1505 
(20) On February 28, 2020, Dr. Mitch Wolfe, 
the Chief Medical Officer of the CDC, said, ‘‘Stigma 
is the enemy of public health’’. 
(21) On March 10, 2020, Dr. Robert Redfield, 
the Director of the CDC, testified that use of the 
term ‘‘Chinese coronavirus’’ is wrong and inappro-
priate. 
(22) On January 26, 2021, President Biden 
issued a Presidential Memorandum ‘‘Condemning 
and Combating Racism, Xenophobia, and Intoler-
ance Against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders 
in the United States’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress as follows: 
(1) The use of anti-Asian terminology and rhet-
oric related to COVID–19, such as the ‘‘Chinese 
Virus’’, ‘‘Wuhan Virus’’, and ‘‘Kung-flu’’, has per-
petuated anti-Asian stigma. 
(2) The use of anti-Asian rhetoric has resulted 
in Asian Americans being harassed, assaulted, and 
scapegoated for the COVID–19 pandemic. 
(3) The reprehensible attacks on people of 
Asian descent and the concerning increase in anti- 
Asian sentiment and racism in the United States
1506 
and around the world have no place in a peaceful, 
civilized, and tolerant world. 
(4) The United States is a diverse country with 
a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength 
and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by 
the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its 
citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is-
landers. 
(5) The United States Government should en-
courage foreign governments to use the official and 
scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as 
recommended by the World Health Organization and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
(6) The United States Government and other 
governments around the world must actively oppose 
racism and intolerance, and use all available and ap-
propriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian 
racism and discrimination. 
SEC. 30314. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE 
SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL 
ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 
Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 
the end;
1507 
(2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the pe-
riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(13) wherever applicable, instances in which 
the government of each country has attempted to 
extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company 
or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its 
employees, contractors, customers, or associated 
staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in 
such country, or sought retaliation against such em-
ployees or contractors for the same, including any 
instance in which the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China has sought to extraterritorially 
censor or punish speech that is otherwise legal in the 
United States on the topics of— 
‘‘(A) repression and violation of funda-
mental freedoms in Hong Kong; 
‘‘(B) repression and persecution of reli-
gious and ethnic minorities in China, including 
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
and the Tibet Autonomous Region; 
‘‘(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveil-
lance technologies to surveil activists, journal-
ists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons 
of different ethnicities; and
1508 
‘‘(D) other gross violations of human 
rights; and 
‘‘(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a 
company or entity located in or based in a third 
country has censored or self-censored the speech of 
its employees, contractors, customers, or associated 
staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each 
country or sought to retaliate against such employ-
ees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure 
from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign gov-
ernment.’’. 
SEC. 30315. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER 
GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER 
GAMES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the 
United Nations Third Committee of the General As-
sembly appealed for action on the mass arbitrary de-
tentions and other crimes against the Uyghur Mus-
lim population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region. 
(2) The 2018 concluding observations of the 
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination decried reports of mass arbi-
trary detention of Uyghurs.
1509 
(3) Over 400 international nongovernmental or-
ganizations have joined together to decry the mass 
arbitrary detentions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
(4) The Olympic Charter states that the prac-
tice of sport ‘‘is a human right’’ that ‘‘shall be se-
cured without discrimination of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status’’, a right that by 
definition cannot be secured in a country in which 
over 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps be-
cause of their race, language, and religion. 
(5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accom-
panied by widespread tracking, arrest, and intimida-
tion of foreign journalists and bloggers, as well as 
restrictions on movement of journalists, contrary to 
explicit commitments made by the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Inter-
national Olympic Committee. 
(6) The Government of the PRC denied visas 
for some journalists granted press accreditation for 
the 
2008 
Olympic 
Games, 
and 
the 
Beijing 
Organising Committee of the Olympic Games repeat-
1510 
edly refused to address incidents involving freedom 
of expression. 
(7) The International Olympic Committee faced 
broad criticism for failing to adequately anticipate 
infringements by the Government of the PRC’s on 
freedom of expression and press for international 
media and 2008 Olympics participants, and failing 
to hold the Government of the PRC to their own 
commitments to safeguard human rights during the 
2008 games. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the International Olympic Committee should— 
(1) consider that the Olympic Charter’s prin-
ciples of solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard to 
reconcile with holding the 2022 Winter Games in a 
country the government of which stands credibly ac-
cused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and 
genocide against ethnic and religious minorities; 
(2) take into account the recent precedent of 
the 2008 games, at which Olympic athletes, spec-
tators, and international media had their funda-
mental freedoms severely challenged, and the likely 
limitations the Government of the PRC will seek to 
enforce on participants speaking out about ongoing 
persecution of the Uyghurs and other human rights
1511 
abuses in the PRC, despite repeated commitments 
by the Government of the PRC; 
(3) emphasize that the International Olympic 
Committee is not opposed to moving an Olympic 
competition in all circumstances, and should imme-
diately rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be 
hosted by a country that recognizes and respects 
human rights; 
(4) develop a framework for reprimanding or 
disqualifying host cities and the countries in which 
they are located if the governments of such countries 
are actively committing mass atrocities— 
(A) during the Olympic and Paralympic 
bidding process; or 
(B) between a city’s election as a host city 
and 
the 
duration 
of 
the 
Olympic 
and 
Paralympic Games that its government is 
hosting; 
(5) affirm the International Olympic Commit-
tee’s— 
(A) desire to stay above politics does not 
permit turning a blind eye to mass atrocity 
crimes, which cannot and should not be dis-
missed as mere political concerns; and
1512 
(B) commitment to the fundamental rights 
instruments of the international system, which 
are beyond partisan or domestic policy, and 
upon which the success of the entire Olympic 
project depends; 
(6) not hold future Olympic games in countries 
that are committing genocide; 
(7) propose a set of clear, executable actions to 
be taken by the International Olympic Committee 
upon infringement of freedom of expression by a 
host country’s government during any Olympics 
event, including the 2022 Winter Olympics, against 
athletes, participants, and international media; and 
(8) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, 
which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes 
when competing during Olympics events, and affirm 
the rights of athletes to political and other speech 
during athletic competitions, including speech that is 
critical of their host countries. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States— 
(1) to implement a presidential and cabinet 
level diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter 
Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in 
the PRC;
1513 
(2) to encourage other nations, especially demo-
cratic partners and allies, to do the same; and 
(3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist 
Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the 
Uyghur genocide. 
SEC. 30316. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS 
WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to use export controls to the extent nec-
essary to further the protection of internationally recog-
nized human rights. 
(b) REVIEW OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES 
TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
as appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and the heads of other Federal agencies as appro-
priate, shall conduct a review of items subject to controls 
for crime control reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the 
Export Administration Regulations. 
(c) CONTROLS.—In furtherance of the policy set forth 
in subsection (a), not later than 60 days after completing 
the review required by subsection (b), the Secretary, in 
coordination with the heads of other Federal agencies as
1514 
appropriate, shall determine whether additional export 
controls are needed to protect human rights, including 
whether— 
(1) controls for crime control reasons pursuant 
to section 742.7 of the Export Administration Regu-
lations should be imposed on additional items, in-
cluding items with critical capabilities to enable 
human rights abuses involving— 
(A) censorship or social control; 
(B) surveillance, interception, or restriction 
of communications; 
(C) monitoring or restricting access to or 
use of the internet; 
(D) identification of individuals through 
facial or voice recognition or biometric indica-
tors; or 
(E) DNA sequencing; or 
(2) end-use and end-user controls should be im-
posed on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer 
of certain items with critical capabilities to enable 
human rights abuses that are subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations if the person seeking to 
export, reexport, or transfer the item has knowledge, 
or the Secretary determines and so informs that per-
1515 
son, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use 
the item to enable human rights abuses. 
(d) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES.—Upon re-
quest from the Secretary, the head of a Federal agency 
shall provide full support and cooperation to the Secretary 
in carrying out this section. 
(e) INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION ON CONTROLS 
TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.—It shall be the policy of 
the United States to seek to secure the cooperation of 
other governments to impose export controls that are con-
sistent, to the extent possible, with the controls imposed 
under this section. 
(f) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress (including the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate) a report on the matters covered by 
this section. The report shall be submitted in unclassified 
form, but may include a classified annex. 
(g) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1752(2)(A) 
of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20 
4811(2)(A)) is amended— 
(1) in clause (iv), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and insert-
ing a semicolon;
1516 
(2) in clause (v), by striking the period and in-
serting ‘‘; or’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(vi) serious human rights abuses.’’. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) END-USER; KNOWLEDGE; ULTIMATE CON-
SIGNEE.—The terms ‘‘end-user’’, ‘‘knowledge’’, and 
‘‘ultimate consignee’’ have the meanings given those 
terms in section 772.1 of the Export Administration 
Regulations. 
(2) EXPORT; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGU-
LATIONS; 
IN-COUNTRY
TRANSFER; 
ITEM; 
REEX-
PORT.—The terms ‘‘export’’, ‘‘Export Administra-
tion Regulations’’, ‘‘in-country transfer’’, ‘‘item’’, 
and ‘‘reexport’’ have the meanings given those terms 
in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act 
of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). 
(3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of Commerce. 
SEC. 30317. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT 
CONTROL POLICY. 
It is the sense of Congress that the President should 
reexamine United States commercial export control policy 
for any country, including the People’s Republic of China, 
that is known to supply arms or dual use items to any
1517 
country the government of which has been designated pur-
suant to any applicable provision of law as a state sponsor 
of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary 
of State as a foreign terrorist organization. 
SEC. 30318. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION, 
FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 
CONTRACEPTIVE 
IMPLANTATION 
IN 
THE 
XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur 
Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 
22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by inserting after sub-
paragraph (E) the following: 
‘‘(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, 
forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
implantation policies and practices.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
ment made by subsection (a)— 
(1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of 
this Act; and 
(2) applies with respect to the first report re-
quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date 
of enactment.
1518 
SEC. 30319. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP 
OF POLITICAL SPEECH. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China censors po-
litical speech of throughout the country through 
many means including through mass censorship of 
the Internet, the Great Firewall, radical curtailment 
of the freedom of the press. 
(2) The PRC employs several other means to 
stifle dissent including instigating private person to 
target dissenting individuals and private companies 
to target offending companies. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) censorship of political speech in China is 
contrary to the human rights of the Chinese people; 
(2) censorship of political speech, whether con-
ducted by the government, or private or quasi-pri-
vate entities is antithetical to United States values 
and interests; and 
(3) the democratic way to conduct political dis-
putes is through argument and persuasion, not force 
or political speech.
1519 
SEC. 30320. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
OF 
CHINA 
EXPLOITS 
HONG 
KONG 
TO 
CIRCUMVENT 
UNITED 
STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS. 
Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act 
of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding 
at the end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
OF 
CHINA 
EXPLOITS 
HONG 
KONG 
TO 
CIRCUMVENT 
UNITED 
STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary 
of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the manner and extent to which 
the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong 
to circumvent the laws and protections of the United 
States. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
‘‘(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com-
merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 
Director of National Intelligence— 
‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
United States export controls; and
1520 
‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 
which the Government of China used Hong 
Kong to circumvent such controls during the re-
porting period. 
‘‘(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce— 
‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
duties on merchandise exported to the United 
States from the People’s Republic of China; and 
‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 
which the Government of China used Hong 
Kong to circumvent such duties during the re-
porting period. 
‘‘(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
the Director of National Intelligence— 
‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
sanctions imposed by the United States or pur-
suant to multilateral regimes; and 
‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 
which the Government of China used Hong 
Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the 
reporting period.
1521 
‘‘(4) In consultation with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Director of National In-
telligence, an assessment of how the Government of 
China uses formal or informal means to extradite or 
coercively move individuals, including United States 
persons, from Hong Kong to the People’s Republic 
of China. 
‘‘(5) In consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
Director of Homeland Security— 
‘‘(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, 
security, and law enforcement agencies of the 
Government of China, including the Ministry of 
State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, 
and the People’s Armed Police, use the Hong 
Kong Security Bureau and other security agen-
cies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on for-
eign nationals, including United States persons, 
conduct influence operations, or violate civil lib-
erties guaranteed under the laws of Hong 
Kong; and 
‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents of 
such espionage, influence operations, or viola-
tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe-
riod.
1522 
‘‘(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.— 
‘‘(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified index. 
‘‘(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion 
of the report required by subsection (a) shall be 
posted on a publicly available internet website of the 
Department of State. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’ means— 
‘‘(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; and 
‘‘(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Financial Services, the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
House of Representatives. 
‘‘(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign 
national’ means a person that is neither—
1523 
‘‘(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
tional of the People’s Republic of China; or 
‘‘(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-
tion within the People’s Republic of China. 
‘‘(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting 
period’ means the 5-year period preceding submis-
sion of the report required by subsection (a). 
‘‘(4) UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The term 
‘United States person’ means— 
‘‘(A) a United States citizen or an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence to 
the United States; or 
‘‘(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
the United States or of any jurisdiction within 
the United States, including a foreign branch of 
such an entity.’’. 
SEC. 30321. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL 
COUNTRY 
REPORTS 
ON 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
PRACTICES. 
It is the sense of Congress that the Department of 
State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Prac-
tices should include relevant information regarding wheth-
er a particular country has provided assistance to the PRC 
or any entity under the influence of the Chinese Com-
1524 
munist Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, includ-
ing through the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the 
PRC without reasonable opportunity for them to be as-
sessed and protected as refugees. 
SEC. 30322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREE-
DOM IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the People’s Re-
public of China maintains one of the worst media environ-
ments in the world and seeks to curtail political speech 
inside and outside the country, including by— 
(1) targeting independent and foreign media in 
China through systematic harassment including the 
denial of visas to foreign journalists, imprisonment, 
the denial of medical care to imprisoned journalists, 
and curtailing access to legal representation; 
(2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online 
and social media content, including through the ban-
ning of virtual private networks; 
(3) using the full force of the State to stifle in-
ternal dissent including dissent online, particularly 
dissent that could lead to political change and con-
tent that criticizes China’s leaders, however trivial, 
reportedly even to the point of censoring compari-
sons of Xi Jingping’s looks with Winnie the Pooh;
1525 
(4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences 
through the United Front Work Department and re-
lated activities; 
(5) seeking to intimidate American-based jour-
nalists working for Radio Free Asia and reporting 
on gross human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region by jailing or otherwise 
harassing members of their families; and 
(6) championing a ‘‘sovereign Internet’’ model 
and exporting technology to enhance the ability of 
like-minded authoritarian regimes to suppress dis-
sent online and monitor the activity of their people. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the freedom of the press is an unalienable 
right that is necessary for citizens to hold their gov-
ernment to account; 
(2) the PRC should cease its repression of jour-
nalists, citizen journalists, news organizations; and 
(3) the PRC should cease the censorship of po-
litical satire, including comparisons of Xi Jingping’s 
looks with Winnie the Pooh.
1526 
SEC. 30323. UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY FOR XINJIANG 
PROVINCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall es-
tablish within the Department of State the position of 
United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province (in this 
section referred to as the ‘‘Special Envoy’’). 
(b) APPOINTMENT.—The Secretary may appoint an 
individual to the position of Special Envoy from among 
officers and employees of the Department of State. The 
Secretary may allow such officer or employee to retain the 
position (and the responsibilities associated with such po-
sition) held by such officer or employee prior to the ap-
pointment of such officer or employee to the position of 
Special Envoy. 
(c) DUTIES.—The Special Envoy shall coordinate 
diplomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assist-
ance, sanctions, counterterrorism, security resources, and 
congressional reporting requirements within the United 
States Government to respond to the gross violations of 
universally recognized human rights occurring in Xinjiang 
Province of the People’s Republic of China, including by 
addressing— 
(1) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other 
predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities; 
(2) the deployment of technologically advanced 
surveillance and police detection methods; and
1527 
(3) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism 
claims used to justify the policies of the Chinese 
Government in Xinjiang Province. 
SEC. 30324. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION 
GROUP. 
(a) REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF 
UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.— 
(1) REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter 
into an agreement with a qualified research en-
tity that is independent of the Department of 
State to write a report on censorship and in-
timidation in the United States and its posses-
sions and territories of United States persons, 
including United States companies that conduct 
business in the People’s Republic of China, 
which is directed or directly supported by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China. 
