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(4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts to support 
attainment of operational capability of the corresponding 
defense articles and services once delivered, including advance 
training with United States or armed forces of partner countries 
on the systems to be received. The description of any such 
training shall also include an identification of the training 
implementer. 
(5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1) has been 
terminated prior to the date of the submission of the report 
for any reason— 
(A) the case information for such transfer, including 
the date of congressional notification, delivery date of the 
Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), final signature of 
the LOA, and information pertaining to delays in delivering 
LOAs for signature; 
(B) a description of the reasons for which the transfer 
is no longer in effect; and 
(C) the impact this termination will have on the 
intended end-user and the consequent implications for 
regional security, including the impact on deterrence of 
military action by countries hostile to the United States, 
the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors. 
(6) A separate description of the actions the United States 
is taking to expedite and prioritize deliveries of defense articles 
and services to Taiwan, including— 
(A) a description of what actions the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense have taken or are 
planning to take to prioritize Taiwan’s Foreign Military 
Sales cases; 
(B) current procedures or mechanisms for determining 
that a Foreign Military Sales case for Taiwan should be 
prioritized above a sale to another country of the same 
or similar item; and 
(C) whether the United States intends to divert defense 
articles from United States stocks to provide an interim 
capability or solution with respect to any delayed deliveries 
to Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish any 
such diverted stocks. 
(7) A description of other actions already undertaken by 
or currently under consideration by the Department of State 
and the Department of Defense to improve delivery timelines 
for the transfers listed pursuant to paragraph (1). 
(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 5509. ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN’S NEEDS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE 
AND RESILIENCE. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall submit a written assessment, with a classified 
annex, of Taiwan’s needs in the areas of civilian defense and resil-
ience to— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate; and
H. R. 7776—910 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The assessment required under 
subsection (a) shall— 
(1) analyze the potential role of Taiwan’s public and civilian 
assets in defending against various scenarios for foreign mili-
taries to coerce or conduct military aggression against Taiwan; 
(2) carefully analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing its 
defensive capabilities through the support of civilians and 
civilian sectors, including— 
(A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high tech labor force; 
(B) the creation of clear structures and logistics support 
for civilian defense role allocation; 
(C) recruitment and skills training for Taiwan’s defense 
and civilian sectors; and 
(D) other defense needs and considerations at the 
provincial, city, and neighborhood levels; 
(3) analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resiliency among 
its people and in key economic sectors; 
(4) identify opportunities for Taiwan to enhance commu-
nications at all levels to strengthen trust and understanding 
between the military, other government departments, civilian 
agencies and the general public, including— 
(A) communications infrastructure necessary to ensure 
reliable communications in response to a conflict or crisis; 
and 
(B) a plan to effectively communicate to the general 
public in response to a conflict or crisis; 
(5) identify the areas and means through which the United 
States could provide training, exercises, and assistance at all 
levels to support the needs discovered through the assessment 
and fill any critical gaps where capacity falls short of such 
needs; and 
(6) review existing United States Government and non- 
United States Government programmatic and funding modali-
ties that are meant to support Taiwan’s civilian defense profes-
sionals in pursuing professional development, educational, and 
cultural exchanges in the United States, including— 
(A) opportunities through Department of State-sup-
ported programs, such as the International Visitor Leaders 
Program; 
(B) opportunities offered through non-governmental 
institutions, such as think tanks, to the extent the review 
can practicably make such an assessment; 
(C) a description of the frequency that civilian defense 
professionals from Taiwan pursue or are selected for the 
programs reviewed in subparagraph (A); 
(D) an analysis of any funding, policy, administrative, 
or other barriers preventing greater participation from Tai-
wan’s civilian defense professionals in the opportunities 
identified in subparagraph (A); 
(E) an evaluation of the value expanding the opportuni-
ties reviewed in subparagraph (A) would offer for strength-
ening Taiwan’s existing civilian defense community, and 
for increasing the perceived value of the field for young 
professionals in Taiwan;
H. R. 7776—911 
(F) an assessment of options the United States Govern-
ment could take individually, with partners in Taiwan, 
or with foreign governments or non-governmental partners, 
to expand the opportunities reviewed in subparagraph (A); 
and 
(G) a description of additional resources and authorities 
that may be required to execute the options described in 
subparagraph (E). 
(c) SHARING
OF REPORT.—The assessment required by sub-
section (a) shall be shared with appropriate officials of Taiwan 
to facilitate cooperation, as appropriate. 
SEC. 5510. ANNUAL REPORT ON TAIWAN DEFENSIVE MILITARY 
CAPABILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. 
Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 135 Stat. 1988) is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 1248. ANNUAL REPORT ON TAIWAN CAPABILITIES AND INTEL-
LIGENCE SUPPORT. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of 
State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence and the heads of other relevant Federal 
departments and agencies, shall jointly perform an annual assess-
ment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96– 
8; 22 U.S.C. 3302(c)), of security matters related to Taiwan, 
including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s defensive military capabili-
ties, and how defensive shortcomings or vulnerabilities of Taiwan 
could be mitigated through cooperation, modernization, or integra-
tion. At a minimum, the assessment shall include the following: 
‘‘(1) An intelligence assessment regarding— 
‘‘(A) conventional military and nuclear threats to 
Taiwan from the People’s Republic of China, including exer-
cises, patrols, and presence intended to intimidate or coerce 
Taiwan; and 
‘‘(B) irregular warfare activities, including influence 
operations, conducted by the People’s Republic of China 
to interfere in or undermine the peace and stability of 
the Taiwan Strait. 
