H. R. 2810—608 
(i) section 3248 of the National Nuclear Security 
Administration Act, as added by subsection (a); and 
(ii) subsection (b); and 
(B) the Director for Cost Estimating and Program 
Evaluation shall provide to such committees a briefing 
on the analysis under subsection (c). 
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.— 
In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
(B) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate. 
SEC. 3117. BUDGET REQUESTS AND CERTIFICATION REGARDING 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT. 
Section 3125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2766) is amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (f); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new sub-
sections: 
‘‘(d) BUDGET REQUESTS.—The Administrator for Nuclear Secu-
rity shall ensure that the budget of the President submitted to 
Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, 
for each of fiscal years 2019 through 2021 includes amounts for 
the nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition activities of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration in accordance with 
the limitation in subsection (a). 
‘‘(e) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the 
Administrator shall certify to the congressional defense committees 
that the Administrator is carrying out the nuclear weapons dis-
mantlement and disposition activities of the Administration in 
accordance with the limitations in subsections (a) and (b).’’. 
SEC. 3118. NUCLEAR WARHEAD DESIGN COMPETITION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In January 2016, the co-chairs of a congressionally 
mandated study panel from the National Academies of Science 
testified to the following before the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices of the House of Representatives: 
(A) ‘‘The National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) complex must engage in robust design competitions 
in order to exercise the design and production skills that 
underpin stockpile stewardship and are necessary to meet 
evolving threats.’’. 
(B) ‘‘To exercise the full set of design skills necessary 
for an effective nuclear deterrent, the NNSA should develop 
and conduct the first in what the committee envisions 
to be a series of design competitions that integrate the 
full end-to-end process from novel design conception 
through engineering, building, and non-nuclear testing of 
a prototype.’’. 
(2) In March 2016 testimony before the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding a
H. R. 2810—609 
December 2016 Defense Science Board report entitled, ‘‘Seven 
Defense Priorities for the New Administration’’, members of 
that Board said the following: 
(A) ‘‘A key contributor to nuclear deterrence is the 
continuous, adaptable exercise of the development, design, 
and production functions for nuclear weapons in both the 
DOD and DOE.... Yet the DOE laboratories and DOD con-
tractor community have done little integrated design and 
development work outside of life extension for 25 years, 
let alone concept development that could serve as a hedge 
to surprise.’’. 
(B) ‘‘The Defense Science Board believes that the triad’s 
complementary features remain robust tenets for the design 
of a future force. Replacing our current, aging force is 
essential, but not sufficient in the more complex nuclear 
environment we now face to provide the adaptability or 
flexibility to confidently hold at risk what adversaries 
value. In particular, if the threat evolves in ways that 
favorably change the cost/benefit calculus in the view of 
an adversary’s leadership, then we should be in a position 
to quickly restore a credible deterrence posture.’’. 
(3) In a memorandum dated May 9, 2014, then-Secretary 
of Energy Ernie Moniz said the following: 
(A) ‘‘If nuclear military capabilities are to provide 
deterrence for the nation they need to be relevant to the 
emerging global strategic environment. The current stock-
pile was designed to meet the needs of a bipolar world 
with roots in the Cold War era. A more complex, chaotic, 
and dynamic security environment is emerging. In order 
to uphold the Department’s mission to ensure an effective 
nuclear deterrent.... we must ensure our nuclear capabili-
ties meet the challenges of known and potential geopolitical 
and technological trends. Therefore we must look ahead, 
using the expertise of our laboratories, to how the capabili-
ties that may be employed by other nations could impact 
deterrence over the next several decades.’’. 
(B) ‘‘We must challenge our thinking about our pro-
grams of record in order to permit foresighted actions that 
may reduce, in the coming decades, the chances for surprise 
and that buttress deterrence.’’. 
