IV 
111TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 698 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the fatal crash 
of an MV–22 aircraft on April 8, 2000, in Marana, Arizona, was not 
a result of aircrew human factors or pilot error. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 30, 2009 
Mr. JONES submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 
Committee on Armed Services 
RESOLUTION 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the fatal crash of an MV–22 aircraft on April 8, 2000, 
in Marana, Arizona, was not a result of aircrew human 
factors or pilot error. 
Whereas an MV–22 aircraft crashed on April 8, 2000, in 
Marana, Arizona, killing the pilot, Lieutenant Colonel 
John A. Brow, the co-pilot, Major Brooks S. Gruber, and 
17 other Marines aboard the aircraft; 
Whereas Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber pos-
sessed excellent and unassailable records throughout their 
careers in the United States Marine Corps and gave their 
lives for the United States and the Marine Corps in the 
crash on April 8, 2000; 
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Whereas after the accident Lieutenant Colonel Brow’s com-
manding officer described him as a ‘‘highly regarded 
pilot, both in the C–130 and MV–22, and his expertise 
and recommendations lent a great deal to the MV–22 
program.’’; 
Whereas after the accident Major Gruber’s commanding offi-
cer described him as a ‘‘very highly regarded pilot, both 
in the CH–53E and MV–22, whose work with special op-
erations gave unique insight to the MV–22 program.’’; 
Whereas numerous reviews and investigations following the 
accident document that the pilots of the aircraft involved 
in the accident were not provided with the necessary and 
critical knowledge of the potential for sudden loss of con-
trolled flight in the MV–22 following Vortex Ring State 
(VRS) onset or the training to recognize, avoid, or re-
cover from the extreme dangers of VRS in the MV–22; 
Whereas after the accident Naval Air Systems Command 
called for a thorough investigative flight test program to 
find the MV–22’s boundaries of VRS, characterize its 
handling qualities, and establish the basis for a new 
flight limitation, new pilot procedures, and a cockpit 
warning system, if warranted; 
Whereas, as a result of testing following the fatal accident, 
a visual and aural cockpit warning system was developed 
to alert the aircrew when the aircraft exceeded the Naval 
Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
(NATOPS) flight manual’s rate-of-descent limit; 
Whereas, on July 27, 2000, the Marine Corps announced in 
a press release that a combination of ‘‘human factors’’ 
caused the April 8, 2000, crash, stating that ‘‘deviations 
from the scheduled flight plan, an unexpected tailwind 
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and the pilot’s extremely rapid rate of descent into the 
landing zone created conditions that led to the accident.’’; 
Whereas the press release also stated the ‘‘although the re-
port stops short of specifying pilot error as a cause, it 
notes that the pilot of the ill-fated aircraft significantly 
exceeded the rate of descent established by regulations 
for safe flight.’’; 
Whereas the press release issued by the Marine Corps also 
quoted Commandant General James L. Jones as saying 
that ‘‘the tragedy is that these were all good Marines 
joined in a challenging mission. Unfortunately, the pilots’ 
drive to accomplish that mission appears to have been the 
fatal factor.’’; 
Whereas the language of the press release is damaging and 
inaccurate because, at the time of the crash, adequate 
testing of the MV–22 in the High Rate of Descent 
(HROD) and the VRS regimes had not been conducted, 
the MV–22 did not have a VRS warning system, and the 
pilots did not have adequate knowledge of the potential 
for sudden loss of controlled flight in the MV–22 fol-
lowing VRS onset or the training to recognize, avoid, or 
recover from the extreme dangers of VRS in the MV–22; 
Whereas according to the investigation conducted pursuant to 
the Judge Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN inves-
tigation), on April 8, 2000, Lieutenant Colonel Brow and 
Major Gruber were participating in an Operational Eval-
uation (OPEVAL) to determine the operational effective-
ness and suitability of the MV–22 and to continue tactics 
development to support the promulgation of an Oper-
ational Tactics Guide; 
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Whereas an OPEVAL is to be conducted under realistic sce-
narios in day, night, and adverse weather; 
Whereas the OPEVAL of April 8, 2000, called for a long- 
range night Non-combatant Evacuation Operation exer-
cise involving the insertion of a security and processing 
unit; 
Whereas, according to the Comptroller General, the Oper-
ational Test and Evaluation Force’s MV–22 report on 
the OPEVAL indicated that the MV–22 ‘‘Naval Air 
