IV 
108TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 398
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development of the means 
to produce nuclear weapons. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 25, 2004
Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, 
Mr. BLUNT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SHERMAN, and Mr. CHABOT) submitted 
the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
on International Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s development 
of the means to produce nuclear weapons.
Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert 
the international community to Iran’s covert nuclear ac-
tivities in support of an intention to develop a nuclear 
weapon, contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); 
Whereas Iran’s covert activities to develop the means to 
produce nuclear weapons are finally beginning to be re-
vealed to the international community; 
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot 
Fuel Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel
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Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz until 
February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facil-
ity was revealed by an opposition group; 
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant 
could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nu-
clear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years; 
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment 
Facility could, when completed, produce enough highly 
enriched uranium for as many as 25–30 nuclear weapons 
per year; 
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General 
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obli-
gations under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 
to report all nuclear material imported into Iran—specifi-
cally, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from 
China in 1991—the processing and use of that material, 
and the facilities involved in the use and processing of 
the material; 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obliga-
tions under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce 
nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving 
questions about its nuclear activities; 
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board 
of Governors in August 2003 that, after further inves-
tigation, Iran failed to disclose additional nuclear activi-
ties as required by its Safeguards Agreement and contin-
ued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared ura-
nium enrichment activities;
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Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 
2003, called on Iran to suspend all further uranium en-
richment and any plutonium reprocessing activities, dis-
close all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with 
the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the 
Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the 
application of safeguards to strengthen investigation of 
all nuclear activities within Iran, and requested all third 
countries to cooperate closely and fully with the Agency 
in resolving questions about Iran’s nuclear program; 
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront 
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear 
activities; 
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director Gen-
eral of the IAEA, Iran finally confirmed that it had con-
ducted research on uranium conversion processes at the 
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the Tehran Nu-
clear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such 
activities; 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Min-
isters of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated that it 
had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and re-
processing activities as defined by the IAEA; 
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspec-
ified nuclear technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied 
international concerns about its nuclear development pro-
gram; 
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran 
further admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment 
centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between
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1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported 
uranium hexafluoride from China; 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a 
laser uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 
kg of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA, an-
other violation of its Safeguards Agreement; 
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had 
irradiated 7 kg of uranium dioxide targets and reproc-
essed them to extract plutonium, another violation of its 
legal obligation to disclose such activities under its Safe-
guards Agreement; 
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it 
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol agreement 
for further safeguards, and would act in accordance with 
the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-force; 
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the 
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all 
enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to 
produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not 
to import enrichment related items; 
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic ac-
tivities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and con-
fronted Iran in numerous lies about its nuclear activities; 
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the 
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that 
Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities 
from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its obliga-
tions under its Safeguards Agreement; 
Whereas despite Iran’s subsequent pledge to, once again, 
fully disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the 
Director General of the IAEA, in his report of February
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Iran would present a ‘‘full picture of its nuclear activi-
ties’’ and ‘‘full transparency’’; 
(2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 
2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding 
issues; and 
(3) its statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors 
of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full trans-
parency and to ‘‘leave no stone unturned’’ to assure the 
IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed 
to a nuclear weapons program; 
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and tech-
nology, and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nu-
clear black market that Iran has used, raising the ques-
tion of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon 
design that it has refused to reveal to international in-
spectors; 
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian 
Federation has recently announced that it will soon con-
clude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear 
fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring the 
need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear 
weapons development program; 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of March 
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with 
‘‘serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in 
October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final 
picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme 
considered essential by the Board’s November 2003 reso-
lution’’, and also noted that the Agency has discovered 
that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associ-
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ated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two 
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment pro-
gram; and designs for hot cells to handle highly radio-
active materials; 
Whereas the same resolution also noted ‘‘with equal concern 
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the de-
velopment of its enrichment technology to its current ex-
tent, and that a number of other questions remain unre-
solved, including the sources of all HEU contamination 
in Iran; the location, extent and nature of work under-
taken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the 
nature, extent, and purpose of activities involving the 
planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support 
claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experi-
ments’’; 
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that 
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a 
protest against the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution 
of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed 
to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension 
calls into serious question Iran’s commitment to full 
transparency about its nuclear activities; and 
Whereas Iran’s pattern of deception and concealment in deal-
ing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the international 
community, its receipt from other countries of the means 
to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also vio-
lated its legal obligation under article II of the NPT not 
to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weap-
ons: Now, therefore, be it
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Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), That the Congress—
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms 
Iran’s continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the international community about its nuclear pro-
grams and activities; 
(2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
including the United States, to use all appropriate 
means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from ac-
quiring nuclear weapons, including ending all nu-
clear and other cooperation with Iran (including the 
provision of dual use items), until Iran fully imple-
ments the Additional Protocol between Iran and the 
IAEA for the application of safeguards; 
(3) declares that Iran, through its many 
breaches for 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted 
with development of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially 
with uranium conversion and enrichment and pluto-
nium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facili-
ties; 
(4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran’s 
nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-
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weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in 
the report of February 24, 2004, by the Director 
General of the IAEA, along with the statement by 
the Government of Iran that it will not disclose 
other research programs, constitute ample evidence 
of Iran’s continuing policy of noncompliance with 
the letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safe-
guards Agreement and the Additional Protocol; 
(5) demands that Iran immediately and perma-
nently cease all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle 
capabilities and to immediately, unconditionally, and 
permanently cease all nuclear enrichment activities, 
including manufacturing and importing related 
equipment; 
(6) demands that Iran honor its stated commit-
ments and legal obligations to grant the IAEA in-
spectors full unrestricted access and cooperate fully 
with the investigation of its nuclear activities and 
demonstrate a new openness and honesty about all 
its nuclear programs; 
(7) contrasts Iran’s behavior with Libya’s, in 
which Libya’s decision to renounce and dismantle its 
nuclear weapons program and to provide full, com-
plete, and transparent disclosure of all its nuclear 
activities has enabled the IAEA to rapidly under-
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stand and verify with high confidence the extent and 
scope of Libya’s program; 
(8) calls upon the members of the European 
Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multi-
lateral trade agreements until such time that Iran 
has verifiably and permanently ceased all nuclear 
weapons development activity, including a permanent 
cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing activities; 
(9) further calls upon the European Union to 
consider what further measures, including sanctions, 
may be necessary to persuade Iran to fulfill its obli-
gations and commitments to the IAEA; 
(10) in light of ongoing revelations of the non-
compliance of the Government of Iran regarding its 
obligations under the NPT and pledges to the IAEA, 
and in light of the consequent and ongoing questions 
and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, and 
the international community regarding Iran’s mili-
tary nuclear activities—
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese 
commercial entities not proceed with the devel-
opment of Iran’s Azadegan oil field; 
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure 
that French and Malaysian commercial entities