A66 If this ore were to be shipped on the Mississippi River, it would not only re- quire approximately 1,000 additional miles to traverse, but the barges would have to fight the swift and treacherous currents of the Mississippi River for a distance of 869 miles. It woud cost con- siderably more to push these barges against this current, and slow down the progress of the two, possibly a week of additional time as compared with the Tennessee-Tombighbee route. In the Tombigbee there is a succession of locks and dams from Mobile to the Tennessee River, impounding water behind the dams in vast pools, almost as still as a millpond. When the Tennessee River is reached, the barges will float down- stream from Pickwick Dam on the Ten- nessee to Paducah, Ky., on the Ohio, From that point upstream on the Ohio River to Pittsburgh, Pa., the Ohio River is controlled by locks and dams, provid- ing more pools and still water for the barges to navigate in. Thus there will be slack water, or downstream naviga- tion for these barges loaded with iron ore from Venezuela all the way to Pitts- burgh, Pa. From Paducah it is downstream 47 miles to Cairo, Iil., on the Mississippi River. Therefore, we will have a slack- water route from the Gulf of Mexico to the Tennessee River, then a downstream route of 262 miles from there to Cairo, which will provide what will amount to a slack-water route from the Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes, and to all points between. The same thing is true for vast ton- nages of bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is made, coming from deposits in Dutch Guinea in South America to processing plants at Alcoa, Tenn., Lister Hill, Ala.—on the Tennessee River-~and other aluminum plants in St. Louis, Mo.; Louisville, Ky.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; and other points in that area, The Aluminum Co. of America is today getting 95 percent of its bauxite from South America, and this project would greatly facilitate its transportation to the great aluminum plants along the Tennessee, the Ohio, the Mississippi Riv- ers, and the Great Lakes, I appeal to the Bureau of the Budget to submit to Congress a request for suffi- cient funds to speed up the construction of this great project with all possible haste, and to the Committee on Appro- priations to include an ample amount for this purpose in its next bill. We cannot afford to wait until our sleeping cities fire awakened by the terrible music of the bursting bomb, Communist China Aggression in Korea EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. JACOB K. JAVITS OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 8, 1951 Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, appended are the editorials from the New York “the face of aggression. Times and the New York Herald Trib- une, both published this date, referred to in my remarks made on the House floor and appearing in the Recorp today: [From the New York Times of January 8, 1951}. UN Pur To THE TEST In urging members of the United Nations to take a firm stand againet Chinese Com- munist aggression in Korea and to call that aggression by its rightful name the United States is acting in the interest of the United Nations, The positions that the world or- ganization takes and the degree to which it is willing to stand by its professions of prin- ciples will largely determine whether it can and will survive. If it surrenders its integ- rity now in the name of a supposititious ex- pediency, it will have betrayed the purposes for which it was conceived and in its confes- sion of impotence invited its own dissolution. The reasons for hesitation on the part of many countries are quite understandable and they should be viewed sympathetically. They are deeply concerned lest the organi~- zation, or one of its major members, become involved in a war with Communist China. Some are likewise concerned lest a large United States commitment in Asia leave too little for purposes of commitment in Europe. The first of those two feelings is the more praiseworthy, but they are both very real. The United States shares both of those feelings. This country does not want to see the battle for Korea develop into a war with the Communist Chinese or with anyone else. This country certainly does not want an overcommitment in any theater to the detri- ment of another point of need. Because of those attitudes the United States has ex- pressed its willingness to explore all possi- bilities for a peaceful settlement of the Ko- Tean struggle. But that exploration must be realistic, both in the physical and in the moral sense. Some of the delay in United Nations ac- tion has been caused by just such an ex« ploration. There is a hopeful waiting to see if a successful peace formula can be devised. Some parts of the various formulas thus far advanced have been anything but realistic. Both the Astan-Arab bloc and the three-man truce committee, as well as Prime Minister Nehru in London, have suggested that as part of a general settlement there should be the establishment of a free and united Korea with nation-wide elections under United Nations auspices. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the North Ko- reans, the Chinese Communists, or the Soviet Union would consent to such a plan for the fraction of a second. To put it forward therefore as an objective to be gained, per- haps, by negotiation with Peiping (contin- gent, of course, upon Peiping’s admission to the United Nations) 1s pure fantasy. The Chinese Communists are in Korea to- day, more than a million strong, precisely to prevent the establishment of a free and unl- fied Korea under United Nations auspices. They ore fighting the United Nationa on the battlefleld, just as the Soviet Union has steadily fought the United Nations in the diplomatic arena, to keep the United Nations from carrying out, in Korea, the very pur- poses to which it is honorably committed, To assume that their admission to the coun- ells of the United Nations will reverse this objective is to lose touch with reality. No Communists. Korean, Chinese, Russian, or American want a free Korea, and they are willing to risk a war to prevent it. Likewise, they not merely risk but boldly demand the complete moral disintegration of the United Nations. The United Nations 4s told upon what terms it can capitulate tn It can admit its grievous and “illegal” error in denouncing APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that aggression in the first place and take the sponsors, abettors, and finally the partners in that aggression into its humbled bosom. The alternative is to be driven into the sea. If the United Nations does so capitulate it will have announced to the world that there is one moral principle of resistance to aggres- sion when the aggressor is small and quite another and quite opposite principle of re- sistance when the aggressor is sufficiently powerful and arrogant. To make that ad- mission 1s to put an end to the moral value of the United Nations Charter. If aggres- sion against the free Republic of Korea was wrong last June it is wrong now and a mil- lion Chinese Communists can't make it right. The United Nations, thanks to Soviet ob- struction, does not have the physical force to counter any and all aggression, But it does have the moral obligation to remain committed against it. The present United Nations forcea may be defeated in the field and obliged to retreat. That is no reason why the United Nations need be defeated in the world of morals and forced into oblivion. [From the New York Herald Tribune of January 8, 1951] THe UN Must Acr Spurrec’ by growing bewlliderment and doubt throughout the country, the State De- partment has undertaken a vigorous diplo- matic offensive to get from the United Na- tions a statement that China has been guilty of aggression in Korea. Less could hardly be asked of an international organization which is, among other things, the standard bearer of the world’s concept of right and wrong An argument was possible directly after the Chinese intervention, and before the thirty-eighth parallel had been crossed, to the effect that the branding of China as aggressor would hamper efforts to achieve a truce. Even then, however, it seemed to us the proper course to keep the facts on the record straight, calling aggression by its ob- vious name, and proceeding to deal with the situation with patience and statesmanlike magnanimity. Some hope apparently persists among non- Communist nations that, in spite of all, cease- fire arrangements can be worked out. Some fenr exists that to name China as aggressor will be a prelude to all-out war. The hope is so slim as to be negligible: moreover, if the Chinese were to find it tn their interests to cal) a truce, the charge of aggressian would hardly deter them. As for the fear of all-out war, the definition of China’s offense does not in any way commit the UN or the United States to .uch an engagement. With the aggressor recognized for what he is, it then becomes the task of policymakers to decide by what moans and t. what extent he is to be checked and punished. Originally the charge of aggression was to be made by the Security Council; but the inevitability of a Russian veto where any of 1ts satellites or minions are involved led to the provision which makes it possible for the veto-free Assembly to take up the issue. For the Assembly not to act would be a shock indeed, For it to act unconvincingly, with numerous abstentions, would be almost as bad. The need is for a decisive move—for an unequivocal statement which will have the effect of restoring to the international scene a reality of which protracted evasions have robbed it. For lack of such a state- ment the free world remains divided and con. fused, aud the Chinese breach retains a shadow of wholly improper justification. For lack of it, too, the UN declines daily in men’s opinion. The State Department, in present- ing forcefully the United States point of view, is serving not only the interests of our country but of law and freedom everywhere.