(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The re-
port required under subparagraph (A) shall— 
(i) assess major trends, patterns, and 
methods of the Government of the People’s
1528 
Republic of China’s efforts to direct or di-
rectly support censorship and intimidation 
of United States persons, including United 
States companies that conduct business in 
the People’s Republic of China, which are 
exercising their right to freedom of speech; 
(ii) assess, including through the use 
of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the 
impact on and consequences for United 
States persons, including United States 
companies that conduct business in the 
People’s Republic of China, that criticize— 
(I) the Government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(II) 
the 
Chinese 
Communist 
Party; 
(III) the authoritarian model of 
government of the People’s Republic 
of China; or 
(IV) a particular policy advanced 
by the Chinese Communist Party or 
the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China;
1529 
(iii) identify the implications for the 
United States of the matters described in 
clauses (i) and (ii); 
(iv) assess the methods and evaluate 
the efficacy of the efforts by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to 
limit freedom of expression in the private 
sector, including with respect to media, so-
cial media, film, education, travel, financial 
services, sports and entertainment, tech-
nology, telecommunication, and internet in-
frastructure interests; 
(v) include policy recommendations 
for the United States Government, includ-
ing recommendations regarding collabora-
tion with United States allies and partners, 
to address censorship and intimidation by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China; and 
(vi) include policy recommendations 
for 
United 
States 
persons, 
including 
United States companies that conduct 
business in China, to address censorship 
and intimidation by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China.
1530 
(C) APPLICABILITY
TO
UNITED
STATES 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent prac-
ticable, the report required under subparagraph 
(A) should identify implications and policy rec-
ommendations that are relevant to United 
States allies and partners facing censorship and 
intimidation directed or directly supported by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall submit the report writ-
ten by the qualified research entity selected 
pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appro-
priate congressional committees. 
(B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to 
in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to 
the public online through relevant United 
States Government websites. 
(3) FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT.—The 
Secretary of State and other Federal agencies se-
lected by the President shall provide the qualified re-
search entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) 
with timely access to appropriate information, data,
1531 
resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to 
write the report described in paragraph (1) in a 
thorough and independent manner. 
(b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR
AND ACTION 
GROUP.— 
(1) CERTIFICATION.—Upon receipt and review 
of the report described in subsection (a), the Presi-
dent shall make a determination on whether the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China en-
gages in the censorship and intimidation of United 
States persons, including United States companies 
that conduct business in the People’s Republic of 
China, which are exercising their right to freedom of 
speech, taking into account the contents of the re-
port and other information available to the govern-
ment of the United States. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—If there is a determination 
under paragraph (1) that the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China engages in the censorship 
and intimidation of United States persons, including 
United States companies that conduct business in 
the People’s Republic of China, which are exercising 
their right to freedom of speech, the President shall 
establish an interagency task force, which shall be 
known as the ‘‘China Censorship Monitor and Action
1532 
Group’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Task 
Force’’). 
(3) MEMBERSHIP.—If, upon receipt and review 
of the report described in subsection (a), he deems 
it in the national interest, the President shall— 
(A) appoint the chair of the Task Force 
from among the staff of the National Security 
Council; 
(B) appoint the vice chair of the Task 
Force from among the staff of the National 
Economic Council; and 
(C) direct the head of each of the following 
executive branch agencies to appoint personnel 
to participate in the Task Force: 
(i) The Department of State. 
(ii) The Department of Commerce. 
(iii) The Department of the Treasury. 
(iv) The Department of Justice. 
(v) The Office of the United States 
Trade Representative. 
(vi) The Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, and other appropriate 
elements of the intelligence community (as 
defined in section 3 of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
1533 
(vii) The Federal Communications 
Commission. 
(viii) The United States Agency for 
Global Media. 
(ix) Other agencies designated by the 
President. 
(4) 
RESPONSIBILITIES.—The 
Task 
Force 
shall— 
(A) oversee the development and execution 
of an integrated Federal Government strategy 
to monitor and address the impacts of efforts 
directed, or directly supported, by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to cen-
sor or intimidate, in the United States or in 
any of its territories, any United States person, 
including United States companies that conduct 
business in the People’s Republic of China, 
which are exercising their right to freedom of 
speech; and 
(B) submit the strategy developed pursu-
ant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate 
congressional committees not later than 120 
days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
1534 
(5) MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet 
not less frequently than twice per year. 
(6) CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should 
regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-
priate, with— 
(A) Federal agencies that are not rep-
resented on the Task Force; 
(B) independent agencies of the United 
States Government that are not represented on 
the Task Force; 
(C) relevant stakeholders in the private 
sector and the media; and 
(D) relevant stakeholders among United 
States allies and partners facing similar chal-
lenges related to censorship or intimidation by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(7) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) ANNUAL
REPORT.—The Task Force 
shall submit an annual report to the appro-
priate congressional committees that describes, 
with respect to the reporting period— 
(i) the strategic objectives and policies 
pursued by the Task Force to address the 
challenges of censorship and intimidation
1535 
of United States persons while in the 
United States or any of its territories, 
which is directed or directly supported by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(ii) the activities conducted by the 
Task Force in support of the strategic ob-
jectives and policies referred to in clause 
(i); and 
(iii) the results of the activities re-
ferred to in clause (ii) and the impact of 
such activities on the national interests of 
the United States. 
(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report sub-
mitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be 
unclassified, but may include a classified annex. 
(C) 
CONGRESSIONAL
BRIEFINGS.—Not 
later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
Task Force shall provide briefings to the appro-
priate congressional committees regarding the 
activities of the Task Force to execute the 
strategy developed pursuant to paragraph 
(3)(A).
1536 
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the 
date that is five years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ includes the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
(2) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term 
‘‘qualified research entity’’ means an entity that— 
(A) is a nonpartisan research organization 
or a federally funded research and development 
center; 
(B) has appropriate expertise and analyt-
ical capability to write the report required 
under subsection (a); and 
(C) is free from any financial, commercial, 
or other entanglements, which could undermine 
the independence of such report or create a 
conflict of interest or the appearance of a con-
flict of interest, with— 
(i) the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China; 
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
1537 
(iii) any company incorporated in the 
People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary 
of such company; or 
(iv) any company or entity incor-
porated outside of the People’s Republic of 
China that is believed to have a substantial 
financial or commercial interest in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
(3) 
UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘United States person’’ means— 
(A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence to the 
United States; or 
(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
the United States or any jurisdiction within the 
United States, including a foreign branch of 
such an entity. 
SEC. 30325. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ON BIS LICENSING INFOR-
MATION. 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives shall make aggregate statistics on licens-
ing information, ensuring all confidential business infor-
mation is protected, for PRC companies on the Entity List 
contained in the Export Administration Regulations avail-
able to the public.
1538 
SEC. 30326. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE PRESI-
DENT UNDER THE EXPORT CONTROL RE-
FORM ACT OF 2018. 
Section 1753(a)(2)(F) of the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4812(a)(2)(F)) is amended by in-
serting ‘‘, security, or’’ before ‘‘intelligence’’. 
SEC. 30327. DETERMINATION WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPO-
SITION OF SANCTIONS ON ENTITIES IN-
VOLVED IN USING UYGHUR FORCED LABOR. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized 
a shipment of 40.31 megawatts of modules manufac-
tured by LONGi Green Energy Technology Co. in 
October 2021 out of the concerns that LONGi used 
forced Uyghur labor in Xinjiang. 
(2) The Department of Commerce added five 
Chinese entities to the entity list for participating in 
using forced Uyghur labor in Xinjiang in June 
2021, these entities include: Hoshine Silicon Indus-
try (Shanshan) Co., Ltd, Xinjiang Daqo New En-
ergy Co., Ltd, Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Met-
als Co., Ltd, and Xinjiang GCL New Energy, 
Xinjiang 
Production 
and 
Construction 
Corps 
(XPCC). 
(3) The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 
2021 (Public Law 116–145), as amended by Public
1539 
Law 117–78, requires the President to impose asset 
blocking sanctions on foreign persons responsible for 
serious human rights abuses in connection with 
forced labor in Xinjiang, China. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
report to the appropriate congressional committees a de-
termination, including a detailed justification, regarding 
whether LONGi Green Energy Technology Co., Hoshine 
Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd, Xinjiang Daqo New 
Energy Co., Ltd, Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals 
Co., Ltd, and Xinjiang GCL New Energy, each meets the 
criteria for designation under section 6 of the Uyghur 
Human Rights Policy Act (Public Law 116–145), as 
amended by section 5 of the Uyghur Forced Labor Pre-
vention Act (Public Law 117–78). 
(c) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION.—The 
report required under this section shall be made available 
on a publicly available website of the Federal Government. 
(d) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the Com-
1540 
mittee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the 
Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices of the House of Representatives. 
TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR 
ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
SEC. 30401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket 
economy like the economy of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC), which has captured such a large 
share of global economic exchange, are in many 
ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated 
and sustained long-term focus and engagement; 
(2) in order to truly address the most detri-
mental aspects of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)- 
directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 
States must adopt policies that— 
(A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-
lectual property theft and mass subsidization of 
Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the
1541 
United States, foreign markets, and the global 
economy; 
(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs 
and consequences for anticompetitive behavior; 
(C) provide options for affected United 
States persons to address and respond to un-
reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in-
dustrial policies; and 
(D) strengthen the protection of critical 
technology and sensitive data, while still fos-
tering an environment that provides incentives 
for secure but open investment, innovation, and 
competition; 
(3) the United States must work with its allies 
and partners and multilateral venues and fora— 
(A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
cepted principles of fair competition and market 
behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive 
economic and industrial policies that undermine 
decades of global growth and innovation; 
(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted 
the same treatment as that of a free-market 
economy until it ceases the implementation of 
laws, regulations, policies, and practices that 
provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur-
1542 
therance of national objectives and impose un-
reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens 
on market-based international commerce; and 
(C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
tor, such as advocating for global rules related 
to transparency and adherence to notification 
requirements, including through the efforts cur-
rently being advanced by the United States, 
Japan, and the European Union; 
(4) the United States and its allies and part-
ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their 
respective companies to cooperate in areas such as— 
(A) advocating for protection of intellectual 
property rights in markets around the world; 
(B) fostering open technical standards; 
and 
(C) increasing joint investments in over-
seas markets; and 
(5) the United States should develop policies 
that— 
(A) insulate United States entities from 
PRC pressure against complying with United 
States laws;
1543 
(B) together with the work of allies and 
partners and multilateral institutions, counter 
the potential impact of the blocking regime of 
the PRC established by the Ministry of Com-
merce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, when 
it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ‘‘Rules 
on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial 
Application of Foreign Legislation and other 
Measures’’; and 
(C) plan for future actions that the Gov-
ernment of the PRC may take to undermine the 
lawful application of United States legal au-
thorities, including with respect to the use of 
sanctions. 
SEC. 30402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS. 
(a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
develop and implement a pilot program for the creation 
of deployable economic defense response teams to help 
provide emergency technical assistance and support to a 
country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic 
measures (in this section referred to as a ‘‘partner coun-
try’’) and to play a liaison role between the legitimate gov-
ernment of that country and the United States Govern-
1544 
ment. Such assistance and support may include the fol-
lowing activities: 
(1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability 
to coercive economic measures. 
(2) Minimizing the damage that such measures 
by an adversary could cause to the partner country. 
(3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral 
contingency plans that may exist for responding to 
the threat or use of such measures. 
(4) In coordination with the partner country, 
developing or improving plans and strategies by the 
country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving 
responses to such measures in the future. 
(5) Assisting the partner country in dealing 
with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure 
or related projects that may undermine the partner 
country’s sovereignty. 
(6) Assisting the partner country in responding 
to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to 
employ economic coercion that undermines the part-
ner country’s sovereignty, including efforts in the 
cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyber-
security or digital security of the partner country or 
initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a
1545 
manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov-
ereignty of the partner country. 
(7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant 
short-to-medium term economic or other assistance 
from the United States and marshalling other re-
sources in support of effective responses to such 
measures. 
(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 
(1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab-
lishment of the pilot program required by subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
other relevant Federal agencies and offices, shall 
provide the appropriate congressional committees 
with a detailed report and briefing describing the 
pilot program, the major elements of the program, 
the personnel and institutions involved, and the de-
gree to which the program incorporates the elements 
described in subsection (a). 
(2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one 
year after the date on which the report required by 
paragraph (1) is submitted, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies 
and offices, shall provide the appropriate congres-
sional committees with a detailed report and briefing 
describing the operations over the previous year of
1546 
the pilot program established pursuant to subsection 
(a), as well as the Secretary’s assessment of its per-
formance and suitability for becoming a permanent 
program. 
(3) FORM.—Each report required under this 
subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex. 
(c) DECLARATION
OF
AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE-
QUIRED.— 
(1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may acti-
vate an economic defense response team for a period 
of 180 days under the authorities of this section to 
assist a partner country in responding to an unusual 
and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an 
adversary of the United States upon the declaration 
of a coercive economic emergency, together with no-
tification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives. 
(2) EXTENSION
AUTHORITY.—The President 
may activate the response team for an additional 
180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis 
to the committees described in paragraph (1) justi-
fying why the continued deployment of the economic 
defense response team in response to the economic
1547 
emergency is in the national security interest of the 
United States. 
(d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this 
section shall expire on December 31, 2026. 
(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority 
to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection 
(d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to 
subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any 
authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President 
other than the authority to activate an economic defense 
response team as described in this section. 
(f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Nat-
ural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nu-
trition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance 
of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agri-
1548 
culture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 
the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 30403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries 
abuse their power to steal assets from state institu-
tions, enrich themselves at the expense of their coun-
tries’ economic development, and use corruption as 
a strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power 
and to undermine democratic institutions abroad. 
(2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness 
of United States businesses, weakens democratic 
governance, 
feeds 
terrorist 
recruitment 
and 
transnational organized crime, enables drug smug-
gling and human trafficking, and stymies economic 
growth. 
(3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate coun-
tries through what appear to be legitimate financial 
transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell 
companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in 
a global shadow economy. 
(4) The Government of the Russian Federation 
is a leading model of this type of kleptocratic sys-
tem, using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode 
democratic governance from within and discredit de-
1549 
mocracy abroad, thereby strengthening the authori-
tarian rule of Vladimir Putin. 
(5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Rus-
sian Federation, often with the backing and encour-
agement of political leadership, use stolen money— 
(A) to purchase key assets in other coun-
tries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic 
control of a sector; 
(B) to gain access to and influence the 
policies of other countries; and 
(C) to advance Russian interests in other 
countries, particularly those that undermine 
confidence and trust in democratic systems. 
(6) Systemic corruption in the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or 
backed by the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the Government of the PRC is 
used— 
(A) to provide unfair advantage to certain 
PRC economic entities; 
(B) to increase other countries’ economic 
dependence on the PRC to secure greater def-
erence to the PRC’s diplomatic and strategic 
goals; and
1550 
(C) to exploit corruption in foreign govern-
ments and among other political elites to enable 
PRC state-backed firms to pursue predatory 
and exploitative economic practices. 
(7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chi-
nese, and other kleptocratic actors requires the 
international community to strengthen democratic 
governance and the rule of law. International co-
operation in combating corruption and illicit finance 
is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering re-
formers in foreign countries during historic political 
openings for the establishment of the rule of law in 
those countries. 
(8) Technical assistance programs that combat 
corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including 
through assistance provided by the Department of 
State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency 
for International Development, and through pro-
grams like the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 
Training and the International Criminal Investiga-
tive Training Assistance Program, can have lasting 
and significant impacts for both foreign and United 
States interests.
1551 
(9) There currently exist numerous inter-
national 
instruments 
to 
combat 
corruption, 
kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including— 
(A) the Inter-American Convention against 
Corruption of the Organization of American 
States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996; 
(B) the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions of the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development, done 
at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘‘Anti-Bribery Convention’’); 
(C) the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, done at New 
York November 15, 2000; 
(D) the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, done at New York October 31, 
2003; 
(E) Recommendation of the Council for 
Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Trans-
actions, adopted November 26, 2009; and 
(F) recommendations of the Financial Ac-
tion Task Force comprising the International 
Standards on Combating Money Laundering
1552 
and the Financing of Terrorism and Prolifera-
tion. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Financial Services, the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘foreign 
assistance’’ means foreign assistance authorized 
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2251 et seq.). 
(3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term ‘‘foreign state’’ 
has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a) 
of title 28, United States Code.
1553 
(4) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The term 
‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 3(4) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 
(5) PUBLIC
CORRUPTION.—The term ‘‘public 
corruption’’ includes the unlawful exercise of en-
trusted public power for private gain, such as 
through bribery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or em-
bezzlement. 
