(III) a substantially increased fi-
nancial 
risk 
exposure 
for 
United 
States-based investors; 
(B) describe the activities of the companies 
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 
their implications for the United States; and 
(C) develop policy recommendations for the 
United States Government, State governments, 
United States financial institutions, United 
States equity and debt exchanges, and other rel-
evant stakeholders to address the risks posed by 
the presence in United States capital markets of 
the companies identified pursuant to subpara-
graph (A). 
(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.— 
In completing the report under paragraph (1), the 
President shall consider whether a company should be 
identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the 
company has— 
(A) materially contributed to the develop-
ment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated pro-
curement by the PLA, of lethal military equip-
ment or component parts of such equipment; 
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(B) contributed to the construction and 
militarization of features in the South China 
Sea; 
(C) been sanctioned by the United States or 
has been determined to have conducted business 
with sanctioned entities; 
(D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
intellectual property theft; 
(E) engaged in corporate or economic espio-
nage; 
(F) contributed to the proliferation of nu-
clear or missile technology in violation of United 
Nations Security Council resolutions or United 
States sanctions; 
(G) contributed to the repression of religious 
and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including 
in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or 
Tibet Autonomous Region; 
(H) contributed to the development of tech-
nologies that enable censorship directed or di-
rectly supported by the Government of the PRC; 
or 
(I) contributed to other activities or behav-
ior determined to be relevant by the President. 
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(4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph 
(1), the President shall weigh the national security 
implications and consider the following factors identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such re-
port should exclude from its analysis the delisting or 
potential delisting of companies from United States 
markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board-registered public 
accounting firm as required by section 104 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)): 
(A) 
The 
possibility 
that 
banning 
or 
delisting companies from United States markets 
could lead to an outflow of companies to list in 
the PRC. 
(B) 
The 
possibility 
that 
banning 
or 
delisting companies from United States markets 
could impact the status of the United States as 
the world’s leading capital markets center, par-
ticularly vis-a`-vis the PRC. 
(C) The impact on American foreign policy 
and national security if United States leadership 
in capital markets was weakened vis-a`-vis the 
PRC. 
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(c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under sub-
section (b) shall be made accessible to the public online 
through relevant United States Government websites. 
SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI-
CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER 
PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS-
TEMS. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on the diplomatic and eco-
nomic implications of cross-border payment systems. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) assess the extent to which American di-
plomacy and global leadership hinge upon the 
current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of 
cross-border payment and financial messaging 
systems; 
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(B) examine the durability of the Society 
for 
Worldwide 
Interbank 
Financial 
Tele-
communication cooperative; 
(C) review and analyze ways in which the 
Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems, 
cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital cur-
rencies could erode this system; and 
(D) analyze how changes to global cross-bor-
der payment systems could undermine United 
States national security interests including im-
pacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering 
of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti- 
money laundering provisions. 
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(c) PUBLICATION.—The report under subsection (a)(1) 
shall be made accessible to the public online through rel-
evant United States Government websites. 
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TITLE II—INVESTING IN 
ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Subtitle A—Strategic and 
Diplomatic Matters 
SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the 
Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to 
the United States and are among the Nation’s most 
precious assets, enabling the United States to advance 
its vital national interests, defend its territory, ex-
pand its economy through international trade and 
commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies 
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while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent 
the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur-
rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power 
or powers, and deter potential aggressors; 
(2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land are critical allies in advancing a free and open 
order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling chal-
lenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to 
advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas 
such as defense and security, economic prosperity, in-
frastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms; 
(3) the United States greatly values other part-
nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 
India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, 
and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-
eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which 
are essential to further shared interests; 
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 
demands consistent United States and allied commit-
ment to strengthening and advancing alliances so 
that they are postured to meet these challenges, and 
will require sustained political will, concrete partner-
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ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-
rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-
ments, high-level and extensive consultations on mat-
ters of mutual interest, mutual and shared coopera-
tion in the acquisition of key capabilities important 
to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the 
face of political, economic, or military coercion; 
(5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance 
shared interests; 
(6) the United States must work with allies to 
prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region; 
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by the 
Expert Group of the International Military Council 
on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled ‘‘Climate 
and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ noted, the 
Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulner-
able to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ-
ment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, 
noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the 
Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian re-
sponse costs and impacting security throughout the 
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region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food 
insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more 
frequent; 
(8) the United State should continue to engage 
on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners 
of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-
lic Law 115–409), in the areas of— 
(A) forecasting environmental challenges; 
(B) assisting with transnational coopera-
tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity 
and access to safe drinking water; 
(C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
tion; and 
(D) meeting environmental challenges and 
developing resilience; 
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, 
should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific cli-
mate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on 
internal and external actions needed— 
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk 
reduction, and resilience to weather-related im-
