H. R. 7776—1153 
(iii) have its rare commercial item or service easily 
replaced by a United States entity or an entity of 
an ally or partner of the United States. 
(3) RARE COMMERCIAL ITEM OR SERVICE.—The term ‘‘rare 
commercial item or service’’ means a good, service, or intellec-
tual property that is not widely available for distribution. 
(b) WORKING GROUP.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Unless the Director of National Intel-
ligence and the Secretary of Commerce make the joint deter-
mination specified in subsection (c), the Director and the Sec-
retary, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall jointly 
establish a working group to counter foreign commercial threats 
(in this section referred to as the ‘‘Working Group’’). 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The composition of the Working Group 
may include any officer or employee of a department or agency 
of the United States Government determined appropriate by 
the Director or the Secretary. 
(3) DUTIES.—The duties of the Working Group shall be 
the following: 
(A) To identify current foreign commercial threats. 
(B) To identify probable future foreign commercial 
threats. 
(C) To identify goods, services, or intellectual property 
that, if produced by entities within the United States, 
or allies or partners of the United States, would mitigate 
foreign commercial threats. 
(4) MEETINGS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and on a regular basis that is 
not less frequently than quarterly thereafter until the date 
of termination under paragraph (5), the Working Group shall 
meet. 
(5) TERMINATION.—Beginning on the date that is 2 years 
after the date of the establishment under paragraph (1), the 
Working Group may be terminated upon the Director of 
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Commerce jointly— 
(A) determining that termination of the Working Group 
is appropriate; and 
(B) submitting to the appropriate congressional 
committees a notification of such determination (including 
a description of the justification for such determination). 
(6) REPORTS.— 
(A) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biannually 
thereafter until the date of termination under paragraph 
(5), the Working Group shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the activities of the 
Working Group. 
(B) MATTERS.—Each report under subparagraph (A) 
shall include a description of the following: 
(i) Any current or future foreign commercial 
threats identified by the Working Group. 
(ii) The strategy of the United States Government, 
if any, to mitigate any current foreign commercial 
threats or future foreign commercial threats so identi-
fied. 
(iii) The plan of the intelligence community to 
provide to the Department of Commerce and other
H. R. 7776—1154 
nontraditional customers of the intelligence community 
support in addressing foreign commercial threats. 
(iv) Any other significant activity of the Working 
Group. 
(c) OPTION
TO
DISCHARGE
OBLIGATION
THROUGH
OTHER 
MEANS.—If the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary 
of Commerce make a joint determination that the requirements 
of the Working Group under subsection (b) (including the duties 
under paragraph (3) and the reporting requirement under para-
graph (6) of such subsection) may be appropriately filled by an 
existing entity or structure, and submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees a notification of such determination (including 
a description of the justification for such determination), the 
Director and Secretary may task such entity or structure with 
such requirements in lieu of establishing the Working Group. 
SEC. 6515. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ON FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION 
OF ADVERTISEMENT TECHNOLOGY DATA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) 
ADVERTISEMENT
TECHNOLOGY
DATA.—The 
term 
‘‘advertisement technology data’’ means commercially available 
data derived from advertisement technology that is used, or 
can be used, to geolocate individuals or gain other targeting 
information on individuals. 
(2) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(E) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) ASSESSMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence shall 
conduct an intelligence assessment of the counterintelligence risks 
of, and the exposure of intelligence community and Department 
of Defense personnel and activities to, tracking by foreign adver-
saries through advertisement technology data. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the intelligence assessment 
under subsection (b). 
SEC. 6516. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT REGARDING RUS-
SIAN GRAY ZONE ASSETS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(D) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(E) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
H. R. 7776—1155 
(2) GRAY ZONE ACTIVITY.—The term ‘‘gray zone activity’’ 
has the meaning given that term in section 825 of the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 
117–103). 
(3) GRAY ZONE ASSET.—The term ‘‘gray zone asset’’— 
(A) means an entity or proxy that is controlled, in 
whole or in part, by a foreign adversary of the United 
States and is used by such foreign adversary in connection 
with a gray zone activity; and 
(B) includes a state-owned enterprise of a foreign 
adversary that is so used. 
(b) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT REGARDING RUS-
SIAN GRAY ZONE ASSETS.— 
(1) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT.—The Director 
of National Intelligence, acting through the National Intel-
ligence Council, shall produce an intelligence community assess-
ment that contains— 
(A) a description of the gray zone assets of Russia; 
(B) an identification of any opportunities to hold such 
gray zone assets at risk, as a method of influencing the 
behavior of Russia; and 
(C) an assessment of the risks and potential benefits, 
with respect to the interests of the United States, that 
may result from the seizure of such gray zone assets to 
hold the assets at risk. 
(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In identifying opportunities to hold 
a gray zone asset of Russia at risk under paragraph (1)(B), 
the National Intelligence Council shall consider the following: 
(A) The effect on civilians of holding the gray zone 
asset at risk. 
(B) The extent to which the gray zone asset is substan-
tially state-owned or substantially controlled by Russia. 
(C) The likelihood that holding the gray zone asset 
at risk will influence the behavior of Russia. 