(6) RULE OF LAW.—The term ‘‘rule of law’’ 
means the principle of governance in which all per-
sons, institutions, and entities, whether public or 
private, including the state, are accountable to laws 
that are— 
(A) publicly promulgated; 
(B) equally enforced; 
(C) independently adjudicated; and 
(D) consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to leverage United States diplomatic en-
gagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule 
of law;
1554 
(2)(A) to promote international instruments to 
combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, 
including instruments referred to in subsection 
(a)(9), and other relevant international standards 
and best practices, as such standards and practices 
develop; and 
(B) to promote the adoption and implementa-
tion of such laws, standards, and practices by for-
eign states; 
(3) to support foreign states in promoting good 
governance and combating public corruption; 
(4) to encourage and assist foreign partner 
countries to identify and close loopholes in their 
legal and financial architecture, including the misuse 
of anonymous shell companies and other legal struc-
tures, that are enabling illicit finance to penetrate 
their financial systems; 
(5) to help foreign partner countries to inves-
tigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally 
combat the use of corruption by malign actors, in-
cluding authoritarian governments, particularly the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China, as a tool 
of malign influence worldwide;
1555 
(6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-re-
lated stolen assets for victims, including through the 
use of appropriate bilateral arrangements and inter-
national agreements, such as the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, done at New York 
October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Conven-
tion against Transnational Organized Crime, done at 
New York November 15, 2000; 
(7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the 
Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 
(subtitle F of title XII of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 
7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper-
ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94), to identify 
and take action against corrupt foreign actors; 
(8) to ensure coordination between relevant 
Federal departments and agencies with jurisdiction 
over the advancement of good governance in foreign 
states; and 
(9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of 
like-minded states— 
(A) to coordinate efforts to counter corrup-
tion, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and
1556 
(B) to strengthen collective financial de-
fense. 
(d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 
the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as 
the ‘‘Anti-Corruption Action Fund’’, only for the 
purposes of— 
(A) strengthening the capacity of foreign 
states to prevent and fight public corruption; 
(B) assisting foreign states to develop rule 
of law-based governance structures, including 
accountable civilian police, prosecutorial, and 
judicial institutions; 
(C) supporting foreign states to strengthen 
domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to 
combat public corruption, including the adop-
tion of best practices under international law; 
and 
(D) supplementing existing foreign assist-
ance and diplomacy with respect to efforts de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). 
(2) FUNDING.— 
(A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, if total 
criminal fines and penalties in excess of
1557 
$50,000,000 are imposed against a person 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 (Public Law 95–213) or section 13, 30A, 
or 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, and 78ff), whether 
pursuant to a criminal prosecution, enforcement 
proceeding, deferred prosecution agreement, 
nonprosecution agreement, a declination to 
prosecute or enforce, or any other resolution, 
the court (in the case of a conviction) or the At-
torney General shall impose an additional pre-
vention payment equal to $5,000,000 against 
such person, which shall be deposited in the 
Anti-Corruption Action Fund established under 
paragraph (1). Amounts deposited into such 
Fund under this subparagraph shall be credited 
as discretionary offsetting collections. 
(B) AVAILABILITY
OF
FUNDS.—Amounts 
deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available 
to the Secretary of State only to the extent and 
in such amounts as provided in advance in ap-
propriations Acts for the purposes described in 
paragraph (1).
1558 
(C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts 
made available to the Secretary of State from 
the Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used 
inside the United States, except for administra-
tive costs related to overseas program imple-
mentation pursuant to paragraph (1). 
(3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action 
Fund— 
(A) may support governmental and non-
governmental parties in advancing the purposes 
described in paragraph (1); and 
(B) shall be allocated in a manner com-
plementary to existing United States foreign as-
sistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activi-
ties. 
(4) ALLOCATION
AND
PRIORITIZATION.—In 
programming foreign assistance made available 
through the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 
General, shall prioritize projects that— 
(A) assist countries that are undergoing 
historic opportunities for democratic transition, 
combating corruption, and the establishment of 
the rule of law; and
1559 
(B) are important to United States na-
tional interests. 
(5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For 
any technical assistance to a foreign governmental 
party under this section, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Attorney General, shall 
prioritize United States Government technical assist-
ance providers as implementers, in particular the Of-
fice of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assist-
ance and Training and the International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program at the 
Department of Justice. 
(6) PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of 
State shall announce that funds deposited in the 
Anti-Corruption Action Fund are derived from ac-
tions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are— 
(A) contributing to international anti-cor-
ruption work; and 
(B) reducing the pressure that United 
States businesses face to pay bribes overseas, 
thereby contributing to greater competitiveness 
of United States companies. 
(7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less
1560 
frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
gressional committees that contains— 
(A) the balance of the funding remaining 
in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 
(B) the amount of funds that have been 
deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action 
Fund; and 
(C) a summary of the obligation and ex-
penditure of such funds. 
(8) NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS.—None of 
the amounts made available to the Secretary of 
State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursu-
ant to this section shall be available for obligation, 
or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or en-
tities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, and the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives, not later than 15 
days in advance of such obligation or transfer. 
(e) 
INTERAGENCY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
TASK 
FORCE.—
1561 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in 
cooperation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption 
Task Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), 
shall manage a whole-of-government effort to im-
prove coordination among Federal departments and 
agencies and donor organizations with a role in— 
(A) promoting good governance in foreign 
states; and 
(B) enhancing the ability of foreign states 
to combat public corruption. 
(2) 
INTERAGENCY
ANTI-CORRUPTION
TASK 
FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall establish and convene the Interagency Anti- 
Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as 
the ‘‘Task Force’’), which shall be composed of rep-
resentatives appointed by the President from appro-
priate departments and agencies, including the De-
partment of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Department of Jus-
tice, the Department of the Treasury, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Department of De-
fense, the Department of Commerce, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence commu-
nity.
1562 
(3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force 
shall meet not less frequently than twice per year. 
(4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall— 
(A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effec-
tiveness of existing foreign assistance programs, 
including programs funded by the Anti-Corrup-
tion Action Fund, that have an impact on— 
(i) promoting good governance in for-
eign states; and 
(ii) enhancing the ability of foreign 
states to combat public corruption; 
(B) assist the Secretary of State in man-
aging the whole-of-government effort described 
in paragraph (1); 
(C) identify general areas in which such 
whole-of-government effort could be enhanced; 
and 
(D) recommend specific programs for for-
eign states that may be used to enhance such 
whole-of-government effort. 
(5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 
1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act 
and not less frequently than annually thereafter 
through the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary 
of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate
1563 
congressional committees regarding the ongoing 
work of the Task Force. Each briefing shall include 
the participation of a representative of each of the 
departments and agencies described in paragraph 
(2), to the extent feasible. 
(f) DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION 
POINTS OF CONTACT.— 
(1) EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CON-
TACT.—The chief of mission of each United States 
embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of 
contact for each such embassy. 
(2) DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption 
points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph 
(1) shall— 
(A) coordinate, in accordance with guid-
ance from the Interagency Anti-Corruption 
Task Force established pursuant to subsection 
(e)(2), an interagency approach within United 
States embassies to combat public corruption in 
the foreign states in which such embassies are 
located that is tailored to the needs of such for-
eign states, including all relevant Federal de-
partments and agencies with a presence in such 
foreign states, such as the Department of State, 
the United States Agency for International De-
1564 
velopment, the Department of Justice, the De-
partment of the Treasury, the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of De-
fense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
and the intelligence community; 
(B) make recommendations regarding the 
use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and 
other foreign assistance funding related to anti- 
corruption efforts in their respective countries 
of responsibility that aligns with United States 
diplomatic engagement; and 
(C) ensure that anti-corruption activities 
carried out within their respective countries of 
responsibility are included in regular reporting 
to the Secretary of State and the Interagency 
Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United 
States embassy strategic planning documents 
and foreign assistance-related reporting, as ap-
propriate. 
(3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall 
develop and implement appropriate training for the 
designated anti-corruption points of contact. 
(g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TO-
WARD IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days
1565 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
nually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, the Attorney General, and the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, shall submit a report or pro-
vide a briefing to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees that summarizes progress made in com-
bating public corruption and in implementing this 
Act, including— 
(A) identifying opportunities and priorities 
for outreach with respect to promoting the 
adoption and implementation of relevant inter-
national law and standards in combating public 
corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; 
(B) describing— 
(i) the bureaucratic structure of the 
offices within the Department of State and 
the United States Agency for International 
Development that are engaged in activities 
to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, 
and illicit finance; and 
(ii) how such offices coordinate their 
efforts with each other and with other rel-
evant Federal departments and agencies;
1566 
(C) providing a description of how the pro-
visions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of sub-
section (d) have been applied to each project 
funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 
(D) providing an explanation as to why a 
United States Government technical assistance 
provider was not used if technical assistance to 
a foreign governmental entity is not imple-
mented by a United States Government tech-
nical assistance provider; 
(E) describing the activities of the Inter-
agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 
pursuant to subsection (e)(2); 
(F) identifying— 
(i) 
the 
designated 
anti-corruption 
points of contact for foreign states; and 
(ii) any training provided to such 
points of contact; and 
(G) recommending additional measures 
that would enhance the ability of the United 
States Government to combat public corruption, 
kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas. 
(2) ONLINE
PLATFORM.—The Secretary of 
State, in conjunction with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Develop-
1567 
ment, should consolidate existing reports with anti- 
corruption components into a single online, public 
platform that includes— 
(A) the Annual Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices required under section 
116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151n); 
(B) the Fiscal Transparency Report re-
quired under section 7031(b) of the Depart-
ment of State, Foreign Operations and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F 
of Public Law 116–6); 
(C) the Investment Climate Statement re-
ports; 
(D) the International Narcotics Control 
Strategy Report; 
(E) any other relevant public reports; and 
(F) links to third-party indicators and 
compliance mechanisms used by the United 
States Government to inform policy and pro-
gramming, as appropriate, such as— 
(i) the International Finance Corpora-
tion’s Doing Business surveys; 
(ii) the International Budget Partner-
ship’s Open Budget Index; and
1568 
(iii) multilateral peer review anti-cor-
ruption compliance mechanisms, such as— 
(I) the Organisation for Eco-
nomic 
Co-operation 
and 
Develop-
ment’s Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions; 
(II) the Follow-Up Mechanism 
for the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption; and 
(III) the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption, done at New 
York October 31, 2003. 
SEC. 30404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE 
COMPANIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
until 2040, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a report 
with respect to persons in China that the Secretary deter-
mines—
1569 
(1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise 
provided, directly or indirectly, items or services re-
lated to targeted digital surveillance to— 
(A) a foreign government or entity located 
primarily inside a foreign country where a rea-
sonable person would assess that such transfer 
could result in a use of the items or services in 
a manner contrary to human rights; or 
(B) a country or any governmental unit 
thereof, entity, or other person determined by 
the Secretary of State, in a notice published in 
the Federal Register, to have used items or 
services for targeted digital surveillance in a 
manner contrary to human rights; or 
(2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-
vided financial, material, or technological support 
for, or items or services to or in support of, the ac-
tivities described in paragraph (1). 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) The name of each foreign person that the 
Secretary determines— 
(A) meets the requirements of subsection 
(a)(1); and
1570 
(B) meets the requirements of subsection 
(a)(2). 
(2) The name of each intended and actual re-
cipient of items or services described in subsection 
(a). 
(3) A detailed description of such items or serv-
ices. 
(4) An analysis of the appropriateness of in-
cluding the persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list 
maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—In compiling data and making 
assessments for the purposes of preparing the report re-
quired by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall con-
sult with a wide range of organizations, including with re-
spect to— 
(1) classified and unclassified information pro-
vided by the Director of National Intelligence; 
(2) information provided by the Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Free-
dom, Business and Human Rights section; 
(3) information provided by the Department of 
Commerce, including the Bureau of Industry and 
Security; 
(4) information provided by the advisory com-
mittees established by the Secretary to advise the
1571 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Se-
curity on controls under the Export Administration 
Regulations, including the Emerging Technology and 
Research Advisory Committee; 
(5) information on human rights and tech-
nology matters, as solicited from civil society and 
human rights organizations through regular consult-
ative processes; and 
(6) information contained in the Country Re-
ports on Human Rights Practices published annually 
by the Department of State. 
(d) FORM AND PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.— 
The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form. The report shall be posted by the 
President not later than 14 days after being submitted 
to Congress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly avail-
able internet website. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) TARGETED DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE.—The 
term ‘‘targeted digital surveillance’’ means the use 
of items or services that enable an individual or enti-
ty to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, exploit, pre-
serve, protect, transmit, retain, or otherwise gain ac-
cess to the communications, protected information, 
work product, browsing data, research, identifying
1572 
information, location history, or online and offline 
activities of other individuals, organizations, or enti-
ties, with or without the explicit authorization of 
such individuals, organizations, or entities. 
(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per-
son’’ means an individual or entity that is not a 
United States person. 
(3) IN
A
MANNER
CONTRARY
TO
HUMAN 
RIGHTS.—The term ‘‘in a manner contrary to 
human rights’’, with respect to targeted digital sur-
veillance, means engaging in targeted digital surveil-
lance— 
(A) in violation of basic human rights, in-
cluding to silence dissent, sanction criticism, 
punish independent reporting (and sources for 
that reporting), manipulate or interfere with 
democratic or electoral processes, persecute mi-
norities or vulnerable groups, or target advo-
cates or practitioners of human rights and 
democratic rights (including activists, journal-
ists, artists, minority communities, or opposi-
tion politicians); or 
(B) in a country in which there is lacking 
a minimum legal framework governing its use, 
including established—
1573 
(i) authorization under laws that are 
accessible, precise, and available to the 
public; 
(ii) constraints limiting its use under 
principles of necessity, proportionality, and 
legitimacy; 
(iii) oversight by bodies independent 
of the government’s executive agencies; 
(iv) involvement of an independent 
and impartial judiciary branch in author-
izing its use; or 
(v) legal remedies in case of abuse. 
SEC. 30405. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI-
NA’S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN MINING AND 
PROCESSING INDUSTRIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter 
for five years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Homeland 
Security, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Commitee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs a report that—
1574 
(1) describes the involvement of the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), state 
sponsored companies, and companies incorporated in 
the PRC in the exploration, planning, development, 
operation, production, financing, or ownership of 
mining or processing facilities in countries identified 
in the United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) 
Annual Mineral Commodity Summaries for which 
the United States imports minerals, metals, and ma-
terials; and 
(2) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
implications for United States national security and 
economic interests and the interests of the countries 
identified pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to 
the PRC’s involvement and influence in developing 
the country’s mining and processing industries. 
(b) PUBLICATION.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall be published on the respective websites 
of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, 
and the Department of Homeland Security.
1575 
TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC 
SECURITY 
SEC. 30501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-
LOGUE. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to pursue, in coordination with United 
States allies and partners, arms control negotiations 
and sustained and regular engagement with the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC)— 
(A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
er’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
pabilities; 
(B) to improve transparency; and 
(C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
tion and misperception; 
(2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov-
ernment of the PRC on relevant issues that lays the 
groundwork for a constructive arms control frame-
work, including— 
(A) fostering dialogue on arms control 
leading to the convening of strategic security 
talks; 
(B) negotiating norms for outer space;
1576 
(C) developing pre-launch notification re-
gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; 
and 
(D) expanding lines of communication be-
tween both governments for the purposes of re-
ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
creasing transparency; 
(3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordina-
tion with United States allies and partners to ensure 
the security of United States and allied interests to 
slow the PRC’s military modernization and expan-
sion, including on— 
(A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic 
missiles; 
(B) integrated air and missile defense; 
(C) hypersonic missiles; 
(D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance; 
(E) space-based capabilities; 
(F) cyber capabilities; and 
(G) command, control, and communica-
tions; and 
(4) to ensure that the United States policy con-
tinues to reassure United States allies and partners.
1577 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) it is in the interest of the United States and 
China to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional 
and nuclear escalation; 
(2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United 
States early warning satellites, other portions of the 
nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 
infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but 
rapid escalation; 
(3) the United States and its allies and part-
ners should promote international norms on military 
operations in space, the employment of cyber capa-
bilities, and the military use of artificial intelligence, 
as an element of risk reduction regarding nuclear 
command and control; and 
(4) United States allies and partners should 
share the burden of promoting and protecting norms 
regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting 
unsafe behavior that violates international norms, 
such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and 
promoting responsible behavior in space and all 
other domains.
1578 
SEC. 30502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN-
GAGE THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 
ISSUES. 
