ons states as recognized by the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as the 
‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the 
‘‘NPT’’). 
(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 
shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 
Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 
the IAEA. 
(2) SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND 
VERIFICATION.—
(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall 
direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influ-
ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab-
lish a Special Committee on Safeguards and 
Verification. 
(B) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Com-
mittee shall—
(i) improve the ability of the IAEA to 
monitor and enforce compliance by Member 
States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency; and
(ii) consider which additional meas-
ures are necessary to enhance the ability of 
the IAEA, beyond the verification mecha-
nisms and authorities contained in the Ad-
ditional Protocol to the Safeguards Agree-
ments between the IAEA and Member States 
of the IAEA, to detect with a high degree of 
confidence undeclared nuclear activities by 
a Member State. 
(3) PENALTIES.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall di-
rect the United States Permanent Representative 
to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that 
a Member State of the IAEA that is under inves-
tigation for a breach of or noncompliance with 
its IAEA obligations or the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations has 
its privileges suspended, including—
(i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
case; 
(ii) being prevented from receiving any 
technical assistance; and 
(iii) being prevented from hosting 
meetings.
(B) TERMINATION
OF
PENALTIES.—The 
penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall 
be terminated when such investigation is con-
cluded and such Member State is no longer in 
such breach or noncompliance. 
(b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.—
(1) 
VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 
contributions of the United States to the IAEA should 
primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nu-
clear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nu-
clear Verification. 
(2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Presi-
dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep-
resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in-
fluence of the United States at the IAEA to—
(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspec-
tions are prioritized for countries that have 
newly established nuclear programs or are initi-
ating nuclear programs; and 
(B) block the allocation of funds for any 
other IAEA development, environmental, or nu-
clear science assistance or activity to a coun-
try—
(i) the government of which the Sec-
retary of State has determined, for purposes
of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
Export Control Act, or other provision of 
law, is a government that has repeatedly 
provided support for acts of international 
terrorism and the government of which the 
Secretary has determined has not disman-
tled and surrendered its weapons of mass 
destruction programs under international 
verification; 
(ii) that is under investigation for a 
breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
obligations or the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
(3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part 
of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to 
Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by
country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards 
inspections and nuclear security activities. 
(c) MEMBERSHIP.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA 
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States at the IAEA to block the membership on the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member State 
of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Ad-
ditional Protocol and—
(A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or 
(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga-
tions or the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. 
(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 
Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to 
modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect 
the principles described in paragraph (1). 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually for two years 
thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report on the implementation 
of this section. 
SEC. 302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 
SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 
It is the sense of Congress that the national security 
interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov-
ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 
should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu-
rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 
TITLE IV—PEACEKEEPING 
SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING REFORM OF 
UNITED 
NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING 
OPER-
ATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations have contributed greatly toward the promotion 
of peace and stability for the past 57 years and the 
majority of peacekeeping personnel who have served 
under the United Nations flag have done so with 
honor and courage, the record of United Nations 
peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by oper-
ational failures and unconscionable acts of mis-
conduct; and
(2) if the reputation of and confidence in United 
Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fun-
damental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in 
the areas of planning, management, training, con-
duct, and discipline, must be implemented without 
delay. 
SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF 
UNITED 
NATIONS 
PEACEKEEPING 
OPER-
ATIONS. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 
reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 
following areas: 
(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.—
(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and 
number of United Nations peacekeeping oper-
ations have increased substantially over the past 
decade, an independent audit of each such oper-
ation, with a view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ oper-
ations and ensuring that such operations are 
cost effective, should be conducted and its find-
ings reported to the Security Council. 
(B) REVIEW
OF
MANDATES
AND
CLOSING 
OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations should
conduct a comprehensive review of all United 
Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with 
a view toward identifying objectives that are 
practical and achievable, and report its findings 
to the Security Council. In particular, the review 
should consider the following: 
(i) Activities that fall beyond the scope 
of traditional peacekeeping activities should 
be delegated to a new Peacebuilding Com-
mission, described in paragraph (3). 
(ii) Long-standing operations that are 
static and cannot fulfill their mandate 
should be downsized or closed. 
(iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
that the withdrawal from a country of an 
otherwise static United Nations peace-
keeping operation would result in the re-
sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar-
ing arrangement that reduces the level of as-
sessed contributions, similar to that cur-
rently 
supporting 
the 
United 
Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be ex-
plored and instituted. 
(C) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping oper-
ations become larger and increasingly complex,
the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand-
ard of qualifications for senior leaders and man-
agers, with particular emphasis on specific skills 
and experience, and current senior leaders and 
managers who do not meet those standards 
should be removed or reassigned. 