‘‘(2) The current military capabilities of Taiwan and the 
ability of Taiwan to defend itself from external conventional 
and irregular military threats across a range of scenarios. 
‘‘(3) The interoperability of current and future defensive 
capabilities of Taiwan with the military capabilities of the 
United States and its allies and partners. 
‘‘(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and procedures under-
pinning an effective defense strategy for Taiwan, including 
how addressing identified capability gaps and capacity short-
falls will improve the effectiveness of such strategy. 
‘‘(5) A description of additional personnel, resources, and 
authorities in Taiwan or in the United States that may be 
required to meet any shortcomings in the development of Tai-
wan’s military capabilities identified pursuant to this section. 
‘‘(6) With respect to materiel capabilities and capacities 
the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State jointly assess 
to be most effective in deterring, defeating, or delaying military 
aggression by the People’s Republic of China, a prioritized
H. R. 7776—912 
list of capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of the military 
forces of Taiwan, including— 
‘‘(A) an identification of— 
‘‘(i) any United States, Taiwan, or ally or partner 
country defense production timeline challenge related 
to potential materiel and solutions to such capability 
gaps; 
‘‘(ii) the associated investment costs of enabling 
expanded production for items currently at maximum 
production; 
‘‘(iii) the associated investment costs of, or mitiga-
tion strategies for, enabling export for items currently 
not exportable; and 
‘‘(iv) existing stocks of such capabilities in the 
United States and ally and partner countries; 
‘‘(B) the feasibility and advisability of procuring solu-
tions to such gaps and shortfalls through United States 
allies and partners, including through co-development or 
co-production; 
‘‘(C) the feasibility and advisability of assisting Taiwan 
in the domestic production of solutions to capability gaps, 
including through— 
‘‘(i) the transfer of intellectual property; and 
‘‘(ii) co-development or co-production arrange-
ments; 
‘‘(D) the estimated costs, expressed in a range of 
options, of procuring sufficient capabilities and capacities 
to address such gaps and shortfalls; 
‘‘(E) an assessment of the relative priority assigned 
by appropriate officials of Taiwan to each such gap and 
shortfall; and 
‘‘(F) a detailed explanation of the extent to which 
Taiwan is prioritizing the development, production, or 
fielding of solutions to such gaps and shortfalls within 
its overall defense budget. 
‘‘(7) The applicability of Department of State and Depart-
ment of Defense authorities for improving the defensive military 
capabilities of Taiwan in a manner consistent with the Taiwan 
Relations Act. 
‘‘(8) A description of any security assistance provided or 
Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales activity 
with Taiwan over the past year. 
‘‘(9) A description of each engagement between the United 
States and Taiwan personnel related to planning over the past 
year. 
‘‘(10) With respect to each to training and exercises— 
‘‘(A) a description of each such instance over the past 
year; 
‘‘(B) a description of how each such instance— 
‘‘(i) sought to achieve greater interoperability, 
improved readiness, joint planning capability, and 
shared situational awareness between the United 
States and Taiwan, or among the United States, 
Taiwan, and other countries; 
‘‘(ii) familiarized the militaries of the United States 
and Taiwan with each other; and 
‘‘(iii) improved Taiwan’s defense capabilities.
H. R. 7776—913 
‘‘(11) A description of the areas and means through which 
the United States is assisting and supporting training, exer-
cises, and assistance to support Taiwan’s requirements related 
to civilian defense and resilience, and how the United States 
is seeking to assist Taiwan in addressing any critical gaps 
where capacity falls short of meeting such requirements, 
including those elements identified in the assessment required 
by section 5502(f) of the James M. Inhofe National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. 
‘‘(12) An assessment of the implications of current levels 
of pre-positioned war reserve materiel on the ability of the 
United States to respond to a crisis or conflict involving Taiwan 
with respect to— 
‘‘(A) providing military or non-military aid to Taiwan; 
and 
‘‘(B) sustaining military installations and other infra-
structure of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. 
‘‘(13) An assessment of the current intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance capabilities of Taiwan, including any 
existing gaps in such capabilities and investments in such 
capabilities by Taiwan since the preceding report. 
‘‘(14) A summary of changes to pre-positioned war reserve 
materiel of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region since 
the preceding report. 
‘‘(15) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense or the 
Secretary of State considers appropriate. 
‘‘(b) PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
State shall jointly develop a plan for assisting Taiwan in improving 
its defensive military capabilities and addressing vulnerabilities 
identified pursuant to subsection (a) that includes— 
‘‘(1) recommendations, if any, for new Department of State 
or Department of Defense authorities, or modifications to 
existing Department of State or Department of Defense authori-
ties, necessary to improve the defensive military capabilities 
of Taiwan in a manner consistent with the Taiwan Relations 
Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 
‘‘(2) an identification of opportunities for key leader and 
subject matter expert engagement between Department per-
sonnel and military and civilian counterparts in Taiwan; and 
‘‘(3) an identification of challenges and opportunities for 
leveraging authorities, resources, and capabilities outside the 
Department of Defense and the Department of State to improve 
the defensive capabilities of Taiwan in accordance with the 
Taiwan Relations Act. 