(a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES- 
PRC ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report, and if necessary a separate 
classified annex, that outlines the approaches and strate-
gies such Secretaries will pursue to engage the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on arms 
control and risk reduction, including— 
(1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
ernments of the United States and the PRC, includ-
ing on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, 
conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace 
issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which 
could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if 
a conflict were to occur, and constrain a desta-
bilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region; 
(2) how the United States Government can en-
gage the Government of the PRC in a constructive 
arms control dialogue;
1579 
(3) identifying strategic military capabilities of 
the PRC that the United States Government is most 
concerned about and how limiting these capabilities 
may benefit United States and allied security inter-
ests; 
(4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control 
nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military 
escalation between the United States and the PRC; 
(5) the personnel and expertise required to ef-
fectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and 
arms control dialogues; and 
(6) opportunities and methods to encourage 
transparency from the PRC. 
(b) REPORT
ON
ARMS
CONTROL
TALKS
WITH 
PRC.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of En-
ergy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that describes— 
(1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with 
the PRC; 
(2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not 
arise, what alternative plans the Department of 
State envisages for ensuring the security of the
1580 
United States and its allies through international 
arms control negotiations; 
(3) effects on the credibility of United States 
extended deterrence assurances to allies and part-
ners if arms control negotiations do not materialize 
and the implications for regional security architec-
tures; 
(4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms 
control talks, whether on a bilateral or international 
basis; and 
(5) the interest level of the Government of PRC 
in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral 
or international basis, including through— 
(A) a formal invitation to appropriate offi-
cials from the PRC, and to each of the perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security 
Council, to observe a United States-Russian 
Federation New START Treaty on-site inspec-
tion to demonstrate the security benefits of 
transparency into strategic nuclear forces; 
(B) discussions on how to advance inter-
national negotiations on the fissile material cut- 
off; 
(C) an agreement with the PRC that al-
lows for advance notifications of ballistic missile
1581 
launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct 
or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions 
related to strategic nuclear forces; 
(D) an agreement not to target or interfere 
in nuclear command, control, and communica-
tions (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) infra-
structure; or 
(E) any other cooperative measure that 
benefits United States-PRC strategic stability. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; 
and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
resentatives.
1582 
SEC. 30503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI-
NA’S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MIS-
SILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE 
MIDDLE EAST. 
(a) MTCR TRANSFERS.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a written determination, and any documentation to sup-
port that determination detailing— 
(1) whether any foreign person in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) knowingly exported, trans-
ferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated 
under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign 
person in the previous three fiscal years; and 
(2) the sanctions the President has imposed or 
intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 
4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly 
engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item 
or items. 
(b) PRC’S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION.— 
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report detailing— 
(1) whether any foreign person in the PRC en-
gaged in cooperation with any other foreign person
1583 
in the previous three fiscal years in the construction 
of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity 
that has not been notified to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and would be subject to com-
plementary access if an Additional Protocol was in 
force; and 
(2) the policy options required to prevent and 
respond to any future effort by the PRC to export 
to any foreign person an item classified as ‘‘plants 
for the separation of isotopes of uranium’’ or 
‘‘plants for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear re-
actor fuel elements’’ under Part 110 of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission export licensing authority. 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required 
under subsection (b) and the report required under sub-
section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives.
1584 
(2) FOREIGN
PERSON; PERSON.—The terms 
‘‘foreign person’’ and ‘‘person’’ mean— 
(A) a natural person that is an alien; 
(B) a corporation, business association, 
partnership, society, trust, or any other non-
governmental entity, organization, or group, 
that is organized under the laws of a foreign 
country or has its principal place of business in 
a foreign country; 
(C) any foreign governmental entity oper-
ating as a business enterprise; and 
(D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary 
of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or 
(C). 
SEC. 30504. REPORT ON SUPPORT FOR BIODEFENSE STEER-
ING COMMITTEE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
telligence, in coordination with the heads of such other ele-
ments of the intelligence community as the Director may 
determine relevant, shall submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees a report on the efforts of the intel-
ligence community to support the Biodefense Steering
1585 
Committee in the implementation of the National Bio-
defense Strategy. 
(b) MATTERS.—The report under subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A description of any previous, ongoing, or 
planned efforts or activities of the intelligence com-
munity to support the implementation of the Na-
tional Biodefense Strategy by the Biodefense Steer-
ing Committee. 
(2) An inventory and assessment of any exist-
ing strategy, plan, or policy of the intelligence com-
munity, or interagency agreement entered into by 
the intelligence community, that relates to the provi-
sion of support to the Biodefense Steering Com-
mittee, including for the implementation of the Na-
tional Biodefense Strategy. 
(3) A description of assessed opportunities for 
the intelligence community to further enhance the 
capabilities and effectiveness of the Biodefense 
Steering Committee with respect to the implementa-
tion of the National Biodefense Strategy. 
(4) An assessment of foreign biological threats 
emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a 
covered country.
1586 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) BIODEFENSE.—The term ‘‘biodefense’’ in-
cludes actions to counter biological threats, reduce 
risks relating to biolgoical threats, and prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from, biological incidents. 
(2) BIODEFENSE STEERING COMMITTEE.—The 
term ‘‘Biodefense Steering Committee’’ means the 
committee established pursuant to the presidential 
memorandum issued on September 18, 2018, and ti-
tled ‘‘Presidential Memorandum on the Support for 
National Biodefense’’, or any successor to such com-
mittee. 
(3) BIOLOGICAL THREAT.—The term ‘‘biologi-
cal threat’’ includes biological warfare, bioterrorism, 
naturally occurring infectious diseases, and acci-
dental exposures. 
(4) CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COMMIT-
TEES; 
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The 
terms 
‘‘congressional intelligence committees’’ and ‘‘intel-
ligence community’’ have the meanings given those 
terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
1587 
(5) COVERED
COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘covered 
country’’ means— 
(A) the People’s Republic of China; 
(B) the Russian Federation; 
(C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
(D) the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea; 
(E) any country with a known history of, 
or assessed to have conditions present for, in-
fectious disease outbreaks or epidemics; and 
(F) any other country the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence determines appropriate. 
(6) FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREAT.—The term 
‘‘foreign biological threat’’ means biological warfare, 
bioterrorism, naturally occurring infectious diseases, 
and accidental exposures to biological materials, 
without regard to whether the threat originates from 
a state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, 
or an undetermined source. 
(7) NATIONAL
BIODEFENSE
STRATEGY.—The 
term ‘‘National Biodefense Strategy’’ means the 
strategy specified in section 1086 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (6 
U.S.C. 104).
1588 
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A 
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 
SEC. 30601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECO-
NOMIC PRIORITIES WITH THE PEOPLE’S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 
1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth 
National Climate Assessment, first published by the 
United States Global Change Research Program in 
2018, concluded that— 
(A) the release of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, most notably the combustion of fossil 
fuels and the degradation of natural resources 
that absorb atmospheric carbon from human 
activity, are the dominant causes of climate 
change during the past century; 
(B) changes in the Earth’s climate are— 
(i) causing sea levels to rise; 
(ii) increasing the global average tem-
perature of the Earth;
1589 
(iii) increasing the incidence and se-
verity of wildfires; and 
(iv) intensifying the severity of ex-
treme weather, including hurricanes, cy-
clones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and 
other disasters that threaten human life, 
healthy communities, and critical infra-
structure. 
(2) An increase in the global average tempera-
ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri-
alized levels would cause— 
(A) the displacement, and the forced inter-
nal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 
people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub- 
Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is 
taken (according to the World Bank); 
(B) the displacement of an average of 
17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every 
year (according to the Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating 
effects of climate change; 
(C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost 
annual economic output in the United States (a 
10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by
1590 
2100 (according to the Fourth National Cli-
mate Assessment); 
(D) an additional 100,000,000 people 
worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 
(according to the World Bank); 
(E) greater food insecurity and decreased 
agricultural production due to climate change’s 
effects on the increased frequency and intensity 
of extreme weather events; 
(F) the proliferation of agricultural pests 
and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrad-
ing ecosystems, and water scarcity; and 
(G) more than 350,000,000 additional peo-
ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat 
stress by 2050. 
(3) According to the International Energy 
Agency, the United States, China, India, and the 
European Union (including the United Kingdom) ac-
count for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. China, which is the world’s top green-
house gases emitter and has an outsized impact on 
the United States’ core interest in climate sta-
bility— 
(A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions 
mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con-
1591 
tained in its 2015 nationally determined con-
tribution, to ‘‘peak’’ emissions around 2030 
ahead of schedule; 
(B) announced, on September 22, 2020, 
and restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to 
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060; 
(C) announced on April 22, 2021, its in-
tent to strictly control coal fired power genera-
tion projects, as well as strictly limit the in-
crease in coal consumption over the 14th five 
year plan period and phase it down in the 15th 
five year plan period; and 
(D) however, remains uncommitted to 
internationally recognized metrics for achieving 
these goals. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) to address the climate crisis, the United 
States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic 
engagement and foreign assistance to promote our 
national security and economic interests related to 
climate change; 
(2) in the absence of United States leadership 
on global issues driving international climate-related 
policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and
1592 
harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitive-
ness; 
(3) promoting international instruments on cli-
mate action and other relevant international stand-
ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-
tices develop, serve the interests of the American 
people and protect United States environmental re-
sources and the planet; 
(4) promoting the adoption and implementation 
of international climate-related agreements, stand-
ards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level 
playing field for United States businesses and other 
stakeholders; 
(5) working with international allies and part-
ners to promote environmental justice and climate 
justice serves the American people’s interests; 
(6) finding common ground with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) on climate action where 
possible is important, but the United States must 
also continue to hold the PRC accountable where its 
actions undermine the interests of the United States 
and its allies and partners; 
(7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, 
the United States should—
1593 
(A) explore opportunities for constructive 
cooperation on climate action initiatives with 
the PRC and other countries while ensuring the 
United States maintains its competitive advan-
tage in climate-related fields of expertise and 
industry, including— 
(i) support for international coopera-
tive policies, measures, and technologies to 
decarbonize industry and power, including 
through circular economy, energy storage 
and grid reliability, carbon capture, and 
green hydrogen; and 
(ii) increased deployment of clean en-
ergy, including renewable and advanced 
nuclear power; green and climate resilient 
agriculture; 
energy 
efficient 
buildings; 
green, and low-carbon transportation; 
(B) cooperate on addressing emissions of 
methane and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases; 
(C) cooperate on addressing emissions 
from international civil aviation and maritime 
activities; 
(D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and 
gas;
1594 
(E) implement the Paris Agreement that 
significantly advances global climate ambition 
on mitigation, adaptation, and support; 
(F) coordinate among relevant Federal, 
State, and local departments and agencies on 
climate action related initiatives; 
(G) provide resources, authorities and sup-
port for enhancing United States ambition and 
commitment to solving the climate crisis includ-
ing climate action specific assistance and multi-
lateral fund contributions; and 
(H) integrate considerations for climate 
change into broader United States foreign pol-
icy decision-making and the United States na-
tional security apparatus. 
(c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro-
vide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended ad-
ministrative actions— 
(1) to restore United States global leadership 
on addressing the climate crisis and make United 
States climate action and climate diplomacy a more 
central tenet of United States foreign policy; 
(2) to improve the United States commitment 
to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate 
global greenhouse gas emission and improve devel-
1595 
oping countries’ resilience and adaptation capacities 
to the effects of climate change; 
(3) to ensure the United States maintains com-
petitive advantage over global strategic competitors 
in diplomacy and new technological development; 
(4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co-
operation agreements with other world powers on 
initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation 
and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse 
gas emissions and improve climate change adapta-
tion capacities; 
(5) to ensure that the United States national 
security apparatus integrates critically important 
data on the compounding effects that climate change 
is having on global security risks by enhancing our 
understanding of how, where, and when such effects 
are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that 
may motivate conflict, displacement, and other driv-
ers of insecurity; and 
(6) to authorize funding and programs to sup-
port a reaffirmation of the United States’ commit-
ments to international cooperation and support for 
developing and vulnerable countries to take climate 
action. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this title:
1596 
(1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term ‘‘clean energy’’ 
means— 
(A) renewable energy and related systems; 
(B) energy production processes that emit 
zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nu-
clear power; and 
(C) systems and processes that capture 
and permanently store greenhouse gas emis-
sions from fossil fuel production and electricity 
generation units. 
(2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term ‘‘climate ac-
tion’’ means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive 
capacity to climate-induced impacts, including— 
(A) climate-related hazards in all coun-
tries; 
(B) integrating climate change measures 
into national policies, strategies and planning; 
and 
(C) improving education, awareness-rais-
ing, and human and institutional capacity with 
respect to climate change mitigation, adapta-
tion, impact reduction, and early warning. 
(3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term ‘‘climate cri-
sis’’ means the social, economic, health, safety, and
1597 
security impacts on people, and the threats to bio-
diversity and natural ecosystem health, which are at-
tributable to the wide-variety of effects on global en-
vironmental and atmospheric conditions as a result 
of disruptions to the Earth’s climate from anthropo-
genic activities that generate greenhouse gas emis-
sions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb 
and regulate atmospheric carbon. 
(4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term ‘‘climate 
diplomacy’’ means methods of influencing the deci-
sions and behavior of foreign governments and peo-
ples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and 
other peaceful measures on or about issues related 
to addressing global climate change, including— 
(A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas 
emissions; 
(B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of 
scientific data and information on the cause 
and effects of climate change; 
(C) the security, social, economic, and po-
litical instability risks associated with the ef-
fects of climate change; 
(D) economic cooperation efforts that are 
related to or associated with climate change and
1598 
greenhouse gas mitigation from the global econ-
omy; 
(E) building resilience capacities and 
adapting to the effects of change; 
(F) sustainable land use and natural re-
source conservation; 
(G) accounting for loss and damage attrib-
uted to the effects of climate change; 
(H) just transition of carbon intense 
economies to low or zero carbon economies and 
accounting for laborers within affected econo-
mies; 
(I) technological innovations that reduce or 
eliminate carbon emissions; and 
(J) clean energy and energy systems. 
(5) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term ‘‘climate 
financing’’ means the transfer of new and additional 
public funds from developed countries to developing 
countries for projects and programs that— 
(A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas 
emissions; 
(B) enhance and restore natural carbon se-
questration; and 
(C) promote adaptation to climate change.
1599 
(6) CLIMATE
SECURITY.—The term ‘‘climate 
security’’ means the effects of climate change on— 
(A) United States national security con-
cerns and subnational, national, and regional 
political stability; and 
(B) overseas security and conflict situa-
tions that are potentially exacerbated by dy-
namic environmental factors and events, includ-
ing— 
(i) the intensification and frequency of 
droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, 
and other extreme weather events; 
(ii) changes in historical severe weath-
er, drought, and wildfire patterns; 
(iii) the expansion of geographical 
ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires 
into regions that had not regularly experi-
enced such phenomena; 
(iv) global sea level rise patterns and 
the expansion of geographical ranges af-
fected by drought; and 
(v) changes in marine environments 
that effect critical geostrategic waterways, 
such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China
1600 
Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents 
Sea, and the Beaufort Sea. 
(7) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—The term ‘‘Green 
Climate Fund’’ means the independent, multilateral 
fund— 
(A) established by parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; and 
(B) adopted by decision as part of the fi-
nancial mechanism of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
(8) PARIS
AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘Paris 
Agreement’’ means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 
adopted by the 21st Conference of Parties of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015. 
(9) RESILIENCE.—The term ‘‘resilience’’ means 
the ability of human made and natural systems (in-
cluding their component parts) to anticipate, absorb, 
cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a 
hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in-
cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora-
tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures 
and functions. It is not preparedness or response.
1601 
(e) ANNUAL BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter, the Department of State, in consultation with 
the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agen-
cies, shall provide a briefing to relevant Committees of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate regarding the 
progress and efforts of the PRC to achieve the goals and 
commitments stated in subsection (a)(3). 
SEC. 30602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agen-
cies, shall conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of 
present and ongoing disruptions to the global climate sys-
tem, including— 
(1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat-
ural disasters; 
(2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in-
cluding fresh water; 
(3) global food, health, and energy insecurities; 
(4) conditions that contribute to— 
(A) intrastate and interstate conflicts; 
(B) foreign political and economic insta-
bility;
1602 
(C) international migration of vulnerable 
and underserved populations; 
(D) the failure of national governments; 
and 
(E) gender-based violence; and 
(5) United States and allied military readiness, 
operations, and strategy. 
