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contractors, build dossiers of personal information for 
blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage’’. 
(2) Outside reporting has confirmed the breadth of 
TikTok’s reach, concluding that its data collection prac-
tices extend to age, phone number, precise location, inter-
net address, device used, phone contacts, social network 
connections, content of private messages sent through the 
application, and videos watched. 
(3) On November 11, 2022, Federal Communica-
tions Commissioner Brendan Carr explained that ‘‘under-
neath [TikTok], it operates as a very sophisticated sur-
veillance app.’’. He characterized it as ‘‘a big risk’’ for 
multiple reasons, including espionage. The risk posed by 
TikTok is exacerbated by the difficulty in assessing pre-
cisely which categories of data it collects. For example, 
outside researchers have found embedded vulnerabilities 
that allow the company to collect more data than the ap-
plication’s privacy policy indicates. 
Whereas PRC law requires obligatory, secret disclosure of 
data controlled by Chinese companies at the PRC’s uni-
lateral request: 
(1) Pursuant to PRC law, the PRC can require a 
company headquartered in the PRC to surrender all its 
data to the PRC, making it an espionage tool of the 
CCP. 
(2) The National Intelligence Law, passed in China 
in 2017, states that ‘‘any organization’’ must assist or 
cooperate with CCP intelligence work. Such assistance or 
cooperation must also remain secret at the PRC’s re-
quest. 
(3) The PRC’s 2014 Counter-Espionage Law states 
that ‘‘relevant organizations . . . may not refuse’’ to col-
lect evidence for an investigation. 
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(4) The PRC’s Data Security Law of 2021 states 
that the PRC has the power to access and control private 
data. 
(5) The PRC’s Counter-Espionage Law grants PRC 
security agencies nearly unfettered discretion, if acting 
under an effectively limitlessly capacious understanding 
of national security, to access data from companies. 
(6) On September 17, 2020, the Department of 
Commerce concluded that the PRC, to advance ‘‘its intel-
ligence-gathering and to understand more about who to 
target for espionage, whether electronically or via human 
recruitment,’’ is constructing ‘‘massive databases of 
Americans’ personal information’’ and that ByteDance 
has close ties to the CCP, including a cooperation agree-
ment with a security agency and over 130 CCP members 
in management positions. 
(7) On December 2, 2022, the Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, stated 
that TikTok’s data repositories on Americans ‘‘are in the 
hands of a government that doesn’t share our values and 
that has a mission that’s very much at odds with what’s 
in the best interests of the United States. . . . The 
[CCP] has shown a willingness to steal Americans data 
on a scale that dwarfs any other’’. 
(8) On December 5, 2022, the Director of National 
Intelligence, Avril Haines, stated, when asked about 
TikTok and PRC ownership, ‘‘It is extraordinary the de-
gree to which [the PRC] . . . [is] developing frameworks 
for collecting foreign data and pulling it in, and their ca-
pacity to then turn that around and use it to target audi-
ences for information campaigns and other things, but 
also to have it for the future so that they can use it for 
a variety of means’’. 
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(9) On December 16, 2022, the Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, William Burns, explained that 
‘‘because the parent company of TikTok is a [PRC] com-
pany, the [CCP] is able to insist upon extracting the pri-
vate data of a lot of TikTok users in this country, and 
also to shape the content of what goes on to TikTok as 
well to suit the interests of the Chinese leadership’’. 
(10) On August 2, 2020, then-Secretary of State, 
Mike Pompeo, stated that PRC-based companies ‘‘are 
feeding data directly to the Chinese Communist Party, 
their national security apparatus’’. 
(11) Public reporting has repeatedly confirmed 
statements made by the executive branch regarding the 
tight interlinkages between ByteDance, TikTok, and the 
CCP. 
(A) The Secretary of ByteDance’s CCP com-
mittee, Zhang Fuping, also serves as ByteDance’s 
Editor-in-Chief and Vice President and has vowed 
that the CCP committee would ‘‘take the lead’’ 
across ‘‘all product lines and business lines’’, which 
include TikTok. 
(B) On May 30, 2023, public reporting revealed 
that TikTok has stored sensitive financial informa-
tion, including the Social Security numbers and tax 
identifications of TikTok influencers and United 
States small businesses, on servers in China acces-
sible by ByteDance employees. 
