Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘En-
suring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act’’ 
or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Definitions. 
Sec. 3. Findings. 
Sec. 4. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 6. Rules of construction. 
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
Subtitle A—Science and Technology 
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply 
chain diversification and management. 
Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base. 
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development 
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment 
standards. 
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure. 
Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign en-
ergy development. 
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership 
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order. 
Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People’s Re-
public of China. 
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pa-
cific. 
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion. 
Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues. 
Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements. 
Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership. 
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition. 
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Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership 
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy. 
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leader-
ship. 
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets. 
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross- 
border payment and financial messaging systems. 
TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters 
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation. 
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group. 
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN. 
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative. 
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries. 
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership. 
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review. 
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act. 
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act. 
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program. 
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the 
Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking. 
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utiliza-
tion of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. 
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Fi-
nance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing. 
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic 
national security and economic objectives. 
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program. 
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation. 
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center. 
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic. 
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018. 
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program. 
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language. 
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan 
Act of 2021. 
Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding. 
Subtitle B—International Security Matters 
Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress. 
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training 
in the Indo-Pacific. 
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international 
waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial 
land features in the South China Sea. 
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Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. 
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Com-
munist Party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA–supported institutions. 
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power 
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement. 
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement. 
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations. 
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers. 
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations. 
Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power 
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the 
world. 
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations. 
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Cana-
dian citizens. 
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada. 
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human 
rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean re-
garding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive 
surveillance technologies. 
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative. 
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership. 
Sec. 251. Countering China’s educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin Amer-
ica. 
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships. 
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector fi-
nance. 
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and be-
tween China and Russia. 
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia. 
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia. 
Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review. 
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PART IV—AFRICA 
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s 
Republic of China in Africa. 
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. 
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa. 
Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. 
Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks. 
Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification. 
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement. 
Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People’s Republic of China-Iran relationship. 
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy. 
Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic 
Council. 
PART VII—OCEANIA 
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania. 
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap. 
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue. 
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships. 
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS 
Sec. 295. Short title. 
Sec. 296. Findings. 
Sec. 297. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 298. Definition. 
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports. 
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners. 
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime. 
Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands. 
Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands. 
TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES 
Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms 
of the people of Hong Kong. 
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong 
Kong. 
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice. 
Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force. 
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities 
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor. 
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection. 
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Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that 
commit human rights abuses. 
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet. 
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or 
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Ti-
betan Buddhists. 
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall 
circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong. 
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human 
rights violations. 
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination. 
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to inter-
national abuses of human rights. 
Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII 
Paralympic Winter Games. 
Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to en-
able human rights abuses. 
Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy. 
Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abor-
tion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implanta-
tion in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech. 
Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China ex-
ploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protec-
tions. 
Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices. 
Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People’s Republic of 
China. 
Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province. 
Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group. 
Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information. 
TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People’s Republic of China’s industrial 
policy. 
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams. 
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy. 
Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies. 
TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY 
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. 
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China 
on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues. 
Sec. 503. Countering the People’s Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic 
missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East. 
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 
Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the People’s 
Republic of China and other countries account for environmental 
issues and climate change. 
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Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions. 
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China. 
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People’s Republic 
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic 
interests. 
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy. 
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 
security. 
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high- 
GWP hydrofluorocarbons. 
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation 
through the Green Climate Fund. 
Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action. 
Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation. 
Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States sup-
ply chains. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
(2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
(3) PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION
ARMY; PLA.—The 
terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 
the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 
(4) PRC; 
CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 
‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 
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SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
tary, technological, and ideological power to become a 
strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United 
States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC 
in these domains are contrary to the interests and 
values of the United States, its partners, and much 
of the rest of the world. 
(2) A number of policies being pursued by the 
PRC— 
(A) threaten the future character of the 
international order and are shaping the rules, 
norms, and institutions that govern relations 
among states; 
(B) will put at risk the ability of the 
United States to secure its national interests; 
and 
(C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
perity, and freedom of the international commu-
nity in the coming decades. 
(3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 
the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked 
to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop-
ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefited 
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from, the free and open international order. The 
United States pursued these goals and contributed to 
the welfare of the Chinese people by— 
(A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations 
and access to global capital markets; 
(B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization; 
(C) providing development finance and 
technical assistance; 
(D) promoting research collaboration; 
(E) educating the PRC’s top students; 
(F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
technologies and scientific knowledge; and 
(G) providing intelligence and military as-
sistance. 
