945 
(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—For purposes of 
bringing a civil action under paragraph (1), nothing 
in this section shall be construed to prevent the chief 
law enforcement officer, or official or agency of a 
State, from exercising the powers conferred on such 
chief law enforcement officer, official or agency of a 
State, by the laws of the State to conduct investiga-
tions, administer oaths or affirmations, or compel 
the attendance of witnesses or the production of doc-
umentary and other evidence. 
(6) ACTIONS BY OTHER STATE OFFICIALS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to civil ac-
tions brought by attorneys general under para-
graph (1), any other officer of a State who is 
authorized by the State to do so, except for any 
private person on behalf of the State attorney 
general, may bring a civil action under para-
graph (1), subject to the same requirements 
and limitations that apply under this subsection 
to civil actions brought by attorneys general. 
(B) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in this 
subsection may be construed to prohibit an au-
thorized official of a State from initiating or 
continuing any proceeding in a court of the
946 
State for a violation of any civil or criminal law 
of the State. 
(e) SEVERABILITY.—If any provision of this section, 
or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, 
is held invalid, the remainder of this section and the appli-
cation of such provision to other persons not similarly situ-
ated or to other circumstances shall not be affected by 
the invalidation. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COMMISSION.—The term ‘‘Commission’’ 
means the Federal Trade Commission. 
(2) CONSUMER
PRODUCT.—The term ‘‘con-
sumer product’’ has the meaning given such term in 
section 101 of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C. 
2301) and section 700.1 of title 16, Code of Federal 
Regulations. 
(3) HIGH-VOLUME THIRD PARTY SELLER.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘high-volume 
third party seller’’ means a participant on an 
online marketplace’s platform who is a third 
party seller and who, in any continuous 12- 
month period during the previous 24 months, 
has entered into 200 or more discrete sales or 
transactions of new or unused consumer prod-
947 
ucts and an aggregate total of $5,000 or more 
in gross revenues. 
(B) CLARIFICATION.—For purposes of cal-
culating the number of discrete sales or trans-
actions or the aggregate gross revenues under 
subparagraph (A), an online marketplace shall 
only be required to count sales or transactions 
made through the online marketplace and for 
which payment was processed by the online 
marketplace, either directly or through its pay-
ment processor. 
(4) ONLINE MARKETPLACE.—The term ‘‘online 
marketplace’’ means any person or entity that oper-
ates a consumer-directed electronically based or 
accessed platform that— 
(A) includes features that allow for, facili-
tate, or enable third party sellers to engage in 
the sale, purchase, payment, storage, shipping, 
or delivery of a consumer product in the United 
States; 
(B) is used by one or more third party sell-
ers for such purposes; and 
(C) has a contractual or similar relation-
ship with consumers governing their use of the 
platform to purchase consumer products.
948 
(5) SELLER.—The term ‘‘seller’’ means a per-
son who sells, offers to sell, or contracts to sell a 
consumer product through an online marketplace’s 
platform. 
(6) THIRD PARTY SELLER.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘third party 
seller’’ means any seller, independent of an on-
line marketplace, who sells, offers to sell, or 
contracts to sell a consumer product in the 
United States through such online market-
place’s platform. 
(B) EXCLUSIONS.—The term ‘‘third party 
seller’’ does not include, with respect to an on-
line marketplace— 
(i) a seller who operates the online 
marketplace’s platform; or 
(ii) a business entity that has— 
(I) made available to the general 
public the entity’s name, business ad-
dress, and working contact informa-
tion; 
(II) an ongoing contractual rela-
tionship with the online marketplace 
to provide the online marketplace with 
the manufacture, distribution, whole-
949 
saling, or fulfillment of shipments of 
consumer products; and 
(III) provided to the online mar-
ketplace identifying information, as 
described in subsection (a), that has 
been verified in accordance with that 
subsection. 
(7) VERIFY.—The term ‘‘verify’’ means to con-
firm information provided to an online marketplace 
pursuant to this section, which may include the use 
of one or more methods that enable the online mar-
ketplace to reliably determine that any information 
and documents provided are valid, corresponding to 
the seller or an individual acting on the seller’s be-
half, not misappropriated, and not falsified. 
(g) RELATIONSHIP TO STATE LAWS.—No State or 
political subdivision of a State, or territory of the United 
States, may establish or continue in effect any law, regula-
tion, rule, requirement, or standard that conflicts with the 
requirements of this section. 
(h) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 20214. SUPERCOMPUTING FOR SAFER CHEMICALS 
(SUPERSAFE) CONSORTIUM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—
950 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘Secretary’’), through the Director of the National 
Toxicology Program, and in collaboration with the 
heads of any other relevant Federal agencies (includ-
ing the Administrator of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and the Secretary of Energy), shall 
form a consortium, to be known as the ‘‘Supercom-
puting for Safer Chemicals (SUPERSAFE) Consor-
tium’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Consor-
tium’’) with the National Laboratories of the De-
partment of Energy and public research institutions 
to carry out the activities described in subsection 
(b). 
(2) INCLUSION OF STATE AGENCIES.—The Sec-
retary shall allow the head of a relevant State agen-
cy to join the Consortium on request of the State 
agency. 
(b) CONSORTIUM ACTIVITIES.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Consortium, working 
through the National Laboratories and public re-
search institutions, shall use supercomputing, ma-
chine learning, and other similar capabilities— 
(A) to establish rapid approaches for large- 
scale identification of toxic substances and the
951 
development of safer alternatives to toxic sub-
stances by developing and validating computa-
tional toxicology methods based on unique high- 
performance computing, artificial intelligence, 
machine learning, and precision measurements; 
(B) to address the need to identify safer 
chemicals for use in consumer and industrial 
products and in their manufacture to support 
the move away from toxic substances and to-
ward safer-by-design alternatives; and 
(C) to make recommendations on how the 
information produced can be applied in risk as-
sessments and other characterizations for use 
by the Environmental Protection Agency and 
other agencies in regulatory decisions, and by 
industry in identifying toxic and safer chemi-
cals. 
(2) MODELS.—In carrying out paragraph (1), 
the Consortium— 
(A) shall use supercomputers and other 
virtual tools to develop, validate, and run mod-
els to predict adverse health effects caused by 
toxic substances and to identify safe chemicals 
for use in products and manufacturing; and
952 
(B) may utilize, as needed, appropriate bi-
ological test systems to test and evaluate ap-
proaches and improve their predictability and 
reliability in industrial and regulatory applica-
tions. 
(c) PUBLIC RESULTS.—The Consortium shall make 
model predictions, along with supporting documentation, 
available to the public in an accessible format. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this sec-
tion— 
(A) for fiscal year 2022, $20,000,000; 
(B) for fiscal year 2023, $30,000,000; and 
(C) for each of fiscal years 2024 through 
2026, $35,000,000. 
(2) AVAILABILITY.—From the amounts made 
available under paragraph (1) for a fiscal year, not 
less than $5,000,000 shall be available to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. 
SEC. 20215. GAO REPORT ON GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR 
SHORTAGE. 
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States 
shall submit to Congress a report on the global semicon-
953 
ductor supply shortage and the impact of that shortage 
on manufacturing in the United States. 
Subtitle C—Defense Supply Chain 
Risk Management 
SEC. 20221. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE SUPPLY CHAINS. 
(a) RISK MANAGEMENT FOR ALL DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE SUPPLY CHAINS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 
shall— 
(1) develop and issue implementing guidance 
for risk management for Department of Defense 
supply chains for materiel for the Department, in-
cluding pharmaceuticals; 
(2) identify, in coordination with the Commis-
sioner of Food and Drugs, supply chain information 
gaps regarding reliance on foreign suppliers of 
drugs, including active pharmaceutical ingredients 
and final drug products; and 
(3) submit to Congress a report regarding— 
(A) existing information streams, if any, 
that may be used to assess the reliance by the 
Department of Defense on high-risk foreign 
suppliers of drugs;
954 
(B) vulnerabilities in the drug supply 
chains of the Department of Defense; and 
(C) any recommendations to address— 
(i) information gaps identified under 
paragraph (2); and 
(ii) any risks related to such reliance 
on foreign suppliers. 
(b) RISK MANAGEMENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN.—The Director 
of the Defense Health Agency shall— 
(1) not later than one year after the issuance 
of the guidance required by subsection (a)(1), de-
velop and publish implementing guidance for risk 
management for the Department of Defense supply 
chain for pharmaceuticals; and 
(2) establish a working group— 
(A) to assess risks to the pharmaceutical 
supply chain; 
(B) to identify the pharmaceuticals most 
critical to beneficiary care at military treatment 
facilities; and 
(C) to establish policies for allocating 
scarce pharmaceutical resources in case of a 
supply disruption.
955 
(c) RESPONSIVENESS TESTING OF DEFENSE LOGIS-
TICS AGENCY PHARMACEUTICAL CONTRACTS.—The Di-
rector of the Defense Logistics Agency shall modify De-
fense 
Logistics 
Agency 
Instructions 
5025.03 
and 
3110.01— 
(1) to require Defense Logistics Agency Troop 
Support to coordinate annually with customers in 
the military departments to conduct responsiveness 
testing of the Defense Logistics Agency’s contin-
gency contracts for pharmaceuticals; and 
(2) to include the results of that testing, as re-
ported by customers in the military departments, in 
the annual reports of the Warstopper Program. 
TITLE III—ENERGY 
SEC. 20301. STRATEGIC TRANSFORMER RESERVE AND RE-
SILIENCE PROGRAM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish 
a program to reduce the vulnerability of the electric grid 
to physical attack, cyber attack, electromagnetic pulse, 
geomagnetic disturbances, severe weather, climate change, 
and seismic events, including by— 
(1) ensuring that large power transformers, 
generator step-up transformers, power conversion 
equipment, and other critical electric grid equipment 
are strategically located to ensure timely replace-
956 
ment of such equipment as may be necessary to re-
store electric grid function rapidly in the event of se-
vere damage to the electric grid due to physical at-
tack, cyber attack, electromagnetic pulse, geo-
magnetic disturbances, severe weather, climate 
change, or seismic events; and 
(2) establishing a coordinated plan to facilitate 
transportation of large power transformers, gener-
ator step-up transformers, power conversion equip-
ment, and other critical electric grid equipment. 
(b) TRANSFORMER RESILIENCE.—In carrying out 
the program established under subsection (a), the Sec-
retary shall— 
(1) improve large power transformers, gener-
ator step-up transformers, power conversion equip-
ment, and other critical electric grid equipment by 
reducing their vulnerabilities; 
(2) develop, test, and deploy innovative equip-
ment designs that are more flexible and offer greater 
resiliency of electric grid functions; 
(3) coordinate with industry and manufacturers 
to standardize large power transformers, generator 
step-up transformers, power conversion equipment, 
and other critical electric grid equipment;
957 
(4) monitor and test large power transformers, 
generator step-up transformers, power conversion 
equipment, and other critical electric grid equipment 
that the Secretary determines may pose a risk to the 
bulk-power system or national security; and 
(5) facilitate the domestic manufacturing of 
large power transformers, generator step-up trans-
formers, power conversion equipment, and other crit-
ical electric grid equipment through the issuance of 
grants and loans, and through the provision of tech-
nical support. 
(c) STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT RESERVES.— 
(1) AUTHORIZATION.—In carrying out the pro-
gram established under subsection (a), the Secretary 
may establish one or more federally owned strategic 
equipment reserves, as appropriate, to ensure na-
tionwide access to large power transformers, gener-
ator step-up transformers, power conversion equip-
ment, and other critical electric grid equipment. 
(2) CONSIDERATION.—In establishing any fed-
erally owned strategic equipment reserve, the Sec-
retary may consider existing spare transformer and 
equipment programs and requirements established 
by the private sector, Regional Transmission Organi-
958 
zations, Independent System Operators, and State 
regulatory authorities. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—The program established under 
subsection (a) shall be carried out in consultation with the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Electricity 
Subsector Coordinating Council, the Electric Reliability 
Organization, manufacturers, and owners and operators of 
critical electric infrastructure and defense and military in-
stallations. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 
$75,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026. 
Such amounts shall remain available until expended. 
(f) CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS.—All laborers and me-
chanics employed by contractors or subcontractors in the 
performance of construction, alteration or repair work car-
ried out, in whole or in part, with financial assistance 
made available under this section shall be paid wages at 
rates not less than those prevailing on projects of a char-
acter similar in the locality as determined by the Secretary 
of Labor in accordance with subchapter IV of chapter 31 
of title 40, United States Code. With respect to the labor 
standards specified in this section, the Secretary of Labor 
shall have the authority and functions set forth in Reorga-
nization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (64 Stat. 1267; 5
959 
U.S.C. App.) and section 3145 of title 40, United States 
Code. 
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) BULK-POWER
SYSTEM; ELECTRIC
RELI-
ABILITY
ORGANIZATION.—The terms ‘‘bulk-power 
system’’ and ‘‘Electric Reliability Organization’’ 
have the meaning given such terms in section 215 
of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824o)). 
(2) INDEPENDENT
SYSTEM
OPERATOR; RE-
GIONAL TRANSMISSION ORGANIZATION STATE REGU-
LATORY AUTHORITY.—The terms ‘‘Regional Trans-
mission Organization’’, ‘‘Independent System Oper-
ator’’, and ‘‘State regulatory authority’’ have the 
meaning given such terms in section 3 of the Fed-
eral Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796). 
(3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of Energy. 
SEC. 20302. SOLAR COMPONENT MANUFACTURING SUPPLY 
CHAIN ASSISTANCE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that it is in the 
interest of the United States— 
(1) to have a viable solar component manufac-
turing supply chain; and
960 
(2) to reduce the reliance of United States 
manufacturers on solar components made in the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall es-
tablish and carry out a program to award grants and di-
rect loans to eligible entities to carry out projects in the 
United States for— 
(1) the construction of new facilities that manu-
facture solar components; and 
(2) retooling, retrofitting, or expanding existing 
facilities that manufacture, or have the ability to 
manufacture, solar components. 
(c) CONSIDERATIONS.—In awarding grants and di-
rect loans under the program, the Secretary shall take into 
consideration whether a project— 
(1) is strategically located near manufacturers 
in the solar component manufacturing supply chain 
to create a geographic concentration of manufactur-
ers in the solar component manufacturing supply 
chain; 
(2) has the potential to materially reduce the 
reliance of United States manufacturers on solar 
components, including photovoltaic cells and photo-
961 
voltaic wafers, made in the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(3) will provide the potential for both direct and 
indirect domestic job creation, including jobs for 
low-income communities, dislocated workers, and 
workers from groups that are underrepresented in 
the manufacturing industry; and 
(4) will result in economic development or eco-
nomic diversification in economically distressed re-
gions or localities, including any region or locality— 
(A) with a high proportion of residential 
and commercial properties that are vacant due 
to foreclosure, eviction, abandonment, or other 
causes; 
(B) with racial disparities in homeowner-
ship rates; 
(C) with population loss; 
(D) where economic inequities have grown 
substantially due to job dislocation and out-
sourcing; and 
(E) in the case of a census tract located 
within a metropolitan area, where the median 
family income for such census tract does not ex-
ceed 80 percent of the greater of statewide me-
962 
dian family income or the metropolitan area 
median family income. 
(d) ADVANCED
SOLAR
TECHNOLOGY.—The Sec-
retary may issue a written finding on whether any ad-
vanced solar technology has significant potential to reduce 
the reliance of United States manufacturers on traditional 
solar components made in the People’s Republic of China. 
(e) PROHIBITION.—In carrying out the program, the 
Secretary may not award grants or direct loans for 
projects that will source solar components from, or supply 
their solar components to, any facility that— 
(1) uses forced labor; or 
(2) is located in— 
(A) an area controlled by the Taliban or 
any entity designated by the Secretary of State 
as a foreign terrorist organization; or 
(B) a foreign country of concern, as de-
fined in section 10306 of this Act. 
(f) APPLICATION.—To be eligible to receive a grant 
or direct loan under the program, an eligible entity shall 
submit to the Secretary an application at such time, in 
such manner, and containing such information as the Sec-
retary may require. 
(g) DIRECT LOAN CONDITIONS.—A direct loan made 
under the program shall—
963 
(1) bear interest at a rate that does not exceed 
a level that the Secretary determines appropriate; 
and 
(2) be subject to such other terms and condi-
tions as the Secretary determines appropriate. 
(h) COST SHARING FOR GRANTS.—Section 988(c) of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C. 16352(c)) shall 
apply to a grant made under this section. 
(i) PREVAILING WAGES.—Any laborer or mechanic 
employed by any contractor or subcontractor in the per-
formance of work funded directly, or assisted in whole or 
in part, by the Federal Government pursuant to this sec-
tion shall be paid wages at rates not less than those pre-
vailing on work of a similar character in the locality, as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor under subchapter 
IV of chapter 31 of title 40, United States Code (com-
monly referred to as the Davis-Bacon Act). With respect 
to the labor standards in this subsection, the Secretary 
of Labor shall have the authority and functions set forth 
in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (64 Stat. 