(C) On December 22, 2022, public reporting re-
vealed that ByteDance employees accessed TikTok 
user data and IP addresses to monitor the physical 
locations of specific United States citizens. 
(D) On June 17, 2022, public reporting re-
vealed that, according to leaked audio from more 
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than 80 internal TikTok meetings, China-based em-
ployees of ByteDance repeatedly accessed nonpublic 
data about United States TikTok users, including 
the physical locations of specific United States citi-
zens. 
(E) On January 20, 2023, public reporting re-
vealed that TikTok and ByteDance employees regu-
larly engage in practice called ‘‘heating,’’ which is a 
manual push to ensure specific videos ‘‘achieve a 
certain number of video views’’. 
(F) In a court filing in June 2023, a former 
employee of ByteDance alleged that the CCP spied 
on pro-democracy protestors in Hong Kong in 2018 
by using backdoor access to TikTok to identify and 
monitor activists’ locations and communications. 
(G) On November 1, 2023, public reporting re-
vealed that TikTok’s internal platform, which houses 
its most sensitive information, was inspected in per-
son by CCP cybersecurity agents in the lead-up to 
the CCP’s 20th National Congress. 
Whereas the PRC’s access to American users’ data poses un-
acceptable risks to United States national security: 
(1) As a general matter, foreign adversary controlled 
social media applications present a clear threat to the na-
tional security of the United States. 
(2) The Department of Homeland Security has 
warned that the PRC’s data collection activities in par-
ticular have resulted in ‘‘numerous risks to U.S. busi-
nesses and customers, including: the theft of trade se-
crets, of intellectual property, and of other confidential 
business information; violations of U.S. export control 
laws; violations of U.S. privacy laws; breaches of contrac-
tual provisions and terms of service; security and privacy 
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risks to customers and employees; risk of PRC surveil-
lance and tracking of regime critics; and reputational 
harm to U.S. businesses’’. These risks are imminent and 
other, unforeseen risks may also exist. 
(3) On September 28, 2023, the Department of 
State’s Global Engagement Center issued a report that 
found that ‘‘TikTok creates opportunities for PRC global 
censorship’’. The report stated that United States Gov-
ernment information as of late 2020 showed that 
‘‘ByteDance maintained a regularly updated internal list 
identifying people who were likely blocked or restricted 
from all ByteDance platforms, including TikTok, for rea-
sons such as advocating for Uyghur independence’’. 
(4) On November 15, 2022, the Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified 
before the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
House of Representatives that TikTok’s national security 
concerns ‘‘include the possibility that the [CCP] could 
use it to control data collection on millions of users or 
control the recommendation algorithm, which could be 
used for influence operations if they so choose, or to con-
trol software on millions of devices, which gives it an op-
portunity to potentially technically compromise personal 
devices’’. 
(5) On March 8, 2023, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified be-
fore the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
that the CCP, through its ownership of ByteDance, could 
use TikTok to collect and control users’ data and drive 
divisive narratives internationally. 
Whereas Congress has extensively investigated whether 
TikTok poses a national security threat because it is 
owned by ByteDance: 
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(1) On October 26, 2021, during the testimony of 
Michael Beckerman, TikTok head of public policy for the 
Americas, before a hearing of the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Protection of the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the Senate, lawmakers ex-
pressed concerns that TikTok’s audio and user location 
data could be used by the CCP. 
(2) On September 14, 2022, lawmakers expressed 
concerns over TikTok’s algorithm and content rec-
ommendations posing a national security threat during a 
hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate with Vanessa 
Pappas, Chief Operating Officer of TikTok. 
(3) On March 23, 2023, during the testimony of 
TikTok CEO, Shou Chew, before the Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 
lawmakers expressed concerns about the safety and secu-
rity of the application, including TikTok’s relationship 
with the CCP. 
(4) On February 28, 2023, former Deputy National 
Security Advisor, Matthew Pottinger, emphasized that it 
has already been confirmed that TikTok’s parent com-
pany ByteDance has used the application to surveil 
United States journalists as a means to identify and re-
taliate against potential sources. The PRC has also 
shown a willingness to harass individuals abroad who 
take stances that contradict the Communist Party lines. 
The application can further be employed to help manipu-
late social discourse and amplify false information to tens 
of millions of Americans. 
