H. R. 2810—381 
(A) ‘‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture relies in part 
on U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and 
on capabilities and infrastructure provided by NATO allies. 
These capabilities include dual-capable aircraft that con-
tribute to current burden-sharing arrangements within 
NATO. In general, we must take care to maintain this 
particular capability, and to modernize it appropriately 
and in a timely fashion.’’; and 
(B) the role of the nuclear weapons of the United 
States is ‘‘to deter nuclear war and to serve as last resort 
weapons of self-defense. In this sense, U.S. nuclear weapons 
are fundamental to our nation’s security and have histori-
cally provided a deterrent against aggression and security 
assurance to U.S. allies. A robust, flexible, and survivable 
U.S. nuclear arsenal underpins the U.S. ability to deploy 
conventional forces worldwide.’’. 
(4) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, Com-
mander of the United States European Command and the 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, testified to the Committee 
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives that ‘‘NATO 
and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of 
our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must 
preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.’’. 
(5) The Russian Federation is currently undergoing signifi-
cant modernization and recapitalization of all three legs of 
its nuclear triad, continues to field and modernize a large 
variety of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and is developing 
and deploying new and unique nuclear capabilities. 
(6) Russia remains in violation of the INF Treaty due 
to the development, testing, and, most recently, the operational 
deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in violation of 
the INF Treaty. 
(7) On March 28, 2017, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the security consequences 
of the deployment of such INF Treaty-violating missiles, testi-
fying to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives that ‘‘our assessment of the impact is that 
it more threatens NATO and infrastructure within the Euro-
pean continent than any other...area of the world that we 
have national interests in or alliance interests in.’’. 
(8) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis Scaparrotti, in 
testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives, responded to a question asking if Russia 
intends to return to compliance with the INF Treaty by stating, 
‘‘I don’t have any indication that they will at this time.’’. 
(9) Rhetoric from Russian officials has demonstrated that 
Moscow has sought to leverage its nuclear arsenal to threaten 
and intimidate neighboring countries, including members of 
NATO, as was the case when the Russian Ambassador to 
Denmark stated, ‘‘Danish warships will be targets for Russian 
nuclear missiles’’ in response to Denmark’s potential coopera-
tion in the NATO missile defense system. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities 
of NATO are of critical importance to the security of the United 
States and of the NATO alliance, and must continue to adapt 
to the changed security environment in Europe;
H. R. 2810—382 
(2) the ability of the United States to forward-deploy dual- 
capable aircraft and nuclear weapons, and of select members 
of NATO to participate in the nuclear deterrence mission of 
NATO by hosting forward-deployed nuclear weapons of the 
United States or operating dual-capable aircraft, is central 
to the credibility of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture 
of NATO; 
(3) the strategic forces of the United States, the inde-
pendent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and the French 
Republic, and the dual-capable aircraft operated by the United 
States and other members of NATO constitute foundational 
elements of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of 
NATO; 
(4) NATO should modernize its nuclear-related infrastruc-
ture to ensure the highest-level of safety and security; 
(5) effective deterrence requires NATO to conduct nuclear 
planning and exercises aligned with 21st century requirements 
and modernize nuclear-related capabilities and infrastructure, 
including dual-capable aircraft, command and control networks, 
and facilities; and 
(6) to ensure the continued credibility of the deterrence 
and defense posture of NATO, the planned completion of F– 
35A aircraft development and testing, as well as the delivery 
of such aircraft to members of NATO, must not be delayed. 
(c) INF TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘INF 
Treaty’’ means the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly 
referred to as the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty’’, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into 
force June 1, 1988. 
SEC. 1237. REPORT ON SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees and the Committees on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives a report on security cooperation with respect to Western 
Balkan countries. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
(1) An assessment of security cooperation between each 
Western Balkan country and the Russian Federation, including 
the following: 
(A) A list of Russian weapons systems and other mili-
tary hardware and technology valued at $1,000,000 or more 
that have been provided to or purchased by each Western 
Balkan country since 2012. 
(B) A description of the participation of each Western 
Balkan country’s security forces in training or exercises 
with the Russian Federation since 2012. 
(C) A description of any security cooperation agree-
ments each Western Balkan country has entered into with 
the Russian Federation.
H. R. 2810—383 
(D) An assessment of intelligence cooperation between 
each Western Balkan country and the Russian Federation. 
