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available for the same purposes as the authorization
to which transferred.
(2) LIMITATION.—The total amount of author-
izations that the Secretary may transfer under the
authority 
of 
this 
section 
may 
not 
exceed
$3,500,000,000.
(b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—Transfers under this
section shall be subject to the same terms and conditions
as transfers under section 1001.
(c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—The transfer authority
provided by this section is in addition to the transfer au-
thority provided under section 1001.
Subtitle C—Other Matters
SEC. 1531. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR
CERTAIN PURPOSES RELATING TO IRAQ.
No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization
of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended
for a purpose as follows:
(1) To establish any military installation or base
for the purpose of providing for the permanent sta-
tioning of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.
(2) To exercise United States control of the oil
resources of Iraq.
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SEC. 1532. REIMBURSEMENT OF CERTAIN COALITION NA-
TIONS FOR SUPPORT PROVIDED TO UNITED
STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS.
(a) AUTHORITY.—From funds made available for the
Department of Defense by section 1506 for operation and
maintenance, Defense-wide activities, the Secretary of De-
fense may reimburse any key cooperating nation for
logistical and military support provided by that nation to
or in connection with United States military operations in
Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.
(b) AMOUNTS OF REIMBURSEMENT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Reimbursement authorized by
subsection (a) may be made in such amounts as the
Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of State and in consultation with the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, may deter-
mine, based on documentation determined by the Sec-
retary of Defense to adequately account for the sup-
port provided.
(2) STANDARDS.—Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense shall prescribe standards for determining the
kinds of logistical and military support to the United
States that shall be considered reimbursable under the
authority in subsection (a). Such standards may not
take effect until 15 days after the date on which the
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Secretary submits to the congressional defense com-
mittees a report setting forth such standards.
(c) LIMITATIONS.—
(1) LIMITATION ON AMOUNT.—The total amount
of reimbursements made under the authority in sub-
section (a) during fiscal year 2008 may not exceed
$1,200,000,000.
(2) PROHIBITION ON CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
TO MAKE PAYMENTS.—The Secretary of Defense may
not enter into any contractual obligation to make a
reimbursement under the authority in subsection (a).
(d) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of Defense
shall—
(1) notify the congressional defense committees
not less than 15 days before making any reimburse-
ment under the authority in subsection (a); and
(2) submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees on a quarterly basis a report on any reimburse-
ments made under the authority in subsection (a)
during such quarter.
SEC. 1533. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR COALITION FORCES
SUPPORTING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AF-
GHANISTAN.
(a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR LOGISTICAL SUP-
PORT.—Subject to the provisions of this section, amounts
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available to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2008
for operation and maintenance may be used to provide sup-
plies, services, transportation (including airlift and sealift),
and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting
United States military and stabilization operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
(b) REQUIRED DETERMINATION.—The Secretary may
provide logistical support under the authority in subsection
(a) only if the Secretary determines that the coalition forces
to be provided the logistical support—
(1) are essential to the success of a United States
military or stabilization operation; and
(2) would not be able to participate in such op-
eration without the provision of the logistical support.
(c) COORDINATION WITH EXPORT CONTROL LAWS.—
Logistical support may be provided under the authority in
subsection (a) only in accordance with applicable provi-
sions of the Arms Export Control Act and other export con-
trol laws of the United States.
(d) LIMITATION
ON VALUE.—The total amount of
logistical support provided under the authority in sub-
section (a) in fiscal year 2008 may not exceed
$400,000,000.
(e) QUARTERLY REPORTS.—
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(1) REPORTS
REQUIRED.—Not later than 15
days after the end of each fiscal-year quarter of fiscal
year 2008, the Secretary shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report on the provision of
logistical support under the authority in subsection
(a) during such fiscal-year quarter.
(2) ELEMENTS.—Each report under paragraph
(1) shall include, for the fiscal-year quarter covered
by such report, the following:
(A) Each nation provided logistical support
under the authority in subsection (a).
(B) For each such nation, a description of
the type and value of logistical support so pro-
vided.
SEC. 1534. COMPETITION FOR PROCUREMENT OF SMALL
ARMS SUPPLIED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.
(a) COMPETITION REQUIREMENT.—For the procure-
ment of pistols and other weapons described in subsection
(b), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure, consistent with
the provisions of section 2304 of title 10, United States
Code, that—
(1) full and open competition is obtained to the
maximum extent practicable;
(2) no responsible United States manufacturer is
excluded from competing for such procurements; and
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(3) products manufactured in the United States
are not excluded from the competition.
