498 
SEC. 1232. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN ANNUAL REPORT ON 
MILITARY POWER OF IRAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1245(b)(3) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public 
Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2542) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 
the end; 
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period 
at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
paragraphs: 
‘‘(E) a description of the strategy and struc-
ture of the global Iranian Threat Network and 
an assessment of the capability of such Network 
and how such Network operates to reinforce 
Iran’s grand strategy; and 
‘‘(F) a description of the gaps in intel-
ligence of the Department of Defense with respect 
to Iran and a prioritization of those gaps in in-
telligence by operational need.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this 
section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 
Act and shall apply with respect to reports required to be 
submitted under section 1245 of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, as so amended, on 
or after that date. 
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SEC. 1233. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE DEFENSE OF THE 
ARABIAN GULF. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In response to U.S. Central Command re-
quirements, the United States Navy has maintained, 
on average, more than one aircraft carrier in the Ara-
bian Gulf for more than five years. 
(2) In February 2013, the senior leadership of 
the Department of Defense elected to reduce the num-
ber of aircraft carriers deployed to the Arabian Gulf 
in light of budget constraints and limitation of the 
overall carrier force structure to support the two air-
craft carrier requirement. 
(3) In reference to the decision to indefinitely 
delay the deployment of the USS Harry Truman, 
CVN 75, and the USS Gettysburg, its cruiser escort, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Martin 
Dempsey stated, ‘‘We’re trying to stretch our readi-
ness out by keeping this particular carrier in home-
port in our global response force, so if something hap-
pens elsewhere in the world, we can respond to it. 
Had we deployed it and ‘consumed’ that readiness, we 
could have created a situation where downstream we 
wouldn’t have a carrier present in certain parts of the 
world at all.’’. 
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(4) Highlighting the risks of having only one 
aircraft carrier in the region and relying on land- 
based aircraft, General Dempsey stated, ‘‘When you 
have carrier-based aircraft, you have complete auton-
omy and control over when you use them. When you 
use land-based aircraft, you often have to have host- 
nation permission to use them.’’. 
(5) Addressing the perception of the United 
States commitment to the region, General James 
Mattis, Commander of U.S. Central Command, testi-
fied in March 2013, ‘‘Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S. 
interests in the region is a perceived lack of an endur-
ing U.S. commitment to collective interests and the 
security of our regional partners.’’. He went on to tes-
tify that, ‘‘The drawdown of our forces can be mis-
interpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of commit-
ment to the region.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) maintaining only one aircraft carrier battle 
group in the Arabian Gulf constrains United States’ 
options and could put at risk the ability to have di-
versified platforms from which to defend the Arabian 
Gulf and, if necessary, to conduct military operations 
to prevent Iran from threatening the United States, 
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United States allies, or Iran’s neighbors with nuclear 
weapons; 
(2) it is in the interests of the United States to 
maintain both land-based and sea-based capabilities 
in the region to project force; 
(3) land-based locations in the region could re-
strict United States military options and critically 
impact the operational capability if required to con-
duct a defense of the Arabian Gulf because the United 
States has not finalized bilateral security agreements 
with key Gulf Cooperation Council countries; 
(4) as a result of these and other critical limita-
tions associated with maintaining one aircraft carrier 
battle group in the Arabian Gulf, United States mili-
tary commanders have expressed concerns about the 
operational constraints, the increasing uncertainty 
among United States allies, and the emboldening of 
potential adversaries such as Iran; 
(5) regarding the ability of the United States 
Navy to maintain a two aircraft carrier presence in 
the Arabian Gulf, the Chief of Naval Operations, Ad-
miral Jonathan Greenert, stated, ‘‘We need 11 car-
riers to do the job. That’s been pretty clearly written, 
and that’s underwritten in our defense strategic guid-
ance.’’. 
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(6) the United States should construct and suffi-
ciently sustain a fleet of at least eleven aircraft car-
riers and associated battle force ships in order to meet 
current and future requirements and to support at 
least a two aircraft carrier battle group presence in 
the Arabian Gulf, in addition to meeting other oper-
ational requirements; and 
(7) the United States should finalize bilateral 
agreements with key Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries that support the Defense of the Arabian Gulf re-
quirements, at the earliest possible date. 