(4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 
pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 
increasingly authoritarian governance model at home 
through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, 
and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These 
policies frequently and deliberately undermine United 
States interests and are contrary to core United 
States values and the values of other nations, both in 
the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra-
tegic decision of the CCP, the United States has been 
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compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy to-
wards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the inter-
national order. 
(5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the 
Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi 
Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the 
Chinese Nation’’ as central to the domestic and for-
eign policy of the PRC. His program demands— 
(A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 
(B) concentration of military power; 
(C) a dominant role for the CCP in the 
state and the economy; 
(D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 
control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 
and 
(E) the denial of any universal values and 
individual rights that are deemed to threaten the 
CCP. 
(6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern-
ance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitu-
tional models of the United States and other democ-
racies. This approach to governance is lauded by the 
CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a 
global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. 
In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ‘‘We 
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firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that 
the superiority of our socialist system will be increas-
ingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of devel-
opment will have increasingly greater influence on the 
world.’’. 
(7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish re-
gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use 
that dominant position to propel the PRC to become 
the ‘‘leading world power’’, shaping an international 
order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving 
these objectives requires turning the PRC into a 
wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a 
strong military and advanced technological capability 
to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other 
countries’ interests. 
(8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
national order, which is built upon the rule of law 
and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
ducting global information and influence operations, 
seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 
align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le-
gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, 
and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of 
multinational organizations for the benefit of the 
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PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense 
of the interests of the United States and the inter-
national community. 
(9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 
follow its model of development and governance. Dur-
ing the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Sec-
retary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model 
of development for other countries by utilizing ‘‘Chi-
nese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solving 
problems’’. 
(10) The PRC is promoting its governance model 
and attempting to weaken other models of governance 
by— 
(A) undermining democratic institutions; 
(B) subverting financial institutions; 
(C) coercing businesses to accommodate the 
policies of the PRC; and 
(D) using disinformation to disguise the na-
ture of the actions described in subparagraphs 
(A) through (C). 
(11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming 
the global leader in science and technology. In May 
2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to 
reach ‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to ‘‘en-
deavor to be a major world center for science and in-
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novation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 
billions of dollars into education and research and de-
velopment and established joint scientific research 
centers and science universities. 
(12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufac-
turing and technological superpower’’ and to promote 
‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is coming 
at the expense of human rights and longstanding 
international rules and norms with respect to eco-
nomic competition, and presents a challenge to 
United States national security and the security of 
allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the 
PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli-
cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, 
and a significant role of the state in internet govern-
ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct 
and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev-
eryday lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘civil-military 
fusion’’ mandates that civil and commercial research, 
which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
aged to develop new military capabilities. 
(13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means 
to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing 
and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-
rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to 
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ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP 
engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
dermine a free and open international market, such 
as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans-
fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda-
tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi-
ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and 
foreign companies. 
(14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) 
are designed to freeze United States and other foreign 
firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-
tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza-
tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation 
of its World Trade Organization commitments. In 
May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC 
aims to keep the ‘‘initiatives of innovation and devel-
opment security . . . in [China’s] own hands’’. 
(15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives 
through a variety of avenues, including its signature 
initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in 
this section as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in the Chi-
nese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road 
and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a 
straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all 
countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of eco-
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nomic relations with the PRC at its center, making 
it the most concrete geographical representation of the 
PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic 
influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets, 
enhances the PRC’s political leverage with govern-
ment leaders around the world, and provides greater 
access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. 
Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference 
through economic dependence. 
(16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re-
gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace 
the United States from the region. As a Pacific 
power, the United States has built and supported en-
during alliances and economic partnerships that se-
cure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of 
law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo- 
Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili-
tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests. 
(17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep 
the United States military from operating in the 
Western Pacific and erodes United States security 
guarantees. 
(18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive 
control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air 
space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually 
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exercising greater influence beyond the region. This 
includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy 
exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op-
erations in areas permitted under international law. 
(19) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’ 
with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately 
be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called ‘‘re-
unification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal 
inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Sec-
retary Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise 
to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option 
of taking all necessary means’’. Taiwan’s embodiment 
of democratic values and economic liberalism chal-
lenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving na-
tional rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-
wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island 
Chain and to project power into the Second Island 
Chain and beyond. 
(20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat-
ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com-
merce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA 
power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimi-
dates other regional claimants in an effort to advance 
its unlawful claims and control the waters around 
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neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi’s 
September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC 
was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 
2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi an-
nounced that ‘‘construction on islands and reefs in 
the South China Sea have seen steady progress’’. 
(21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA 
to attain a level of capacity and capability superior 
to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
duct of modern military operations by shifting its 
military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate [for] 
China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force ‘‘commen-
surate with China’s international status’’. Ultimately, 
this transformation could enable China to impose its 
will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of 
military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi estab-
lished the following developmental benchmarks for the 
advancement of the PLA: 
(A) A mechanized force with increased 
informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020. 
