H. R. 3230—287
(2) What commitment the United States Government is
seeking from the People’s Republic of China to ensure that
the People’s Republic of China establishes a fully effective
export control system that will prevent transfers (such as the
Pakistan sale) from taking place in the future.
(3) A description of the pledges, assurances, and other
commitments made by representatives of the Governments of
the People’s Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan to the Government of the United States since January
1, 1991, with respect to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
or nuclear-capable missiles, and an assessment of the record
of compliance with such undertakings.
(4) Whether, in light of the recent assurances provided
by the People’s Republic of China, the President intends to
make the certification and submit the report required by section
902(a)(6)(B) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2151 note), and make the
certification and submit the report required by Public Law
99–183, relating to the approval and implementation of the
agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States
and the People’s Republic of China, and, if not, why not.
(5) Whether the Secretary of State considers the recent
assurances and clarifications provided by the People’s Republic
of China to have provided sufficient information to allow the
United States to determine that the People’s Republic of China
is not in violation of paragraph (2) of section 129 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as required by Public Law 99–183.
(6) If the President is unable or unwilling to make the
certifications and reports referred to in paragraph (4), a descrip-
tion of what the President considers to be the significance
of the clarifications and assurances provided by the People’s
Republic of China in the course of the recent discussions regard-
ing the transfer by the People’s Republic of China of nuclear-
weapon-related equipment to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
(7) A description of the laws, regulations, and procedures
currently used by the People’s Republic of China to regulate
exports of nuclear technology, equipment, or materials, includ-
ing dual-use goods, and an assessment of the effectiveness
of such arrangements.
(8) A description of the current policies and practices of
other countries in response to the transfer of nuclear and
missile technology by the People’s Republic of China to the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
SEC. 1307. UNITED STATES-PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JOINT
DEFENSE CONVERSION COMMISSION.
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise available for the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 1997 or any prior fiscal
year may be obligated or expended for any activity associated with
the United States-People’s Republic of China Joint Defense Conver-
sion Commission until 15 days after the date on which the first
semiannual report required by section 1343 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104–106; 110
Stat. 487) is received by Congress.
SEC. 1308. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EXPORT CONTROLS.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following findings:
H. R. 3230—288
(1) Export controls are a part of a comprehensive response
to national security threats. The export of a United States
commodity or technology should be restricted in cases in which
the export of the commodity or technology would increase the
threat to the national security of the United States or would
be contrary to the nonproliferation goals or foreign policy
interests of the United States.
(2) The export of certain commodities and technology may
adversely affect the national security and foreign policy of
the United States by making a significant contribution to the
military potential of countries or by enhancing the capability
of countries to design, develop, test, produce, stockpile, or use
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, and
other significant military capabilities. Therefore, the adminis-
tration of export controls should emphasize the control of these
exports.
(3) The acquisition of sensitive commodities and tech-
nologies by those countries and end users whose actions or
policies run counter to United States national security or for-
eign policy interests may enhance the military capabilities of
those countries, particularly their ability to design, develop,
test, produce, stockpile, use, and deliver nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons and missile delivery systems, and other
significant military capabilities. This enhancement threatens
the security of the United States and its allies. The availability
to countries and end users of items that contribute to military
capabilities or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
is a fundamental concern of the United States and should
be eliminated through deterrence, negotiations, and other
appropriate means whenever possible.
(4) The national security of the United States depends
not only on wise foreign policies and a strong defense, but
also a vibrant national economy. To be truly effective, export
controls should be applied uniformly by all suppliers.
(5) On November 8, 1995, the President continued the
national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12938
of November 14, 1994, ‘‘with respect to the unusual and extraor-
dinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the means of
delivering such weapons’’.
(6) A successor regime to COCOM (the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) has not been estab-
lished. Currently, each nation is determining independently
which dual-use military items, if any, will be controlled for
export.
(7) The United States should play a leading role in promot-
ing transparency and responsibility with regard to the transfers
of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) establishing an international export control regime,
empowered to control exports of dual-use technology, is criti-
cally important and should be a top priority for the United
States; and
(2) the United States should strongly encourage its allies
and other friendly countries to—
H. R. 3230—289
(A) adopt export controls that are the same or similar
to the export controls imposed by the United States on
items on the Commerce Control List;
(B) 
strengthen 
enforcement 
of 
their 
export
controls; and
(C) explore the use of unilateral export controls where
the possibility exists that an export could contribute to
the enhancement of military capabilities or proliferation
described in paragraphs (3) and (5) of subsection (a).