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con-
ducted under subsection (a) are— 
(1) to support the practical application of sci-
entific data and research on climate change’s dy-
namic effects around the world to improve resilience, 
adaptability, security, and stability despite growing 
global environmental risks and changes; 
(2) to ensure that the strategic planning and 
mission execution of United States international de-
velopment and diplomatic missions adequately ac-
count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal-
lenges associated with the effects of climate change; 
(3) to improve coordination between United 
States science agencies conducting research and 
forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change 
and United States national security agencies; 
(4) to better understand the disproportionate 
effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls,
1603 
indigenous communities, and other historically 
marginalized populations; and 
(5) to inform the development of the climate se-
curity strategy described in subsection (d). 
(c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub-
section (a) shall— 
(1) examine developing countries’ vulnerabilities 
and risks associated with global, regional, and local-
ized effects of climate change; and 
(2) assess and make recommendations on nec-
essary measures to mitigate risks and reduce 
vulnerabilities associated with effects, including— 
(A) sea level rise; 
(B) freshwater resource scarcity; 
(C) wildfires; and 
(D) increased intensity and frequency of 
extreme weather conditions and events, such as 
flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, in-
cluding tropical cyclones. 
(d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary 
shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)— 
(1) to inform the development and implementa-
tion of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of 
Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, re-
1604 
gional bureaus, and other offices and programs oper-
ating chief of mission authority, including those with 
roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security 
assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, pre-
vention, and assistance; and 
(2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, 
develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement 
plans, policies, and actions— 
(A) to account for the impacts of climate 
change to global human health, safety, govern-
ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and 
other critical natural resources, settlements, in-
frastructure, marginalized groups, and eco-
nomic activity; 
(B) to evaluate the climate change vulner-
ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of 
United States interests and non-defense assets 
abroad; 
(C) to coordinate the integration of climate 
change risk and vulnerability assessments into 
all foreign policy and security decision-making 
processes, including awarding foreign assist-
ance; 
(D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re-
gions and countries that are—
1605 
(i) vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change; and 
(ii) strategically significant to the 
United States; 
(E) to enhance the resilience capacities of 
foreign countries to the effects of climate 
change as a means of reducing the risks of con-
flict and instability; 
(F) to advance principles of good govern-
ance by encouraging foreign governments, par-
ticularly nations that are least capable of cop-
ing with the effects of climate change— 
(i) to conduct climate security evalua-
tions; and 
(ii) to facilitate the development of cli-
mate security action plans to ensure sta-
bility and public safety in disaster situa-
tions in a humane and responsible fashion; 
(G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 
susceptibility, and resiliency of United States 
interests and nondefense assets abroad; 
(H) to build international institutional ca-
pacity to address climate security implications 
and to advance United States interests, regional 
stability, and global security; and
1606 
(I) other activities that advance— 
(i) the utilization and integration of 
climate science in national security plan-
ning; and 
(ii) the clear understanding of how 
the effects of climate change can exacer-
bate security risks and threats. 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and every two years there-
after for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies shall submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
annex if necessary, that includes— 
(1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and pro-
grams in support of the strategy in subsection (c), 
as well as— 
(A) an assessment of the funding expended 
by relevant Federal departments and agencies 
on emerging events exacerbated by climate 
change and the legal, procedural, and resource 
constraints faced by the Department of State
1607 
and the United States Agency for International 
Development throughout respective budgeting, 
strategic planning, and management cycles to 
support the prevention of and response to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(B) current annual global assessments of 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(C) recommendations to further strengthen 
United States capabilities described in this sec-
tion; and 
(D) consideration of analysis, reporting, 
and policy recommendations by civil society, 
academic, and nongovernmental organizations 
and institutions, and partner countries to pre-
vent and respond to emerging events exacer-
bated by climate change; 
(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi-
bility by— 
(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 
preventing, mitigating, and responding to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
and 
(B) strengthening regional organizations; 
and
1608 
(3) the implementation status of the rec-
ommendations included in the review under para-
graph (1). 
(f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is en-
couraged to include, in the Director’s annual (or more 
often as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied 
by a classified annex, if necessary, to Congress (including 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on In-
telligence of the Senate) on threats to United States na-
tional security— 
(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and 
(2) whenever possible, specific identification of 
countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change. 
SEC. 30603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERA-
TION WITH CHINA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse 
gas emissions and changes to the environment re-
quire global cooperation and coordination of efforts, 
as well as holding other countries such as the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC) accountable for their
1609 
actions and commitments to ensure a level playing 
field with the United States and its allies and part-
ners; 
(2) other countries look toward the United 
States and the PRC, as the world’s largest emitters 
and largest economies, for leadership by example to 
effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, de-
velop and deploy energy generation technologies, and 
integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the in-
evitable effects of climate change; 
(3) given the volume of the PRC’s greenhouse 
gas emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly 
reduce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero 
emissions around 2050, China should— 
(A) revise its long-term pledge; 
(B) seek to immediately peak its emissions; 
(C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions significantly to meet a more ambi-
tious long-term 2050 reductions target; and 
(D) update its nationally determined con-
tribution along a trajectory that aligns with 
achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050 
emissions target; 
(4) it is in the United States national interest 
to emphasize the environment and climate change in
1610 
its bilateral engagement with the PRC, as global cli-
mate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant 
reduction in PRC domestic and overseas emissions; 
(5) the United States and the PRC, to the ex-
tent practicable, should coordinate on making and 
delivering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, with aspirations towards achieving 
net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050; 
(6) the United States and its allies and part-
ners should work together, using diplomatic and eco-
nomic tools, to hold the PRC accountable for any 
failure by the PRC— 
(A) to increase ambition in its 2030 na-
tionally determined contribution, in line with 
net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 be-
fore the 26th Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and 
meeting a more ambitious nationally determined 
contribution; 
(B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin-
ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement; 
(C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under-
mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or 
underlying framework, particularly within areas
1611 
of accountability transparency, and shared re-
sponsibility among all parties; 
(D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive 
projects from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initia-
tive and other overseas investments, includ-
ing— 
(i) working with United States allies 
and partners to eliminate support for coal 
power production projects in the Belt and 
Road Initiative; 
(ii) providing financing and project 
support for cleaner and less risky alter-
natives; and 
(iii) undertaking ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ 
to enhance capacity building programs and 
overseas sustainable investment criteria, 
including in areas such as integrated en-
ergy planning, power sector reform, just 
transition, distributed generation, procure-
ment, transparency, and standards to sup-
port low-emissions growth in developing 
countries; and 
(E) to phase out existing coal power plants 
and reduce net coal power production;
1612 
(7) the United States should pursue confidence- 
building opportunities for the United States and the 
PRC to undertake ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ on clean en-
ergy research, development, finance, and deploy-
ment, including through economic and stimulus 
measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and 
policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equi-
table, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify 
implementation, 
which 
would 
provide 
catalytic 
progress towards delivering a global clean energy 
transformation that benefits all people; 
(8) the United States should pursue cooperative 
initiatives to reduce global deforestation, including 
efforts to shift toward the import and consummation 
of forest and agricultural commodities that are pro-
duced in a manner that does not contribute to defor-
estation; 
(9) the United States should pursue appro-
priate scientific cooperative exchanges and research 
that align with United States interests and those of 
its international partners and allies, provide reci-
procity of access, protect intellectual property rights, 
and preserve the values and human rights interests 
of the American people;
1613 
(10) the U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for 
Climate should seek to work with other countries to 
require China end its classification of ‘‘developing 
nation’’ within the Paris Agreement; and 
(11) the United States should seek to require 
the Chinese Communist Party to match emission 
cutting targets established by the United States. 
SEC. 30604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL-
TERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek oppor-
tunities to partner with multilateral development finance 
institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de-
velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support in-
vestments in developing countries that— 
(1) support low carbon economic development; 
and 
(2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi-
ronmental changes and natural disasters. 
(b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Execu-
tive Officer of the United States International Develop-
ment Finance Corporation should seek to partner with 
other multilateral development finance institutions and de-
velopment finance institutions to leverage the respective 
available funds to support low carbon economic develop-
1614 
ment, which may include clean energy including renewable 
and nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, 
and resilience activities in countries. 
(c) 
CO-FINANCING
OF
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS.— 
(1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph 
(2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, and the heads of other relevant Federal agen-
cies are authorized to co-finance infrastructure, re-
silience, and environmental adaptation projects that 
advance the development objectives of the United 
States overseas and provide viable alternatives to 
projects that would otherwise be included within the 
People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initia-
tive. 
(2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements 
authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be 
approved unless— 
(A) the projects to be financed— 
(i) promote the public good; 
(ii) promote United States national 
security or economic interests;
1615 
(iii) promote low carbon emissions, in-
cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear 
energy projects; and 
(iv) will have substantially lower envi-
ronmental impact than the proposed Belt 
and Road Initiative alternative; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives, as well as 
the relevant committees of jurisdiction for the 
House of Representatives and Senate with over-
sight of the Federal agency engaged in the co- 
financing relationship, are notified not later 
than 15 days in advance of entering into such 
co-financing arrangements. 
SEC. 30605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTER-
ESTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary 
of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplo-
macy in United States foreign policy by— 
(1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter-
agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral ac-
tions to address the climate crisis; and
1616 
(2) improving coordination and integration of 
climate action across all bureaus and United States 
missions abroad. 
(b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary 
of State shall— 
(1) prioritize climate action and clean energy 
within the bureaus and offices under the leadership 
of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, En-
ergy, and the Environment; 
(2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co-
ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of 
State regarding the integration of climate action and 
climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative 
across the Department of State; 
(3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State— 
(A) to assess how issues related to climate 
change and United States climate action are in-
tegrated into their operations and programs; 
(B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and 
diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; 
and 
(C) to make available the technical assist-
ance and resources of the bureaus and offices 
with relevant expertise to provide technical as-
sistance and expert support to other bureaus
1617 
within the Department of State regarding cli-
mate action, clean energy development, and cli-
mate diplomacy; 
(4) manage the integration of scientific data on 
the current and anticipated effects of climate change 
into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements 
across programmatic and regional bureaus of the 
Department of State and into the Department of 
State’s decision making processes; 
(5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices 
provide appropriate technical support and re-
sources— 
(A) to the President, the Secretary of 
State, and their respective designees charged 
with addressing climate change and associated 
issues; 
(B) to United States diplomats advancing 
United States foreign policy related to climate 
action; and 
(C) for the appropriate engagement and 
integration of relevant domestic agencies in 
international climate change affairs, including 
United States participation in multilateral fora; 
and
1618 
(6) carry out other activities, as directed by the 
Secretary of State, that advance United States cli-
mate-related foreign policy objectives, including glob-
al greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adapta-
tion activities, and global climate security. 
(c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all 
foreign missions are— 
(1) advancing United States bilateral climate 
diplomacy; 
(2) engaging strategically on opportunities for 
bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov-
ernments; and 
(3) utilizing the technical resources and coordi-
nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En-
ergy and the Environment. 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State 
for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in 
cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that—
1619 
(1) assesses how climate action and United 
States climate diplomacy is integrated across the 
Bureaus of the Department of State; and 
(2) includes recommendations on strategies to 
improve cross bureau coordination and under-
standing of United States climate action and climate 
diplomacy. 
(e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the 
positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Undersec-
retary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or un-
dergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under 
Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other 
Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate. 
(f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions. 
Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of 
the appropriate chief of mission or the Under Sec-
retary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Envi-
ronment of the Department of State, as the case 
may be. The Secretary shall ensure each embassy, 
consulate, and diplomatic mission to which such Of-
ficers are assigned pursuant to paragraph (2) has
1620 
sufficient additional and appropriate staff to support 
such Officers. 
(2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers 
shall be assigned to the following posts: 
(A) United States embassies, or, if appro-
priate, consulates. 
(B) United States diplomatic missions to, 
or liaisons with, regional and multilateral orga-
nizations, including the United States diplo-
matic missions to the European Union, African 
Union, Organization of American States, Arctic 
Council, and any other appropriate regional or-
ganization, and the United Nations and its rel-
evant specialized agencies. 
(C) Other posts as designated by the Sec-
retary. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change 
Officer shall— 
(A) provide expertise on effective ap-
proaches to— 
(i) mitigate the emission of gases 
which contribute to global climate change 
and formulate national and global plans 
for reducing such gross and net emissions; 
and
1621 
(ii) reduce the detrimental impacts at-
tributable to global climate change, and 
adapt to such impacts; 
(B) engage and convene, in a manner that 
is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals 
and organizations which represent a govern-
ment office, a nongovernmental organization, a 
social or political movement, a private sector 
entity, an educational or scientific institution, 
or any other entity concerned with— 
(i) global climate change; the emission 
of gases which contribute to global climate 
change; or 
(ii) reducing the detrimental impacts 
attributable to global climate change; 
(C) facilitate engagement by United States 
entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
on climate change; and 
(D) carry out such other responsibilities as 
the Secretary may assign. 
(4) 
RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
UNDER
SEC-
RETARY.—The 
Under 
Secretary 
for 
Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the De-
partment of State shall, including by acting through 
the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ-
1622 
mental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of 
State— 
(A) provide policy guidance to Climate 
Change Officers established under this sub-
section; 
(B) develop relations with, consult with, 
and provide assistance to relevant individuals 
and organizations concerned with studying, 
mitigating, and adapting to global climate 
change, or reducing the emission of gases which 
contribute to global climate change; and 
(C) assist officers and employees of re-
gional bureaus of the Department of State to 
develop strategies and programs to promote 
studying, mitigating, and adapting to global cli-
mate change, or reducing the emission of gases 
which contribute to global climate change. 
(g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of 
mission in a foreign country shall— 
(1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic 
plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a 
strategy to promote actions to improve and increase 
studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 
change, or reducing the emission of gases which con-
tribute to global climate change by—
1623 
(A) consulting and coordinating with and 
providing support to relevant individuals and 
organizations, including experts and other pro-
fessionals and stakeholders on issues related to 
climate change; and 
(B) holding periodic meetings with such 
relevant individuals and organizations relating 
to such strategy; and 
(2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials 
and leaders of such country regarding progress to 
improve and increase studying, mitigating, and 
adapting to global climate change, or reducing the 
emission of gases which contribute to global climate 
change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and 
just in such country; and 
(3) certify annually to the Secretary of State 
that to the maximum extent practicable, consider-
ations related to climate change adaptation and 
mitigation, sustainability, and the environment were 
incorporated in activities, management, and oper-
ations of the United States embassy or other diplo-
matic post under the director of the chief of mission. 
(h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall establish curriculum at the Department of State’s
1624 
Foreign Service Institute that supplements political and 
economic reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide 
employees of the Department with specialized training 
with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to glob-
al climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which 
contribute to global climate change. Such training shall 
include the following: 
(1) Awareness of the full range of national and 
subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory 
authorities, funds, and programs involved in the 
international commitments of the United States re-
garding global climate change and the emission of 
gases which contribute to global climate change, the 
science of global climate change, and methods for 
mitigating and adapting to global climate change. 
(2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and 
adapting to global climate change and reducing the 
emission of gases which contribute to global climate 
change that are equitable, inclusive, and just. 
(3) Familiarity with United States agencies, 
multilateral agencies, international financial institu-
tions, and the network of donors providing assist-
ance to mitigate and adapt to global climate change.
1625 
(4) Awareness of the most frequently an-
nounced goals and methods of the entities specified 
in subsection (f)(3)(B). 
(i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements offi-
cers of the Department of State, and other United States 
embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or ac-
quisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals, 
solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sus-
tainability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from cli-
mate change. 
(j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, 
the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report that includes a detailed 
breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the role 
of Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which 
they have been assigned, and the strategies developed by 
the chief of mission, as applicable. 
(k) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.— 
The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination 
among the Department of State and other relevant Fed-
eral departments and agencies toward contributing tech-
nical cooperation, engagement, development finance, or 
foreign assistance relevant to United States international
1626 
climate action and in support of United States climate di-
plomacy. 
(l) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section 
are critical for demonstrating the commitment to include 
climate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy pri-
orities, as well as preserving the United States’ role as 
a global leader on climate change action. 
SEC. 30606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL-
IENCE STRATEGY. 
(a) AMENDMENT.—Section 117 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (b)— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(b)’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assist-
ance to programs and initiatives that— 
‘‘(i) promote resilience among communities fac-
ing harmful impacts from climate change; and 
‘‘(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected 
by climate change. 
‘‘(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a 
Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following:
1627 
‘‘(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, in consultation with the Adminis-
trator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Sec-
retary of Energy, and any other Federal agency the Presi-
dent determines appropriate, shall establish a comprehen-
sive, integrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred 
to as the ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change on displacement 
and humanitarian emergencies. 