(B) The complete modernization of China’s 
national defense by 2035. 
(C) The full transformation of the PLA into 
a world-class force by 2050. 
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(22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies 
described in this section undermine United States in-
terests, such as— 
(A) upholding a free and open international 
order; 
(B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
national institutions with liberal norms and val-
ues; 
(C) preserving a favorable balance of power 
in the Indo-Pacific; 
(D) ensuring the defense of its allies; 
(E) preserving open sea and air lanes; 
(F) fostering the free flow of commerce 
through open and transparent markets; and 
(G) promoting individual freedom and 
human rights. 
(23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten-
sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be-
havior and therefore increased the need for United 
States global leadership and a competitive posture. 
The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the 
COVID–19 pandemic by— 
(A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 
Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called 
‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong; 
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(B) aggressively imposing its will in the 
East and South China Seas; 
(C) increasing its territorial aggression in 
South Asia, including against India; and 
(D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up 
the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion 
about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
credit the United States, its allies, and global 
health efforts. 
(24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re-
ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included— 
(A) concerted efforts, in the early days of 
the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope 
of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well 
as cases of person-to-person transmission; 
(B) claims that the virus originated in 
United States biological defense research at Fort 
Detrick, Maryland; 
(C) Chinese state media reports insinuating 
a possible link between the virus and other 
United States biological facilities; and 
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(D) efforts to block access to qualified inter-
national infectious disease experts who might 
contradict the CCP’s narrative. 
(25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and poli-
cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra-
tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro-
mote our vital interests and values. 
(26) The United States policy of strategic com-
petition with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China is part of a broader strategic approach to the 
Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with coopera-
tion with United States allies and partners to ad-
vance shared values and interests and to preserve and 
enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules- 
based, stable, and diverse region. 
(27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive 
framework for promoting United State security inter-
ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa-
cific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years— 
(A) to support greater security and defense 
cooperation between the United States and allies 
and partners in the Indo-Pacific region; 
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(B) to advance democracy and the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo- 
Pacific region; 
(C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be-
tween the United States and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(D) to deepen people-to-people engagement 
through programs such as the Young Southeast 
Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth 
Volunteers program; and 
(E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States 
to pursue the following objectives: 
(1) The United States global leadership role is 
sustained and its political system and major founda-
tions of national power are secured for the long-term 
in the political, economic, technological, and military 
domains. 
(2) The United States position as an indispen-
sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
gagement. 
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(3) The United States deters military confronta-
tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce 
the risk of conflict. 
(4) The United States and its allies maintain a 
stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with 
China. The United States and its allies maintain un-
fettered access to the region, including through free-
dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, con-
sistent with international law and practice. 
(5) The allies and partners of the United 
States— 
(A) maintain confidence in United States 
leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
cific region; 
(B) can withstand and combat subversion 
by the PRC; and 
(C) work closely with the United States in 
setting global rules, norms, and standards that 
benefit the international community. 
(6) The combined economic and military 
strength of the United States and its allies and part-
ners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of at-
tempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential 
benefits. 
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(7) The United States leads the free, open, and 
rules-based international order, which comprises resil-
ient states and institutions that uphold and defend 
principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi-
vidual freedom, and human rights. The international 
order is strong enough to withstand attempts at desta-
bilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 
(8) The key rules, norms, and standards of inter-
national engagement in the 21st century are main-
tained, including— 
(A) the protection of human rights, commer-
cial engagement and investment, and technology; 
and 
(B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
are in alignment with the values and interests of 
the United States, its allies and partners, and 
other stakeholders in the liberal international 
order. 
(9) The United States counters attempts by the 
PRC to— 
(A) undermine open and democratic soci-
eties; 
(B) distort global markets; 
(C) manipulate the international trade sys-
tem; 
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(D) coerce other nations via economic, 
cyber, and military means; or 
(E) use its technological advantages to un-
dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na-
tional security interests. 