(5) On March 23, 2023, Nury Turkel, the Chair of 
the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, raised the alarm that TikTok’s parent com-
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pany, ByteDance, has a strategic partnership with Chi-
na’s Ministry of Public Security, and China’s domestic 
version of the application, Douyin, has been used to col-
lect data and sensitive information from Uyghurs and 
other oppressed ethnic minority groups. 
(6) On July 26, 2023, William Evanina, the former 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center, pointed to TikTok as just one of many areas of 
concern that combine to paint a concerning picture of the 
CCP’s capabilities and intent as an adversarial, malign 
competitor. 
(7) On November 30, 2023, John Garnaut of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) remarked 
that TikTok has sophisticated capabilities that create the 
risk that TikTok can clandestinely shape narratives and 
elevate favorable opinions while suppressing statements 
and news that the PRC deems negative. 
(8) On January 18, 2024, the Select Committee on 
Strategic Competition between the United States and the 
Chinese Communist Party of the House of Representa-
tives was briefed by a set of senior interagency officials 
to discuss these matters. 
(9) On March 22, 2023, elements of the intelligence 
community provided a classified briefing on the threat to 
members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives and leadership 
for the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives. 
(10) On April 26, 2023, the executive branch pro-
vided a classified briefing on the threat to members of 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
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(11) On June 5, 2023, the executive branch pro-
vided a classified briefing on the threat to staff of the 
Committee on Banking of the Senate and the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(12) In June 2023, at the request of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the intelligence community provided a classi-
fied threat briefing open to all Members of the House of 
Representatives. 
(13) On November 15, 2023, elements of the intel-
ligence community provided a classified briefing to the 
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on, 
inter alia, the Peoples Republic of China’s conduct of 
global foreign malign influence operations, including 
through platforms such as TikTok. 
Whereas Congress and the executive branch are of one mind 
on the risks presented by TikTok’s data collection prac-
tices: 
(1) On May 15, 2019, the President issued an Exec-
utive Order on Securing the Information and Commu-
nications Technology and Services Supply Chain, which 
stated that ‘‘unrestricted acquisition or use in the United 
States of information and communications technology or 
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied 
by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the ju-
risdiction or direction of foreign adversaries . . . con-
stitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the na-
tional security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States’’. 
(2) On June 9, 2021, the President issued an Exec-
utive Order on Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data 
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from Foreign Adversaries, which stated that ‘‘[f]oreign 
adversary access to large repositories of United States 
persons’ data also presents a significant risk.’’ The EO 
stated that ‘‘the United States must act to protect 
against the risks associated with connected software ap-
plications that are designed, developed, manufactured, or 
supplied by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to 
the jurisdiction or direction of, a foreign adversary’’. 
(3) In May 2019, in connection with a review by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS), a company based in the PRC agreed to divest 
its interest in a popular software application reportedly 
due to concerns relating to potential access by the PRC 
to American user data from the application. 
(4) On July 8, 2020, then-National Security Advi-
sor, Robert O’Brien, stated that the CCP uses TikTok 
and other PRC-owned applications to collect personal, 
private, and intimate data on Americans to use ‘‘for ma-
lign purposes’’. 
(5) On August 14, 2020, the President found ‘‘there 
is credible evidence . . . that ByteDance, Ltd. . . . 
might take action that threatens to impair the national 
security of the United States’’. 
(6) In February 2023, the Deputy Attorney General, 
Lisa Monaco, stated, ‘‘Our intelligence community has 
been very clear about [the CCP’s] efforts and intention 
to mold the use of [TikTok] using data in a worldview 
that is completely inconsistent with our own.’’. Deputy 
Attorney General Monaco also stated, ‘‘I don’t use 
TikTok and I would not advise anybody to do so because 
of [national security] concerns’’. 
(7) On July 13, 2022, Federal Communications 
Commission Commissioner, Brendan Carr, testified be-
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fore the Subcommittee on National Security of the Com-
mittee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Rep-
resentatives that ‘‘there is a unique set of national secu-
rity concerns when it comes to [TikTok]’’. 
(8) On March 23, 2023, the Secretary of State, 
Antony Blinken, testified before the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives that TikTok 
is a threat to national security that should be ‘‘ended one 
way or another’’. 
Whereas the executive branch has sought to address the risks 
identified above through requiring ByteDance to divest 
its ownership of TikTok: 
(1) On August 14, 2020, the President issued an 
Executive order directing ByteDance to divest any assets 
or property used to enable or support ByteDance’s oper-
ation of the TikTok application in the United States and 
any data obtained or derived from TikTok application or 
Musical.ly application users in the United States. The 
Order, however, remains the subject of litigation. 