‘‘(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through fiscal year 
2027, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in con-
sultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress— 
‘‘(1) a report on the results of the assessment required 
by subsection (a); 
‘‘(2) the plan required by subsection (b); and 
‘‘(3) a report on— 
‘‘(A) the status of efforts to develop and implement 
the joint multi-year plan required under section 5506 of 
the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
H. R. 7776—914 
for Fiscal Year 2023 to provide for the acquisition of appro-
priate defensive military capabilities by Taiwan and to 
engage with Taiwan in a series of combined training and 
planning activities consistent with the Taiwan Relations 
Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); and 
‘‘(B) any other matters the Secretary of State and 
the Secretary of Defense consider necessary. 
‘‘(d) FORM.—The reports required by subsection (c) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
‘‘(e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES
OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—For 
purposes of this section, the term ‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’ means— 
‘‘(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate; and 
‘‘(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives.’’. 
SEC. 5511. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Advancing peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific has 
been a central element of United States foreign policy toward 
the region. 
(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), especially since the election of Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016, 
has conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken Taiwan dip-
lomatically, economically, and militarily in a manner that 
threatens to erode United States policy and create a fait 
accompli on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future. 
(3) To secure United States interests and preserve the 
ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, 
it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, and 
territorial space. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States 
to— 
(1) maintain the position that peace and stability in the 
Western Pacific are in the political, security, and economic 
interests of the United States, and are matters of international 
concern; and 
(2) work with allies and partners to promote peace and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter military acts or other 
forms of coercive behavior that would undermine regional sta-
bility. 
SEC. 5512. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN DEFENSE RELATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 
et seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States 
to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States- 
Taiwan relations; 
(2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United 
States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the 
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and 
that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes, is of 
grave concern to the United States;
H. R. 7776—915 
(3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of 
the People’s Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to 
the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of 
Taiwan; 
(4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity 
to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that 
would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, 
of the people on Taiwan should be maintained; 
(5) the United States should continue to support the 
development of capable, ready, and modern defense forces nec-
essary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, 
including by— 
(A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles 
and services through foreign military sales, direct commer-
cial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis 
on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy; 
(B) ensuring timely review of and response to requests 
of Taiwan for defense articles and services; 
(C) conducting practical training and military exercises 
with Taiwan that enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient 
defensive capabilities, as described in the Taiwan Relations 
Act; 
(D) exchanges between defense officials and officers 
of the United States and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, 
and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel 
Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for 
the purposes of— 
(i) enhancing cooperation on defense planning; 
(ii) improving the interoperability of the military 
forces of the United States and Taiwan; and 
(iii) improving the reserve force of Taiwan; 
(E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its ability to 
employ military capabilities in asymmetric ways, as 
described in the Taiwan Relations Act; and 
(F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief; and 
(6) the United States should increase its support to a 
free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China to curtail or 
influence the free exercise of rights and democratic franchise. 
PART 2—COUNTERING PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA’S COERCION AND INFLUENCE 
CAMPAIGNS 
SEC. 5513. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following 
5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall develop and implement a strategy 
to respond to— 
(1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities carried out 
to advance the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘‘United Front’’ work 
related to Taiwan, including activities directed, coordinated,
H. R. 7776—916 
or otherwise supported by the United Front Work Department 
or its subordinate or affiliated entities; and 
(2) information and disinformation campaigns, cyber 
attacks, and nontraditional propaganda measures supported 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons 
or entities in Taiwan. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall include descriptions of— 
(1) the proposed response to propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns by the People’s Republic of China and cyber-intru-
sions targeting Taiwan, including— 
(A) assistance in building the capacity of Taiwan’s 
public and private-sector entities to document and expose 
propaganda and disinformation supported by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Com-
munist Party, or affiliated entities; 
(B) assistance to enhance Taiwan’s ability to develop 
a holistic strategy to respond to sharp power operations, 
including election interference; and 
(C) media training for Taiwan officials and other 
Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns; 
(2) the proposed response to political influence operations 
that includes an assessment of the extent of influence exerted 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, 
financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities; 
(3) support for exchanges and other technical assistance 
to strengthen the Taiwan legal system’s ability to respond 
to sharp power operations; and 
(4) programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center 
to expose misinformation and disinformation in the Chinese 
Communist Party’s propaganda. 
SEC. 5514. TASK FORCE TO COUNTER ECONOMIC COERCION BY THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) increasing use 
of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, 
organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that the 
United States devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilat-
eral response; 
(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the 
United States Government respond to the PRC’s coercive eco-
nomic practices and hold the PRC accountable; 
(3) improved engagement and communication with the pri-
vate sector, including receiving information from the United 
States private sector about the PRC’s coercive economic prac-
tices would help the United States Government and private 
sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of potential pres-
sure points and vulnerabilities; and 
(4) PRC coercive economic practices create pressures for 
the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United 
States national interests and competitiveness. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF TASK FORCE.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
establish an interagency task force to be known as the ‘‘Countering
H. R. 7776—917 
Economic Coercion Task Force’’ (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘Task Force’’). 
(c) DUTIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall— 
(A) oversee the development and implementation of 
an integrated United States Government strategy to 
respond to People’s Republic of China (PRC) coercive eco-
nomic practices, which shall include— 
(i) systematically monitoring and evaluating— 
(I) the costs of such practices on United States 
businesses and overall United States economic 
performance; 
(II) instances in which such practices taken 
against a non-PRC entity has benefitted other par-
ties; and 
(III) the impacts such practices have had on 
United States national interests; and 
(ii) facilitating coordination among Federal depart-
ments and agencies when responding to such practices 
as well as proactively deterring such economic coercion, 
including by clarifying the roles for Federal depart-
ments and agencies identified in subsection (d) in 
implementing the strategy; and 
(iii) forming policy recommendations for the 
implementation of relevant United States authorities 
to respond to instances of PRC coercive economic prac-
tices; 
(B) consult with United States allies and partners on 
the feasibility and desirability of collectively identifying, 
assessing, and responding to PRC coercive economic prac-
tices, as well as actions that could be taken to expand 
coordination with the goal of ensuring a consistent, 
coherent, and collective response to such practices and 
establishing long-term deterrence of such practices; 
(C) effectively engage the United States private sector, 
particularly sectors, groups, or other entities that are 
susceptible to such PRC coercive economic practices, on 
concerns related to such practices; and 
(D) develop and implement a process for regularly 
sharing relevant information, including classified informa-
tion to the extent appropriate and practicable, on such 
PRC coercive economic practices with United States allies, 
partners, and the private sector. 
(2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out its duties under this 
subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the 
extent necessary and appropriate, with the following: 
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector. 
(B) Federal departments and agencies that are not 
represented on the Task Force. 
(C) United States allies and partners. 
(d) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall— 
(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the 
staff of the National Security Council; 
(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among 
the staff of the National Economic Council; and 
(3) determine the Federal departments and agencies that 
will serve on the task force, and direct the head of those
H. R. 7776—918 
agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary 
or above to participate in the Task Force. 
(e) REPORTS.— 
(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit 
to Congress a report that includes the following elements: 
(A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic 
tools the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce 
other governments and non-PRC companies (including 
United States companies) including the Government of the 
PRC’s continued efforts to codify informal practices into 
its domestic law. 
(B) The strategy required by subsection (c)(1)(A). 
(C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive economic 
practices that captures both— 
(i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC coercive 
economic practices; and 
(ii) the inappropriate use of economic tools, 
including those authorized under the laws and regula-
tions of the PRC. 
(D) A comprehensive review of the array of tools the 
United States Government employs or could employ to 
respond to economic coercion against the government, 
companies, and other entities of the United States or its 
allies and partners. 
(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral— 
(i) preemptive practices to defend or deter against 
PRC coercive economic practices; and 
(ii) actions taken in response to the Government 
of the PRC’s general use of coercive economic practices, 
including the imposition of costs on the PRC. 
(F) An assessment of United States allies and partners 
key vulnerabilities to PRC coercive economic practices. 
(G) A description of gaps in existing resources or 
capabilities for United States Government departments and 
agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive economic 
practices directed at United States entities and assist 
United States allies and partners in their responses to 
PRC coercive economic practices. 
(H) An analysis of the circumstances under which the 
PRC employs different types of economic coercion and 
against what kinds of targets. 
(I) An assessment of United States and international 
rules and norms as well as any treaty obligations the 
PRC has stretched, circumvented, or broken through its 
economically coercive practices and the United States 
response in each instance. 
(2) INTERIM REPORTS.— 
(A) FIRST INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date on which the report required by paragraph (1) 
is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall submit 
to Congress a report that includes the following elements: 
(i) Updates to information required by subpara-
graphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).
H. R. 7776—919 
(ii) A description of activities conducted by the 
Task Force to implement the strategy required by sub-
section (c)(1)(A). 
(iii) An assessment of the implementation and 
effectiveness of the strategy, lessons learned from the 
past year and planned changes to the strategy. 
(B) SECOND INTERIM REPORT.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date on which the report required by subpara-
graph (A) is submitted to Congress, the Task Force shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report that includes an update to the elements required 
under the report required by subparagraph (A). 
(3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
on which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted 
to Congress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress a final 
report that includes the following elements: 
(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic practices 
and the cost of such coercive practices to United States 
businesses. 
(B) A description of areas of possible vulnerability for 
United States businesses and businesses of United States 
partners and allies. 
(C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort 
to counter PRC coercive economic practices, including 
through further coordination with United States allies and 
partners. 
(D) Illustrative examples. 
(4) FORM.—The reports required by this subsection shall 
be submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified 
summary. 
(f) SUNSET.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall terminate at the 
end of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the 
final report required by subsection (e)(3) is submitted to Con-
gress. 
(2) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS.—The Task force may use the 60- 
day period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of 
concluding its activities, including providing testimony to Con-
gress concerning the final report required by subsection (e)(3). 