‘‘(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy 
shall— 
‘‘(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid- 
onset effects of events caused by climate change, 
consider the effects of events caused by climate 
change, and describe the key features of successful 
strategies to prevent such conditions; 
‘‘(B) include specific objectives and multisec-
toral approaches to the effects of events caused by 
climate change; 
‘‘(C) promote United States national security 
and economic interests while leading international 
climate-related policymaking efforts, on which the 
absence of United States leadership would lead to a
1628 
substantial and harmful decline in the nation’s glob-
al competitiveness; 
‘‘(D) promote international instruments on cli-
mate action and other relevant international stand-
ards and best practices, as such standards and prac-
tices develop, that serve the interests of the Amer-
ican people and protect United States environmental 
resources and the planet; 
‘‘(E) promote the adoption and implementation 
of such international climate-related agreements, 
standards, and practices by foreign states; 
‘‘(F) work with United States allies and part-
ners to ensure a level playing field exists when it 
comes to climate action and to encourage and assist 
foreign countries to make similar or even greater 
commitments than the United States; 
‘‘(G) describe approaches that ensure national 
leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage 
with civil society, local partners, and the affected 
communities, including marginalized populations and 
underserved populations, in the design, implementa-
tion, and monitoring of climate change programs to 
best safeguard the future of those subject to dis-
placement;
1629 
‘‘(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies 
to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that— 
‘‘(i) the Department of State is responsible 
for— 
‘‘(I) 
leading 
the 
Global 
Climate 
Change Resilience Strategy; 
‘‘(II) establishing United States for-
eign policy; 
‘‘(III) advancing diplomatic and polit-
ical efforts; and 
‘‘(IV) guiding security assistance and 
related civilian security efforts to mitigate 
climate change threats; 
‘‘(ii) the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development is— 
‘‘(I) responsible for overseeing pro-
grams to prevent the effects of events 
caused by climate change; 
‘‘(II) the lead implementing agency 
for development and related nonsecurity 
program policy related to building resil-
ience and achieving recovery; and 
‘‘(III) responsible for providing over-
seas humanitarian assistance to respond to 
international and internal displacement
1630 
caused by climate change and to coordi-
nate the pursuit of durable solutions for 
climate-displaced persons; and 
‘‘(iii) other Federal agencies support the 
activities of the Department of State and the 
United States Agency for International Devel-
opment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of 
the Secretary of State and the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International De-
velopment; 
‘‘(I) describe programs that agencies will under-
take to achieve the stated objectives, including de-
scriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal 
year and account; 
‘‘(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina-
tion between the United States, foreign govern-
ments, and international organizations, including the 
World Bank, the United Nations, regional organiza-
tions, and private sector organizations; 
‘‘(K) address efforts to expand public-private 
partnerships and leverage private sector resources; 
‘‘(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mecha-
nisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs 
and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resil-
ience Strategy;
1631 
‘‘(M) describe how the Global Climate Change 
Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are 
country-led and context-specific; 
‘‘(N) establish a program to monitor climate 
and social conditions to anticipate and prevent cli-
mate and environmental stressors from evolving into 
national security risks; 
‘‘(O) include an assessment of climate risks in 
the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy 
and Development Review; 
‘‘(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent prac-
ticable, for international climate resilience in support 
of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy; 
and 
‘‘(Q) include environmental defenders to miti-
gate the impacts of climate change and work with 
allies and partners to ensure a level playing field ex-
ists when it comes to climate action. 
‘‘(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 
President shall submit a report to the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part 
on the information collected pursuant to this section, that 
details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy.
1632 
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 
may include a classified annex, if necessary. 
‘‘(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and 
the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall 
brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives regarding the progress made by the Fed-
eral Government in implementing the Global Climate 
Change Resilience Strategy. 
‘‘(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of 
the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, 
the Comptroller General of the United States, in coopera-
tion and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal 
Government has made toward incorporating climate 
change into department and agency policies, including the 
resources that have been allocated for such purpose. 
‘‘(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) 
shall assess— 
‘‘(i) the degree to which the Department of 
State and the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) are— 
‘‘(I) developing climate change risk assess-
ments; and
1633 
‘‘(II) providing guidance to missions on 
how to include climate change risks in their in-
tegrated country strategies; 
‘‘(ii) whether the Department of State and 
USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the re-
quirements described in paragraph (2); and 
‘‘(iii) any areas in which the Department of 
State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to 
fulfill such requirements.’’. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resil-
ience Strategy. 
SEC. 
30607. 
ADDRESSING 
INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SE-
CURITY. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) CONVENTION.—The term ‘‘Convention’’ 
means the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, 
and entered into force March 21, 1994. 
(2) MOST
VULNERABLE
COMMUNITIES
AND 
POPULATIONS.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable commu-
nities and populations’’ means communities and pop-
ulations that are at risk of substantial adverse ef-
1634 
fects of climate change and have limited capacity to 
respond to such effects, including women, impover-
ished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and 
informal workers. 
(3) MOST
VULNERABLE
DEVELOPING
COUN-
TRIES.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable developing 
countries’’ means, as determined by the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, developing countries that are at risk 
of substantial adverse effects of climate change and 
have limited capacity to respond to such effects, con-
sidering the approaches included in any international 
treaties and agreements. 
(4) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘Program’’ means 
the International Climate Change Adaptation, Miti-
gation, and Security Program established pursuant 
to subsection (c). 
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro-
vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing 
bilateral and regional international development assist-
ance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, 
in support of host country driven projects, planning, poli-
cies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host 
countries—
1635 
(1) to primarily produce reliable renewable en-
ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from 
the power sector while facilitating the transition in 
key global markets from electricity generated from 
fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in 
a manner that is equitable for workers and commu-
nities; 
(2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur-
rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and 
(3) to employ— 
(A) sustainable land use practices that 
mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation; and 
(B) agricultural production practices that 
reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro-
tecting water quality, and increasing food secu-
rity and nutrition. 
(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas-
ury and the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), shall establish a 
program, to be known as the ‘‘International Climate 
Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program’’, 
to provide bilateral and regional assistance to developing
1636 
countries for programs, projects, and activities described 
in subsection (e). 
(d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro-
vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and 
not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local re-
sources available to carry out activities that fit the charac-
teristics of the Program. 
(e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 
States to ensure that the Program provides resources to 
developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable 
communities and populations in such countries, to support 
the development and implementation of programs, 
projects, and activities that— 
(1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 
the integration and deployment of clean energy, in-
cluding transmission, distribution, and interconnec-
tions to renewable energy, while facilitating the tran-
sition from electricity generated from fossil fuel 
power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a 
manner that is equitable for workers and commu-
nities; 
(2) address financial or other barriers to the 
widespread deployment of clean energy technologies 
that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas 
emissions;
1637 
(3) improve the availability, viability, and acces-
sibility of zero emission vehicles, including support 
for design and development of transportation net-
works and land use practices that mitigate carbon 
emissions in the transportation sector; 
(4) support building capacities that may in-
clude— 
(A) developing and implementing meth-
odologies and programs for measuring green-
house gas emissions and verifying emissions 
mitigation, including building capacities to con-
duct emissions inventories and meet reporting 
requirements under the Paris Agreement; 
(B) assessing, developing, and imple-
menting technology and policy options for 
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoid-
ance of future emissions, including sector-based 
and cross-sector mitigation strategies; 
(C) enhancing the technical capacity of 
regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and 
related institutions in developing countries to 
improve the deployment of clean energy tech-
nologies and practices, including through in-
creased transparency;
1638 
(D) training and instruction regarding the 
installation and maintenance of renewable en-
ergy technologies; and 
(E) activities that support the development 
and implementation of frameworks for intellec-
tual property rights in developing countries; 
(5) improve resilience, sustainable economic 
growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the 
effects of climate change; 
(6) promote appropriate job training and access 
to new job opportunities in new economic sectors 
and industries that emerge due to the transition 
from fossil fuel energy to clean energy; 
(7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the re-
silience capacities of communities to the effects of 
climate change, including effects on— 
(A) water availability; 
(B) agricultural productivity and food se-
curity; 
(C) flood risk; 
(D) coastal resources; 
(E) biodiversity; 
(F) economic livelihoods; 
(G) health and diseases; 
(H) housing and shelter; and
1639 
(I) human migration; 
(8) help countries and communities adapt to 
changes in the environment through enhanced com-
munity planning, preparedness, and growth strate-
gies that take into account current and forecasted 
regional and localized effects of climate change; 
(9) conserve and restore natural resources, eco-
systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of 
climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, 
and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide 
natural protections from the effects of climate 
change such as extreme weather; 
(10) provide resources, information, scientific 
data and modeling, innovative best practices, and 
technical assistance to support vulnerable developing 
countries to adapt to the effects of climate change; 
(11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient 
societies, including through improvements to make 
critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change; 
(12) encourage the adoption of policies and 
measures, including sector-based and cross-sector 
policies and measures, that substantially reduce, se-
quester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the
1640 
domestic energy and transportation sectors of devel-
oping countries; 
(13) reduce deforestation and land degradation 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement 
sustainable forestry practices; 
(14) promote sustainable land use activities, in-
cluding supporting development planning, design, 
and construction with respect to transportation sys-
tems and land use; 
(15) promote sustainable agricultural practices 
that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and 
improve food and water security of communities; 
(16) foster partnerships with private sector en-
tities and nongovernmental international develop-
ment organizations to assist with developing solu-
tions and economic opportunities that support 
projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described 
in subsection (b); 
(17) provide technical assistance and strengthen 
capacities of developing countries to meet the goals 
of the conditional nationally determined contribu-
tions of those countries; 
(18) establish investment channels designed to 
leverage private sector financing in— 
(A) clean energy;
1641 
(B) sustainable agriculture and natural re-
source management; and 
(C) the transportation sector as described 
in paragraph (3); and 
(19) provide technical assistance and support 
for non-extractive activities that provide alternative 
economic growth opportunities while preserving crit-
ical habitats and natural carbon sinks. 
(f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.— 
(1) 
IN
GENERAL.—The 
Administrator 
of 
USAID, in consultation with other Federal depart-
ments and agencies, shall provide assistance under 
the Program— 
(A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur-
suant to the requirements under subsection (g); 
(B) to multilateral funds or international 
institutions with programs for climate mitiga-
tion or adaptation in developing countries con-
sistent with the policy described in subsection 
(e); or 
(C) through a combination of the mecha-
nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B). 
(2) LIMITATION.— 
(A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MUL-
TILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
1642 
TUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Adminis-
trator of USAID may provide up to 40 percent 
of the assistance available to carry out the Pro-
gram to 1 or more multilateral funds or inter-
national institutions that meet the requirements 
of subparagraph (B). 
(B) MULTILATERAL
FUND
OR
INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multi-
lateral fund or international institution is eligi-
ble to receive assistance under subparagraph 
(A)— 
(i) if— 
(I) such fund or institution is es-
tablished pursuant to— 
(aa) the Convention; or 
(bb) an agreement nego-
tiated under the Convention; or 
(II) the assistance is directed to 
1 or more multilateral funds or inter-
national 
development 
institutions, 
pursuant to an agreement negotiated 
under the Convention; and 
(ii) if such fund or institution— 
(I) specifies the terms and condi-
tions under which the United States is
1643 
to provide assistance to the fund or 
institution, and under which the fund 
or institution is to provide assistance 
to recipient countries; 
(II) ensures that assistance from 
the United States to the fund or insti-
tution and the principal and income of 
the fund or institution are disbursed 
only— 
(aa) to support projects, 
planning, policies, and initiatives 
described in subsection (b); 
(bb) consistent with the pol-
icy described in subsection (e); 
and 
(cc) in regular consultation 
with relevant governing bodies of 
the fund or institution that— 
(AA) include represen-
tation from countries among 
the most vulnerable devel-
oping countries; and 
(BB) provide public ac-
cess.
1644 
(C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The 
Secretary of State, the Administrator of 
USAID, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
notify the appropriate congressional committees 
not later than 15 days before providing assist-
ance to a multilateral fund or international in-
stitution under this subsection. 
(3) 
LOCAL
CONSULTATIONS.—Programs, 
projects, and activities supported by assistance pro-
vided under this subsection shall require consulta-
tions with local communities, particularly the most 
vulnerable communities and populations in such 
communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in 
which any programs, projects, or activities are 
planned to engage such communities and peoples 
through adequate disclosure of information, public 
participation, and consultation, including full consid-
eration of the interdependence of vulnerable commu-
nities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of 
local communities. 
(g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent incon-
sistent with this subsection, the administrative au-
thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the imple-
1645 
mentation of this subsection to the same extent and 
in the same manner as such authorities apply to the 
implementation of such Act in order to provide the 
Administrator of USAID with the authority to pro-
vide assistance to countries, including the most vul-
nerable developing countries, for programs, projects, 
and activities consistent with the purposes described 
in subsection (b) and the policy described in sub-
section (e). 
(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this 
subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that— 
(A) the environmental impact of proposed 
programs, projects, and activities is considered 
through adequate consultation, public participa-
tion, and public disclosure of relevant informa-
tion; and 
(B) programs, projects, and activities 
under this subsection— 
(i) avoid environmental degradation, 
to the maximum extent practicable; and 
(ii) are aligned, to the maximum ex-
tent practicable, with broader development, 
poverty alleviation, or natural resource 
management objectives and initiatives in 
the recipient country.
1646 
(3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis-
trator shall seek to ensure that— 
(A) local communities, particularly the 
most vulnerable communities and populations in 
areas in which any programs, projects, or ac-
tivities are carried out under this subsection, 
are engaged in the design, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of such programs, 
projects, and activities through disclosure of in-
formation, public participation, and consulta-
tion; and 
(B) the needs and interests of the most 
vulnerable communities and populations are ad-
dressed in national or regional climate change 
adaptation plans developed with USAID sup-
port. 
(4) CONSULTATION
AND
DISCLOSURE.—For 
each country receiving assistance under this sub-
section, the Administrator shall establish a process 
for consultation with, and disclosure of information 
to, local, national, and international stakeholders re-
garding any programs, projects, or activities carried 
out under this subsection. 
(h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section
1647 
$2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year 
thereafter. 
SEC. 30608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM 
SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 
United States representatives to appropriate international 
bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence 
of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign pol-
icy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such 
body or conference— 
(1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to 
reduce short-lived climate pollutants; 
(2) invest in and develop alternative energy 
sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli-
ances, and products to replace sources of short-lived 
climate pollutants; 
(3) enhance coordination with the private sec-
tor— 
(A) to increase production and distribution 
of clean energy alternatives, industrial proc-
esses, and products that will replace sources of 
short-lived climate pollutants; 
(B) to develop action plans to mitigate 
short-lived climate pollutants from various pri-
vate sector operations;
1648 
(C) to encourage best technology, methods, 
and management practices for reducing short- 
lived climate pollutants; 
(D) to craft or enhance specific financing 
mechanisms for the incremental costs associ-
ated with mitigating short-lived climate pollut-
ants; and 
(E) to grow economic opportunities and 
develop markets, as appropriate, for reducing 
short-lived climate pollutants; 
(4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu-
latory authorities and governments to remove unnec-
essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate 
pollutant mitigation solutions, including— 
(A) the use of safe and affordable clean 
energy; 
(B) the implementation of policies requir-
ing industrial and agricultural best practices for 
capturing or mitigating the release of methane 
from extractive, agricultural, and industrial 
processes; and 
(C) climate assessment, scientific research, 
monitoring, and technological development ac-
tivities;
1649 
(5) develop and implement clear, accountable, 
and metric-based targets to measure the effective-
ness of projects described in paragraph (4); and 
(6) engage international partners in an existing 
multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish 
through an international agreement a new multilat-
eral forum) to improve global cooperation for— 
(A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating 
efforts to reduce short-lived climate pollutants; 
(B) developing and implementing best 
practices for significantly reducing emissions of 
short-lived climate pollutants, including expand-
ing capacity for innovative instruments to effec-
tively mitigate short-lived climate pollutants at 
the national and subnational levels of foreign 
countries, particularly countries with little ca-
pacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
deploy clean energy facilities, and countries that 
lack sufficient policies to advance such develop-
ment; 
(C) encouraging the development of stand-
ards and practices, and increasing transparency 
and accountability efforts for the reduction of 
short-lived climate pollutants;
1650 
(D) integrating tracking and monitoring 
systems into industrial processes; 
(E) fostering research to improve scientific 
understanding of— 
(i) how high concentrations of short- 
lived climate pollutants affect human 
health, safety, and our environment; 
(ii) changes in the amount and re-
gional concentrations of black carbon and 
methane emissions, based on scientific 
modeling and forecasting; 
(iii) effective means to sequester 
short-lived climate pollutants; and 
(iv) other related areas of research the 
United States representatives deem nec-
essary; 
(F) encouraging the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and other inter-
national finance organizations— 
(i) to prioritize efforts to combat 
short-lived climate pollutants; and 
(ii) to enhance or maintain trans-
parency by providing sufficient and ade-
quate information to facilitate independent
1651 
verification of their climate finance report-
ing; 
(G) encouraging observers of the Arctic 
Council (including India and China) to adopt 
mitigation plans consistent with the findings 
and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s 
Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 
Methane; 
(H) collaborating on technological ad-
vances in short-lived climate pollutants mitiga-
tion, sequestration and reduction technologies; 
and 
(I) advising foreign countries, at both the 
national and subnational levels, regarding the 
development and execution of regulatory poli-
cies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing 
the creation and the collection and safe man-
agement of short-lived climate pollutants. 