(D) PRE-DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING.—Pre-de-
ployment training on interpretation of the man-
date of the operation, specifically in the areas of 
use of force, civilian protection and field condi-
tions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 
human rights should be mandatory, and all per-
sonnel, regardless of category or rank, should be 
required to sign an oath that each has received 
and understands such training as a condition of 
participation in the operation. 
(2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.—
(A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CON-
DUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 
has the status of a binding rule and applies 
equally to all personnel serving in United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat-
egory or rank, should be promulgated, adopted, 
and enforced.
(B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CON-
DUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, should receive training on the Code of Con-
duct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping 
operation, in addition to periodic follow-on 
training. In particular—
(i) all personnel, regardless of category 
or rank, should be provided with a personal 
copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
translated into the national language of 
such personnel, regardless of whether such 
language is an official language of the 
United Nations; 
(ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
each pledges to abide by the Code of Con-
duct, and that each understands the con-
sequences of violating the Code of Conduct, 
including immediate termination of the 
participation of such personnel in the 
peacekeeping operation to which such per-
sonnel is assigned as a condition of ap-
pointment to such operation; and
(iii) peacekeeping operations should 
conduct educational outreach programs to 
reach local communities where peacekeeping 
personnel of such operations are based, in-
cluding explaining prohibited acts on the 
part of United Nations peacekeeping per-
sonnel and identifying the individual to 
whom the local population may direct com-
plaints or file allegations of exploitation, 
abuse, or other acts of misconduct. 
(C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated 
monitoring mechanisms, such as the Personnel 
Conduct Units already deployed to support 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in 
Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, should be present in each op-
eration to monitor compliance with the Code of 
Conduct, and—
(i) should report simultaneously to the 
Head of Mission, the United Nations De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations, and 
the Associate Director of OIOS for Peace-
keeping Operations (established under sec-
tion 104(b)(10)); and
(ii) should be tasked with designing 
and implementing mission-specific meas-
ures to prevent misconduct, conduct follow-
on training for personnel, coordinate com-
munity outreach programs, and assist in 
investigations, as OIOS determines nec-
essary and appropriate. 
(D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, pro-
fessional, and independent investigative body 
should be established and introduced into United 
Nations 
peacekeeping 
operations. 
In 
par-
ticular—
(i) the investigative body should in-
clude professionals with experience in inves-
tigating sex crimes, as well as experts who 
can provide guidance on standards of proof 
and evidentiary requirements necessary for 
any subsequent legal action; 
(ii) provisions should be included in a 
Model Memorandum of Understanding that 
obligate Member States that contribute 
troops to a peacekeeping operation to des-
ignate a military prosecutor who will par-
ticipate in any investigation into an allega-
tion of misconduct brought against an indi-
vidual of such Member State, so that evi-
dence is collected and preserved in a man-
ner consistent with the military law of such 
Member State; 
(iii) the investigative body should be 
regionally based to ensure rapid deployment 
and should be equipped with modern 
forensics equipment for the purpose of posi-
tively identifying perpetrators and, where 
necessary, for determining paternity; and 
(iv) the investigative body should re-
port directly to the Associate Director of 
OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations, while 
providing copies of any reports to the De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations, the 
Head of Mission, and the Member State 
concerned. 
(E) FOLLOW-UP.—A dedicated unit, similar 
to the Personnel Conduct Units, staffed and 
funded through existing resources, should be es-
tablished within the headquarters of the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
and tasked with—
(i) promulgating measures to prevent 
misconduct;
(ii) coordinating allegations of mis-
conduct, and reports received by field per-
sonnel; and 
(iii) gathering follow-up information 
on completed investigations, particularly by 
focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
individual concerned taken by the United 
Nations or by the Member State that is con-
tributing troops to which such individual 
belongs, and sharing such information with 
the Security Council, the Head of Mission, 
and the community hosting the peace-
keeping operation. 
(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS AS-
SISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations 
should provide immediate medical assistance to 
victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the re-
sponsibility for providing longer-term treatment, 
care, or restitution lies solely with the individual 
found guilty of the misconduct. In particular, 
the following reforms should be implemented: 
(i) The United Nations should not as-
sume responsibility for providing long-term 
treatment or compensation by creating a 
‘‘Victims Trust Fund’’, or any other such
similar fund, financed through assessed con-
tributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, thereby shielding individuals 
from personal liability and reinforcing an 
atmosphere of impunity. 