(b) PROCUREMENTS COVERED.—This section applies
to the procurement of the following:
(1) Pistols and other weapons less than 0.50 cal-
iber for assistance to the Army of Iraq, the Iraqi Po-
lice Forces, and other Iraqi security organizations.
(2) Pistols and other weapons less than 0.50 cal-
iber for assistance to the Army of Afghanistan, the
Afghani Police Forces, and other Afghani security or-
ganizations.
SEC. 1535. REPORT ON SUPPORT FROM IRAN FOR ATTACKS
AGAINST COALITION FORCES IN IRAQ.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since January 19, 1984, the Secretary of
State has designated the Islamic Republic of Iran as
a ‘‘state sponsor of terrorism,’’ one of only five coun-
tries in the world at present so designated.
(2) The Department of State, in its most recent
‘‘Country Reports on Terrorism,’’ stated that ‘‘Iran
remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism’’
in 2006.
(3) The most recent Country Reports on Ter-
rorism report further stated, ‘‘Iran continued [in
2006] to play a destabilizing role in Iraq. . . Iran pro-
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vided guidance and training to select Iraqi Shia po-
litical groups, and weapons and training to Shia
militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks. Ira-
nian government forces have been responsible for at
least some of the increasing lethality of anti-Coalition
attacks by providing Shia militants with the capa-
bility to build IEDs with explosively formed projec-
tiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese
Hezbollah. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was
linked to armor-piercing explosives that resulted in
the deaths of Coalition Forces.’’
(4) In an interview published on June 7, 2006,
Zalmay Khalilzad, then-United States ambassador to
Iraq, said of Iranian support for extremist activity in
Iraq, ‘‘We can say with certainty that they support
groups that are attacking coalition troops. These
groups are using the same ammunition to destroy ar-
mored vehicles that the Iranians are supplying to
Hezbollah in Lebanon. They pay money to Shiite mi-
litias and they train some of the groups. We can’t say
whether Teheran is supporting Al Qaeda, but we do
know that Al Qaeda people come here from Pakistan
through Iran. And Ansar al Sunna, a partner organi-
zation of Zarqawi’s network, has a base in northwest
Iran.’’
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(5) On April 26, 2007, General David Petraeus,
commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said of Ira-
nian support for extremist activity in Iraq, ‘‘The level
of financing, the level of training on Iranian soil, the
level of equipping some sophisticated technologies. . .
even advice in some cases, has been very, very sub-
stantial and very harmful.’’
(6) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus also
said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq,
‘‘We know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem]
Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force. . .. We
believe that he works directly for the supreme leader
of the country.’’
(7) On May 27, 2007, then-Major General Wil-
liam Caldwell, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-
Iraq, said, ‘‘What we do know is that the Iranian in-
telligence services, the Qods Force, is in fact both
training, equipping, and funding Shia extremist
groups. . . both in Iraq and also in Iran. . .. We have
in detention now people that we have captured that,
in fact, are Sunni extremist-related that have, in fact,
received both some funding and training from the
Iranian intelligence services, the Qods Force.’’
(8) On February 27, 2007, in testimony before
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, Lieu-
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tenant General Michael Maples, director of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, said of Iranian support for
extremist activity in Iraq, ‘‘We believe Hezbollah is
involved in the training as well.’’
(9) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General Kevin
Bergner, spokesperson for Multi-National Force-Iraq,
stated, ‘‘The Iranian Qods Force is using Lebanese
Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surrogate in
Iraq.’’
(10) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner detailed the capture in southern Iraq by coa-
lition forces of Ali Musa Daqdaq, whom the United
States military believes to be a 24-year veteran of
Lebanese Hezbollah involved in the training of Iraqi
extremists in Iraq and Iran.
(11) 
The 
Department 
of 
State 
designates
Hezbollah a foreign terrorist organization.
(12) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that the Iranian Qods Force operates
three camps near Teheran where it trains Iraqi ex-
tremists in cooperation with Lebanese Hezbollah, stat-
ing, ‘‘The Qods Force, along with Hezbollah instruc-
tors, train approximately 20 to 60 Iraqis at a time,
sending them back to Iraq organized into these special
groups. They are being taught how to use EPFs [ex-
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plosively formed penetrators], mortars, rockets, as
well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnapping oper-
ations.’’
