H. R. 5531
One Hundred Seventh Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday,
the twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two
An Act
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecu-
tion of the war against areas outside of its control, which
has already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced
more than 4,000,000 people.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored
peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best
chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of
human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian
relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort
to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas
of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan,
the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a
major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese
people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
process. It is critical that credible civil authority and institu-
tions play an important role in the reconstruction of post-
war Sudan.
(6) Through the manipulation of traditional rivalries among
peoples in areas outside of its full control, the Government
of Sudan has used divide-and-conquer techniques effectively
to subjugate its population. However, internationally sponsored
reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
human suffering and the effectiveness of this tactic.
(7) The Government of Sudan utilizes and organizes mili-
tias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for
raiding and enslaving parties in areas outside of the control
of the Government of Sudan in an effort to disrupt severely
the ability of the populations in those areas to sustain them-
selves. The tactic helps minimize the Government of Sudan’s
accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that
it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales
H. R. 5531—2
to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the
areas outside of its control.
(9) By regularly banning air transport relief flights by
the United Nations relief operation OLS, the Government of
Sudan has been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid
by the Sudanese people from the United States and other
donor countries as a devastating weapon of war in the ongoing
effort by the Government of Sudan to starve targeted groups
and subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government’s control.
(10) The acts of the Government of Sudan, including the
acts described in this section, constitute genocide as defined
by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (78 U.N.T.S. 277).
(11) The efforts of the United States and other donors
in delivering relief and assistance through means outside of
OLS have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies
in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan’s manipulation
of food donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(12) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan
facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the
population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption
of their ability to sustain themselves.
(13) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al
Ghazal and the Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions have
been excluded completely from relief distribution by OLS, con-
sequently placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
(14) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000
per day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the
immediate food needs of the recipients, the current inter-
national relief operations are neither sustainable nor desirable
in the long term.
(15) The ability of populations to defend themselves against
attack in areas outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan has been severely compromised by the disengagement
of the front-line states of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda, fos-
tering the belief among officials of the Government of Sudan
that success on the battlefield can be achieved.
(16) The United States should use all means of pressure
available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war
in Sudan, including—
(A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic
tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into
a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil
authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside of
government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-people rec-
onciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of
government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide
humanitarian relief to those areas; and
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the
United States and within multilateral institutions toward
those ends.