I 
108TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5411 
To amend the the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to restrict exports of nuclear 
related materials and equipment. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NOVEMBER 19, 2004 
Mr. MARKEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on International Relations 
A BILL 
To amend the the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to restrict 
exports of nuclear related materials and equipment. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Nuclear Prolifera-
tion Prevention Act’’. 
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR TRADE WITH IRAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 11 of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 is amended by adding at the end the following 
new section:
‘‘SEC. 135. PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR TRADE WITH IRAN’S 
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS. 
‘‘(a) PROHIBITIONS.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of this Act, any international arrangement or 
any agreement for cooperation made pursuant to this Act, 
or any other provision of law, no license, approval, or au-
thorization for the export or reexport, or transfer, or re-
transfer, whether directly or indirectly, of any— 
‘‘(1) special nuclear material, 
‘‘(2) source material, 
‘‘(3) byproduct material, 
‘‘(4) production facility, 
‘‘(5) utilization facility, 
‘‘(6) items or components which are designed or 
intended to be used in a production or utilization fa-
cility, or with respect to which there is a risk of di-
version for use in such a facility, 
‘‘(7) items or components which are designed or 
intended for use in the construction of a production 
or utilization facility, 
‘‘(8) items and assistance requiring any author-
ization, licensing, or other approval pursuant to this 
Act, or 
‘‘(9) any nuclear-related items on the Com-
merce Control List maintained under part 774 of
title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or any suc-
cessor to such list), 
may be made to any country that the President determines 
has, since January 1, 2004, provided to the Islamic Re-
public of Iran any special nuclear material, source mate-
rial, byproduct material, production facility, utilization fa-
cility, or items, components, or technologies which are or 
can be used in a production or utilization facility or in 
(or to develop, test, or manufacture) a nuclear explosive 
device. 
‘‘(b) EXCEPTIONS.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to 
exports, reexports, transfers, or retransfers of radiation 
monitoring technologies, surveillance equipment, seals, 
cameras, tamper-indication devices, nuclear detectors, 
monitoring systems, or equipment necessary to safely 
store, transport, or remove hazardous materials, whether 
such items, services, or information are regulated by the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, or 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, except to the extent 
that such technologies, equipment, seals, cameras, devices, 
detectors, or systems are available for use in the design 
or construction of nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. 
‘‘(c) WAIVERS.—The President may waive the appli-
cation of subsection (a) to a country if the President deter-
mines and certifies to the Congress that the waiver will
not result in any increased risk that the Islamic Republic 
of Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, or 
any materials or components of nuclear weapons and 
that— 
‘‘(1) the government of such country has not, 
within the preceding 12-month period, provided any 
material support to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
acquiring nuclear materials, nuclear reactors, or any 
technology or component which is or could be used 
to manufacture a nuclear explosive device; 
‘‘(2) in the judgment of the President, the gov-
ernment of such country has provided adequate, 
verifiable assurances that it will cease all further ex-
ports or transfers of nuclear-weapons-usable tech-
nology or material, and has put in place and en-
forced effective export controls on transfers or ex-
ports of such technology or material by nongovern-
mental entities; 
‘‘(3) the waiver is in the vital national security 
interest of the United States; or 
‘‘(4) the waiver is essential to prevent or re-
spond to a serious radiological hazard in the country 
receiving the waiver that may or does threaten pub-
lic health and safety.
‘‘(d) COOPERATIVE
THREAT
REDUCTION
PRO-
GRAMS.—This section shall not apply to any license, ap-
proval, or authorization which the President determines 
is necessary to implement Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Programs. For purposes of this subsection, Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Programs are the programs specified in 
section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201; 110 Stat. 
2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note). 
‘‘(e) APPLICATION.—This section shall apply with re-
spect to any license, approval, or authorization described 
in subsection (a) which is made, or required to be made, 
on or after the date of the enactment of this section.’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of con-
tents of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is amended by 
inserting after the item relating to section 134 the fol-
lowing new item: 
‘‘Sec. 135. Prohibition on nuclear trade with Iran’s nuclear suppliers.’’. 
SEC. 3. REPORT TO CONGRESS. 
Not later than 6 months after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the President shall submit a report to 
the Congress containing the following information: 
(1) A complete list of missile and nuclear mate-
rials and technology provided to Iran by any entity 
in the People’s Republic of China, including the Chi-
nese Government, or by the government of, or any 
other entity in, any other country. 
(2) An estimate and assessment of the current 
status of efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear explo-
sives and their delivery vehicles. 
(3) An assessment of the extent to which the 
agreement recently reached between the Islamic Re-
public of Iran and the governments of Great Britain, 
France, and Germany could effectively limit further 
efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear explosives. 
(4) An evaluation of the basis for and credi-
bility of claims recently set forth by an Iranian re-
sistance group that Iran may be enriching uranium 
at a secret facility unknown to United Nations weap-
ons inspectors. 
(5) Whether the United States has provided 
United Nations and International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) weapons inspectors with full access 
to the intelligence that forms the basis for any con-
clusion that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear 
weapons program. 
(6) The steps the United States is taking to en-
sure that the United Nations and IAEA inspectors 
receive full access to all suspected Iranian nuclear 
sites and that the United States works together with
the international community to ensure that Iran pro-
vides such inspectors with full cooperation in their 
efforts to verify that Iran has complied with its obli-
gations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and the agreement referred to in 
paragraph (3). 
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