1267; 5 U.S.C. App.) and section 3145 of title 40, United 
States Code. 
(j) LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any con-
trary provision of law, including the National Labor
964 
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), paragraphs 
(2) through (7) shall apply with respect to any fund-
ing recipient who is an employer and any labor orga-
nization who represents or seeks to represent em-
ployees of a funding recipient, as those terms are de-
fined in section 2 of the National Labor Relations 
Act (29 U.S.C. 152). 
(2) LABOR
PEACE.—Any employer receiving 
funds under this section shall recognize for purposes 
of collective bargaining a labor organization that 
demonstrates that a majority of the employees in a 
unit appropriate for bargaining who perform or will 
perform funded work have signed valid authoriza-
tions designating the labor organization as their bar-
gaining representative and that no other labor orga-
nization is currently certified or recognized as the 
exclusive representative of any of the employees in 
the unit pursuant to the National Labor Relations 
Act (29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.). Upon such showing of 
majority status, the employer shall notify the labor 
organization and the National Labor Relations 
Board (the Board) that it has determined that the 
labor organization represents a majority of the em-
ployees and that it is recognizing the labor organiza-
tion as the exclusive representative of the employees
965 
for the purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to 
section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 
U.S.C. 159). 
(3) CERTIFICATION.—Should a dispute over 
majority status or the appropriateness of the unit 
arise between the employer and the labor organiza-
tion, either party may request that the Board inves-
tigate and resolve the dispute. If the Board finds 
that a majority of the employees in a unit appro-
priate for bargaining has signed valid authorizations 
designating the labor organization as their bar-
gaining representative and that no other individual 
or labor organization is currently certified or recog-
nized as the exclusive representative of any of the 
employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct an 
election but shall certify the labor organization as 
the representative described in section 9(a) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 159(a)). 
(4) COMMENCEMENT
OF
BARGAINING.—Not 
later than 10 days after receiving a written request 
for collective bargaining from a recognized or cer-
tified labor organization, or within such period as 
the parties agree upon, the labor organization and 
employer shall meet and commence to bargain collec-
966 
tively and shall make every reasonable effort to con-
clude and sign a collective bargaining agreement. 
(5) MEDIATION.—If after the expiration of the 
90-day period beginning on the date on which bar-
gaining is commenced, or such additional period as 
the parties may agree upon, the parties have failed 
to reach an agreement, either party may notify the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of the 
existence of a dispute and request mediation. When-
ever such a request is received, it shall be the duty 
of the Service promptly to put itself in communica-
tion with the parties and to use its best efforts, by 
mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agree-
ment. 
(6) ARBITRATION.—If after the expiration of 
the 30-day period beginning on the date on which 
the request for mediation is made under paragraph 
(5), or such additional period as the parties may 
agree upon, the Service is not able to bring the par-
ties to agreement by conciliation, the Service shall 
refer the dispute to a tripartite arbitration panel es-
tablished in accordance with such regulations as may 
be prescribed by the Service, with one member se-
lected by the labor organization, one member se-
lected by the employer, and one neutral member mu-
967 
tually agreed to by the parties. The labor organiza-
tion and employer must each select the members of 
the tripartite arbitration panel within 14 days of the 
Service’s referral; if the labor organization or em-
ployer fail to do so, the Service shall designate any 
members not selected by the labor organization or 
the employer. A majority of the tripartite arbitration 
panel shall render a decision settling the dispute as 
soon as practicable and not later than within 120 
days, absent extraordinary circumstances or by 
agreement or permission of the parties, and such de-
cision shall be binding upon the parties for a period 
of 2 years, unless amended during such period by 
written consent of the parties. Such decision shall be 
based on— 
(A) the employer’s financial status and 
prospects; 
(B) the size and type of the employer’s op-
erations and business; 
(C) the employees’ cost of living; 
(D) the employees’ ability to sustain them-
selves, their families, and their dependents on 
the wages and benefits they earn from the em-
ployer; and
968 
(E) the wages and benefits other employers 
in the same business provide their employees. 
(7) SUBCONTRACTORS.—Any employer receiv-
ing funds under this section shall require any sub-
contractor whose employees perform or will perform 
funded work to comply with the requirements set 
forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) above. 
(k) COSTS OF DIRECT LOANS.—The Secretary may 
use any amounts made available under this section to pay 
the costs of providing direct loans under the program. 
(l) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 
$600,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026. 
(m) SET ASIDE.—Not less than $20,000,000 of the 
amount made available to carry out this section each fiscal 
year shall be used to award grants or direct loans under 
the program to eligible entities that are small businesses 
located in economically disadvantaged communities. 
(n) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ADVANCED
SOLAR
TECHNOLOGY.—The 
term ‘‘advanced solar technology’’ means any new or 
emerging technology, system, or mechanism that 
uses solar radiation to generate electrical energy, 
and any component thereof.
969 
(2) DIRECT CURRENT OPTIMIZER.—The term 
‘‘direct current optimizer’’ means a product which 
converts direct current electricity from one or more 
solar modules or advanced solar technologies to a 
different direct current voltage that is matched to 
the input requirements of an inverter. 
(3) DIRECT
LOAN.—The term ‘‘direct loan’’ 
means a disbursement of funds by the Government 
to a non-Federal borrower under a contract that re-
quires the repayment of such funds with or without 
interest. The term includes the purchase of, or par-
ticipation in, a loan made by another lender and fi-
nancing arrangements that defer payment for more 
than 90 days, including the sale of a Government 
asset on credit terms. 
(4) ELIGIBLE ENTITY.—The term ‘‘eligible enti-
ty’’ means a private entity, including a manufac-
turer, or a partnership of private entities. 
(5) FORCED LABOR.—The term ‘‘forced labor’’ 
has the meaning given such term in section 307 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307). 
(6) INTEGRATED
MODULE.—The term ‘‘inte-
grated module’’ means a solar module produced by 
a single manufacturer through the conversion of a
970 
photovoltaic wafer or other semiconductor material 
into an end product which is— 
(A) suitable to generate electricity when 
exposed to sunlight; and 
(B) ready for installation without addi-
tional manufacturing processes. 
(7) INVERTER.—The term ‘‘inverter’’ means a 
product which converts direct current electricity 
from one or more solar modules or advanced solar 
technologies into alternating current electricity. 
(8) LABOR ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘labor 
organization’’ has the meaning given the term in 
section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 
U.S.C. 152). 
(9) PARTIES.—The term ‘‘parties’’ means a 
labor organization that is newly recognized or cer-
tified as a representative under section 9(a) of the 
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 159(a)) 
and the employer of the employees represented by 
such organization. 
(10) PHOTOVOLTAIC CELL.—The term ‘‘photo-
voltaic cell’’ means the smallest semiconductor ele-
ment of a solar module which performs the imme-
diate conversion of light into electricity.
971 
(11) PHOTOVOLTAIC WAFER.—The term ‘‘pho-
tovoltaic wafer’’ means a thin slice, sheet, or layer 
of semiconductor material of at least 240 square 
centimeters produced by a single manufacturer— 
(A) either— 
(i) directly from molten or evaporated 
solar grade polysilicon or deposition of 
solar grade thin film semiconductor photon 
absorber layer; or 
(ii) through formation of an ingot 
from molten polysilicon and subsequent 
slicing; and 
(B) which comprises the substrate or ab-
sorber layer of one or more photovoltaic cells. 
(12) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘program’’ means 
the program established under subsection (b). 
(13) RACKING.—The term ‘‘racking’’ means a 
structural steel or aluminum support element, of any 
cross-section shape and which may be assembled 
from individually manufactured segments, spanning 
longitudinally, on which solar modules are sup-
ported. 
(14) 
SECRETARY.—The 
term 
‘‘Secretary’’ 
means the Secretary of Energy.
972 
(15) SOLAR
COMPONENT.—The term ‘‘solar 
component’’ includes an integrated module, a photo-
voltaic cell, a photovoltaic wafer, solar grade 
polysilicon, a solar module, an inverter, racking, a 
tracker, a direct current optimizer, and any ad-
vanced solar technology for which the Secretary has 
issued a written finding under subsection (d) that 
such advanced solar technology has significant po-
tential to reduce the reliance of United States manu-
facturers on traditional solar components made in 
the People’s Republic of China. 
(16) SOLAR
GRADE
POLYSILICON.—The term 
‘‘solar grade polysilicon’’ means silicon which is— 
(A) suitable for use in photovoltaic manu-
facturing; and 
(B) purified to a minimum purity of 
99.999999 percent silicon by mass. 
(17) SOLAR MODULE.—The term ‘‘solar mod-
ule’’ means the connection and lamination of photo-
voltaic cells into an environmentally protected final 
assembly which is— 
(A) suitable to generate electricity when 
exposed to sunlight; and 
(B) ready for installation without an addi-
tional manufacturing process.
973 
(18) TRACKER.—The term ‘‘tracker’’ means— 
(A) a structural steel support on which 
solar modules are supported; and 
(B) the mechanism by which that support 
is oriented to varying angles with respect to the 
sun’s position. 
(19) TRADITIONAL
SOLAR
COMPONENT.—The 
term ‘‘traditional solar component’’ means an inte-
grated module, a photovoltaic cell, a photovoltaic 
wafer, solar grade polysilicon, and a solar module. 
SEC. 20303. SUPPORT FOR THE FIRST THREE COMMERCIAL- 
SCALE 
IMPLEMENTATIONS 
OF 
TRANS-
FORMATIVE INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of ap-
propriations, the Secretary shall establish and carry out 
a program under which the Secretary provides grants and 
loan guarantees to eligible entities to carry out eligible 
projects. 
(b) APPLICATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—To apply for a grant or loan 
guarantee under the program, an eligible entity shall 
submit to the Secretary an application at such time, 
in such manner, and containing such information as 
the Secretary may require.
974 
(2) SELECTION.—In evaluating applications 
submitted under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall 
select applications that will result in the greatest— 
(A) improvement to the competitiveness of 
United States industry in global markets; 
(B) reduction in energy use; or 
(C) reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—In evaluating applications 
submitted under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall 
solicit input from outside technical and industry ex-
perts on the specific industry sectors in which eligi-
ble technologies would be implemented. 
(c) GRANTS AND LOAN GUARANTEES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the program, 
the Secretary may not provide grants or loan guar-
antees to carry out more than three eligible projects 
for any category of eligible technology. 
(2) GRANT
AMOUNTS.—The amounts of the 
grants that may be provided to carry out eligible 
projects for each category of eligible technology shall 
be not more than the following: 
(A) 60 percent of the total eligible project 
costs for the first eligible project for the cat-
egory of eligible technology.
975 
(B) 45 percent of the total eligible project 
costs for the second eligible project for the cat-
egory of eligible technology. 
(C) 30 percent of the total eligible project 
costs for the third eligible project for the cat-
egory of eligible technology. 
(3) LOAN GUARANTEE AMOUNTS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—In carrying out the 
program, the Secretary may not provide a loan 
guarantee for an amount that is greater than 
80 percent of the applicable eligible project 
costs. 
(B) GRANT
AND
LOAN
GUARANTEE.—In 
any case in which an eligible entity is provided 
a grant and a loan guarantee under the pro-
gram, such loan guarantee may not exceed the 
amount that is equal to 80 percent of the 
amount that is equal to the difference be-
tween— 
(i) the eligible project cost; and 
(ii) the amount of the grant. 
(4) PROJECT
MILESTONES.—The Secretary 
shall work with the grant or loan guarantee recipient 
to develop project milestones and shall issue pay-
976 
ments after the recipient demonstrates that the eligi-
ble project has reached such milestones. 
(d) MONITORING AND REPORTING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall annually 
submit to Congress a report on how grants and loan 
guarantees provided under the program were used. 
(2) PROPRIETARY AND COMPETITIVE INFORMA-
TION.—Each report submitted under paragraph (1) 
shall exclude any proprietary or competitive informa-
tion relating to eligible entities that were provided a 
grant or loan guarantee, or eligible technologies that 
were implemented, under the program. 
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 
$500,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and $1,000,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2023 through 2031, to remain avail-
able until expended. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ELIGIBLE ENTITY.—The term ‘‘eligible enti-
ty’’ means any of the following entities, including a 
consortium or partnership of such entities: 
(A) An owner of an industrial plant at 
which an eligible technology would be imple-
mented. 
(B) A provider that—
978 
(C) is able to significantly reduce the en-
ergy use or greenhouse gas emissions of the 
process with respect to which the eligible tech-
nology is implemented, relative to the tech-
nology available on the date of enactment of 
this Act; and 
(D) has the potential to significantly re-
duce annual United States industrial energy use 
or greenhouse gas emissions, relative to the 
United States industrial energy use or green-
house gas emissions in calendar year 2021, if 
the eligible technology is widely implemented at 
appropriate existing and new industrial plants 
in the United States. 
(5) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘program’’ means 
the program established under subsection (a). 
(6) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of Energy. 
SEC. 20304. IMPROVING THE NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM. 
(a) PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Energy shall estab-
lish a grant program to provide financial assistance to 
States to offset the incremental rate increases paid by low- 
income households resulting from the implementation of 
infrastructure replacement, repair, and maintenance pro-
979 
grams that are approved by the rate-setting entity and de-
signed to accelerate the necessary replacement, repair, or 
maintenance of natural gas distribution systems. 
(b) DATE OF ELIGIBILITY.—Awards may be provided 
under this section to offset rate increases described in sub-
section (a) occurring on or after the date of enactment 
of this Act. 
(c) PRIORITIZATION.—The Secretary shall collabo-
rate with States to prioritize the distribution of grants 
made under this section. At a minimum, the Secretary 
shall consider prioritizing the distribution of grants to 
States which have— 
(1) authorized or adopted enhanced infrastruc-
ture replacement programs or innovative rate recov-
ery mechanisms, such as infrastructure cost trackers 
and riders, infrastructure base rate surcharges, de-
ferred regulatory asset programs, and earnings sta-
bility mechanisms; and 
(2) a viable means for delivering financial as-
sistance to low-income households. 
(d) AUDITING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 
The Secretary shall establish auditing and reporting re-
quirements for States with respect to the performance of 
eligible projects funded pursuant to grants awarded under 
this section.
980 
(e) PREVAILING WAGES.—All laborers and mechanics 
employed by contractors or subcontractors in the perform-
ance of construction, alteration, or repair work assisted, 
in whole or in part, by a grant under this section shall 
be paid wages at rates not less than those prevailing on 
similar construction in the locality as determined by the 
Secretary of Labor in accordance with subchapter IV of 
chapter 31 of title 40. With respect to the labor standards 
in this subsection, the Secretary of Labor shall have the 
authority and functions set forth in Reorganization Plan 
Numbered 14 of 1950 (64 Stat. 1267; 5 U.S.C. App.) and 
section 3145 of title 40. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) INNOVATIVE
RATE
RECOVERY
MECHA-
NISMS.—The term ‘‘innovative rate recovery mecha-
nisms’’ means rate structures that allow State public 
utility commissions to modify tariffs and recover 
costs of investments in utility replacement incurred 
between rate cases. 
(2) 
LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLD.—The 
term 
‘‘low-income household’’ means a household that is 
eligible to receive payments under section 2605(b)(2) 
of the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 
1981 (42 U.S.C. 8624(b)(2)).
981 
(g) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry 
out this section $250,000,000 in each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2031. 
SEC. 20305. CONSIDERATION OF ENERGY STORAGE SYS-
TEMS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 111(d) of the Public Util-
ity Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2621(d)) 
is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(22) CONSIDERATION
OF
ENERGY
STORAGE 
SYSTEMS.—Each State shall consider requiring that, 
as part of a supply side resource planning process, 
an electric utility of the State demonstrate to the 
State that the electric utility considered an invest-
ment in energy storage systems based on appro-
priate factors, including— 
‘‘(A) total costs and normalized life cycle 
costs; 
‘‘(B) cost effectiveness; 
‘‘(C) improved reliability; 
‘‘(D) security; and 
‘‘(E) system performance and efficiency.’’. 
(b) TIME LIMITATIONS.—Section 112(b) of the Pub-
lic Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 
2622(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
982 
‘‘(9)(A) Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of this paragraph, each State regulatory 
authority (with respect to each electric utility for 
which the State regulatory authority has ratemaking 
authority) and each nonregulated electric utility 
shall commence the consideration referred to in sec-
tion 111, or set a hearing date for consideration, 
with respect to the standard established by para-
graph (22) of section 111(d). 
‘‘(B) Not later than 2 years after the date of 
enactment of this paragraph, each State regulatory 
authority (with respect to each electric utility for 
which the State regulatory authority has ratemaking 
authority), and each nonregulated electric utility, 
shall complete the consideration, and shall make the 
determination, referred to in section 111 with re-
spect to the standard established by paragraph (22) 
of section 111(d).’’. 
(c) FAILURE TO COMPLY.—Section 112(c) of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 
2622(c)) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘subsection (b)(2)’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘subsection (b)’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: ‘‘In the 
case of the standard established by paragraph (22)
983 
of section 111(d), the reference contained in this 
subsection to the date of enactment of this Act shall 
be deemed to be a reference to the date of enact-
ment of that paragraph.’’. 