(13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between
$750,000 and $3,000,000 every month from Iranian
sources.
(14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that ‘‘[o]ur intelligence reveals that
senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity’’
and that it would be ‘‘hard to imagine’’ that Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is
unaware of it.
(15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated, ‘‘There does not seem to be any follow-
through on the commitments that Iran has made to
work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing secu-
rity issues here in Iraq.’’
(16) On February 11, 2007, the United States
military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its rep-
resentatives stated that at least 170 members of the
United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at
least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.
(17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated at-
tack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Pro-
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vincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting
in the murder of five American soldiers, four of whom
were first abducted.
(18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stated
that the so-called Qazali network was responsible for
the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordina-
tion Center and that ‘‘there’s no question that the
Qazali network is directly connected to the Iranian
Qods force [and has] received money, training, arms,
ammunition, and at some points in time even advice
and assistance and direction’’.
(19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces
possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force
had developed detailed information on the United
States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-
ordination Center ‘‘regarding our soldiers’ activities,
shift changes, and defenses, and this information was
shared with the attackers’’.
(20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers,
‘‘[They] could not have conducted this complex oper-
ation without the support and direction of the Qods
Force.’’
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(21) On May 28, 2007, the United States Am-
bassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, met in Baghdad with
representatives of the government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran to express United States concern about
Iranian anti-coalition activity in Iraq;
(22) Section 1213(a) of the fiscal year 2007 John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act (Public
Law 109–364) required that the intelligence commu-
nity produce an updated National Intelligence Esti-
mate (NIE) on Iran.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
that—
(1) the murder of members of the United States
Armed Forces by a foreign government or its agents
is an intolerable and unacceptable act against the
United States by the foreign government in question;
and
(2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran must take immediate action to end any train-
ing, arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any
other forms of support that it or its agents are pro-
viding, and have provided, to Iraqi militias and in-
surgents, who are contributing to the destabilization
of Iraq and are responsible for the murder of members
of the United States Armed Forces.
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(3) It is imperative for the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the Federal government to have accu-
rate intelligence on Iran and therefore the intelligence
community should produce the NIE on Iran without
further delay;
(4) Congress supports United States diplomacy
with the representatives of the government of Islamic
Republic of Iran in order to stop any actions by the
Iranian government or its agents against United
States service members in Iraq;
(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60
days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National
Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to
Iraq in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence shall jointly submit to Congress a report
describing and assessing in detail—
(A) any external support or direction pro-
vided to anti-coalition forces by the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;
(B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
and
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(C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the
United States Government to counter the activi-
ties of agents of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Iraq.
(2) FORM.—Each report required under para-
graph (1) shall be in unclassified form to the extent
practical consistent with the need to protect national
security, but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to au-
thorize or otherwise speak to the use of Armed Forces
against Iran.
SEC. 1536. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE CONSEQUENCES
OF A FAILED STATE IN IRAQ.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following find-
ings:
(1) A failed state in Iraq would become a safe
haven for Islamic radicals, including al Qaeda and
Hezbollah, who are determined to attack the United
States and United States allies.
(2) The Iraq Study Group report found that ‘‘[a]
chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of op-
erations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or
even globally’’.
(3) The Iraq Study Group noted that ‘‘Al Qaeda
will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq
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as a significant victory that will be featured promi-
nently as they recruit for their cause in the region
and around the world’’.
(4) A National Intelligence Estimate concluded
that the consequences of a premature withdrawal from
Iraq would be that—
(A) Al Qaeda would attempt to use Anbar
province to plan further attacks outside of Iraq;
(B) neighboring countries would consider
actively intervening in Iraq; and
(C) sectarian violence would significantly
increase in Iraq, accompanied by massive civil-
ian casualties and displacement.
(5) The Iraq Study Group found that ‘‘a pre-
mature American departure from Iraq would almost
certainly produce greater sectarian violence and fur-
ther deterioration of conditions. . .. The near-term re-
sults would be a significant power vacuum, greater
human suffering, regional destabilization, and a
threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would depict
our withdrawal as a historic victory.’’
(6) A failed state in Iraq could lead to broader
regional conflict, possibly involving Syria, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
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(7) The Iraq Study group noted that ‘‘Turkey
could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent
Kurdistan from declaring independence’’.
