SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics and 
Attribution Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 
American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 
of the most serious threats to the national security 
of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attri-
bution of responsibility would be of utmost impor-
tance. Because of the destructive power of a nuclear 
weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except 
the radioactive material in the weapon itself. 
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 
both existing techniques and those under develop-
ment, it may be possible to identify the source and 
pathway of a weapon or material after it is inter-
dicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted 
smuggled material is now possible in some cases, 
pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped 
field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is 
also immature, and the challenges are compounded 
by the pressures and time constraints of performing 
forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack. 
(3) A robust and well-known capability to iden-
tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in-
tended for or used in an act of terror could also 
deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the 
threat of effective attribution could compel improved 
security at material storage facilities, preventing the 
unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological mate-
rials. 
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate-
rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 
necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam-
ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 
samples, and compare samples against known signa-
tures of nuclear and radiological material. 
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 
detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, 
so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost 
importance. Over the past several decades, the abil-
ity of the United States to gather atmospheric sam-
ples—often the preferred method of sample acquisi-
tion—has diminished. This ability must be restored 
and modern techniques that could complement or re-
place existing techniques should be pursued. 
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 
a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ-
ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 
traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In
a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro-
vide the most useful tools for analysis and character-
ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
programs and radiochemists in United States Na-
tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 
declined over the past several decades. The nar-
rowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical 
field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust 
and credible nuclear forensics program. 
(5) Once samples have been acquired and char-
acterized, it is necessary to compare the results 
against samples of known material from reactors, 
weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from med-
ical, academic, commercial, and other facilities con-
taining such materials, throughout the world. Some 
of these samples are available to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agree-
ments, and some countries maintain internal sample 
databases. Access to samples in many countries is 
limited by national security concerns. 
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it 
is necessary to have the capability to positively iden-
tify the source of nuclear or radiological material, 
and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological 
material must be aware of that capability. Inter-
national cooperation may be essential to catalogue 
all existing sources of nuclear or radiological mate-
rial. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should— 
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter-
national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 
under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements, an international framework for de-
termining the source of any confiscated nuclear or 
radiological material or weapon, as well as the 
source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or 
radiological material used in such a weapon; 
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu-
clear or radiological materials and samples of con-
trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the ex-
tent required by the agreements entered into under 
paragraph (1); and 
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
change and dissemination of sensitive information 
needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear 
detonation.
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-
TION OFFICE. 
(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated 
by Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ 
after the semicolon; 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as 
paragraph (14); and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the 
following: 
‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 
of the Secretary and in coordination with the heads 
of appropriate departments and agencies, methods 
and capabilities to support the attribution of nuclear 
or radiological material to its source when such ma-
terial is intercepted by the United States, foreign 
governments, or international bodies or is dispersed 
in the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear 
or radiological explosion; 
‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 
Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 
planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear
forensics activities in order to ensure an enduring 
national technical nuclear forensics capability and 
strengthen the collective response of the United 
States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; 
‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics 
Expertise Development Program which— 
‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and main-
taining a vibrant and enduring academic path-
way from undergraduate to post-doctorate 
study in nuclear and geochemical science spe-
cialties directly relevant to technical nuclear 
forensics, 
including 
radiochemistry, 
geo-
chemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, 
materials science, and analytical chemistry; and 
‘‘(B) shall— 
‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 
study student scholarships, with a duration 
of up to four years per student, which shall 
include, whenever possible, at least one 
summer internship at a national laboratory 
or appropriate Federal agency in the field 
of technical nuclear forensics during the 
course of the student’s undergraduate ca-
reer;