H. R. 7776—1138 
(D) The lead official or entity conducting the workforce 
climate survey. 
(E) Any actions the Director intends to take, or is 
considering, in response to the results of the workforce 
climate survey. 
(3) ACCESSIBILITY OF WORKFORCE CLIMATE SURVEYS.—The 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall ensure that, 
to the extent practicable, and consistent with the protection 
of intelligence sources and methods, workforce climate surveys 
are accessible to employees of such Agency on classified and 
unclassified systems. 
(e) FEASIBILITY REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the 
date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report containing an analysis of the feasibility (including 
the anticipated cost, personnel requirements, necessary authorities, 
and such other matters as may be determined appropriate by the 
Director for purposes of analyzing feasibility) of— 
(1) conducting 360-degree performance reviews among 
employees of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and 
(2) including leadership suitability assessments (including 
personality evaluations, communication style assessments, and 
emotional intelligence aptitude assessments) for promotions of 
such employees to a position within grade GS–14 or above 
of the General Schedule. 
Subtitle D—Other Elements 
SEC. 6431. MODIFICATION OF ADVISORY BOARD IN NATIONAL RECON-
NAISSANCE OFFICE. 
Section 106A(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3041a(d)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (3)(A)(i), by inserting ‘‘, in consultation 
with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary 
of Defense,’’ after ‘‘Director’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘the date that is 3 years 
after the date of the first meeting of the Board’’ and inserting 
‘‘September 30, 2024’’. 
SEC. 6432. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADVISORY BOARD FOR NATIONAL 
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency an advisory board (in this section 
referred to as the ‘‘Board’’). 
(b) DUTIES.—The Board shall— 
(1) study matters relating to the mission of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, including with respect to 
integration of commercial capabilities, promoting innovation, 
advice on next generation tasking, collection, processing, exploi-
tation, and dissemination capabilities, strengthening functional 
management, acquisition, and such other matters as the 
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency con-
siders appropriate; and 
(2) advise and report directly to the Director with respect 
to such matters. 
(c) MEMBERS.—
H. R. 7776—1139 
(1) NUMBER AND APPOINTMENT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Board shall be composed of 6 
members appointed by the Director from among individuals 
with demonstrated academic, government, business, or 
other expertise relevant to the mission and functions of 
the Agency. 
(B) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days after the 
date on which the Director appoints a member to the 
Board, the Director shall notify the congressional intel-
ligence committees and the congressional defense commit-
tees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States 
Code) of such appointment. 
(C) INITIAL APPOINTMENTS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
shall appoint the initial 6 members to the Board. 
(2) TERMS.—Each member shall be appointed for a term 
of 3 years. 
(3) VACANCY.—Any member appointed to fill a vacancy 
occurring before the expiration of the term for which the mem-
ber’s predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only for 
the remainder of that term. 
(4) CHAIR.—The Board shall have a Chair, who shall be 
appointed by the Director from among the members. 
(5) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—Each member shall receive travel 
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accord-
ance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 
57 of title 5, United States Code. 
(6) EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.—The Director may appoint an 
executive secretary, who shall be an employee of the Agency, 
to support the Board. 
(d) MEETINGS.—The Board shall meet not less than quarterly, 
but may meet more frequently at the call of the Director. 
(e) REPORTS.—Not later than March 31 of each year, the Board 
shall submit to the Director and to the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
a report on the activities and significant findings of the Board 
during the preceding year. 
(f) NONAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS.—The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the 
Board. 
(g) TERMINATION.—The Board shall terminate on the date that 
is 5 years after the date of the first meeting of the Board. 
SEC. 6433. ELEVATION OF THE COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS OPER-
ATIONS OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY. 
Beginning not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the head of the commercial and business operations 
office of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall report 
directly to the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency. 
SEC. 6435. STUDY ON PERSONNEL UNDER STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM. 
(a) STUDY.—The Director of National Intelligence and the 
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of
H. R. 7776—1140 
the Department of Energy, in consultation with the National Lab-
oratories Directors’ Council and in coordination with such other 
entities, agencies, and departments as the Directors consider appro-
priate, shall jointly conduct a study of the skills, recruitment, 
and retention of the personnel at the national laboratories who 
carry out projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership Pro-
gram. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The study under subsection (a) shall address 
the following: 
(1) The degree to which the personnel at the national 
laboratories who carry out projects under the Strategic Intel-
ligence Partnership Program have the requisite training, 
skillsets, or expertise in critical science, technology, and 
engineering areas to support ongoing and anticipated projects 
under such Program, and the sufficiency of such personnel. 