(d) PRIOR STATE ACTIONS.—Section 112 of the Pub-
lic Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 
2622) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(i) PRIOR STATE ACTIONS.—Subsections (b) and 
(c) of this section shall not apply to the standard estab-
lished by paragraph (22) of section 111(d) in the case of 
any electric utility in a State if, before the enactment of 
this subsection— 
‘‘(1) the State has implemented for such utility 
the standard concerned (or a comparable standard); 
‘‘(2) the State regulatory authority for such 
State or relevant nonregulated electric utility has 
conducted a proceeding to consider implementation 
of the standard concerned (or a comparable stand-
ard) for such utility; or 
‘‘(3) the State legislature has voted on the im-
plementation of such standard (or a comparable 
standard) for such utility.’’. 
(e) PRIOR
AND PENDING PROCEEDINGS.—Section 
124 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(16 U.S.C. 2634) is amended by adding at the end the
984 
following: ‘‘In the case of the standard established by 
paragraph (22) of section 111(d), the reference contained 
in this section to the date of the enactment of this Act 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the date of enactment 
of such paragraph (22).’’. 
SEC. 20306. COORDINATION OF PROGRAMS. 
To the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary of 
Energy shall ensure that the funding and administration 
of the different offices within the Grid Modernization Ini-
tiative of the Department of Energy and other programs 
conducting energy storage research are coordinated and 
streamlined. 
SEC. 20307. STATE FLEX-TECH ENERGY PROGRAM. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Part D of title III of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6321 et seq.) is 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘SEC. 367. FLEX-TECH ENERGY PROGRAM TO ENHANCE 
MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS. 
‘‘(a) FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.—Upon request from 
the State energy agency of a State that has in effect an 
approved State energy conservation plan under this part, 
or an Indian Tribe, the Secretary shall provide financial 
assistance to such State energy agency or Indian Tribe 
to be used for the development, implementation, improve-
ment, or expansion of a flex-tech energy program de-
985 
scribed in subsection (b) to enhance manufacturing com-
petitiveness. 
‘‘(b) FLEX-TECH ENERGY PROGRAM ELEMENTS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A flex-tech energy program 
may include— 
‘‘(A) provision of technical and administra-
tive assistance to manufacturers through quali-
fied engineering firms, as determined by the 
State energy agency or Indian Tribe; 
‘‘(B) provision of financial assistance to 
manufacturers— 
‘‘(i) for energy studies of manufac-
turing facilities that are conducted by 
qualified engineering firms; and 
‘‘(ii) to support the implementation of 
the measures and recommendations identi-
fied in energy studies conducted pursuant 
to clause (i), including the design, acquisi-
tion, installation, testing, operation, main-
tenance, and repair of energy- and water- 
using systems, resiliency-related measures, 
emissions reduction-related measures, util-
ity cost savings measures, and measures 
related to advanced manufacturing tech-
nologies and artificial intelligence; and
986 
‘‘(C) reporting on monitoring, tracking, 
and success metrics of the program. 
‘‘(2) STUDIES.—An energy study of a manufac-
turing facility conducted pursuant to paragraph 
(1)(B) may include— 
‘‘(A) an evaluation of the energy-using sys-
tems of the facility, including evaluation of the 
performance of such systems relative to design 
intent, operational needs of the facility and its 
occupants, and operation and maintenance pro-
cedures; 
‘‘(B) an evaluation of emissions related to 
the facility, including greenhouse gas emissions, 
and recommendations on sustainability planning 
and practices; 
‘‘(C) an evaluation of potential energy effi-
ciency, water efficiency, greenhouse gas emis-
sions mitigation, and load reduction measures 
for the facility; 
‘‘(D) an evaluation of potential on-site en-
ergy measures, including grid-interactive effi-
ciency systems, combined heat and power, effi-
cient compressed air systems, energy storage, 
energy management systems, renewable thermal
987 
systems, and electrification or other forms of 
fuel switching; 
‘‘(E) recommendations on the use of new 
technologies by the applicable manufacturer; 
and 
‘‘(F) detailed estimates of potential imple-
mentation costs, operating cost savings, energy 
savings, emissions reductions, and simple pay-
back periods, for measures and recommenda-
tions identified in such study. 
‘‘(3) 
QUALIFIED
ENGINEERING
FIRMS.—A 
State energy agency or Indian Tribe administering 
a flex-tech energy program shall maintain and regu-
larly update a publicly available list of qualified engi-
neering firms that are approved by the State energy 
agency or Indian Tribe to provide assistance to man-
ufacturers pursuant to this section. 
‘‘(c) FUNDING.— 
‘‘(1) ALLOCATION.—Except as provided in 
paragraph (2), to the extent practicable, the Sec-
retary shall allocate funding made available to carry 
out this section in accordance with the formula used 
for distribution of Federal financial assistance pro-
vided pursuant to this part to States that have in ef-
988 
fect an approved State energy conservation plan 
under this part. 
‘‘(2) INDIAN TRIBES.—The Secretary shall set 
aside and distribute not less than 5 percent of 
amounts made available for each fiscal year to carry 
out this section to provide financial assistance— 
‘‘(A) to Indian Tribes; or 
‘‘(B) directly to manufacturers located in 
Indian Country or, in the case of Alaska, an 
Alaska Native Village Statistical Area, as iden-
tified by the U.S. Census Bureau, for energy 
studies and implementation of the measures 
and recommendations identified in such energy 
studies, as described in subsection (b)(1)(B). 
‘‘(3) USE OF FUNDS.— 
‘‘(A) ENERGY
STUDIES; ADMINISTRATIVE 
EXPENSES.—A State energy agency or Indian 
Tribe that receives financial assistance pursu-
ant to this section for a fiscal year may not— 
‘‘(i) use more than 50 percent of such 
financial assistance for energy studies; 
‘‘(ii) use more than 50 percent of such 
financial assistance to support the imple-
mentation of recommendations from such 
energy studies; and
989 
‘‘(iii) use more than 10 percent of 
such financial assistance for administrative 
expenses, including for outreach and tech-
nical assistance. 
‘‘(B) INDIVIDUAL MANUFACTURING FACIL-
ITY.—A State energy agency that receives fi-
nancial assistance pursuant to this section for 
a fiscal year may not use more than 5 percent 
of such financial assistance with respect to an 
individual manufacturing facility. 
‘‘(4) SUPPLEMENT.—Financial assistance pro-
vided to a State energy agency or Indian Tribe pur-
suant to this section shall be used to supplement, 
not supplant, any Federal, State, or other funds oth-
erwise made available to such State under this part. 
‘‘(5) FINANCING.—To the extent practicable, a 
State energy agency or Indian Tribe shall implement 
a flex-tech energy program described in subsection 
(b) using funding provided under this Act, public fi-
nancing, private financing, or any other sources of 
funds. 
‘‘(d) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Upon request of a State 
energy agency or Indian Tribe, the Secretary shall 
provide information and technical assistance in the
990 
development, implementation, improvement, or ex-
pansion of a flex-tech energy program described in 
subsection (b). 
‘‘(2) INCLUSIONS.—Technical assistance pro-
vided pursuant to paragraph (1) may include pro-
gram design options to, with respect to manufactur-
ers that employ fewer than 500 full-time equivalent 
employees at a manufacturing facility— 
‘‘(A) meet the needs of such manufactur-
ers; and 
‘‘(B) encourage the use of advanced manu-
facturing processes by such manufacturers, in-
cluding use of additive manufacturing, ad-
vanced sensors and controls, techniques to re-
duce embedded emissions, and advanced com-
posite materials. 
‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) INDIAN
COUNTRY.—The term ‘Indian 
Country’ means— 
‘‘(A) all land within the limits of any In-
dian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of- 
way running through the reservation;
991 
‘‘(B) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired ter-
ritory thereof, and whether within or without 
the limits of a State; and 
‘‘(C) all Indian allotments, the Indian ti-
tles to which have not been extinguished, in-
cluding rights-of-way running through the 
same. 
‘‘(2) INDIAN TRIBE.—The term ‘Indian Tribe’ 
has the meaning given the term in section 4 of the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act (25 U.S.C. 5304). 
‘‘(3) STATE ENERGY AGENCY.—The term ‘State 
energy agency’ has the meaning given such term in 
section 391(10).’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of con-
tents for the Energy Policy and Conservation Act is 
amended by adding after the item related to section 366 
the following: 
‘‘Sec. 367. Flex-tech energy program to enhance manufacturing competitive-
ness.’’. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 
365(f) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 
U.S.C. 6325(f)) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing:
992 
‘‘(3) FLEX-TECH
ENERGY
PROGRAM
TO
EN-
HANCE
MANUFACTURING
COMPETITIVENESS.—In 
addition to the authorization of appropriations under 
paragraph (1), for the purposes of carrying out sec-
tion 367, there is authorized to be appropriated 
$100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
2026.’’. 
TITLE IV—MEDICAL PRODUCT 
SUPPLY CHAIN IMPROVEMENTS 
Subtitle A—Medical Product Inno-
vation, Transparency, and Safe-
ty 
SEC. 20401. NATIONAL CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE IN AD-
VANCED 
AND 
CONTINUOUS 
PHARMA-
CEUTICAL MANUFACTURING. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3016 of the 21st Century 
Cures Act (21 U.S.C. 399h) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘SEC. 3016. NATIONAL CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE IN AD-
VANCED 
AND 
CONTINUOUS 
PHARMA-
CEUTICAL MANUFACTURING. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, acting through the Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs— 
‘‘(1) shall solicit and, beginning not later than 
one year after the date of enactment of the America
993 
COMPETES Act of 2022, receive requests from in-
stitutions of higher education, or consortia of insti-
tutions of higher education, to be designated as a 
National Center of Excellence in Advanced and Con-
tinuous Pharmaceutical Manufacturing (in this sec-
tion referred to as a ‘National Center of Excellence’) 
to support the advancement, development, and im-
plementation of advanced and continuous pharma-
ceutical manufacturing; and 
‘‘(2) shall so designate not more than 5 institu-
tions of higher education or consortia of such insti-
tutions that— 
‘‘(A) request such designation; and 
‘‘(B) meet the criteria specified in sub-
section (c). 
‘‘(b) REQUEST FOR DESIGNATION.—A request for 
designation under subsection (a) shall be made to the Sec-
retary at such time, in such manner, and containing such 
information as the Secretary may require. Any such re-
quest shall include a description of how the institution of 
higher education, or consortium of institutions of higher 
education, meets or plans to meet each of the criteria spec-
ified in subsection (c). 
‘‘(c) CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION DESCRIBED.—The 
criteria specified in this subsection with respect to an in-
994 
stitution of higher education, or consortium of institutions 
of higher education, are that the institution or consortium 
has, as of the date of the submission of a request under 
subsection (a) by such institution or consortium— 
‘‘(1) physical and technical capacity for re-
search, development, implementation, and dem-
onstration of advanced and continuous pharma-
ceutical manufacturing; 
‘‘(2) manufacturing knowledge-sharing net-
works with other institutions of higher education, 
large and small pharmaceutical manufacturers, ge-
neric and nonprescription manufacturers, contract 
manufacturers, and other relevant entities; 
‘‘(3) proven capacity to design, develop, imple-
ment, and demonstrate new, highly effective tech-
nologies for use in advanced and continuous phar-
maceutical manufacturing; 
‘‘(4) a track record for creating, preserving, 
and transferring knowledge with respect to advanced 
and continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing; 
‘‘(5) the proven ability to facilitate training of 
an adequate future workforce for research on, and 
implementation of, advanced and continuous phar-
maceutical manufacturing; and
995 
‘‘(6) experience in participating in and leading 
advanced and continuous pharmaceutical manufac-
turing technology partnerships with other institu-
tions of higher education, large and small pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, generic and nonprescription 
manufacturers, contract manufacturers, and other 
relevant entities— 
‘‘(A) to support companies seeking to im-
plement advanced and continuous pharma-
ceutical manufacturing in the United States; 
‘‘(B) to support Federal agencies with 
technical assistance and employee training, 
which may include regulatory and quality met-
ric guidance as applicable, and hands-on train-
ing, for advanced and continuous pharma-
ceutical manufacturing; 
‘‘(C) with respect to advanced and contin-
uous pharmaceutical manufacturing, to orga-
nize and conduct research and development ac-
tivities needed to create new and more effective 
technology, develop and share knowledge, create 
intellectual property, and maintain technological 
leadership;
996 
‘‘(D) to develop best practices for design-
ing and implementing advanced and continuous 
pharmaceutical manufacturing processes; and 
‘‘(E) to assess and respond to the national 
workforce needs for advanced and continuous 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, including the 
development and implementing of training pro-
grams. 
‘‘(d) TERMINATION
OF DESIGNATION.—The Sec-
retary may terminate the designation of any National Cen-
ter of Excellence designated under this section if the Sec-
retary determines such National Center of Excellence no 
longer meets the criteria specified in subsection (c). Not 
later than 90 days before the effective date of such a ter-
mination, the Secretary shall provide written notice to the 
National Center of Excellence, including the rationale for 
such termination. 
‘‘(e) CONDITIONS FOR DESIGNATION.—As a condi-
tion of designation as a National Center of Excellence 
under this section, the Secretary shall require that an in-
stitution of higher education or consortium of institutions 
of higher education enter into an agreement with the Sec-
retary under which the institution or consortium agrees—
997 
‘‘(1) to collaborate directly with the Food and 
Drug Administration to publish the reports required 
by subsection (g); 
‘‘(2) to share data with the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration regarding best practices and research 
generated through the funding under subsection (f); 
‘‘(3) to develop, along with industry partners 
(which may include large and small biopharma-
ceutical manufacturers, generic and nonprescription 
manufacturers, and contract research organizations 
or contract manufacturers that carry out drug devel-
opment and manufacturing activities) and another 
institution or consortium designated under this sec-
tion, if any, a roadmap for developing an advanced 
and continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing work-
force; 
‘‘(4) to develop, along with industry partners 
and other institutions or consortia of such institu-
tions designated under this section, a roadmap for 
strengthening existing, and developing new, relation-
ships with other institutions of higher education or 
consortia thereof; and 
‘‘(5) to provide an annual report to the Food 
and Drug Administration regarding the institution’s 
or consortium’s activities under this section, includ-
998 
ing a description of how the institution or consor-
tium continues to meet and make progress on the 
criteria specified in subsection (c). 
‘‘(f) FUNDING.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall award 
funding, through grants, contracts, or cooperative 
agreements, to the National Centers of Excellence 
designated under this section for the purpose of 
studying and recommending improvements to ad-
vanced and continuous pharmaceutical manufac-
turing, including such improvements as may enable 
the Centers— 
‘‘(A) to continue to meet the conditions 
specified in subsection (e); 
‘‘(B) to expand capacity for research on, 
and development of, advanced and continuous 
pharmaceutical manufacturing; and 
‘‘(C) to implement research infrastructure 
in advanced and continuous pharmaceutical 
manufacturing suitable for accelerating the de-
velopment of drug products needed to respond 
to emerging medical threats, such as emerging 
drug shortages, quality issues disrupting the 
supply chain, epidemics and pandemics, and 
other such situations requiring the rapid devel-
999 
opment of new products or new manufacturing 
processes. 
‘‘(2) CONSISTENCY WITH FDA MISSION.—As a 
condition on receipt of funding under this sub-
section, a National Center of Excellence shall agree 
to consider any input from the Secretary regarding 
the use of funding that would— 
‘‘(A) help to further the advancement of 
advanced and continuous pharmaceutical manu-
facturing through the National Center of Excel-
lence; and 
‘‘(B) be relevant to the mission of the 
Food and Drug Administration. 
‘‘(3) RULE
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in 
this section shall be construed as precluding a Na-
tional Center for Excellence designated under this 
section from receiving funds under any other provi-
sion of this Act or any other Federal law. 
‘‘(g) ANNUAL REVIEW AND REPORTS.— 
‘‘(1) ANNUAL
REPORT.—Beginning not later 
than one year after the date on which the first des-
ignation is made under subsection (a), and annually 
thereafter, the Secretary shall— 
‘‘(A) submit to Congress a report describ-
ing the activities, partnerships and collabora-
1000 
tions, Federal policy recommendations, previous 
and continuing funding, and findings of, and 
any other applicable information from, the Na-
tional Centers of Excellence designated under 
this section; 
‘‘(B) include in such report an accounting 
of the Federal administrative expenses de-
scribed in subsection (i)(2) over the reporting 
period; and 
‘‘(C) make such report available to the 
public in an easily accessible electronic format 
on the website of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. 
‘‘(2) REVIEW OF NATIONAL CENTERS OF EX-
CELLENCE AND POTENTIAL DESIGNEES.—The Sec-
retary shall periodically review the National Centers 
of Excellence designated under this section to ensure 
that such National Centers of Excellence continue to 
meet the criteria for designation under this section. 
