IV 
117TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 157 
Opposing the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to Iran without ad-
dressing the full scope of Iran’s malign activities, including its nuclear 
program, ballistic and cruise missile capabilities, weapons proliferation, 
support for terrorism, hostage-taking, gross human rights violations, 
and other destabilizing activities. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 24, 2021 
Mr. GALLAGHER (for himself, Ms. CHENEY, Mr. KATKO, Mr. STEWART, Mr. 
LAMBORN, 
Mrs. 
HARTZLER, 
Mr. 
CURTIS, 
Mr. 
BERGMAN, 
Mr. 
RESCHENTHALER, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. GROTHMAN, Mrs. BICE of Okla-
homa, Mrs. WALORSKI, Mr. WOMACK, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. GAETZ, 
Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. BUDD, Mr. STEUBE, and Mrs. HINSON) submitted 
the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a 
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
RESOLUTION 
Opposing the lifting of sanctions imposed with respect to 
Iran without addressing the full scope of Iran’s malign 
activities, including its nuclear program, ballistic and 
cruise missile capabilities, weapons proliferation, support 
for terrorism, hostage-taking, gross human rights viola-
tions, and other destabilizing activities. 
Whereas the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (commonly 
referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’), an agreement that was fi-
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nalized by the administration of President Barack Obama 
and the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, the People’s Republic of China, and the Russian 
Federation in July 2015, provided Iran permanent sanc-
tions relief and access to more than $100,000,000,000 in 
return for temporary restrictive measures on Iran’s nu-
clear program; 
Whereas, under the JCPOA, restrictions on the number and 
types of centrifuges that Iran may manufacture, retain, 
test, and use, the number and types of enrichment facili-
ties that Iran may construct, and the amount and level 
of enriched uranium and heavy water that Iran may 
stockpile, will expire; 
Whereas multiple United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to 
suspend all enrichment of uranium, but the JCPOA did 
not require Iran to cease its enrichment of uranium, a 
failure that is directly responsible for Iran’s expanded en-
richment activity today; 
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 
(in this preamble referred to as ‘‘UNSCR 2231’’), adopt-
ed on July 20, 2015, called on Iran not to undertake any 
activity related to nuclear-capable ballistic missile activi-
ties for 8 years and imposed a 5-year ban on conven-
tional arms transfers to and from Iran; 
Whereas neither the JCPOA nor UNSCR 2231 adequately 
addressed the threat emanating from Iran’s ballistic and 
cruise missile program or long-standing support for ter-
rorism, and the sunset provisions applied to prohibitions 
in UNSCR 2231 and the JCPOA severely weakened their 
restrictions and inadvertently legitimized that program 
and support; 
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Whereas, based on the shortcomings of the JCPOA and 
UNSCR 2231, bipartisan majorities in both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives opposed the JCPOA 
and the sanctions relief for Iran contained in the agree-
ment; 
Whereas the sanctions relief contained in the JCPOA pro-
vided resources necessary for Iran to continue developing 
ballistic missiles and supporting terrorism; 
Whereas the United States Government has designated Iran’s 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (in this preamble re-
ferred to as the ‘‘IRGC’’) as a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion under section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)) and a specially designated 
global terrorist entity pursuant to Executive Order 13224 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and 
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, 
threaten to commit, or support terrorism); 
Whereas, by a vote of 98–2 in the Senate and 419–3 in the 
House of Representatives, Congress required the imposi-
tion of terrorism-related sanctions against the IRGC as 
part of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.); 
Whereas, on May 21, 2018, the United States Government 
outlined steps that the Government of Iran must take to 
normalize relations with the United States, including— 
(1) providing the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy a full account of the possible military dimensions of 
its nuclear program and permanently and verifiably aban-
doning that program; 
(2) ceasing all enrichment and vowing never to pur-
sue plutonium reprocessing; 
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(3) providing the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy with access to all sites throughout the entire country; 
(4) ending its development and proliferation of bal-
listic missiles; 
(5) releasing all United States citizens currently held 
hostage, as well as citizens of countries that are partners 