(b) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH
AND 
PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED 
IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.— 
(1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success 
of the United States Climate Alliance and the green-
house gas reduction programs and strategies estab-
1652 
lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Center for Corporate Climate Leadership. 
(2) AUTHORIZATION
OF
EFFORTS
TO
BUILD 
FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, shall build partner-
ships, as appropriate, with the governments of for-
eign countries and to support international efforts to 
reduce short-lived climate pollutants. 
(c) CONSIDERATION OF SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POL-
LUTANTS
IN
NEGOTIATING
INTERNATIONAL
AGREE-
MENTS.—In negotiating any relevant international agree-
ment with any country or countries after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall— 
(1) consider the impact short-lived climate pol-
lutants are having on the increase in global average 
temperatures and the resulting global climate 
change; 
(2) consider the effects that climate change is 
having on the environment; and 
(3) ensure that the agreement strengthens ef-
forts to significantly reduce short-lived climate pol-
lutants from such country or countries. 
(d) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS 
FROM SHIPS.—The Administrator of the Environmental
1653 
Protection Agency, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Commandant 
of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehensive plan 
to reduce black carbon emissions from ships based on ap-
propriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. The 
plan shall provide for such reduction through— 
(1) a clean freight partnership; 
(2) limits on black carbon emissions; and 
(3) efforts that include protection of access to 
critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of 
coastal communities. 
(e) ESTABLISHMENT
OF INTERAGENCY WORKING 
GROUP ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANTS MITIGA-
TION.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi-
dent shall establish a task force, to be known as the 
Interagency Working Group on Short-Lived Climate 
Pollutant Mitigation. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Work-
ing Group shall include the head (or a designee 
thereof) of— 
(A) the Department of Agriculture; 
(B) the Department of Commerce;
1654 
(C) the Department of Defense; 
(D) the Department of Energy; 
(E) the Department of Health and Human 
Services; 
(F) the Department of the Interior; 
(G) the Department of State; 
(H) the Department of Transportation; 
(I) the Environmental Protection Agency; 
(J) the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration; 
(K) the Council on Environmental Quality; 
(L) the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development; and 
(M) any other Federal agency the Presi-
dent determines appropriate. 
(3) DUTIES.—The Working Group shall— 
(A) review the policy recommendations 
made by— 
(i) the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change; 
(ii) the United States Climate Alli-
ance; 
(iii) the Interagency Strategy to Re-
duce Methane Emissions;
1655 
(iv) the Council on Climate Prepared-
ness and Resilience; 
(v) the Clean Cooking Alliance; 
(vi) the International Maritime Orga-
nization; and 
(vii) other relevant organizations and 
institutions; and 
(B) develop an action plan to reduce short- 
lived climate pollutants that incorporates any 
appropriate 
proposals 
or 
recommendations 
made by the entities referred to in subpara-
graph (A). 
SEC. 30609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION 
THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND. 
(a) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.— 
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(A) climate change most severely impacts 
vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in 
the United States and around the world; 
(B) it is the responsibility of the United 
States Government to work with and press 
other countries to address environmental justice 
and climate justice;
1656 
(C) the report of the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme entitled ‘‘Climate Change 
and the Cost of Capital in Developing Coun-
tries’’, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10 
years prior to the publication of the report, cli-
mate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most 
affected by catastrophes rooted in climate 
change an additional $62,000,000,000 in inter-
est payments alone; 
(D) individuals and families, particularly 
communities of color, indigenous communities, 
and low-income communities, that are on the 
frontlines of climate change across the globe are 
often in close proximity to environmental 
stressors or sources of pollution; 
(E) the communities described in subpara-
graph (D)— 
(i) are often the first exposed to the 
causes and impacts of climate change; and 
(ii) have the fewest resources with 
which to mitigate those impacts or to relo-
cate; 
(F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate cli-
mate change must include specific protections 
for and acknowledgment of the harm of climate
1657 
change to communities of color, indigenous peo-
ples, women, and other frontline communities 
and marginalized peoples around the world; 
(G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the 
parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change adopted the Paris 
Agreement, a benchmark agreement— 
(i) to combat climate change; 
(ii) to accelerate and intensify the ac-
tions and investments needed for a sus-
tainable low carbon future; and 
(iii) 
that 
acknowledges, 
‘‘Parties 
should, when taking action to address cli-
mate change, respect, promote and con-
sider their respective obligations on human 
rights, the right to health, the rights of in-
digenous peoples, local communities, mi-
grants, children, persons with disabilities 
and people in vulnerable situations and the 
right to development, as well as gender 
equality, empowerment of women and in-
tergenerational equity’’; 
(H) the Paris Agreement—
1658 
(i) notes the importance of ‘‘climate 
justice’’ when mitigating and adapting to 
climate change; and 
(ii) recognizes ‘‘the need for an effec-
tive and progressive response to the urgent 
threat of climate change’’; 
(I) it is imperative for all countries to un-
dertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the 
goal of limiting global warming to not more 
than 1.5 degrees Celsius; 
(J) developed countries have the greatest 
capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emis-
sions, while— 
(i) developing countries have the least 
capacity to engage in mitigation activities; 
and 
(ii) the capacity of developing coun-
tries to engage in mitigation activities is 
less than the national mitigation potential 
of those developing countries; 
(K) the determination for the fair share of 
mitigation and adaptation activities for each 
country must take into account— 
(i) the historic greenhouse gas emis-
sions of each country; and
1659 
(ii) the current capacity of each coun-
try to both mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions and adapt to climate impacts; 
(L) developed countries that have histori-
cally emitted a disproportionately high share of 
greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the eco-
nomic benefits of those polluting activities, have 
a corresponding disproportionately greater re-
sponsibility to engage in global mitigation and 
adaptation activities, as compared to less indus-
trialized countries that have historically polluted 
far less; 
(M) the only realistic way for less industri-
alized countries to meet their full mitigation po-
tential is through international climate financ-
ing by more developed countries; 
(N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, devel-
oped countries committed to jointly mobilize, 
starting in 2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in 
public climate financing (as well as private in-
vestment and other alternative forms of fi-
nance), for developing countries, a commitment 
reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement;
1660 
(O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment de-
scribed in subparagraph (N) was a political 
compromise that falls short of the actual fi-
nancing needs for climate action in developing 
countries; 
(P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has 
estimated that the transition to renewable en-
ergy sources in developing countries will require 
hundreds of billions of dollars annually; 
(Q) the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme has estimated that adaptation needs 
relating to climate change in developing coun-
tries may be as much as $300,000,000,000 an-
nually by 2030; 
(R) the Green Climate Fund was created 
in 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial 
financing mechanism to help developing coun-
tries limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
and adapt to climate change; 
(S) in 2015, the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change agreed 
that the Green Climate Fund should serve the 
goals of the Paris Agreement, which states that 
‘‘developed country Parties shall provide finan-
cial resources to assist developing country Par-
1661 
ties with respect to both mitigation and adapta-
tion in continuation of their existing obligations 
under the Convention’’; 
(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 
institution for climate financing, as the Green 
Climate Fund ensures— 
(i) balanced governance between de-
veloped and developing countries; 
(ii) stakeholder engagement and dis-
course; 
(iii) a balanced approach between 
mitigation and adaptation; 
(iv) fair and equal labor and working 
conditions; 
(v) conservation of biodiversity and 
critical habitats; and 
(vi) strong environmental, social, and 
gender protections; 
(U) the Green Climate Fund— 
(i) promotes and protects human 
rights and the rights of marginalized 
groups, 
including 
indigenous 
peoples, 
women, children, and people with disabil-
ities; and
1662 
(ii) 
continues 
to 
take 
steps 
to 
strengthen protection for marginalized 
groups; 
(iii) the United States committed 
$3,000,000,000 
of 
the 
first 
$10,000,000,000 raised for the initial re-
source mobilization period of the Green 
Climate Fund, though only 1⁄3 of this 
pledge was fulfilled, leaving the United 
States the only country to fall substantially 
short of a commitment of a country to the 
Green Climate Fund; and 
(V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully 
operational and proven institution supporting 
well over 100 projects and programs in devel-
oping countries around the world. 
(2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 
the United States to provide climate financing— 
(A) as an essential part of the global effort 
to combat climate change; and 
(B) that— 
(i) upholds the principles of environ-
mental justice and climate justice;
1663 
(ii) supports programs and projects 
developed by recipient countries and com-
munities; 
(iii) is designed and implemented with 
the free, prior, and informed consent of in-
digenous peoples and other impacted com-
munities; 
(iv) promotes gender equality as es-
sential in all of the projects and programs 
supported by climate financing; 
(v) includes best practices for environ-
mental and social safeguards to ensure 
that projects and programs supported by 
climate 
financing 
respect 
fundamental 
human rights; and 
(vi) addresses both mitigation and ad-
aptation as essential aspects of responding 
to climate change. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the 
Green Climate Fund $4,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal 
years 2022 and 2023. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the climate financing needs to achieve the 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to keep the
1664 
planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming 
are significantly greater than the amount of funds author-
ized to be appropriated under subsection (a). 
SEC. 30610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RE-
SPONSE TO CLIMATE ACTION. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall 
establish a Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in 
this section as the ‘‘Task Force’’) with the mandate to— 
(1) monitor international climate and related 
impacted social conditions to anticipate and prevent 
climate and environmental stressors from evolving 
into national security risks; 
(2) monitor and assess climate action under-
taken by other countries in response to national 
strategies and international commitments, and co-
ordinate closely with allies and partners to ensure a 
coordinated response against any state or non-state 
actors, including the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and PRC companies, undermining global cli-
mate objectives, norms, and practices; 
(3) strengthen the efforts of the Department of 
State and the United States Government to act 
proactively to mitigate the human harms and poten-
tial for national security risks resulting from inter-
1665 
national emerging events exacerbated by climate 
change; and 
(4) assist other Federal departments and agen-
cies, foreign partners, and multilateral organizations 
in their efforts to do the same. 
(b) LEADERSHIP.—The Secretary of State shall des-
ignate a senior career official, as appropriate, of the De-
partment of State to serve as the Chair of the Task Force. 
Such official shall report to the Secretary of State. 
(c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Under the direction of the 
Chair, the Task Force shall— 
(1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacer-
bated by climate change and the risk of emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change throughout the 
world are adequately considered and addressed; 
(2) facilitate the development and execution of 
policies and tools to enhance the capacity of the 
United States to prevent and respond to emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change worldwide; 
(3) monitor developments throughout the world 
that heighten the risk of emerging events exacer-
bated by climate change; 
(4) identify gaps in United States foreign policy 
related to the prevention of and response to emerg-
1666 
ing events exacerbated by climate change with re-
spect to certain regions or particular countries; 
(5) incorporate lessons learned from past 
United States efforts to prevent and respond to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change and 
other impacts that are comparable in scope or sever-
ity; 
(6) provide the Secretary of State with rec-
ommendations and potential improvements to poli-
cies, programs, resources, and tools related to the 
prevention of and response to emerging events exac-
erbated by climate change; 
(7) coordinate the Department of State’s en-
gagement in interagency processes led by the Na-
tional Security Council that share the Task Force’s 
objectives; 
(8) conduct outreach not less frequently than 
biannually, with representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations dedicated to the prevention of and re-
sponse to emerging events exacerbated by climate 
change and other appropriate parties, to— 
(A) receive assistance relating to the Task 
Force’s efforts to address emerging events exac-
erbated by climate change and develop new or
1667 
improved policies, programs, resources, and 
tools; and 
(B) provide a public understanding of the 
work of the Task Force; 
(9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), 
focus on particular ways for the United States to de-
velop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to— 
(A) monitor, receive early warning of, and 
coordinate responses to potential emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change; 
(B) engage allies and partners, including 
multilateral and regional institutions, to build 
capacities and mobilize action for preventing 
and responding to emerging events exacerbated 
by climate change; 
(C) encourage the deployment of civilian 
advisors to prevent and respond to emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change; 
(D) increase the capacity of and develop 
doctrine for the United States Foreign Service, 
civil service, Armed Forces, development profes-
sionals, and other actors to engage in the full 
spectrum of activities to prevent and respond to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change;
1668 
(E) develop and implement tailored foreign 
assistance programs that address and mitigate 
the risks of emerging events exacerbated by cli-
mate change; 
(F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, 
and sharing of appropriate information; and 
(G) address any other issues that the Task 
Force determines appropriate; 
(10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through 
(9), receive support from bureaus and offices of the 
Department of State, as the Secretary of State de-
termines appropriate; and 
(11) facilitate annual coordination between the 
Department of State and other appropriate depart-
ments and agencies to ensure international and do-
mestic climate change objectives are aligned. 
(d) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall— 
(1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement 
and support interagency processes led by the Na-
tional Security Council that share the Task Force’s 
objectives; and 
(2) operate with regular consultation and par-
ticipation of designated representatives, at the As-
sistant Secretary level or higher, from all such exec-
1669 
utive departments, agencies, or offices as the Chair 
may designate. 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter 
for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the Task Force, shall submit to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
annex if necessary, that includes— 
(1) a review, in consultation with the des-
ignated representatives specified in subsection (d), 
consisting of— 
(A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current 
efforts based on United States and locally iden-
tified indicators, including capacities and con-
straints for United States Government-wide de-
tection, early warning and response, informa-
tion-sharing, contingency planning, and coordi-
nation of efforts to prevent and respond to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(B) an assessment of the funding expended 
by relevant Federal departments and agencies 
on emerging events exacerbated by climate
1670 
change and the legal, procedural, and resource 
constraints faced by the Department of State 
and the United States Agency for International 
Development throughout respective budgeting, 
strategic planning, and management cycles to 
support the prevention of and response to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(C) current annual global assessments of 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(D) recommendations to further strength-
en United States capabilities described in sub-
paragraph (A); and 
(E) consideration of analysis, reporting, 
and policy recommendations by civil society, 
academic, and other nongovernmental organiza-
tions and institutions to prevent and respond to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
(2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi-
bility by— 
(A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 
preventing, mitigating, and responding to 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 
and 
(B) strengthening regional organizations; 
and
1671 
(3) the implementation status of the rec-
ommendations included in the review under para-
graph (1). 
(f) BRIEFINGS
AND MATERIALS.—The Chair and 
members of the Task Force shall, not less frequently than 
annually, provide briefings and materials to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(g) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is en-
couraged to include, in his or her annual (or more often 
as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a 
classified annex, if necessary, to Congress (including the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate) on threats to United States national 
security— 
(1) a review of countries and regions at risk of 
emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and 
(2) whenever possible, specific identification of 
countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging 
events exacerbated by climate change. 
(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that rapid and robust climate change response mech-
anisms, including the establishment of the Task Force, are
1672 
critical for ensuring other countries remain accountable to 
their climate action commitments as well as preserving the 
national security and economic interests of the United 
States. 
SEC. 30611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO 
REDUCE DEFORESTATION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
having a substantial impact on the most important 
forest ecosystems in the world, and illegal logging 
and agricultural expansion have caused the massive 
forest loss. According to the World Resources Insti-
tute, the PRC has become the world’s leading im-
porter and consumer of timber products, soybeans, 
and palm oil, as well as the largest manufacturing 
and export country of forest products. 
(2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more 
than 100 countries in the world. According to a 
Global Witness report, between January 2013 and 
April 2020, Chinese financial institutions provided 
more than $22.5 billion to major companies that 
produce and trade commodities at high risk of driv-
ing deforestation. These commodities include beef, 
soy, palm oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber.
1673 
(3) Further, the growing international demand 
for such agricultural commodities causes the major-
ity of deforestation emissions globally, and most of 
the associated land-clearing violates applicable na-
tional or local laws. According to a 2021 Forest 
Trends report, at least 69 percent of forest land con-
verted to pasture or cropland was cleared illegally. 
