206
‘‘(7) To consult with the Electronic Crimes 
Task Force of the United States Secret Service on 
private sector outreach and information activities. 
‘‘(8) To consult with the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness to ensure that realistic cybersecurity 
scenarios are incorporated into tabletop and recovery 
exercises. 
‘‘(9) To consult and coordinate, as appropriate, 
with other Federal agencies on cybersecurity-related 
programs, policies, and operations. 
‘‘(10) To consult and coordinate within the De-
partment and, where appropriate, with other rel-
evant Federal agencies, on security of digital control 
systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data Ac-
quisition (SCADA) systems. 
‘‘(d) AUTHORITY OVER THE NATIONAL COMMUNICA-
TIONS SYSTEM.—The Assistant Secretary shall have pri-
mary authority within the Department over the National 
Communications System.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—The table of contents 
in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the 
end of the items relating to subtitle A of title II the fol-
lowing:
‘‘Sec. 203. Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity.’’.
207
(c) CYBERSECURITY DEFINED.—Section 2 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101) is amend-
ed by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(17)(A) The term ‘cybersecurity’ means the 
prevention of damage to, the protection of, and the 
restoration of computers, electronic communications 
systems, electronic communication services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, in-
cluding information contained therein, to ensure its 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and nonrepudiation. 
‘‘(B) In this paragraph—
‘‘(i) each of the terms ‘damage’ and ‘com-
puter’ has the meaning that term has in section 
1030 of title 18, United States Code; and 
‘‘(ii) each of the terms ‘electronic commu-
nications system’, ‘electronic communication’, 
‘wire communication’, and ‘electronic commu-
nication’ has the meaning that term has in sec-
tion 2510 of title 18, United States Code.’’.
208
TITLE XIV—ENABLING COMMU-
NICATIONS 
INTEROPER-
ABILITY 
SEC. 211. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as ‘‘Connecting the Oper-
ations of National Networks of Emergency Communica-
tions Technologies for First Responders Act of 2004’’. 
SEC. 212. FINDINGS; PURPOSES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Throughout the United States, public safety 
agencies—law enforcement, firefighters, emergency 
technicians, public health officials, and others—in 
the same jurisdictions cannot now communicate ef-
fectively with one another, with agencies in neigh-
boring jurisdictions, or with other public safety 
agencies at the Federal and State level, when re-
sponding to emergencies or participating in major 
deployment. 
(2) The inability of public safety agencies in the 
United States to communicate with one another 
within and across jurisdictions and disciplines is a 
long-recognized and complex problem that threatens 
the public’s safety and security and often results in 
unnecessary loss of lives and property.
209
(3) The lack of interoperability was at least 
partially responsible for the deaths of 343 fire-
fighters in New York City on September 11, 2001, 
when police could not communicate effectively with 
firefighters prior to the collapse of the Twin Towers. 
(4) In the immediate aftermath of the Okla-
homa City bombing in 1995, studies showed that 
emergency responders had to use runners to carry 
messages from one command center to another be-
cause the responding agencies used different emer-
gency radio channels, different frequencies, and dif-
ferent radio systems. 
(5) In Littleton, Colorado, 46 public safety 
agencies responded to the shooting spree inside Col-
umbine High School in 1999. Precious minutes were 
lost because command personnel were forced to send 
runners to communicate crucial information. Incom-
patible radio communication systems were a signifi-
cant factor, according to the Columbine Review 
Commission. 
(6) There are more than 50,000 State and local 
public safety agencies. Many of these agencies are 
small or volunteer organizations with limited budg-
ets, and little or no engineering expertise. State and
210
local agencies consistently cite lack of funding as a 
critical obstacle to interoperability. 
(7) State and local budget crises have made 
funding public safety communications even more dif-
ficult, and competition with other critical homeland 
security needs, such as personnel, physical facilities, 
protective gear, and other kinds of equipment reduce 
the available funding for mission-critical communica-
tions infrastructures and equipment. 
(8) Funding is needed for all phases of the 
communications system life cycle: planning, system 
design and engineering, procurement and installa-
tion, operations and maintenance, and testing and 
technology development. There is clear need for a 
dedicated and consistent Federal funding source 
that is sufficient to finance comprehensive interoper-
able communications solutions. The role of Federal, 
State, and local governments and agencies in fund-
ing interoperable communications must be clear. 
(9) Achieving nationwide interoperability will 
require a significant financial commitment at all lev-
els of government. In 1998, the Public Safety Wire-
less Network estimated that developing interoperable 
communications 
nationwide 
could 
cost 
$18,000,000,000. According to the Office of Wire-