(D) The likelihood that holding the gray asset at risk, 
or degrading the asset, will affect any attempt of Russia 
to use force to change existing borders or undermine the 
political independence or territorial integrity of any state, 
including Ukraine. 
(E) Such other factors as the National Intelligence 
Council may determine appropriate. 
(3) APPENDIX.—The intelligence community assessment 
under paragraph (1) shall include an appendix that contains 
a list of the categories of gray zone assets of Russia, with 
specific examples of— 
(A) gray zone assets in each category; and 
(B) for each such gray zone asset listed, the ways 
in which Russia uses the asset to advance its gray zone 
activities. 
(4) SUBMISSION.—The Director, consistent with the protec-
tion of sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress the intelligence community assessment 
under paragraph (1). 
(5) FORM.—The intelligence community assessment under 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
contain a classified annex.
H. R. 7776—1156 
Subtitle C—Reports and Other Matters 
SEC. 6521. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means the following: 
(A) The congressional intelligence committees. 
(B) The Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 
(C) The Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) MILITARY WILL TO FIGHT.—The term ‘‘military will to 
fight’’ means, with respect to the military of a country, the 
disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed. 
(3) NATIONAL WILL TO FIGHT.—The term ‘‘national will to 
fight’’ means, with respect to the government of a country, 
the resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations 
for an objective even when the expectation of success decreases 
or the need for significant political, economic, and military 
sacrifices increases. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) According to a study by the RAND corporation, ‘‘will 
to fight’’ is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect 
of war. 
(2) In testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence officials of the 
United States indicated that although the intelligence commu-
nity accurately anticipated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the 
intelligence community did not accurately assess the will of 
Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Russian invasion 
or that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in averting a rapid 
Russian military occupation of Kyiv. 
(3) According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence 
community estimated that the Afghan government’s forces 
could hold out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years 
if all ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. This 
estimate was revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence 
community view that Afghanistan’s military collapse could come 
in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the Afghan government 
fell within days after the ground forces of the United States 
were withdrawn. 
(4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security 
Forces in 2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United 
States by surprise. 
(5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had important 
implications for policy decisions of the United States toward 
Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further exam-
ination of how the intelligence community assesses a foreign 
military’s will to fight. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with
H. R. 7776—1157 
the heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the 
Director determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report examining the extent to which 
analyses of the military will to fight and the national will to 
fight informed the all-source analyses of the intelligence community 
regarding how the armed forces and governments of Ukraine, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform at key junctures. 
(d) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (c) shall include 
the following: 
(1) The methodology of the intelligence community for 
measuring the military will to fight and the national will to 
fight of a foreign country. 
(2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence commu-
nity applied such methodology when assessing the military 
will to fight and the national will to fight of— 
(A) Afghanistan following the April 2021 announce-
ment of the full withdrawal of the United States Armed 
Forces; 
(B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and 
advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; 
and 
(C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of 
the invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in February 
2022. 
(3) The extent to which— 
(A) the assessments described in paragraph (2) 
depended on the observations of personnel of the United 
States Armed Forces who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and 
Ukrainian armed forces; and 
(B) such observations reflected any standardized, objec-
tive methodology. 
(4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will 
to fight and the national will to fight may have affected the 
capacity of the intelligence community to provide ‘‘early 
warning’’ about the collapse of government forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
(5) The extent to which ‘‘red teaming’’ was used to test 
the assessments described in paragraph (2). 
(6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence 
analysts were highlighted in final written products presented 
to senior policymakers of the United States. 
(7) The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered 
to the policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of 
the intelligence community. 
(8) Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence 
community going forward to incorporate lessons learned and 
enhance the quality of future analytical products to more 
accurately reflect the military will to fight and the national 
will to fight and improve the capacity of the intelligence commu-
nity to accurately predict the success or failure of the armed 
forces of a foreign country. 
(e) ANNEX.—In submitting the report under subsection (c) to 
the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives, the Director shall also include
H. R. 7776—1158 
an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, providing an 
inventory of the following: 
(1) Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected 
the analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
(2) Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has 
taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges. 
(f) FORM.—The report under subsection (c) may be submitted 
in classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified 
summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods. 
SEC. 6522. REPORT ON THREAT FROM HYPERSONIC WEAPONS. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
taining an assessment of the threat to the United States, and 
to allies and partners of the United States, from hypersonic weapons 
in light of the use of such weapons by Russia in Ukraine. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(1) The information learned by the United States regarding 
the hypersonic weapons capabilities of Russia. 
(2) Insights into the doctrine of Russia regarding the use 
of hypersonic weapons. 
(3) An assessment of how allies and partners of the United 
States view the threat of hypersonic weapons. 
(4) An assessment of the degree to which the development 
of missiles with similar capabilities as hypersonic weapons 
used by Russia would enhance or reduce the ability of the 
United States to deter Russia from threatening the national 
security of the United States. 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) may be submitted 
in classified form. 
SEC. 6523. REPORT ON ORDNANCE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
and the congressional defense committees a report on ordnance 
of Russia and China, including the technical specificity required 
for the safe handling and disposal of such ordnance. 
