H. R. 2471—1009 
(B) Consult with relevant private sector, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial governments and international stake-
holders to identify needs and establish mechanisms for 
providing input into the Joint Ransomware Task Force. 
(C) Identifying, in consultation with relevant entities, 
a list of highest threat ransomware entities updated on 
an ongoing basis, in order to facilitate— 
(i) prioritization for Federal action by appropriate 
Federal agencies; and 
(ii) identify metrics for success of said actions. 
(D) Disrupting ransomware criminal actors, associated 
infrastructure, and their finances. 
(E) Facilitating coordination and collaboration between 
Federal entities and relevant entities, including the private 
sector, to improve Federal actions against ransomware 
threats. 
(F) Collection, sharing, and analysis of ransomware 
trends to inform Federal actions. 
(G) Creation of after-action reports and other lessons 
learned from Federal actions that identify successes and 
failures to improve subsequent actions. 
(H) Any other activities determined appropriate by 
the Joint Ransomware Task Force to mitigate the threat 
of ransomware attacks. 
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to provide any additional authority to any Federal agency. 
SEC. 107. CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING. 
(a) REPORT ON STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT.—Not later than 
30 days after the date on which the Director issues the final 
rule under section 2242(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
as added by section 103 of this division, the Director shall submit 
to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
House of Representatives a report that describes how the Director 
engaged stakeholders in the development of the final rule. 
(b) REPORT
ON
OPPORTUNITIES
TO
STRENGTHEN
SECURITY 
RESEARCH.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 
of this Act, the Director shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee 
on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report 
describing how the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center established under section 2209 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 659) has carried out activities under 
section 2241(a)(9) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added 
by section 103 of this division, by proactively identifying opportuni-
ties to use cyber incident data to inform and enable cybersecurity 
research within the academic and private sector. 
(c) REPORT ON RANSOMWARE VULNERABILITY WARNING PILOT 
PROGRAM.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter for the duration of the pilot 
program established under section 105, the Director shall submit 
to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
House of Representatives a report, which may include a classified 
annex, on the effectiveness of the pilot program, which shall include 
a discussion of the following:
H. R. 2471—1010 
(1) The effectiveness of the notifications under section 
105(c) in mitigating security vulnerabilities and the threat of 
ransomware. 
(2) Identification of the most common vulnerabilities uti-
lized in ransomware. 
(3) The number of notifications issued during the preceding 
year. 
(4) To the extent practicable, the number of vulnerable 
devices or systems mitigated under the pilot program by the 
Agency during the preceding year. 
(d) REPORT ON HARMONIZATION OF REPORTING REGULATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
on which the Secretary of Homeland Security convenes the 
Cyber Incident Reporting Council described in section 2246 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 
103 of this division, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
that includes— 
(A) a list of duplicative Federal cyber incident reporting 
requirements on covered entities; 
(B) a description of any challenges in harmonizing 
the duplicative reporting requirements; 
(C) any actions the Director intends to take to facilitate 
harmonizing the duplicative reporting requirements; and 
(D) any proposed legislative changes necessary to 
address the duplicative reporting. 
(2) RULE
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in paragraph (1) 
shall be construed to provide any additional regulatory 
authority to any Federal agency. 
(e) GAO REPORTS.— 
(1) IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DIVISION.—Not later than 2 
years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller 
General of the United States shall submit to the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives a report on the implementation of this division 
and the amendments made by this division. 
(2) EXEMPTIONS TO REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date on which the Director issues the final rule required 
under section 2242(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
as added by section 103 of this division, the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States shall submit to the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate 
and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives a report on the exemptions to reporting under 
paragraphs (2) and (5) of section 2242(a) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division, 
which shall include— 
(A) to the extent practicable, an evaluation of the 
quantity of cyber incidents not reported to the Federal 
Government; 
(B) an evaluation of the impact on impacted entities, 
homeland security, and the national economy due to cyber 
incidents, ransomware attacks, and ransom payments, 
including a discussion on the scope of impact of cyber 
incidents that were not reported to the Federal Govern-
ment;
H. R. 2471—1011 
(C) an evaluation of the burden, financial and other-
wise, on entities required to report cyber incidents under 
this division, including an analysis of entities that meet 
the definition of a small business concern under section 
3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632); and 
(D) a description of the consequences and effects of 
limiting covered cyber incident and ransom payment 
reporting to only covered entities. 