‘‘(3) REPORT ON LONG-TERM VISION OF FDA 
ROLE.—Not later than 2 years after the date on 
which the first designation is made under subsection 
(a), the Secretary, in consultation with the National 
Centers of Excellence designated under this section, 
shall submit a report to the Congress on the long-
1001 
term vision of the Department of Health and 
Human Services on the role of the Food and Drug 
Administration in supporting advanced and contin-
uous pharmaceutical manufacturing, including— 
‘‘(A) a national framework of principles re-
lated to the implementation and regulation of 
advanced and continuous pharmaceutical manu-
facturing; 
‘‘(B) a plan for the development of Federal 
regulations and guidance for how advanced and 
continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing can 
be incorporated into the development of phar-
maceuticals and regulatory responsibilities of 
the Food and Drug Administration; 
‘‘(C) a plan for development of Federal 
regulations or guidance for how advanced and 
continuous pharmaceutical manufacturing will 
be reviewed by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion; and 
‘‘(D) appropriate feedback solicited from 
the public, which may include other institutions 
of higher education, large and small biopharma-
ceutical 
manufacturers, 
generic 
and 
non-
prescription manufacturers, and contract manu-
facturers.
1002 
‘‘(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) ADVANCED.—The term ‘advanced’, with 
respect to pharmaceutical manufacturing, refers to 
an approach that incorporates novel technology, or 
uses an established technique or technology in a new 
or innovative way, that enhances drug quality or im-
proves the performance of a manufacturing process. 
‘‘(2) CONTINUOUS.—The term ‘continuous’, 
with respect to pharmaceutical manufacturing, re-
fers to a process— 
‘‘(A) where the input materials are con-
tinuously fed into and transformed within the 
process, and the processed output materials are 
continuously removed from the system; and 
‘‘(B) that consists of an integrated process 
that consists of a series of two or more simulta-
neous unit operations. 
‘‘(3) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.— 
The term ‘institution of higher education’ has the 
meaning given such term in section 101(a) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001(a)). 
‘‘(4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘Secretary’ means 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, acting 
through the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. 
‘‘(i) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
1003 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 
appropriated to carry out this section $100,000,000 
for the period of fiscal years 2022 through 2026. 
‘‘(2) FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.— 
Of the amounts made available to carry out this sec-
tion for a fiscal year, the Secretary shall not use 
more than eight percent for Federal administrative 
expenses, including training, technical assistance, re-
porting, and evaluation.’’. 
(b) TRANSITION RULE.—Section 3016 of the 21st 
Century Cures Act (21 U.S.C. 399h), as in effect on the 
day before the date of the enactment of this section, shall 
apply with respect to grants awarded under such section 
before such date of enactment. 
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The item relating to 
section 3016 in the table of contents in section 1(b) of 
the 21st Century Cures Act (Public Law 114–255) is 
amended to read as follows: 
‘‘Sec. 3016. National Centers of Excellence in Advanced and Continuous Phar-
maceutical Manufacturing.’’. 
SEC. 20402. NOTIFICATION, NONDISTRIBUTION, AND RE-
CALL OF DRUGS. 
(a) ORDER TO CEASE DISTRIBUTION AND RECALL.— 
Section 569D of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (21 U.S.C. 360bbb–8d) is amended—
1004 
(1) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘CON-
TROLLED SUBSTANCES’’ and inserting ‘‘DRUGS’’; 
(2) by striking ‘‘controlled substance’’ each 
place such term appears and inserting ‘‘drug’’; 
(3) in subsection (b)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘controlled substances’’ 
and inserting ‘‘drugs’’; and 
(B) by inserting ‘‘of subsection (a)’’ after 
‘‘an order pursuant to paragraph (1) or an 
amended order pursuant to subparagraph (B) 
or (C) of paragraph (3)’’; and 
(4) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘or an official 
senior to such Director’’ and inserting ‘‘or the Direc-
tor of the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Re-
search (or an official senior to either such Direc-
tor)’’. 
(b) IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.—Section 801(a) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 381(a)) 
is amended by striking ‘‘is a controlled substance subject 
to an order under section 569D’’ and inserting ‘‘is a drug 
subject to an order under section 569D’’. 
SEC. 20403. REPORTING REQUIREMENT FOR DRUG MANU-
FACTURERS. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENTS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY.— 
Section 510(i) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
1005 
Act (21 U.S.C. 360(i)) is amended by inserting at the end 
the following: 
‘‘(5) The requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) 
shall apply to establishments within a foreign country en-
gaged in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of any drug, including the ac-
tive pharmaceutical ingredient, that is required to be listed 
pursuant to subsection (j). Such requirements shall apply 
regardless of whether the drug or active pharmaceutical 
ingredient undergoes further manufacture, preparation, 
propagation, compounding, or processing at a separate es-
tablishment or establishments outside the United States 
prior to being imported or offered for import into the 
United States.’’. 
(b) LISTING OF DRUGS.—Section 510(j)(1) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 
360(j)(1)) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 
the end; 
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period 
at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(F) in the case of a drug contained in the ap-
plicable list, a certification that the registrant has—
1006 
‘‘(i) identified every other establishment 
where manufacturing is performed for the drug; 
and 
‘‘(ii) notified each known foreign establish-
ment engaged in the manufacture, preparation, 
propagation, compounding, or processing of the 
drug, including the active pharmaceutical ingre-
dient, of the inclusion of the drug in the list 
and the obligation to register.’’. 
(c) QUARTERLY REPORTING ON AMOUNT OF DRUGS 
MANUFACTURED.—Section 510(j)(3)(A) of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (as added by section 3112 
of the CARES Act (Public Law 116–136)) is amended 
by striking ‘‘annually’’ and inserting ‘‘once during the 
month of March of each year, once during the month of 
June of each year, once during the month of September 
of each year, and once during the month of December of 
each year’’. 
SEC. 20404. ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR FALSE INFORMA-
TION AND RECORDS DESTRUCTION. 
(a) PROHIBITION
OF FALSE INFORMATION
AND 
RECORD DESTRUCTION.—Section 301 of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 331) is amend-
ed by adding at the end the following:
1007 
‘‘(fff) The intentional material falsification, fabrica-
tion, destruction, omission, or removal of the whole or any 
part of records or information that is— 
‘‘(1) required under this Act— 
‘‘(A) to be produced during the develop-
ment or manufacture of a drug; or 
‘‘(B) to be produced or maintained by the 
sponsor of an application for the approval of a 
drug under section 505 or the holder of an ap-
proved application for a drug under section 
505; or 
‘‘(2) subject to inspection under this Act by the 
Secretary.’’. 
(b) PENALTIES.—Section 303(f) of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 333(f)) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraph 
(5), by striking or ‘‘or (9)’’ each place it appears 
and inserting ‘‘(9), or (10)’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(10) Notwithstanding subsection (a), any person 
who violates section 301(fff) shall be subject to— 
‘‘(A) a civil monetary penalty not to exceed— 
‘‘(i) $1,000,000 per violation; and
1008 
‘‘(ii) $10,000,000 for all violations (exclud-
ing those described in subparagraph (B)) adju-
dicated in a single proceeding; and 
‘‘(B) in the case of a violation that continues 
after the Secretary provides written notice to such 
person, if such person does not sufficiently remedy 
the violation, including by producing corrected 
records or information, additional civil penalties not 
to exceed— 
‘‘(i) $1,000,000 for the first 30-day period 
(or any portion thereof) following such notice 
during which such person continues to be in 
violation; 
‘‘(ii) for each such 30-day period there-
after, the amount that is double the amount ac-
tually imposed for the preceding 30-day period, 
not to exceed $2,000,000 for any 30-day period; 
and 
‘‘(iii) $20,000,000 for all violations de-
scribed in this subparagraph adjudicated in a 
single proceeding.’’.
1009 
Subtitle B—Strengthening Amer-
ica’s Strategic National Stock-
pile 
SEC. 20411. REIMBURSABLE TRANSFERS. 
Section 319F–2(a) of the Public Health Service Act 
(42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a)) is amended by amending para-
graph (6) to read as follows: 
‘‘(6) TRANSFERS AND REIMBURSEMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Without regard to 
chapter 5 of title 40, United States Code, the 
Secretary may transfer to any Federal depart-
ment or agency, on a reimbursable basis, any 
drugs, vaccines and other biological products, 
medical devices, and other supplies in the stock-
pile if— 
‘‘(i) the transferred supplies are less 
than one year from expiry; 
‘‘(ii) the stockpile is able to replenish 
the supplies, as appropriate; and 
‘‘(iii) the Secretary decides the trans-
fer is in the best interest of the United 
States Government. 
‘‘(B) USE
OF
REIMBURSEMENT.—Reim-
bursement derived from the transfer of supplies 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) may, to the ex-
1010 
tent and in the amounts made available in ad-
vance in appropriations Acts, be used by the 
Secretary to carry out this section. Funds made 
available pursuant to the preceding sentence are 
in addition to any other funds that may be 
made available for such purpose. 
‘‘(C) 
RULE
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—This 
paragraph shall not be construed to preclude 
transfers of products in the stockpile under 
other authorities. 
‘‘(D) REPORT.—Not later than September 
30, 2023, the Secretary shall submit to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions of 
the Senate a report on each transfer made 
under this paragraph and the amount received 
by the Secretary in exchange for that transfer. 
‘‘(E) SUNSET.—The authority to make 
transfers under this paragraph shall cease to be 
effective on September 30, 2024.’’. 
SEC. 20412. EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE. 
Section 319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 247d–6b) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)(3)—
1011 
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ‘‘; 
and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) in subparagraph (J), by striking the 
period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
and 
(C) by inserting the following new subpara-
graph at the end: 
‘‘(K) ensure contents of the stockpile re-
main in good working order and, as appro-
priate, conduct maintenance services on con-
tents of the stockpile; and’’; and 
(2) in subsection (c)(7)(B), by adding at the 
end the following new clause: 
‘‘(ix) 
EQUIPMENT
MAINTENANCE 
SERVICE.—In carrying out this section, the 
Secretary may enter into contracts for the 
procurement of equipment maintenance 
services.’’. 
SEC. 20413. SUPPLY CHAIN FLEXIBILITY MANUFACTURING 
PILOT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 319F–2(a)(3) of the Pub-
lic Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a)(3)), as 
amended by section 20412, is further amended by adding 
at the end the following new subparagraph:
1012 
‘‘(L) enhance medical supply chain elas-
ticity and establish and maintain domestic re-
serves of critical medical supplies (including 
personal protective equipment, ancillary medical 
supplies, and other applicable supplies required 
for the administration of drugs, vaccines and 
other biological products, and other medical de-
vices (including diagnostic tests)) by— 
‘‘(i) increasing emergency stock of 
critical medical supplies; 
‘‘(ii) geographically diversifying do-
mestic production of such medical supplies, 
as appropriate; 
‘‘(iii) entering into cooperative agree-
ments or partnerships with respect to man-
ufacturing lines, facilities, and equipment 
for the domestic production of such med-
ical supplies, taking into consideration en-
tering into such cooperative agreements or 
partnerships with small and medium man-
ufacturers of such medical supplies; and 
‘‘(iv) managing, either directly or 
through cooperative agreements with man-
ufacturers and distributors, domestic re-
serves established under this subparagraph
1013 
by refreshing and replenishing stock of 
such medical supplies.’’. 
(b) REPORTING; SUNSET.—Section 319F–2(a) of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a)), as 
amended by section 20411, is further amended by adding 
at the end the following: 
‘‘(7) REPORTING.—Not later than September 
30, 2023, the Secretary shall submit to the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor and Pensions of the Senate a report 
on the details of each cooperative agreement or part-
nership entered into under paragraph (3)(L), includ-
ing the amount expended by the Secretary on each 
such cooperative agreement or partnership. 
‘‘(8) SUNSET.—The authority to enter into co-
operative agreements or partnerships pursuant to 
paragraph (3)(L) shall cease to be effective on Sep-
tember 30, 2024.’’. 
(c) FUNDING.—Section 319F–2(f) of the Public 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(f)) is amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(3) SUPPLY CHAIN ELASTICITY.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—For the purpose of 
carrying out subsection (a)(3)(L), there is au-
1014 
thorized to be appropriated $500,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2024, to re-
main available until expended. 
‘‘(B) RELATION
TO
OTHER
AMOUNTS.— 
The amount authorized to be appropriated by 
subparagraph (A) for the purpose of carrying 
out subsection (a)(3)(L) is in addition to any 
other amounts available for such purpose.’’. 
SEC. 20414. GAO STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY AND BENE-
FITS OF A USER FEE AGREEMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General of the 
United States shall conduct a study to investigate the fea-
sibility of establishing user fees to offset certain Federal 
costs attributable to the procurement of single-source ma-
terials for the Strategic National Stockpile under section 
319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
247d–6b) and distributions of such materials from the 
Stockpile. In conducting this study, the Comptroller Gen-
eral shall consider, to the extent information is available— 
(1) whether entities receiving such distributions 
generate profits from those distributions; 
(2) any Federal costs attributable to such dis-
tributions; 
(3) whether such user fees would provide the 
Secretary with funding to potentially offset procure-
1015 
ment costs of such materials for the Strategic Na-
tional Stockpile; and 
(4) any other issues the Comptroller General 
identifies as relevant. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2024, the 
Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to 
the Congress a report on the findings and conclusions of 
the study under subsection (a). 
SEC. 20415. GRANTS FOR STATE STRATEGIC STOCKPILES. 
Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended 
by inserting after section 319F–4 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
247d–6e) the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 319F–5. GRANTS FOR STATE STRATEGIC STOCKPILES. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may establish a 
pilot program consisting of awarding grants to States to 
expand or maintain a strategic stockpile of commercially 
available drugs, devices, personal protective equipment, 
and other products deemed by the State to be essential 
in the event of a public health emergency. 
‘‘(b) ALLOWABLE USE OF FUNDS.— 
‘‘(1) USES.—A State receiving a grant under 
this section may use the grant funds to— 
‘‘(A) acquire commercially available prod-
ucts listed pursuant to paragraph (2) for inclu-
sion in the State’s strategic stockpile;
1016 
‘‘(B) store, maintain, and distribute prod-
ucts in such stockpile; and 
‘‘(C) conduct planning in connection with 
such activities. 
‘‘(2) LIST.—The Secretary shall develop and 
publish a list of the products that are eligible, as de-
scribed in subsection (a), for inclusion in a State’s 
strategic stockpile using funds received under this 
section. 
‘‘(3) CONSULTATION.—In developing the list 
under paragraph (2) and otherwise determining the 
allowable uses of grant funds under this section, the 
Secretary shall consult with States and relevant 
stakeholders, including public health organizations. 
‘‘(c) FUNDING REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary may 
not obligate or expend any funds to award grants or fund 
any previously awarded grants under this section for a fis-
cal year unless the total amount made available to carry 
out section 319F–2 for such fiscal year is equal to or 
greater than the total amount of funds made available to 
carry out section 319F–2 for fiscal year 2022. 
‘‘(d) MATCHING FUNDS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—With respect to the costs of 
expanding and maintaining a strategic stockpile 
through a grant under this section, as a condition on
1017 
receipt of the grant, a State shall make available (di-
rectly) non-Federal contributions in cash toward 
such costs in an amount that is equal to not less 
than the amount of Federal funds provided through 
the grant. 
‘‘(2) WAIVER.—The Secretary may waive the 
requirement of paragraph (1) with respect to a State 
for the first two years of the State receiving a grant 
under this section if the Secretary determines that 
such waiver is needed for the State to establish a 
strategic stockpile described in subsection (a). 
‘‘(e) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary shall 
provide technical assistance to States in establishing, ex-
panding, and maintaining a stockpile described in sub-
section (a). 
‘‘(f) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘drug’ 
has the meaning given to that term in section 201 of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
‘‘(g) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—To 
carry out this section, there is authorized to be appro-
priated $3,500,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2024, to remain available until expended. 
‘‘(h) SUNSET.—The authority vested by this section 
terminates at the end of fiscal year 2024.’’.
1018 
SEC. 20416. ACTION REPORTING. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services or the Assistant Secretary for Prepared-
ness and Response, in consultation with the Administrator 
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall— 
(1) not later than 30 days after the date of en-
actment of this Act, issue a report to the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions of the Senate regarding 
all State, local, Tribal, and territorial requests for 
supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile re-
lated to COVID–19; and 
(2) not less than every 30 days thereafter 
through the end of the emergency period (as such 
term is defined in section 1135(g)(1)(B) of the So-
cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320b–5(g)(1)(B))), 
submit to such committees an updated version of 
such report. 
(b) REPORTING PERIOD.— 
(1) INITIAL REPORT.—The initial report under 
subsection (a) shall address all requests described in 
such subsection made during the period— 
(A) beginning on January 31, 2020; and 
(B) ending on the date that is 30 days be-
fore the date of submission of the report.
1019 
(2) UPDATES.—Each update to the report 
under subsection (a) shall address all requests de-
scribed in such subsection made during the period— 
(A) beginning at the end of the previous 
reporting period under this section; and 
(B) ending on the date that is 30 days be-
fore the date of submission of the updated re-
port. 