Subtitle E—Reports and Other 
Matters 
SEC. 1241. REPORT ON POSTURE AND READINESS OF 
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO RESPOND 
TO FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN AFRICA 
AND THE MIDDLE EAST. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya on 
September 11, 2012, may have never occurred or 
could have been prevented had there been an inter-
national stabilizing force following NATO-led oper-
ations in order to help stabilize the country, build ca-
pacity within the security forces, and pursue terrorist 
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groups that threaten the local government as well as 
United States interests; 
(2) the attack also highlighted the limitations of 
the United States military to alert, deploy, and deci-
sively counter a no-notice terrorist attack such as the 
one in Benghazi, or another security contingency, due 
to the limitations stemming from United States mili-
tary posture in Africa and the Middle East and when 
there is a lack of a layered defense at United States 
diplomatic facilities; 
(3) the United States military is more effectively 
able to respond to terrorist attacks on United States 
facilities outside of the United States if the respond-
ing United States military assets are forward de-
ployed; 
(4) when an intelligence threat assessment deter-
mines that a United States facility overseas is vulner-
able to attack, such facility should have robust force 
protection measures sufficient to safeguard personnel 
and assets until a United States military response 
can arrive; 
(5) the continually evolving terrorist threat to 
United States interests on the Continent of Africa 
and the Middle East necessitates that the United 
States military maintains a forward deployed posture 
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in Europe, Middle East, and Africa in order to be 
able to respond to terrorist events, or other security 
contingencies, and to effectively evacuate and recover 
United States personnel; 
(6) the United States military, in conjunction 
with the Department of State and the intelligence 
community, should continue to evaluate the assump-
tions underpinning the terrorist threat in order to en-
sure that it is effectively able to respond globally to 
future terrorist attacks; 
(7) the United States military should regularly 
re-evaluate the posture and alert status requirements 
of its crisis response elements in order to be more re-
sponsive to the evolving and global nature of the ter-
rorist threat, and all United States military crisis re-
sponse elements should be fully equipped with the re-
quired supporting capabilities to conduct their mis-
sions; 
(8) on April 16, 2013, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, testified be-
fore the House Appropriations Committee that the 
military is, ‘‘. . .adapting our force posture to a new 
normal of combustible violence in North Africa and in 
the Middle East’’; 
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(9) The President stated in a press conference on 
May 16, 2013, ‘‘I have directed the Defense Depart-
ment to ensure that our military can respond light-
ening quick in times of crisis.’’; 
(10) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should 
continue to evaluate the posture of United States 
forces to respond to the global terrorist threat, includ-
ing an evaluation of whether United States Africa 
Command should have forces and necessary equip-
ment permanently assigned to the command to re-
spond more promptly to this ‘‘new normal’’; and 
(11) although the Department of State-initiated 
Accountability Review Board found that the Marine 
Security Guard program should be expanded and that 
there should be greater coordination between the De-
partment of Defense and the Department of State to 
identify additional resources for security at high risk 
posts, the United States military may be challenged 
to provide additional security to Department of State 
facilities due to budget shortfalls, on-going force struc-
ture constraints, and increasing operational require-
ments for the Department of Defense. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
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Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the posture and 
readiness of United States Armed Forces to respond 
to future terrorist attacks in Africa and the Middle 
East. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall include, at a min-
imum, the following: 
(A) An assessment of terrorist groups and 
other non-state groups that threaten United 
States interests and facilities in Africa, includ-
ing a description of the key assumptions under-
pinning such assessment. 
(B) A description of the readiness, posture, 
and alert status of relevant United States Armed 
Forces in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and 
the United States and any changes implemented 
or planned to be implemented since the terrorist 
attack in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 
2012, to respond to the ‘‘new normal’’ and Presi-
dent Obama’s directive for the military to re-
spond ‘‘lightening quick’’ in times of crisis. 
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(C) In consultation with the Secretary of 
State, a description of new or modified require-
ments of the Department of State, if any, for— 
(i) United States Marine Security 
Guard Detachments; 
(ii) any other Department of Defense 
assets to provide enhanced security at De-
partment of State facilities; 
(iii) an explanation of how any new 
requirements for Marine Security Detach-
ments or other Department of Defense assets 
affect the capacity of the Armed Forces, in-
cluding specifically the capacity of the Ma-
rine Corps, to fulfill Department of Defense 
operational requirements; and 
(iv) an explanation of how any 
unfulfilled requirements for Marine Secu-
rity Detachments would adversely impact 
security at Department of State facilities. 
(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate; and 
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(B) the Committee on Armed Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives. 
