IV 
118TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 697 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relating to the Com-
munist Party of China’s ‘‘Made In China 2025’’ Plan and publicly- 
known malign Communist Party of China’s actions supporting the goals 
of its ‘‘Made in China 2025’’ plan. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2023 
Ms. SHERRILL (for herself, Mr. GALLAGHER, and Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI) sub-
mitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
RESOLUTION 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives relat-
ing to the Communist Party of China’s ‘‘Made In China 
2025’’ Plan and publicly-known malign Communist Party 
of China’s actions supporting the goals of its ‘‘Made 
in China 2025’’ plan. 
Resolved, 
SECTION 1. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA’S ‘‘MADE IN 
CHINA 2025’’ PLAN. 
The House of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) In 2006, the Communist Party of China (in 
this resolution referred to as ‘‘CCP’’) intensified its 
focus on science and technology innovation as a na-
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tional goal under the ‘‘Medium- and Long-Term 
Plan for Science and Technology Development’’ and 
its 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans. 
(2) The ‘‘Made in China 2025’’ plan (in this 
resolution referred to as ‘‘MIC2025’’), issued in 
2015, under the 13th Five Year Plan is the CCP’s 
10-year national science and technology industrial 
policy that seeks to vault China into global leader-
ship in the research and manufacturing of advanced 
science and technology tools, applications, and prod-
ucts, while using a whole-of-society approach, deep 
government intervention, and market protections for 
the People’s Republic of China (in this resolution re-
ferred to as ‘‘PRC’’) businesses in the select sectors. 
(3) MIC2025 prioritizes raising high bars to 
foreign market access, while increasing PRC invest-
ments in and government and business focus on 
proactively acquiring technology and knowledge 
abroad on these advanced science and technology 
areas: 
(A) Advanced information technology and 
telecommunications services. 
(B) Advanced machining and robotics. 
(C) Aerospace engineering and equipment. 
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(D) Maritime infrastructure, equipment, 
and next generation vessels. 
(E) Advanced railway infrastructure. 
(F) Renewable energy products, batteries, 
and electric vehicles. 
(G) Advanced materials. 
(H) Innovative farming equipment, tech-
nology, and agriculture. 
(I) Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and 
advanced medical equipment. 
(J) Next generation electrical equipment. 
(4) MIC2025 sector development will further 
integrate emerging technologies, such as advance 
semiconductors, 3D printing, cloud computing, big- 
data analytics, quantum computing, artificial intel-
ligence (AI), and new forms of energy. 
(5) The PRC’s leader Xi Jinping, who currently 
holds the role of State Chairman of the PRC, Gen-
eral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 
states that CCP plans to lessen the PRC’s reliance 
on foreign markets for goods and services by 2025 
and a goal for at least seventy-percent self-suffi-
ciency in MIC2025 areas by using foreign tech-
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nology acquisitions and joint ventures to acquire, do-
mestically produce, and then sell these goods abroad. 
(6) The PRC’s stated goal in its MIC2025 pol-
icy is to advance production in the PRC from prod-
ucts that are ‘‘Made in China’’ to those that are 
‘‘Created in China’’, using the underpinnings of 
MIC2025 to transform foreign innovations into a 
homegrown industrial base to promote scientific, 
technological, and manufacturing independence. 
(7) In 2021, the CCP’s Central Committee pub-
lished a resolution on its self-made achievements 
over the course of the past century, stating that 
PRC ‘‘self-reliance in science and technology’’ and 
its ‘‘bolstered . . . creation, protection, and applica-
tion of intellectual property rights’’ are key tenets of 
boosting the CCP’s position, while not including ref-
erences to foreign trade or economic and commercial 
partnerships as a part of its advancement. 
(8) In November 2022, during the CCP’s Party 
Congress, the CCP noted again that science and 
technological innovation are core tenets of the PRC’s 
development and according to the PRC’s Ministry of 
Science and Technology, international collaborative 
science and technology efforts are ultimately focused 
on boosting the PRC’s security. 