(c) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—The report under sub-
section (a) (and updates thereto) shall include— 
(1) the details of each request described in such 
subsection, including— 
(A) the specific medical countermeasures, 
devices, personal protective equipment, and 
other materials requested; and 
(B) the amount of such materials re-
quested; and 
(2) the outcomes of each request described in 
subsection (a), including— 
(A) whether the request was wholly ful-
filled, partially fulfilled, or denied; 
(B) if the request was wholly or partially 
fulfilled, the fulfillment amount; and 
(C) if the request was partially fulfilled or 
denied, a rationale for such outcome.
1020 
SEC. 20417. IMPROVED, TRANSPARENT PROCESSES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 1, 2023, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall develop 
and implement improved, transparent processes for the 
use and distribution of drugs, vaccines and other biological 
products, medical devices, and other supplies (including 
personal protective equipment, ancillary medical supplies, 
and other applicable supplies required for the administra-
tion of drugs, vaccines and other biological products, med-
ical devices, and diagnostic tests) in the Strategic National 
Stockpile under section 319F–2 of the Public Health Serv-
ice Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b) (in this section referred to 
as the ‘‘Stockpile’’). 
(b) PROCESSES.—The processes developed under 
subsection (a) shall include— 
(1) the form and manner in which States, local-
ities, Tribes, and territories are required to submit 
requests for supplies from the Stockpile; 
(2) the criteria used by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services in responding to such requests, 
including the reasons for fulfilling or denying such 
requests; 
(3) what circumstances result in prioritization 
of distribution of supplies from the Stockpile to 
States, localities, Tribes, or territories;
1021 
(4) clear plans for future, urgent communica-
tion between the Secretary and States, localities, 
Tribes, and territories regarding the outcome of 
such requests; and 
(5) any differences in the processes developed 
under subsection (a) for geographically related emer-
gencies, such as weather events, and national emer-
gencies, such as pandemics. 
(c) CLASSIFICATION.—The processes developed under 
subsection (a) shall be unclassified to the greatest extent 
possible consistent with national security. The Secretary 
of Health and Human Services may classify portions of 
such processes as necessary to protect national security. 
(d) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than January 
1, 2024, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
shall— 
(1) submit a report to the Committee on En-
ergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions of the Senate regarding the improved, 
transparent processes developed under this section; 
(2) include in such report recommendations for 
opportunities for communication (by telebriefing, 
phone calls, or in-person meetings) between the Sec-
1022 
retary and States, localities, Tribes, and territories 
regarding such improved, transparent processes; and 
(3) submit such report in unclassified form to 
the greatest extent possible, except that the Sec-
retary may include a classified appendix if necessary 
to protect national security. 
SEC. 20418. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
Section 319F–2(f)(1) of the Public Health Service 
Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(f)(1)) is amended by striking 
‘‘$610,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2019 through 
2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$705,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2024’’. 
SEC. 20419. GAO REPORT ON AUTOMATED SUPPLY-CHAIN 
TRACKING APPLICATION. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
States shall report to Congress on the possibility of the 
establishment of an automated supply-chain tracking ap-
plication that provides near real-time insight into the 
amount of critical medical and health supplies available 
in the stockpile under section 319F–2(a) of the Public 
Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a)). Such report 
shall contain an evaluation of— 
(1) the feasibility of such an application; and 
(2) the potential benefits of such an application.
1023 
SEC. 20420. HIGH-QUALITY MASKS FOR CHILDREN. 
(a) INCLUSION
IN
STOCKPILE.—Section 319F– 
2(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d– 
6b(a)(1)) is amended by inserting after ‘‘shall maintain 
a stockpile or stockpiles of drugs, vaccines and other bio-
logical products, medical devices, and other supplies (in-
cluding personal protective equipment’’ the following: 
‘‘(which may include high-quality pediatric masks, a per-
centage of which may be small adult masks for pediatric 
use)’’. 
(b) GUIDANCE FOR PEDIATRIC MASKS.—The Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, in consultation with 
the Director of the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, pediatricians, child health care pro-
vider organizations, manufacturers, and other relevant 
stakeholders, shall— 
(1) develop guidelines for the use of respirators, 
barrier face coverings, or masks for use in pediatric 
populations, which may be made available through 
the Strategic National Stockpile under section 
319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
247d–6b) for public health emergencies declared 
under section 319 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 247d); 
and 
(2) not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, submit to the Committee on
1024 
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions of the Senate a report on pedi-
atric masks that includes the guidelines developed 
under paragraph (1). 
DIVISION D—COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
SEC. 30000. SHORT TITLE. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This division may be cited as the 
‘‘Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement 
Act’’ or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’. 
SEC. 30001. DEFINITIONS. 
In this division: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate. 
(2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
(3) PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY; PLA.—The 
terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 
the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.
1025 
(4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 
‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 30002. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
tary, technological, and ideological power to become 
a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the 
United States. The policies increasingly pursued by 
the PRC in these domains are contrary to the inter-
ests and values of the United States, its partners, 
and much of the rest of the world. 
(2) A number of policies being pursued by the 
PRC— 
(A) threaten the future character of the 
international order and are shaping the rules, 
norms, and institutions that govern relations 
among states; 
(B) will put at risk the ability of the 
United States to secure its national interests; 
and 
(C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
perity, and freedom of the international commu-
nity in the coming decades.
1026 
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 
the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked 
to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop-
ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefited 
from, the free and open international order. The 
United States pursued these goals and contributed 
to the welfare of the Chinese people by— 
(A) increasing the PRC’s access to global 
capital markets; 
(B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization; 
(C) providing development finance and 
technical assistance; 
(D) promoting research collaboration; 
(E) educating the PRC’s top students; 
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
technologies and scientific knowledge; and 
(G) providing intelligence and military as-
sistance. 
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 
pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 
increasingly authoritarian governance model at home 
through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, 
and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These 
policies 
frequently 
and 
deliberately 
undermine
1027 
United States interests and are contrary to core 
United States values and the values of other nations, 
both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to 
this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States 
has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strat-
egy towards the PRC and reanimate its defense of 
the international order. 
(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the 
Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi 
Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the 
Chinese Nation’’ as central to the domestic and for-
eign policy of the PRC. His program demands— 
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 
(B) concentration of military power; 
(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the 
state and the economy; 
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 
control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 
and 
(E) the denial of any universal values and 
individual rights that are deemed to threaten 
the CCP. 
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov-
ernance as superior to, and at odds with, the con-
stitutional models of the United States and other de-
1028 
mocracies. This approach to governance is lauded by 
the CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status 
as a global leader, and to shaping the future of the 
world. In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, 
‘‘We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese 
characteristics develops further * * * it is * * * in-
evitable that the superiority of our socialist system 
will be increasingly apparent * * * [and] our coun-
try’s road of development will have increasingly 
greater influence on the world.’’. 
(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish 
regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to 
use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
come the ‘‘leading world power’’, shaping an inter-
national order that is conducive to its interests. 
Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC 
into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using 
a strong military and advanced technological capa-
bility to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of 
other countries’ interests. 
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
national order, which is built upon the rule of law 
and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
ducting global information and influence operations, 
seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
1029 
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the 
legitimacy of internationally recognized human 
rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and 
agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit 
of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the 
expense of the interests of the United States and the 
international community. 
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 
follow its model of development and governance. 
During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General 
Secretary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a 
model of development for other countries by utilizing 
‘‘Chinese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solv-
ing problems’’. 
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance 
model and attempting to weaken other models of 
governance by— 
(A) undermining democratic institutions; 
(B) subverting financial institutions; 
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate 
the policies of the PRC; and 
(D) using disinformation to disguise the 
nature of the actions described in subpara-
graphs (A) through (C).
1030 
(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming 
the global leader in science and technology. In May 
2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC 
to reach ‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to 
‘‘endeavor to be a major world center for science and 
innovation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 
billions of dollars into education and research and 
development and established joint scientific research 
centers and science universities. 
(12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufac-
turing and technological superpower’’ and to pro-
mote ‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is 
coming at the expense of human rights and long-
standing international rules and norms with respect 
to economic competition, and presents a challenge to 
United States national security and the security of 
allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the 
PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies 
through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and 
a significant role of the state in internet governance. 
Through these means, the PRC increases direct and 
indirect government control over its citizens’ every-
day lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘civil-military fu-
sion’’ mandates that civil and commercial research,
1031 
which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
aged to develop new military capabilities. 
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means 
to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing 
and technological superpower. The PRC uses state- 
directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to 
ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP 
engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
dermine a free and open international market, such 
as intellectual property theft, forced technology 
transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and 
mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part 
of business and commercial agreements between Chi-
nese and foreign companies. 
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) 
are designed to freeze United States and other for-
eign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding 
competition in other important markets. The heavy 
subsidization of Chinese companies includes poten-
tial violation of its World Trade Organization com-
mitments. In May 2018, General Secretary Xi said 
that the PRC aims to keep the ‘‘initiatives of inno-
vation and development security * * * in [China’s] 
own hands’’.
1032 
(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives 
through a variety of avenues, including its signature 
initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to 
in this subsection as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in 
the Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital 
Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes 
BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan 
for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web 
of economic relations with the PRC at its center, 
making it the most concrete geographical represen-
tation of the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases 
the economic influence of state-owned PRC firms in 
global markets, enhances the PRC’s political lever-
age with government leaders around the world, and 
provides greater access to strategic nodes such as 
ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks 
political deference through economic dependence. 
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish 
regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and dis-
place the United States from the region. As a Pa-
cific power, the United States has built and sup-
ported enduring alliances and economic partnerships 
that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic
1033 
and military coercion in the region to secure its own 
interests. 
(17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep 
the United States military from operating in the 
Western Pacific and erodes United States security 
guarantees. 
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclu-
sive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air 
space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually 
exercising greater influence beyond the region. This 
includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy 
exploration, transport, and the exercise of security 
operations in areas permitted under international 
law. 
(19) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’ 
with Taiwan through whatever means may ulti-
mately be required. The CCP’s insistence that so- 
called ‘‘reunification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes 
this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, Gen-
eral Secretary Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no 
promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] 
the option of taking all necessary means’’. Taiwan’s 
embodiment of democratic values and economic lib-
eralism challenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of 
achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to
1034 
exploit Taiwan’s dominant strategic position in the 
First Island Chain and to project power into the 
Second Island Chain and beyond. 
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
cuted an illegal island-building campaign that 
threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of 
commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the 
PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and 
intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to 
advance its unlawful claims and control the waters 
around neighboring countries. Despite General Sec-
retary Xi’s September 2015 speech, in which he said 
the PRC was not militarizing the South China Sea, 
during the 2017 19th Party Congress, General Sec-
retary Xi announced that ‘‘construction on islands 
and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady 
progress’’. 
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA 
to attain a level of capacity and capability superior 
to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
duct of modern military operations by shifting its 
military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate 
[for] China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force 
‘‘commensurate with China’s international status’’. 
Ultimately, this transformation could enable China
1035 
to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through 
the threat of military force. In 2017, General Sec-
retary Xi established the following developmental 
benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA: 
(A) A mechanized force with increased 
informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020. 
(B) The complete modernization of China’s 
national defense by 2035. 
(C) The full transformation of the PLA 
into a world-class force by 2050. 
(22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli-
cies described in this subsection undermine United 
States interests, such as— 
(A) upholding a free and open inter-
national order; 
(B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
national institutions with liberal norms and val-
ues; 
(C) preserving a favorable balance of 
power in the Indo-Pacific; 
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies; 
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes; 
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce 
through open and transparent markets; and
1036 
(G) promoting individual freedom and 
human rights. 
(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has in-
tensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s 
behavior and therefore increased the need for United 
States global leadership and a competitive posture. 
The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the 
COVID–19 pandemic by— 
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 
Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so- 
called ‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong; 
(B) aggressively imposing its will in the 
East and South China Seas; 
(C) increasing its territorial aggression in 
South Asia, including against India; and 
(D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up 
the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion 
about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
credit the United States, its allies, and global 
health efforts. 
(24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re-
ferred to in paragraph (23)(D) has included—
1037 
(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of 
the pandemic, to downplay the nature and 
scope of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as 
well as cases of person-to-person transmission; 
(B) claims that the virus originated in 
United States biological defense research at 
Fort Detrick, Maryland; 
(C) Chinese state media reports insinu-
ating a possible link between the virus and 
other United States biological facilities; and 
(D) efforts to block access to qualified 
international infectious disease experts who 
might contradict the CCP’s narrative. 
(25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and 
policies, the United States must adopt a policy of 
strategic competition with the PRC to protect and 
promote our vital interests and values. 
(26) The United States policy of strategic com-
petition with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China is part of a broader strategic approach to the 
Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with coopera-
tion with United States allies and partners to ad-
vance shared values and interests and to preserve 
and enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, 
rules-based, stable, and diverse region.
1038 
(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
2018 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a com-
prehensive framework for promoting United State 
security interests, economic interests, and values in 
the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 
over 5 years— 
(A) to support greater security and defense 
cooperation between the United States and al-
lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) to advance democracy and the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights in the 
Indo-Pacific region; 
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation 
between the United States and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement 
through programs such as the Young Southeast 
Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth 
Volunteers program; and 
(E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 30003. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United 
States to pursue the following objectives:
1039 
(1) The United States global leadership role is 
sustained and its political system and major founda-
tions of national power are secured for the long-term 
in the political, economic, technological, and military 
domains. 
(2) The United States position as an indispen-
sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
gagement. 
(3) The United States deters military con-
frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 
reduce the risk of conflict. 
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a 
stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with 
China. The United States and its allies maintain un-
fettered access to the region, including through free-
dom of navigation, consistent with international law 
and practice. 
(5) The allies and partners of the United 
States— 
(A) maintain confidence in United States 
leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
cific region; 
(B) can withstand and combat subversion 
by the PRC; and
1040 
(C) work closely with the United States in 
setting global rules, norms, and standards that 
benefit the international community. 
(6) The combined economic and military 
strength of the United States and its allies and part-
ners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of at-
tempts to dominate other states outweigh the poten-
tial benefits. 
(7) The United States leads the free, open, and 
rules-based international order, which comprises re-
silient states and institutions that uphold and defend 
principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi-
vidual freedom, and human rights. The international 
order is strong enough to withstand attempts at de-
stabilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of 
international engagement in the 21st century are 
maintained, including— 
(A) the protection of human rights, com-
mercial engagement and investment, and tech-
nology; and 
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
are in alignment with the values and interests 
of the United States, its allies and partners,
1041 
and other stakeholders in the liberal inter-
national order. 
(9) The United States counters attempts by the 
PRC to— 
(A) undermine open and democratic soci-
eties; 
(B) distort global markets; 
(C) coerce other nations via economic, 
cyber, and military means; or 
(D) use its technological advantages to un-
dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na-
tional security interests. 
(10) The United States deters military con-
frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 
reduce the risk of conflict. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 
in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic 
foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 
growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 
improve the ability of the United States to pursue 
its vital economic, foreign policy, and national secu-
rity interests;
1042 
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 
with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
development, security, informational, and techno-
logical realms to maximize the United States’ 
strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of 
harming the interests and values of the United 
States and its partners and allies; 
(3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
national system characterized by the rule of law, 
open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a 
shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu-
tion of disputes, human rights, good and transparent 
governance, freedom from coercion, and a unified re-
sponse to the threat of climate change; 
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral 
and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance 
shared interests and values and bolster partner 
countries’ confidence that the United States is and 
will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner 
that respects the views and interests of its allies and 
friends; 
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United 
States allies and partners in boosting their own ca-
pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro-
1043 
tect shared interests and values, free from coercion 
and external pressure; 
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 
healthy, constructive competition in United States- 
China economic relations by improving United 
States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent 
any PRC attempts to harm United States economic 
competitiveness; 
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector- 
led growth in emerging markets around the world, 
including through the use of United States Govern-
ment tools that— 
(A) support greater private sector invest-
ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 
that are grounded in the rule of law; 
(B) promote open markets; 
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
frameworks; 
(D) improve the management of key eco-
nomic sectors; 
(E) combat corruption; 
(F) foster and support greater collabora-
tion with and among partner countries and the 
United States private sector to develop secure 
and sustainable infrastructure; and
1044 
(G) support American workers and create 
American jobs; 
(8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy 
in support of United States companies and busi-
nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
tion; 
(9) to ensure that the United States is second 
to none in the innovation of critical and emerging 
technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 
semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— 
(A) providing necessary investment and 
concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
celerate development of such technologies; 
(B) modernizing export controls and in-
vestment screening regimes and associated poli-
cies and regulations; 
(C) enhancing the role of the United 
States in technical standards-setting bodies; 
(D) reducing United States barriers and 
increasing incentives for collaboration with al-
lies and partners on the research and co-devel-
opment of critical technologies; 
(E) collaborating with allies and partners 
to protect critical technologies by—
1045 
(i) coordinating and aligning export 
control measures; 
(ii) building capacity for defense tech-
nology security; 
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-
tegically critical supply chains; and 
(iv) ensuring diversification; and 
(F) designing major defense capabilities 
for export to vetted allies and partners; 
(10) to collaborate with like-minded democ-
racies and other willing partners to promote ideals 
and principles that— 
(A) advance a free and open international 
order; 
(B) strengthen democratic institutions; 
(C) protect and promote human rights; 
and 
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
porting; 
(11) to develop comprehensive strategies and 
policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; 
(12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 
United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 
multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity
1046 
and effectiveness of these organizations in facili-
tating solutions to global challenges; 
(13) to advocate for the defense of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
lationship with the PRC; 
(14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a 
free and open order and address regional and global 
challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-
garding— 
(A) violations and abuses of human rights; 
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and 
(C) the undermining and abrogation of 
treaties, other international agreements, and 
other international norms related to human 
rights; 
(15) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re-
pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-
vantages or compel other nations to defer to its po-
litical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten 
the United States or its allies and partners; 
(16) to maintain United States access to the 
Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-
ments in United States military capabilities, policies, 
and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust
1047 
cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with al-
lies and partners; 
(17) to deter the PRC from— 
(A) initiating armed conflict; 
(B) coercing nations; or 
(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level 
of armed conflict; 
(18) to strengthen United States-PRC military- 
to-military communication and improve both military 
and civilian crisis avoidance and management proce-
dures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of 
unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits 
and recurrent exchanges between civilian and mili-
tary officials and other measures, in alignment with 
United States interests; and 
(19) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-
picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests 
align, including through bilateral or multilateral 
means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, 
and especially in the following areas— 
(A) global fight against climate change; 
(B) nuclear security; and 
(C) global financial stability.
