TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Sec. 301. Donor contributions to Afghanistan and reports. 
Sec. 302. Report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan. 
Sec. 303. Comprehensive interagency strategy for long-term security and sta-
bility in Afghanistan. 
Sec. 304. Special envoy for Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. 
Sec. 305. Transit through Pakistan of shipments by India in support of recon-
struction efforts in Afghanistan. 
Sec. 306. Reauthorization of Radio Free Afghanistan. 
Sec. 307. Eligibility in certain circumstances for agencies of the governments 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan to receive a reward under the De-
partment of State Rewards Program. 
Sec. 308. United States policy toward Iran. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Nearly six years after the liberation of Af-
ghanistan from the Taliban, who provided Osama 
Bin-Laden and Al-Qaeda with a safe haven for plan-
ning the attacks of September 11, 2001, Afghani-
stan remains highly unstable and the Government of 
President Hamid Karzai remains subject to attacks 
from remnants of the Taliban who have regrouped 
along with other insurgent groups, including some 
foreign fighters associated with Al-Qaeda. 
(2) The Government of Afghanistan supports 
the continued deployment of international forces to 
supplement its own nascent national security forces, 
and 
the 
North 
Atlantic 
Treaty 
Organization 
(NATO), which took over international stability op-
erations for the entire country on October 5, 2006, 
must show continued commitment to these oper-
ations in order to assist Afghanistan in defeating the 
growing insurgency in rural areas of Afghanistan. 
(3) The current United States counter-narcotics 
strategy for Afghanistan has not produced signifi-
cant results, in part due to a failure to seek out and 
capture high-level warlords and kingpins who control 
the flow of illicit narcotics and because sufficient 
sustainable alternatives have not been provided to 
Afghan farmers who suffer from a lack of access to 
microfinance facilities, financial services, and land 
rights and whose crops are subject to eradication. 
(4) In some cases, the misaligned eradication 
policy endorsed by the United States Government 
has led adversely-affected Afghan farmers and vil-
lagers to support insurgent groups, including the 
Taliban. 
(5) The violence and instability in Afghanistan 
is further exacerbated by the flourishing trade in 
opium and opium-related crops, which has reached 
record levels and which fuel local militias, corrupts 
the national and local governments, and provides 
funding for insurgent and terrorist groups. 
(6) The United States and the international 
community must continue to support Afghanistan 
both through increased support for its national and
local police forces, the Afghan National Army, and 
Afghan counter-narcotics operations. 
(7) The United States and the international 
community must also continue to support the growth 
of the Afghan economy through foreign assistance 
and other means because Afghanistan remains one 
of the poorest countries in the world and economic 
growth is impeded by the lingering remnants of 25 
years of civil war and occupation and the ongoing in-
stability since December 2001, including the growing 
illicit drug economy. 
(8) The United States and the international 
community must also continue to show a long-term 
commitment to support the promotion of democracy 
and the protection of human rights in Afghanistan, 
including increased assistance for the rule of law, 
freedom of the press, freedom of association, free-
dom of religion, and other measures of good govern-
ance. 
(9) From January 31 to February 1, 2006, the 
Government of Afghanistan and the international 
community issued the Afghanistan Compact, which 
sets forth both the international community’s com-
mitment to Afghanistan and Afghanistan’s commit-