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD A Program fer Unity EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. RALPH HARVEY OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 8, 1951 Mr. HARVEY. Mr. Speaker, under leave granted to extend my remarks in the Recorp, I include the following edi- torial from the Indianapolis Times of Thursday, January 4, 1951: A PrRoGcRAM For Uniry In this time of stress and danger our country needs a program on which the Amer- ican people can unite, Many notable Americans have made con- structive contributions to the current for- eign policy debate. None of them has ques- tioned the gravity of the world situation. None has denied the necessity of rearma- ment. Few, if any, have shown the slightest disposition toward appeasement of aggres- sion. The serfous differences that do exist con- cern the adequacy of the meusures being taken tuo mect the Russian challenge and the wisdom—or iack of wisdum—with which America’s world policies have been con- ceived and carriod forward The grave misgivings that do obstruct unity arise in major part from lack of con- fidence in the State Department. This newspaper beiteves that the debate has helped to develop the essential outlines of a program which could have, because it would deserve, united and nonpartisan sup- port. American rearmament comes first in such @ program. Defense officials should make fewer speeches worrying about how large, how fast a mobilization effort the people will support and concentrate on pushing forward th largest, fastest effort possible. The State Department should fully con- sult the military and Congress before it makes any more basic strategic decisions with respect to such areas as Spain and Formosa. The diplomats have had too free a rein on matters of that kind. We need allies, but we cannot safely con- tinue to take it tor granted that our allies will do the things necessary to become de- pendable partners in a crisis. Our Government's commitments should be honored, where there is reasonable com~ pliance with the terms of contracts by other nations party to them. But the record to date has not been reassuring and, at least until there is a new Secretary of State, the degree of compliance should be kept under survey by @ congressional watchdog com- mittee. The administration can avold future mis- takes by submitting all agreements which have the force of treaties to the Senate for ratification, as the Constitution provides. Secret diplomacy has been responsible for many of our troubles. Since the Chinese Communists insist on fighting, we should lower the barriers and let Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fight them, and arm the anti-Red guerrillas on the Chinese mainland, as well. Placed on the defensive, the Red Chinese might look less tough. Our present policy tends to protect their rear while they attack Americans in Korea. To avoid another Korea in Western Eu- rope, we should insist that our allies go along step by step with us in forming the defense force. Unless and until we have reliable allies in Europe and Asia, was should not consider sending American armies to fight on either continent. Spain should be helped to arm and to build air bases behind the Pyrenees, without more delay. Japan should be permitted to begin rearming now. No more money should be sent abroad during this crisis which does not contribute to containment of communism by military strength. Few of the point 4 projects thus far suggested can meet that teat. They can wait while we strive to save the world from war, if that is possible, or to save our country if Russia forces war upon us. And confidence in the State Department should be restored. To restore that confidence, Secretary Ache- son should go. He has returned empty-handed from every international conference he has attended in the 2 years he has been in office. His policy is caught on dead center be- tween the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists, He has opposed Dutch colonialism in In- donesia while supporting French colonialism in Indochina. By encouraging the British to recognize Red China, he has placed the United States at odds with Britain on China policy. By first giving away our bargaining power, he has placed the United States at odds with France on German policy. He has just touched the Japanese problem, but that touch was enough to get us all snarled up with India and the Philippines. Wiere misunderstanding doesn’t exist, he produces it It must be a gift, All of the money he has spent in Europe hasn’t produced a single new division. Not one of the “situations of strength” he talks about has besn built. He is regarded as a soft touch abroad and has lost public confidence at home. He inherited a sound bipartisan relation- ship with Congress and destroyed it by his inability to understand the meaning of team- work. The wave of “McCarthyism” which swept the Nation was a direct reaction to the exhibitionism he displayed when he refused to turn his back on Alger Hiss. Our retreat in Asia dates from his appoint- ment as Under Secretary of State in 1045, when he initiated our disastrous China policy. Having made himself the principal ob- stacle to national unity, he has disqualified himself for further public service. We need a Secretary of State in whose wis- dom and ability the American people and Congress can feel it safe to place their trust. Inflation Control EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. CHARLES B. HOEVEN OF IOWA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 8, 1951 Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Rrc- orp, I enclose herewith letter addressed to me by Allan B. Kline, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, to- gether with a certain resolution ap- proved by the voting delegates to the annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation held in Dallas, Tex., December 11~14, 1950; AMERICAN Farm BUREAU FEDERATION, Washington, D.C., January 5, 1951. Hon. CuHarius B. HOnvEn, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. Dear Mx. Horven: The inflationery threat created by our present defense program has become a matter of common knowledge. Firm and effective action is necessary to A67 counter this threat. Counter measures ob- viously are being taken, The grave danger facing us on the economic front is the possi- bility that the laudable desire to check in- flation will lead to adoption of the wrong measeures, Price, wage, and ration controls cannot pre- vent inflation. If we put our faith in such measures, we not only will fail to prevent inflation, but we will also sell the defense program short by curbing the productive power, which is our grentest source of strength. In an emergency of long dura- tion, such controls could destroy our free- choice economic system. A part of the agitation for controls appeurs to stem from a misunderstanding of the situation we are in today. We are in a period of international tension which may last for several years. Our national policy is still (1) to present the outbreak of a third world war, and (2) to build up our national military and economic atrength as rapidly as possible 80 that we will be able to win such a war if it proves unavoidable. We cannot estimate the probable duration of the present tension, or calculate when we may face the greatest test ot our strength. Accordingly, we must adopt policies which will not only serve our present needs, but contribute to the rapid develop- mont of a much greater nationul strength. Price and wage controls would hamper the development of the increased production we so badly need. This can easily be illustrated by reference to livestock and meat, although similar results can be expected if price and wage ceilings are applied in other areas of the economy. Meat production is at a high level, but ever greater production is needed. The pro- duction of meat—particularly pork—can be substantially increased in the coming year if hampering restrictions are avoided. We have a large hog population to supply brood sows, we have the second largest supply of corn in our history; and we have the equip- ment and know-how. Production, both of feed and of livestock, can be stepped up on an enduring baais, This is what we need in America. Farmers are ready to produce. The most effective steps which could be taken by Government to assure an adequate production of live- stock would be to (1) ma*e the fullest use of the outlook material of the United States Department of Agriculture indicating prob- able firn. demand, (2) assure farmers that price and ration controls are not going to be put on meat, and (3) suspend corn acre- age allotments for the 1951 crop. Price and ration controls on livestock and meat inevitably will mean less meat. Farm- ers must make many decision. which influ- ence the quantity of meat they will produce. Price and ration controls cannot help but tip the balance on many of these decisions toward less production. Stepped-up pro- duction on an enduring basis is the consum- er's best hope for adequate meat supplies and reasonable prices. Under a control sys- tem, meat might seem to be cheap in the butcher shops, but it would not be in the shops. 7 Experience has demonstrated that ceilings on meat invite black markets. Under OPA, black markets resulted in enormous waste of labor in legitimate plants; reduced volume for such plants and consequent reductions in the taxes paid by them; loss of valuable by-products which were vitally needed; and creation of a public health hazard by the sale of uninspected meat. Experience under OPA definitely proved that, even if more effective measures can be developed to cope with the black market, an army of administrative personnel would be required, both in Government and in the industry. Manpower is one of our most se- rious shortages; we cannot afford to divert thousands of workers from the production of goods to the administration of unnecessary and unworkable regulations.
A68 In this time of national emergency, we are calling on you to support measures—such as (1) the elimination of all nonessential gov- ernmental expenses, (2) increased efficiency in government, (8) pay-as-we-go taxation, and (4) necessary steps in the fleld of mone- tary, credit, and fiscal policy-—-which action will really control inflation. In addition, it is only reasonable that we make greater use of techniques which have enabled our eco- nomic system to outstrip every other system of production and distribution. It ts because price controls are clumsy and inefficient substitutes for the automatic functioning of market prices, that we oppose such controls. Our policy in this regard is not taken with the tdea of serving the spe- cial interests of farmers as 8 group; instead, we