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(9) Importantly, that along with the MIC2025 
plan, there is a policy of ‘‘dual-circulation’’, both 
policies which are overseen by General Secretary Xi 
Jinping, that seek to transfer into the PRC the 
globe’s innovative technical ideas and products, 
produce them domestically for their own large popu-
lation, and then sell them abroad to obtain growing 
shares of foreign markets, all the while protecting 
those domestic businesses from foreign competition. 
(10) To further support ‘‘dual-circulation’’ and 
speed its MIC2025 developments, the PRC uses offi-
cially sanctioned tools such as unfair government 
subsidies, state-sponsored talent acquisition pro-
grams, lax labor and environmental regulations, co-
erced foreign investments and acquisitions, direct 
state investments and policy direction, burdensome 
paperwork requirements for foreign firms, and 
forced transfers of intellectual property. 
(11) The CCP broadly uses a national concept 
of military-civil fusion to adapt and adopt civilian 
technologies—either domestically produced or taken 
from abroad—to boost its military capabilities. 
(12) The CCP has over the past few years and 
especially in 2023, broadened and deepened the 
scope of its counterintelligence and data security 
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laws, along with the use of these laws against busi-
nesses from other countries. 
(13) MIC2025 is rapidly coming to a close, and 
the next steps include a CCP desire to dominate 
international standard setting by 2035 and be the 
global leader in technological innovation, manufac-
turing, industrial production, and military capabili-
ties by 2049, supported by its 14th Five Year Plan 
and its National Medium- to Long-Term Science 
and Technology Development Plan. These plans’ in-
tentions focus on basic science, domestication of crit-
ical commercial areas and getting the PRC to the 
forefront of ‘‘this century’s critical technologies’’. 
SEC. 2. PUBLICLY-KNOWN MALIGN CCP ACTIONS SUP-
PORTING ITS MIC2025 GOALS. 
The House of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) In March 2023, the PRC Commerce Min-
ister stated that 2023 would be a year of 
‘‘Invest[ing] in China’’, in front of global business 
executives, stating the PRC sought to boost invest-
ments in its manufacturing and high-tech sectors 
and that the PRC would reduce restrictions on for-
eign firms. However, the government took immediate 
actions to the contrary. 
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(2) In April 2023, the National People’s Con-
gress passed an updated and newly expanded coun-
terespionage law stating that any, ‘‘attempts to ille-
gally obtain or share state secrets or other data, ma-
terials, or items related to national security or na-
tional interests, which are carried out by or for for-
eign elements other than an espionage organization 
. . .’’ is punishable, without defining ‘‘national secu-
rity’’, ‘‘national interests’’, or organizations of con-
cern, while reiterating the policy that all aspects of 
society are to collect, report, and defend against any 
transgressions against the government. 
(3) In 2023, PRC authorities raided global con-
sulting firms Bain & Company, Capvision, and 
Mintz Group on the grounds of collecting and as-
sessing PRC business data, which have been a rou-
tine part of these companies’ business operations. 
(4) General Secretary Xi Jinping has overseen 
an expansive growth in national security laws that 
are loosely defined and nebulously enforced with no 
legal recourse and requiring mandatory cooperation. 
These laws include the new Counterespionage Law, 
the National Security Law, the Foreign NGO Man-
agement Law, the National Intelligence Law, the 
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Hong Kong National Security Law, and the Data 
Security Law. 
(5) In 2023, PRC regulators put on notice 
United States semiconductor company Micron Tech-
nologies by embarking on a surprise investigation 
without claiming any vulnerabilities in Micron’s 
products and without concrete evidence that PRC 
regulators needed to ‘‘secur[e] the information of in-
frastructure of [China’s] supply chain’’, ostensibly 
for national security reasons. 
(6) In 2023, the PRC’s State Administration 
for Market Regulation reportedly slowed and denied 
its review process slowed its review process of United 
States global acquisitions and mergers, while requir-
ing United States firms make available all of their 
products in the PRC that are available to other 
countries in a likely effort to dull United States ex-
port controls. 
(7) In 2022, the Department of Justice indicted 
the PRC firm Hytera Communications Corp for 
retro-engineering and stealing proprietary Motorola 
technology, which Hytera then sold abroad. 
(8) In 2021, a PRC front company named 
‘‘LinkOcean’’ falsified its business information to 
steal and transfer to a PRC military university on 
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the Department of Commerce’s Entity List over 
$100,000 in special underwater marine technologies. 
(9) In 2020, the PRC software technology firm 
Baidu used fake ad-clicking software to boost its ad 
revenues, while stealing user information and trans-
mitting it back to the PRC. 
(10) Since 2020, the CCP has not fulfilled its 
obligations under the Phase One Trade Agreement 
between the United States and the PRC and con-
tinues to require the transfer of sensitive United 
States agricultural company knowledge to PRC 
firms. 
(11) In 2019, United States firm Akhan Semi-
conductor’s proprietary glass was stolen by PRC 
telecommunications firm Huawei, who attempted to 
retro-engineer it in violation of United States export 
control law. 
(12) In 2018, United States wind energy firm 
ASMC, after signing a sales deal with the PRC firm 
Sinovel Wind Group Co., Ltd., had its proprietary 
intellectual property stolen by Sinovel, who then 
manufactured ASMC’s products and sold the prod-
ucts in the United States. 
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(13) In 2017, PRC cyber actors were caught 
widely illicitly collecting private business information 
on sectors across the MIC2025 portfolio. 
(14) In 2016, a PRC seed company illicitly ac-
quired and intended to smuggle proprietary seeds 
from Iowa to the PRC, while to this day the PRC 
agricultural seed market remains blocked from for-
eign competition. 
(15) Throughout the 2020s, PRC state-sanc-
tioned cyber actor ‘‘APT 41’’ conducted operations 
in line with MIC2025, stealing at least hundreds of 
billions of dollars worth of intellectual property from 
multinational corporations, much of which was 
emerging technology or not yet invented products. 
(16) According to a Center for Strategic and 
International Studies analysis of publicly known 
PRC espionage cases, which vastly outnumber any 
other foreign state, almost half of the perpetrators 
were military affiliates, almost half used cyber 
means to steal data, and over half sought to collect 
commercial information. 
(17) The PRC’s Tax Bureau previously ordered 
United States companies doing business in the PRC 
to use software purposefully loaded with malicious 
malware. 
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(18) PRC ‘‘Talent Programs’’ have been used 
to select certain well-placed individuals to target cer-
tain United States research sectors to compromise 
intellectual property, tarnishing the sanctity of open 
and transparent norms of international research, 
international academic collaboration, and America’s 
vibrant and vital foreign student researcher popu-
lation. 
(19) The China Scholarship Council, which fa-
cilitates high performing PRC students studying 
abroad and foreign students to study in the PRC, 
has been found to require students sign Council con-
tracts that require reporting on their work to PRC 
officials and limitations on students’ academic free-
dom while abroad. 
(20) The CCP allows forced labor, low environ-
mental standards, mandated overproduction of prod-
ucts, and minimal worker safeguards, all of which 
act as non-monetary subsidies to cheapen products 
from the PRC. 
(21) Since General Secretary Xi Jinping as-
sumed power, he re-asserted the role of state-owned 
enterprises in the economy and increased the pur-
chases of shares in private PRC businesses. 