(4) The growing demand for timber and agri-
cultural 
commodities 
has 
accelerated 
unsustainable—and often illegal—logging and the 
trade of timber products, which harms the countries 
in which it takes place by siphoning away govern-
ment tax revenue, transforming the livelihoods of 
communities dependent on forests, and hurting legal 
businesses’ competitiveness. Further, illegal logging 
and illegal conversion of forest to agricultural land 
threatens biodiversity and accelerates deforestation 
and forest degradation in key timber supply coun-
tries, undermining United States and global climate 
goals. 
(5) The United States should work with inter-
national partners to ensure that Chinese and other 
banks factor into lending practices the environ-
mental and social impact of the companies they fi-
nance. This should include pressuring the PRC and
1674 
other countries to revise regulations to require the 
banking sector not to finance companies linked to 
deforestation and include rigorous checks on the 
companies operating in sectors or regions where 
there is a high risk of deforestation to ensure they 
are not associated with deforestation. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ADMINISTRATOR.—Except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided, the term ‘‘Administrator’’ means 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development. 
(2) DEFORESTATION.—The term ‘‘deforest-
ation’’ means a change in land use from a forest (in-
cluding peatlands) to any other land use. 
(3) DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘devel-
oping country’’ means a country eligible to receive 
official development assistance according to the in-
come guidelines of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development. 
(4) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS.—The term ‘‘emis-
sions reductions’’ means greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions achieved from reduced or avoided defor-
estation under this section. 
(5) FOREST.—
1675 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The term ‘‘forest’’ 
means a terrestrial ecosystem, including wet-
land forests, comprised of native tree species 
generated and maintained primarily through 
natural ecological and evolutionary processes. 
(B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘‘forest’’ does 
not include plantations, such as crops of trees 
planted by humans primarily for the purposes 
of harvesting. 
(6) FOREST DEGRADATION.—The term ‘‘forest 
degradation’’ is any reduction in the carbon stock of 
a forest due to the effects of human land-use activi-
ties, including such land-use activities on peatlands. 
(7) INTACT FOREST.—The term ‘‘intact forest’’ 
means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems 
within the global extent of forest cover that— 
(A) covers an area of at least 500 square 
kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each 
direction; and 
(B) contains forest and non-forest eco-
systems minimally influenced by human eco-
nomic activity and large enough that all native 
biodiversity, including viable populations of 
wide-ranging species, could be maintained.
1676 
(9) LEAKAGE.—The term ‘‘leakage’’ means the 
unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to 
the displacement of activities in a project area to 
areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emis-
sions. 
(10) LEAKAGE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.—The 
term ‘‘leakage prevention activities’’ means activities 
in developing countries that are directed at pre-
serving existing forest carbon stocks, including for-
ested wetlands and peatlands that might, absent 
such activities, be lost through leakage. 
(11) NATIONAL
DEFORESTATION
REDUCTION 
ACTIVITIES.—The term ‘‘national deforestation re-
duction activities’’ means activities in developing 
countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions from deforestation that is calculated by 
measuring actual emissions against a national defor-
estation baseline established pursuant to subpara-
graphs (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4). 
(12) SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOR-
EST
DEGRADATION
REDUCTION
ACTIVITIES.—The 
term ‘‘subnational deforestation and forest degrada-
tion reduction activities’’ means activities in devel-
oping countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse 
gas emissions from deforestation and forest degrada-
1677 
tion that is calculated by measuring actual emissions 
using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative de-
termined under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established 
by the Administrator at the State or provincial level. 
(c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are to 
provide United States assistance to developing countries 
to develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation or conserve or restore 
forest ecosystems— 
(1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems 
with respect to permanent carbon capture and se-
questration in a manner in which such value is 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable; and 
(2) in a manner that— 
(A) is consistent with and enhances the 
implementation 
of 
complementary 
United 
States policies that support the good govern-
ance of forests, biodiversity conservation, and 
environmentally sustainable development; 
(B) takes into consideration the views and 
participation of local communities and most vul-
nerable communities and populations, particu-
larly forest-dependent communities; and 
(C) incorporates the right to free prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peoples.
1678 
(d) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED 
DEFORESTATION.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—Not later 
than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other 
appropriate agencies, shall establish a program to 
provide assistance to reduce deforestation in devel-
oping countries and its impacts, in accordance with 
this section. 
(2) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the pro-
gram established under paragraph (1) shall be— 
(A) to achieve— 
(i) emissions reductions of at least 
7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent in 2025; 
(ii) cumulative emissions reductions of 
at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon di-
oxide equivalent by December 31, 2030; 
and 
(iii) additional emissions reductions in 
subsequent years; 
(B) to build capacity to reduce deforest-
ation at a national level in developing countries 
experiencing deforestation, which may include—
1679 
(i) preparing developing countries to 
participate in international markets for 
international offset credits for reduced 
emissions from deforestation; 
(ii) supporting the development of 
overseas domestic policy frameworks to en-
sure effective, efficient, and equitable ben-
efit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits 
issued by national and subnational govern-
ments; and 
(iii) promoting and expanding land ti-
tling initiatives and programs in other 
countries; 
(C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in 
countries where such forest carbon may be vul-
nerable to leakage, particularly in developing 
countries with largely intact native forests; 
(D) to build the scientific knowledge and 
institutional capacity to help developing coun-
tries— 
(i) monitor the effects of climate 
change on their forests; 
(ii) develop and implement strategies 
to conserve their forests; and
1680 
(iii) support forest-dependent commu-
nities adapt to climate change; 
(E) to the extent practicable, to reduce de-
forestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability 
and increase the resilience to climate effects for 
forests and forest-dependent communities; 
(F) to prevent degradation and fragmenta-
tion of forests and other intact ecosystems, par-
ticularly in tropical countries, including by pro-
viding assistance or supporting policies to— 
(i) conserve, protect, and restore the 
integrity of such ecosystems; and 
(ii) support the rights of Indigenous 
People and local communities and their 
ability to continue their effective steward-
ship of their intact traditional lands and 
territories; 
(G) to build capacity to address illegal de-
forestation for agricultural commodities; and 
(H) to remove subsidies that favor defor-
estation; 
(e) REQUIREMENTS
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFOR-
ESTATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.— 
(1) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—
1681 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), the Administrator may pro-
vide assistance under this section only with re-
spect to a developing country that— 
(i) the Administrator, in consultation 
with other appropriate agencies, deter-
mines— 
(I) is experiencing deforestation 
or forest degradation; or 
(II) has standing forest carbon 
stocks that may be at risk of deforest-
ation or degradation; 
(ii) has the legal regimes, standards, 
and safeguards to ensure that the rights 
and interests of indigenous peoples and 
forest-dependent communities are pro-
tected in accordance with the standards es-
tablished under paragraph (4); and 
(iii) has entered into a bilateral or 
multilateral agreement or arrangement 
with the United States, or is part of an 
international program supported by the 
United States to prevent deforestation, 
that establishes the conditions of participa-
tion by the country in the program estab-
1682 
lished under this section, which shall in-
clude an agreement to meet the standards 
established under paragraph (4) for the ac-
tivities to which such standards apply. 
(B) EXCEPTION.—A developing country 
that does not meet the requirement described in 
paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance 
under this section for the purpose of building 
capacity to meet such requirement. 
(2) AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—Subject to the 
requirements of this section, in providing assistance 
under this section, the Administrator may support 
activities to achieve the objectives described in sub-
section (c)(2), such as— 
(A) national deforestation reduction activi-
ties; 
(B) subnational deforestation and forest 
degradation reduction activities, including pilot 
activities, policies, and measures that reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to 
significant uncertainty; 
(C) activities to measure, monitor, and 
verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and 
rates of deforestation, including, if applicable, 
spatially explicit land use plans that identify in-
1683 
tact and primary forest areas and managed for-
est areas; 
(D) leakage prevention activities; 
(E) the development and implementation 
of measurement, monitoring, reporting, and 
verification capacities and governance struc-
tures, including legal regimes, standards, proc-
esses, and safeguards, as established under 
paragraph (4), to enable a country to quantify 
emissions reductions for purposes of purchasing 
or trading subnational emissions reduction cred-
its in carbon markets; 
(F) the identification of, and actions to ad-
dress, the drivers of land use emissions; 
(G) programs that would exclude from the 
United States illegally harvested timber or 
products made from illegally harvested timber, 
in accordance with and consistent with the ob-
jectives of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 
(16 U.S.C. 3371 et seq.); 
(H) the development and strengthening of 
governance capacities to reduce deforestation 
and other land use emissions and to combat il-
legal logging and associated trade, including the 
development of systems for independent moni-
1684 
toring of the efficacy of forest law enforcement 
and increased enforcement cooperation, includ-
ing joint efforts with Federal agencies, to en-
force the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 
U.S.C. 3371 et seq.); 
(I) programs to help countries strengthen 
the necessary governance and technological ca-
pacity to trace and make publicly available the 
origin of agricultural commodities associated 
with tropical deforestation, such as beef, soy, 
palm oil, paper, pulp, cocoa, and rubber; 
(J) the development and strengthening of 
governance capacities and associated implemen-
tation activities to combat illegal deforestation 
related to the production of agricultural com-
modities, such as those described in subpara-
graph (I); 
(K) the provision of incentives for policy 
reforms to achieve the objectives described in 
subsection (c)(2); 
(L) the development of pilot projects— 
(i) to examine where mitigation and 
adaptation activities in forest ecosystems 
coincide; and
1685 
(ii) to explore means for enhancing 
the resilience of forest ecosystems and for-
est-dependent communities; 
(M) the promotion of mechanisms to de-
liver resources for local action and to address 
the needs, rights, interests, and participation of 
local and indigenous communities; 
(N) the promotion of land tenure and ti-
tling programs, including legal recognition and 
effective protection of the land tenure, access 
and use rights of Indigenous People and local 
communities; and 
(O) the monitoring and evaluation of the 
results of the activities conducted under this 
section. 
(3) MECHANISMS.—The Administrator shall 
apply the administrative authorities under the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
seq.), except to the extent inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this section, to the same extent and in the 
same manner as such authorities apply to the imple-
mentation of such Act in order to support activities 
to achieve the objectives described in subsection 
(c)(2) by—
1686 
(A) developing and implementing programs 
and project-level activities that achieve such ob-
jectives; 
(B) to the extent practicable, giving pri-
ority in any review process to activities under 
paragraph (2)(A); and 
(C) as appropriate, considering multi-year 
funding arrangements in carrying out the pur-
poses of this section. 
(4) STANDARDS.—The Administrator, in con-
sultation with other appropriate agencies, shall es-
tablish program standards that— 
(A) ensure that emissions reductions 
achieved through supported activities— 
(i) 
are 
additional, 
measurable, 
verifiable, and monitored; 
(ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, 
and permanence; and 
(iii) at a minimum, meet the stand-
ards established under the emissions unit 
criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Re-
duction Scheme for International Aviation 
(CORSIA) developed by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); 
(B) require—
1687 
(i) the establishment of a national de-
forestation baseline for each country with 
national deforestation reduction activities 
that is used to account for reductions 
achieved from such activities; or 
(ii) if a developing country has estab-
lished policies and taken measures to re-
duce emissions from disturbed peatlands, 
deforestation, or forest degradation, but 
has not established a national baseline, the 
provision of a credible, transparent, accu-
rate, and conservative alternative for quan-
tifying emissions; 
(C) provide that each national deforest-
ation baseline established under subparagraph 
(B)(i)— 
(i) is national, or subnational on an 
interim basis, in scope; and 
(ii) is consistent with nationally ap-
propriate mitigation commitments or ac-
tions with respect to deforestation, taking 
into consideration— 
(I) the average annual historical 
deforestation rates of the country dur-
ing a period of at least 5 years; and
1688 
(II) the applicable drivers of de-
forestation and other factors to ensure 
additionality; 
(iii) establishes a trajectory that 
would result in zero net deforestation by 
not later than 20 years after the date on 
which the baseline is established; 
(iv) is adjusted over time to account 
for changing national circumstances; and 
(v) is designed to account for all sig-
nificant sources of greenhouse gas emis-
sions from deforestation in the country; 
(D) with respect to assistance provided for 
activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) 
of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions 
to be achieved and verified before the provision 
of any assistance under this section; 
(E) with respect to accounting for sub-
national deforestation and forest degradation 
reduction activities that lack the standardized 
or precise measurement and monitoring tech-
niques needed for a full accounting of changes 
in emissions or baselines, or are subject to 
other sources of uncertainty, apply a conserv-
1689 
ative discount factor to reflect the uncertainty 
regarding the levels of reductions achieved; 
(F) ensure that activities under this sec-
tion are designed, carried out, and managed— 
(i) using forest management practices 
that, in an open and transparent process— 
(I) improve the livelihoods of for-
est communities in a manner that 
promotes the maintenance of intact 
forests, protects associated biodiver-
sity, and restores native forest species 
and ecosystems while avoiding the in-
troduction of invasive nonnative spe-
cies; 
(II) maintain natural biodiver-
sity, resilience, and carbon storage ca-
pacity of forests; 
(III) to the extent practicable, do 
not adversely affect the permanence of 
forest carbon stocks or emissions re-
ductions; 
(IV) include broad stakeholder 
participation and the free prior and 
informed consent of affected indige-
nous peoples; and
1690 
(V) take into account the needs 
and interests of local communities, 
forest-dependent communities, indige-
nous peoples, and vulnerable social 
groups; 
(ii) in consultation with, and with the 
full and effective participation of, local 
communities, indigenous peoples, and for-
est-dependent 
communities 
in 
affected 
areas, as partners and primary stake-
holders, before and during the design, 
planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of activities; and 
(iii) with equitable sharing of profits 
and benefits derived from the activities 
with local communities, indigenous peoples, 
and forest-dependent communities; and 
(G) with respect to assistance for all activi-
ties under this section, seek to ensure the estab-
lishment and enforcement of legal regimes, 
standards, processes, and safeguards by the 
country in which the activities are conducted, as 
a condition of such assistance or as a proposed 
activity for which such assistance may be pro-
vided, which—
1691 
(i) protect the rights and interests of 
local communities, indigenous peoples, for-
est-dependent communities, human rights 
defenders, and vulnerable social groups; 
and 
(ii) promote consultations with local 
communities, indigenous peoples, and for-
est-dependent 
communities 
in 
affected 
areas, as partners and primary stake-
holders, before and during the design, 
planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of activities under this section; 
and 
(iii) ensure equitable sharing of prof-
its and benefits from incentives for emis-
sions reductions or leakage prevention with 
local communities, indigenous peoples, and 
forest-dependent communities. 
(5) SCOPE.— 
(A) REDUCED EMISSIONS.—The Adminis-
trator shall include reduced emissions from for-
est degradation and disturbance of peatlands 
within the scope of activities under this section. 
(B) EXPANSION OF AUTHORIZED ACTIVI-
TIES.—If the Administrator determines, in con-
1692 
sultation with other appropriate agencies, that 
sufficient methodologies and technical capacities 
exist to measure, monitor, and account for the 
emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the 
Administrator may expand the authorized ac-
tivities under this section, as appropriate, to in-
clude reduced soil carbon-derived emissions as-
sociated with deforestation and degradation of 
forested wetlands and peatlands, consistent 
with a comprehensive approach to maintaining 
and enhancing forests, increasing climate resil-
iency, reducing emissions, and increasing re-
movals of greenhouse gases. 
(6) ACCOUNTING.—The Administrator shall use 
a publicly accessible registry to account for and reg-
ister the emissions reductions achieved through as-
sistance provided under this section each year, after 
appropriately discounting for uncertainty and other 
relevant factors as required by the standards estab-
lished under paragraph (4). 
(7) INTERNATIONAL
DEFORESTATION
REDUC-
TION
PROGRAM
INSURANCE
ACCOUNT
FOR
NON-
COMPLETION OR REVERSAL.—In furtherance of the 
objectives described in subsection (c)(2), the Admin-
1693 
istrator shall develop and implement a program 
that— 
(A) addresses noncompletion or reversal 
with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions 
that were not, or are no longer, sequestered; 
and 
(B) may include a mechanism to hold in 
reserve a portion of the amount allocated for 
projects to support the program. 
(8) EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may 
extend, for an additional 5 years, the period 
during which assistance is authorized for activi-
ties supported by assistance under this section, 
if the Administrator determines that— 
(i) the country in which the activities 
are 
conducted 
is 
making 
substantial 
progress toward adopting and imple-
menting a program to achieve reductions 
in deforestation measured against a na-
tional baseline; 
(ii) the greenhouse gas emissions re-
ductions achieved as a result of the activi-
ties are not resulting in significant leakage;