(f) REPORT
ON
EFFECTIVENESS
OF
ENFORCEMENT
MECHA-
NISMS.—Not later than 1 year after the date on which the Director 
issues the final rule required under section 2242(b) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, as added by section 103 of this division, 
the Director shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives a report on 
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms within section 
2244 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by section 
103 of this division. 
DIVISION Z—ISRAEL RELATIONS 
NORMALIZATION ACT OF 2022 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Israel Relations Normaliza-
tion Act of 2022’’. 
SEC. 102. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Support for peace between Israel and its neighbors 
has longstanding bipartisan support in Congress. 
(2) For decades, Congress has promoted Israel’s acceptance 
among Arab and other relevant countries and regions by 
passing numerous laws opposing efforts to boycott, isolate, and 
stigmatize America’s ally, Israel. 
(3) The recent peace and normalization agreements 
between Israel and several Arab states—the United Arab Emir-
ates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco—have the potential to fun-
damentally transform the security, diplomatic, and economic 
environment in the Middle East and North Africa and advance 
vital United States national security interests. 
(4) These historic agreements could help advance peace 
between and among Israel, the Arab states, and other relevant 
countries and regions, further diplomatic openings, and enhance 
efforts towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict resulting in two states—a democratic Jewish state of 
Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state—living side 
by side in peace, security, and mutual recognition. 
(5) These agreements build upon the decades-long leader-
ship of the United States Government in helping Israel broker 
peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and promoting peace 
talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. 
(6) These agreements also build on decades of private diplo-
matic and security engagement between Israel and countries 
in the region.
H. R. 2471—1012 
(7) These normalization and peace agreements could begin 
to transform the region by spurring economic growth, invest-
ment, and tourism, enhancing technological innovation, pro-
moting security cooperation, bolstering water security and 
sustainable development, advancing understanding, and forging 
closer people-to-people relations. 
SEC. 103. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED. 
In this division, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 104. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords to 
encourage other nations to normalize relations with Israel and 
ensure that existing agreements reap tangible security and 
economic benefits for the citizens of those countries; 
(2) to develop and implement a regional strategy to encour-
age economic cooperation between and among Israel, Arab 
states, and the Palestinians to enhance the prospects for peace, 
respect for human rights, transparent governance, and for 
cooperation to address water scarcity, climate solutions, health 
care, sustainable development, and other areas that result in 
benefits for residents of those countries and regions; 
(3) to develop and implement a regional security strategy 
that recognizes the shared threat posed by Iran and violent 
extremist organizations, ensures sufficient United States deter-
rence in the region, builds partner capacity to address shared 
threats, and explores multilateral security arrangements built 
around like-minded partners; 
(4) to support and encourage government-to-government 
and grassroots initiatives aimed at normalizing ties with the 
state of Israel and promoting people-to-people contact between 
Israelis, Arabs, and residents of other relevant countries and 
regions, including by expanding and enhancing the Abraham 
Accords; 
(5) to support a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict resulting in two states living side by side in 
peace, security, and mutual recognition; 
(6) to implement the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partner-
ship for Peace Act (title VIII of division K of Public Law 
116–260), which will support economic development and 
peacebuilding efforts among Israelis and Palestinians, in a 
manner which encourages regional allies to become inter-
national donors to these efforts; 
(7) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of Israel 
and legal barriers to normalization with Israel; and 
(8) to work to combat anti-Semitism and support normaliza-
tion with Israel, including by countering anti-Semitic narratives 
on social media and state media and pressing for curricula 
reform in education.
H. R. 2471—1013 
SEC. 105. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND 
THE 
ABRAHAM 
ACCORDS 
AND 
OTHER 
RELATED 
NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary 
of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development and the heads of 
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop 
and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy 
on expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements: 
(1) An assessment of future staffing and resourcing require-
ments of entities within the Department of State, the United 
States Agency for International Development, and other appro-
priate Federal departments and agencies with responsibility 
to coordinate United States efforts to expand and strengthen 
the Abraham Accords. 
(2) An assessment of opportunities to further promote 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab 
states, and other relevant countries and in the economic, social, 
cultural, scientific, technical, educational, and health fields and 
an assessment of roadblocks to increased cooperation. 
(3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral security 
cooperation between Israel, the United States, Arab states, 
and other relevant countries and regions that have normalized 
relations with Israel, including an assessment of potential road-
blocks to increased security cooperation, interoperability, and 
information sharing. 
(4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional Arab 
and other relevant countries and regions to normalize relations 
with Israel. 
