H. R. 3616—253
(b) CONTENTS OF REPORTS.—The reports required by subsection
(a) shall include information reflecting the activities of forums estab-
lished to consider issues relating to treaty implementation and
treaty compliance.
SEC. 1503. REPORT ON ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
CAPABILITIES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.
Not later than 3 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee
on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National
Security of the House of Representatives a report on the status
and adequacy of current direct communications capabilities between
the governments of the United States and Russia. The report shall
identify each existing direct communications link between those
governments and each such link that is designed to be used, or
is available to be used, in an emergency situation. The Secretary
shall describe in the report any shortcomings with the existing
communications capabilities and shall include such proposals as
the Secretary considers appropriate to improve those capabilities.
In considering improvements to propose, the Secretary shall assess
the feasibility and desirability of establishing a direct communica-
tions link between the commanders of appropriate United States
unified and specified commands, including the United States Space
Command and the United States Strategic Command, and their
Russian counterparts.
SEC. 1504. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The 7,000 to 12,000 or more nonstrategic (or ‘‘tactical’’)
nuclear weapons estimated by the United States Strategic Com-
mand to be in the Russian arsenal may present the greatest
threat of sale or theft of a nuclear warhead in the world
today.
(2) As the number of deployed strategic warheads in the
Russian and United States arsenals declines to just a few
thousand under the START accords, Russia’s vast superiority
in tactical nuclear warheads—many of which have yields
equivalent to strategic nuclear weapons—could become strategi-
cally destabilizing.
(3) While the United States has unilaterally reduced its
inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent
since the end of the Cold War, Russia is behind schedule
in implementing the steep tactical nuclear arms reductions
pledged by former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991 and
Russian President Yeltsin in 1992, perpetuating the dangers
from Russia’s tactical nuclear stockpile.
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that
the President should call on Russia to expedite reduction of its
tactical nuclear arsenal in accordance with the promises made
in 1991 and 1992.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than March 15, 1999, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the nonstrategic
nuclear weapons of Russia. The report shall include—
(1) estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields,
viability, and locations of those weapons;
(2) an assessment of the strategic implications of Russia’s
nonstrategic arsenal, including the potential use of those weap-
ons in a strategic role or the use of their components in strategic
H. R. 3616—254
nuclear systems and the potential of Russian superiority in
tactical nuclear weapons to destabilize the overall nuclear bal-
ance as strategic nuclear weapons are sharply reduced under
the START accords;
(3) an assessment of the extent of the current threat of
theft, sale, or unauthorized use of the warheads of those weap-
ons, including an analysis of Russian command and control
as it concerns the use of tactical nuclear weapons;
(4) a summary of past, current, and planned efforts to
work cooperatively with Russia to account for, secure, and
reduce Russia’s stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and associ-
ated fissile material;
(5) a summary of how the United States would prevent,
or plans to cope militarily with, scenarios in which a deteriora-
tion in relations with Moscow causes Russia to redeploy tactical
nuclear weapons or in which Russia threatens to employ, or
actually employs, tactical nuclear weapons in a local or regional
conflict involving the United States or allies of the United
States; and
(6) an assessment of the steps that could be taken by
the United States to enhance military preparedness in order
(A) to deter any potential attempt by Russia to possibly exploit
its advantage in tactical nuclear weapons through coercive
‘‘nuclear diplomacy’’ or on the battlefield, or (B) to counter
Russia if Russia should make such an attempt to exploit its
advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.
(d) VIEWS.—The Secretary of Defense shall include in the report
under subsection (c) the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
and of the commander of the United States Strategic Command.
Subtitle B—Satellite Export Controls
SEC. 1511. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) United States business interests must not be placed
above United States national security interests;
(2) United States foreign policy and the policies of the
United States regarding commercial relations with other coun-
tries should affirm the importance of observing and adhering
to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);
(3) the United States should encourage universal observ-
ance of the Guidelines to the Missile Technology Control
Regime;
(4) the exportation or transfer of advanced communication
satellites and related technologies from United States sources
to foreign recipients should not increase the risks to the
national security of the United States;
(5) due to the military sensitivity of the technologies
involved, it is in the national security interests of the United
States that United States satellites and related items be subject
to the same export controls that apply under United States
law and practices to munitions;
(6) the United States should not issue any blanket waiver
of the suspensions contained in section 902 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public
Law 101–246), regarding the export of satellites of United
H. R. 3616—255
States origin intended for launch from a launch vehicle owned
by the People’s Republic of China;
(7) the United States should pursue policies that protect
and enhance the United States space launch industry; and
(8) the United States should not export to the People’s
Republic of China missile equipment or technology that would
improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the People’s
Republic of China.
