IV 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 105 
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear weapons-capable 
Islamic Republic of Iran. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 4, 2025 
Mr. MOSKOWITZ (for himself and Mr. LAWLER) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
RESOLUTION 
Affirming the threats to world stability from a nuclear 
weapons-capable Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Whereas numerous officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
have repeatedly made statements against the United 
States, Israel, and their allies and partners, including— 
(1) the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who stated— 
(A) ‘‘As long as America continues its wicked-
ness, interference, and savagery, the Iranian nation 
will not abandon ‘Death to America’ ’’; 
(B) ‘‘The Zionist regime is a deadly, cancerous 
growth and a detriment to this region. It will un-
doubtedly be uprooted and destroyed’’; 
(C) ‘‘We will definitely do everything necessary 
to prepare the Iranian nation for confronting the Ar-
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rogant Powers, whether militarily, in terms of arma-
ment, or politically. Our officials are already working 
on this’’; and 
(D) ‘‘The United States of America and the Zi-
onist regime will definitely receive a crushing re-
sponse for what they do against Iran and the Resist-
ance Front’’; 
(2) an adviser to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, who stated, ‘‘We have 
no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s ex-
istence be threatened, there will be no choice but to 
change our military doctrine’’; and 
(3) former foreign ministry spokesperson of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Nasser Kanani, who stated, ‘‘This 
action of the three European countries [France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom] is the continuation of the hos-
tile policy of the West and economic terrorism against 
the people of Iran, which will face the appropriate and 
proportionate action of the Islamic Republic of Iran’’; 
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran is directly responsible 
for 
the 
death 
and 
injury 
of 
United 
States 
servicemembers, including— 
(1) between 2005 and 2011, when the Quds Force, 
a branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, 
provided explosively formed penetrators to Iranian-backed 
fighters in Iraq and killed 195 United States troops and 
wounded nearly another 900 United States troops; 
(2) since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, 
where Iranian-backed proxies have attacked United 
States troops in the region more than 170 times; and 
(3) on January 28, 2024, when an Iranian-backed 
proxy launched a drone that killed 3 United States troops 
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and wounded nearly another 40 United States troops sta-
tioned at Tower 22 in Jordan; 
Whereas the United States Government has reported— 
(1) ‘‘Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah— 
which 
in 
recent 
years 
has 
been 
estimated 
at 
[$700,000,000]—accounts for the overwhelming majority 
of [Hizballah’s] annual budget’’; 
(2) ‘‘Hamas has received funding, weapons, and 
training from Iran’’; and 
(3) ‘‘Iran also provides up to [$100,000,000] annu-
ally in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, 
including Hamas’’; 
Whereas the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support to the 
Houthis, including through the provision of ballistic and 
cruise missiles and unmanned weapons systems, has al-
lowed the Houthis to carry out attacks against United 
States partners; 
Whereas, since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has engaged in acts of international ter-
rorism and continuously threatened the United States, 
Israel, and their partners and allies; 
Whereas, on January 19, 1984, the United States designated 
the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism for repeatedly providing support for acts of inter-
national terrorism; 
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran an-
nounced that it had enriched uranium for the first time 
to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrich-
ment Plant in Natanz, Iran; 
Whereas, on December 23, 2006, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which im-
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posed sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment activities; 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council subsequently 
adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 
1929 (2010), all of which targeted the nuclear program 
of, and imposed additional sanctions with respect to, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran; 
Whereas, on February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
announced that it had launched its first satellite, which 
raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the 
ballistic missile program; 
Whereas, in September 2009, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clan-
destine Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, years after construction started on the 
plant; 
Whereas, on January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, 
which traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the 
Islamic Republic of Iran the capability to threaten United 
States military installations in the Middle East; 
Whereas, in 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the 
nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 
contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs re-
lating to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, develop-
ment, and manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of 
Iran; 
Whereas, on September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the exist-
ence of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material 
in the Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection 
of the warehouse by the International Atomic Energy 
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Agency (referred to in this preamble as the ‘‘IAEA’’) de-
tected radioactive particles, which the Government of 
Iran failed to adequately explain; 
Whereas, on June 19, 2020, the IAEA adopted Resolution 
GOV/2020/34, which expressed ‘‘serious concern . . . 