(b) DESIGN COMPETITION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with paragraph (2), the 
Administrator for Nuclear Security, in coordination with the 
Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall carry out 
a new and comprehensive design competition for a nuclear 
warhead that could be employed on ballistic missiles of the 
United States by 2030. Such competition shall— 
(A) examine options for warhead design and related 
delivery system requirements in the 2030s, including— 
(i) life extension of existing weapons; 
(ii) new capabilities; and 
(iii) such other concepts as the Administrator and 
the Chairman determine necessary to fully exercise 
and create responsive design capabilities in the enter-
prise and ensure a robust nuclear deterrent into the 
2030s;
H. R. 2810—610 
(B) assess how the capabilities and defenses that may 
be employed by other countries could impact deterrence 
in 2030 and beyond and how such threats could be 
addressed or mitigated in the warhead and related delivery 
systems; 
(C) exercise the full set of design skills necessary for 
an effective nuclear deterrent and responsive enterprise 
through production of conceptual designs and, as the 
Administrator determines appropriate, production of non- 
nuclear prototypes of components or subsystems; and 
(D) examine and recommend actions for significantly 
shortening timelines and significantly reducing costs associ-
ated with design, development, certification, and production 
of the warhead, without reducing worker or public health 
and safety. 
(2) TIMING.—The Administrator shall— 
(A) during fiscal year 2018, develop a plan to carry 
out paragraph (1); and 
(B) during fiscal year 2019, implement such plan. 
(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than March 1, 2018, the Administrator, 
in coordination with the Chairman, shall provide a briefing to 
the congressional defense committees on the plan of the Adminis-
trator to carry out the warhead design competition under subsection 
(b). Such briefing shall include an assessment of the costs, benefits, 
risks, and opportunities of such plan, particularly impacts to 
ongoing life extension programs and infrastructure projects. 
SEC. 3119. MODIFICATION OF MINOR CONSTRUCTION THRESHOLD FOR 
PLANT PROJECTS. 
Section 4701(2) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 
2741(2)) is amended by striking ‘‘$10,000,000’’ and inserting 
‘‘$20,000,000’’. 
SEC. 3120. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF ADVISORY BOARD ON 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND WORKER HEALTH. 
Section 3687(i) of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness 
Compensation Program Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 7385s–16(i)) is 
amended by striking ‘‘5 years’’ and inserting ‘‘10 years’’. 
SEC. 3121. USE OF FUNDS FOR CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECT SUP-
PORT ACTIVITIES RELATING TO MOX FACILITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided by subsection (b), the 
Secretary of Energy shall carry out construction and project support 
activities relating to the MOX facility using funds authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal 
year 2018 for the National Nuclear Security Administration for 
the MOX facility. 
(b) WAIVER.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary may waive the requirement 
under subsection (a) to carry out construction and project sup-
port activities relating to the MOX facility if the Secretary 
submits to the congressional defense committees— 
(A) the commitment of the Secretary to remove pluto-
nium intended to be disposed of in the MOX facility from 
South Carolina and ensure a sustainable future for the 
Savannah River Site; 
(B) a certification that—
H. R. 2810—611 
(i) an alternative option for carrying out the pluto-
nium disposition program for the same amount of 
plutonium as the amount of plutonium intended to 
be disposed of in the MOX facility exists, meeting 
the requirements of the Business Operating Procedure 
of the National Nuclear Security Administration enti-
tled ‘‘Analysis of Alternatives’’ and dated March 14, 
2016 (BOP–03.07); and 
(ii) the remaining lifecycle cost, determined in a 
manner comparable to the cost estimating and assess-
ment best practices of the Government Accountability 
Office, as found in the document of the Government 
Accountability Office entitled ‘‘GAO Cost Estimating 
and Assessment Guide’’ (GAO–09–3SP), for the alter-
native option would be less than approximately half 
of the estimated remaining lifecycle cost of the mixed- 
oxide fuel program; and 
(C) the details of any statutory or regulatory changes 
necessary to complete the alternative option. 
(2) ESTIMATES.—The Secretary shall ensure that the esti-
mates used by the Secretary for purposes of the certification 
under paragraph (1)(B) are of comparable accuracy. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) MOX FACILITY.—The term ‘‘MOX facility’’ means the 
mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah River 
Site, Aiken, South Carolina. 
(2) PROJECT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.—The term ‘‘project sup-
port activities’’ means activities that support the design, long- 
lead equipment procurement, and site preparation of the MOX 
facility. 