(2) Whether such personnel have compensation, benefits, 
and pay scales that are competitive with comparable roles 
in the private sector in the geographic market in which the 
relevant national laboratory is located. 
(3) Any challenges associated with the retention of such 
personnel. 
(4) The talent composition of such personnel, broken down 
by career phase and degree status, to include any relevant 
exit survey data. 
(5) A description of current or previous programs to 
enabling such personnel to rotate between elements of the 
intelligence community and the national laboratories, including 
the number of personnel on nonreimbursable or reimbursable 
assignment to an element of the intelligence community. 
(6) The degree to which such projects and personnel support 
or augment other ongoing mission areas and capacities at the 
national laboratories. 
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.—Upon completing the study under sub-
section (a), the Directors shall jointly develop findings and rec-
ommendations based on the results of the study regarding the 
recruitment and retention of personnel at the national laboratories 
who carry out projects under the Strategic Intelligence Partnership 
Program, including with respect to the following: 
(1) New or alternative business models, sponsorship 
arrangements, or work scope agreements. 
(2) Extending eligibility for existing, or establishing new, 
recruitment, retention, or other career incentive programs, 
including student loan repayment and forgiveness programs, 
to such personnel. 
(3) Initiating geographically flexible or remote work 
arrangements for such personnel. 
(4) Enabling such personnel to participate in training at 
elements of the intelligence community, or obtain academic 
training at the National Intelligence University. 
(5) Establishing new, or enhancing existing, opportunities 
for detailee or rotational programs among the intelligence 
community and the national laboratories. 
(6) Using a compensation system modeled on the Cyber 
Talent Management System of the Department of Homeland 
Security for such personnel. 
(7) Any other recommendations the Directors determine 
relevant.
H. R. 7776—1141 
(d) REPORT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Directors shall jointly submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee 
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the House of Representatives a report containing 
the study under subsection (a) and the recommendations under 
subsection (c). 
(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(e) NATIONAL LABORATORIES DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘national laboratories’’ means— 
(1) each national security laboratory (as defined in section 
3281(1) of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act 
(50 U.S.C. 2471(1))); and 
(2) each national laboratory of the Department of Energy. 
SEC. 6436. BRIEFING ON COORDINATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY AND BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives. 
(b) CLASSIFIED BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence and the Secretary of Commerce, or their designees, shall 
jointly provide a classified briefing to the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding— 
(1) coordination between the intelligence community and 
the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of 
Commerce; 
(2) existing processes of the Bureau for the access to, stor-
age of, transmission of, and use of information provided to 
the Bureau by an element of the intelligence community; and 
(3) such recommendations as the Director and the Secretary 
may have to enhance such access, storage, transmission, and 
use.
H. R. 7776—1142 
TITLE LXV—MATTERS RELATING TO 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Subtitle A—Intelligence Matters Relating 
to the People’s Republic of China 
SEC. 6501. REPORT ON WEALTH AND CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF THE 
LEADERSHIP OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. 
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, shall make available to the public an unclassified 
report on the wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party, including the General Secretary 
of the Chinese Communist Party and senior leadership officials 
in the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing 
Committee, and any other regional Party Secretaries. 
SEC. 6502. IDENTIFICATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT OF COMPANIES 
WITH INVESTMENTS BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Energy and Commerce and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence 
community as the Director considers appropriate, the Chairperson 
of the Federal Communication Commission, and the Administrator 
of the National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report on the risk to national security of the use of— 
(1) telecommunications companies with a 10% or greater 
direct or indirect foreign investment by an entity or person 
owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction 
of, the People’s Republic of China that is operating in the 
United States or providing services to affiliates and personnel 
of the intelligence community; and 
(2) hospitality and conveyance companies with substantial 
investment by the People’s Republic of China by affiliates and 
personnel of the intelligence community for travel on behalf 
of the United States Government. 