SEC. 1242. ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) Egypt is undergoing a significant political 
transition and the ultimate outcome of this political 
process and its implications for United States na-
tional security interests remain uncertain; 
(2) the United States continues to have consider-
able concerns about the intentions and actions of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and whether the gov-
ernment of President Morsi is committed to a plural-
istic, democratic Egypt; 
(3) the United States has a stake in Egypt be-
coming a mature, pluralistic democracy in which the 
rights of Egyptian citizens, including women and mi-
norities, are protected; 
(4) the United States should continue to closely 
monitor President Morsi’s support for the peace trea-
ty with the Government of Israel, which has been a 
stabilizing force in the region for over 30 years; 
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(5) the United States military relationship with 
the Egyptian military is long-standing and should re-
main a key pillar to, and component of, United 
States engagement with Egypt; 
(6) the close military-to-military relationship be-
tween the United States and Egypt has been a crit-
ical component in enabling counterterrorism coopera-
tion between the two governments to ensure the 
United States military has freedom of movement 
throughout the region in order to deter aggression and 
respond to threats to United States national security 
interests, particularly in light of the security situa-
tion in Libya and the Sinai; 
(7) the Egyptian military has exercised restraint 
and professionalism during the unrest in Egypt over 
the last two years and hopefully will remain a key 
mechanism through which the United States can sup-
port the people of Egypt in achieving their goals for 
a representative and democratic political system, 
while promoting peace and security in the region; 
and 
(8) therefore, with appropriate vetting, United 
States military assistance and support to the Egyp-
tian military should continue, even as civilian aid to 
Egypt receives greater scrutiny as a result of the un-
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certainty associated with Egypt’s current political 
leadership and economic policies. 
(b) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees a report that contains a comprehensive plan for 
United States military assistance and cooperation 
with Egypt. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
quired under paragraph (1) shall include, at a min-
imum, a detailed description of the following: 
(A) How United States security assistance 
and cooperation enables— 
(i) freedom of movement for the United 
States military throughout the region; and 
(ii) the Government of Egypt to dis-
rupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, affili-
ated groups, and other terrorist organiza-
tions, whether based in and operating from 
Egyptian territory or the region. 
(B) The capacity of the Government of 
Egypt to prevent the illicit movement of terror-
ists, criminals, weapons, and other dangerous 
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material across Egypt’s borders or administra-
tive boundaries, including through tunnels and 
other illicit points of entry into Gaza. 
(C) The extent to which the Egyptian mili-
tary is— 
(i) supporting the protection of the po-
litical, economic, and religious freedoms 
and human rights of all citizens and resi-
dents in Egypt; 
(ii) supporting credible and legitimate 
elections in Egypt; 
(iii) supporting the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty; 
(iv) taking effective steps to eliminate 
smuggling networks and to detect and de-
stroy tunnels between Egypt and Gaza; and 
(v) supporting action to combat ter-
rorism in the Sinai. 
(3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and 
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(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1243. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE MILITARY DEVEL-
OPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(‘‘North Korea’’) has escalated regional tensions with 
hostile rhetoric and provocative actions. 
(2) North Korea threatened a nuclear attack on 
the United States and a resumption of open war 
against the Republic of Korea (‘‘South Korea’’). 
(3) North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile programs constitute a threat to the national 
security of the United States and to regional stability. 
(4) On April 14, 2009, North Korea halted nego-
tiations regarding its nuclear weapons program when 
it abandoned the Six-Party Talks with the People’s 
Republic of China (‘‘China’’), Japan, the Russian 
Federation (‘‘Russia’’), South Korea, and the United 
States. 
(5) On May 25, 2009, North Korea detonated a 
nuclear device in an underground explosive test. 
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(6) On March 26, 2010, North Korea sank a 
South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, killing 46 
South Korean sailors. 
(7) On November 23, 2010, North Korea shelled 
the border island of Yeonpyeong-do, killing four peo-
ple. This was the first direct artillery attack on South 
Korean territory since the signing of the 1953 armi-
stice. 
(8) On April 13, 2012, North Korea conducted a 
rocket launch that failed to send a satellite into orbit. 
This launch violated United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolutions 1718 and 1874. 
(9) On December 12, 2012, North Korea used 
banned long-range missile technology to launch an 
earth observation satellite into orbit. In response, the 
UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 2087, con-
demning the launch. 
(10) On February 12, 2013, North Korea con-
ducted a third underground nuclear test in violation 
of UNSC Resolution 1718, 1874, and 2087. The test 
also contravened North Korea’s commitments under 
the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party 
Talks. 
(11) On March 7, 2013, the UNSC unanimously 
adopted Resolution 2094, condemning North Korea’s 
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third nuclear test and imposed additional sanctions 
against the regime. 
(12) On March 28, 2013, North Korea unilater-
ally nullified the armistice agreement with the United 
States that suspended military conflict on the Korean 
peninsula. 
(13) On March 30, 2013, North Korea declared 
a state of war with South Korea. 