(10) The United States deters military con-
frontation with the PRC and both nations work to re-
duce the risk of conflict. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in 
pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 
(1) to strengthen the United States domestic 
foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 
growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 
improve the ability of the United States to pursue its 
vital economic, foreign policy, and national security 
interests; 
(2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 
with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
development, security, informational, and techno-
logical realms to maximize the United States’ 
strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harm-
ing the interests and values of the United States and 
its partners and allies; 
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(3) to lead a free, open, and secure international 
system characterized by the rule of law, open markets 
and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commit-
ment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, 
human rights, good and transparent governance, and 
freedom from coercion; 
(4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral 
and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance 
shared interests and values and bolster partner coun-
tries’ confidence that the United States is and will re-
main a strong, committed, and reliable partner that 
respects the views and interests of its allies and 
friends; 
(5) to encourage and collaborate with United 
States allies and partners in boosting their own capa-
bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect 
shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex-
ternal pressure; 
(6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 
healthy, constructive competition in United States- 
China economic relations by— 
(A) advancing policies that harden the 
United States economy against unfair and ille-
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gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
ercion of United States businesses; and 
(B) improving United States laws and reg-
ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-
tempts to harm United States economic competi-
tiveness; 
(7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led 
growth in emerging markets around the world, in-
cluding through the use of United States Government 
tools that— 
(A) support greater private sector invest-
ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 
that are grounded in the rule of law; 
(B) promote open markets; 
(C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
frameworks; 
(D) improve the management of key eco-
nomic sectors; 
(E) combat corruption; 
(F) foster and support greater collaboration 
with and among partner countries and the 
United States private sector to develop secure 
and sustainable infrastructure; and 
(G) support American workers and create 
American jobs; 
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(8) to play a leading role in advancing inter-
national rules and norms that foster free and recip-
rocal trade and open and integrated markets; 
(9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in 
support of United States companies and businesses in 
partner countries that seek fair competition; 
(10) to ensure that the United States is second 
to none in the innovation of critical and emerging 
technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 
semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— 
(A) providing necessary investment and 
concrete incentives for the private sector to accel-
erate development of such technologies; 
(B) modernizing export controls and invest-
ment screening regimes and associated policies 
and regulations; 
(C) enhancing the role of the United States 
in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues 
for developing norms regarding the use of emerg-
ing critical technologies; 
(D) reducing United States barriers and in-
creasing incentives for collaboration with allies 
and partners on the research and co-development 
of critical technologies; 
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(E) collaborating with allies and partners 
to protect critical technologies by— 
(i) coordinating and aligning export 
control measures; 
(ii) building capacity for defense tech-
nology security; 
(iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-
tegically critical supply chains; and 
(iv) ensuring diversification; and 
(F) designing major defense capabilities for 
export to vetted allies and partners; 
(11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies 
and other willing partners to promote ideals and 
principles that— 
(A) advance a free and open international 
order; 
(B) strengthen democratic institutions; 
(C) protect and promote human rights; and 
(D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
porting; 
(12) to develop comprehensive strategies and 
policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; 
(13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 
United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 
multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity 
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and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating 
solutions to global challenges; 
(14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights in the United States rela-
tionship with the PRC; 
(15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a 
free and open order and address regional and global 
challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-
garding— 
(A) violations and abuses of human rights; 
(B) restrictions on religious practices; and 
(C) the undermining and abrogation of 
treaties, other international agreements, and 
other international norms related to human 
rights; 
(16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re-
pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-
vantages or compel other nations to defer to its polit-
ical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the 
United States or its allies and partners; 
(17) to maintain United States access to the 
Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-
ments in United States military capabilities, policies, 
and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust co-
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operation, exercises, and interoperability with allies 
and partners; 
(18) to deter the PRC from— 
(A) initiating armed conflict; 
(B) coercing nations; or 
(C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 
armed conflict; 
(19) to strengthen United States-PRC military- 
to-military communication and improve both mili-
tary and civilian crisis avoidance and management 
procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the 
risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level 
visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and 
military officials and other measures, in alignment 
with United States interests; and 
(20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-
picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, 
including through bilateral or multilateral means and 
at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially 
in the following areas— 
(A) global fight against climate change; 
(B) nuclear security; and 
(C) global financial stability. 
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SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol-
icy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions: 
(1) Revitalizing American leadership globally 
and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United 
States— 
(A) to marshal sustained political will to 
protect its vital interests, promote its values, and 
advance its economic and national security ob-
jectives; and 
(B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
persuade the American people and United States 
allies and partners of— 
(i) the current challenges facing the 
international rules based order; and 
(ii) the need for long-term investments 
and engagement to defend shared interests 
and values. 
(2) The United States must coordinate closely 
with allies and partners to compete effectively with 
the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 
to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 
and checking aggressive PRC behavior. 
(3) Effective United States strategy toward 
China requires— 
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(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; 
and 
(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful col-
laboration and consultation between the executive 
branch and Congress. 
(4) The United States must ensure close integra-
tion among economic and foreign policymakers and 
provide support to the private sector, civil society, 
universities and academic institutions, and other rel-
evant actors in free and open societies to enable such 
actors— 
(A) to collaborate to advance common inter-
ests; and 
(B) to identify appropriate policies— 
(i) to strengthen the United States and 
its allies; and 
(ii) to promote a compelling vision of 
a free and open order. 