1048 
SEC. 30004. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the execution of the policy described in section 30003(b) 
requires the following actions: 
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally 
and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United 
States— 
(A) to marshal sustained political will to 
protect its vital interests, promote its values, 
and advance its economic and national security 
objectives; and 
(B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
persuade the American people and United 
States allies and partners of— 
(i) the current challenges facing the 
international rules based order; and 
(ii) the need for long-term invest-
ments and engagement to defend shared 
interests and values. 
(2) The United States must coordinate closely 
with allies and partners to compete effectively with 
the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 
to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 
and checking aggressive PRC behavior. 
(3) Effective United States strategy toward 
China requires—
1049 
(A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
gress; and 
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
collaboration and consultation between the exec-
utive branch and Congress. 
(4) The United States must ensure close inte-
gration among economic and foreign policymakers 
and provide support to the private sector, civil soci-
ety, universities and academic institutions, and other 
relevant actors in free and open societies to enable 
such actors— 
(A) to collaborate to advance common in-
terests; and 
(B) to identify appropriate policies— 
(i) to strengthen the United States 
and its allies; and 
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of 
a free and open order. 
(5) The United States must ensure that all 
Federal departments, agencies, and overseas mis-
sions are organized and resourced to effectively de-
fend and advance United States interests, by— 
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo- 
Pacific region, at posts around the world, and 
in Washington, DC;
1050 
(B) placing greater numbers of foreign 
service officers, international development pro-
fessionals, members of the foreign commercial 
service, intelligence professionals, and other 
United States Government personnel in the 
Indo-Pacific region; and 
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the 
training, demonstrated proficiency in language 
and culture, technical skills, and other com-
petencies required to advance a successful strat-
egy in relation to the PRC. 
(6) The United States must place renewed pri-
ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary 
instruments of national power, including diplomacy, 
information, technology, economics, foreign assist-
ance and development finance, commerce, intel-
ligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
addressing the challenges posed by the PRC. 
(7) The United States must sustain military ca-
pabilities necessary to achieve United States political 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including— 
(A) promoting regional security in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(B) reassuring allies and partners while 
protecting them from coercion; and
1051 
(C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
venting unwanted conflict. 
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful 
adaptation to the information environment of the 
21st century. United States public diplomacy and 
messaging efforts must effectively— 
(A) promote the value of partnership with 
the United States; and 
(B) 
counter 
CCP 
propaganda 
and 
disinformation that threatens United States in-
terests. 
(9) The United States must ensure key environ-
mental, energy management, labor, and social re-
sponsibility standards are maintained across the 
technology supply chain, including— 
(A) prohibitions on human trafficking and 
fundamental rights outlined in the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Declaration on the 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
and as defined by the ILO Conventions; and 
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
are in alignment with the values and interests 
of the United States, its allies and partners, 
and other stakeholders in the liberal inter-
national order.
1052 
(b) FURTHER SENSE.—It is further the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) it is in the national interest for the United 
States to become a formal signatory of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay, Jamaica, Decem-
ber 10, 1982; and 
(2) the ratification of the UNCLOS remains a 
top priority of the United States Navy and the 
United States Coast Guard, the importance of which 
was most recently underscored by the strategic chal-
lenges the United States faces in the Asia-Pacific, 
the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions. 
SEC. 30005. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON 
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing 
in this division shall be construed to diminish, supplant, 
supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities 
of the United States Government under section 620M of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) 
or section 362 of title 10, United States Code. 
(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY 
FORCE.—Nothing in this division may be construed as au-
thorizing the use of military force.
1053 
TITLE I—INVESTING IN 
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
Subtitle A—Science and 
Technology 
SEC. 30101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES 
COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DI-
VERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
tate the contracting by the Department of State for the 
professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States 
persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
ment issues related to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), including— 
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 
certain production facilities to locations outside the 
PRC; 
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside 
of the PRC; 
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
lenges in the course of the activities described in 
paragraphs (1) and (2); and
1054 
(4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 
through providing market intelligence, facilitating 
contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 
and other services. 
(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons 
contracted to perform the services described in subsection 
(a) shall— 
(1) be under the authority of the United States 
Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 
hired, in accordance with existing United States 
laws; 
(2) coordinate with Department of State and 
Department of Commerce officers; and 
(3) coordinate with United States missions and 
relevant local partners in other countries as needed 
to carry out the services described in subsection (a). 
(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in 
subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, 
small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the 
matters described in subsection (a). 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fis-
1055 
cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying 
out this section. 
(e) PROHIBITION
ON ACCESS
TO ASSISTANCE
BY 
FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated 
pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity— 
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, 
or other foreign adversary; 
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership 
from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, 
direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and 
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time 
of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract 
within the previous one year that is no longer in ef-
fect, with— 
(A) the Government of the PRC; 
(B) the CCP; 
(C) the PLA; 
(D) an entity majority-owned, majority- 
controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or 
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an 
entity described in subparagraph (D). 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, 
control, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings
1056 
given to those terms in part 117 of title 32, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, or a successor document. 
SEC. 30102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND IN-
DUSTRIAL BASE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated 
approach, which leverages economies of scale with 
major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
tain its lead in defense technology; 
(2) allowing for the export, re-export, or trans-
fer of defense-related technologies and services to 
members of the national technology and industrial 
base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United 
States Code) would advance United States security 
interests by helping to leverage the defense-related 
technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 
to reduce the dependence on other countries, includ-
ing countries that pose challenges to United States 
interests around the world, for defense-related inno-
vation and investment; and 
(3) it is in the interest of the United States to 
continue to increase cooperation with Australia, 
Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-re-
1057 
lated technology and services and leverage the in-
vestments of like-minded, major ally nations in order 
to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense 
technology innovation. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State shall submit a report to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives, the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate, and any other appropriate 
congressional committees that— 
(A) describes the Department of State’s ef-
forts to facilitate access among the national 
technology and industrial base to defense arti-
cles and services subject to the United States 
Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the 
Arms 
Export 
Control 
Act 
(22 
U.S.C. 
2778(a)(1)); and 
(B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for-
eign policy, or other challenges or consider-
1058 
ations that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to 
include any gaps in the respective export con-
trol regimes implemented by United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aus-
tralia, or Canada. 
(2) FORM.—This report required under para-
graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 
classified annex. 
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure 
and Energy Development 
SEC. 30111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 30112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL 
QUALITY 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
STANDARDS. 
(a) SENSE
OF
CONGRESS
ON
COLLABORATIVE 
STANDARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should initiate collaboration among governments,
1059 
the private sector, and civil society to encourage the adop-
tion of the standards for quality global infrastructure de-
velopment advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, includ-
ing with respect to the following issues: 
(1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in 
which infrastructure investments are made. 
(2) Anti-corruption. 
(3) Rule of law. 
(4) Human rights and labor rights. 
(5) Fiscal and debt sustainability. 
(6) Social and governance safeguards. 
(7) Transparency. 
(8) Environmental and energy standards. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO CO-
OPERATION.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should launch a series of fora around the world 
showcasing the commitment of the United States and 
partners of the United States to high-quality development 
cooperation, including with respect to the issues described 
in subsection (a). 
SEC. 30113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the 
United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat-
egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern-
1060 
ment to provide foreign countries with financing that 
strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore 
reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-
ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-
ing to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative. 
(b) STRATEGY.— 
(1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall develop and submit a strategy to the 
relevant congressional committees to use the re-
sources of Federal agencies to counteract offers of 
assistance and financing from the PRC to foreign 
governments that are of strategic importance to the 
United States. 
(2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy 
shall— 
(A) identify primary sectors where the 
United States could provide a competitive ad-
vantage to increase a country’s economic inde-
pendence; 
(B) select countries with corresponding 
economic needs, with priority given to those 
who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influ-
ence;
1061 
(C) identify any corresponding existing fi-
nancing available from United States Govern-
ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-
nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign 
governments if none are currently available; 
(D) identify any cooperative and com-
plementary assistance and financing from 
friendly foreign governments, including coordi-
nated assistance and co-financing; 
(E) create a streamlined decision-making 
process, directed by the National Security 
Council, to devise financing and make agency 
decisions and commitments on a timely basis to 
support United States competitive offers; 
(F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
mission Working Group to develop a com-
prehensive strategy to develop alternatives to 
the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative for develop-
ment finance; and 
(G) integrate existing efforts into the 
strategy, including efforts to address the Gov-
ernment of the PRC’s use of the United Na-
tions to advance the Belt and Road Initiative, 
including the proliferation of memoranda of un-
derstanding between the PRC and United Na-
1062 
tions funds and programs regarding the imple-
mentation of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
(3) PARTICIPATING
AGENCIES.—Participating 
Federal agencies should include the Department of 
State, Department of the Treasury, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), 
United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
United States Trade and Development Agency, De-
partment of Commerce, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, and other Federal depart-
ments and agencies as appropriate. 
(4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President 
should issue an Executive order to implement the 
strategy and make such changes in agency regula-
tions and procedures as are necessary to put the 
strategy into effect. 
(5) 
RELEVANT
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘relevant congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Financial Services, and the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives; and
1063 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate. 
(c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
nation with the Administrator of the USAID, is author-
ized to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as 
the ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Net-
work’’, under which the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with other relevant Federal agencies, including those rep-
resented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Com-
mittee, may carry out various programs to advance the 
development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
infrastructure worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by— 
(1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 
improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 
procurement environments, and project preparation 
capacity of countries that are partners of the United 
States in such development; 
(2) providing transaction advisory services and 
project preparation assistance to support sustainable 
infrastructure; and 
(3) coordinating the provision of United States 
assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
1064 
cluding infrastructure that uses United States man-
ufactured goods and services, and catalyzing invest-
ment led by the private sector. 
(d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 
‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ de-
scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost 
the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten-
tial infrastructure projects, including through providing 
services such as— 
(1) legal services; 
(2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 
(3) debt sustainability analyses; 
(4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 
(5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high- 
quality infrastructure. 
(e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastruc-
ture Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described 
under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
thorized to provide support, including through the 
Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist-
1065 
ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and 
other infrastructure project support. 
(2) 
JOINT
STRATEGIC
INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic In-
frastructure Fund should be used in coordination 
with the Department of Defense, the International 
Development 
Finance 
Corporation, 
like-minded 
donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appro-
priate, to support joint infrastructure projects that 
are in the national security interest of the United 
States and vulnerable to strategic competitors. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 
2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Trans-
action and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 
should be made available for the Transaction Advisory 
Fund. 
SEC. 30114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-
ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory 
lending and financing, including in the form of providing 
support to companies incorporated in the People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the
1066 
Government of the PRC in the energy sectors of devel-
oping countries. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States 
to— 
(1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted 
energy needs and capacities of developing countries, 
and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC 
state-owned industries and other companies incor-
porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing 
labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-
rect financing by the PRC government, PRC finan-
cial institutions, or direct state support to state- 
owned enterprises and other companies incorporated 
in the PRC; 
(2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power 
sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
oping countries; 
(3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, 
and other financial products on terms that advance 
domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage 
private sector growth, and, when appropriate United 
States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
1067 
ternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 
Chinese financial institutions; 
(4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
verage investment in advanced energy technologies 
in developing countries; and 
(5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the 
effects of energy engagement by the PRC through 
predatory lending or other actions that negatively 
impact other countries. 
(c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
ergy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a United States Government strategy to increase 
United States exports of advanced energy technologies 
to— 
(1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
oping countries; 
(2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and 
transparent energy markets;
1068 
(3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 
trading relationships; and 
(4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy. 
SEC. 30115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI-
NA’S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DE-
VELOPMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate committees of Congress (including the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate) a report that— 
(1) identifies priority countries for deepening 
United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
cordance with the economic and national security in-
terests of the United States and where deeper en-
ergy partnerships are most achievable; 
(2) describes the involvement of the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
companies incorporated in the PRC in the develop-
ment, operation, financing, or ownership of energy 
generation facilities, transmission infrastructure, or 
energy resources in the countries identified in para-
graph (1);
1069 
(3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
implications for United States national interests and 
the interests of the countries identified in paragraph 
(1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and in-
fluence in developing country energy production or 
transmission; and 
(4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 
United States to partner with the countries identi-
fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
port shared interests between the United States and 
such countries. 
(b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s 
website. 
SEC. 30116. REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE AG-
RICULTURE SECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 10 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Agriculture, shall submit to Congress a 
report on foreign investment in the agriculture sector of 
the United States and the impact of such investment on 
the national security of the United States. 
(b) PRIORITY.—In preparing the report required by 
subsection (a), the Secretaries shall prioritize investment
1070 
by the People’s Republic of China in the agriculture sector 
of the United States. 
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 30121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States played a leadership role 
in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms 
governing the international economic order following 
the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic 
economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability. 
(2) It is in the United States’ vital interest to 
upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to 
strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-
ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism. 
SEC. 30122. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that United States national interests and the pri-
macy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are inti-
mately tied to the following economic objectives: 
(1) Confirming American leadership and par-
ticipation in global regional economic organizations 
and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
1071 
operation (APEC) and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). 
(2) Building secure and resilient supply chains 
for industries critical for United States national in-
terest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per-
sonal protective equipment. 
(3) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a 
market-based economic model. 
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the United States Trade Representa-
tive and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report 
to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents 
the steps the United States is taking and plans to take 
to achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and in-
cludes specific action plans for the following: 
(1) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component 
of the region’s economic architecture. 
(2) Working with allies and partners to build 
resilient and trusted supply chains especially for 
critical and emerging technologies, including semi-
conductors, and products and components critical 
for national health, including vaccines and related 
materials and personal protective equipment.
1072 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 30123. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOL-
STER AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA 
PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States has benefitted from the 
regional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-
cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its 
inception in 1989; 
(2) APEC is a hub of commerce for 21 member 
economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 60 percent 
of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade; 
(3) APEC has contributed to the economic 
growth in the region and enhanced access to global 
value chains, while raising the profile of critical top-
1073 
ics such as fair trade, sustainability, gender parity, 
and inclusive growth; 
(4) it is in the United States interest to engage 
and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive 
regional economy that benefits United States work-
ers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates 
the United States economy with others in the region; 
(5) when the United States last hosted APEC 
in 2011, it was able to promote United States inter-
ests, while reassuring allies and partners about its 
strong commitment to the region in the economic 
arena; 
(6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum 
to make progress on several United States priorities, 
that are shared by United States allies and partners, 
including— 
(A) making regional commerce more inclu-
sive; 
(B) fostering innovation and digitization; 
and 
(C) addressing climate change and environ-
mental protection; 
(7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous 
opportunity to leverage American leadership to 
shape the regional economic agenda;
1074 
(8) hosting APEC would allow the United 
States to advance several of its own priorities in the 
region, including to— 
(A) expand the participation of APEC 
stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-
mental advocates, and other part of civil soci-
ety; 
(B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and 
promote small and medium enterprises; 
(C) spotlight best practices and plans to 
upgrade skills for the next-generation of tech-
nology jobs; 
(D) advance a climate and sustainable 
trade and development agenda with a focus on 
green technologies, infrastructure and finance; 
and 
(E) advance work on digital issues; and 
(9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United 
States should immediately announce its interest to 
host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-
tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-
port.
