I 
115TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 6534 
To phase out the use of private military contractors. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 25, 2018 
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY (for herself, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GUTIE´RREZ, Ms. LEE, Mr. 
MCGOVERN, Mr. POLIS, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, Mr. RASKIN, Mr. POCAN, 
Ms. MOORE, Mr. PALLONE, Ms. JAYAPAL, Mr. KHANNA, and Mr. RUSH) 
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services, 
and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently de-
termined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To phase out the use of private military contractors. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Outsourcing Se-
curity Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The United States Government is increas-
ingly relying on armed private security contractors 
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to perform mission-critical and emergency essential 
functions that historically have been performed by 
United States military or Government personnel. 
(2) As of March 2011, the Department of De-
fense had approximately 155,000 contract employees 
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, as compared to 
145,000 members of the United States Armed 
Forces operating in these two theaters of war. 
(3) As of March 2011, the Department of De-
fense had deployed 9,207 armed private security 
contractors in Iraq and 18,971 in Afghanistan, a 
change from 10,743 and 4,111, respectively, in 
March 2009. 
(4) As of April 1, 2011, the Department of 
State had over 2,500 security contractors in Iraq 
and 1,272 in Afghanistan, under the Worldwide Per-
sonal Protective Services (WPPS) contract. 
(5) In September 2009, photos were published 
showing employees of ArmorGroup North America 
(AGNA), hired by the Department of State to pro-
vide security at the United States Embassy in 
Kabul, engaging in lewd sexual hazing and harass-
ment. 
(6) Before the September 2009 incident, the 
Department of State had issued multiple deficiency 
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notices, a cure notice, and a show-cause notice ex-
pressing grave concerns about the company’s per-
formance on the contract; one State Department of-
ficial even wrote that the company’s deficiencies ‘‘en-
danger performance of the contract to such a degree 
that the security of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is 
in jeopardy’’. 
(7) On July 7, 2011, the Department of Justice 
announced that Armor Group North America paid a 
$7.5 million settlement to resolve charges that the 
company submitted false claims for payment on a 
State Department contract; the settlement resolves 
claims that AGNA guards violated the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act by visiting brothels in Kabul 
with the knowledge of AGNA’s management, as well 
as allegations that AGNA misrepresented the prior 
work experience of 38 third country nationals hired 
to guard the embassy. 
(8) A 2010 Senate Armed Services Committee 
investigation found that EOD Technology, the com-
pany hired to take over protection of the Kabul Em-
bassy from AGNA, was suspected of hiring local 
warlords with possible Taliban ties, and in March 
2011 the EODT contract was terminated for de-
fault. 
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(9) In May 2009, four men employed as mili-
tary trainers for Paravant LLC, a Blackwater affil-
iate, fired on a civilian vehicle in Kabul, killing two 
Afghans and wounding a third; two of the guards 
were convicted of involuntary manslaughter in 
March 2011. 
(10) On September 16, 2007, individuals hired 
by the company then known as Blackwater USA 
opened fire on Baghdad’s Nisour Square, killing 17 
Iraqis and wounding at least 20 others. 
(11) In August 2010, XE Services, LLC, the 
company formerly known as Blackwater, entered 
into a civil settlement with the State Department, 
under which the company agreed to pay a penalty of 
$42 million for 288 alleged violations of the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA) and the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 
(12) In July 2010, The Washington Post 
quoted Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as saying 
‘‘This is a terrible confession . . . I can’t get a 
number on how many contractors work for the Of-
fice of the Secretary of Defense.’’. 
(13) On October 18, 2007, Secretary Gates 
stated that the work of many contractors in Iraq is 
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‘‘at cross-purposes to our larger mission in Iraq,’’ 
and that ‘‘right now those missions are in conflict’’. 
(14) In 2007, the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform of the House of Representatives 
investigated Blackwater’s employment practices and 
found that the company’s classification of its secu-
rity guards may have allowed the firm to avoid pay-
ing Social Security, Medicare, and Federal income 
and employment taxes. 
(15) On Christmas Eve 2006, Blackwater con-
tractor Andrew Moonen, while drunk, shot and killed 
a guard to Iraqi Vice President Adil Abd-al-Mahdi 
in the Green Zone, and though Mr. Moonen lost his 
job with Blackwater as a result of this incident, he 
was promptly hired by Combat Support Associates, 
another Department of Defense contractor, and sent 
to work in Kuwait. 
(16) In the wake of the 2004 killing of four 
Blackwater contractors in Fallujah, the families of 
the men killed filed a civil suit against the company, 
alleging that Blackwater failed to properly equip and 
man its armored vehicles; after nearly seven years in 
court, the case was thrown out when the families 
could reportedly no longer pay the court costs. 
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(17) XE Services, LLC, the company formerly 
known as Blackwater, has also faced allegations of 
weapons smuggling and improperly licensing fire-
arms; in April 2010, five former Blackwater employ-
ees, including former president Gary Jackson and 
former executive vice president William Wheeler 
Mathews, Jr., were indicted on charges including 
conspiring to violate Federal firearm laws, posses-
sion of unregistered firearms, and obstruction of jus-
tice. Jackson and Mathews later pleaded guilty to a 
misdemeanor firearms recordkeeping violation. 
(18) In response to a request from the Com-
mittee on Oversight and Government Reform of the 
House of Representatives, the Inspector General of 
the Small Business Administration investigated 
Blackwater in 2008 and found that the company 
may have misrepresented its small business status, 
enabling it to qualify for $110,000,000 in govern-
ment contracts set aside specifically for small busi-
nesses. 
(19) Signed affidavits were filed in a civil law-
suit against Blackwater that company founder Erik 
Prince views himself ‘‘as a Christian crusader tasked 
with eliminating Muslims and the Islamic faith from 
the globe’’, that he knowingly deployed ‘‘demon-
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strably unfit men’’ to Iraq, and that he used illegal 
ammunition, including a bullet designed to explode 
after entering the human body, among other 
charges. 
(20) In November 2007, a contractor employed 
by DynCorp International, LLC, reportedly shot and 
killed an unarmed taxi driver who, according to wit-
nesses, posed no threat to the DynCorp convoy. 
(21) A January 2007 report by the Special In-
spector General for Iraq Reconstruction stated that 
DynCorp billed the United States for millions of dol-
lars of work that was never authorized. 
(22) In October 2007, an audit report issued by 
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc-
tion stated that the Department of State ‘‘does not 
know specifically what it received for most of the 
$1,200,000,000 in expenditures under its DynCorp 
Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program’’. 
(23) Congress does not have complete access to 
information about all security contracts, the number 
of armed private security contractors working in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other combat zones, the 
number of contractors who have died, and any dis-
ciplinary actions taken against contract personnel or 
companies. 
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(24) The Central Intelligence Agency paid two 
contractor psychologists $81 million to devise an in-
terrogation program that yielded very little intel-
ligence and may have violated United States law and 
international human rights treaties. 
(25) In 2016, it was reported that Erik Prince 
was under investigation by the Department of Jus-
tice and other Federal agencies for attempting to 
broker military services to foreign governments and 
possible money laundering. 
(26) A 2011 report by the Project On Govern-
ment Oversight found the government paid signifi-
cantly more for contractors to staff certain contin-
gency operation positions, including security guards 
and language specialists. 
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) MISSION CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY ESSEN-
TIAL
FUNCTIONS.—The term ‘‘mission critical or 
emergency essential functions’’— 
(A) means— 
(i) activities for which continued per-
formance is considered essential to support 
combat systems and operational activities; 
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(ii) activities whose delay, absence, or 
failure of performance would significantly 
affect the broader success or failure of a 
military operation; or 
(iii) functions, the compromise of 
which would degrade the system effective-
ness in achieving the core mission for 
which it was designed; and 
(B) includes— 
(i) the provision of protective services, 
including diplomatic security services; 
(ii) the provision of security advice 
and planning; 
(iii) military and police training; 
(iv) prison administration; 
(v) interrogation; 
(vi) 
intelligence 
and 
counterintel-
ligence; 
(vii) counterterrorism; and 
(viii) the provision of support for the 
conduct of operations or security coopera-
tion. 
(2) 
CONTINGENCY
OPERATION.—The 
term 
‘‘contingency operation’’ has the meaning provided 
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by section 101(a)(13) of title 10, United States 
Code. 
(3) OTHER
SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY
OPER-
ATIONS.—The term ‘‘other significant military oper-
ations’’ means activities, other than combat oper-
ations, that are carried out by United States Armed 
Forces in an uncontrolled or unpredictable high- 
threat environment where personnel performing se-
curity functions may be called upon to use deadly 
force. 
(4) 
SPECIFIED
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘specified congressional commit-
tees’’ means the following committees: 
(A) The Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
form, the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
(B) The Committee on Armed Services, 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernmental Affairs, the Committee on Appro-
priations, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
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SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL TO 
PERFORM DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN AREAS 
OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER 
SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall ensure that 
all personnel working on behalf of the United States at 
any United States diplomatic or consular mission in areas 
of contingency operations and other significant military 
operations are provided diplomatic security services only 
by United States Government personnel. 
