782 
† HR 5515 PAP
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 
113–291; 128 Stat. 3651). 
(b) COVERED PARTS DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘covered parts’’ means commercially available off-the- 
shelf items as defined in section 104 of title 41, United 
States Code. 
SEC. 1645. PLAN TO TRAIN OFFICERS IN NUCLEAR COM-
MAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, the Sec-
retary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, develop a plan to train, educate, manage, and 
track officers of the Armed Forces in nuclear command, con-
trol, and communications. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall address— 
(1) manpower requirements at various grades; 
(2) desired career paths and promotion timing; 
and 
(3) any other matters the Secretary of Defense 
considers relevant to develop a mature cadre of offi-
cers with nuclear command, control, and communica-
tions expertise. 
(c) SUBMISSION OF PLAN.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
783 
† HR 5515 PAP
of Defense shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) 
to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—The plan required by sub-
section (a) shall be implemented not later than 18 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 1646. PLAN FOR ALIGNMENT OF ACQUISITION OF WAR-
HEAD LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS AND DE-
LIVERY VEHICLES FOR SUCH WARHEADS. 
Not later than February 15, 2019, the Chairman of 
the Nuclear Weapons Council established under section 179 
of title 10, United States Code, shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a plan containing a proposal for 
better aligning the acquisition of warhead life extension 
programs by the National Nuclear Security Administration 
with the acquisition of the planned delivery vehicles for such 
warheads by the Department of Defense. 
SEC. 1647. EXTENSION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON PLAN FOR 
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE, NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS 
DELIVERY 
SYSTEMS, 
AND 
NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. 
Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat.
784 
† HR 5515 PAP
1576), as most recently amended by section 1665 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Pub-
lic Law 115–91), is further amended in subsection (a)(1) 
by striking ‘‘2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2024’’. 
SEC. 1648. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR ACTIVITIES 
TO MODIFY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT TO IM-
PLEMENT OPEN SKIES TREATY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for 
fiscal year 2019 for research, development, test, and engi-
neering or aircraft procurement, Air Force, for the digital 
visual imaging system may be obligated or expended to 
carry out any activities to modify any United States air-
craft for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty 
until— 
(1) the Secretary of Defense submits to the ap-
propriate congressional committees the certification 
described in paragraph (2) of section 1235(b) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2018 (Public Law 115–91); and 
(2) the President submits to the appropriate con-
gressional committees the certification described in 
paragraph (3) of such section. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
785 
† HR 5515 PAP
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives. 
(2) OPEN
SKIES
TREATY.—The term ‘‘Open 
Skies Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open Skies, done 
at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force 
January 1, 2002. 
SEC. 1649. SENSE OF SENATE ON NUCLEAR POSTURE RE-
VIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in 
his opening statement before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives on February 
6, 2018, ‘‘Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent 
is much less expensive than fighting a war that we 
were unable to deter.’’. 
(2) In the same statement, Secretary Mattis said, 
‘‘Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of lab-
oratories and plants is also long past due . . . Due 
to consistent underfunding, significant and sustained
786 
† HR 5515 PAP
investments will be required over the coming decade 
to ensure that the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration will be able to deliver at the rate needed to 
support nuclear deterrence into the 2030s and be-
yond.’’. 
(3) Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter re-
cently wrote that ‘‘it is essential to recapitalize the 
nuclear Triad, because it is the bedrock of deterrence. 
During the past 25 years, the United States has made 
no major new investments in its nuclear forces, yet 
other countries have conducted vigorous buildups. 
This history does not support the contention that U.S. 
investments fuel the nuclear programs of others. My 
views are reflected in the latest Nuclear Posture Re-
view.’’. 
(4) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy Jim Miller recently wrote, ‘‘Secretary of Defense 
Jim Mattis’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review offers con-
tinuity with past U.S. policy and plans, including 
those in the 2010 NPR. It deserves broad bipartisan 
support.’’. 
(5) The Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, 
said in a statement on February 3, 2018, ‘‘Japan 
highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly ar-
ticulates the U.S. resolve to ensure the effectiveness of
787 
† HR 5515 PAP
its deterrence and its commitment to providing ex-
tended deterrence to its allies including Japan, in 
light of the international security environment which 
has been rapidly worsened since the release of the pre-
vious 2010 NPR, in particular, by continued develop-
ment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams.’’. 
