H. R. 1530—299
section 2540 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection
(a). The report shall include—
(1) an analysis of the costs and benefits of the loan guaran-
tee program; and
(2) any recommendations for modification of the program
that the President considers appropriate, including—
(A) any recommended addition to the list of countries
for which a guarantee may be issued under the program;
and
(B) any proposed legislation necessary to authorize
a recommended modification.
(c) FIRST YEAR COSTS.—The Secretary of Defense shall make
available, from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1996 for operations and maintenance, such amounts
as may be necessary, not to exceed $500,000, for the expenses
of the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1996 that are
directly attributable to the administration of the defense export
loan guarantee program under subchapter VI of chapter 148 of
title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (a).
(d) 
REPLENISHMENT
OF
OPERATIONS
AND
MAINTENANCE
ACCOUNTS FOR FIRST YEAR COSTS.—The Secretary of Defense shall,
using funds in the special account referred to in section 2540c(d)
of title 10, United States Code (as added by subsection (b)), replen-
ish operations and maintenance accounts for amounts expended
from such accounts for expenses referred to in subsection (c).
SEC. 1322. NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES
EXPORT CONTROL POLICY.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Export controls remain an important element of the
national security policy of the United States.
(2) It is in the national security interest that United States
export control policy be effective in preventing the transfer,
to potential adversaries or combatants of the United States,
of technology that threatens the national security or defense
of the United States.
(3) It is in the national security interest that the United
States monitor aggressively the export of militarily critical tech-
nology in order to prevent its diversion to potential adversaries
or combatants of the United States.
(4) The Department of Defense relies increasingly on
commercial and dual-use technologies, products, and processes
to support United States military capabilities and economic
strength.
(5) The maintenance of the military advantage of the
United States depends on effective export controls on dual-
use items and technologies that are critical to the military
capabilities of the Armed Forces.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Secretary of Defense should evaluate license applica-
tions for the export of militarily critical commodities the export
of which is controlled for national security reasons if those
commodities are to be exported to certain countries of concern;
(2) the Secretary of Defense should identify the dual-use
items and technologies that are critical to the military capabili-
ties of the Armed Forces, including the military use made
of such items and technologies;
H. R. 1530—300
(3) upon identification by the Secretary of Defense of the
dual-use items and technologies referred to in paragraph (2),
the President should ensure effective export controls or use
unilateral export controls on dual-use items and technologies
that are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces
(regardless of the availability of such items or technologies
overseas) with respect to the countries that—
(A) pose a threat to the national security interests
of the United States; and
(B) are not members in good standing of bilateral or
multilateral agreements to which the United States is a
party on the use of such items and technologies; and
(4) the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary
of Defense, should ensure effective controls on the re-export
by other countries of dual-use items and technologies that
are critical to the military capabilities of the Armed Forces.
(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—(1) Not later than December 1 of each
year through 1999, the President shall submit to the committees
specified in paragraph (4) a report on the effect of the export
control policy of the United States on the national security interests
of the United States.
(2) The report shall include the following:
(A) A list setting forth each country determined by the
Secretary of Defense, the intelligence community, and other
appropriate agencies to be a rogue nation or potential adversary
or combatant of the United States.
(B) For each country so listed, a list of—
(i) the categories of items that the United States cur-
rently prohibits for export to the country;
(ii) the categories of items that may be exported from
the United States with an individual license, and in such
cases, any licensing conditions normally required and the
policy grounds used for approvals and denials; and
(iii) the categories of items that may be exported under
a general license designated ‘‘G-DEST’’.
(C) For each category of items listed under subparagraph
(B)—
(i) a statement whether a prohibition, control, or licens-
ing requirement on a category of items is imposed pursuant
to an international multilateral agreement or is unilateral;
(ii) a statement whether a prohibition, control, or
licensing requirement on a category of items is imposed
by the other members of an international agreement or
is unilateral;
(iii) when the answer under either clause (i) or clause
(ii) is unilateral, a statement concerning the efforts being
made to ensure that the prohibition, control, or licensing
requirement is made multilateral; and
(iv) a statement on what impact, if any, a unilateral
prohibition is having, or would have, on preventing the
rogue nation or potential adversary from attaining the
items in question for military purposes.
(D) A description of United States policy on sharing satellite
imagery that has military significance and a discussion of the
criteria for determining the imagery that has that significance.