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(22) The Department of Commerce, because of 
continued PRC government intervention into impor-
tant sectors of the PRC economy, continues to cer-
tify that the PRC remains a non-market economy, 
alongside the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, Georgia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova, the Rus-
sian 
Federation, 
the 
Republic 
of 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan, and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
(23) Upon widespread public acknowledgment 
and initial United States action to confront 
MIC2025, the CCP still abides by, but no longer 
publicly acknowledges MIC2025 or the detailed 
plans, intentions, and activities to accomplish its 
14th Five Year Plan or long-term science and tech-
nology goals. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that— 
(1) the United States finds itself in not only a 
security and diplomatic competition, but one heavily 
based upon economic and commercial competition; 
(2) the CCP seeks to dominate the sectors in 
MIC2025 through unfair trade practices, such as 
forced labor, low environmental standards, illegal 
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subsidies, and stolen foreign research and intellec-
tual property, and then create and recreate the prod-
ucts in the PRC often to be sold abroad at cheaper- 
than-market rates, with the ultimate goal being to 
undercut, if not bankrupt, United States businesses 
and stifle United States manufacturing and invest-
ments in critical future technologies; 
(3) all United States businesses, research insti-
tutions, and United States Federal entities involved 
in cutting edge research and design—no matter 
their size, funding, or where they are located—are 
MIC2025 targets for CCP disruption, intelligence 
collection, intellectual property theft, unfair competi-
tive practices, and commercial coercion; 
(4) United States science and technology firms 
should prepare themselves for growing unfair trade 
practices and continued theft of intellectual prop-
erty, particularly as Xi Jinping’s tenure continues; 
(5) United States public, private, and non-profit 
collaboration will drive United States innovation and 
must do so with speed and purpose, as this era of 
strategic competition will be won by close, coordi-
nated, and collaborative work between the United 
States public, private, and non-profit sectors and 
strategic partners abroad; 
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(6) United States businesses, non-profits, aca-
demia, and Federal entities should review their secu-
rity practices to protect their buildings, technology, 
products, proprietary knowledge, and personnel from 
all undue foreign interference and espionage, includ-
ing instituting thorough screenings and reviews for 
business or research collaborations with countries 
and entities that are named in sanctions or export 
control documents or are known to use illicit third 
party entities, such as ‘‘shell companies’’, to subvert 
import restrictions or obfuscate dual-use military in-
terests in seemingly benign civilian research efforts; 
(7) United States businesses, non-profits, aca-
demia, and Federal entities involved in MIC2025 
areas should review and invest in Federal and State 
guidelines on cybersecurity practices and tools, re-
search security standards, and counterintelligence 
risk postures; 
(8) every United States Government agency and 
department should orient their internal resources 
and postures to prepare for an era of strategic com-
petition with the CCP, which will affect security, 
diplomatic, economic, and commercial factors; 
(9) Federal entities should also seek to boost 
outreach to the private, academic, and non-profits 
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sectors to find new ways to partner in science and 
technical efforts, alongside new ways to protect 
United States innovation; 
(10) United States Government agencies and 
departments should review their regulations and 
processes to ensure that internal rulemaking does 
not unnecessarily slow the United States ability to 
compete with the CCP and that it protects United 
States ingenuity and commercial products, while 
keeping pace with the rate of scientific, techno-
logical, manufacturing, and commercial advance-
ments; 
(11) the Department of Commerce finds itself 
at the frontline of global strategic competition; 
(12) Congress should support the Department 
of Commerce’s efforts at home and abroad while 
conducting rigorous oversight to ensure the Depart-
ment is prioritizing the long-term interest of the na-
tional security, economic security, and well-being of 
the United States; 
(13) Federal entities should support United 
States private and research institutions organiza-
tions that seek to diversify their supply chains, in-
crease their understanding of the level of PRC-pro-
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duced content in their supply chains, or extend trade 
relationships with new Pacific partners; 
(14) United States treaty allies and non-treaty 
partners have a tremendous part to play in strategic 
competition and the United States Government 
should seek to bolster diplomatic and commercial re-
lationships with these partners; 
(15) the United States desires a stable and fair 
playing field in its commercial relationships abroad, 
with reciprocal access and mutual benefits, and the 
United States values international research and de-
velopment relationships based upon trust and good-
will; and 
(16) opposes the above-mentioned unfair, ag-
gressive actions and policies of the CCP and sup-
ports the people of the PRC in creating an economy 
that is open to honest global partnership, free from 
malign intent, and aligns with the norms of modern 
global trade. 
Æ 
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