(5) An assessment of opportunities created by normalization 
agreements with Israel to advance prospects for peace between 
Israelis and Palestinians 
(6) A detailed description of how the United States Govern-
ment will leverage diplomatic lines of effort and resources from 
other stakeholders (including from foreign governments, inter-
national donors, and multilateral institutions) to encourage 
normalization, economic development, and people-to-people 
programming. 
(7) Identification of existing investment funds that support 
Israel-Arab state cooperation and recommendations for how 
such funds could be used to support normalization and increase 
prosperity for all relevant stakeholders. 
(8) A proposal for how the United States Government and 
others can utilize the scholars and Arabic language resources 
of the United States Holocaust Museum to counter Holocaust 
denial and anti-Semitism. 
(9) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic Center for 
Pluralism to prepare educational materials, convene inter-
national seminars, promote tolerance and pluralism, and bring 
together scholars as a means of advancing religious tolerance 
and countering political and religious extremism. 
(10) Recommendations to improve Department of State 
cooperation and coordination, particularly between the Special 
Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador at Large
H. R. 2471—1014 
for International Religious Freedom, and the Office of Inter-
national Religious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia, 
Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder improvement 
of relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant 
countries and regions. 
(11) An assessment on the value and feasibility of Federal 
support for inter-parliamentary exchange programs for Mem-
bers of Congress, Knesset, and parliamentarians from Arab 
and other relevant countries and regions, including through 
existing Federal programs that support such exchanges. 
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. 
SEC. 106. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION WITH 
ISRAEL. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Strength-
ening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the Normalization of 
Relations with Israel Act of 2022’’. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Arab League, an organization comprising 22 Middle 
Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained 
an official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods 
since the founding of Israel in 1948. 
(2) Longstanding United States policy has encouraged Arab 
League states to normalize their relations with Israel and has 
long prioritized funding cooperative programs that promote 
normalization between Arab League States and Israel, 
including the Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which 
promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation. 
(3) While some Arab League governments are signaling 
enhanced cooperation with the state of Israel on the govern-
ment-to-government level, most continue to persecute their own 
citizens who establish people-to-people relations with Israelis 
in nongovernmental fora, through a combination of judicial 
and extrajudicial retribution. 
(4) Some Arab League states maintain draconian anti- 
normalization laws that punish their citizens for people-to- 
people relations with Israelis, with punishments, including 
imprisonment, 
revocation 
of 
citizenship, 
and 
execution. 
Extrajudicial punishments by these and other Arab states 
include summary imprisonment, accusations of ‘‘treason’’ in 
government-controlled media, and professional blacklisting. 
(5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the other forms 
of retribution, effectively condemn these societies to mutual 
estrangement and, by extension, reduce the possibility of concil-
iation and compromise. 
(6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said in 2008 
at the United Nations that Israel agrees with the Arab Peace 
Initiative that a military solution to the conflict ‘‘will not 
achieve peace or provide security for the parties’’. 
(7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a rising tide 
of Arab civic actors advocate direct engagement with Israeli 
citizens and residents. These include the Arab Council for 
Regional Integration, a group of 32 public figures from 15 
Arab countries who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds 
that the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partnership 
with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to bridge the
H. R. 2471—1015 
Israeli-Palestinian divide, and inspired divisive intra-Arab boy-
cotts among diverse sects and ethnic groups. 
(8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the Arab Council 
to the French National Assembly in Paris testified to the harm-
ful effects of ‘‘anti-normalization laws’’, called on the Assembly 
to enact a law instructing the relevant French authorities to 
issue an annual report on instances of Arab government retribu-
tion for any of their citizens or residents who call for peace 
with Israel or engage in direct civil relations with Israeli citi-
zens, and requested democratic legislatures to help defend the 
region’s civil peacemakers. 
(9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France published an 
endorsement of the Arab Council’s proposal, calling on France 
and other democratic governments to ‘‘protect Arabs who 
engage in dialogue with Israeli citizens’’ and proposing ‘‘the 
creation of a study group in the National Assembly as well 
as in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a legal 
and technical monitoring of the obstacles which Arab pro-
ponents of dialogue with Israelis face’’. 
(10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides significant symbiotic 
benefit to the security and economic prosperity of the region. 
(c) ADDITIONAL REPORTING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the status of efforts to 
promote normalization of relations with Israel and other coun-
tries . 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under paragraph (1) 
shall include the following information: 
(A) The status of ‘‘anti-normalization laws’’ in countries 
comprising the Arab League, including efforts within each 
country to sharpen existing laws, enact new or additional 
‘‘anti-normalization legislation’’, or repeal such laws. 