(14) On April 4, 2013, North Korea placed two 
intermediate-range Musudan missiles on mobile 
launchers and temporarily relocated them to the east-
ern coast of the Korean peninsula before removing 
them a month later from the launch sites. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the United States and its allies, South Korea 
and Japan, share the goal of a stable and peaceful 
Korean Peninsula, free of nuclear weapons; 
(2) the United States remains committed to de-
fending its allies in the Asia-Pacific region and sta-
bility in Northeast Asia requires restraint by all par-
ties from activities that would complicate inter-
national relations or escalate international tensions, 
and international disputes should be mitigated in a 
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constructive manner consistent with established prin-
ciples of international law; 
(3) Congress supports— 
(A) the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, 
(B) North Korea’s abandonment of its nu-
clear programs and return to the Treaty on the 
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; 
and 
(C) North Korea’s full acceptance of and 
compliance with the terms of the 1953 Armistice 
Agreement; 
(4) the United States has national interests in 
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the 
implementation of the United States-Korea Free 
Trade Agreement, nuclear non-proliferation efforts, 
the promotion of respect for the fundamental human 
rights of the North Korean people, international 
cyber-security cooperation, and full implementation of 
United States and multilateral sanctions against il-
licit activities; 
(5) the United States encourages China and Rus-
sia to fully implement and enforce United States and 
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United Nations Security Council sanctions against 
North Korea; and 
(6) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Defense should keep Congress fully in-
formed on security developments on the Korean Pe-
ninsula. 
SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DEFENSE COOPERA-
TION WITH GEORGIA. 
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should 
enhance its defense cooperation efforts with Georgia and 
support the efforts of the Government of Georgia to provide 
for the defense of its government, people, and sovereign ter-
ritory. 
SEC. 1245. LIMITATION ON ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL 
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COORDINA-
TION CENTERS. 
(a) LIMITATION.—None of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for 
fiscal year 2014 for the Department of Defense may be obli-
gated or expended to plan, prepare, establish, or implement 
any ‘‘Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination 
Center’’ (RSCC) or similar regional coordination entities. 
(b) EXCLUSION.—The limitation contained in sub-
section (a) shall not apply with respect to any RSCC or 
similar regional coordination entity authorized by statute, 
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including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special 
Operations Headquarters authorized under section 1244 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2541). 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordi-
nation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the con-
gressional committees specified in subsection (d) a report 
on the following: 
(1) A detailed description of the intent and pur-
pose of the RSCC concept. 
(2) Defined and validated requirements justi-
fying the establishment of RSCCs or similar entities 
within each geographic combatant command, to in-
clude how such centers have been coordinated and de- 
conflicted with existing regional and multilateral 
frameworks or approaches. 
(3) An explanation of why existing regional cen-
ters and multilateral frameworks cannot satisfy the 
requirements and needs of the Department of Defense 
and geographic combatant commands. 
(4) Cost estimates across the Future Years De-
fense Program for such centers, to include estimates 
of contributions of nations participating in such cen-
ters. 
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(5) Any other matters that the Secretary of De-
fense or Secretary of State determines appropriate. 
(d) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The 
congressional committees referred to in subsection (c) are— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1246. ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON MILITARY AND SECU-
RITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMO-
CRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. 
(a) REPORT.—Subsection (a) of section 1236 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 
(Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1641), as amended by sec-
tion 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 2013 (Public Law 112–239; 126 Stat. 2042), is 
further amended by striking ‘‘November 1, 2012, and No-
vember 1, 2013,’’ and inserting ‘‘November 1, 2013, Novem-
ber 1, 2015, and November 1, 2017,’’. 
(b) UPDATE.—Section 1236 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 is amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection 
(d); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following 
new subsection: 
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‘‘(c) UPDATE.—The Secretary of Defense shall revise 
or supplement the most recent report submitted pursuant 
to subsection (a) if, in the Secretary’s estimation, interim 
events or developments occurring in a period between re-
ports required under subsection (a) warrant revision or 
supplement.’’. 
SEC. 1247. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL REPORT UNDER ARMS 
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACT. 
(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 
Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
U.S.C. 2593a) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and to the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate’’ 
and inserting ‘‘the appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’ means— 
‘‘(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
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‘‘(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives.’’. 
(b) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Section 403 of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a), as 
amended by subsection (a) of this section, is further amend-
ed— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection 
(f); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following 
new subsection: 
‘‘(e) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than May 
15 of each year, the President shall provide to such commit-
tees a briefing on such report.’’. 