(ii) If an individual responsible for 
misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
assistance, responsibility for providing as-
sistance to a victim should be assigned to 
the Member State that contributed the 
troops to which such individual belonged or 
to the manager concerned. 
(iii) In the case of misconduct by a 
member of a military contingent, appro-
priate funds shall be withheld from the 
troop contributing country concerned. 
(iv) In the case of misconduct by a ci-
vilian employee or contractor of the United 
Nations, appropriate wages shall be gar-
nished from such individual or fines shall 
be imposed against such individual, con-
sistent with existing United Nations Staff 
Rules.
(G) MANAGERS
AND
COMMANDERS.—The 
manner in which managers and commanders 
handle cases of misconduct by those serving 
under them should be included in their indi-
vidual performance evaluations, so that man-
agers and commanders who take decisive action 
to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, 
while those who create a permissive environment 
or impede investigations are penalized or re-
lieved of duty, as appropriate. 
(H) DATA BASE.—A centralized data base 
should be created and maintained within the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Op-
erations to track cases of misconduct, including 
the outcome of investigations and subsequent 
prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have 
engaged in misconduct or other criminal activi-
ties, regardless of category or rank, are perma-
nently barred from participation in future 
peacekeeping operations. 
(I) 
WELFARE.—Peacekeeping 
operations 
should assume responsibility for maintaining a 
minimum standard of welfare for mission per-
sonnel to ameliorate conditions of service, while 
adjustments are made to the discretionary wel-
fare payments currently provided to Member 
States that contribute troops to offset the cost of 
operation-provided recreational facilities. 
(3) PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION.—
(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—Consistent with the 
recommendations of the High Level Panel Re-
port, the United Nations should establish a 
Peacebuilding Commission, supported by a 
Peacebuilding Support Office, to marshal the ef-
forts of the United Nations, international finan-
cial institutions, donors, and non-governmental 
organizations to assist countries in transition 
from war to peace. 
(B) STRUCTURE
AND
MEMBERSHIP.—The 
Commission should—
(i) be a subsidiary body of the United 
Nations Security Council, limited in size to 
ensure efficiency; 
(ii) include members of the United Na-
tions Security Council, major donors, major 
troop contributing countries, appropriate 
United Nations organizations, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund; and
(iii) invite the President of ECOSOC, 
regional actors, Member States that con-
tribute troops, regional development banks, 
and other concerned parties that are not al-
ready members, as determined appropriate, 
to consult or participate in meetings as ob-
servers. 
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Commission 
should seek to ease the demands currently placed 
upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
to undertake tasks that fall beyond the scope of 
traditional peacekeeping, by—
(i) developing and integrating country-
specific and system-wide conflict prevention, 
post-conflict reconstruction, and long-term 
development policies and strategies; and 
(ii) serving as the key coordinating 
body for the design and implementation of 
military, humanitarian, and civil adminis-
tration aspects of complex missions. 
(D) RESOURCES.—The establishment of the 
Peacebuilding Commission and the related 
Peacebuilding Support Office, should be staffed 
within existing resources.
SEC. 403. CERTIFICATION. 
(a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
CONTINGENT
UPON
PRESIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATION
OF 
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.—
(1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OP-
ERATIONS.—
(A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
certifies that the requirements described in para-
graph (2) have been satisfied, the President shall 
direct the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United 
Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expan-
sion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations. 
(B) EXCEPTION
AND
NOTIFICATION.—The 
requirements described under subparagraphs (F) 
and (G) of paragraph (2) may be waived until 
January 1, 2007, if the President determines 
that such is in the national interest of the 
United States. If the President makes such a de-
termination, the President shall, not later than 
15 days before the exercise of such waiver, notify 
the appropriate congressional committees of such 
determination and resulting waiver.
(2) CERTIFICATION
OF
PEACEKEEPING
OPER-
ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in 
paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Sec-
retary to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of re-
forms, related to peacekeeping operations have been 
adopted by the United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations or the General Assembly, as ap-
propriate: 
(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 
has the status of a binding rule and applies 
equally to all personnel serving in United Na-
tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat-
egory or rank, has been adopted by the General 
Assembly and mechanisms have been established 
for training such personnel concerning the re-
quirements of the Code and enforcement of the 
Code. 
(B) All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have 
been trained concerning the requirements of the 
Code of Conduct and each has been given a per-
sonal copy of the Code, translated into the na-
tional language of such personnel.