(5) The United States must ensure that all Fed-
eral departments, agencies, and overseas missions are 
organized and resourced to effectively defend and ad-
vance United States interests, by— 
(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo- 
Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in 
Washington, DC; 
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(B) placing greater numbers of foreign serv-
ice officers, international development profes-
sionals, members of the foreign commercial serv-
ice, intelligence professionals, and other United 
States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
region; and 
(C) ensuring that this workforce has the 
training, demonstrated proficiency in language 
and culture, technical skills, and other com-
petencies required to advance a successful strat-
egy in relation to the PRC. 
(6) The United States must place renewed pri-
ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary 
instruments of national power, including diplomacy, 
information, technology, economics, foreign assistance 
and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and 
law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the 
challenges posed by the PRC. 
(7) The United States must sustain military ca-
pabilities necessary to achieve United States political 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including— 
(A) promoting regional security in the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(B) reassuring allies and partners while 
protecting them from coercion; and 
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(C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
venting unwanted conflict. 
(8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful 
adaptation to the information environment of the 21st 
century. United States public diplomacy and mes-
saging efforts must effectively— 
(A) promote the value of partnership with 
the United States; and 
(B) 
counter 
CCP 
propaganda 
and 
disinformation that threatens United States in-
terests. 
SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON 
ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing in 
this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, 
or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United 
States Government under section 620M of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of 
title 10, United States Code. 
(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY 
FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
izing the use of military force. 
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TITLE I—INVESTING IN 
AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 
Subtitle A—Science and Technology 
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-
PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-
SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate 
the contracting by the Department of State for the profes-
sional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons 
and business entities with supply chain management issues 
related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-
ing— 
(1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 
certain production facilities to locations outside the 
PRC; 
(2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of 
the PRC; 
(3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
lenges in the course of the activities described in para-
graphs (1) and (2); and 
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(4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 
through providing market intelligence, facilitating 
contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 
and other services. 
(b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons con-
tracted to perform the services described in subsection (a) 
shall— 
(1) be under the authority of the United States 
Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 
hired, in accordance with existing United States laws; 
(2) coordinate with Department of State and De-
partment of Commerce officers; and 
(3) coordinate with United States missions and 
relevant local partners in other countries as needed to 
carry out the services described in subsection (a). 
(c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in sub-
section (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small- 
, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters 
described in subsection (a). 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out 
this section. 
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(e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOR-
EIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated pur-
suant to this section may be provided to an entity— 
(1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or 
other foreign adversary; 
(2) determined to have beneficial ownership from 
foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direc-
tion, or influence of foreign adversaries; and 
(3) that has any contract in effect at the time of 
the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract with-
in the previous one year that is no longer in effect, 
with— 
(A) the Government of the PRC; 
(B) the CCP; 
(C) the PLA; 
(D) an entity majority-owned, majority- 
controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or 
(E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an 
entity described in subparagraph (D). 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, con-
trol, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings given 
to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program 
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cil, to devise financing and make agency deci-
sions and commitments on a timely basis to sup-
port United States competitive offers; 
(F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
mission Working Group to develop a comprehen-
sive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC’s 
Belt and Road Initiative for development fi-
nance; and 
(G) integrate existing efforts into the strat-
egy, including efforts to address the Government 
of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to ad-
vance the Belt and Road Initiative, including 
the proliferation of memoranda of understanding 
between the PRC and United Nations funds and 
programs regarding the implementation of the 
Belt and Road Initiative. 
(3) PARTICIPATING
AGENCIES.—Participating 
Federal agencies should include the Department of 
State, Department of the Treasury, United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), 
United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, 
Millennium 
Challenge 
Corporation, 
United States Trade and Development Agency, De-
partment of Commerce, and other Federal depart-
ments and agencies as appropriate. 
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ment with major global economies, United States 
allies, and for each region of the world; and 
(E) outline what further steps the PRC may 
take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its eco-
nomic position and influence. 
(2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s 
trade and investment policies, including— 
(A) the impact of these trade and invest-
ment agreements on the PRC’s economy, with a 
focus on its trade and investment profile, the im-
pact on the PRC’s economic growth and per-cap-
ita income, and the impact on the profitability 
and market share of Chinese companies and 
SOEs; 
(B) the impact of these agreements on the 
PRC’s political and diplomatic relations with 
the countries it entered into agreements with and 
by region; and 
(C) the impact of the PRC’s trade and in-
vestment relationships with other countries on 
the market share of United States companies. 
SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that United States national interests and the primacy of 
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