‘‘(B) have access to all records, documents,
and other available materials relating to those
programs and operations;
‘‘(C) have direct and prompt access to any
official of the United Nations; and
‘‘(D) have access to all records and offi-
cials of the specialized agencies of the United
Nations.
‘‘(4)
The
United
Nations
has
fully
imple-
mented, and made available to all member states,
procedures that effectively protect the identity of,
and prevent reprisals against, any staff member of
the United Nations making a complaint or disclosing
information to, or cooperating in any investigation
or inspection by, the United Nations Inspector Gen-
eral.
‘‘(5) The United Nations has fully implemented
procedures
that
ensure
compliance
with
rec-
ommendations of the United Nations Inspector Gen-
eral.
‘‘(6) The United Nations has required the
United Nations Inspector General to issue an annual
report and has ensured that the annual report and
all other reports of the Inspector General are made
available to the General Assembly without modifica-
tion.
‘‘(7) The United Nations has provided, and is
committed to providing, sufficient budgetary re-
sources to ensure the effective operation of the
United Nations Inspector General.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 11 of the United Na-
tions Participation Act of 1945, as added by subsection
(a), shall apply only with respect to fiscal years after fiscal
year 1995.
øSEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
ø(a) IN GENERAL.—The United Nations Participa-
tion Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amend-
ed by adding at the end the following new section:
ø‘‘SEC. 12. (a) CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF IN-
TELLIGENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS.—
ø‘‘(1) REQUIREMENT
FOR
AGREEMENT.—The
United States may provide intelligence to the United
Nations only pursuant to a written agreement be-
tween the President and the Secretary General of
the United Nations.
ø‘‘(2) CONTENT
OF
AGREEMENT.—Any such
agreement shall specify—
ø‘‘(A) the types of intelligence to be pro-
vided to the United Nations;
ø‘‘(B) the circumstances under which intel-
ligence may be provided to the United Nations;
and
ø‘‘(C) the procedures to be observed by the
United Nations—
ø‘‘(i) concerning persons who shall
have access to the intelligence provided;
and
ø‘‘(ii)
to
protect
the
intelligence
against disclosure not authorized by the
agreement.
ø‘‘(3) DURATION OF AGREEMENT.—Any such
agreement shall be effective for a period not to ex-
ceed one year from the date on which the agreement
enters into force.
ø‘‘(b) ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—An
agreement described in subsection (a) shall be effective
only if the President has transmitted the agreement to the
Committee on International Relations and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
not less than 30 days in advance of the entry into force
of the agreement.
ø‘‘(c) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.—The President
may delegate the authority and assign the duties of the
President under this section only to the Secretary of De-
fense or the Director of Central Intelligence.
ø‘‘(d) EXCEPTIONS.—Subsection (a) shall not apply
to the provision of intelligence—
ø‘‘(1) that is provided only to, and for the use
of, United States Government personnel serving with
the United Nations; or
ø‘‘(2) that is essential for the protection of na-
tionals of the United States, including members of
the United States Armed Forces and civilian person-
nel of the United States Government.
ø‘‘(e) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—Nothing
in this section shall be construed to—
ø‘‘(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority
of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect in-
telligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5));
or
ø‘‘(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provi-
sions of—
ø‘‘(A) title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413–415); or
ø‘‘(B) section 112b of title 1, United
States Code.’’.
ø(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
subsection (a) shall take effect 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.¿
SEC. 512. CONDITIONS ON PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The United Nations Participation
Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 et seq.) is further amended by
adding the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 12. (a) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMA-
TION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.—Before intelligence infor-
mation is provided by the United States to the United Na-
tions, the President shall ensure that the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, has established guidelines govern-
ing the provision of intelligence information to the United
Nations which shall protect intelligence sources and meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure in accordance with section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403–3(c)(5)).
‘‘(b) PERIODIC
AND SPECIAL REPORTS.—(1) The
President shall periodically report, but not less frequently
than semiannually, to the Committee on International Re-
lations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the
types of intelligence provided to the United Nations and
the purposes for which it was provided during the period
covered by the report. The President shall also report to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate, within 15 days after it becomes known to
him, any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided
to the United Nations.
