A78 Service demonstrated the value of conserva- tion farming during the last war. Wisely planned and carefully applied systems of conservation. farming not only resulted in large increases in production but protected the land at the same time. Farmers and ranchers were able to get larger yields with less labor, equipment, and fertilizer. In war, as in peace, the land continues as our most vital and basic resource. Every- thing we do, all we share, and whatever we amount to as a great and vigorous people begins with and rests on the sustained pro- ductivity of our agricultural lands. Any un- dermining of this base undermines and weakens our Nation and all of its people. So during the year ahead—1951—you have a greater responsibility and a greater oppor- tunity than ever before, Soil-conservation work must be speeded up. Once again it be- comes an indispensable part of the basic do- fense operations of the Nation. And you and your job, important in peacetime, now be- come doubly important to the Nation as it begins mobilizing for the emergency with every resource we possess. What you are able to accomplish this year will not only bring results thig year but next year and on into 1955 and 1960, when the need may be even greater. We in the Soil Conservation Service have an unusual and indispensable service to give to the country, We have the knowledge and the experience necessary to work with farm- ers and ranchers on the land to protect it, ‘use it wisely, and make it yield more year after year. In our work with soil conserva- tion districts we are also helping to build and strengthen the American system of self-gov- ernment at the very sustaining foundation. Our land, our liberty, our self-respect, and our system of self-government—these are what we have fought for in the past and are determined to protect in the future. Every man in the Soil Conservation Service can help and help best by studying his job, stick- ing to it, and putting even more of his en- thusiasm and determination into it than ever before. For my part I will be working with you and for you to the best of my abil- ity all the way. H. H. BENNETT. Winning the Peace—The Economic Front—An Address Delivered by Paul G. Hoffman, ECA Consultant, Before National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., New York, N. Y., November 1, 1950 EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. CLYDE DOYLE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, January 3, 1951 Mr, DOYLE. Mr. Speaker, by unani- mous consent heretofore granted me, I am privileged to submit for the consid- ered attention ard thinking of the Members of this Eighty-second session of the United States Congress, the text of what appeared to me at the time I first read it, several weeks ago, as a written analysis I wished every colleague, yes, every American, to also read. The good and sound and international works by the author, already performed, make it unnecessary for me to say more about him. In his speech delivered as afore- said, Mr. Hoffman said, as follows: TI am extraordinarily gratified to receive the Robert Dollar award this year for two very special reasons. California is my home State although for the past 6 years I have spent not over 2 weeks a year there. Capt. Robert Dollar is a legendary figure in California. His name is a symbol of high adventure. He ‘was also a man of exemplary habits. He neither smoked nor drank, a fact to which my father frequently made reference. At long last, I am heading home and I am bringing home the bacon in the form of the Robert Dollar award, You have no idea how impressed my fellow Californians will be. Another reason why J am deeply appreci- ative of this award is that it 1s being given me by the National Foreign Trade Council because, rightly or wrongly, you have de- cided that I have made a contribution to the betterment of world trade. I hope you are right because I admit to a very deep interest in the restoration of world trade to a high level. I do not need to tell this audience how important world trade is to friendship and understanding between the diverse peo- ple who inhabit this earth. Nor how im- portant friendship and understanding is to our chances of winning the one thing for which people throughout the world today are yearning—and that is a just and lasting peace. I do not, however, propose to devote my remarks this evening to world trade. In the latter part of last June I underwent a serious operation. I realize that few people—if any—are particularly concerned about other people's operations, but I propose, neverthe- less, to talk about mine tonight—or, rather, some of its after effects. One of the important—-to me—results of that operation was that I was compelled to lie flat on my back for 30 days—not even being permitted to read. I tried the daytime radio but gave it up. Reading and the radlo both being out, I found myself in the un- happy position of having nothing to do but think. At the time the Korean War had just broken out. No one knew what might come of it. World war III actually seemed a pos- sibility. Quite naturally, I started thinking why !t was that we, the United States, always won wars but lost the peace. The reason why we lost the peace after World War I seemed quite clear. True, we did toy with the idea of the League of Na- tions but most of us failed entirely to grasp the fact that if we were to win the peace we would have to fight for it with the same boldness, tmagination, vigor, and dedication with