(6) In testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate on April 30, 2018, Secretary 
of Defense Jim Mattis said, ‘‘Modernizing the na-
tion’s nuclear deterrent delivery systems and our nu-
clear command and control is the [Department of De-
fense’s] top priority.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that— 
(1) the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is a meas-
ured and appropriate response to the current security 
environment, taking into account the developments in 
other nuclear weapons states such as the People’s Re-
public of China and the Russian Federation and the 
return to great power competition as identified by 
two successive Secretaries of Defense and outlined in 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy; 
(2) Congress should fully fund the complete nu-
clear modernization program of the Department of
788 
† HR 5515 PAP
Defense, including the Columbia-class submarine, the 
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the B–21 long- 
range bomber, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, the 
re-engining of the B–52H bomber, and dual-capable 
aircraft; 
(3) the Department of Defense should organize 
itself appropriately to engineer, acquire, and operate 
nuclear command, control, and communications sys-
tems that are secure, reliable, and modernized; 
(4) Congress should fully fund the National Nu-
clear Security Administration component of the nu-
clear modernization program, including— 
(A) the existing warhead life extension pro-
grams and major alterations, including the 
W76–2 warhead modification program and the 
W80–4 life extension program; and 
(B) the recapitalization of infrastructure for 
production and processing of plutonium pits, 
uranium, tritium, lithium, and trusted strategic 
radiation-hardened microelectronics; 
(5) in order to execute the programs described in 
this subsection in the timely fashion required by the 
Nuclear Posture Review, the National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration must balance workload, improve 
management of large programs, and better integrate
789 
† HR 5515 PAP
its acquisition programs with those of the Department 
of Defense; 
(6) the United States maintains a steadfast com-
mitment to the policy of extended deterrence in Eu-
rope and East Asia, and the nuclear modernization 
program will ensure that commitment remains cred-
ible; 
(7) the United States should continue to honor 
long-held arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear 
security commitments, and should seek to increase 
transparency and predictability through strategic 
dialogue, risk-reduction communication channels, and 
the sharing of best practices; 
(8) when complied with by all parties, effective 
nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures 
and agreements can support the security of the 
United States and countries that are allies or part-
ners of the United States by— 
(A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
rials, technology, and expertise; 
(B) decreasing the risk of misperception 
and miscalculation; and 
(C) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
competition; and
790 
† HR 5515 PAP
(9) the United States should continue to affirm 
its commitments to arms control efforts that advance 
the security of the United States and countries that 
are allies or partners of the United States, and are 
verifiable and enforceable, including the Treaty be-
tween the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 
on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 
5, 2011 (commonly known as the ‘‘New START Trea-
ty’’), which is in effect through February 2021, and 
with mutual agreement may be extended for up to five 
years. 
Subtitle E—Missile Defense 
Programs 
SEC. 1651. EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION RELATING TO MIS-
SILE DEFENSE INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS. 
Section 130h(e) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ‘‘January 1, 2019’’ and inserting 
‘‘January 1, 2021’’. 
SEC. 1652. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR 
STANDARD MISSILE–3 IB GUIDED MISSILES. 
(a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.— 
Subject to section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, the 
Secretary of Defense may enter into one or more multiyear
791 
† HR 5515 PAP
contracts, beginning with the fiscal year 2019 program 
year, for the procurement of Standard Missile–3 Block IB 
guided missiles. 
(b) AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.—The 
Secretary may enter into one or more contracts for advance 
procurement associated with the missiles for which author-
ization to enter into a multiyear procurement contract is 
provided under subsection (a). 
(c) COST ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary 
may not exercise the authority provided under subsection 
(a) or (b) until the Secretary submits to the congressional 
defense committees the report and confirmation required 
under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, of section 
2306b(i)(2) of title 10, United States Code. 
(d) CONDITION
FOR
OUT-YEAR
CONTRACT
PAY-
MENTS.—A contract entered into under subsection (a) shall 
provide that any obligation of the United States to make 
a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal 
year 2019 is subject to the availability of appropriations 
for that purpose for such later fiscal year.
792 
† HR 5515 PAP
SEC. 1653. EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS ON 
UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
AGENCY. 
Section 1696 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (130 Stat. 2638; Public Law 114– 
328) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘Not later than’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘Each year, not later than’’ 
(B) by striking ‘‘for each of fiscal years 
2018 and 2019’’; and 
(2) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘the budget if’’ 
and all that follows through the period at the end and 
inserting ‘‘the budget if additional resources had been 
available for the budget to fund the program, activity, 
or mission requirement.’’. 
SEC. 1654. IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM AND ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE 
DEFENSE PROGRAM CO-DEVELOPMENT AND 
CO-PRODUCTION. 