SEC. 1512. CERTIFICATION OF EXPORTS OF MISSILE EQUIPMENT OR
TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA.
The President shall certify to the Congress at least 15 days
in advance of any export to the People’s Republic of China of
missile equipment or technology (as defined in section 74 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c)) that—
(1) such export is not detrimental to the United States
space launch industry; and
(2) the missile equipment or technology, including any
indirect technical benefit that could be derived from such
export, will not measurably improve the missile or space launch
capabilities of the People’s Republic of China.
SEC. 1513. SATELLITE CONTROLS UNDER THE UNITED STATES MUNI-
TIONS LIST.
(a) CONTROL OF SATELLITES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS
LIST.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all satellites
and related items that are on the Commerce Control List of dual-
use items in the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR part
730 et seq.) on the date of the enactment of this Act shall be
transferred to the United States Munitions List and controlled
under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).
(b) DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS REGISTRATION FEES.—Section
45 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22
U.S.C. 2717) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking out ‘‘$700,000’’ and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘‘100 percent’’; and
(B) by striking out ‘‘(a) DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS
REGISTRATION FEES.—’’; and
(2) by striking out subsection (b).
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—(1) Subsection (a) shall take effect on
March 15, 1999, and shall not apply to any export license issued
before such effective date or to any export license application made
under the Export Administration Regulations before such effective
date.
(2) The amendments made by subsection (b) shall be effective
as of October 1, 1998.
(d) REPORT.—Not later than January 1, 1999, the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to Congress a report contain-
ing—
(1) a detailed description of the plans of the Department
of State to implement the requirements of this section, including
any organizational changes that are required and any Executive
orders or regulations that may be required;
(2) an identification and explanation of any steps that
should be taken to improve the license review process for
H. R. 3616—256
exports of the satellites and related items described in sub-
section (a), including measures to shorten the timelines for
license application reviews, and any measures relating to the
transparency of the license review process and dispute resolu-
tion procedures;
(3) an evaluation of the adequacy of resources available
to the Department of State, including fiscal and personnel
resources, to carry out the additional activities required by
this section; and
(4) any recommendations for additional actions, including
possible legislation, to improve the export licensing process
under the Arms Export Control Act for the satellites and related
items described in subsection (a).
SEC. 1514. NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS ON SATELLITE EXPORT
LICENSING.
(a) ACTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT.—Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President shall take such actions as are
necessary to implement the following requirements for improving
national security controls in the export licensing of satellites and
related items:
(1) MANDATORY TECHNOLOGY CONTROL PLANS.—All export
licenses shall require a technology transfer control plan
approved by the Secretary of Defense and an encryption tech-
nology transfer control plan approved by the Director of the
National Security Agency.
(2) MANDATORY MONITORS AND REIMBURSEMENT.—
(A) MONITORING OF PROPOSED FOREIGN LAUNCH OF SAT-
ELLITES.—In any case in which a license is approved for
the export of a satellite or related items for launch in
a foreign country, the Secretary of Defense shall monitor
all aspects of the launch in order to ensure that no
unauthorized transfer of technology occurs, including tech-
nical assistance and technical data. The costs of such mon-
itoring services shall be fully reimbursed to the Department
of Defense by the person or entity receiving such services.
All reimbursements received under this subparagraph shall
be credited to current appropriations available for the pay-
ment of the costs incurred in providing such services.
(B) CONTENTS OF MONITORING.—The monitoring under
subparagraph (A) shall cover, but not be limited to—
(i) technical discussions and activities, including
the design, development, operation, maintenance,
modification, and repair of satellites, satellite compo-
nents, missiles, other equipment, launch facilities, and
launch vehicles;
(ii) satellite processing and launch activities,
including launch preparation, satellite transportation,
integration of the satellite with the launch vehicle,
testing and checkout prior to launch, satellite launch,
and return of equipment to the United States;
(iii) activities relating to launch failure, delay, or
cancellation, including post-launch failure investiga-
tions; and
(iv) all other aspects of the launch.