•HRES 827 IH 
Whereas the CCP has codified into law its authority to inter-
fere in and influence the operations of companies oper-
ating within and outside of the PRC and demand access 
to any data stored in or transiting through its network 
equipment; 
Whereas Article 30 of the CCP Constitution requires a CCP 
cell to be formed in any company where there are three 
of more CCP members; 
Whereas Article 15 of Regulations of the CCP on the Work 
of Grassroots Organizations in State Owned Enterprise 
requires all important operating and management issues 
to be discussed by the Party Committee, and only after 
be decided on by the board of directors or management; 
Whereas Article 19 of China’s Company Law requires every 
company to establish a CCP cell and carry out CCP ac-
tivities and to provide necessary conditions for CCP cell 
activities; 
Whereas Article 26 of the Guideline on Improving Business 
Conditions for Private Enterprises calls on private busi-
nesses to support Party construction; 
Whereas, in addition to inserting itself directly into company 
operations through CCP cells and ownership stakes, the 
CCP is erecting a legal and regulatory system that in ef-
fect gives it direct influence over a company’s operations 
and access to all its personal and business information, 
thereby turning nominally private companies into re-
sources for and tools of the CCP; 
Whereas the PRC’s National Security Law declares nearly 
any issue—from the economy to technology and informa-
tion to ideology—a matter of national security and intel-
ligence work; 
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•HRES 827 IH 
Whereas the PRC’s Cybersecurity Law gives the CCP expan-
sive powers over how information technology products are 
approved and where data and information are stored, in-
cluding— 
(1) Articles 22 and 23 which require network prod-
ucts and services to adhere to mandatory national stand-
ards and obtain certain certifications, many of which re-
quire the disclosure of proprietary information, such as 
source code, and the use of indigenously innovated Chi-
nese intellectual property; 
(2) Article 28 which mandates any network operator 
to provide technical support and assistance to public se-
curity and national security organs; and 
(3) Article 37 which sets forth broad requirements 
for data and information to be stored within the bound-
aries of the PRC; 
Whereas the National Intelligence Law gives Chinese intel-
ligence agencies authority to compel private companies to 
support intelligence operations, including Article 7, which 
requires an organization or citizen to support, assist, and 
cooperate with state intelligence work, and Article 14, 
which demands that organizations provide support, as-
sistance, and cooperation to intelligence organs; 
Whereas Article 22 of China’s Counterespionage Law states 
that when agencies are investigating espionage activities 
and collecting evidence, organizations and individuals 
must not refuse to provide it information; 
Whereas Article 18 of the Anti-Terrorism Law states that 
telecommunications business operators and internet serv-
ice providers shall provide technical interfaces, decryp-
tion, and other technical support and assistance for pub-
lic security organs and state security organs to prevent 
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•HRES 827 IH 
and investigate terrorist activities in accordance with the 
law; 
Whereas Article 31 of the Encryption Law provides for gov-
ernment inspections of commercial encryption that, when 
used in concert with other laws and regulations, could re-
sult in full access of encrypted servers and decryption 
keys by the CCP; 
Whereas several provisions in the Ministry of Public Security 
Regulation on Internet Security Supervision and Inspec-
tion give security organs the right to conduct onsite and 
remote inspections of company networks—including tech-
nical aspects of its operations and the data and informa-
tion stored on its servers—and allows authorities to copy 
any information on corporate servers; 
Whereas these and other laws, regulations, and standards 
combined with the Internet+ initiative, the social credit 
system for individuals and companies, and other indus-
trial and sector-specific plans form the foundation for the 
PRC’s authoritarian digital governance model that it is 
aggressively exporting around the world; 
Whereas the PRC’s authoritarian model puts absolute control 
of the digital economy, including its hardware, software, 
algorithms, encryption, data, and other proprietary infor-
mation, into the hands of the CCP, removing any sem-
blance of privacy; and 
Whereas General Secretary Xi Jinping has said ‘‘high-end 
technology is the weapon of a modern country’’ and the 
CCP has clearly demonstrated its ambition to attack 
global markets with its products and services to make the 
world safe for its authoritarian model and dependent on 
its technologies: Now, therefore, be it 
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•HRES 827 IH 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that— 
(1) the Parliament of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland is encouraged to 
reject or amend the National Security Council’s deci-
sion on telecommunications security in a manner 
that excludes high-risk vendors, such as Huawei, 
from the country’s 5G infrastructure; 
(2) Huawei’s track-record of illegal and corrupt 
behavior is endemic to their operations; 
(3) whether state-owned or nominally private, 
all Chinese companies, including Huawei, operate 
within a political and regulatory environment that 
removes their ability to act independently from or to 
refuse requests by the CCP; 
(4) this distinct state-led economy and com-
munist political system removes independent cor-
porate governance and obscures the true nature of 
Chinese corporate entities, harming the transparency 
needed to maintain the international rules-based sys-
tem; 
(5) fifth-generation telecommunications net-
works that incorporate products and services devel-
oped by Chinese companies face significant techno-
logical, political, ethical, and geopolitical risk; and 
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•HRES 827 IH 
(6) the United States Government and its allies 
and partners must work expeditiously to develop and 
implement a concerted strategy, using all tools avail-
able, to combat what amounts to legal warfare by 
the Chinese government to weaponize its companies 
when needed. 
Æ 
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