(a) IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise 
made available for fiscal year 2019 for procurement, 
Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense
793 
† HR 5515 PAP
Agency, not more than $70,000,000 may be provided 
to the Government of Israel to procure components for 
the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system 
through co-production of such components in the 
United States by industry of the United States. 
(2) CONDITIONS.— 
(A) 
AGREEMENT.—Funds 
described 
in 
paragraph (1) for the Iron Dome short-range 
rocket defense program shall be available subject 
to the terms and conditions in the Agreement Be-
tween the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of 
the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome De-
fense System Procurement, signed on March 5, 
2014, as amended to include co-production for 
Tamir interceptors. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 
days prior to the initial obligation of funds de-
scribed in paragraph (1), the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees— 
(i) a certification that the amended bi-
lateral international agreement specified in
794 
† HR 5515 PAP
subparagraph (A) is being implemented as 
provided in such agreement; and 
(ii) an assessment detailing any risks 
relating to the implementation of such 
agreement. 
(b) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, DAVID’S
SLING
WEAPON
SYSTEM
CO-PRODUC-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2019 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $50,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel to pro-
cure the David’s Sling Weapon System, including for 
co-production of parts and components in the United 
States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a certifi-
cation that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreement and the bilat-
795 
† HR 5515 PAP
eral co-production agreement for the David’s 
Sling Weapon System; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); and 
(C) the level of co-production of parts, com-
ponents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) in 
the United States by United States industry for 
the David’s Sling Weapon System is not less 
than 50 percent. 
(c) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, ARROW 3 UPPER TIER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM CO- 
PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2019 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $80,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel for the 
Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program, including 
for co-production of parts and components in the 
United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided by 
paragraph (3), the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
796 
† HR 5515 PAP
quisition and Sustainment shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a certification that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreements for the 
Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); 
(C) the United States has entered into a bi-
lateral international agreement with Israel that 
establishes, with respect to the use of such 
funds— 
(i) in accordance with subparagraph 
(D), the terms of co-production of parts and 
components on the basis of the greatest 
practicable co-production of parts, compo-
nents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) 
by United States industry and minimizes 
nonrecurring engineering and facilitization
797 
† HR 5515 PAP
expenses to the costs needed for co-produc-
tion; 
(ii) complete transparency on the re-
quirement of Israel for the number of inter-
ceptors and batteries that will be procured, 
including with respect to the procurement 
plans, acquisition strategy, and funding 
profiles of Israel; 
(iii) technical milestones for co-produc-
tion of parts and components and procure-
ment; 
(iv) a joint affordability working 
group to consider cost reduction initiatives; 
and 
(v) joint approval processes for third- 
party sales; and 
(D) the level of co-production described in 
subparagraph (C)(i) for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program is not less than 50 percent. 
(3) WAIVER.—The Under Secretary may waive 
the certification required by paragraph (2) if the 
Under Secretary certifies to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that the Under Secretary has re-
ceived sufficient data from the Government of Israel 
to demonstrate—
798 
† HR 5515 PAP
(A) the funds specified in paragraph (1) are 
provided to Israel solely for funding the procure-
ment of long-lead components and critical hard-
ware in accordance with a production plan, in-
cluding a funding profile detailing Israeli con-
tributions for production, including long-lead 
production, of the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Inter-
ceptor Program; 
(B) such long-lead components have success-
fully completed knowledge points, technical mile-
stones, and production readiness reviews; and 
(C) the long-lead procurement will be con-
ducted in a manner that maximizes co-produc-
tion in the United States without incurring non-
recurring engineering activity or cost other than 
such activity or cost required for suppliers of the 
United States to start or restart production in 
the United States. 
(d) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) and paragraph (2) of subsection (c), the Under 
Secretary may submit— 
(1) one certification covering both the David’s 
Sling Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program; or
799 
† HR 5515 PAP
(2) separate certifications for each respective sys-
tem. 
(e) TIMING.—The Under Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees the certifications under 
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) and paragraph (2) of sub-
section (c) by not later than 60 days before the funds speci-
fied in paragraph (1) of subsections (b) and (c) for the re-
spective system covered by the certification are provided to 
the Government of Israel. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1655. METRICS FOR EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTEGRATED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
SYSTEM 
AGAINST 
OPERATIONALLY 
REAL-
ISTIC BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. 
(a) DEVELOPMENT OF METRICS REQUIRED.—The Di-
rector of the Missile Defense Agency shall, in coordination 
with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational 
Test Agency, the Commander of the Joint Forces Combatant