have firm conviction that our recommen- dations are in the general interest of all Americans. Price, wage, and ration contrcels have more in common with totalitarian prin- ciples than with the principles which support our free American system. Such measures cannot prevent inflation, but certainly would impair our national strength by interfering with production. Our position on these vital matters 1s set forth more completely in the enclosed copy of a resolution Inflation Control, which was approved by the elected delegates from our member State Farm Bureaus at our annual meeting in Dallas, Tex., last month, Sincerely yours, ALLAN B. KLINE, President. —_—_— ResovvrTion ENTITLED “INFLATION CONTROL,” APPROVED BY THE VOTING DELEGATES TO THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN FARM BurREAU FEDERATION, HELD IN DALuas, TEX., Drcemser 11-14, 1950 The American Farm Bureau Federation has long urged that aggressive steps be taken in the monetary, credit, and fiscal policy flelds to bring greater stability to the general price level. Since the control of monetary, credit, and fiscal policy rests in the hands of the Federal Government, under the Constitu- tion, the problem is not one of delegating authority to the Federal Government in new areas. It is a matter of reshaping and coor- dinating policies in a field in which Govern- ment policy now largely prevails so that such policies will make a greater contribution to the development of a more stable price level. Monetary, credit, and fiscal policies which affect the general stability of prices are in direct and impersonal! as contrasted with the direct and personal controls that are required by specific programs designed to rectify the dislocations and injustices resulting from an unstable price level. Greater stability of the general price level offers the only oppor- tunity for greater economic security without programs which require specific and direct controls on each farm, business, or indi- vidual. The inflationary pressures generated by our present national-defense program make effective action to stabilize the purchasing power of the American dollar more urgent now than ever before. Inflation cannot be stopped by price, wage, and ration controls. Such measures deal with symptoms rather than fundamental causes. They interfere with production; im- pair the flexibility of our economy; reduce our capacity to expand output; require huge administrative staffs; and invite black mar- kets. We face an emergency of indefinite duration. In such a situation the prema- ture adoption of price, wage, and ration controls could strangle our economy to the point of impairing our ability to fight an all- out war should such a conflict prove una- voidable., American farmers have produced beyond belief in times of need and we pledge our- selves to ample production now. We believe that if we are given full information as to production desired, and if productive aids are made available to us, we can produce more food and ‘ber more efficiently if controle are held to an absolute minimum. We insist that we be given an opportunity to demon- atrate our productive capacity without con- trols. If total war forces the application of price and wage ceilings, we will insist that they be applied on an across-the-board basis. The present situation calls for a bold attack on the fundamental cause of inflation, which cause is an increase in the supply of money in relation to the supplies of goods and serv- ices available to consumers. Most importantly, we must pay the bill. There is no possibility of controlling in- fiation without taxes high enough to get on a pay-as-we-go basis. We must strive to meet increased de- mand with increased production wherever possible. To do this we must enhance the opportunity of individuals to be produc- tive, and increase the length of the work- week, Strict Governinent economy is a must. Nonessential Government expendi- tures must be eliminated. Necessary Gov- ernment borrowing must be planned so as to prevent an increase in the Government debt to the banks, because such an increase would both directly and indirectly increase the supply of money. To this end we urge that efforts to sell EB bonds be intensified; that careful consideration be given to the desirability of offering additional induce- ment for holders to reinvest the proceeds of maturing E bonds in Government securi- ties; and that steps be taken to prevent a further shift of non-bank-held negotiable bonds to the banking system. The national debt should be so handled as to make the maximum contribution to price and economic stability, rather than to fi- nance the debt at a minimum cost. Monetary and credit policies carried on by the Federal Reserve System cannot alone achieve a stable level of prices. Yet they are an important factor and should be geared toward that objective. The Federal Reserve's authority to vary the member bank reserve requirments should be increased. If the in- flation threat continues, reserve require- ments for banks should be raised, with ap-~ propriate adjustments in the bank holdings eligible to be counted as reserves. The Government's present policy of re- stricting the expansion of housing and