SEC. 1248. LIMITATION ON FUNDS TO PROVIDE THE RUS-
SIAN FEDERATION WITH ACCESS TO CERTAIN 
MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or oth-
erwise made available for each of the fiscal years 2014 
through 2018 for the Department of Defense may be used 
to provide the Russian Federation with access to informa-
tion regarding— 
(1) missile defense technology of the United 
States relating to hit-to-kill technology; or 
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(2) telemetry data with respect to missile defense 
interceptors or target vehicles. 
SEC. 1249. REPORTS ON ACTIONS TO REDUCE SUPPORT OF 
BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS OF CHINA, 
SYRIA, IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA. 
(a) DISCLOSURE OF AND REPORT ON RUSSIAN SUP-
PORT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS OF CHINA, SYRIA, 
IRAN, AND NORTH KOREA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall seek to en-
courage the Government of the Russian Federation to 
disclose any support by the Russian Federation or 
Russian entities for the ballistic missile programs of 
the People’s Republic of China, Syria, Iran, or North 
Korea. 
(2) REPORT
REQUIRED.—The President shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a 
semi-annual report on any disclosure by the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation of any such support 
during the preceding six-month period. 
(3) INITIAL
REPORT.—The initial report re-
quired by paragraph (2) shall be submitted not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act and in addition to addressing any such support 
during the preceding six-month period shall also ad-
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dress any such support during the 10-year period 
ending on the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(b) COOPERATION OF RUSSIA AND CHINA TO REDUCE 
TECHNOLOGY AND EXPERTISE THAT SUPPORTS THE BAL-
LISTIC
MISSILE
PROGRAMS
OF
SYRIA, IRAN, NORTH 
KOREA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co-
ordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall de-
velop a plan to seek and secure the cooperation of the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China to verifiably reduce the spread of technology 
and expertise that supports the ballistic missile pro-
grams of the Syria, Iran, North Korea, or any other 
country that the Secretary of State determines has a 
ballistic missile program. 
(2) REPORT
AND
BRIEFINGS
REQUIRED.—The 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act a report describing the plan re-
quired in paragraph (1) and provide briefings to such 
committees annually thereafter until 2018 on the 
progress and results of these efforts. 
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(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
(c) FORM.—Each report required by this section shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classi-
fied annex, if necessary. 
SEC. 1250. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO 
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—With respect to an agreement on 
the status of forces between the United States and a foreign 
country, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, shall notify the appropriate congres-
sional committees not later than 15 days after the date on 
which the agreement is signed, renewed, amended or other-
wise revised, or terminated. 
(b) BRIEFINGS REQUIRED.—Not later than February 
1 of each calendar year, the Secretary of Defense, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of State, shall provide a brief-
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(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘a 
specific weapon system’’ and inserting ‘‘activi-
ties’’; and 
(3) in subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e), by strik-
ing ‘‘Weapon System Partnership Agreement’’ each 
place it appears and inserting ‘‘Support Partnership 
Agreement’’. 
(b) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 21(e)(3) of 
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761(e)(3)) is 
amended— 
(1) in subparagraphs (A) and (C)(i), by striking 
‘‘Maintenance and Supply Agency of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization’’ and inserting ‘‘North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO) Support Organiza-
tion and its executive agencies’’; 
(2) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking ‘‘weapon 
system partnership agreement’’ and inserting ‘‘sup-
port partnership agreement’’; and 
(3) in subparagraph (C)(i)(II), by striking ‘‘a 
specific weapon system’’ and inserting ‘‘activities’’. 
SEC. 1253. LIMITATION ON FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT EXECU-
TIVE AGREEMENTS RELATING TO UNITED 
STATES MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress reaffirms, with 
respect to executive agreements relating to the missile de-
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(1) AUTHORITY.—Upon determination by the 
Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in 
the national interest, the Secretary may transfer 
amounts of authorizations made available to the De-
partment of Defense in this title for fiscal year 2014 
between any such authorizations for that fiscal year 
(or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authoriza-
tions so transferred shall be merged with and be 
available for the same purposes as the authorization 
to which transferred. 
(2) LIMITATION.—The total amount of author-
izations that the Secretary may transfer under the 
authority 
of 
this 
subsection 
may 
not 
exceed 
$3,000,000,000. 
(b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—Transfers under this 
section shall be subject to the same terms and conditions 
as transfers under section 1001. 
(c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—The transfer authority 
provided by this section is in addition to the transfer au-
thority provided under section 1001. 
Subtitle C—Limitations and Other 
Matters 
SEC. 1531. AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND. 
(a) CONTINUATION OF EXISTING LIMITATIONS ON USE 
OF FUNDS IN FUND.—Funds available to the Department 
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