(E) An assessment of how security cooperation between 
each Western Balkan country and the Russian Federation 
affects the security interests of the United States, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western 
Balkan country, and each NATO member state that borders 
the Western Balkan country. 
(2) An assessment of security cooperation between each 
Western Balkan country and the United States, including the 
following: 
(A) A list of United States weapons systems and other 
military hardware and technology valued at $1,000,000 
or more that have been provided to or purchased by each 
Western Balkan country since 2012. 
(B) A description of the participation of each Western 
Balkan country’s security forces in training or exercises 
with the United States since 2012. 
(C) A description of any security cooperation agree-
ments each Western Balkan country has entered into with 
the United States. 
(D) An assessment of intelligence cooperation between 
each Western Balkan country and the United States. 
(3) An assessment of security cooperation between each 
Western Balkan country and NATO. 
(4) A description of each Western Balkan country’s partici-
pation and activities in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, 
if applicable. 
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) 
DEFINITION.—The 
term 
‘‘Western 
Balkan 
countries’’ 
means— 
(1) Serbia; 
(2) Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
(3) Kosovo; and 
(4) Macedonia. 
SEC. 1238. PLAN TO RESPOND IN CASE OF RUSSIAN NONCOMPLIANCE 
WITH THE NEW START TREATY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate a report— 
(1) describing the options available in response to a failure 
by Russia to achieve the reductions required by the New START 
Treaty before February 5, 2018; and 
(2) including the assessment of the Secretary of Defense 
whether such a failure would constitute a material breach 
of the New START Treaty, providing grounds for the United 
States to withdraw from the treaty. 
(b) OPTIONS DESCRIBED.—The report required under subsection 
(a) shall specifically describe options to respond to such a failure 
relating to the following: 
(1) Economic sanctions. 
(2) Diplomacy.
H. R. 2810—384 
(3) Additional deployment of ballistic or cruise missile 
defense capabilities, or other United States capabilities that 
would offset any potential Russian military advantage from 
such a failure. 
(4) Redeployment of United States nuclear forces beyond 
the levels required by the New START Treaty, and the associ-
ated costs and impacts on United States operations. 
(5) Legal countermeasures available under other treaties 
between the United States and Russia, including under the 
Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and 
entered into force January 1, 2002. 
(c) NEW START TREATY.—In this section, the term ‘‘New 
START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at 
Prague April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011. 
SEC. 1239. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUSSIAN FED-
ERATION. 
(a) STRATEGY
REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State and in consultation with 
each of the Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the commanders of each of the regional and functional 
combatant commands, shall develop and implement a comprehen-
sive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Federation. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the strategy required by subsection (a). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by this subsection 
shall include the following elements: 
(A) An evaluation of strategic objectives and motiva-
tions of the Russian Federation. 
(B) A detailed description of Russian threats to the 
national security of the United States, including threats 
that may pose challenges below the threshold of armed 
conflict. 
(C) A discussion of how the strategy complements the 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
Strategy. 
(D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and means inherent 
to the strategy. 
(E) A discussion of the strategy’s objectives with respect 
to deterrence, escalation control, and conflict resolution. 
(F) A description of the military activities across 
geographic regions and military functions and domains that 
are inherent to the strategy. 
(G) A description of the posture, forward presence, 
and readiness requirements inherent to the strategy. 
(H) A description of the roles of the United States 
Armed Forces in implementing the strategy, including— 
(i) the role of United States nuclear capabilities; 
(ii) the role of United States space capabilities; 
(iii) the role of United States cyber capabilities; 
(iv) the role of United States conventional ground 
forces;
H. R. 2810—385 
(v) the role of United States naval forces; 
(vi) the role of United States air forces; and 
(vii) the role of United States special operations 
forces. 
(I) An assessment of the force requirements needed 
to implement and sustain the strategy. 
(J) A description of the logistical requirements needed 
to implement and sustain the strategy. 
(K) An assessment of the technological research and 
development requirements needed to implement and sus-
tain the strategy. 
(L) An assessment of the training and exercise require-
ments needed to implement and sustain the strategy. 
(M) An assessment of the budgetary resource require-
ments needed to implement and sustain the strategy 
through December 31, 2030. 
(N) An analysis of the adequacy of current authorities 
and command structures for countering unconventional 
warfare. 
(O) Recommendations for improving the counter- 
unconventional warfare capabilities, authorities, and com-
mand structures of the Department of Defense. 