(b) COORDINATION.—The Director shall carry out subsection 
(a) in coordination with the head of any element of the Defense 
Intelligence Enterprise that the Director determines appropriate. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
H. R. 7776—1159 
(1) CONGRESSIONAL
DEFENSE
COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘congressional defense committees’’ has the meaning given that 
term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code. 
(2) 
DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
ENTERPRISE.—The 
term 
‘‘Defense Intelligence Enterprise’’ has the meaning given that 
term in section 426(b) of title 10, United States Code. 
SEC. 6524. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CHINA AND RUSSIA TARGETING 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE.—The term ‘‘foreign malign 
influence’’ means any hostile effort undertaken by, at the direc-
tion of, or on behalf of or with the substantial support of, 
the government of a foreign country with the objective of influ-
encing, through overt or covert means— 
(A) the political, military, economic, or other policies 
or activities of the government of the country that is the 
target of the hostile effort, including any election within 
such target country; or 
(B) the public opinion within such target country. 
(3) LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—The term ‘‘Latin 
America and the Caribbean’’ means the countries and non- 
United States territories of South America, Central America, 
the Caribbean, and Mexico. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the National Intelligence Council and in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report on activities undertaken by China and Russia 
in Latin America and the Caribbean that are intended to increase 
the influence of China and Russia, respectively, therein. Such report 
shall include a description of the following: 
(1) Foreign malign influence campaigns by China and 
Russia targeting Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(2) Financial investments intended to increase Chinese or 
Russian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(3) Efforts by China and Russia to expand diplomatic, 
military, or other ties to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(4) Any other activities determined appropriate by the 
Director. 
(c) MATTERS.—With respect to the description of foreign malign 
influence campaigns under subsection (b), the report shall include 
an assessment of the following: 
(1) The objectives of any such campaign. 
(2) The themes and messaging used in any such campaign.
H. R. 7776—1160 
(3) The scale and nature of the threat posed by any such 
campaign. 
(4) The effect of such threat on the national security, diplo-
matic, military, or economic interests of the United States. 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 6525. REPORT ON SUPPORT PROVIDED BY CHINA TO RUSSIA. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, and the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(b) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements 
of the intelligence community that the Director determines appro-
priate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report on whether and how China, including with respect to 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese 
Communist Party, any Chinese state-owned enterprise, and any 
other Chinese entity, has provided support to Russia with respect 
to the unprovoked invasion of and full-scale war by Russia against 
Ukraine. 
(c) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under subsection (b) shall 
include a discussion of support provided by China to Russia with 
respect to— 
(1) helping the Government of Russia or Russian entities 
evade or circumvent sanctions by the United States or multilat-
eral sanctions and export controls; 
(2) deliberately inhibiting onsite United States Government 
export control end-use checks, including interviews and inves-
tigations, in China; 
(3) providing Russia with any technology, including semi-
conductors classified as EAR99, that supports Russian intel-
ligence or military capabilities; 
(4) establishing economic or financial arrangements that 
will have the effect of alleviating the effect of sanctions by 
the United States or multilateral sanctions; and 
(5) providing any material, technical, or logistical support, 
including to Russian military or intelligence agencies and state- 
owned or state-linked enterprises. 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (c) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. 
(e) SUNSET.—The requirement to submit the report under sub-
section (b) shall terminate on the earlier of— 
(1) the date on which the Director of National Intelligence 
determines the conflict in Ukraine has ended; or
H. R. 7776—1161 
(2) the date that is 2 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
SEC. 6526. REPORT ON GLOBAL CCP FINANCING OF PORT INFRASTRUC-
TURE. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report documenting all Chinese financing of port infrastructure 
globally, during the period beginning on January 1, 2012, and 
ending on the date of the submission of the report, and the commer-
cial and economic implications of such investments. The report 
shall also include the following: 
(1) A review of existing and potential or planned future 
Chinese financing, including financing by government entities, 
and state-owned enterprises, in port infrastructure at such 
ports. 
(2) Any known Chinese interest in establishing a military 
or intelligence presence at or near such ports. 
(3) An assessment of China’s current and potential future 
ability to leverage commercial ports for military or intelligence 
collection purposes and the implications of such ability for 
the national security of the United States and allies and part-
ners of the United States. 
(4) A description of activities undertaken by the United 
States and allies and partners of the United States to help 
identify and provide alternatives to Chinese investments in 
port infrastructure. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex 
produced consistent with the protection of sources and methods. 
SEC. 6527. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PROVISION OF SUPPORT BY INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR ATROCITY PREVENTION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ATROCITIES.—The term ‘‘atrocities’’ has the meaning 
given that term in section 6 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 132 
Stat. 5586). 
(2) ATROCITY
CRIME
SCENE.—The term ‘‘atrocity crime 
scene’’ means 1 or more locations that are relevant to the 
investigation of an atrocity, including buildings or locations 
(including bodies of water) where physical evidence may be 
collected relating to the perpetrators, victims, and events of 
the atrocity, such as mass graves and other sites containing 
deceased individuals.