SEC. 3122. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR PROGRAMS 
IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) PROHIBITION.—None of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 
2018 for atomic energy defense activities may be obligated or 
expended to enter into a contract with, or otherwise provide assist-
ance to, the Russian Federation. 
(b) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Energy, without delegation, may 
waive the prohibition in subsection (a) only if— 
(1) the Secretary determines, in writing, that a nuclear- 
related threat arising in the Russian Federation must be 
addressed urgently and it is necessary to waive the prohibition 
to address that threat; 
(2) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense 
concur in the determination under paragraph (1); 
(3) the Secretary of Energy submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report containing— 
(A) a notification that the waiver is in the national 
security interest of the United States; 
(B) justification for the waiver, including the deter-
mination under paragraph (1); and 
(C) a description of the activities to be carried out 
pursuant to the waiver, including the expected cost and 
timeframe for such activities; and 
(4) a period of seven days elapses following the date on 
which the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (3).
H. R. 2810—612 
(c) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition under subsection (a) and the 
requirements under subsection (b) to waive that prohibition shall 
not apply to an amount, not to exceed $3,000,000, that the Secretary 
may make available for the Department of Energy Russian Health 
Studies Program. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
Subtitle C—Plans and Reports 
SEC. 3131. ANNUAL SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS ON CERTAIN 
HARDWARE RELATING TO DEFENSE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title XLIII of the Atomic Energy Defense 
Act (50 U.S.C. 2563 et seq.), as amended by section 3114, is further 
amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 4311. ANNUAL SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS ON CERTAIN 
HARDWARE RELATING TO DEFENSE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION. 
‘‘(a) ANNUAL SELECTED ACQUISITION REPORTS.— 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—At the end of each fiscal year, the 
Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report on each covered hardware project. The 
reports shall be known as Selected Acquisition Reports for 
the covered hardware project concerned. 
‘‘(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The information contained in the 
Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a covered hard-
ware project shall be the information contained in the Selected 
Acquisition Report for such fiscal year for a major defense 
acquisition program under section 2432 of title 10, United 
States Code, expressed in terms of the covered hardware 
project. 
‘‘(b) COVERED HARDWARE PROJECT DEFINED.—In this section, 
the term ‘covered hardware project’ means a project carried out 
under the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and develop-
ment program that— 
‘‘(1) is focused on the production and deployment of hard-
ware, including with respect to the development and deploy-
ment of satellites or satellite payloads; and 
‘‘(2) exceeds $500,000,000 in total program cost over the 
course of five years.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended by inserting after the item
H. R. 2810—613 
relating to section 4310, as added by section 3114, the following 
new item: 
‘‘Sec. 4311. Annual Selected Acquisition Reports on certain hardware relating to de-
fense nuclear nonproliferation.’’. 
SEC. 3132. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF NATIONAL 
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle A of title XLVII of the Atomic Energy 
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2741 et seq.), as amended by section 3111(d), 
is further amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 4716. UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECU-
RITY ADMINISTRATION. 
‘‘(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 10 days after the date 
on which the budget of the President for a fiscal year is submitted 
to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
Code, the Administrator shall submit to the Secretary of Energy 
and the congressional defense committees a report on the unfunded 
priorities of the Administration. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each report required by subsection (a) 
shall specify, for each unfunded priority covered by the report, 
the following: 
‘‘(A) A summary description of that priority, including 
the objectives to be achieved if that priority is funded 
(whether in whole or in part). 
‘‘(B) The additional amount of funds recommended in 
connection with the objectives under subparagraph (A). 
‘‘(C) Account information with respect to that priority. 
‘‘(2) PRIORITIZATION OF PRIORITIES.—Each report required 
by subsection (a) shall present the unfunded priorities covered 
by the report in order of urgency of priority. 
‘‘(c) UNFUNDED PRIORITY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘unfunded priority’, in the case of a fiscal year, means a program, 
activity, or mission requirement that— 
‘‘(1) is not funded in the budget of the President for that 
fiscal year as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) 
of title 31, United States Code; 
‘‘(2) is necessary to fulfill a requirement associated with 
the mission of the Administration; and 
‘‘(3) would have been recommended for funding through 
the budget referred to in paragraph (1) by the Administrator— 
‘‘(A) if additional resources were available for the 
budget to fund the program, activity, or mission require-
ment; or 
‘‘(B) in the case of a program, activity, or mission 
requirement that emerged after the budget was formulated, 
if the program, activity, or mission requirement had 
emerged before the budget was formulated.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended by inserting after the item 
relating to section 4715, as added by section 3111(d), the following 
new item: 
‘‘Sec. 4716. Unfunded priorities of the National Nuclear Security Administration.’’.