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pacts on strategic interests of the United States 
and partners and allies of the United States in 
the region; and 
(B) to address humanitarian and food secu-
rity impacts of weather-related changes in the re-
gion; and 
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-
nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional 
architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States— 
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
cooperation with and among United States allies in 
the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through 
diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy 
security and development, scientific and health part-
nerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intel-
ligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-re-
lated initiatives; 
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral and 
bilateral treaty obligations, including— 
(A) defending Japan consistent with the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-
tween the United States of America and Japan, 
done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all 
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related and subsequent bilateral security agree-
ments and arrangements concluded on or before 
the date of enactment of this Act; 
(B) defending the Republic of Korea con-
sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 
the United States and the Republic of Korea, 
done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all re-
lated and subsequent bilateral security agree-
ments and arrangements concluded on or before 
the date of enactment of this Act; 
(C) defending the Philippines consistent 
with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
tween the United States and the Republic of the 
Philippines, done at Washington, August 30, 
1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral se-
curity agreements and arrangements concluded 
on or before the date of enactment of this Act; 
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma-
nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, 
understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk commu-
nique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bi-
lateral security agreements and arrangements 
concluded on or before the date of enactment of 
this Act; and 
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(E) defending Australia consistent with the 
Security Treaty Between Australia and the 
United States of America, done at San Fran-
cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and 
subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar-
rangements concluded on or before the date of en-
actment of this Act; 
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ 
bilateral and regional partnerships, including with 
India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand; 
(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to pro-
mote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bi-
laterally and through regional and multilateral fora 
and pacts; 
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and India; and 
(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustain-
able development of the Mekong River Basin, includ-
ing by providing support for environmental conserva-
tion and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-re-
gion and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
land, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the 
Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States ef-
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forts should focus on increasing MRC member coun-
tries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation and 
management of natural resources. 
SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should 
continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, 
India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to en-
hance and implement a shared vision to meet regional 
challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, re-
silient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by re-
spect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market- 
driven economic growth, and that is free from undue 
influence and coercion; 
(2) the United States should expand dialogue 
and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 
democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to 
uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-
cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific; 
(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 
leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the 
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economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including 
expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro-
duction and equitable access, and to address shared 
challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-
nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in-
vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
the important cooperation among Quad nations that 
is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 
(4) building upon their announced commitment 
to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines 
by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, 
the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-
operation, including through partnerships other mul-
tilateral development banks, should also venture to fi-
nance development and infrastructure projects in the 
Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, 
and sustainable; 
(5) the United States should participate in the 
Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar 
initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, 
economic, and national security sectors to the United 
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States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded 
countries; and 
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group could— 
(A) sustain and deepen engagement between 
senior officials of the Quad countries on a full 
spectrum of issues; and 
(B) be modeled on the successful and long- 
standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 
between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal 
and informal parliamentary exchanges. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and 
cooperation with the Quad. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 
required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of how the United States 
intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-
ment with India, Japan, and Australia on 
shared interests and common challenges. 
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(B) A summary of— 
(i) current and past Quad initiatives 
across the whole of the United States Gov-
ernment, including to promote broad based 
and inclusive economic growth, trade, and 
investment, and to advance technology co-
operation, energy innovation, climate miti-
gation and adaptation, physical and digital 
infrastructure development, education, dis-
aster management, and global health secu-
rity; 
(ii) proposals shared among Quad 
countries to deepen existing security co-
operation, intelligence sharing, economic 
partnerships, and multilateral coordination; 
and 
(iii) initiatives and agreements under-
taken jointly with Quad countries, in addi-
tion to other like-minded partners in the 
Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest. 
(C) A description of efforts to jointly— 
(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co-
operation to prepare for the next pandemic 
by focusing on medium-term vaccine and 
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117 
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 
and educational institutions, including public univer-
sities, in the United States are encouraged to partner 
with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa-
tive Office in the United States to establish programs 
to promote an increase in educational and cultural 
exchanges. 
SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 
U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United 
States to ‘‘promote extensive, close, and friendly com-
mercial, cultural, and other relations between the peo-
ple of the United States and the people of Taiwan’’. 
(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to 
the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the 
‘‘Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs’’. 
(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer 
to Taiwan as ‘‘Taiwan’’, not ‘‘Taipei’’ or ‘‘Chinese 
Taipei’’. 
(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to cul-
tivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the 
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