Training and Operating Procedures Standardization 
(NATOPS) manual lacked adequate content, accuracy, 
and clarity at the time of the accident. Additionally, be-
cause of incomplete developmental testing in the High 
Rate of Descent (HROD) regime, there was insufficient 
explanatory or emphatic text to warn pilots of hazards of 
operating in this area. The flight simulator did not rep-
licate this loss of controlled flight regime.’’; 
Whereas the preliminary NATOPS manual and MV–22 
ground school syllabus provided insufficient guidance or 
warning as to high rate of descent airspeed conditions 
and the potential consequences of a rapid rate of descent; 
Whereas the officer conducting the JAGMAN investigation 
stated that ‘‘The fact that this aircraft not only found 
itself in a Vortex Ring State condition with no apparent 
warning to the aircrew, but also departed controlled flight 
is particularly concerning.’’; 
Whereas, based on this evidence, it is clear that the pilots of 
the aircraft involved in the accident on April 8, 2000, did 
not have the knowledge, warning systems, or training 
needed to avoid or recover from VRS onset at the time 
of the accident; 
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Whereas, on December 15, 2000, after a second crash of a 
MV–22 aircraft that year, then-Secretary of Defense Bill 
Cohen determined that the accident history of the MV– 
22 aircraft and other testing issues required an inde-
pendent, high-level review of the program and therefore 
established a Blue Ribbon Panel to review the safety of 
the MV–22 aircraft and to recommend corrective actions; 
Whereas the Blue Ribbon Panel was briefed by the Comp-
troller General and the contents of this brief were incor-
porated into a subsequent Comptroller General report 
which cited concerns about the adequacy of development 
tests conducted prior to the MV–22 aircraft entering the 
operational test and evaluation phase, in particular that 
such developmental testing was deleted, deferred, or sim-
ulated in order to meet cost and scheduled goals; 
Whereas the original plan to test the flying qualities of the 
flight control system of the MV–22, including various 
rates of descent, speeds, and weights, would have pro-
vided considerable knowledge of the MV–22 flight quali-
ties especially in areas related to the sudden loss of con-
trolled flight following VRS onset; 
Whereas, to meet cost and schedule targets, the actual test-
ing of the MV–22 conducted was less than a third of the 
testing originally planned; 
Whereas the MV–22 pilots involved in the accident did not 
understand the optimum use of nacelle tilt to recover 
from VRS onset; 
Whereas additional HROD and VRS developmental testing 
could have prevented the tragic accident on April 8, 
2000, in Marana, Arizona, by providing the pilots the 
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knowledge and training to either avoid or recover from 
VRS; 
Whereas the Comptroller General report also revealed that 
the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation of the De-
partment of Defense stated that ‘‘while the possible exist-
ence of VRS in the V–22 was known when flight limits 
for OPEVAL were established, the unusual attitude fol-
lowing entry into VRS was not expected’’ and ‘‘thus, the 
first indication the pilot may receive that he has encoun-
tered this difficulty is when the aircraft initiated an 
uncommanded, uncontrollable roll.’’; and 
Whereas Lieutenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber and 
their families are dishonored by the assertion that the 
aircrew was in any way responsible for this fatal acci-
dent: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that— 
(1) the fatal crash of an MV–22 on April 8, 
2000, in Marana, Arizona, was not a result of air-
crew human factors or pilot error that can be attrib-
uted to the late Lieutenant Colonel John A. Brow or 
the late Major Brooks S. Gruber who performed 
their duties as United States Marine Corps aviators 
competently and professionally; 
(2) the fatal factor in the crash of an MV–22 
on April 8, 2000, was the aircraft’s lack of a Vortex 
Ring State (VRS) warning system and the failure to 
provide the pilots with the necessary and critical 
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knowledge and training regarding the extreme dan-
gers of VRS onset in the MV–22; 
(3) because of inadequate High Rate of Descent 
(HROD) and VRS developmental testing, the pilots 
of the MV–22 involved in the accident on April 8, 
2000, were not trained or able to recognize, avoid, 
or recover from VRS onset in the MV–22; and 
(4) had adequate HROD and VRS develop-
mental testing been conducted prior to the Oper-
ational Evaluation of April 8, 2000, and had a VRS 
warning system been installed in the aircraft, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Brow and Major Gruber would have 
been better able to avoid or recover from VRS. 
Æ 
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