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACTORS PER-
FORMING MISSION CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY 
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL AREAS OF 
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND OTHER SIG-
NIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
(a) REPORT BY PRESIDENT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than June 1, 
2019, the President shall submit to the specified 
congressional committees a report on the status of 
planning for the transition away from the use of pri-
vate contractors for mission critical or emergency es-
sential functions by January 1, 2020, in all areas of 
contingency operations and other significant military 
operations. 
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(2) ADDITIONAL
MATTERS
COVERED.—If the 
report submitted under paragraph (1) states that 
the relevant agencies will not be able to transition to 
government and military personnel for such func-
tions by January 1, 2020, the President shall in-
clude in the report the following: 
(A) A statement of the reasons why the 
relevant agencies are unable to do so, the date 
by which they will be able to do so, and the 
plan to ensure that they will be able to do so 
by that date. 
(B) A certification that— 
(i) all contract employees have under-
gone background checks to ensure that 
they do not have criminal records and have 
not been accused of human rights abuses; 
(ii) no contract employees are subject 
to pending criminal charges; 
(iii) all contract employees are under 
the jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, 
United States Code (relating to military 
extraterritorial jurisdiction); 
(iv) contract employees, if accused of 
crimes by the host country, must remain in 
United States custody; and 
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(v) contracts include whistleblower 
protections for employees to provide good 
faith information to management, govern-
ment agencies, and Congress of any con-
tract violations, human rights abuses, or 
criminal actions. 
(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by 
this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, to the maximum extent possible, but may con-
tain a classified annex, if necessary. 
(b) EXAMINATION
OF CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICES.—Any individual or entity under contract with 
the Federal Government to provide mission critical or 
emergency essential functions after January 1, 2020, shall 
allow the specified congressional committees to examine 
their accounting practices with respect to any such con-
tract quarterly and upon request. 
(c) REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONTRACT RE-
NEWALS.—Any contract with the Federal Government re-
quiring personnel to perform mission critical or emergency 
essential functions that is proposed to be renewed after 
the date of the enactment of this Act may be renewed only 
if— 
(1) the President reports to the specified con-
gressional committees that the relevant agency does 
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not have adequate personnel to perform the duties 
stipulated in the contract; and 
(2) the President certifies that— 
(A) all contract employees have undergone 
background checks to ensure that they do not 
have criminal records and have not been ac-
cused of human rights abuses; 
(B) no contract employees are subject to 
pending criminal charges; 
(C) all contract employees are under the 
jurisdiction of section 3261 of title 18, United 
States Code (relating to military extraterritorial 
jurisdiction); 
(D) contract employees, if accused of 
crimes by the host country, must remain in the 
custody of the United States; and 
(E) the contract includes whistleblower 
protections for employees to provide good faith 
information to management, government agen-
cies, and Congress of any contract violations, 
human rights abuses, or criminal actions. 
SEC. 6. CONGRESSIONAL ACCESS TO CONTRACTS. 
(a) REQUIREMENT TO ALLOW CONGRESS ACCESS TO 
COPIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF CERTAIN CONTRACTS AND 
TASK ORDERS.— 
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(1) REQUIREMENT
REGARDING
CONTRACTS 
AND TASK ORDERS BEFORE ENACTMENT.—The Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of the Interior, and the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development 
shall allow the chairman and the ranking minority 
member of each specified congressional committee 
access to a copy of, and a description of the work 
performed or to be performed under, each contract, 
and each task order issued under an existing con-
tract, in an amount greater than $5,000,000 entered 
into by the Department of Defense, the Department 
of State, the Department of the Interior, and the 
Agency for International Development, respectively, 
during the period beginning on October 1, 2001, and 
ending on the last day of the month during which 
this Act is enacted for work to be performed in 
areas of contingency operations and other significant 
military operations. 
(2) FORM OF SUBMISSIONS.—The copies and 
descriptions required by paragraph (1) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, to the maximum extent 
possible, but may contain a classified annex, if nec-
essary. 
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(b) REPORTS ON CONTRACTS FOR WORK TO BE 
PERFORMED IN AREAS OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS 
AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT MILITARY OPERATIONS.—The 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
of the Interior, and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development shall each submit 
to each specified congressional committee a report not 
later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act that contains the following information: 
(1) The number of persons performing work in 
areas of contingency operations and other significant 
military operations under contracts (and sub-
contracts at any tier) entered into by Department of 
Defense, the Department of State, the Department 
of the Interior, and the United States Agency for 
International Development, respectively. 
(2) The total cost of such contracts. 
(3) The total number of persons who have been 
wounded or killed in performing work under such 
contracts. 
(4) A description of the disciplinary actions 
that have been taken against persons performing 
work under such contracts by the contractor, the 
United States Government, or the government of 
any country in which the area of contingency oper-
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ations or other significant military operations is lo-
cated. 
Æ 
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