SEC. 6503. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP FOR MONI-
TORING THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILI-
TIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National Intelligence, in con-
sultation with such heads of elements of the intelligence community
H. R. 7776—1143 
as the Director considers appropriate, shall establish a cross-intel-
ligence community analytical working group (in this section referred 
to as the ‘‘working group’’) on the economic and technological 
capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. 
(b) MONITORING AND ANALYSIS.—The working group shall mon-
itor and analyze— 
(1) the economic and technological capabilities of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(2) the extent to which those capabilities rely on exports, 
financing, or services from the United States and other foreign 
countries; 
(3) the links of those capabilities to the military-industrial 
complex of the People’s Republic of China; and 
(4) the threats those capabilities pose to the national secu-
rity and values of the United States. 
(c) ANNUAL ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Financial Services, the Committee on Armed Services, 
the Committee on Homeland Security, the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Ways and Means, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once each year, 
the working group shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress an assessment of the economic and technological 
strategy, efforts, and progress of the People’s Republic of China 
to become the dominant military, technological, and economic 
power in the world and undermine the rules-based world order. 
(3) ELEMENTS.—Each assessment required by paragraph 
(2) shall include the following: 
(A) An unclassified overview of the major goals, strate-
gies, and policies of the People’s Republic of China to 
control, shape, or develop self-sufficiency in key tech-
nologies and control related supply chains and ecosystems, 
including— 
(i) efforts to acquire United States and other for-
eign technology and recruit foreign talent in technology 
sectors of the People’s Republic of China, including 
the extent to which those efforts relate to the military- 
industrial complex of the People’s Republic of China; 
(ii) efforts related to incentivizing offshoring of 
United States and foreign manufacturing to China, 
influencing global supply chains, and creating supply 
chain vulnerabilities for the United States, including 
China’s financing or potential financing in foreign 
countries to create monopolies in the processing and 
exporting of rare earth and other critical materials
H. R. 7776—1144 
necessary for renewable energy, including cobalt, 
lithium, and nickel; 
(iii) related tools and market access restrictions 
or distortions imposed by the People’s Republic of 
China on foreign firms and laws and regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China that discriminate 
against United States and other foreign firms; and 
(iv) efforts of the People’s Republic of China to 
attract or restrict financing from the United States 
and other foreign countries to build self-sufficient 
national defense capabilities, an evaluation of the rel-
ative contribution of foreign financing to China’s eco-
nomic support for such capabilities, and the type of 
capital flows from the United States into China’s 
national defense capabilities from the specific actions 
taken by the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China to attract or restrict financing to the outcome 
of such efforts for entities and persons of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(B) An unclassified assessment of the progress of the 
People’s 
Republic 
of 
China 
to 
achieve 
its 
goals, 
disaggregated by economic sector. 
(C) An unclassified assessment of the impact of the 
transfer of capital, technology, data, talent, and technical 
expertise from the United States to China on the economic, 
technological, and military capabilities of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(D) An unclassified list of the top 200 businesses, aca-
demic and research institutions, or other entities of the 
People’s Republic of China that are— 
(i) developing, producing, or exporting to other 
countries the technologies that are strategically impor-
tant to the People’s Republic of China or supporting 
entities of the People’s Republic of China that are 
subject to sanctions imposed by the United States; 
(ii) supporting the military-civil fusion program 
or the military industrial complex of the People’s 
Republic of China; or 
(iii) otherwise supporting the goals and efforts of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese govern-
ment entities, including the Ministry of State Security, 
the Ministry of Public Security, and the People’s Lib-
eration Army. 
(E) An unclassified list of the top 100 development, 
infrastructure, or other strategic projects that the People’s 
Republic of China is financing abroad that— 
(i) advance the technology goals and strategies 
of the Chinese Communist Party; or 
(ii) evade financial sanctions, export controls, or 
import restrictions imposed by the United States. 
(F) An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses, 
research institutions, or other entities of the People’s 
Republic of China that are developing surveillance, smart 
cities, or related technologies that are— 
(i) exported to other countries, undermining democ-
racy worldwide; or
H. R. 7776—1145 
(ii) provided to the security services of the People’s 
Republic of China, enabling them to commit severe 
human rights abuses in China. 
(G) An unclassified list of the top 100 businesses or 
other entities of the People’s Republic of China that are— 
(i) operating in the genocide zone in Xinjiang; or 
(ii) supporting the Xinjiang Public Security 
Bureau, the Xinjiang Bureau of the Ministry of State 
Security, the People’s Armed Police, or the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps. 