(g) ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTRIES AND ENTITIES TARGETED BY 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR ECONOMIC COERCION.—The 
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, the Secretary of Commerce, and 
the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide appropriate assistance 
to countries and entities that are subject to coercive economic 
practices by the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 5515. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate; and
H. R. 7776—920 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 
(2) QUALIFIED
RESEARCH
ENTITY.—The term ‘‘qualified 
research entity’’ means an entity that— 
(A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a Feder-
ally funded research and development center; 
(B) has appropriate expertise and analytical capability 
to write the report required under subsection (c); and 
(C) is free from any financial, commercial, or other 
entanglements, which could undermine the independence 
of such report or create a conflict of interest or the appear-
ance of a conflict of interest, with— 
(i) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(ii) the Chinese Communist Party; 
(iii) any company incorporated in the People’s 
Republic of China or a subsidiary of such company; 
or 
(iv) any company or entity incorporated outside 
of the People’s Republic of China that is believed to 
have a substantial financial or commercial interest 
in the People’s Republic of China. 
(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States per-
son’’ means— 
(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
or 
(B) an entity organized under the laws of the United 
States or any jurisdiction within the United States, 
including a foreign branch of such an entity. 
(b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an inter-
agency task force, which shall be known as the ‘‘China Censor-
ship Monitor and Action Group’’ (referred to in this subsection 
as the ‘‘Task Force’’). 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall take the following 
actions with respect to the membership of, and participation 
in, the Task Force: 
(A) Appoint the chair of the Task Force from among 
the staff of the National Security Council. 
(B) Appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from 
among the staff of the National Economic Council. 
(C) Determine the Federal departments and agencies 
that will serve on the Task Force, and direct the head 
of those agencies to appoint personnel at the level of Assist-
ant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Task Force shall— 
(A) oversee the development and execution of an 
integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and 
address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly sup-
ported, by the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China to censor or intimidate, in the United States or 
in any of its possessions or territories, any United States 
person, including United States companies that conduct 
business in the People’s Republic of China, which are exer-
cising their right to freedom of speech; and
H. R. 7776—921 
(B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to subpara-
graph (A) to the appropriate congressional committees not 
later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act. 
(4) MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not less fre-
quently than twice per year. 
(5) CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should regularly con-
sult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with— 
(A) Federal agencies that are not represented on the 
Task Force; 
(B) independent agencies of the United States Govern-
ment that are not represented on the Task Force; 
(C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and 
the media; and 
(D) relevant stakeholders among United States allies 
and partners facing similar challenges related to censorship 
or intimidation by the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China. 
(6) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) ANNUAL
REPORT.—The Task Force shall submit 
an annual report to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees that describes, with respect to the reporting period— 
(i) the strategic objectives and policies pursued 
by the Task Force to address the challenges of censor-
ship and intimidation of United States persons while 
in the United States or any of its possessions or terri-
tories, which is directed or directly supported by the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China; 
(ii) the activities conducted by the Task Force in 
support of the strategic objectives and policies referred 
to in clause (i); and 
(iii) the results of the activities referred to in clause 
(ii) and the impact of such activities on the national 
interests of the United States. 
(B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report submitted pursuant 
to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may include 
a classified annex. 
(C) CONGRESSIONAL
BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide briefings 
to the appropriate congressional committees regarding the 
activities of the Task Force to execute the strategy devel-
oped pursuant to paragraph (3)(A). 
(c) REPORT
ON CENSORSHIP
AND INTIMIDATION
OF UNITED 
STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA.— 
(1) REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall select and seek to enter into an agreement with 
a qualified research entity that is independent of the 
Department of State to write a report on censorship and 
intimidation in the United States and its possessions and 
territories of United States persons, including United 
States companies that conduct business in the People’s 
Republic of China, which is directed or directly supported 
by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.
H. R. 7776—922 
(B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required 
under subparagraph (A) shall— 
(i) assess major trends, patterns, and methods of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China’s 
efforts to direct or directly support censorship and 
intimidation of United States persons, including United 
States companies that conduct business in the People’s 
Republic of China, which are exercising their right 
to freedom of speech; 
(ii) assess, including through the use of illustrative 
examples, as appropriate, the impact on and con-
sequences for United States persons, including United 
States companies that conduct business in the People’s 
Republic of China, that criticize— 
(I) the Chinese Communist Party; 
(II) the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China; 
(III) the authoritarian model of government 
of the People’s Republic of China; or 
(IV) a particular policy advanced by the Chi-
nese Communist Party or the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(iii) identify the implications for the United States 
of the matters described in clauses (i) and (ii); 
(iv) assess the methods and evaluate the efficacy 
of the efforts by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China to limit freedom of expression in 
the private sector, including media, social media, film, 
education, travel, financial services, sports and enter-
tainment, technology, telecommunication, and internet 
infrastructure interests; 
(v) include policy recommendations for the United 
States 
Government, 
including 
recommendations 
regarding collaboration with United States allies and 
partners, to address censorship and intimidation by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China; 
and 
(vi) include policy recommendations for United 
States persons, including United States companies that 
conduct business in China, to address censorship and 
intimidation by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES ALLIES AND PART-
NERS.—To the extent practicable, the report required under 
subparagraph (A) should identify implications and policy 
recommendations that are relevant to United States allies 
and partners facing censorship and intimidation directed 
or directly supported by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
submit the report written by the qualified research entity 
selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate 
congressional committees.
H. R. 7776—923 
(B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to in subpara-
graph (A) shall be made accessible to the public online 
through relevant United States Government websites. 
(d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date that 
is 5 years after the date of enactment of this Act. 
PART 3—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
SEC. 5516. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, 
the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati have severed diplomatic rela-
tions with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China. 
(2) Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), the decision-making body of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), as an observer annually between 2009 
and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC 
has increasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. 
Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 
2019, 2020, or 2021. 
(3) The Taipei Flight Information Region reportedly served 
1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 passengers in 2018, and is 
home to Taiwan Taoyuan International Airport, the eleventh 
busiest airport in the world. Taiwan has been excluded from 
participating at the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) since 2013. 
(4) United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2758 
does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and 
its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC 
the right to represent the people of Taiwan. 
SEC. 5517. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICI-
PATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Taiwan is an important contributor to the global 
community, as a model for democracy, and by providing exper-
tise in global health, international aviation security, emerging 
technology development, and high environmental standards; 
(2) multiple United States Government administrations of 
both political parties have taken important steps to advance 
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organiza-
tions; 
(3) existing efforts to enhance United States cooperation 
with Taiwan to provide global public goods, including through 
development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
relief, in trilateral and multilateral fora are laudable and should 
continue; 
(4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, and legal bar-
riers remain to advancing Taiwan’s meaningful participation 
in the international community; and 
(5) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other parts 
of the global community could be further enhanced through 
a systematic approach, along with greater attention from Con-
gress and the American public to such efforts.
H. R. 7776—924 
SEC. 5518. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPA-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy— 
(1) to advance Taiwan’’s meaningful participation in a 
prioritized set of international organizations (IOs); and 
(2) that responds to growing pressure from the PRC on 
foreign governments, IOs, commercial actors, and civil society 
organizations to comply with its ‘‘One-China Principle’’, with 
respect to Taiwan. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy required under 
subsection (a) should include the following elements: 
(1) An assessment of the methods the PRC uses to coerce 
actors to into adhering to its ‘‘One-China Principle.’’ The 
methods should include those employed against governments, 
IOs, and civil society organizations. The assessment should 
also include pressure on commercial actors, to the extent it 
is relevant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participation 
in IOs. 
(2) An assessment of the policies of foreign governments 
toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify likeminded allies and 
partners who might become public or private partners in the 
strategy. 
(3) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as practicable, to 
identify IOs that best lend themselves to advancing Taiwan’s 
participation. 
(4) A plan to expand economic, security, and diplomatic 
engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, 
enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan, in accordance 
with United States interests. 
(5) A survey of IOs that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful 
participation, including an assessment of whether any erosion 
in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred within those organiza-
tions and how Taiwan’s participation has positively strength-
ened the capacity and activity of these organizations, thereby 
providing positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar 
forums. 
(6) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which the United 
States Government will prioritize for using its voice, vote, and 
influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation over 
the three-year period following the date of enactment of this 
Act. The list should be derived from the IOs identified in 
paragraph (3). 
(7) A description of the diplomatic strategies and the coali-
tions the United States Government plans to develop to imple-
ment paragraph (6). 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in subsection (a) 
shall be classified, but it may include an unclassified summary. 
(d) SUPPORT FOR MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION.—The Permanent 
Representative of the United States to the United Nations and 
other relevant United States officials shall actively support Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in all appropriate international organiza-
tions.
H. R. 7776—925 
SEC. 5519. MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
should allow Taiwan to meaningfully participate in the 
organization, including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, 
conferences, technical working groups, meetings, activities, and 
mechanisms; 
(2) Taiwan is a global leader and hub for international 
aviation, with a range of expertise, information, and resources 
and the fifth busiest airport in Asia (Taoyuan International 
Airport), and its meaningful participation in ICAO would 
significantly enhance the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety 
and security of global aviation; and 
(3) coercion by the Chinese Communist Party and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China has ensured the systematic exclusion 
of Taiwan from meaningful participation in ICAO, significantly 
undermining the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and 
security of global aviation. 
(b) PLAN
FOR TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION
IN
THE 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION.—The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the 
Secretary of Transportation, is authorized— 
(1) to initiate a United States plan to secure Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial 
assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, 
meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and 
(2) to instruct the United States representative to the ICAO 
to— 
(A) use the voice and vote of the United States to 
ensure 
Taiwan’s 
meaningful 
participation 
in 
ICAO, 
including in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, conferences, 
technical working groups, meetings, activities, and mecha-
nisms; and 
(B) seek to secure a vote at the next ICAO triennial 
assembly session on the question of Taiwan’s participation 
in that session. 
(c) REPORT CONCERNING TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION.—Not later 
than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
not later than April 1 of each year thereafter for the following 
6 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce of the House of Representatives an unclassified 
report that— 
(1) describes the United States plan to ensure Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial 
assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, 
meetings, activities, and mechanisms; 
(2) includes an account of the efforts made by the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of Commerce to ensure Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial 
assembly sessions, conferences, technical working groups, 
meetings, activities, and mechanisms; and
H. R. 7776—926 
(3) identifies the steps the Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Commerce will take in the next year to ensure 
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, including in ICAO 
triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical working 
groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms. 
PART 4—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
SEC. 5520. REPORT ON TAIWAN TRAVEL ACT. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) LIST OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in accordance with the Taiwan 
Travel Act (Public Law 115–135), shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress— 
(1) a list of high-level officials from the United States 
Government who have traveled to Taiwan on or after the date 
of the enactment of the Taiwan Travel Act; and 
(2) a list of high-level officials of Taiwan who have entered 
the United States on or after such date of enactment. 