SEC. 1309. COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE.
(a) COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE.—Subsection (a) of section
1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
‘‘(5) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs shall serve as execu-
tive secretary to the committee.’’.
(b) ADDITIONAL
PURPOSE
OF
THE
COMMITTEE.—Subsection
(b)(1)(A) of such section is amended by inserting ‘‘and efforts, includ-
ing efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and to negate paramilitary and terrorist threats involving weapons
of mass destruction’’ after ‘‘counterproliferation policy’’.
(c) FOUR-YEAR EXTENSION OF THE COMMITTEE.—Subsection (f)
of such section is amended by striking out ‘‘September 30, 1996’’
and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘September 30, 2000’’.
(d) REPORTS ON COUNTERPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES AND PRO-
GRAMS.—Section 1503 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking out ‘‘REPORT REQUIRED.—(1) Not later
than May 1, 1995 and May 1, 1996, the Secretary’’ and
inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—
Not later than May 1 of each year, the Secretary’’; and
(B) by striking out paragraph (2); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
‘‘(d) REVIEW COMMITTEE CHARTER DEFINED.—For purposes of
this section, the term ‘Review Committee charter’ means section
1605 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994 (22 U.S.C. 2751 note).
‘‘(e) TERMINATION OF REQUIREMENT.—The final report required
under subsection (a) is the report for the year following the year
in which the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
established under the Review Committee Charter ceases to exist.’’.
SEC. 1310. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ASSISTING OTHER
COUNTRIES 
TO 
IMPROVE 
SECURITY 
OF 
FISSILE
MATERIAL.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) With the end of the Cold War, the world is faced
with the need to manage the dismantling of vast numbers
of nuclear weapons and the disposition of the fissile materials
that they contain.
(2) If recently agreed reductions in nuclear weapons are
fully implemented, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons,
containing a hundred tons or more of plutonium and many
hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium, will no longer
be needed for military purposes.
H. R. 3230—290
(3) Plutonium and highly enriched uranium are the essen-
tial ingredients of nuclear weapons.
(4) Limits on access to plutonium and highly enriched
uranium are the primary technical barrier to acquiring nuclear
weapons capability in the world today.
(5) Several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that
amount of highly enriched uranium, are sufficient to make
a nuclear weapon.
(6) Plutonium and highly enriched uranium will continue
to pose a potential threat for as long as they exist.
(7) Action is required to secure and account for plutonium
and highly enriched uranium.
(8) It is in the national interest of the United States to—
(A) minimize the risk that fissile materials could be
obtained by unauthorized parties;
(B) minimize the risk that fissile materials could be
reintroduced into the arsenals from which they came, halt-
ing or reversing the arms reduction process; and
(C) strengthen the national and international control
mechanisms and incentives designed to ensure continued
arms reductions and prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In light of the findings contained
in subsection (a), it is the sense of Congress that the United States
has a national security interest in assisting other countries to
improve the security of their stocks of fissile material.
SEC. 1311. REVIEW BY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 95–19.
(a) REVIEW.—The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct
a review of the underlying assumptions and conclusions of the
National Intelligence Estimate designated as NIE 95–19 and
entitled ‘‘Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the
Next 15 Years’’, released by the Director in November 1995.
(b) METHODOLOGY FOR REVIEW.—The Director shall carry out
the review under subsection (a) through a panel of independent,
nongovernmental individuals with appropriate expertise and experi-
ence. Such a panel shall be convened by the Director not later
than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) REPORT.—The Director shall submit the findings resulting
from the review under subsection (a), together with any comments
of the Director on the review and the findings, to Congress not
later than three months after the appointment of the Commission
under section 1321.
Subtitle B—Commission To Assess the Bal-
listic Missile Threat to the United States
SEC. 1321. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established a commission
to be known as the ‘‘Commission To Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States’’ (hereafter in this subtitle referred
to as the ‘‘Commission’’).
(b) COMPOSITION.—The Commission shall be composed of nine
members appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence. In select-