(H) A list of investment funds, public companies, or 
private or early-stage firms of the People’s Republic of 
China that have received more than $100,000,000 in capital 
flows from the United States during the 10-year period 
preceding the date on which the assessment is submitted. 
(4) PREPARATION
OF
ASSESSMENTS.—In preparing each 
assessment required by paragraph (2), the working group shall 
use open source documents in Chinese language and commercial 
databases. 
(5) FORMAT.—An assessment required by paragraph (2) 
may be submitted in the format of a National Intelligence 
Estimate. 
(6) FORM.—Each assessment required by paragraph (2) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex. 
(7) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of each assess-
ment required by paragraph (2) shall be published on the 
publicly accessible website of the Director of National Intel-
ligence. 
(d) BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS.—Not less frequently than quar-
terly, the working group shall provide to Congress a classified 
briefing on the economic and technological goals, strategies, and 
progress of the People’s Republic of China, especially on the informa-
tion that cannot be disclosed in the unclassified portion of an 
assessment required by subsection (c)(2). 
(e) CLASSIFIED ANALYSES.—Each classified annex to an assess-
ment required by subsection (c)(2) or corresponding briefing pro-
vided under subsection (d) shall include an analysis of— 
(1) the vulnerabilities of the People’s Republic of China, 
disaggregated by economic sector, industry, and entity; and 
(2) the technological or supply chain chokepoints of the 
People’s Republic of China that provide leverage to the United 
States. 
(f) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to be effective on the 
date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 6504. ANNUAL REPORT ON CONCENTRATED REEDUCATION 
CAMPS IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
H. R. 7776—1146 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Financial Services, and the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
(2) COVERED CAMP.—The term ‘‘covered camp’’ means a 
detention camp, prison, forced labor camp, or forced labor fac-
tory located in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of 
the People’s Republic of China, referred to by the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China as ‘‘concentrated reeducation 
camps’’ or ‘‘vocational training centers’’. 
(b) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation 
with such heads of elements of the intelligence community as the 
Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the status of covered camps. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(1) An identification of the number and geographic location 
of covered camps and an estimate of the number of victims 
detained in covered camps. 
(2) A description of— 
(A) the types of personnel and equipment in covered 
camps; 
(B) the funding received by covered camps from the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China; and 
(C) the role of the security services of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps in enforcing atrocities at covered camps. 
(3) A comprehensive list of— 
(A) the entities of the Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps, including subsidiaries and affiliated 
businesses, with respect to which sanctions have been 
imposed by the United States; 
(B) commercial activities of those entities outside of 
the People’s Republic of China; and 
(C) other Chinese businesses, including in the artificial 
intelligence, biotechnology, and surveillance technology sec-
tors, that are involved with the atrocities in Xinjiang or 
supporting the policies of the People’s Republic of China 
in the region. 
(d) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(e) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of each report 
required by subsection (b) shall be published on the publicly acces-
sible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
SEC. 6505. ASSESSMENTS OF PRODUCTION OF SEMICONDUCTORS BY 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, the Committee on Homeland Security
H. R. 7776—1147 
and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, 
the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Home-
land Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
(2) LEGACY SEMICONDUCTOR.—The term ‘‘legacy semicon-
ductor’’ has the meaning given such term in section 
9902(a)(6)(A) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 
4652(a)(6)(A)). 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress an assessment of progress by the People’s 
Republic of China in global competitiveness in the production of 
semiconductors by Chinese firms, including any subsidiary, affiliate, 
or successor of such firms. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out subsection (b), the Director 
shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of 
such other Federal agencies as the Director considers appropriate. 
(d) ELEMENTS.—Each assessment submitted under subsection 
(b) shall include the following: 
(1) The progress of the People’s Republic of China toward 
self-sufficiency in the supply of semiconductors, including glob-
ally competitive Chinese firms competing in the fields of artifi-
cial intelligence, cloud computing, autonomous vehicles, next- 
generation and renewable energy, advanced life sciences and 
biotechnology, and high-performance computing. 
(2) The progress of the People’s Republic of China in devel-
oping indigenously or accessing foreign sources of intellectual 
property critical to the design and manufacturing of leading 
edge process nodes, including electronic design automation tech-
nology. 
