In the Senate of the United States, 
September 26 (legislative day, September 17), 2008. 
Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representa-
tives (H.R. 2631) entitled ‘‘An Act to strengthen efforts in 
the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear 
forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of 
nuclear material, and for other purposes.’’, do pass with the 
following 
AMENDMENT: 
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert: 
SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 
American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 
of the most serious threats to the national security of 
the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu-
tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance. 
Because of the destructive power of the weapon, there
could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive 
material in the bomb itself. 
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 
both existing techniques and those under development, 
it may be possible to identify the source and pathway 
of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto-
nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate-
rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 
forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post- 
detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 
and the challenges are compounded by the pressures 
and time constraints of performing forensics after a 
nuclear or radiological attack. 
(3) A robust and well-known capability to iden-
tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in-
tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter 
prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of 
effective attribution could compel improved security 
at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit-
ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate-
rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 
necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam-
ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize
samples, and compare samples against known signa-
tures of nuclear and radiological material. 
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 
detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so 
the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost im-
portance. Over the past several decades, the ability of 
the United States to gather atmospheric samples, 
often the preferred method of sample acquisition, has 
diminished. This ability must be restored and modern 
techniques that could complement or replace existing 
techniques should be pursued. 
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 
a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ-
ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 
traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 
a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro-
vide the most useful tools for analysis and character-
ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
programs and radiochemists in United States Na-
tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 
declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 
pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is 
a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and 
credible nuclear forensics program.
(5) Once samples have been acquired and charac-
terized, it is necessary to compare the results against 
samples of known material from reactors, weapons, 
and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca-
demic, commercial, and other facilities containing 
such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
samples are available to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and 
some countries maintain internal sample databases. 
Access to samples in many countries is limited by na-
tional security concerns. 
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
necessary to have the capability to positively identify 
the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po-
tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 
must be aware of that capability. International co-
operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 
sources of nuclear or radiological material. 
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should— 
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter-
national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 
under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral
agreements, an international framework for deter-
mining— 
(A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or 
radiological material or weapon; and 
(B) the source of any detonated weapon and 
the nuclear or radiological material used in such 
a weapon; 
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu-
clear or radiological materials and samples of con-
trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent 
required by the agreements entered into under para-
graph (1); and 
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
change and dissemination of sensitive information 
needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det-
onation. 
SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-
TION OFFICE. 
(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is 
amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘(a) MISSION’’; 
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 
end;
(3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as para-
graph (14); and 
(4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 
of the Secretary, and in consultation with the Attor-
ney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, and the heads of appropriate de-
partments and agencies, a ‘National Strategy and 
Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the 
Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the 
United States Government’ and the methods, capabili-
ties, and capacity for nuclear materials forensics and 
attribution, including— 
‘‘(A) an investment plan to support nuclear 
materials forensics and attribution; 
‘‘(B) the allocation of roles and responsibil-
ities for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-det-
onation activities; and 
‘‘(C) the attribution of nuclear or radio-
logical material to its source when such material 
is intercepted by the United States, foreign gov-
ernments, or international bodies or is dispersed
in the course of a terrorist attack or other nu-
clear or radiological explosion; 
‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De-
tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 
Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 
planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 
forensics and attribution activities— 
‘‘(A) to ensure an enduring national tech-
nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 
the collective response of the United States to nu-
clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and 
‘‘(B) to coordinate and implement the na-
tional strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve 
national forensics and attribution capabilities 
for all Federal nuclear and radiological forensics 
capabilities; 
‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex-
pertise Development Program, which— 
‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintain-
ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway 
from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in 
nuclear and geochemical science specialties di-
rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in-
cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear
physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, 
and analytical chemistry; and 
‘‘(B) shall— 
‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 
study student scholarships, with a duration 
of up to 4 years per student, which shall in-
clude, if possible, at least 1 summer intern-
ship at a national laboratory or appro-
priate Federal agency in the field of tech-
nical nuclear forensics during the course of 
the student’s undergraduate career; 
‘‘(ii) make available for graduate study 
student fellowships, with a duration of up 
to 5 years per student, which shall— 
‘‘(I) include, if possible, at least 2 
summer internships at a national lab-
oratory or appropriate Federal agency 
in the field of technical nuclear 
forensics during the course of the stu-
dent’s graduate career; and 
‘‘(II) require each recipient to 
commit to serve for 2 years in a post- 
doctoral position in a technical nuclear 
forensics-related specialty at a national
laboratory 
or 
appropriate 
Federal 
agency after graduation; 
‘‘(iii) 
make 
available 
to 
faculty 
awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years 
each, to ensure faculty and their graduate 
students have a sustained funding stream; 
and 
‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 
reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 
programs; and’’. 
(b) JOINT INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REPORTING RE-
QUIREMENT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Section 1907(a)(1) of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) 
is amended— 
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking 
‘‘and’’ at the end; 
(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking 
the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office and each of the relevant Depart-
ments that are partners in the National Tech-
nical Forensics Center—
‘‘(i) includes, as part of the assess-
ments, evaluations, and reviews required 
under this paragraph, each relevant agen-
cy’s activities and investments in support of 
nuclear forensics and attribution activities; 
‘‘(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the 
Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most 
current version of the plan required under 
section 1902(a)(10); and 
‘‘(iii) after March 31 of each year, 
funds allocated for activities authorized 
under section 1902 are not spent until the 
submission to Congress of the report re-
quired under subsection (b).’’. 
Attest: 
Secretary.