(8) The Iraq Study Group noted that ‘‘Iran
could send troops to restore stability in southern Iraq
and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional
influence of Iran could rise at a time when that coun-
try is on a path to producing nuclear weapons.’’
(9) A failed state in Iraq would lead to massive
humanitarian suffering, including widespread ethnic
cleansing and countless refugees and internally dis-
placed persons, many of whom will be tortured and
killed for having assisted Coalition forces.
(10) A recent editorial in the New York Times
stated, ‘‘Americans must be clear that Iraq, and the
region around it, could be even bloodier and more
chaotic after Americans leave. There could be repris-
als against those who worked with American forces,
further ethnic cleansing, even genocide. Potentially
destabilizing refugee flows could hit Jordan and
Syria. Iran and Turkey could be tempted to make
power grabs.’’
(11) The Iraq Study Group found that ‘‘[i]f we
leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-range
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consequences could eventually require the United
States to return’’.
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that—
(1) the Senate should commit itself to a strategy
that will not leave a failed state in Iraq; and
(2) the Senate should not pass legislation that
will undermine our military’s ability to prevent a
failed state in Iraq.
SEC. 1537. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FEDERALISM IN IRAQ.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iraq continues to experience a self-sustaining
cycle of sectarian violence.
(2) The ongoing sectarian violence presents a
threat to regional and world peace, and the long-term
security interests of the United States are best served
by an Iraq that is stable, not a haven for terrorists,
and not a threat to its neighbors.
(3) A central focus of al Qaeda in Iraq has been
to turn sectarian divisions in Iraq into sectarian vio-
lence through a concentrated series of attacks, the
most significant being the destruction of the Golden
Dome of the Shia al-Askariyah Mosque in Samarra
in February 2006.
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(4) Iraqis must reach a comprehensive and sus-
tainable political settlement in order to achieve sta-
bility, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such a
settlement is a primary cause of violence in Iraq.
(5) Article One of the Constitution of Iraq de-
clares Iraq to be a ‘‘single, independent federal state’’.
(6) Section Five of the Constitution of Iraq de-
clares that the ‘‘federal system in the Republic of Iraq
is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and
governorates, and local administrations’’ and enumer-
ates the expansive powers of regions and the limited
powers of the central government and establishes the
mechanisms for the creation of new federal regions.
(7) The federal system created by the Constitu-
tion of Iraq would give Iraqis local control over their
police and certain laws, including those related to em-
ployment, education, religion, and marriage.
(8) The Constitution of Iraq recognizes the ad-
ministrative role of the Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment in 3 northern Iraqi provinces, known also as the
Kurdistan Region.
(9) The Kurdistan region, recognized by the Con-
stitution of Iraq, is largely stable and peaceful.
(10) The Iraqi Parliament approved a fed-
eralism law on October 11th, 2006, which establishes
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procedures for the creation of new federal regions and
will go into effect 18 months after approval.
(11) Iraqis recognize Baghdad as the capital of
Iraq, and the Constitution of Iraq stipulates that
Baghdad may not merge with any federal region.
(12) Despite their differences, Iraq’s sectarian
and ethnic groups support the unity and territorial
integrity of Iraq.
(13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated
on November 27, 2006, ‘‘[t]he crisis is political, and
the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and
bloodletting of innocents are the politicians’’.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
that—
(1) the United States should actively support a
political settlement in Iraq based on the final provi-
sions of the Constitution of Iraq that create a federal
system of government and allow for the creation of
federal regions, consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi
people and their elected leaders;
(2) the active support referred to in paragraph
(1) should include—
(A) calling on the international community,
including countries with troops in Iraq, the per-
manent 5 members of the United Nations Secu-
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rity Council, members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and Iraq’s neighbors—
(i) to support an Iraqi political settle-
ment based on federalism;
(ii) to acknowledge the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq; and
(iii) to fulfill commitments for the ur-
gent delivery of significant assistance and
debt relief to Iraq, especially those made by
the member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council;
(B) further calling on Iraq’s neighbors to
pledge not to intervene in or destabilize Iraq and
to agree to related verification mechanisms; and
(C) convening a conference for Iraqis to
reach an agreement on a comprehensive political
settlement based on the federalism law approved
by the Iraqi Parliament on October 11, 2006;
(3) the United States should urge the Govern-
ment of Iraq to quickly agree upon and implement a
law providing for the equitable distribution of oil rev-
enues, which is a critical component of a comprehen-
sive political settlement based upon federalism;
(4) the steps described in paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3) could lead to an Iraq that is stable, not a
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haven for terrorists, and not a threat to its neighbors;
and
(5) nothing in this Act should be construed in
any way to infringe on the sovereign rights of the na-
tion of Iraq.