1075 
SEC. 30124. TASK FORCE TO COUNTER CHINA’S ECONOMIC 
COERCION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) in-
creasing use of economic coercion against foreign 
governments, companies, organizations, other enti-
ties, and individuals requires that the United States 
better understand these measures in order to devise 
a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response; 
(2) the private sector is a crucial partner in 
helping the United States Government understand 
the PRC’s coercive economic measures and hold the 
PRC accountable, and that additional business 
transparency would help the United States Govern-
ment and private sector stakeholders conduct early 
assessments of potential pressure points and 
vulnerabilities; and 
(3) PRC coercive economic measures create 
pressures for the private sector to behave in ways 
antithetical to United States national interests and 
competitiveness. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF TASK FORCE.—Not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall establish an interagency task force to
1076 
be known as the ‘‘Countering Economic Coercion Task 
Force’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Task Force’’). 
(c) DUTIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall— 
(A) oversee the development and imple-
mentation of an integrated United States Gov-
ernment strategy to respond to People’s Repub-
lic of China (PRC) coercive economic measures, 
which shall include— 
(i) systematically monitoring and eval-
uating— 
(I) the costs of such measures on 
United States businesses and overall 
United States economic performance; 
(II) instances in which such 
measures taken against a non-PRC 
entity has benefitted other parties; 
and 
(III) the impacts such measures 
have had on United States national 
interests; and 
(ii) facilitating coordination among 
Federal departments and agencies when 
responding to such measures as well as 
proactively deterring such economic coer-
1077 
cion; including by clarifying the roles for 
departments and agencies identified in 
subsection (d) in implementing the strat-
egy; 
(B) consult with United States allies and 
partners on the feasibility and desirability of 
collectively identifying, assessing, and respond-
ing to PRC coercive economic measures, as well 
as actions that could be taken to expand coordi-
nation with the goal of ensuring a consistent, 
coherent, and collective response to such meas-
ures and establishing long-term deterrence to 
such measures; 
(C) effectively engage the United States 
private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or 
other entities that are susceptible to such PRC 
coercive economic measures, on concerns related 
to such measures; and 
(D) develop and implement a process for 
regularly sharing relevant information, includ-
ing classified information to the extent appro-
priate and practicable, on such PRC coercive 
economic measures with United States allies, 
partners, and the private sector.
1078 
(2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out its duties 
under this subsection, the Task Force should regu-
larly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-
priate, with the following: 
(A) Relevant stakeholders in the private 
sector. 
(B) Federal departments and agencies that 
are not represented on the Task Force. 
(C) United States allies and partners. 
(d) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall— 
(1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from 
among the staff of the National Security Council; 
(2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force 
from among the staff of the National Economic 
Council; and 
(3) direct the head of each of the following Fed-
eral departments and agencies to appoint personnel 
at the level of Assistant Secretary or above to par-
ticipate in the Task Force: 
(A) The Department of State. 
(B) The Department of Commerce. 
(C) The Department of the Treasury. 
(D) The Department of Justice. 
(E) The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative.
1079 
(F) The Department of Agriculture. 
(G) The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and other appropriate elements of 
the intelligence community (as defined in sec-
tion 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3003)). 
(H) The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. 
(I) The United States International Devel-
opment Finance Corporation. 
(J) Any other department or agency des-
ignated by the President. 
(e) REPORTS.— 
(1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task 
Force shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that includes the following ele-
ments: 
(A) A comprehensive review of the array of 
economic tools the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) employs or could em-
ploy in the future to coerce other governments, 
non-PRC companies (including United States 
companies), and multilateral institutions and 
organizations, including the Government of the
1080 
PRC’s continued efforts to codify informal 
practices into its domestic law. 
(B) The strategy required by subsection 
(c)(1)(A). 
(C) An interagency definition of PRC coer-
cive economic measures that captures both— 
(i) the use of informal or extralegal 
PRC coercive economic measures; and 
(ii) the illegitimate use of formal eco-
nomic tools. 
(D) A comprehensive review of the array of 
economic and diplomatic tools the United 
States Government employs or could employ to 
respond to economic coercion against the 
United States and United States allies and 
partners. 
(E) A list of unilateral or multilateral— 
(i) proactive measures to defend or 
deter against PRC coercive economic meas-
ures; and 
(ii) actions taken in response to the 
Government of the PRC’s general use of 
coercive economic measures, including the 
imposition of reputational costs on the 
PRC.
1081 
(F) An assessment of areas in which 
United States allies and partners are vulnerable 
to PRC coercive economic measures. 
(G) A description of gaps in existing re-
sources or capabilities for United States Gov-
ernment departments and agencies to respond 
effectively to PRC coercive economic measures 
directed at United States entities and assist 
United States allies and partners in their re-
sponses to PRC coercive economic measures. 
(H) An analysis of the circumstances 
under which the PRC employs different types of 
economic coercion and against what kinds of 
targets. 
(I) An assessment, as appropriate, of inter-
national norms and regulations as well as any 
treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, cir-
cumvented, or broken through its economically 
coercive practices. 
(2) INTERIM REPORTS.— 
(A) FIRST
INTERIM
REPORT.—Not later 
than one year after the date on which the re-
port required by paragraph (1) is submitted to 
the appropriate congressional committees, the 
Task Force shall submit to the appropriate con-
1082 
gressional committees a report that includes the 
following elements: 
(i) Updates to information required by 
subparagraphs (A) through (G) of para-
graph (1). 
(ii) A description of activities con-
ducted by the Task Force to implement 
the 
strategy 
required 
by 
subsection 
(c)(1)(A). 
(iii) An assessment of the implemen-
tation and effectiveness of the strategy, 
lessons learned from the past year and 
planned changes to the strategy. 
(B) SECOND INTERIM REPORT.—Not later 
than one year after the date on which the re-
port required by subparagraph (A) is submitted 
to the appropriate congressional committees, 
the Task Force shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report that includes 
an update to the elements required under the 
report required by subparagraph (A). 
(3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date on which the report required by para-
graph (2)(B) is submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees, the Task Force shall submit
1083 
to the appropriate congressional committees and also 
make available to the public on the website of the 
Executive Office of the President a final report that 
includes the following elements: 
(A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic 
measures and the cost of such coercive meas-
ures to United States businesses. 
(B) A description of areas of possible vul-
nerability for United States businesses and 
businesses of United States partners and allies. 
(C) Recommendations on how to continue 
the effort to counter PRC coercive economic 
measures, including through further coordina-
tion with United States allies and partners. 
(D) A list of cases made public under sub-
section (f). 
(4) FORM.— 
(A) INITIAL AND INTERIM REPORTS.—The 
reports required by paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and 
(2)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex. 
(B) FINAL REPORT.—The report required 
by paragraph (3) shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may include a classified annex. 
(f) PUBLICLY AVAILABLE LIST.—
1084 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task 
Force shall to the extent practicable make available 
to the public on the website of the Executive Office 
of the President a list of cases in the past six 
months in which open source reporting indicates 
that the PRC has directed coercive economic meas-
ures against a non-PRC entity. 
(2) UPDATES.—The list required by paragraph 
(1) should be updated every 180 days, and shall be 
managed by the Department of State after the ter-
mination of the Task Force under subsection (g). 
(g) SUNSET.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall termi-
nate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on 
the date on which the final report required by sub-
section (e)(3) is submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees and made publicly available. 
(2) ADDITIONAL
ACTIONS.—The Task force 
may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 
(1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, in-
cluding providing testimony to Congress concerning 
the final report required by subsection (e)(3). 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
1085 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate. 
(2) COERCIVE
ECONOMIC
MEASURES.—The 
term ‘‘coercive economic measures’’ includes formal 
or informal restrictions or conditions, such as on 
trade, investment, development aid, and financial 
flows, intended to impose economic costs on a non- 
People’s Republic of China target in order to achieve 
strategic political objectives, including influence over 
the policy decisions of a foreign government, com-
pany, organization, or individual. 
SEC. 30125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECH-
NOLOGY ISSUES. 
(a) LEADERSHIP
IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States must lead in international bodies that set the gov-
ernance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled tech-
nologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate 
within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital do-
main.
1086 
(b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It 
is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with 
allies and partners, should lead an international effort to 
combat the expanding use of information and communica-
tions technology products and services to surveil, repress, 
and manipulate populations (also known as ‘‘digital 
authoritarianism’’). 
(c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish 
information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained 
as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 
mechanism for communication. 
(d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-
ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards 
for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such 
technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether 
they are governments or other entities, and that they do 
not threaten democratic governance or human rights. 
SEC. 30126. DIGITAL DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
1087 
(1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated 
United States dependence on digital tools, inter-
national rules around digital rules have remained 
largely piecemeal; and 
(2) the People’s Republic of China is operating 
under and advancing a set of digital rules that are 
contrary to United States values and interests, and 
those of United States allies and partners. 
SEC. 30127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY
AND CYBERSECURITY 
PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish 
a program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and 
Cybersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries— 
(1) expand and increase secure Internet access 
and digital infrastructure; 
(2) promote and protect human rights and 
counter corruption and predatory behavior through-
out communications and cybersecurity policy and im-
plementation; 
(3) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, 
disinformation and misinformation, and the use of 
digital technology and services to carry out criminal 
activity or human rights violations;
1088 
(4) bolster the role of civil society in informing 
ICT policy and regulations; 
(5) promote exports of United States ICT 
goods and services and increase United States com-
pany market share in target markets; 
(6) promote the innovation and diversification 
of ICT goods and supply chain services to be less re-
liant on imports from the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(7) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
operability, and promote best practices for a national 
approach to cybersecurity; and 
(8) enhance the security of their digital infra-
structure to facilitate better information sharing 
with the United States and United States allies and 
partners, as appropriate. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, in consultation 
with the United States Trade Representative and the Na-
tional Cyber Director, shall jointly submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees an implementation plan 
for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the submis-
sion of the plan to advance the goals identified in sub-
1089 
section (a). The implementation plan shall also include a 
description of interagency responsibilities to carry out im-
plementation, a description of any barriers to successful 
implementation, and a description of any additional re-
sources or authorities needed for successful implementa-
tion. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementa-
tion plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State 
and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development shall consult with— 
(1) the appropriate congressional committees; 
(2) the Committee on Ways and Means, the 
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives; 
(3) the Committee on Finance, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-
ate; 
(4) leaders of the United States industry; 
(5) civil society leaders with expertise in tech-
nology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic 
development and competitiveness, and human rights, 
including from the Open Technology Fund;
1090 
(6) representatives from relevant United States 
Government agencies; and 
(7) representatives from like-minded allies and 
partners. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 30128. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COM-
PETITION. 
It is the sense of Congress that National Security Ad-
visor Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the United 
States and likeminded democracies are in an ideological 
competition with the People’s Republic of China, under 
the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party, 
when he stated, ‘‘China is essentially making the case that 
the Chinese model is better than the American model * 
* * * This is not any longer some kind of implied contrast. 
It is an explicit statement that there is an alternative 
model to the democratic market economy model that the 
United States has been advancing over the course of dec-
ades.’’.
1091 
SEC. 30129. REPORT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA 
AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of elements of 
the intelligence community that the Director determines 
appropriate, shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report containing the following: 
(1) Details on the cooperation between China 
and the United Arab Emirates regarding defense, 
security, technology, and other strategically sensitive 
matters that implicate the national security interests 
of the United States. 
(2) The most recent, as of the date of the re-
port, quarterly assessment by the intelligence com-
munity of measures that the United Arab Emirates 
has implemented to safeguard technology of the 
United States and the reliability of any assurances 
by the United Arab Emirates (with respect to both 
current assurances and assurances being considered 
as of the date of the report). 
(3) A certification by the Director regarding 
whether such assurances described in paragraph (2) 
are viable and sufficient to protect technology of the 
United States from being transferred to China or 
other third parties.
1092 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall in-
clude an unclassified executive summary. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the terms ‘‘intel-
ligence community’’ and ‘‘congressional intelligence com-
mittees’’ have the meanings given such terms in section 
3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
SEC. 30129A. AUTHORIZATION TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF 
FOR THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CON-
TROL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAS-
URY. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, acting through the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, is au-
thorized to hire an additional 10 full-time employees to 
carry out activities of the Office associated with the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy 
and Leadership 
SEC. 30131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
POLICY. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China operates a 
system of state-owned financial institutions including 
retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and 
insurers which are given favorable treatment under
1093 
Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have 
strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the 
PRC. 
(2) In order to join the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government com-
mitted to opening the credit card payment business 
to foreign firms by 2006. 
(3) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive 
capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese mar-
ket to foreign investors while hamstringing its own 
citizens ability to control their money. 
(4) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a 
technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 
2019. 
(5) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire 
Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state- 
owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public 
offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by 
Chinese regulators. 
(6) The PRC Government is pioneering the use 
of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the 
world’s first central bank backed digital currency, 
and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong
1094 
Monetary Authority have already begun testing the 
cross-border functionality of the digital currency. 
SEC. 30132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-
CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the 
United States and the American people by allowing 
the United States to maintain economic independ-
ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance 
government outlays; 
(2) American global leadership has benefited 
from the United States monetary stability, credit-
worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
nology innovations; 
(3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of 
American national security rely on the United States 
role as the global financial leader, hub of global 
trade, and source of economic opportunity; 
(4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of 
a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing 
forward a Central Bank digital currency, the Peo-
1095 
ple’s Republic of China is attempting to become the 
leading hub of finance in the world; and 
(5) the United States must maintain its posi-
tion as a global financial leader to continue its 
broader global leadership role around the world. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall sub-
mit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
that— 
(1) lists and examines the benefits to American 
foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-
nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the 
world’s global reserve currency; 
(2) describes the actions taken by the People’s 
Republic of China that could cement China’s role as 
the world’s leading financial center; 
(3) analyzes the possible impact on American 
national security and foreign policy were the yuan to 
supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve 
currency; 
(4) outlines how the United States can work 
diplomatically with allies, partners, and other na-
tions to preserve a financial system that is free, 
open, and fair; and
1096 
(5) identifies steps the United States can take 
to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial 
center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob-
al reserve currency. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 
Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
SEC. 30133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED 
STATES CAPITAL MARKETS. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Sec-
retary of State and in consultation with and with 
support from the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, shall submit a report to the Committees on Fi-
1097 
nancial Services, Foreign Affairs, and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives and the Committees on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Foreign Relations, and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
that describes the capital raising activities in the 
United States of companies incorporated in the PRC 
and companies incorporated outside PRC that pre-
dominantly invest in companies incorporated in the 
PRC. The report should discuss risks to the United 
States national security posed by the capital raising 
activities of these companies. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
shall— 
(A) identify companies that— 
(i) are incorporated in the PRC that 
issue registered securities or are listed or 
traded on one or several stock exchanges 
within 
the 
United 
States, 
including 
through the use of American depository re-
ceipts, variable interest entity structures, 
over-the-counter market, or ‘‘A Shares’’, or 
are otherwise added to indexes and ex-
change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
changes in the PRC;
1098 
(ii) are incorporated in the PRC that 
issue unregistered securities within the 
United States; 
(iii) are incorporated outside of PRC 
but predominantly invest in companies in-
corporated within the PRC, including com-
panies that raise capital through the var-
ious exemptions available under the securi-
ties laws of the United States; or 
(iv) based on the factors for consider-
ation described in paragraph (3), have 
knowingly and materially contributed to— 
(I) 
activities 
that 
undermine 
United States national security; 
(II) serious abuses of internation-
ally recognized human rights; or 
(III) a substantially increased fi-
nancial risk exposure for United 
States-based investors; 
(B) describe the activities of the companies 
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 
their implications for the United States; and 
(C) develop policy recommendations for the 
United States Government and State govern-
1099 
ments to address the risks posed by companies 
identified pursuant to subparagraph (A). 
(3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.— 
In completing the report under paragraph (1), the 
Secretary shall consider whether a company identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)— 
(A) has materially contributed to the devel-
opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated 
procurement by the People’s Liberation Army, 
of lethal military equipment or component parts 
of such equipment; 
(B) has contributed to the construction 
and militarization of features in the South 
China Sea; 
(C) has been sanctioned by the United 
States or has been determined to have con-
ducted business with sanctioned entities; 
(D) has engaged in an act or a series of 
acts of intellectual property theft; 
(E) has engaged in corporate or economic 
espionage; 
(F) has contributed to the proliferation of 
nuclear or missile technology in violation of 
United Nations Security Council resolutions or 
United States sanctions;
1100 
(G) has contributed to the repression of re-
ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, 
including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region or the Tibet Autonomous Region; 
(H) has contributed to the development of 
technologies that enable censorship directed or 
directly supported by the Government of the 
PRC; and 
(I) has contributed to other activities or 
behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
dent. 
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under this 
section shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 
report required under this section shall be made accessible 
to the public online through relevant United States Gov-
ernment websites. 
SEC. 30134. REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES 
TO CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT AND FINAN-
CIAL MESSAGING SYSTEMS. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Sec-
retary of State, shall submit a report to the Commit-
1101 
tees on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committees 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and For-
eign Relations of the Senate on the implications of 
cross-border payment systems. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
shall— 
(A) examine the benefits and concerns re-
lated to the use of the current cross-border pay-
ments system, including the messaging systems; 
(B) review and analyze ways in which the 
Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems 
(CIPS), cryptocurrencies, and foreign central 
bank digital currencies could erode this system; 
and 
(C) analyze how changes to global cross- 
border payment systems could undermine 
United States national security interests includ-
ing impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the 
countering of terrorist finance, and the enforce-
ment of anti-money laundering provisions. 
(b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
section (a)(1) shall be submitted in classified form.
1102 
SEC. 30135. REPORT ON LINKS BETWEEN PRIVATE SECTOR 
CHINESE TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL MEDIA 
COMPANIES AND THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 
ARMY, CHINESE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall prepare and 
submit to Congress a report on links between private sec-
tor Chinese technology and social media companies and 
the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese intelligence, and 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include a discussion and 
analysis of— 
(1) national security risks from illicit or coer-
cive technology transfer; 
(2) Chinese investment in private sector United 
States and allied nation technology companies in 
fields such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, 
next-generation energy technology and other areas 
determined to be vital to the national security of the 
United States by Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, 
and Defense; and 
(3) key technology focus areas (as such term is 
defined in section 20209(16) of this Act).
1103 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and made available 
to the public, but may contain a classified annex. 
TITLE II—INVESTING IN 
ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Subtitle A—Strategic and 
Diplomatic Matters 
SEC. 30201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 30202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT 
FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-
CIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
1104 
(1) the United States treaty alliances in the 
Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to 
the United States and are among the Nation’s most 
precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-
vance its vital national interests, defend its territory, 
establish enduring cooperation with allies while seek-
ing to establish new partnerships, prevent the domi-
nation of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding mari-
time and air lanes by a hostile power or powers, and 
deter potential aggressors; 
(2) the Governments of the United States, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and 
open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling 
challenges with unity of purpose, and have collabo-
rated to advance specific efforts of shared interest in 
areas such as defense and security, infrastructure 
connectivity, and fundamental freedoms; 
(3) the United States greatly values other part-
nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 
India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, 
and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-
eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
1105 
and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which 
are essential to further shared interests; 
(4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 
demands consistent United States and allied com-
mitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so 
that they are postured to meet these challenges, and 
will require sustained political will, concrete partner-
ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-
rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-
ments, high-level and extensive consultations on 
matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
ercion; 
(5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance 
shared interests; 
(6) the United States must work with allies to 
prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region; 
(7) as the report released in August 2020 by 
the Expert Group of the International Military 
Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled
1106 
‘‘Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ 
noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions 
most vulnerable to climate impacts, and as former 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 
and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary Gen-
eral of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat 
multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing hu-
manitarian response costs and impacting security 
throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing pat-
terns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow 
stronger and more frequent; 
(8) the United State should continue to engage 
on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners 
of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-
lic Law 115–409), in the areas of— 
(A) forecasting environmental challenges; 
(B) assisting with transnational coopera-
tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity 
and access to safe drinking water; 
(C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
tion; and 
(D) meeting environmental challenges and 
developing resilience;
1107 
(9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pa-
cific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy fo-
cusing on internal and external actions needed— 
(A) to facilitate regional early recovery, 
risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related 
impacts on strategic interests of the United 
States and partners and allies of the United 
States in the region; and 
(B) to address humanitarian and food se-
curity impacts of weather-related changes in the 
region; and 
(10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-
nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional 
architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States— 
(1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
rity cooperation with and among United States allies 
in the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including 
through diplomatic engagement, regional develop-
ment, energy security and development, scientific 
and health partnerships, educational and cultural ex-
1108 
changes, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic 
and defense-related initiatives; 
(2) to uphold the United States multilateral 
and bilateral treaty obligations, including— 
(A) defending Japan consistent with the 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-
tween the United States of America and Japan, 
done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all 
related and subsequent bilateral security agree-
ments and arrangements concluded on or before 
the date of enactment of this Act; 
(B) defending the Republic of Korea con-
sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
tween the United States and the Republic of 
Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, 
and all related and subsequent bilateral security 
agreements and arrangements concluded on or 
before the date of enactment of this Act; 
(C) defending the Philippines consistent 
with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
Between the United States and the Republic of 
the Philippines, done at Washington, August 
30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilat-
eral security agreements and arrangements con-
1109 
cluded on or before the date of enactment of 
this Act; 
(D) defending Thailand consistent with the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma-
nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 
1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk 
communique of 1962, and all related and subse-
quent bilateral security agreements and ar-
rangements concluded on or before the date of 
enactment of this Act; and 
(E) defending Australia consistent with the 
Security Treaty Between Australia and the 
United States of America, done at San Fran-
cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and 
subsequent bilateral security agreements and 
arrangements concluded on or before the date 
of enactment of this Act; 
(3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ 
bilateral and regional partnerships, including with 
India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand; 
(4) to cooperate with allies and partners to pro-
mote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bi-
laterally and through regional and multilateral fora 
and pacts;
1110 
(5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and India; and 
(6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustain-
able development of the Mekong River Basin, includ-
ing by providing support for environmental conserva-
tion and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-re-
gion and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, whose governments com-
prise the Mekong River Commission (MRC). United 
States efforts should focus on increasing MRC mem-
ber countries’ capacity in the sustainable conserva-
tion and management of natural resources. 
SEC. 30203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) as a Pacific power, the United States should 
continue to strengthen its cooperation with Aus-
tralia, India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as 
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to 
enhance and implement a shared vision to meet re-
gional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclu-
sive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, character-
ized by respect for democratic norms, rule of law,
1111 
and market-driven economic growth, and that is free 
from undue influence and coercion; 
(2) the United States should expand dialogue 
and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-
gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 
democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to 
uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-
cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific; 
(3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 
leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to 
the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in-
cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
cine production and equitable access, and to address 
shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical 
technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure 
investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-
aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad-
vances the important cooperation among Quad na-
tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 
(4) building upon their announced commitment 
to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vac-
cines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific 
region, the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, the Japan International Co-
1112 
operation Agency, and the Japan Bank for Inter-
national Cooperation, including through partnerships 
other multilateral development banks, should also 
venture to finance development and infrastructure 
projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competi-
tive, transparent, and sustainable; 
(5) the United States should participate in the 
Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar 
initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, 
economic, and national security sectors to the 
United States, its Quad partners, and other like- 
minded countries; and 
(6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
tary Working Group could— 
(A) sustain and deepen engagement be-
tween senior officials of the Quad countries on 
a full spectrum of issues; and 
(B) be modeled on the successful and long- 
standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 
between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, as well as other for-
mal and informal parliamentary exchanges. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
1113 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees (including the Permanent Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate) a strategy for bolstering en-
gagement and cooperation with the Quad. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 
required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol-
lowing: 
(A) A description of how the United States 
intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in 
the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-
ment with India, Japan, and Australia on 
shared interests and common challenges. 
(B) A summary of— 
(i) current and past Quad initiatives 
across the whole of the United States Gov-
ernment, including to promote broad based 
and inclusive economic growth and invest-
ment, and to advance technology coopera-
tion, energy innovation, climate mitigation 
and adaptation, physical and digital infra-
1114 
structure development, education, disaster 
management, and global health security; 
(ii) proposals shared among Quad 
countries to deepen existing security co-
operation, intelligence sharing, economic 
partnerships, and multilateral coordination; 
and 
(iii) initiatives and agreements under-
taken jointly with Quad countries, in addi-
tion to other like-minded partners in the 
Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest. 
(C) A description of efforts to jointly— 
(i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co-
operation to prepare for the next pandemic 
by focusing on medium-term vaccine and 
medical supply production and building a 
broader dialogue on global public health; 
(ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 
regional economic engagement and integra-
tion, and strengthen regional rules and 
standards around investment; 
(iii) strengthen climate actions on 
mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-
nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-
nance;
1115 
(iv) facilitate the development of qual-
ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific 
through joint financing, investment, tech-
nical assistance, and standards setting; 
(v) enhance joint maritime security 
and maritime domain awareness initiatives 
to protect the maritime commons and sup-
port international law and freedom of navi-
gation in the Indo-Pacific; and 
(vi) develop international technology 
standards and share or co-develop new in-
novative technologies of the future. 
SEC. 30204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-
TARY WORKING GROUP. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the govern-
ments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the 
United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of 
reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra- 
Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer coopera-
tion on shared interests and values. 
(b) UNITED STATES GROUP.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern-
ments of the Quad countries enter into a written
1116 
agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a 
Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there 
shall be established a United States Group, which 
shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra- 
Parliamentary Working Group. 
(2) MEMBERSHIP.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 
Members of Congress. 
(B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of 
Congress appointed to the United States Group 
under subparagraph (A)— 
(i) half shall be appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
from among Members of the House, not 
fewer than four of whom shall be members 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and 
(ii) half shall be appointed by the 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 
based on recommendations of the majority 
leader and minority leader of the Senate, 
from among Members of the Senate, not 
fewer than four of whom shall be members 
of the Committee on Foreign Relations
1117 
(unless the majority leader and minority 
leader determine otherwise). 
(3) MEETINGS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The United States 
Group shall seek to meet not less frequently 
than annually with representatives and appro-
priate staff of the legislatures of Japan, Aus-
tralia, and India, and any other country invited 
by mutual agreement of the Quad countries. 
(B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in 
subparagraph (A) may be held— 
(i) in the United States; 
(ii) in another Quad country during 
periods when Congress is not in session; or 
(iii) virtually. 
(4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.— 
(A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of 
the House of Representatives shall designate 
the chairperson or vice chairperson of the dele-
gation of the United States Group from the 
House from among members of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. 
(B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President 
Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the 
chairperson or vice chairperson of the delega-
1118 
tion of the United States Group from the Sen-
ate from among members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations. 
(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to 
be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal 
years 2022 through 2025 for the United States 
Group. 
(B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year 
for which an appropriation is made for the 
United States Group, half of the amount 
appropriated shall be available to the dele-
gation from the House of Representatives 
and half of the amount appropriated shall 
be available to the delegation from the 
Senate. 
(ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The 
amounts available to the delegations of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate 
under clause (i) shall be disbursed on 
vouchers to be approved by the chairperson 
of the delegation from the House of Rep-
resentatives and the chairperson of the del-
egation from the Senate, respectively.
1119 
(6) PRIVATE
SOURCES.—The United States 
Group may accept gifts or donations of services or 
property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 
the Senate. 
(7) CERTIFICATION
OF
EXPENDITURES.—The 
certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from 
the House of Representatives or the delegation of 
the Senate of the United States Group shall be final 
and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the 
auditing of the accounts of the United States Group. 
(8) ANNUAL
REPORT.—The United States 
Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 
for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is 
made for the United States Group, including a de-
scription of its expenditures under such appropria-
tion. 
SEC. 30205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION 
WITH ASEAN. 
It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) stand with the nations of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond
1120 
to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in 
building capacity to prepare for and respond to 
pandemics and other public health challenges; 
(2) support high-level United States participa-
tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year; 
(3) reaffirm the importance of United States- 
ASEAN economic engagement and support the 
ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) goals, in-
cluding strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-term 
economic growth and cooperation with the United 
States that focuses on innovation and capacity-build-
ing efforts in technology, education, disaster man-
agement, food security, and human rights, particu-
larly for ASEAN’s poorest countries; 
(4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN 
community, as well as to foster greater integration 
and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and 
security partners, including Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India; 
(5) recognize the value of strategic economic 
initiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, 
which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and 
the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in 
the region;
1121 
(6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and 
international arbitration mechanisms, consistent 
with international law, including through the adop-
tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea 
that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
motes peace and stability in the region; 
(7) urge all parties involved in the maritime 
and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, 
including the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China— 
(A) to cease any current activities, and 
avoid undertaking any actions in the future, 
that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
timidation, or military force; 
(B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, 
and other features, and refrain from new ef-
forts to militarize, including the construction of 
new garrisons and facilities and the relocation 
of additional military personnel, material, or 
equipment;
1122 
(C) to oppose actions by any country that 
prevent other countries from exercising their 
sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
sive economic zones and continental shelves by 
enforcing claims to those areas in the South 
China Sea that lack support in international 
law; and 
(D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
ministrative and military districts in contested 
areas in the South China Sea; 
(8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
tions that cause permanent physical damage to the 
marine environment and support the efforts of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 
region; 
(9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common 
approach to encourage China and the Philippines to 
comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of 
the Philippines in the case against the People’s Re-
public of China’s excessive maritime claims; 
(10) reaffirm the commitment of the United 
States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
1123 
human smuggling and trafficking in persons and 
urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional 
mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
refugees and migrants; 
(11) support the Mekong-United States Part-
nership; 
(12) support newly created initiatives with 
ASEAN nations, including the United States- 
ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Pol-
icy Implementation Project, the United States- 
ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States- 
ASEAN Health Futures; 
(13) encourage the President to communicate 
to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the 
rule of law and open and transparent government, 
strengthening civil society, and protecting human 
rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing 
politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary 
killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom 
of speech and expression; 
(14) support efforts by organizations in 
ASEAN that address corruption in the public and 
private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
force bribery criminalization in the private sector,
1124 
and build beneficial ownership transparency through 
the ASEAN–USAID PROSPECT project partnered 
with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
tion (SEA–PAC); 
(15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people 
partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
ership training to a new generation that will create 
and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and 
partnerships, and rise to address the regional and 
global challenges of the future; 
(16) support the creation of initiatives similar 
to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for 
other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to- 
people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society 
leaders; 
(17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments 
that have fully upheld and implemented all United 
Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
national agreements with respect to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN 
governments to do the same; and 
(18) allocate appropriate resources across the 
United States Government to articulate and imple-
1125 
ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports 
ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and prob-
lem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific 
community. 
SEC. 30206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act’’ or the 
‘‘YSEALI Act’’. 
(b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIA-
TIVE.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 
the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian 
Leaders Initiative (‘‘YSEALI’’) program. 
(2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek 
to build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast 
Asia to— 
(A) support young leaders from Southeast 
Asia by offering professional development and a 
global network to share expertise, including in 
the areas of civic engagement, economic em-
powerment and social entrepreneurship, edu-
cation and environmental issues; and
1126 
(B) further strengthen the enduring part-
nership between the United States and South-
east Asia and connect United States experts 
with YSEALI participants. 
(3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.— 
(A) YSEALI ACADEMIC
FELLOWS
PRO-
GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Aca-
demic Fellows Program to bring students from 
YSEALI partner countries to the United States 
for the purposes of building practical expertise, 
leadership skills, and professional networks re-
lating to one or more of the YSEALI themes. 
The Secretary of State may award fellowships 
under the Academic Fellows Program to eligible 
individuals based on the following: 
(i) Citizenship and residency in a 
YSEALI partner country. 
(ii) Status as a full-time under-
graduate student, or recent graduate of 
college, university, or other institutions of 
higher learning. 
(iii) Other criteria determined appro-
priate by the Secretary. 
(B) YSEALI 
PROFESSIONAL
FELLOWS 
PROGRAM.—There is established the YSEALI
1127 
Professional Fellows Program to bring profes-
sionals from YSEALI partner countries to the 
United States for the purposes of building prac-
tical expertise, leadership skills, and profes-
sional networks relating to one or more of the 
YSEALI themes. The Secretary of State may 
award fellowships under the Professional Fel-
lows Program to eligible individuals based on 
the following: 
(i) Citizenship and residency in a 
YSEALI partner country. 
(ii) Status as an emerging leader in 
government, civil society, or the private 
sector, and demonstrated expertise relating 
to one or more of the YSEALI themes. 
(iii) Current employment, and two or 
more years of professional work experience 
relevant to one or more YSEALI themes. 
(iv) Other criteria determined appro-
priate by the Secretary. 
(C) OTHER
INITIATIVES.—The Secretary 
of State may designate other initiatives as 
YSEALI initiatives under this section if they 
advance the goals of the YSEALI program as 
described in paragraph (2).
1128 
(4) ACTIVITIES.— 
(A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 
The Secretary of State shall oversee all United 
States-based activities carried out under the 
YSEALI program, including the participation 
of YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at 
a United States university or college, and the 
participation of YSEALI Professional Fellows 
at United States private and public sector orga-
nizations for individually-tailored work place-
ments. Both fellowships may include site visits, 
professional networking opportunities, leader-
ship training, community service, and organized 
cultural activities, as appropriate. 
(B) 
SOUTHEAST
ASIA-BASED
ACTIVI-
TIES.—The Secretary of State should continue 
to support overseas initiatives of the program, 
including the following: 
(i) Quality leadership training, profes-
sional development, and networking oppor-
tunities for YSEALI alumni. 
(ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI 
Professional Fellows Program’s United 
States professional hosts and interlocutors 
to support post-United States exchange ac-