IV
106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. CON. RES. 97
Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms transfers to the
Government of Indonesia until the President certifies that the Govern-
ment of Indonesia is no longer arming, financing, or supporting para-
military units in East Timor and has taken certain other actions relating
to East Timor, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 5, 1999
Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island (for himself, Mrs. LOWEY, Mr. LANTOS, Ms.
MCKINNEY, Mr. EVANS, and Mr. HALL of Ohio) submitted the following
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Urging the prohibition on military assistance and arms trans-
fers to the Government of Indonesia until the President
certifies that the Government of Indonesia is no longer
arming, financing, or supporting paramilitary units in
East Timor and has taken certain other actions relating
to East Timor, and for other purposes.
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ‘‘East
Timor Paramilitary Accountability Resolution’’.
•HCON 97 IH
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1)(A) Paramilitary violence in East Timor has
escalated significantly beginning in November 1998.
(B) Since then, some 10,000 civilians have fled
from the countryside to seek refuge in churches,
schools and private homes.
(C) Incidents of rape, beatings, torture and dis-
appearance have been reported frequently.
(2) Indonesia invaded East Timor on December
7, 1975, and has illegally occupied that nation for
more than 23 years.
(3) The Indonesian occupation has claimed the
lives of over 200,000 East Timorese—fully a third
of the population—in massacres, by torture, and
through forced starvation.
(4) The Indonesian military (ABRI) and elite
units like the Kopassus special forces have carried
out a systematic reign of terror in East Timor, num-
bering over 21,000 troops according to ABRI docu-
ments from September 1998.
(5) East Timorese Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo
and diplomat Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly award-
ed the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for their acts of
courage on behalf of their people.
•HCON 97 IH
(6)(A) On May 21, 1998, 33 years after he
seized power in a bloody coup, Indonesian dictator
Suharto was forced to resign in the wake of mass
pro-democracy protests and a severe economic crisis.
(B) His handpicked successor, B.J. Habibie, as-
sumed the presidency.
(7) In June 1998, Indonesian President
Habibie, in a striking change of policy, introduced a
plan for autonomy for East Timor, but excluded
East Timorese control over the military, foreign pol-
icy and currency, and a referendum on self-deter-
mination.
(8)(A) In July 1998, the United States Senate
unanimously adopted a resolution supporting East
Timor’s right to a referendum on self-determination.
(B) In October 1998, the United States Con-
gress went on record as supporting self-determina-
tion for East Timor in a provision included in the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999.
(9) On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President
Habibie offered that Indonesia would consider Indo-
nesian withdrawal from East Timor as a ‘‘second
option’’ for East Timor if the majority of its people
were to reject his autonomy plan.
•HCON 97 IH
(10) In February 1999, jailed East Timorese
resistance leader Xanana Gusmao was moved from
prison to house arrest.
(11)(A) Also in February 1999, Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright met with Gusmao, as well
as Indonesian officials, during a visit to Jakarta.
(B) Afterward she praised Gusmao’s character,
and expressed United States support for several of
the steps necessary for a peaceful transition in East
Timor including an international monitoring pres-
ence and the disarming of Indonesian-backed para-
military units as soon as possible.
(12)(A) The United Nations, under Secretary
General Kofi Annan, has sponsored a series of talks
between Portugal and Indonesia on East Timor’s po-
litical status.
(B) In February 1999 these talks yielded a ten-
tative agreement to hold a United Nations-sponsored
ballot in East Timor to determine East Timor’s re-
jection or acceptance of an Indonesian autonomy
plan.
(13)(A) On April 6, 1999, over 25 internally
displaced persons were attacked and killed by ma-
chete-wielding members of the paramilitary unit Besi
•HCON 97 IH
(17) Another brutal attack was waged against
civilians in the area of Suai on April 22, 1999, and
more than 8 individuals were killed.
(18) On April 23, 1999, United Nations talks
yielded a tentative agreement that is expected to be
signed on May 5, 1999, in New York.
(19) Any such agreement must be followed with
a free and fair vote, United Nations and other inter-
national monitors, and the disarming and disbanding
of the paramilitary units.
SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
The Congress declares that the United States will no
longer accept, condone, finance, or supply the Indonesian
military occupiers, nor their proxies, the paramilitary civil-
ian militia units, in East Timor.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense should take an active
and visible role in urging the Government of Indonesia and
the Indonesian military—
(1) to permit an international investigation of
the massacre at Liquica; and
•HCON 97 IH
(2) to bring to justice those individuals respon-
sible for gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights in East Timor.
SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO PROHIBI-
TION ON UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSIST-
ANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF INDONESIA.
(a) PROHIBITION.—It is the sense of the Congress
that United States military assistance and arms transfers
should not be provided to the Government of Indonesia
unless the President certifies to the Congress that the
Government of Indonesia—
(1) is no longer arming, financing, or sup-
porting paramilitary units in East Timor, and ceases
its own military attacks on civilians, separate from
and together with these paramilitary units;
(2) has assisted in the successful disarming and
disbanding of the paramilitary units in East Timor;
(3) allows free and open access to East Timor
to a continuing United Nations presence, inter-
national human rights and relief and development
organizations, and the press; and
(4) has reduced substantially the Indonesian
military (ABRI) troop presence in East Timor, as
•HCON 97 IH
the beginning of a United Nations-monitored with-
drawal;
(b) UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AND
ARMS TRANSFERS.—In this section, the term ‘‘United
States military assistance and arms transfers’’ means—
(1) assistance under chapter 2 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to military
assistance), including the transfer of excess defense
articles under section 516 of that Act;
(2) assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to inter-
national 
military 
education 
and 
training 
or
‘‘IMET’’), including military education and training
for civilian personnel under section 541 of such Act
(commonly referred to as ‘‘Expanded IMET’’); or
(3) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military Fi-
nancing’’ Program under section 23 of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and the transfer
of defense articles, defense services, design and con-
struction services, or any other defense-related train-
ing under that Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
Æ