(3) Activity of Chinese firms with respect to the production 
of semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors, including 
any identified export diversion to evade export controls. 
(4) Any observed stockpiling efforts by Chinese firms with 
respect to semiconductor manufacturing equipment, substrate 
materials, silicon wafers, or other necessary inputs for semicon-
ductor production. 
(5) An analysis of the relative market share of different 
Chinese semiconductor manufacturers at different process 
nodes and the estimated increase or decrease of market share 
by that manufacturer in each product category during the pre-
ceding year. 
(6) A comprehensive summary of recruitment activity of 
the People’s Republic of China targeting semiconductor manu-
facturing engineers and managers from non-Chinese firms. 
(7) An analysis of the capability of the workforce of the 
People’s Republic of China to design, produce, and manufacture 
of semiconductors that are not legacy semiconductors and rel-
evant equipment.
H. R. 7776—1149 
SEC. 6512. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR RUSSIAN 
ATROCITIES ACCOUNTABILITY. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(2) ATROCITY.—The term ‘‘atrocity’’ means a war crime, 
crime against humanity, or genocide. 
(3) COMMIT.—The term ‘‘commit’’, with respect to an 
atrocity, includes the planning, committing, aiding, and abet-
ting of such atrocity. 
(4) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign person’’ means 
a person that is not a United States person. 
(5) RUSSIAN ATROCITY.—The term ‘‘Russian atrocity’’ means 
an atrocity that is committed by an individual who is— 
(A) a member of the armed forces, or the security 
or other defense services, of the Russian Federation; 
(B) an employee of any other element of the Russian 
Government; or 
(C) an agent or contractor of an individual specified 
in subparagraph (A) or (B). 
(6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States per-
son’’ has the meaning given that term in section 105A(c) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3039). 
(b) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
COORDINATOR
FOR
RUSSIAN 
ATROCITIES ACCOUNTABILITY.— 
(1) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall designate a senior official of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence to serve as the intelligence 
community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability (in 
this section referred to as the ‘‘Coordinator’’). 
(2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall oversee the efforts of 
the intelligence community relating to the following: 
(A) Identifying, and (as appropriate) disseminating 
within the United States Government, intelligence relating 
to the identification, location, or activities of foreign persons 
suspected of playing a role in committing Russian atrocities 
in Ukraine. 
(B) Identifying analytic and other intelligence needs 
and priorities of the intelligence community with respect 
to the commitment of such Russian atrocities. 
(C) Addressing any gaps in intelligence collection 
relating to the commitment of such Russian atrocities and 
developing recommendations to address any gaps so identi-
fied, including by recommending the modification of the 
priorities of the intelligence community with respect to 
intelligence collection. 
(D) Collaborating with appropriate counterparts across 
the intelligence community to ensure appropriate coordina-
tion on, and integration of the analysis of, the commitment 
of such Russian atrocities.
H. R. 7776—1150 
(E) Identifying intelligence and other information that 
may be relevant to preserve evidence of potential war 
crimes by Russia, consistent with the public commitments 
of the United States to support investigations into the 
conduct of Russia. 
(F) Ensuring the Atrocities Early Warning Task Force 
and other relevant departments and agencies of the United 
States Government receive appropriate support from the 
intelligence community with respect to the collection, anal-
ysis, preservation, and, as appropriate, dissemination, of 
intelligence related to Russian atrocities in Ukraine. 
(3) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress— 
(A) the name of the official designated as the Coordi-
nator pursuant to paragraph (1); and 
(B) the strategy of the intelligence community for the 
collection of intelligence related to Russian atrocities in 
Ukraine, including a detailed description of how the Coordi-
nator shall support, and assist in facilitating the 
implementation of, such strategy. 
(4) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than May 1, 2023, 
and annually thereafter until May 1, 2026, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report detailing, for the year 
covered by the report— 
(i) the analytical findings and activities of the intel-
ligence community with respect to Russian atrocities 
in Ukraine; and 
(ii) the recipients of information shared pursuant 
to this section for the purpose of ensuring account-
ability for such Russian atrocities, and the date of 
any such sharing. 
(B) FORM.—Each report submitted under subparagraph 
(A) may be submitted in classified form, consistent with 
the protection of intelligence sources and methods. 