SEC. 1538. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following find-
ings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the
Multi-National Force Iraq, stated in testimony before
a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ‘‘[i]t
is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi
leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Re-
publican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the
Shi’a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to
serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the
Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq’’.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States
Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint
session of the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives on September 10, 2007, that ‘‘Iran plays
a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support
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Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined
it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of
the Iraqi state’’.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Esti-
mate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that
‘‘Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal sup-
port for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particu-
larly the JAM [Jaysh al-Mahdi], since at least the be-
ginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator
(EFP) attacks have risen dramatically’’.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission
on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September
6, 2007, states that ‘‘[t]he Commission concludes that
the evidence of Iran’s increasing activism in the
southeastern part of the country, including Basra and
Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an accepted
fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used
to ‘defeat’ our armor protection comes across the bor-
der from Iran with relative impunity’’.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of
Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007,
that ‘‘[w]e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian
border in particular are of extreme severity and have
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the potential of at least delaying our efforts inside the
country. Many of the arms and weapons that kill and
maim our soldiers are coming from across the Ira-
nian border’’.
(6) Ambassador Crocker further testified before
Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks
with Iran, That ‘‘I think that it’s an option that we
want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not
produce anything. I don’t think that we should either,
therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round,
nor do I think we should say we’re not going to talk
anymore. . . I do believe it’s important to keep the op-
tion for further discussions on the table.’’
(7) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on
September 16, 2007, That ‘‘I think that the adminis-
tration believes at this point that continuing to try
and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian chal-
lenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by
far the preferable approach. That’s the one we are
using. . .we always say all options are on the table,
but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is
the one that we are pursuing.’’
(8) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for
extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that
‘‘[w]e know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen.
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Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods
Force. . . We believe that he works directly for the su-
preme leader of the country’’.
(9) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of
Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the
United States presence in Iraq, that ‘‘[t]he political
power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we
will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course
we are prepared to fill the gap’’.
(10) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress,
with respect to President Ahmedinejad’s statement, on
September 11, 2007, that ‘‘[t]he Iranian involvement
in Iraq—its support for extremist militias, training,
connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of muni-
tions that are used against our force as well as the
Iraqis—are all, in my view, a pretty clear dem-
onstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says,
and is already trying to implement it to the best of
his ability’’.
(11) General Petraeus stated on September 12,
2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of
Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces
of the United States in Iraq, that ‘‘[t]e evidence is
very, very clear. We captured it when we captured
Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy com-
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mander, and others, and it’s in black and white. . . We
interrogated these individuals. We have on tape. . .
Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have
done what you have done without Iranian support, he
literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of
course not. . . So they told us about the amounts of
money that they have received. They told us about the
training that they received. They told us about the
ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of
that that they received’’.
(12) General Petraeus further stated on Sep-
tember 14, 2007, that ‘‘[w]hat we have got is evidence.
This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off com-
puters that we captured, documents and so forth. . . In
one case, a 22-page document that lays out the plan-
ning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and after-
math of the operation conducted that resulted in the
death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in Janu-
ary’’.
(13) The Department of Defense report to Con-
gress entitled ‘‘Measuring Stability and Security in
Iraq’’ and released on September 18, 2007, consistent
with section 9010 of Public Law 109–289, states that
‘‘[t]here has been no decrease in Iranian training and
funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq that attack
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Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians. . . Tehran’s
support for these groups is one of the greatest impedi-
ments to progress on reconciliation’’.
(14) The Department of Defense report further
states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi’a ex-
tremist groups in Iraq, that ‘‘[m]ost of the explosives
and ammunition used by these groups are provided
by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–
Qods Force. . . For the period of June through the end
of August, [explosively formed penetrator] events are
projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of
March through May’’.
(15) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has
held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq secu-
rity with representatives of the Government of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran.
(16) Ambassador Crocker testified before Con-
gress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these
talks, stating that ‘‘I laid out the concerns we had
over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq’s se-
curity, but found no readiness on Iranians’ side at all
to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I
came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians
were interested simply in the appearance of discus-
sions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S.