(C) All personnel, regardless of category or 
rank, are required to sign an oath that each has 
received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 
pledges to abide by the Code, and that each un-
derstands the consequences of violating the Code, 
including the immediate termination of the par-
ticipation of such personnel in the peacekeeping 
operation to which such personnel is assigned as 
a condition of the appointment to such oper-
ation. 
(D) All peacekeeping operations have de-
signed and implemented educational outreach 
programs to reach local communities where 
peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 
based to explain prohibited acts on the part of 
United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
identify the individual to whom the local popu-
lation may direct complaints or file allegations 
of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis-
conduct. 
(E) A centralized data base has been created 
and is being maintained in the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations that 
tracks cases of misconduct, including the out-
comes of investigations and subsequent prosecu-
tions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of cat-
egory or rank, who have engaged in misconduct 
or other criminal activities are permanently 
barred from participation in future peacekeeping 
operations. 
(F) A Model Memorandum of Under-
standing between the United Nations and each 
Member State that contributes troops to a peace-
keeping operation has been adopted by the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Op-
erations that specifically obligates each such 
Member State to—
(i) designate a competent legal author-
ity, preferably a prosecutor with expertise 
in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
to participate in any investigation into an 
allegation of misconduct brought against an 
individual of such Member State; 
(ii) refer to its competent national or 
military authority for possible prosecution, 
if warranted, any investigation of a viola-
tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi-
nal activity by an individual of such Mem-
ber State;
(iii) report to the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of 
any such investigation; 
(iv) undertake to conduct on-site court 
martial proceedings relating to allegations 
of misconduct alleged against an individual 
of such Member State; and 
(v) assume responsibility for the provi-
sion of appropriate assistance to a victim of 
misconduct committed by an individual of 
such Member State. 
(G) A professional and independent inves-
tigative and audit function has been established 
within the United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations and the OIOS to monitor 
United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
TITLE 
V—DEPARTMENT 
OF 
STATE AND GOVERNMENT AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE 
SEC. 501. POSITIONS FOR UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
The Secretary of State shall make every effort to re-
cruit United States citizens for positions within inter-
national organizations.
SEC. 502. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULAR ASSESSED 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 
(a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congres-
sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized 
request in support of the assessed contribution of the United 
States to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations. 
(b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The de-
tailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall—
(1) contain information relating to the amounts 
requested in support of each of the various sections 
and titles of the regular assessed budget of the United 
Nations; and 
(2) compare the amounts requested for the cur-
rent year with the actual or estimated amounts con-
tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years 
for the same sections and titles. 
(c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the United 
Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular assessed 
budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time such adjust-
ment is presented to the Advisory Committee on Adminis-
trative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and con-
sult with the appropriate congressional committees. 
SEC. 503. REVIEW AND REPORT. 
Not later than six months after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall conduct a re-
view of programs of the United Nations that are funded
through assessed contributions and submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report containing—
(1) the findings of such review; and 
(2) recommendations relating to—
(A) the continuation of such programs; and 
(B) which of such programs should be vol-
untarily funded, other than those specified in 
subparagraphs (A) through (R) of subsection 
(c)(2) of section 11 of the United Nations Par-
ticipation Act of 1945, as amended by section 
101(c) of this Act. 
SEC. 504. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. 
(a) REPORT
ON UNITED NATIONS REFORMS.—Not 
later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this 
Act and again 12 months thereafter, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States of the Government Accountability 
Office shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on the status of the 1997, 2002, and 2005 
management reforms initiated by the Secretary General 
and on the reforms mandated by this Act. 
(b) REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF STATE CERTIFI-
CATIONS.—Not later than six months after each certifi-
cation submitted by the Secretary of State to the appro-
priate congressional committees under this Act and sub-
section (d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participa-
tion Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this Act), 
the Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on each such certifi-
cation. The Secretary shall provide the Comptroller General 
with any information required by the Comptroller General 
to submit any such report. 
TITLE VI—CERTIFICATIONS AND 
WITHHOLDING OF CONTRIBU-
TIONS 
SEC. 601. CERTIFICATIONS AND WITHHOLDING OF CON-
TRIBUTIONS. 
(a) CERTIFICATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (3), the certifications required under subsection 
(d)(3) of section 11 of the United Nations Participa-
tion Act of 1945 (as amended by section 101(c) of this 
Act) and section 103, sections 104(a) through 104(e), 
sections 201(c) and 201(e), and section 202 of this Act 
are certifications submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees by the Secretary of State that 
the requirements of each such section have been satis-
fied with respect to reform of the United Nations. 
(2) ALTERNATE CERTIFICATION MECHANISM.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
paragraph (3), in the event that the Secretary is