in- stallment credit should be continued in ef- fect, with such adjustments as may be nec- essary from time to time to keep these re- strictions consistent with the requirements of an effective program to contro} inflation. We reiterate our recommendation that the Congress establish a bipartisan joint con- gressional monetary study commission, charged with the responsibility of making studies and submitting recommendations to the Congress on means of bringing greater stability to the purchasing power of money. Why You Buy Books That Sell Communism EXTENSION OF REMARKS oFr HON. GEORGE A. DONDERO OF MICHIGAN IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, January 8, 1951 Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Rzc- orp, I include the following article ap- pearing in the January 1951 issue of the American Legion Magazine: APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Wuy You Buy Booxs TuaT Set, COMMUNISM (By Irene Corbally Kuhn) One day recently John Smith went into a Manhattan book store and asked for a copy of Seeds of Treason, the comprehensive, ob- jective study of the perjury trials of Aiger Hiss. The clerk, without looking up, said they didn’t carry it. Why? She shrugged her shoulders. How should she know? They just didn't carry it. Not for sale and not in the lending library. What about that other book: the one by the fellow Senator McCartHy got before the Tydings com- mittee? “Oh, you mean Prof, Owen Lattimore's Ordeal by Slander. Sure. Just a minute.” She fell over herself in her eagerness to haul out a fresh copy. “Such a wonderful man. It’s a marvelous book. You'll be glad you bought it” Smith was impressed by her salesmanship, but after leafing through the book he left without buying it. The next day Smith had some business in a small suburban commu- nity. He wandered into one of those pretty little greeting-card-gift-shoppe book stores owned and run by a middle-aged widow, used to better days. The shop is her complete livelihood, and she has to buy carefully so as not to be caught with a stock she can't sell, All this our man Smith learned quickly. He’s a friendly soul, the shop wasn’t busy, and the owner was glad to have someone to talk to. HOW A REVIEW AFFECTS BOOK SALES No; she didn’t have Seeds of Treason either. Why? Well, she depended on the book-review sections in the New York papers, the Times and Herald Tribune mostly—and the reviewers in those papers hadn't seemed to think much of the book. She guided her purchases of books, especially reorders, by what the reviewers said. She felt the “ex- perts” those big important newspapers chose to review for them knew more about books than she did. John Smith listened. Did she have a copy of that other book—Ordeal by Slander, by Owen Lattimore? Oh, yes, indeed, she had that in stock. The New York Times Sunday book section and the Herald Tribune both had given it all of page 1 and space inside, too; and both papers had reviewed it again on Monday. So, of course, she had ordered it. It must be a very important book, she continued, and she was planning to read it herself. John Smith could be anybody. These two experiences have been duplicated with other books in other cities and towns for a good many years now. They represent only two techniques in the Communist master plan that embraces every known means of influ- encing and dominating the human mind. In what that courageous long-time fighter against communism, author Eugene Lyons has called the Red decade—the 1930’s—the people's or popular front phase of Commu- nist activity outside Russia achieved phe- nomena! success. Our own American popu- lar front, though never officially in power as it was in France and, briefly, in Spain, bored deep into the Federul Government and pene- trated in various degrees the labor movement, education, the churches, youth movements, the theater, movies, the arts, publishing in all its branches. At its highest point, about 1938, the Comintern (it’s now the Comin- form), a8 the international Communist or- ganization was known, had mobilized the de- lHberately conscious or the starry-eyed in- nocent collaboration of thousands of influ- ential American educators, New Deal officials, social workers, social registerites, novelists, script writers, directors, publishers, editors, and the literati generally. Each phase of American life and activity could be explored almost endlessly for proof of the success of this sinister foreign propaganda that has but one aim: the destruction of free, capitalist