(C) SUPPLEMENT.—The Director of National Intel-
ligence may supplement an existing reporting requirement 
with the information required under subparagraph (A) on 
an annual basis to satisfy that requirement with prior 
notification of intent to do so to the appropriate committees 
of Congress. 
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on the 
date that is 4 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 6513. LEAD INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR 
COUNTERING AND NEUTRALIZING PROLIFERATION OF 
IRAN-ORIGIN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, and the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
H. R. 7776—1151 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, and the Subcommittee on Defense of 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) FIVE EYES PARTNERSHIP.—The term ‘‘Five Eyes Partner-
ship’’ means the intelligence alliance comprising Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
(3) UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM.—The term ‘‘unmanned 
aircraft system’’ includes an unmanned powered aircraft 
(including communication links and the components that con-
trol the unmanned aircraft), that— 
(A) does not carry a human operator; 
(B) may fly autonomously or be piloted remotely; 
(C) may be expendable or recoverable; and 
(D) may carry a lethal payload or explode upon 
reaching a designated location. 
(b) COORDINATOR.— 
(1) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall designate an official from an element of the intelligence 
community to serve as the lead intelligence community coordi-
nator for countering and neutralizing the proliferation of Iran- 
origin unmanned aircraft systems (in this section referred to 
as the ‘‘Coordinator’’). 
(2) PLAN.—Not later than 120 days after the date on which 
the Coordinator is designated under paragraph (1), the Coordi-
nator shall— 
(A) develop a comprehensive plan of action, driven 
by intelligence information, for countering and neutralizing 
the threats posed by the proliferation of Iran-origin 
unmanned aircraft systems; and 
(B) provide to appropriate committees of Congress a 
briefing on such plan of action. 
(3) FINAL REPORT.— 
(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than January 1, 2024, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress a final report on the activi-
ties and findings of the Coordinator. 
(B) MATTERS.—The report under subparagraph (A) 
shall include the following: 
(i) An assessment of the threats posed by Iran- 
origin unmanned aircraft systems, including the threat 
to facilities and personnel of the United States Govern-
ment in the greater Middle East, particularly in the 
areas of such region that are located within the area 
of responsibility of the Commander of the United States 
Central Command. 
(ii) A detailed description of intelligence sharing 
efforts, as well as other joint efforts driven by intel-
ligence information, with allies and partners of the 
United States, to assist in countering and neutralizing 
of such threats. 
(iii) Recommendations for any changes in United 
States policy or legislative authorities to improve the 
capacity of the intelligence community to assist in 
countering and neutralizing such threats.
H. R. 7776—1152 
(C) FORM.—The report under subparagraph (A) may 
be submitted in classified form. 
(D) ANNEX.—In submitting the report under subpara-
graph (A) to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Director shall also include an accompanying annex, which 
shall be classified, that separately details all efforts sup-
ported exclusively by National Intelligence Program funds. 
(c) COLLABORATION
WITH
FIVE
EYES
PARTNERSHIP
AND 
ISRAEL.—Taking into account the findings of the final report under 
subsection (b)(3), the Director of National Intelligence shall seek 
to— 
(1) develop and implement a common approach among 
the Five Eyes Partnership toward countering the threats posed 
by Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including by 
leveraging the unique intelligence capabilities and information 
of the members of the Five Eyes Partnership; and 
(2) intensify cooperation with Israel for the purpose of 
countering Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems, including 
by strengthening and expanding existing cooperative efforts 
conducted pursuant to section 1278 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 
133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C. 8606 note). 
(d) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on the 
date on which the final report is submitted under subsection (b)(3). 
SEC. 6514. COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO COUNTER FOREIGN 
COMMERCIAL THREATS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) FOREIGN COMMERCIAL THREAT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘foreign commercial threat’’ 
means a rare commercial item or service that is produced 
by, offered by, sold by, licensed by, or otherwise distributed 
under the control of a strategic competitor or foreign 
adversary in a manner that may provide the strategic 
competitor or foreign adversary leverage over an intended 
recipient. 
(B) DETERMINATIONS BY WORKING GROUP.—In deter-
mining whether an item or service is a foreign commercial 
threat, the Working Group shall consider whether the stra-
tegic competitor or foreign adversary could— 
(i) withhold, or threaten to withhold, the rare 
commercial item or service; 
(ii) create reliance on the rare commercial item 
or service as essential to the safety, health, or economic 
wellbeing of the intended recipient; or