and allies of the United States; 
(6) ending support for terrorist groups, including 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad; 
(7) respecting the sovereignty of Iraq by demobi-
lizing Iranian-controlled Shia militias in the country; 
(8) ending its military support for the Houthi militia 
in Yemen; 
(9) withdrawing all forces under Iranian command 
in Syria; 
(10) ending support for the Taliban in Afghanistan 
and for senior al Qaeda leaders around the region; 
(11) ending the IRGC’s support for terrorists and 
militant partners around the world; and 
(12) halting its threatening behavior against its 
neighbors; 
Whereas President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal 
of the United States from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, 
and gradually reimposed sanctions that were suspended 
by the Obama administration under the JCPOA, depriv-
ing the regime of valuable funds that the regime could 
have used to support its malign activities; 
Whereas the JCPOA defined the sanctions that the Obama 
administration suspended under the JCPOA as ‘‘nuclear- 
related’’, but ‘‘nuclear-related’’ is not a term recognized 
under existing United States statutory sanctions related 
to Iran; 
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Whereas the Obama administration agreed to define the most 
significant bilateral sanctions imposed by the United 
States on Iran as ‘‘nuclear-related’’, waive the application 
of those sanctions under the JCPOA, and commit the ex-
ecutive branch to work to repeal the provisions of law 
providing for those sanctions upon the expiration of the 
JCPOA; 
Whereas, pursuant to the terms of the JCPOA, sanctions 
were lifted on Iranian financial institutions, cargo vessels, 
aircraft, fraudulent charities, and other entities that were 
not linked to Iran’s nuclear program, but were sanctioned 
for illicit conduct; 
Whereas, pursuant to section 401(a) of the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
2010 (22 U.S.C. 8551(a)), in order to terminate sanc-
tions against the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian 
financial institutions, the President is required to certify 
that ‘‘the Government of Iran . . . no longer satisfies the 
requirements for designation as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism’’, and that ‘‘Iran has ceased the pursuit, acquisi-
tion, and development of, and verifiably dismantled its, 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic 
missiles and ballistic missile launch technology’’; 
Whereas, on March 12, 2020, President Trump extended the 
national emergency declared by Executive Order 12957 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain 
transactions with respect to the development of Iranian 
petroleum resources) following a determination that 
Iran’s malign activities pose an unusual and extraor-
dinary threat to the United States; 
Whereas the Department of the Treasury has determined 
that the IRGC and its affiliated entities have a dominant 
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presence in Iran’s commercial and financial sectors and 
maintain extensive economic interests in the defense, con-
struction, aviation, oil, banking, metal, automobile, and 
mining industries; 
Whereas, on October 8, 2020, the Secretary of the Treasury 
designated the financial sector of Iran for the imposition 
of sanctions, authorizing sanctions with respect to per-
sons operating in Iran’s construction, mining, manufac-
turing, and textile sectors, to deny the Government of 
Iran financial resources that may be used to fund and 
support its malign activities; 
Whereas the United States Government has sanctioned Ira-
nian entities for their support to, or association with, 
Iran’s terrorism campaigns, ballistic missile program, or 
the Supreme Leader of Iran, including the Central Bank 
of Iran, the National Development Fund of Iran, ele-
ments of the IRGC, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, and 
entities in Iran’s banking, petroleum, and industrial sec-
tors; 
Whereas, in February 2020, the Financial Action Task 
Force, the global anti-money laundering standard-setting 
body, fully lifted the suspension of countermeasures and 
called on its members and urged all jurisdictions to apply 
effective countermeasures relating to the terrorist financ-
ing risk emanating from Iran and the threat that poses 
to the international financial system; 
Whereas the United States Government, under Democratic 
and Republican administrations, has concluded that Iran 
provides a safe haven for al Qaeda leaders and that the 
al Qaeda network has used Iran to establish a ‘‘core pipe-
line’’ through which money, facilitators, and operators 
moved to Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
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States financial system for the purpose of con-
ducting dollarized transactions; and 
(6) opposes the suspension or lifting of the call 
for countermeasures by the Financial Action Task 
Force on the Iranian financial sector until Iran fully 
completes its action plan. 
Æ 
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