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSJONAL RECORD society and the conversion of thinking, in- dependent men and women into plodding mindless slaves, It is with but one phase of this intellectual cuckoldry of the Kremiin that we can deal in this article—the penetration of the book- publishing field and ita essential attribute, literary reviewing and criticiam. And in order to explore two subdivisions of the master plan, we invite the reader to return to John Smith and hits experiences with the clerk in the Manhattan book shop and the suburban widow. Books are published to be sold as mer- chandise, like shoes or sardines. Ironically, however, the avidity of the American mind for knowledge and information, the Amer- ican passion for advancement and improve- ment, factors which stimulated mass pro- duction of books and made publishing big business, have also provided our enemies with one of their most valuable weapons. Books have becomre transmission belts for insidious propaganda for treason. The American with something to sell geta it to his buying public chiefly through ad- vertising and modern sales methods. it is as true of books as it is of candy, cosmetics, and cigarettes. But books, although they are frankly material, are also food for the mind and spirit. But unlike a new brand of soap which has to depend on paid advertising to sell it to the public, a book gets extra special free treatment. This is the review by the newspaper and magazine, the radio, and TV critics. The reviewer stands between the public and the publisher's product in almost the same way that a capricious or haughty head waiter mans the barricade and the plush rope at a swank eating place and decides what table he'll let you have, or whether he'll bother to let you in at all, The reviewer can hang garlands or garbage on an author’s work. On the reviewer's in- tegrity, even more than on his technical skill, depend on author’s reputation and livelihood. The importance of the reviewer then is evident, since the only news the public gets of a book is through the reviews and paid advertising; and paid advertising, more often than not, depends on the amount, Kind and quality of the reviews. If the reviews are poor, the publisher won't put money into paid advertising. He can't afford to. He can afford it less if the book gets no reviews, which often happens. Depending also on the reviews is the extent of the sales effort ex- pended on the book. Before the reviewer has given his verdict, the bookseller has had information about the book only from the publisher's representative, the naturally prej- udiced salesman and a few other trade sources. No bookseller, not even the most industrious and conscientious ones, can read all the 8,000 to 10,000 new books that come out every year. He has to depend on re- viewers’ estimates of books more than on his own judgment and experience. Proof of the importance of this is to be found in the recent victory of the American Legion in a controversy with the officials of the Brookline (Mass.) Public Library over ciroulating an anti-Communist book dealing with the Alger Hiss case—Seeds of Treason. Local Legion officials had charged that the library had banned the book, which has been on best-seller lists since the start of its publication last April. Recently, Arthur L. Endicott, chairman of the board of trustees, announced that the book had been made available to library petrons. In explaining the library's earlier stand on the book Mr. Endicott said: “The selection of books was in Jarge measure dependent upon the reviews which we have learned from past experience to be a satisfactory guide. Several of the reviews were not such as to induce the committee of our staff, which makes a preliminary recommendation, to purchase the book. The trustees are the final authority to decide upon the purchase of any controversial book.” However, Mr. Endicott revealed that fol- lowing the Legion’s determined stand on the matter, the trustees had decided to pur- chase the book for the Brookline Library. This explains why book reviewera are im- portant to the Communists, too. Their in- fluence, 1f it can be won, can be used to enormous advantage. The Communists were the first to see this, naturally, 60 it was {mperative that if they were to control or dominate this important field of communications they spot thelr agents or sympathizers among the reviewers. Thorough strategists that they are, they don't rely on partial or even complete coverage of a single arm; they make use of the whole body of publishing. LEBT-WING LITERARY NETWORK In addition to spotting their own agents or sympathizers among the reviewers, they actually get active party members or coopera- tive fellow-travelers into publishing houses as editors or editorial assistants; they put their people into retail book outlets, in de- partment stores, and bookshops. And they have set up and control booke selling clubs, related trade-unions, etc. And, of course, the party has plenty of members and sympathizers among the authors them- selves, always ready to follow the line in fic- tion or nonfiction work; to logroll for the other faithful and to be hatchet-men against anti-Communist writers. Thus organized, they are able to work a parallel course of intensive propaganda for their alms and sabotage of everyone and everything opposed to those aims. Whenever a book comes along that is po- tentially damaging to the Communist effort the entire strength of their forces is mar- shaled against it. They go beyond just book reviews; they bear down on the faithful and the naive in all other specialized types of writing; syndicated columns, editorials, etc., for it is through this group that public opinion is formed, convictions cemented, prejudices solidified, and hatreds whipped ‘up. Just this past summer, the syndicated columnist, Bob Considine, one of the coun- try’s best and most prolific writers, und a