(2) On August 6, 2020, the President issued an Ex-
ecutive order (E.O. 13942) that directed the Secretary of 
Commerce to take actions that would have prohibited cer-
tain transactions related to TikTok in 45 days if 
ByteDance failed to divest its ownership of TikTok. The 
companies and content creators using the TikTok mobile 
application filed lawsuits challenging those prohibitions, 
as a result of which two district courts issued preliminary 
injunctions enjoining the prohibitions. 
(3) Following the multiple judicial rulings that en-
joined the executive branch from enforcing the regula-
tions contemplated in E.O. 13942, on June 9, 2021, the 
President issued a new Executive order that rescinded 
E.O. 13942, and directed the Secretary of Commerce to 
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more broadly assess and take action, where possible, 
against connected software applications that pose a 
threat to national security. 
Whereas Congress has passed, and the executive branch has 
implemented, a ban on ByteDance-controlled applications 
like TikTok from Government devices because of the na-
tional security threat such applications pose; even so, the 
application’s widespread popularity limits the effective-
ness of this step: 
(1) Prior to 2022, several Federal agencies, includ-
ing the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland 
Security, had issued orders banning TikTok on devices 
for which those specific agencies are responsible. 
(2) On December 29, 2022, following its adoption by 
Congress, the President signed into law a bill banning 
the use of TikTok on Government devices due to the na-
tional security threat posed by the application under its 
current ownership. 
(3) A majority of States in the United States have 
also banned TikTok on State government devices due to 
the national security threat posed by the application 
under its current ownership. 
(4) To date, as long as TikTok is subject to the 
ownership or control of ByteDance, no alternative to pre-
venting or prohibiting TikTok’s operation of the applica-
tion in the United States has been identified that would 
be sufficient to address the above-identified risks. 
(5) The national security risks arise from and are 
related to the ownership or control of TikTok by a for-
eign adversary controlled company. Severing ties to such 
foreign adversary controlled company, for example by a 
full divestment, would mitigate such risks. 
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(6) As has been widely reported, TikTok, Inc. has 
proposed an alternative, a proposal referred to as 
‘‘Project Texas,’’ which is an initiative to try and satisfy 
concerns relating to TikTok’s handling of United States 
user data. 
(A) Under the proposal, United States user 
data would be stored in the United States, using the 
infrastructure of a trusted third party. 
(B) That initiative would have allowed the ap-
plication algorithm, source code, and development 
activities to remain in China under ByteDance’s 
control and subject to PRC laws, albeit subject to 
proposed safeguards relating to cloud infrastructure 
and other data security concerns. Project Texas 
would also have allowed ByteDance to continue to 
have a role in certain aspects of TikTok’s United 
States operations. 
(C) Project Texas would have allowed TikTok 
to continue to rely on the engineers and back-end 
support in China to update its algorithms and the 
source code needed to run the TikTok application in 
the United States. 
(D) Allowing code development in and access to 
United States user data from China potentially ex-
poses United States users to malicious code, back-
door vulnerabilities, surreptitious surveillance, and 
other problematic activities tied to source code devel-
opment. 
(E) Allowing back-end support, code develop-
ment, and operational activities to remain in China 
would also require TikTok to continue to send 
United States user data to China to update the ma-
chine learning algorithms and source code for the 
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application, and to conduct related back-end serv-
ices, like managing users’ accounts. 
(7) On January 31, 2024, the Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified 
before the Select Committee on Strategic Competition be-
tween the United States and the Chinese Communist 
Party of the House of Representatives that TikTok gives 
the PRC ‘‘the ability to control data collection on millions 
of users, which can be used for all sorts of intelligence 
operations or influence operations,’’ and ‘‘the ability, 
should they so choose, to control the software on millions 
of devices, which means the opportunity to technically 
compromise millions of devices’’. 
(8) The risks posed by TikTok’s data collection 
would be addressed by the Protecting Americans from 
Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, despite 
the potential that the PRC might purchase similar types 
of data from private data brokers. 
(9) The degree of risk posed by TikTok has in-
creased alongside the application’s immense popularity in 
the United States. 
Resolved, That the House of Representatives has de-
termined that ByteDance and TikTok pose an unaccept-
able risk to the national security of the United States. 
Æ 
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