(P) A discussion of how the strategy provides a frame-
work for future planning and investments in regional 
defense initiatives, including the European Deterrence Ini-
tiative. 
(Q) A plan to increase conventional precision strike 
weapon stockpiles in the United States European Com-
mand’s areas of responsibility, which shall include nec-
essary increases in the quantities of such stockpiles that 
the Secretary of Defense determines will enhance deter-
rence and warfighting capability of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization forces. 
(R) A plan to counter the military capabilities of the 
Russian Federation, which, in addition to elements the 
Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate, shall 
include recommendations for— 
(i) improving the capability of United States Armed 
Forces to operate in a Global Positioning System (GPS)- 
denied or GPS-degraded environment; 
(ii) improving the capability of United States 
Armed Forces to counter Russian unmanned aircraft 
systems, electronic warfare, and long-range precision 
strike capabilities; and 
(iii) countering unconventional capabilities and 
hybrid threats from the Russian Federation. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by this subsection shall 
be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 1239A. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THE THREAT OF MALIGN INFLU-
ENCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) STRATEGY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the appropriate United
H. R. 2810—386 
States Government officials, shall jointly develop a comprehen-
sive strategy to counter the threat of malign influence by the 
Russian Federation. 
(2) SCOPE OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following actions: 
(A) To attribute, defend against, and counter hybrid 
warfare operations short of traditional armed conflict 
against the United States and its allies and partners. 
(B) To deter, and respond when necessary, to malicious 
cyber activities by the Russian Federation. 
(C) To identify and defend against the threat of malign 
influence by the Russian Federation, including actions to 
counter— 
(i) the use of misinformation, disinformation, and 
propaganda in social and traditional media; 
(ii) corrupt or illicit financing of political parties, 
think tanks, media organizations, and academic 
institutions; and 
(iii) the use of coercive economic tools, including 
sanctions, market access, cryptocurrencies, and dif-
ferential pricing, especially in the energy sector. 
(D) To promote the core values and principles of the 
United States, enhance the transatlantic relationship, 
strengthen good governance and democracy among Euro-
pean allies and partners, and further integration into multi-
lateral institutions underpinning the global order, including 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements: 
(1) SECURITY
MEASURES.—Actions to counter the use of 
force, coercion, and other hybrid warfare operations of the 
military, intelligence, and other security forces, including 
irregulars, groups, or individuals, of the Russian Federation, 
including the following: 
(A) Actions to build the military presence and capabili-
ties of military and security forces of the United States 
and European allies and partners to deter and respond 
to aggression by the Russian Federation. 
(B) Actions to improve indications and warnings, and 
capabilities to identify and attribute responsibility for the 
use of force, coercion, or other hybrid warfare operations 
by the Russian Federation. 
(C) Actions to support NATO allies and non-NATO 
partners in maintaining their sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
(2) INFORMATION OPERATIONS.—Actions to counter informa-
tion operations of the Russian Federation, including the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Actions to identify, attribute, and counter malign 
disinformation, active measures, propaganda, and decep-
tion and denial activities of the Russian Federation in 
the United States and Europe, through traditional and 
social media. 
(B) To enhance joint, regional, and combined informa-
tion operations and strategic communication strategies to 
counter Russian Federation information warfare, malign
H. R. 2810—387 
influence, and propaganda activities and increase coopera-
tion, exercises, and policy development with the NATO 
Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. 
(C) The establishment of interagency mechanisms for 
the coordination and implementation of the strategy with 
respect to disinformation, active measures, propaganda, 
and deception and denial activities of the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(D) Actions to strengthen the effectiveness of and fully 
resource the Global Engagement Center to carry out its 
purpose specified in section 1287(a)(2) of National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 
note) to lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the 
Federal Government to recognize, understand, expose, and 
counter propaganda and disinformation efforts by the Rus-
sian Federation, other foreign governments, and non-state 
actors. 
(E) Programs to strengthen investigative journalism 
and media independence abroad in countries most vulner-
able to malign influence by the Russian Federation. 
(F) Actions to build resilience to disinformation, active 
measures, propaganda, and deception and denial activities 
of the Russian Federation in the United States and other 
countries vulnerable to malign influence by the Russian 
Federation. 
(G) Efforts to work with traditional and social media 
providers to attribute and counter the threat of malign 
influence by the Russian Federation. 
(3) CYBER
MEASURES.—Actions to counter the threat of 
malign influence by the Russian Federation in cyberspace, 
including the following: 
(A) To increase inclusion of regional cyber planning 
within larger United States joint planning exercises in 
the European region and increase joint exercises and policy 
development through the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence. 
(B) To identify potential areas of cybersecurity 
collaboration and partnership capabilities with NATO and 
other European allies and partners. 
(C) Programs to educate citizens, information and 
communications technology experts, and private sector 
organizations in the United States and abroad to enhance 
their resilience to malign influence by the Russian Federa-
tion in cyberspace. 
(4) POLITICAL
AND
DIPLOMATIC
MEASURES.—Actions to 
counter malign political influence by the Russian Federation 
in the United States and among European allies and partners, 
including the following: 
(A) Programs and activities to enhance the resilience 
of United States democratic institutions and infrastructure 
at the national and subnational levels. 
(B) Programs working through the Department of State 
and the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment to promote good governance and enhance democratic 
institutions abroad, particularly in countries deemed most 
vulnerable to malign influence by the Russian Federation.
H. R. 2810—388 
(C) Actions within the United Nations, the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other 
multi-lateral organizations to counter malign influence by 
the Russian Federation. 
(D) Actions to identify organizations or networks of 
individuals affiliated or collaborating with the Government 
of the Russian Federation or proxies of the Russian Federa-
tion in the United States or European allies and partners. 
(5) FINANCIAL MEASURES.—Actions to counter corrupt and 
illicit financial networks of the Russian Federation in the 
United States and abroad, including the following: 
(A) Actions to promote the transparency of corrupt 
and illicit financial transactions of the Russian Federation, 
and other anti-corruption measures. 
(B) Actions to maintain and enhance the focus within 
the Department of the Treasury on tracing corrupt and 
illicit financial flows linked to the Russian Federation that 
interact with the United States financial system and 
exposing beneficial ownership and opaque Russia-related 
business transactions of significant importance. 
(C) Actions to build the capacity of financial intel-
ligence units of allies and partners. 
(D) Actions to enhance financial intelligence coopera-
tion between the United States and the European Union. 
(6) ENERGY SECURITY MEASURES.—Actions to promote the 
energy security of European allies and partners, and to reduce 
their dependence on energy imports from the Russian Federa-
tion that the Russian Federation uses as a weapon to coerce, 
intimidate, and influence those countries, including the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Actions to develop plans, working with the govern-
ments of European allies and partners to enhance energy 
market liberalization, effective regulation and oversight, 
energy reliability, and energy efficiency. 
(B) Actions to work with the European Union to pro-
mote the growth of liquefied natural gas trade and expan-
sion of the gas transport infrastructure in Europe. 
(C) Actions to promote a dialogue within the NATO 
on a coherent, strategic approach to energy security for 
NATO members and partner nations. 
(7) PROMOTION
OF
VALUES.—Actions to promote United 
States values and principles to provide a strong, credible alter-
native to malign influence by the Russian Federation, including 
the following: 
(A) Actions to promote alliance structure, the impor-
tance of transatlantic security as it relates to United States 
national security, and the continued integration of coun-
tries within multilateral institutions within Europe. 
(B) Public diplomacy and outreach to the people of 
the Russian Federation. 
(c) CONSISTENCY WITH OTHER LAWS.—The strategy required 
by subsection (a) shall be consistent with the following: 
(1) The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc-
tions Act (Public Law 115–44). 
(2) The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
8921 et seq.).
H. R. 2810—389 
(3) The Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
8901 et seq.). 
(4) The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act 
of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 5811 note). 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
of State shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report detailing the strategy required by subsection (a). 
(e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In the 
section the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
Subtitle 
E—Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 
2017 
SEC. 1241. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017’’. 
SEC. 1242. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of State reports 
entitled, ‘‘Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commit-
ments’’, all stated that the United States has determined that 
‘‘the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under 
the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground- 
launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 
500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of 
such missiles’’. 
(2) The 2016 report also noted that ‘‘the cruise missile 
developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a 
ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 
km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and 
all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a 
missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty’’. 
(3) 
Potential 
consistency 
and 
compliance 
concerns 
regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed 
since 2008, were not officially raised with the Russian Federa-
tion until 2013, and were not briefed to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) until January 2014. 
(4) The United States Government is aware of other consist-
ency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions vis- 
a`-vis its INF Treaty obligations.