(c) ANNUAL REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the implementation of 
the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), 
including a discussion of its positive effects on United States 
interests in the region. 
(2) FORM.—The report required under paragraph (1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 5521. AMENDMENTS TO THE TAIWAN ALLIES INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVE (TAIPEI) 
ACT OF 2019. 
The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement 
Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–135) is amended— 
(1) in section 2(5), by striking ‘‘and Kiribati’’ and inserting 
‘‘Kiribati, and Nicaragua,’’; 
(2) in section 4— 
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking 
‘‘should be’’ and inserting ‘‘is’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the 
end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(D) by adding at the end the following:
H. R. 7776—927 
‘‘(4) to support Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with govern-
ments and countries’’; and 
(3) in section 5— 
(A) in subsection (a)— 
(i) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 
(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(iii) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(4) identify why governments and countries have altered 
their diplomatic status vis-a-vis Taiwan and make recommenda-
tions to mitigate further deterioration in Taiwan’s diplomatic 
relations with governments and countries.’’; 
(B) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for five years, the Secretary of State shall report’’ and 
inserting ‘‘90 days after the date of the enactment of the 
Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, and annually thereafter 
for the following 7 years, the Secretary of State shall submit 
an unclassified report, with a classified annex,’’; 
(C) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); 
and 
(D) by inserting after subsection (b) the following: 
‘‘(c) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, and annually 
thereafter for the following 7 years, the Secretary of State shall 
provide briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on 
the steps taken in accordance with section (a). The briefings 
required under this subsection shall take place in an unclassified 
setting, but may be accompanied by an additional classified 
briefing.’’. 
SEC. 5522. REPORT ON ROLE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 
NUCLEAR THREAT IN ESCALATION DYNAMICS. 
(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(3) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intel-
ligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report assessing the role of the increasing nuclear threat of 
the People’s Republic of China in escalation dynamics with respect 
to Taiwan. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
H. R. 7776—928 
SEC. 5523. REPORT ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA’S WAR 
AGAINST UKRAINE ON THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(4) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
(5) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
of the Senate; 
(6) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation of the Senate; 
(7) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(8) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives; 
(9) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives; 
(10) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the House of Representatives; 
(11) the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(12) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intel-
ligence, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees that analyzes the impact of Russia’s war against 
Ukraine on the PRC’s diplomatic, military, economic, and propa-
ganda objectives with respect to Taiwan. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 
describe— 
(1) adaptations or known changes to PRC strategies and 
military doctrine that the United States assesses are a direct 
result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine or that the United 
States assesses represent lessons learned by the People’s 
Republic of China in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
including changes— 
(A) to PRC behavior in international forums; 
(B) within the People’s Liberation Army, with respect 
to the size of forces, the makeup of leadership, weapons 
procurement, equipment upkeep, the doctrine on the use 
of specific weapons, such as weapons banned under the 
international law of armed conflict, efforts to move weapons 
supply chains onto mainland PRC, or any other changes 
in its military strategy with respect to Taiwan; 
(C) in economic planning, such as sanctions evasion, 
efforts to minimize exposure to sanctions, or moves in 
support of the protection of currency or other strategic 
reserves; 
(D) to propaganda, disinformation, and other informa-
tion operations originating in the PRC; and 
(E) to the PRC’s strategy for the use of force against 
Taiwan, including any information on preferred scenarios
H. R. 7776—929 
or operations to secure its objectives in Taiwan, adjust-
ments based on how the Russian military has performed 
in Ukraine, and other relevant matters; and 
(2) United States plans to adapt policies and military plan-
ning in response to the changes referred to in paragraph (1). 
(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in classified form. 
(e) COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—The Secretary 
of State shall share information contained in the report required 
by subsection (b), as appropriate, with appropriate officials of allied 
and partners, including Taiwan and other partners in Europe and 
in the Indo-Pacific. 
SEC. 
5524. 
EXPANDING 
UNITED 
STATES-TAIWAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days following the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the heads of other 
relevant Federal departments and agencies that provide inter-
national economic assistance and other support, shall submit to 
Congress a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral and 
multilateral development initiatives through the American Institute 
in Taiwan as appropriate. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required by sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements: 
(1) A comprehensive review of existing cooperation mecha-
nisms and initiatives among USAID, DFC, other relevant Fed-
eral agencies that provide international economic assistance 
and other support, and relevant departments and agencies in 
Taiwan, including Taiwan’s International Cooperation and 
Development Fund (ICDF). 
(2) An assessment of how United States development 
cooperation with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan 
compares to comparable cooperation with partners of similar 
economic size and foreign assistance capacity to Taiwan. 
(3) An analysis of the opportunities and challenges the 
cooperation reviewed in paragraph (1) has offered to date. The 
analysis shall include— 
(A) opportunities that collaboration has offered to 
expand the United States Government’s ability to deliver 
support, assistance, and other international financial prod-
ucts into a wider range communities; 
(B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, other relevant 
Federal agencies that provide international economic 
assistance and other support in both Taiwan and the 
United States, or the organizations’ implementing partners 
have a comparative advantage in providing assistance; 
(C) opportunities to transition capacity building events 
with relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan, 
through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework 
as well as other forums, into enduring forms of development 
cooperation. 