that Iran has not provided access to the Agency under 
the Additional Protocol to two locations’’; 
Whereas, on April 17, 2021, the IAEA verified that the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran had begun to enrich uranium to 
60 percent purity; 
Whereas, on August 14, 2021, the former President of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, stated, 
‘‘Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization can enrich uranium 
by 20 percent and 60 percent and if . . . our reactors 
need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity’’; 
Whereas, on April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
confirmed the relocation of a production facility for ad-
vanced centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, 
Iran, to the fortified underground Natanz Enrichment 
Complex; 
Whereas, on April 19, 2022, the Department of State re-
leased a report stating there are ‘‘serious concerns’’ 
about ‘‘possible undeclared nuclear material and activities 
in Iran’’; 
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the IAEA reported that the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 
kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched 
uranium, roughly enough material for a nuclear weapon; 
Whereas, on June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
turned off surveillance cameras installed by the IAEA to 
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monitor uranium enrichment activities at nuclear sites in 
the country; 
Whereas, on July 14, 2022, in The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel 
Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which was 
signed between President Biden and Israel, the United 
States stressed its commitment ‘‘never to allow Iran to 
acquire a nuclear weapon, and that [the United States] 
is prepared to use all elements of its national power to 
ensure that outcome’’; 
Whereas, on July 27, 2022, the head of the Atomic Energy 
Organization of Iran, Mohammad Eslami, announced 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran is building a new nu-
clear reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, 
which will be one of the largest nuclear facilities in Iran; 
Whereas, on December 2, 2022, IAEA Director General 
Rafael Mariano Grossi stated, ‘‘Iran informed us they 
were tripling . . . their capacity to enrich uranium at 60 
percent, which is very close to military level, which is 90 
percent’’; 
Whereas, on January 25, 2023, Director General Grossi stat-
ed, ‘‘One thing is true: [the Islamic Republic of Iran has] 
amassed enough nuclear material for several nuclear 
weapons’’; 
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 
percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold 
for weapons-grade fissile material; 
Whereas, on September 4, 2023, an IAEA report estimated 
the total uranium stockpile of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran to be 3795.5 kilograms (8367.65 pounds) and that 
the Islamic Republic of Iran has enough fissile material, 
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that if further enriched, would be sufficient to produce 
several nuclear weapons; 
Whereas, on October 18, 2023, United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2231 (2015) lapsed and many pro-
liferation-related penalties and restrictions were lifted, al-
lowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to test or transfer 
ballistic missiles, which may contribute to the further de-
velopment of a nuclear weapon delivery system; 
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the 
United States, France, Germany, and the United King-
dom jointly declared, ‘‘The production of high-enriched 
uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification. 
These decisions demonstrate Iran’s lack of good will to-
wards de-escalation and represent reckless behavior in a 
tense regional context . . . Iran must fully cooperate 
with the IAEA to enable it to provide assurances that its 
nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.’’; 
Whereas, on February 27, 2024, a spokesperson for the De-
partment of State stated, ‘‘We remain seriously con-
cerned about Iran’s continued expansion of its nuclear 
program in ways that have no credible civilian purpose, 
including its continued production of highly enriched ura-
nium’’; 
Whereas, on June 3, 2024, Director General Grossi stated, 
‘‘Many countries have said if Iran gets nuclear weapons, 
they will do the same. Adding nuclear weapons to the 
cauldron of the Middle East is a very bad idea.’’; 
Whereas, on June 5, 2024, by a vote of 20 to 2, the United 
States joined other nations in formally censuring the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran for advances in their nuclear pro-
gram and failure to cooperate with the IAEA; 
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Whereas, on June 18, 2024, it was reported that intelligence 
agencies of the United States and Israel were looking 
into information that the Islamic Republic of Iran may 
have developed a computer model that could be used for 
research and development of nuclear weapons; 
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance 
with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism 
Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; Public 
Law 117–263), which stated, ‘‘Iran continues to increase 
the size of its uranium stockpile, increase its enrichment 
capacity, and develop, manufacture, and operate ad-
vanced centrifuges. Tehran has the infrastructure and ex-
perience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, at 
multiple facilities’’; 
Whereas, on November 28, 2024, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to start enrich-
ing uranium with thousands of advanced centrifuges at 
its Fordow and Natanz plants, while also installing more 
uranium-enriching centrifuges at those locations; 
Whereas, on December 5, 2024, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence published another assessment, in 
accordance with Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and 
Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; 
Public Law 117–263), which stated— 
(1) ‘‘Iran’s 20-percent and 60-percent enriched ura-
nium stockpiles are far greater than needed for what it 
claims it will use the uranium for and Iran could produce 
more than a dozen nuclear weapons if its total uranium 
stockpile were further enriched’’; and 
(2) ‘‘Iran probably will consider installing or oper-
ating more advanced centrifuges, further increasing its 
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