which we had fought the war. Our fallure to grasp that fact lost us the peace we might easily, then, have won. The cituation was somewhat different in World War II. Even while the war was being fought a great many people realized that if we were to win the peace we would have to wage a peace. The United Nations, the World Bank, the World Fund, UNRRA were the result of that thinking but even there we made one assumption that turned out incorrect. We thought that al! nations wanted peace and would help to make that peace. We learned the hard way that this was not so. We learned that one nation— Russia—wanted not peace but the conquest of the free world. The most persuasive question facing the world today is whether, under these condi- tions, it is possible to wage a peace and win it. Even those who feel peace can be won hold divergent views as to how the peace should be waged. There are those who be- Neve we can sit down with the Soviets and, talking things over, arrive at a workable compromise. IT have no objectiona to talking things over with anyone at any time. But I see no hope for a workable compromise now for the simple reason that Russia's alm today is not peace but chaos and confusion in the free world. There is, I believe, ample evidence to sup- port my views. Every peace offensive staged APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD by Russia has been nothing more or less than & tactical move in a program to enslave the world. There are those who believe that one way to win the peace is to engage in a preventive war. Here, again, I find myself in disagree- ment. I can conceive of nothing more dam- aging to the prestige of the United States than for us to engage in aggression no mat- ter how much aggression seems to be justi- fied. Furthermore, even from the standpoint of practicability, such a move, at the present time, could invite only disaster. We could drop bombs on Russia and, very probably, damage her extensively but Russia could set her 200 divisions marching toward the At- lantic with nothing to stop them but the 14 divisions now in existence. We would then face the task of liberating Europe at some Jater date. There is a middle course offering, I believe, a reasonable hope of success. We, the free nations, must unite in build- ing up our armed forces to such strength Russia will not dare start marching. While this is being done we must, concur- rently on the political, economic, and in- formational fronts, take vigorous action aimed, first, at protecting the free world against internal aggression and, second, at keeping the Kremlin continually off balance. The Marshall plan gave the Kremlin a shock. So did the toy balloons recently re- leased in Western Europe to land in Poland, Germany, and the satellite states. So did the recent action of the United Nations to give the Assembly power to move to preserve peace even when the Security Council was rendered inactive by the use of the veto. Just what is involved in building up our military defenses and the military defenses of our allies to the point where our united strength can keep the Kremlin from match- ing, I do not know. I have been told it will take, perhaps one hundred and twenty bil- lions over the next 3 yeurs with the amount declining considerably thereafter. Included in this over-all figure there would be some thirteen billions to assist our allies in building up their war facilities and in meeting certain other military expenses. In this connection my recent trip to Europe, where I conversed with numerous foreign ministers, left me with one very defi- nite impression If we are to have the whole-hearted cooperation of the western Europeans in such a program we must leave no doubts in their minds that in bullding up our military strength and in helping them to build up theirs, we have one alm and one only in mind—to prevent a war and not to wage a war. They do not want to have to go through another liberation. On the economic front we must continue to extend economic aid to those countries whose continued economic strength is vital to the interest of the United States economy. This means not only those natio s of West- ern Europe who need help but the Philip- pines, Korea, und certain other Asiatic countries. The Marshall plan called for huge expendi- tures the first year but it must be remem- bered that the program was primarily de- signed to repair damages due to the ravagos of war. Each year the program has cost us progressively less. In most of the Asiatic countries now being served by ECA the pro- gram is largely limited to the agricultural field where much can be done with very little money. The total program for this fiscal year for Indonesia, Burma, French Indochina and Thailand js less than 8100,- 000,000. My guess is that economic aid to the countries whose economy is of vital in- terest to the United States should not ex- ceed $3,000,000,000. Success of the campaign on the political front demands, I think, great skill rather than many dollars. The same situation pre- vails in the case of the informational pro- gram. Here dollars are important but dol- lars alone will not be effective unless the
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD program is carried out with Imagination and boldness. The total dollar cost of all three programs, economic, political, and informational, should not exceed $3,500,000,000 a year, or less than 10 porcent of the funds proposed for defense purposes. But tf the campaign 1s not waged effectively on these three non- shooting fronts, we may find we have left the back door open to aggression even if the front door is closed through military expenditures. There are two questions which many of you, with good reason, are, no doubt, asking yourselves. You may have wondered why Russia does not start marching now * * * before we have time to build up our defenses. That ts a good question. I asked it of all the foreign ministers with whom I talked. The consensus of opinion was that Rus: ia had no present intent of engaging in a gon- eral war, First, becauce wo have better and bigger atom bombs. Second, because Russia still ndheres to the Marxist doctrine that capitalism contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. They have been watch- ing the United States economy hopefully since 1946. They ncw feel quite certain that our proposed high defense expenditures and our aid to the other free nations will be our undoing. I happen not to agree with that thesis. I even believe that the defense load may be the making of Western Europe. Another reason given me by the ministers in support of their belief that the Kremlin would not, at the present time, march, is that the masters of the Kremlin are not sure they could digest the countries they would have to overrun—and to rule. It is probable that Stalin figures, too, that if he started a major war he and his pals might lose their jobs and, perhaps, their lives. They know what hap- pened to Hitler and Mussolini. Of course, there is always the possibility that Russia might blunder into world war ITI. She was close to it this summer, when she s0 completely misunderstood the attitude of the United States toward Koren. She just could not believe we would send our boys into Korea when, obviously, there was no material advantage for us in so doing. In their own peculfar amoral manner they reasoned that unless there was some material advantage to us in protecting Korea, we would salve our conscience by having the United Nations pass a few pious resolutions condemning the ac- tion of the North Koreans after they had taken control of the peninsula. The second question in most of your minds is, I am sure, what will follow this stepped- up cooperative program, military, economic, political, and informational. Are we to live in a state of siege indefinitely? Is there any hope that Russia will change its course? The answer is not clear. Winston Churchill believes that, negotiating from strength, we can, in a reasonably short time, work out a compromise with even the present masters of the Kremlin. Others pin their hopes on the gituation in Russia today * * * as it is known to be. With 15,000,000 people behind barbed wire, they do not think the situation can continue indefinitely. They believe that in 8 years, 6, or maybe even longer, there will be a new regime in Russia, which will cooper- ate with the West * * * that the present men in the Kremlin will be replaced by those who will want to devote their attention and energies to building up their own country rather than to destroying others. To sum it all up, the consensus of opinion was that there is a good chance that the Kremlin will not start its armies marching within the next 3 years. And that, as a conse~- quence, we will have time in which to achieve, at a minimum, a workable compromise, and, as a maximum, a new and more liberal regime in Russia with which we can live in perce. Russia’s Challenge and United States Military Policy EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. THOMAS E. MARTIN OF IOWA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, the Korean campaign may lead to a final struggle between Russia and the United States unless the United Stat2s quickly rebuilds its military strength sufficient- ly to persuade Russia to discontinue her aggressive manifestation of her rivalry. I shall not attempt here to discuss all factors bearing upon this rivalry and our ability to cope with it short of war but I quote herewith some statements of his- torians, statesmen, and military lcaders of a century or more ago to show an awarencss at that time of the growing rivalry between Russia and the United States and noting the characteristics of the peoples of these two countries, Alexis de Tocqueville, of France, in 1831, visited the United States to inquire into what was then hailed as the great experiment in constitutional liberty. Coming to North America shortly after the pronouncement of the Monroe Doc- trine, De Tocqueville was acquainted with the major currents of national develop- ments in Europe which, in view of subse- quent events, he described with remark- able precision. Writing about 1835 in his Democracy in America—P. F. Collier & Son, 1900, volume I, page 441—he summarized his views with unusual clarity: There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward the same end, although they started from different points: I allude to the Rus- sians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most promi- nent place amongst the nations; and the world learned their existence and their great- ness at almost the same time. All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth; all the others are stopped, or con- tinue to advance with extreme difficulty; these are proceeding with ease and with ce- lerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the other by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a sin- gle arm; the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe. Just before the outbreak of the Cri- mean War in 1853 between France and England on the one hand and Russia on A79 the other, Lord Palmerston, British For- eign Minister for many years and Prime Minister for nearly 10 years, spoke of the ezardom and its methods as follows: The policy and practice of the Russlan Government has always been to push for- ward its encroachments as fast and as far eas the apathy or want of firmness of other governments would allow it, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance. In furtherance of this policy, the Rucsian Government has always had two strings to its bow, moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and London; active aggresston by its agents on the scene of operations. During his famous Asiatic cruise, our eminent naval officer, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, not only vis- ited the Japanese Empire and other islands of that region but also the main- land of eastern Asia. He was thus able to interpret realistically the movements he discerned. I am herewith quoting from a paper written by him and read by him before the American Geographical and Statistical Society at a mecting held March 6, 1856, in New York City, and published by D. Appleton & Co., 1856, page 28: It requires no sage to predict events as strongly foreshadowed to us all; still west- ward will the course of empire tako its way. But the last act in the drama is yet to be unfolded, and notwithstanding the rensoning of political empires—westward, northwnrd, and southward—to me it seems that the people of America will, in some form or other, extend their dominion and their power until they shall have brought within their mighty embrace multitudes of the islands of the great Pacific, and placed the Saxon race upon the eastern shores of Asia; and I think, too. that eastward and southward will her great rival of future aggrandizement (Russia) stretch forth her power to the coast of China and Siam, and thus the Saxon and the Cos- sack will meet once more, in strife or in friendship, on another field. Will it be in friendship? I fear not. The antagonistic exponents of freedom and absolutism must thus meet at last, and then will be fought that mighty battle on which the world will look with breathless interest, for on its is- sue will depend the freedom or the slavery of the world—despotism or rational liberty must be the fate of civilized man. I think I see in the distance the giants that are grow- ing up for that fierce and final encounter; in the progress of events that battle must sooner or later inevitably be fought. A review of these historical statements will undoubtedly be of interest today be- cause of the great importance of full understanding of present issues in our foreign policy. While most of the modern wars have been between “have-not” nations and “have” nations, indications point strong- ly to the possible final clash between Russia and the United States—the two greatest “have” nations. It will be very difficult to determine when or whether the “have-not” nations may have made their last great challenge to the “have” nations and when or whether the basic rivalry between Russia and the United States may precipitate war between them. It is, indeed, highly important that we avoid such dissipation of our resources as may reduce us even tem- porarily to the status of a “have-not” nation or any commitment that may de- prive us of our power to control our
A80 own resources as was done by the Har- riman Commission report in November 1947, in placing the so-called Marshall plan on strategic grounds and as was done in the debate on the Greek-Turkish loans in the spring of 1947 in pronounc- ing our purpose to fence Russia in. Those policies not only committed us beyond our power to control our own resources but they swiftly and violently brought the rivairy between Russia and the United States to a head. I sincerely hope we can still prove Commodore Perry's prediction wrong but it will require all the wisdom and good judgment we can muster to guide our Nation out of our present situation with success and without the disaster of Commodore Perry’s prediction. I sin- cerely hope that the decisions of our leaders will be made with full under- standing of the factors and characteris- tics recognized long ago by Alexis de Tocqueville, Lord Palmerston, and Com- modore Perry. The Basis for Foreign Policy EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. ROBERT B. CHIPERFIELD OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Recorp, I include the following edi- torial from the Wall Street Journal of December 26, 1950: Tue Basis yor ForEIGN Pouicy What should be the basis for the foreign policy of the United States? President Truman, in what has come to be known as the Truman doctrine, says that it should be the containment of communism, that this Nation should fight communism anywhere, and if necessary everywhere, that it threatens the peace. Former President Herbert Hoover says that the foundation of our policy must be to preserve this Nation and the Western Hemis- phere. There is an important difference between these two points of view. That difference 1s now being openly and widely debated for the first time in a silent decade. The two views need not, of course, con- fiict always or in every particular. To fight Communist power in particular places can be an essential part of our own defense, The QGefense of the Western Hemisphere does not preclude, and may require, fighting Soviet power outside the Western Hemisphere. The two viewpoints can converge. There is, moreover, similarity of purpose in the two views. The advocates of con- tainment everywhere advocate it to save America. The objective of the others is also to stop communism from engulfing the whole world, including ourselves. They are all honorable men. Nevertheless, the difference {is vital, not for what is intended but for what results. The Truman doctrine begins by accepting United States responsibility for defending all parte of the world from Soviet encroach- ment; this becomes primary policy. In ef- fect, the United States becomes a nation without differentiated frontiers. The fron- tier becomes one gigantic circle around Rus- @ia’s present sphere, And since the doctrine is to defend that circle everywhere, the Tela- tive values of the various points on the circle become lost. All points become more or less of equal value. The next progression, an unintended one, is that the responsibility of other peoples to defend themselves gradually becomes sec- ondary. Their self-defense is, of course, definitely desirable. But since containment every- where is viewed as essential to our ultimate safety, we soon think we must defend other countries regardless of their own efforts. And the other countries soon begin to think they do us a favor to let us defend them. At this stage decision becomes confused. Korea, let us say, cannot be weighed on any balance. It is a point on the circle; it is a part of the general responsibility we have as- sumed; and so we fight for 1t whether or not it has great value in terms of the larger fight. So long as the policy is to contain every- where there is simply no standard to dis- tinguish among Korea, Indochina, or the Rhine—all become Koreas if the Communists choose to make them g0. From this kind of thinking there is another progression—also unintended but also in- evitable. Unconsciously we begin to make the de- fense of this Nation a subordinate consid- eration in weighing any proposed action. If the policy is to contain everywhere and there is a threat anywhere, what room is there to debate whether to fight this par- ticular threat will strengthen or weaken our own defenses? Unless we are to ebrogate the policy there is no choice but to fight the threat anywhere. Action is automatic. The United States has then no choice but to in- tervene in Korea—or any other place, The Truman doctrine thus puts the de- fense of this Nation second in the minds of the men whose trust is the defense of this Nation. With the defense of this Nation as the paramount policy all this is changed. From this premise, the cost of any action would be measured against the gain; the risks of in- tervention in any Korea would be meas- ured against the risks of abstention. Men would still differ in judgment. They would still debate the intervention in Korea, the rearmament of Germany, the reinforce- ment of Europe. All these things would still be dificult matters to decide. Even from the Hoover premise, men would differ on the Hoover proposals as to what is best or pru- dent in a particular place, But in the debate men would have a com- mon plane of reference—the safety and pres- ervation of this country. There would then be something to measure against, there would he a standard for making value judg- ments, a balance on which to weigh military and political opinions. The policy of containment leaves us no choices. By trying to contain everywhere we become vulnerable everywhere and we can be truly strong nowhere. In the name of saving the world this policy deprives us of the freedom to seek out what is best to save America, The policy of putting the safety of this Nation first is the only one which offers us & way of wisely measuring our strength against the task—or, indeed, offers any way of measuring at all. Therefore it, and not the policy of containment everywhere, ought to be paramount in the forelgn policy of the United States. It may be argued by honorable men that this reversal of emphasis ignores morality. For in its application there may come a time when the United States, measuring what !s best for her own safety, may have to make the harsh decision of abandoning tempo- rarily some cherished bastion. And the greater obligation, tt is truly said, is to pre- serve the world from barbarism. To this we can only reply that there is in the world today only one power that stands APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD in the way of that barbarism. So long as the United States stands, the way is barred. So soon as it falls, the whole world will be engulfed, It will profit neither ourselves nor civiliza- tion to risk the destruction of that power in the name of saving civilization. To pursue in the name of morality a course which weakens the power of the United States would be the true immorality. A foreign policy which puts anything ahead of the preservation of this Nation be- trays the Nation and civilization. Who’s Being Isolationist? EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. LESLIE C. ARENDS OF ILLINOIS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Speaker, under Jeave to revise and extend my remarks, I am inserting in the CONGRESSIONAL Recorp an excellent editorial entitled “Who's Being Isolationist?” which ap- peared in the Pantagraph, of Blooming- ton, Ill, of January 5. The editorial emphasizes the extensive aid, both economic and military, which the United States has already extended our allies to stem the tide of communism, And it raises the very important ques- tion whether those whom we have been helping have really sought to help make themselves strong. It is this failure of our allies to do their part that is forcing the United States to question the wisdom of our foreign policy. At an early date I plan to say some- thing at some length on this subject. I urge a reading of this editorial, It is thought-provoking, to say the least: Wuo’s Brina ISOLATIONIST? Most Europeans and many Americans are accusing those who question our foreign policy of being isolationists. Such accusa- tions are red herrings. This country’s for- eign policy always has been and always should be pursued with the welfare of this country foremost in mind. Any other policy is naive and absurd in this realistic world. Have we been tesolationist in the pursuit of that policy? In the last decade we have given Britain, France, the Netherlands, Bel- gium, Turkey, Canada, Greece, Australia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ethiopta, Iceland, and India just under 652,000,000,000 to help them restore their economy and to try to assure them that they should be our allies. That does not include millions given to China, the Philippines, and South American countries. It does not include recent loans to Spain and Yugoslavia. It does not in- clude billions poured into Germany and Japan, Last June some 583 nations pledged to go along with us in a firm United Nations stand to stop aggression in Korea, These nations promised manpower and equipment to help stop the Korean Reds and to show the world that liberty-loving people would not toler- ate international gangsterism, They first promised 33,000 men and later increased the promised number as the task in Korea grew more difficult. To date we have thrown 140,000 men into Korea to help the 100,000 South Korean force. And to date these countries have sup- plied 20,000 men and some equipment. Just to keep the record straight, here is the latest published report of what countries have supplied what:
APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Australia: 1,000 men, two destroyers, one 75-plane Mustang fighter squadron. Belgium-Luxemburg: 750 men, en route. Canada: 1,000 men, three destroyers, one air transport squadron. Colombia: one frigate, en route. France: 1,000 men, one frigate. Great Britain: 6,000 men, 2 patrol squad- rons of Sunderland flying boats, 2 aircraft carriers with planes, 2 Nght cruisers, 5 de- stroyers, 3 frigates, 1 auxiliary vessel. Greece: 800 to 1,000 men, 6 transport planes. New Zcaland: 1,100 men, en route, 2 cor- vettes. The Netherlands: 650 men, 1 destroyer. The Phillipines, 1,200 men. Siam: 1,200 men, 2 corvettes. South Africa: One fighter squadron, Turkey: 5,200 men. When President Truman hinted at using the atom bomb in Korea and when the UN policy in Korea brought resistance from China, these same allies began in effect to desert us both in and outside UN. We stand virtually alone in our policy toward Red China The same nations not living up to their pledges in supplying men and equip- ment in Korea continue to recognize Red China, to supply her and to urge that she be seated in UN councils even though she defies every moral principle of UN. This country is not isolationist. Its allies are becoming isolationists by abandoning the United Nations effort to halt aggression. And those are the allies to whom we have given nearly 852,000,000,000 in the last decade. It is no wonder that our foreign policy is being questioned. It will continue to ke questioned until it is revised to make more effective a close alliance with other nations who see the dangers of Communist enslave- ment of the world The wish of the American people is to have a strong alliance with strong free nations. Our foreign policy has not produced such an alliance. It has instead been a one-way street. It has resulted in a Europe depend- ent upon our aid but apparently unwilling to buckle down to save itself. The question is not how we shall withdraw into ourselves, but how we can prevent other free nations from forcing us to have to take such a course as a final and extremely haz- ardous risk. If we make such a choice—and there is every reason to hope that we can work out an effective alliance capable of defending and willing to defend Mberty—it will not be our choice, but Europe's. Availability of Hunters for National Defense EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL OF NEW YORK IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. EDWIN ARTHUR HALL. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my re- marks in the Recorp, I include the fol- lowing letter: JOHNSON City, N. Y., January 4, 1951. Hon. En HAtu, Congressman, Washington, D. C. Hi Ep: I was going to write you before this time but for some reason or other I did not. Say, Ed, I saw in the press about us hunt- ers to defend our country in case of need or help on manpower. In today’s press I saw where some man down there opposed such a movement. You XCVII—App.——6 can tell that gentleman that I am 56 years old but still can kill a woodchuck at 300 yards. I ought to be able to kill a Red or rat at 50C as I can handle the rifle, the re- volver, or shotgun and in very good shape. T hunted in all parts of Broome, Chenango, and Tioga Counties and know every bit of the grounds thoroughly. You tell that opposer not to get in front of me with my 30-06 at 500 yards or he will be a dead duck. Do not forget to call on me on anything you like, and I will be there like Johnny on the spot. I like to hear from you. Yours very respectfully, PETER COURLAS. P. S—I have plenty of ammunition, too. Citizenship Restrictions EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. SAMUEL W. YORTY OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. YORTY. Mr. Speaker, during these days when democracy is called upon to block the ambitious encroachments of communism, it is fitting that we should strive not only to preserve our democracy but also to improve and perfect it. In introducing today a bill to remove the restrictions which bar some aliens en- titled to permanent residence from ob- taining citizenship, I am seeking to ac- complish what I know is the will of the majority of the Congress, and which surely would have been accomplished by the last Congress except for technical legal difficulties involving amendments to the proposal I have submitted today, and the Internal Security Act which was then pending in the Senate. Many of our resident aliens now in- eligible for citizenship are the parents of children who served with great distinc- tion in the last war. The largest num- bers are of Japanese descent, and if rea- son to bar them from citizenship ever existed, that reason most certainly does not exist today. Under the able guid- ance of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Japanese people have been able to find an outlet for their pre- viously suppressed desire to become and remain one of the peaceful members of the family of nations. The bonds of friendship between the new Japan and the United States are growing in strength, and it is to our mutual ad- vantage that we continue to strengthen our friendly relations with each other. Of course, the international situation is not as important as our desire to dem- onstrate our attachment to the prin- ciples of justice by dealing justly with the almost 100,000 loyal Americans who have resided among us for many years, who have worked and lived as good Amer- icans, sharing our benefits and our bur- dens, but who are, nevertheless, tech- nically barred from ever being able to proudly say, “I am a citizen of the United States.’ I am sure this Congress will want to make it possible for these peo- ple to obtain their citizenship without further delay. A&8l Senator Johnson Given More Power To Speed Up Defense Program EXTENSION OF REMARKS HON. J. FRANK WILSON OF TEXAS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, January 9, 1951 Mr. WILSON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the REcorD, I include the following editorial from the Dallas Daily Times-Herald of January 5, 1951: SENATOR JOHNSON GIVEN More Powsr To Sprexp Up Derense ProGRAM Senator LyNDON JOHNSON's aggressiveness and ability have won for him two high party honors in the new Congress, those of chair- man of the delegation from Texas and assistant majority leader in the Senate. These positions and his chairmanship of the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness make the Junior Senator from Texas one of the principal leaders in Congress. His fellow Texans have cause to be proud of him. But Senator JoHnson has already made it clear that at this time his mind is occupied with something more than attainment of personal honors and that his chief aim is to apeed up the steps that are being taken to prepare this Nation to meet the greatest crisis in its history. The assistant majority leader in the Sen- ate 1s known popularly as the whip, for it is his job to rally party members and spur them to action. The qualifications of Sen- ator JoHNSON for this post are obvious and the fact that he has been chosen for it is gratifying to all citizens who appreciate the need for action. When he gives the word “go” he will speak as a Member of Congress who was preaching preparedness for war when almost all others leaders were thinking in terms of a minimum defense establish- ment and when the public was demanding cuts in Army, Navy, and Alr Force expendi- tures. There are still wishful thinkers in this country and abroad who are trying to con- vince themselves and others that the thun- der of a gathering world war is only a false alarm and that we shall be exempt from harm if we only boost production, attend strictly to our own business, and vote regularly. But, as a matter of fact, the very life of this sovereign Nation is threatened and Senator JoHNSON is among those who are not blind to realities. Many obstacles now stand in the way of steps to meet the world emergency. They ine clude: Confusion in the councils of leader- ship; thoughts about the next presidential election; hesitancy on the part of many citizens to make patriotic sacrifice; the difi- culty of making reductions in Federal, State, county, and city expenditures that have no relation to the armament program; and the wave of isolationism that is sweeping the country because of the timidity and false hopes of our professed allies in Europe. All these obstacles will retard the action of the new Congress. They will cause long and acrimonious debate while men die in battle and while our foes grow stronger and more arrogant. Maneuvers for advantage in the next presidential election will cause valu- able time to be wasted. At least, all this neglect of the Nation's safety will prevatl un- less foresighted, courageous men in the Sen~ ate and the House do all they can to pre- vent it. It is a comfort to know that LyNpon Jounson of Texas is one of the key men in the Senate.