(4) An assessment of any legal, policy, logistical, financial, 
or administrative barriers to expanding cooperation in trilateral 
or multilateral development. The analysis shall include—
H. R. 7776—930 
(A) availability of personnel at the American Institute 
in Taiwan responsible for coordinating development assist-
ance cooperation; 
(B) volume of current cooperation initiatives and bar-
riers to expanding them; 
(C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers facing the 
United States or other partners to including Taiwan in 
formal and informal multilateral development cooperation 
mechanisms; 
(D) resource or capacity barriers to expanding coopera-
tion facing the United States or Taiwan; and 
(E) geopolitical barriers that complicate United States- 
Taiwan cooperation in third countries. 
(5) Recommendations to address the challenges identified 
in paragraph (4). 
(6) A description of any additional resources or authorities 
that expanding cooperation might require. 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required under subsection 
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex. 
SEC. 5525. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED STATES ECO-
NOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. 
It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) expanding United States economic relations with 
Taiwan has benefitted the people of both the United States 
and Taiwan, as Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest 
goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest 
source of imports, and a key destination for United States 
agricultural exports; 
(2) further integration would benefit both peoples and is 
in the strategic and diplomatic interests of the United States; 
and 
(3) the United States should explore opportunities to 
expand economic agreements between Taiwan and the United 
States, through dialogue, and by developing the legal templates 
required to support potential future agreements. 
PART 5—SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDU-
CATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH 
TAIWAN 
SEC. 5526. SHORT TITLE. 
This part may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 
SEC. 5527. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 
3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ‘‘to preserve and 
promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and 
other relations between the people of the United States and 
the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China 
mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area’’. 
(2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the United States has grown 
its strategic partnership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 
23,000,000 people.
H. R. 7776—931 
(3) The creation of a United States fellowship program 
with Taiwan would support— 
(A) a key priority of expanding people-to-people 
exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. 
Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy; 
(B) President Joseph R. Biden’s commitment to 
Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy and a critical economic and 
security partner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance; and 
(C) April 2021 guidance from the Department of State 
based on a review required under the Taiwan Assurance 
Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF of Public 
Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage U.S. government engagement 
with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relation-
ship’’. 
SEC. 5528. PURPOSES. 
The purposes of this part are— 
(1) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan stra-
tegic partnership and broaden understanding of the Indo-Pacific 
region by temporarily assigning officials of any agencies of 
the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study 
in Mandarin and placement as Fellows in a Taiwanese civic 
institution; 
(2) to provide for eligible United States personnel— 
(A) to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese language 
skills; and 
(B) to expand their understanding of the political 
economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region; and 
(3) to better position the United States to advance its 
economic, security, and human rights interests and values in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 5529. DEFINITIONS. 
In this part: 
(1) AGENCY HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency head’’ means, in the 
case of the executive branch of United States Government 
or a legislative branch agency described in paragraph (2), the 
head of the respective agency. 
(2) AGENCY
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
GOVERNMENT.—The 
term ‘‘agency of the United States Government’’ includes the 
Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget 
Office, and the Congressional Research Service of the legislative 
branch, as well as any agency of the executive branch. 
(3) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(4) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’ means— 
(A) an employee of an agency of the United States 
Government on loan to the American Institute in Taiwan, 
without a change of position from the agency at which 
the employee is employed; and
H. R. 7776—932 
(B) a legislative branch employee from the Government 
Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, or the 
Congressional Research Service. 
(5) IMPLEMENTING
PARTNER.—The term ‘‘implementing 
partner’’ means any United States organization described in 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that— 
(A) performs logistical, administrative, and other func-
tions, as determined by the Department of State and the 
American Institute of Taiwan in support of the Taiwan 
Fellowship Program; and 
(B) enters into a cooperative agreement with the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan Fellow-
ship Program. 
(6) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘Program’’ means the Taiwan 
Fellowship Program established pursuant to section 5530. 
SEC. 5530. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall establish 
the Taiwan Fellowship Program (referred to in this section as 
the ‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship opportunity in Taiwan of 
up to 2 years for eligible United States citizens. The Department 
of State, in consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan 
and the implementing partner, may modify the name of the Pro-
gram. 
(b) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in Taiwan should 
use amounts appropriated pursuant to section 5533(a) to enter 
into an annual or multi-year cooperative agreement with an 
appropriate implementing partner. 
(2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State or the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with, as appropriate, 
the implementing partner, should award to eligible United 
States citizens, subject to available funding— 
(A) approximately 5 fellowships during the first 2 years 
of the Program; and 
(B) approximately 10 fellowships during each of the 
remaining years of the Program. 
(c) AMERICAN INSTITUTION
IN TAIWAN AGREEMENT; IMPLE-
MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the American Institute in Taiwan, in con-
sultation with the Department of State, should— 
(1) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and Cul-
tural Representative Office, or with another appropriate entity, 
for the purpose of entering into an agreement to facilitate 
the placement of fellows in an agency of Taiwan; and 
(2) begin the process of selecting an implementing partner, 
which— 
(A) shall agree to meet all of the legal requirements 
required to operate in Taiwan; and 
(B) shall be composed of staff who demonstrate signifi-
cant experience managing exchange programs in the Indo- 
Pacific region. 
(d) CURRICULUM.— 
(1) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each fellowship 
under this section, each fellow should study— 
(A) the Mandarin Chinese language;