‘‘(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the
first sentence of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not
apply to the provision of intelligence that is provided only
to, and for the use of, United States Government personnel
serving with the United Nations.
‘‘(c) DELEGATION OF DUTIES.—The President may
not delegate the duties of the President under this section.
‘‘(d) IMPROVED HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE INFOR-
MATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS.—The Secretary of State
(or the designee of the Secretary), in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of De-
fense, shall work with the United Nations to improve the
handling, processing, dissemination, and management of
all intelligence information provided to it by its members.
‘‘(e) RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LAW.—Nothing in
this section shall be construed to—
‘‘(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intel-
ligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclo-
sure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403–3(c)(5)); or
‘‘(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions
of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413–415).’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by sub-
section (a) shall take effect 45 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
TITLE VI—REVITALIZATION AND
EXPANSION
OF
THE
NORTH
ATLANTIC
TREATY
ORGANI-
ZATION
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘NATO Revitalization
and Expansion Act of 1995’’.
SEC. 602. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1948, the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) has helped to guarantee the se-
curity, freedom, and prosperity of the United States
and its partners in the alliance.
(2) NATO has expanded its membership on
three different occasions since its founding in 1949.
(3) The steadfast and sustained commitment of
the member countries of NATO to mutual defense
against the threat of communist domination played
a significant role in precipitating the collapse of the
Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Union.
(4) In the place of that threat, new security
threats are emerging to the shared interests of the
member countries of NATO.
(5) Although these new threats are more geo-
graphically and functionally diverse and less predict-
able, they still imperil shared interests of the United
States and its NATO allies.
(6) Western interests must be protected on a
cooperative basis without an undue burden falling
upon the United States.
(7) NATO is the only multilateral organization
that is capable of conducting effective military oper-
ations to protect Western interests.
(8) The valuable experience gained from ongo-
ing military cooperation within NATO was critical to
the success of joint military operations in the 1991
liberation of Kuwait.
(9) NATO is an important diplomatic forum for
discussion of issues of concern to its member states
and for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
(10) Admission of Central and East European
countries that have recently been freed from Com-
munist domination to NATO could contribute to
international peace and enhance the security of
those countries.
(11) A number of countries, including the
Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovakia), the Baltic states (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania), and Ukraine, have expressed
interest in NATO membership.
(12) In recognition of this interest, the Partner-
ship for Peace proposal offers limited military co-
operation to many European countries not currently
members of NATO, but fails to establish bench-
marks or guidelines for eventual NATO membership.
(13) In particular, Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic,
and
Slovakia
have
made
significant
progress toward establishing democratic institutions,
free market economies, civilian control of their
armed forces, police, and intelligence services, and
the rule of law since the fall of their previous Com-
munist governments.
SEC. 603. UNITED STATES POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United States—
(1) to continue the Nation’s commitment to an
active leadership role in NATO;
(2) to join with the Nation’s NATO allies to re-
define the role of the alliance in the post-Cold War
world, taking into account—
(A) the fundamentally changed security en-
vironment of Central and Eastern Europe;
(B) the need to assure all countries of the
defensive nature of the alliance and the desire
of its members to work cooperatively with all
former adversaries;
(C) the emerging security threats posed by
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
logical weapons of mass destruction and the
means to deliver them;
(D) the continuing challenges to the inter-
ests of all NATO member countries posed by
unstable and undemocratic regimes harboring
hostile intentions; and
(E) the dependence of the global economy
on a stable energy supply and the free flow of
commerce;
(3) to affirm that NATO military planning
should include joint military operations beyond the
geographic bounds of the alliance under Article 4 of
the North Atlantic Treaty when the shared interests
of the United States and other member countries re-
quire such action to defend vital interests;
(4) that Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovakia should be in a position to further the
principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to con-
tribute to the security of the North Atlantic area not
later than January 10, 1999 (5 years from the date
of the establishment of the Partnership for Peace),
and, in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty,
should be invited to become full NATO members not
later than that date, provided these countries—
(A) meet appropriate standards, includ-
ing—
(i) shared values and interests;
(ii) democratic governments;
(iii) free market economies;
(iv) civilian control of the military, of
the police, and of intelligence services;