(B) Instances of the use of state-owned or state-oper-
ated media outlets to promote anti-Semitic propaganda, 
the prosecution of citizens or residents of Arab countries 
for calling for peace with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, 
or engaging Israeli citizens in any way. 
(C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution by Arab 
governments or government-controlled institutions against 
citizens or residents of Arab countries for any of the same 
actions referred to in subparagraph (B). 
SEC. 107. SUNSET. 
This division shall cease to be effective on the date that is 
5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
DIVISION 
AA—TRANS-SAHARA 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
PARTNERSHIP 
PROGRAM 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the Trans-Sahara Counterter-
rorism Partnership Program Act of 2022.
H. R. 2471—1016 
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) terrorist and violent extremist organizations, such as 
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, the Islamic 
State of West Africa, and other affiliated groups, have killed 
tens of thousands of innocent civilians, displaced populations, 
destabilized local and national governments, and caused mass 
human suffering in the affected communities; 
(2) poor governance, political and economic marginalization, 
and lack of accountability for human rights abuses by security 
forces are drivers of extremism; 
(3) it is in the national security interest of the United 
States— 
(A) to combat the spread of terrorism and violent extre-
mism; and 
(B) to build the capacity of partner countries to combat 
such threats in Africa; 
(4) terrorist and violent extremist organizations exploit 
vulnerable and marginalized communities suffering from pov-
erty, lack of economic opportunity (particularly among youth 
populations), corruption, and weak governance; and 
(5) a comprehensive, coordinated, interagency approach is 
needed to develop an effective strategy— 
(A) to address the security challenges in the Sahel- 
Maghreb; 
(B) to appropriately allocate resources and de-conflict 
programs; and 
(C) to maximize the effectiveness of United States 
defense, diplomatic, and development capabilities. 
SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States to assist countries in 
North Africa and West Africa, and other allies and partners that 
are active in those regions, in combating terrorism and violent 
extremism through a coordinated, interagency approach with a 
consistent strategy that appropriately balances security activities 
with diplomatic and development efforts to address the political, 
socioeconomic, governance, and development challenges in North 
Africa and West Africa that contribute to terrorism and violent 
extremism. 
SEC. 104. TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP PRO-
GRAM. 
(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(4) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives; 
(7) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and
H. R. 2471—1017 
(8) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall establish a part-
nership program, which shall be known as the ‘‘Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership Program’’ (referred to in this 
section as the ‘‘Program’’), to coordinate the programs, projects, 
and activities of the Program in countries in North Africa 
and West Africa that are conducted— 
(A) to improve governance and the capacities of coun-
tries in North Africa and West Africa to deliver basic 
services, particularly to at-risk communities, as a means 
of 
countering 
terrorism 
and 
violent 
extremism 
by 
enhancing state legitimacy and authority and countering 
corruption; 
(B) to address the factors that make people and commu-
nities vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist and violent 
extremist organizations, including economic vulnerability 
and mistrust of government and government security 
forces, through activities such as— 
(i) supporting strategies that increase youth 
employment opportunities; 
(ii) promoting girls’ education and women’s polit-
ical participation; 
(iii) strengthening local governance and civil 
society capacity; 
(iv) improving government transparency and 
accountability; 
(v) fighting corruption; 
(vi) improving access to economic opportunities; 
and 
(vii) other development activities necessary to sup-
port community resilience; 
(C) to strengthen the rule of law in such countries, 
including by enhancing the capability of the judicial institu-
tions to independently, transparently, and credibly deter, 
investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism and violent 
extremism; 
(D) to improve the ability of military and law enforce-
ment entities in partner countries— 
(i) to detect, disrupt, respond to, and prosecute 
violent 
extremist 
and 
terrorist 
activity, 
while 
respecting human rights; and 
(ii) to cooperate with the United States and other 
partner countries on counterterrorism and counter- 
extremism efforts; 
(E) to enhance the border security capacity of partner 
countries, including the ability to monitor, detain, and 
interdict terrorists; 
(F) to identify, monitor, disrupt, and counter the 
human capital and financing pipelines of terrorism; or 
(G) to support the free expression and operations of 
independent, local-language media, particularly in rural 
areas, while countering the media operations and recruit-
ment propaganda of terrorist and violent extremist 
organizations. 
(2) ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK.—Program activities shall—