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(E) A description of the relationship between United States
policy on the export of space launch vehicle technology and
the Missile Technology Control Regime.
(F) An assessment of United States efforts to support the
inclusion of additional countries in the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime.
(G) An assessment of the ongoing efforts made by potential
participant countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime
to meet the guidelines established by the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
(H) A discussion of the history of the space launch vehicle
programs of other countries, including a discussion of the mili-
tary origins and purposes of such programs and the current
level of military involvement in such programs.
(3) The President shall submit the report in unclassified form,
but may include a classified annex.
(4) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are the
following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on National Security and the Commit-
tee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.
(5) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime’’ means the policy statement announced
on April 16, 1987, between the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan
to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the Missile
Technology Control Regime Annex, and any amendment thereto.
SEC. 1323. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW OF EXPORT LICENSES
FOR CERTAIN BIOLOGICAL PATHOGENS.
(a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REVIEW.—Any application to the
Secretary of Commerce for a license for the export of a class 2,
class 3, or class 4 biological pathogen to a country identified to
the Secretary under subsection (c) as a country that is known
or suspected to have a biological weapons program shall be referred
to the Secretary of Defense for review. The Secretary of Defense
shall notify the Secretary of Commerce within 15 days after receipt
of an application under the preceding sentence whether the export
of such biological pathogen pursuant to the license would be con-
trary to the national security interests of the United States.
(b) DENIAL OF LICENSE IF CONTRARY TO NATIONAL SECURITY
INTEREST.—A license described in subsection (a) shall be denied
by the Secretary of Commerce if it is determined that the export
of such biological pathogen to that country would be contrary to
the national security interests of the United States.
(c) IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO
HAVE A PROGRAM TO DEVELOP OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.—
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall determine, for the purposes
of this section, those countries that are known or suspected to
have a program to develop offensive biological weapons. Upon mak-
ing such determination, the Secretary shall provide to the Secretary
of Commerce a list of those countries.
(2) The Secretary of Defense shall update the list under para-
graph (1) on a regular basis. Whenever a country is added to
or deleted from such list, the Secretary shall notify the Secretary
of Commerce.
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(3) Determination under this subsection of countries that are
known or suspected to have a program to develop offensive biological
weapons shall be made in consultation with the Secretary of State
and the intelligence community.
(d) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘class
2, class 3, or class 4 biological pathogen’’ means any biological
pathogen that is characterized by the Centers for Disease Control
as a class 2, class 3, or class 4 biological pathogen.
SEC. 1324. ANNUAL REPORTS ON IMPROVING EXPORT CONTROL
MECHANISMS AND ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
(a) JOINT REPORTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE AND COMMERCE.—
Not later than April 1 of each of 1996 and 1997, the Secretary
of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to Congress
a joint report, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, relating to United States export-control mechanisms. Each
such report shall set forth measures to be taken to strengthen
United States export-control mechanisms, including—
(1) steps being taken by each Secretary (A) to share on
a regular basis the export licensing watchlist of that Secretary’s
department with the other Secretary, and (B) to incorporate
the export licensing watchlist data received from the other
Secretary into the watchlist of that Secretary’s department;
(2) steps being taken by each Secretary to incorporate
into the watchlist of that Secretary’s department similar data
from systems maintained by the Department of Defense and
the United States Customs Service; and
(3) a description of such further measures to be taken
to strengthen United States export-control mechanisms as the
Secretaries consider to be appropriate.
(b) REPORTS BY INSPECTORS GENERAL.—(1) Not later than April
1 of each of 1996 and 1997, the Inspector General of the Department
of State and the Inspector General of the Department of Commerce
shall each submit to Congress a report providing that official’s
evaluation of the effectiveness during the preceding year of the
export licensing watchlist screening process of that official’s depart-
ment. The reports shall be submitted in both a classified and
unclassified version.
(2) Each report of an Inspector General under paragraph (1)
shall (with respect to that official’s department)—
(A) set forth the number of export licenses granted to
parties on the export licensing watchlist;
(B) set forth the number of end-use checks performed with
respect to export licenses granted to parties on the export
licensing watchlist the previous year;
(C) assess the screening process used in granting an export
license when an applicant is on the export licensing watchlist;
and
(D) assess the extent to which the export licensing watchlist
contains all relevant information and parties required by stat-
ute or regulation.
(c) ANNUAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE REPORT.—The Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting after section 654 (22
U.S.C. 2414) the following new section: