710 
HR 1960 PCS
(2) President Obama should fully consider all 
courses of action to remove President Bashar al- 
Assad from power; 
(3) the conflict in Syria threatens the vital na-
tional security interests of Israel and the stability of 
Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, the implications of 
which should be sufficiently weighed by the Presi-
dent when considering policy approaches towards the 
conflict in Syria; 
(4) the sale or transfer of advanced anti-air-
craft weapons systems to Syria poses a grave risk to 
Israel and the United States supports Israel’s right 
to respond to this grave threat as needed; 
(5) the President should fully consider all 
courses of action to reinforce his stated ‘‘redline’’ re-
garding the use of weapons of mass destruction by 
the Assad regime in Syria, which could threaten the 
credibility of the United States with its allies in the 
region and embolden the Assad regime; 
(6) the United States should continue to con-
duct rigorous planning and operational preparation 
to support any efforts to secure the chemical and bi-
ological stockpiles and associated weapons; 
(7) the United States should have a policy that 
supports the stability of countries on Syria’s border, 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00710
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
711 
HR 1960 PCS
including Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Israel; 
(8) the United States should continue to sup-
port Syrian opposition forces with non-lethal aid; 
(9) the President, the Department of Defense, 
the Department of State, and the intelligence com-
munity, in cooperation with European and regional 
allies, should ensure that the risks of all courses of 
action or inaction regarding Syria are fully explored 
and understood and that Congress is kept fully in-
formed of such risks; 
(10) the President should fully consider, and 
the Department of Defense should conduct prudent 
planning for, the provision of lethal aid and relevant 
operational training to vetted Syrian opposition 
forces, including an analysis of the risks of the pro-
vision of such aid and training; 
(11) should the President decide to employ any 
military assets in Syria, the President should pro-
vide a supplemental budget request to Congress; and 
(12) the President should use all diplomatic 
means to disrupt the flow of arms into Syria, includ-
ing efforts to dissuade Russia from further arms 
sales with Syria, the influx of weapons and fighters 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00711
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
712 
HR 1960 PCS
from Hezbollah, and the infiltration of weapons and 
fighters from Iran. 
SEC. 1252. REVISION OF STATUTORY REFERENCES TO 
FORMER NATO SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 
AND RELATED NATO AGREEMENTS. 
(a) TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 
2350d of title 10, United States Code, is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘NATO Maintenance and Sup-
ply Organization’’ each place it appears and insert-
ing ‘‘NATO Support Organization and its executive 
agencies’’; 
(2) in subsection (a)(1)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘Weapon System Partner-
ship Agreements’’ and inserting ‘‘Support Part-
nership Agreements’’; and 
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘a 
specific weapon system’’ and inserting ‘‘activi-
ties’’; and 
(3) in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), by 
striking ‘‘Weapon System Partnership Agreement’’ 
each place it appears and inserting ‘‘Support Part-
nership Agreement’’. 
(b) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 21(e)(3) 
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761(e)(3)) 
is amended— 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00712
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
713 
HR 1960 PCS
(1) in subparagraphs (A) and (C)(i), by striking 
‘‘Maintenance and Supply Agency of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization’’ and inserting ‘‘North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Support Or-
ganization and its executive agencies’’; 
(2) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ‘‘weapon 
system partnership agreement’’ and inserting ‘‘sup-
port partnership agreement’’; and 
(3) in subparagraph (C)(i)(II), by striking ‘‘a 
specific weapon system’’ and inserting ‘‘activities’’. 
SEC. 1253. LIMITATION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT EXECU-
TIVE AGREEMENTS RELATING TO UNITED 
STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—Congress reaffirms, 
with respect to executive agreements relating to the mis-
sile defense capabilities of the United States, including 
basing, locations, capabilities and numbers of missiles with 
respect to such missile defense capabilities, that section 
303(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
U.S.C. 2573(b)) provides the following: ‘‘No action shall 
be taken pursuant to this or any other Act that would 
obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed 
Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily 
significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making 
power of the President set forth in Article II, Section 2, 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00713
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
714 
HR 1960 PCS
Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless authorized by the 
enactment of further affirmative legislation by the Con-
gress of the United States.’’. 
(b) LIMITATION ON FUNDS.—None of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available 
for fiscal year 2014 or any fiscal year thereafter for the 
Department of Defense may be used— 
(1) to implement any executive agreement relat-
ing to the missile defense capabilities of the United 
States, including basing, locations, capabilities, and 
numbers of missiles with respect to such missile de-
fense capabilities; or 
(2) to implement rules of engagement or Guid-
ance for Employment of Force relating to such exec-
utive agreement. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (b) shall 
not apply with respect to the use of funds to negotiate 
or implement any executive agreement with a country with 
respect to which the United States has entered into a trea-
ty of alliance or has a security guarantee. 
(d) EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT DEFINED.—In this sec-
tion, the term ‘‘executive agreement’’ means an inter-
national agreement other than— 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00714
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
715 
HR 1960 PCS
(1) an agreement that is in the form of a treaty 
under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion of the United States; or 
(2) an agreement that requires implementing 
legislation to be enacted into law for the agreement 
to enter into force with respect to the United States. 
SEC. 1254. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
THREAT REDUCTION ENGAGEMENT ACTIVI-
TIES AND UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST- 
BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds made available 
for fiscal year 2014 for Threat Reduction Engagement ac-
tivities may be obligated or expended for such purposes 
until the President certifies to Congress that no state 
party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has 
undertaken nuclear weapons test activities in fiscal year 
2013 that are inconsistent with United States interpreta-
tions regarding obligations under such Treaty. 
(b) LOBBYING OR ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES.—None of 
the funds made available for fiscal year 2014 for contribu-
tions of the United States to the CTBTO entities may be 
used for lobbying or advocacy in the United States relating 
to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00715
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
716 
HR 1960 PCS
(c) CTBTO ENTITIES.—In subsection (b), the term 
‘‘CTBTO entities’’ means— 
(1) the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Trea-
ty Organization International Monitoring System; 
and 
(2) the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Trea-
ty Organization Preparatory Commission-Special 
Contributions. 
SEC. 1255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MILITARY-TO-MILITARY 
COOPERATION 
BETWEEN 
THE 
UNITED 
STATES AND BURMA. 
It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) as the United States policy rebalances to-
wards Asia, it is critical that the United States mili-
tary comprehensively evaluate its engagement with 
Burma; 
(2) the future of the military-to-military rela-
tionship between the United States and Burma 
should take into account the current ethnic conflict 
in Burma and persecution of ethnic and religious 
minorities; 
(3) while the United States has national secu-
rity interests in Burma’s peace and stability, the 
peaceful settlement of armed conflicts with the eth-
nic minority groups requires the Burmese military to 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00716
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
717 
HR 1960 PCS
respect ceasefire agreements, laws of war, and 
human rights provisions; and 
(4) the Department of Defense should fully con-
sider and assess the Burmese military’s efforts to 
implement reforms, end impunity for human rights 
abuses, and increase transparency and accountability 
before expanding military-to-military cooperation be-
yond initial dialogue and isolated engagements. 
SEC. 1256. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE STATIONING OF 
UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) During the past several years, over 700 ki-
netic terror incidents have occurred in the U.S. Eu-
ropean Command (EUCOM) area of operations. Ris-
ing tensions in the region due to unemployment, fis-
cal insolvency, ethnic strife, hegemonic desires, and 
terrorism, pose risks to the security and stability of 
Europe. 
(2) Arab Spring uprisings in Middle Eastern 
and North African countries, including the Republic 
of Mali, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Libya, and the 
Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), have presented emerg-
ing strategic challenges that present significant im-
plications for regional stability, the security of the 
State of Israel (Israel), and the national security in-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00717
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
718 
HR 1960 PCS
terests of the United States and many European al-
lies. 
(3) U.S. Africa Command does not have for-
mally assigned Army or Marine Corps units assigned 
to it and it continues to share Air Force and Navy 
component commands with EUCOM. Consequently, 
United States forces stationed in Europe have been 
deployed to support contingencies associated with 
the Arab Spring in North Africa. 
(4) The Commander of U.S. European Com-
mand is responsible for developing operational plans 
for the defense of Israel. Moreover, forces stationed 
in Europe would be deployed to defend Israel in the 
event of such a contingency. 
(5) Regimes, including the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and Syria, continue efforts to procure, develop, 
and proliferate advanced ballistic missile tech-
nologies that pose a serious threat to United States 
forces and installations in the theater, as well as to 
the territory, populations, and forces of Israel and 
European allies. United States missile defense capa-
bilities in Europe seek to mitigate these threats. 
(6) Violent extremist organizations, including 
Kongra-Gel, al Qaida, Lebanese Hizballah, and Ira-
nian Qods Force, may utilize Europe as an impor-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00718
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
719 
HR 1960 PCS
tant venue for recruitment, logistical support, fi-
nancing, and the targeting of the United States and 
Western interests. 
(7) Congress has lacked sufficient data to com-
pare the strategic benefits and the costs associated 
with permanently stationing forces in Europe. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has found 
that the combatant commands do not completely and 
consistently report cost data in their theater posture 
plans. In particular, GAO reported in February 
2011 that EUCOM lacks comprehensive cost data in 
its theater posture plans and therefore decision mak-
ers lack critical information that could be used to 
make fully informed posture decisions. Additionally, 
in June 2012, GAO found that the Department of 
Defense has taken steps to align posture initiatives 
with strategy and cost, but continues to lack com-
prehensive and consistent cost estimates of initia-
tives. 
(8) The Department of Defense has reported 
that the cost of permanently stationing forces in the 
United States rather than overseas is often offset by 
such factors as increased rotational costs. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
22:02 Jul 08, 2013
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 00719
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1960.PCS
H1960
emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS