109TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5682
AN ACT 
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agree-
ment for cooperation with India.
109TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5682
AN ACT 
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for coopera-
tion with India.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United 
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 
2006’’. 
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the 
means to produce them, and the means to deliver 
them are critical objectives for United States foreign 
policy; 
(2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its 
implementation, particularly its verification and 
compliance, is the keystone of United States non-
proliferation policy; 
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in 
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capa-
bilities and maintaining a stable international secu-
rity situation; 
(4) countries that have never become a party to 
the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal re-
gime pose a potential challenge to the achievement 
of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, be-
cause those countries have not undertaken the 
NPT’s international obligation to prohibit the spread 
of dangerous nuclear technologies;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to 
the fullest extent possible to ensure that those coun-
tries that are not NPT members are responsible 
with any nuclear technology they develop; 
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to 
enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as 
set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has 
never been an NPT member with respect to civilian 
nuclear technology if—
(A) the country has demonstrated respon-
sible behavior with respect to the nonprolifera-
tion of technology related to weapons of mass 
destruction programs and the means to deliver 
them; 
(B) the country has a functioning and un-
interrupted democratic system of government, 
has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of 
the United States, and is working with the 
United States in key foreign policy initiatives 
related to non-proliferation; 
(C) such cooperation induces the country 
to implement the highest possible protections 
against the proliferation of technology related 
to weapons of mass destruction programs and
the means to deliver them, and to refrain from 
actions that would further the development of 
its nuclear weapons program; and 
(D) such cooperation will induce the coun-
try to give greater political and material sup-
port to the achievement of United States global 
and regional nonproliferation objectives, espe-
cially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, 
if necessary, sanctioning and containing states 
that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, 
that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability or other weapons of mass destruction 
capability and the means to deliver such weap-
ons; 
(7)(A) India meets the criteria described in 
paragraph (6); and 
(B) it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to deepen its relationship with India 
across a full range of issues, including peaceful nu-
clear cooperation; 
(8) the South Asia region is so important that 
the United States should continue its policy of en-
gagement, collaboration, and exchanges with and be-
tween India and Pakistan; and
(9) the United States Government, pursuant to 
the restrictions in this Act, shall not participate in, 
or contribute to, the manufacture or acquisition of 
nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies 
of the United States: 
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to 
produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 
state, within or outside of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; 
commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’). 
(2) Encourage states party to the NPT to in-
terpret the right to ‘‘develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’’, as 
described in Article IV of the NPT, as being a quali-
fied right that is conditioned by the overall purpose 
of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weap-
ons and nuclear weapons capability, including by re-
fraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state 
party that has not demonstrated that it is in full 
compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined 
by the IAEA.
(3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
guidelines concerning consultation by members re-
garding violations of supplier and recipient under-
standings by instituting the practice of a timely and 
coordinated response by NSG members to all such 
violations, including termination of nuclear transfers 
to an involved recipient, that discourages individual 
NSG members from continuing cooperation with 
such recipient until such time as a consensus regard-
ing a coordinated response has been achieved. 
(b) WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following 
shall be the policies of the United States with respect to 
South Asia: 
(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by 
India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China 
at the earliest possible date. 
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the 
conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons to which both the United States and India be-
come parties. 
(3) Secure India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement 
of Interdiction Principles; 
(C) public announcement of its decision to 
conform its export control laws, regulations, 
and policies with the Australia Group and with 
the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Con-
trol Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement; 
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress 
toward implementing the decision described in 
subparagraph (C); and 
(E) ratification of or accession to the Con-
vention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 
12, 1997. 
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation 
in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if 
necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts 
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a 
nuclear weapons capability (including the capability 
to enrich or process nuclear materials), and the 
means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. 
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon 
arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduc-
tion and eventual elimination.
(6) To ensure that spent fuel generated in In-
dia’s civilian nuclear power reactors is not trans-
ferred to the United States except pursuant to the 
Congressional review procedures required under sec-
tion 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2160 f.). 
(7) Pending implementation of a multilateral 
moratorium, encourage India not to increase its pro-
duction of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities. 
SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL AP-
PROVAL. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, if the President makes the determination de-
scribed in subsection (b), the President may—
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear 
cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153)) from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of 
such Act, and such agreement for cooperation may 
only enter into force in accordance with subsection 
(f); 
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with 
respect to India, provided that such waiver shall
cease to be effective if the President determines that 
India has engaged in any activity described section 
129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than sec-
tion 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such 
Act, at any time after the date of the enactment of 
this Act; and 
(3) with respect to India—
(A) waive the restrictions of section 129 
a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any activity that oc-
curred on or before July 18, 2005; and 
(B) section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act. 
(b) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—The de-
termination referred to in subsection (a) is a determina-
tion by the President that the following actions have oc-
curred: 
(1) India has provided the United States and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency with a 
credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear 
facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a 
declaration regarding its civil facilities with the 
IAEA. 
(2) India and the IAEA have concluded an 
agreement requiring the application of IAEA safe-
guards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA
standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA 
Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) 
to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and pro-
grams as declared in the plan described in para-
graph (1), including materials used in or produced 
through the use of India’s civil nuclear facilities. 
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial 
progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol 
consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and poli-
cies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear pro-
gram. 
(4) India is working actively with the United 
States for the early conclusion of a multilateral 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 
(5) India is working with and supporting 
United States and international efforts to prevent 
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing tech-
nology. 
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure 
nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, 
including through—
(A) the enactment and enforcement of 
comprehensive export control legislation and 
regulations;
(B) harmonization of its export control 
laws, regulations, policies, and practices with 
the policies and practices of the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime and the Nuclear Sup-
pliers Group; and 
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG 
in accordance with the procedures of those re-
gimes for unilateral adherence. 
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to per-
mit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the 
guidelines of the NSG. 
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit 
to the Committee on International Relations of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate information con-
cerning any determination made pursuant to sub-
section (b), together with a report detailing the basis 
for the determination. 
(2) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—To the 
fullest extent available to the United States, the in-
formation referred to in paragraph (1) shall include 
the following: 
(A) A summary of the plan provided by 
India to the United States and the IAEA to
separate India’s civil and military nuclear facili-
ties, materials, and programs, and the declara-
tion made by India to the IAEA identifying In-
dia’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA 
safeguards, including an analysis of the credi-
bility of such plan and declaration, together 
with copies of the plan and declaration. 
(B) A summary of the agreement that has 
been entered into between India and the IAEA 
requiring the application of safeguards in ac-
cordance with IAEA practices to India’s civil 
nuclear facilities as declared in the plan de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), together with a 
copy of the agreement, and a description of the 
progress toward its full implementation. 
(C) A summary of the progress made to-
ward conclusion and implementation of an Ad-
ditional Protocol between India and the IAEA, 
including a description of the scope of such Ad-
ditional Protocol. 
(D) A description of the steps that India 
is taking to work with the United States for the 
conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weap-
ons, including a description of the steps that
the United States has taken and will take to 
encourage India to identify and declare a date 
by which India would be willing to stop produc-
tion of fissile material for nuclear weapons uni-
laterally or pursuant to a multilateral morato-
rium or treaty. 
(E) A description of the steps India is tak-
ing to prevent the spread of nuclear-related 
technology, including enrichment and reprocess-
ing technology or materials that can be used to 
acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well 
as the support that India is providing to the 
United States to further United States objec-
tives to restrict the spread of such technology. 
(F) A description of the steps that India is 
taking to secure materials and technology appli-
cable for the development, acquisition, or manu-
facture of weapons of mass destruction and the 
means to deliver such weapons through the ap-
plication of comprehensive export control legis-
lation and regulations, and through harmoni-
zation and adherence to Missile Technology 
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, 
and United Nations Security Council Resolution
1540, and participation in the Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative. 
(G) A description of the decision taken 
within the Nuclear Suppliers Group relating to 
nuclear 
cooperation 
with 
India, 
including 
whether nuclear cooperation by the United 
States under an agreement for cooperation ar-
ranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is con-
sistent with the decision, practices, and policies 
of the NSG. 
(H) A description of the scope of peaceful 
cooperation envisioned by the United States 
and India that will be implemented under the 
Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, including 
whether such cooperation will include the provi-
sion of enrichment and reprocessing technology. 
(I) A description of the steps taken to en-
sure that proposed United States civil nuclear 
assistance to India will not directly, or in any 
other way, assist India’s nuclear weapons pro-
gram, including—
(i) the use of any United States 
equipment, technology, or nuclear material
by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facil-
ity or nuclear-weapons related complex; 
(ii) the replication and subsequent use 
of any United States technology in an 
unsafeguarded 
nuclear 
facility 
or 
unsafeguarded 
nuclear 
weapons-related 
complex, or for any activity related to the 
research, development, testing, or manu-
facture of nuclear explosive devices; and 
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in 
such a manner as to facilitate the in-
creased production of highly-enriched ura-
nium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nu-
clear facilities. 
(d) RESTRICTIONS
ON NUCLEAR TRANSFERS
TO 
INDIA.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Pursuant to the obligations 
of the United States under Article I of the NPT, 
nothing in this Act, or any agreement pursuant to 
this Act, shall be interpreted as permitting any civil 
nuclear cooperation between the United States and 
India that would in any way assist, encourage, or in-
duce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nu-
clear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
(2) NSG TRANSFER
GUIDELINES.—Notwith-
standing the entry into force of an agreement for 
nuclear cooperation with India pursuant to section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item 
subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer 
guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India 
if such transfer would violate or be inconsistent with 
the transfer guidelines of the NSG as in effect on 
the date of the transfer. 
(3) TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO 
INDIA.—Notwithstanding the entry into force of an 
agreement for nuclear cooperation with India pursu-
ant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to 
this Act, exports of nuclear and nuclear-related ma-
terial, equipment, or technology to India shall be ter-
minated if India makes any materially significant 
transfer of—
(A) nuclear or nuclear-related material, 
equipment, or technology that does not conform 
to NSG guidelines, or 
(B) ballistic missiles or missile-related 
equipment or technology that does not conform 
to MTCR guidelines,
unless the President determines that cessation of 
such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the 
achievement of United States nonproliferation objec-
tives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense 
and security. 
(4) PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO 
INDIA.—If nuclear transfers to India are restricted 
pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the Presi-
dent should seek to prevent the transfer to India of 
nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from 
other participating governments in the NSG or from 
any other source. 
(e) APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT FOR NUCLEAR CO-
OPERATION REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—An agreement for nuclear 
cooperation between the United States and India 
submitted pursuant to this section may become ef-
fective only if—
(A) the President submits to Congress the 
agreement concluded between the United States 
and India, including a copy of the safeguards 
agreement entered into between the IAEA and 
India relating to India’s declared civilian nu-
clear facilities, in accordance with the require-
ments and procedures of section 123 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (other than section 
123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act; and 
(B) after the submission under subpara-
graph (A), the agreement is approved by a joint 
resolution that is enacted into law. 
(2) CONSULTATION.—Beginning one month 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 
month thereafter until the President submits to Con-
gress the agreement referred to in paragraph (1), 
the President should consult with the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate regarding the status of the negotiations be-
tween the United States and India with respect to 
civilian nuclear cooperation and between the IAEA 
and India with respect to the safeguards agreement 
described in subsection (b)(2). 
(f) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.—For pur-
poses of this section, a joint resolution referred to in sub-
section (e)(1)(B) is a joint resolution of the two Houses 
of Congress—
(1) the matter after the resolving clause of 
which is as follows: ‘‘That the Congress hereby ap-
proves the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Be-
tween the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of India submitted by the President on 
lllllllllll.’’, with the blank space 
being filled with the appropriate date; 
(2) which does not have a preamble; and 
(3) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘Joint Reso-
lution Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Co-
operation Between the United States and India’’. 
(g) CONSIDERATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION OF AP-
PROVAL.—The provisions of paragraphs (2) through (6) 
of section 130 i. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2159 i.) shall apply to a joint resolution under sub-
section (f) of this section to the same extent as such provi-
sions apply to a joint resolution under section 130 i. of 
such Act. No amendment to, or motion to recommit, a 
joint resolution under subsection (f) of this section is in 
order. 
(h) SECTION 123 OF ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 
NOT AFFECTED.—Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this 
section does not preclude the approval, under section 123 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of 
an agreement for cooperation in which India is the cooper-
ating party.
(i) SUNSET.—The procedures under this section shall 
cease to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolu-
tion under this section. 
(j) REPORTS.—
(1) POLICY OBJECTIVES.—The President shall, 
not later than January 31, 2007, and not later than 
January 31 of each year thereafter, submit to the 
Committee on International Relations of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate a report on—
(A) the extent to which each policy objec-
tive in section 3(b) has been achieved; 
(B) the steps taken by the United States 
and India in the preceding calendar year to ac-
complish those objectives; 
(C) the extent of cooperation by other 
countries in achieving those objectives; and 
(D) the steps the United States will take 
in the current calendar year to accomplish those 
objectives. 
(2) NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO INDIA.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 
after the date on which an agreement for nu-
clear cooperation between the United States 
and India is approved by Congress under sec-
tion 4(f) and every year thereafter, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate a report describing United States 
exports to India for the preceding year pursu-
ant to such agreement and the anticipated ex-
ports to India for the next year pursuant to 
such agreement. 
(B) NUCLEAR
FUEL.—The report de-
scribed in subparagraph (A) shall also include 
(in a classified form if necessary)—
(i) an estimate for the previous year 
of the amount of uranium mined in India; 
(ii) the amount of such uranium that 
has likely been used or allocated for the 
production of nuclear explosive devices; 
(iii) the rate of production of—
(I) fissile material for nuclear ex-
plosive devices; and 
(II) nuclear explosive devices; 
and 
(iv) an analysis as to whether im-
ported uranium has affected such rate of 
production of nuclear explosive devices.
(C) UNSAFEGUARDED
NUCLEAR
FACILI-
TIES.—The report described in subparagraph 
(A) shall also include (in a classified form if 
necessary) a description of whether United 
States civil nuclear assistance to India is di-
rectly, or in any other way, assisting India’s nu-
clear weapons program, including—
(i) the use of any United States 
equipment, technology, or nuclear material 
by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facil-
ity or nuclear-weapons related complex; 
(ii) the replication and subsequent use 
of any United States technology in an 
unsafeguarded 
nuclear 
facility 
or 
unsafeguarded 
nuclear 
weapons-related 
complex, or for any activity related to the 
research, development, testing, or manu-
facture of nuclear explosive devices; and 
(iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in 
such a manner as to facilitate the in-
creased production of highly-enriched ura-
nium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nu-
clear facilities. 
(3) NEW NUCLEAR REACTORS OR FACILITIES.—
Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the Committee on International 
Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a re-
port describing any new nuclear reactors or nuclear 
facilities that the Government of India has des-
ignated as civilian and placed under inspections or 
has designated as military. 
(4) DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL.—Not 
later than one year after the date on which an 
agreement for nuclear cooperation between the 
United States and India is approved by Congress 
under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate a report describing the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program. 
(5) GROWTH IN INDIA’S MILITARY FISSILE MA-
TERIAL PRODUCTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 
after the date on which an agreement for nu-
clear cooperation between the United States 
and India is approved by Congress under sec-
tion 4(f) and every year thereafter, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate a report that—
(i) measures the effectiveness of the 
civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 
achieving the goals and objectives de-
scribed in section 2; and 
(ii) assesses the relative level of In-
dia’s nuclear fissile material production 
compared to the previous year. 
(B) CONTENTS.—The report described in 
subparagraph (A) shall also include information 
relating to—
(i) the amount of natural uranium 
India has mined and milled during the pre-
vious year; 
(ii) the
amount of electricity
In-
dia’s civilian reactors have produced during 
the previous year; 
(iii) the amount of
domestic natural 
uranium India has used in its declared ci-
vilian reactors to produce electricity during 
the previous year;
(iv) the amount of fissile material 
India has produced for military purposes 
during the previous year; 
(v) the amount of domestic natural 
uranium and domestic enrichment capacity
India has used to produce such fissile ma-
terial; 
(vi) the amount of
domestic
ura-
nium India has otherwise stockpiled
for 
possible civil or military use; 
(vii) an identification of any changes 
with regard to these quantities from the 
previous year; and 
(viii) any additional qualitative factors 
determined to be relevant with respect to 
subparagraph (A), as appropriate, such as 
the location of production facilities. 
(C) PREPARATION; FORM
OF
REPORT.—
The report should rely on public information to 
the extent possible. The report shall include a 
classified annex if necessary. 
(k) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 
(1) IAEA.—The term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
(2) MTCR.—The term ‘‘MTCR’’ means the 
Missile Technology Control Regime. 
(3) NPT.—The term ‘‘NPT’’ means the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
(4) NPT MEMBER.—The term ‘‘NPT member’’ 
means a country that is a party to the NPT. 
(5) NSG.—The term ‘‘NSG’’ means the Nu-
clear Suppliers Group.
Passed the House of Representatives July 26, 2006. 
Attest:
Clerk.