop, using sound acquisition practices, a highly reliable 
and cost-effective persistent space-based sensor architecture 
capable of supporting the ballistic missile defense system. 
(b) TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT.—The Director shall 
ensure that the sensor architecture developed under sub-
section (a) is rigorously tested before final production deci-
sions or operational deployment. 
(c) FUNCTIONS.—The sensor architecture developed 
under subsection (a) shall include one or more of the fol-
lowing functions: 
(1) Control of increased raid sizes.
788 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(2) Precision tracking of threat missiles. 
(3) Fire-control-quality tracks of evolving threat 
missiles. 
(4) Enabling of launch-on-remote and engage-on- 
remote capabilities. 
(5) Discrimination of warheads. 
(6) Effective kill assessment. 
(7) Enhanced shot doctrine. 
(8) Integration with the command, control, battle 
management, and communication program of the bal-
listic missile defense system. 
(9) Integration with all other elements of the 
current ballistic missile defense system, including the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot Air and 
Missile Defense Systems. 
(10) Such additional functions as determined by 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 
(d) COST ESTIMATES.—Whenever the Director devel-
ops a cost estimate for the sensor architecture required by 
subsection (a), the Director shall use— 
(1) the cost-estimating and assessment guide of 
the Government Accountability Office entitled ‘‘GAO 
Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide’’ (GAO–09– 
3SP), or a successor guide; or
789 
† HR 2810 EAS 
(2) the most current operating and support cost- 
estimating guide of the Office of Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation (CAPE). 
SEC. 1653. GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR CAPABILITY, CA-
PACITY, AND RELIABILITY. 
(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that it is the policy of the United States to maintain 
and improve, with the allies of the United States, an effec-
tive, robust layered missile defense system capable of defend-
ing the citizens of the United States residing in territories 
and States of the United States, allies of the United States, 
and deployed Armed Forces of the United States. 
(b) INCREASE IN CAPACITY AND CONTINUED ADVANCE-
MENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall— 
(1) subject to the annual authorization of appro-
priations and the annual appropriation of funds for 
National Missile Defense, increase the number of 
United States ground-based interceptors, unless other-
wise directed by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 
by up to 28; 
(2) develop a plan to further increase such num-
ber to the currently available missile field capacity of 
104 and to plan for any future capacity at any site 
that may be identified by the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Review; and
829 
† HR 2810 EAS 
SEC. 2512. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2017 PROJECTS. 
(a) CAMP HUMPHREYS.—In the case of the authoriza-
tion contained in the table in section 2511 of the Military 
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (divi-
sion B of Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2704) for Camp 
Humphreys, Republic of Korea, for construction of the 8th 
Army Correctional Facility, the Secretary of Defense may 
construct a level 1 correctional facility of 26,000 square feet 
and a utility and tool storage building of 400 square feet. 
(b) K–16 AIR BASE.—In the case of the authorization 
contained in the table in section 2511 of the Military Con-
struction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division 
B of Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2704) for the K–16 
Air Base, Republic of Korea, for renovation of the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) Operations Facility, B–606, the 
Secretary of Defense may renovate an operations adminis-
tration area of 5,500 square meters.
994 
† HR 2810 EAS 
forces in the program under this section during the pre-
ceding year. 
‘‘(2) Each report under this subsection shall set forth, 
for the year covered by such report, the following: 
‘‘(A) The number of members who were eligible 
for participation in the program, in aggregate and by 
component of the armed forces. 
‘‘(B) The number of members who participated 
in the program, in aggregate and by component of the 
armed forces, for each of the following: 
‘‘(i) Preseparation counseling provided by 
the Department of Defense. 
‘‘(ii) Briefings provided by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs. 
‘‘(iii) Employment workshops provided by 
the Department of Labor. 
‘‘(C) The number of members who did not par-
ticipate in the program due to a waiver of the par-
ticipation requirement under subsection (c)(2) for 
each service set forth in subparagraph (B). 
‘‘(3) Each report under this subsection may also in-
clude such recommendations for legislative or administra-
tive action as the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, considers appro-