fearless one who calls the shots as he sees them, spoke about this field of specialized writing, which is his own, on a national radio network. He described it as the one which wields the greatest power: one, therefore, which should have a corresponding sense of responsibility. By and large he said these writers who are given such wide latitude of expression are with acant exception, fair- minded nen and women. But he added: “If there is any apparent antireligious feeling among these specialists in journal- ism, it, will be found chiefly among the book reviewers of certain leading New York newa- papers and literary publications. “Here a rather shocking situation prevatis,” he went on. “If you write a book which steps on the toes of our home-grown left- wingers, bamboozled liberals or outright Communists, or their idols abroad, you can almost count on receiving a number of sour reviews—where the reviews hurt most. “There are, of course, outstanding excep- tions to this rule. But the average big city book critic sets himself up as a defender and champion of the legend that those who speak out against Communists and their pale pink carbon copies are eutomatically cheap sensationaliste, warmongers, and unc- tuous serfs of Wall Street. “Bome of these book reviewers get away with murder, even though their reviews ap- pear in newspapers and magazines which could not possibly exist—nor could the re- viewere—under communism. Yet the read- er of a fat Sunday newspaper can digest an A69 editorial denouncing communism or shudder through such stories as the tortured con- feusions of clergymen and businessmen be- hind the tron curtain—and then turn to the book review sections and encounter some in~ bred critic beating to a pulp a book author who is trying to say the same thing, “They seem to produce nothing, these critics. Their role ls simply to belt, one over any writer who has the industry and knowl- edge to produce an anti-Communist tome. Deplorably, few authors have any way of retorting, rebutting, or suing the critic for pulling the rug from under years of devoted work, “We have book publishers, too, among them, some grown quite fat under our capit- talistic system, who will not touch an anti- Communist book. Among these are some shrewd fellows who have sense enough to know that such books will be solidly battered by the critics and probably lose money. But there are others who seem to believe with the critics, and like them are Russia-firsters. “I can speak with a little personal experi- ence in this latter respect,” Considine con- tinued. “I had something to do with the editing of a book named The Rape of Poland, written by the exiled democratic Prenrier of Poland, Stanislaw Mikolajeryk. He gave a most detailed account of how Communists were able to seize that predominantly Cath- Olic country with hardly the firing of a shot— except in the prisons of the secret police. The publisher who originally planned to pro- duce the book actually asked Mikolajczyk to tone down hir accounts of the tortures and murders infitcted on Polish patriots during the destruction of that country’s hard-won liberties. “Mikolajczyk, of course, refused to go along with this treacherous suggestion. He found another publisher—one with the courage to let the truth be told” Mikolajcvyk’s book, the Rape of Poland, subtitled “Pattern of Soviet Aggression,” was published, without censorship or distortion, by Whittlesey House, a division of the Mc- Graw-Hill Book Co., Inc. Poland was the first country on Russta’s schedule of seizures by force—force of lying propaganda, fifth-column tactics, boring from within, all the techniques of oppres- sion and suppression with the trade mark of the hammer and sickle, masquerading under the sickening euphemism of libera- tion. The Communists therefore ordered the heaviest attacks on be ks by Poles or about Poland that attempted to reveal the truth. Still another notable book which fell into this category, was Defeat in Victory, by Jan C’achanowski, published in 1047, a dramatic and moving account of Poland’s last free days before the Communist: took over. This died of neglect; deliberate, planned neglect. THYY DIDN'T LIKE FLYNN Sometimes the attack centers on the author, regardiess of the book. John T. Fiynn is one such victim, and the violence of the attack on him was all the greater because experience had shown that Mr. Flynn, with a long-established reputation as a Writer, editor, critic, and fighter for prin- ciple, didn't scare easily and never quit. He also knew all the tricks and anticipated a great many of the moves charted and planned for his professional destruction. When he wrote the Roosevelt Myth, he submitted the manuscript to’ several publishers and dis- cussed it with still others. This was the firet time in his more than 40 years’ experi- ence as a well-known writer-editor that he had had to peddle a book manuscript. Bome of the publishers were old friends and most of them who read the manuscript ex- pressed great interest and approval—but— their lista were full; they couldn't get the book out in time really to profit from it; the paper situation was bad, etc., etc., ad nauseam, The excuses were os transparent as they were lame and weak.