I
107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 931
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war
in Sudan.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 7, 2001
Mr. TANCREDO (for himself, Mr. PAYNE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WOLF, Mr. WATTS
of Oklahoma, Mr. PITTS, Mr. CAMP, Mr. Evans, Mr. WELDON of Florida,
Ms. PELOSI, Mr. MCNULTY, Mr. WHITFIELD, Mr. LEWIS of Kentucky,
Ms. RIVERS, Mr. BISHOP, Mrs. TAUSCHER, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. NEAL of
Massachusetts, Ms. NORTON, Mr. DOOLITTLE, Mr. LAMPSON, Mr.
UPTON, Mr. HEFLEY, and Mr. CLEMENT) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
A BILL
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive
solution to the war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Peace Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified
its prosecution of the war against areas outside of
its control, which has already cost more than
2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than
4,000,000.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally
sponsored peace process, protected from manipula-
tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso-
lution of the war, protection of human rights, and
a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu-
manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential
element in the effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States
is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of
the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov-
ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au-
thority and institutions is a major impediment to
achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace
process.
(6) Through manipulation of traditional rival-
ries among peoples in areas outside their full con-
trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used
divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their
population, and internationally sponsored reconcili-
ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
the tactic’s effectiveness and human suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and
organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and
other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties
in areas outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of
those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic
is in addition to the overt use of bans on air trans-
port relief flights in prosecuting the war through se-
lective starvation and is used to minimize the Gov-
ernment of Sudan’s accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly
stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds
from future oil sales to increase the tempo and
lethality of the war against the areas outside its con-
trol.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air
transport flights under the United Nations relief op-
eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov-
ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the
receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the
United States and other donor countries as a dev-
astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the
Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out-
side of the Government’s control.
(10) The efforts of the United States and other
donors in delivering relief and assistance through
means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad-
dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov-
ernment of Sudan’s manipulation of food donations
to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected
areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-
dressed in the near term, the population in areas of
Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of
their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in
Bahr al Ghazal, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile
regions have been excluded completely from relief
distribution by OLS, consequently placing their pop-
ulations at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded
$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on
providing only for the immediate food needs of the
recipients, the current international relief operations
are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend them-
selves against attack in areas outside the Govern-
ment of Sudan’s control has been severely com-
promised by the disengagement of the front-line
sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of
the Government of Sudan that success on the battle-
field can be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of
pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-
tion to the war in Sudan, including—
(A) the multilateralization of economic and
diplomatic tools to compel the Government of
Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable demo-
cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
Sudan outside government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-
people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in
areas outside of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms
to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;
and
(E) cooperation among the trading part-
ners of the United States and within multilat-
eral institutions toward those ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term ‘‘Gov-
ernment of Sudan’’ means the National Islamic
Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) OLS.—The term ‘‘OLS’’ means the United
Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the
World Food Program, and participating relief orga-
nizations known as ‘‘Operation Lifeline Sudan’’.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby—
(1) condemns—
(A) violations of human rights on all sides
of the conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan’s overall
human rights record, with regard to both the
prosecution of the war and the denial of basic
human and political rights to all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-
ting and tolerating the practice;
(D) the Government of Sudan’s use and
organization 
of 
‘‘murahalliin’’ 
or
‘‘mujahadeen’’, Popular Defense Forces (PDF),
and regular Sudanese Army units into orga-
nized and coordinated raiding and slaving par-
ties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,
the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile regions; and
(E) aerial bombardment of civilian targets
that is sponsored by the Government of Sudan;
and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on
air transport relief flights by the Government of
Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a
tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys-
tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and
economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in
a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED
PEACE PROCESS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby recognizes that—
(1) a single viable, internationally and region-
ally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest op-
portunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settle-
ment to the war in Sudan; and
(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best
made through a peace process based on the Declara-
tion of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July
20, 1994.
(b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The
Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel
of the Department of State for the support of—
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov-
ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts sup-
porting a peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool
to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions, should seek to—
(A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline
Sudan to end the veto power of the Government
of Sudan over the plans by Operation Lifeline
Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by
doing so, to end the manipulation of the deliv-
ery of those relief supplies to the advantage of
the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;
(B) investigate the practice of slavery in
Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimi-
nation; and
(C) sponsor a condemnation of the Govern-
ment of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to
aerial bombardment.
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
‘‘(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections
(d) and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall
include—
‘‘(1) a description of the sources and current
status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil
exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects
on the inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such
financing and construction, and the Government of
Sudan’s ability to finance the war in Sudan;
‘‘(2) a description of the extent to which that
financing was secured in the United States or with
involvement of United States citizens;
‘‘(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in
areas outside its control, including targets, fre-
quency, and best estimates of damage; and
‘‘(4) a description of the extent to which hu-
manitarian relief has been obstructed or manipu-
lated by the Government of Sudan or other forces
for the purposes of the war in Sudan.’’.
SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR
RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President should continue to increase the
use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-
plies in southern Sudan.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de-
tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to-
ward carrying out subsection (a).
SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-
PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin-
gency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices if
necessary, the greatest possible amount of United States
Government and privately donated relief to all affected
areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains and the
Upper Nile and the Blue Nile regions, in the event the
Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incre-
mental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
(b) 
REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the
plan developed under subsection (a), the President may
reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for
the purposes of the plan.
Æ