H. R. 2810—614 
SEC. 3133. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) STATUS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND 
ACCOUNTING PROGRAM.— 
(1) REPEAL.—Section 4303 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
Act (50 U.S.C. 2563) is repealed. 
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended by striking the item 
relating to section 4303. 
(b) STATUS OF SECURITY OF ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE FACILI-
TIES.—Section 4506 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 
2657) is amended by striking ‘‘of each year’’ each place it appears 
and inserting ‘‘of each even-numbered year’’. 
(c) SECURITY RISKS POSED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX.— 
(1) INCLUDED IN STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
PLAN.—Section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 
U.S.C. 2523) is amended— 
(A) in subsection (c)— 
(i) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as para-
graphs (7) and (8), respectively; and 
(ii) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following 
new paragraph: 
‘‘(6) A summary of the plan regarding the research and 
development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of tech-
nologies described in subsection (d)(7).’’; and 
(B) in subsection (d)— 
(i) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph 
(8); and 
(ii) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following 
new paragraph (7): 
‘‘(7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, 
and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within 
the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cyber 
security threats during the five fiscal years following the date 
of the report, together with— 
‘‘(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, 
a description of the technologies deployed to address the 
physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site; 
‘‘(B) for each site and for the nuclear security enter-
prise, the methods used by the Administration to establish 
priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity 
technologies; and 
‘‘(C) a detailed description of how the funds identified 
for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph 
(1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal 
year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out 
that plan.’’. 
(2) CONFORMING
AMENDMENT.—Section 3253(b) of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453) 
is amended by striking paragraph (5). 
(d) MODIFICATION OF SUBMISSION OF SELECTED ACQUISITION 
REPORTS.—Section 4217(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 
U.S.C. 2537(a)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘each fiscal-year quarter’’ and inserting 
‘‘the first quarter of each fiscal year’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘or a major’’ and inserting ‘‘and each 
major’’; and
H. R. 2810—615 
(C) by inserting ‘‘during the preceding fiscal year’’ after 
‘‘4713(a)(2))’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (2)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘a fiscal-year quarter’’ and inserting 
‘‘a fiscal year’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘such fiscal-year quarter’’ and inserting 
‘‘each fiscal-year quarter in that fiscal year’’. 
(e) LONG-TERM
PLAN
FOR
MEETING
NATIONAL
SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR UNENCUMBERED URANIUM.—Section 4221(a) of 
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2538c(a)) is amended 
by striking ‘‘Concurrent with’’ and all that follows through ‘‘2026’’ 
and inserting ‘‘Not later than December 31 of each even-numbered 
year through 2026’’. 
(f) 
DEFENSE
NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
MANAGEMENT 
PLAN.— 
(1) MODIFICATION
OF
SUBMISSION.—Section 4309 of the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2575) is amended— 
(A) by striking subsection (c); 
(B) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); 
and 
(C) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the fol-
lowing new subsections: 
‘‘(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—The Administrator shall develop and 
annually update a five-year management plan for activities associ-
ated with the defense nuclear nonproliferation programs of the 
Administration to prevent and counter the proliferation of materials, 
technology, equipment, and expertise related to nuclear and radio-
logical weapons in order to minimize and address the risk of nuclear 
terrorism and the proliferation of such weapons. 
‘‘(b) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—(1) Not later than March 15 
of each even-numbered year, the Administrator shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees a summary of the plan devel-
oped under subsection (a). 
‘‘(2) Not later than March 15 of each odd-numbered year, the 
Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). 
‘‘(3) Each summary submitted under paragraph (1) and each 
report submitted under paragraph (2) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.’’. 
(2) ELIMINATION
OF
IDENTIFICATION
OF
FUTURE
INTER-
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS.—Subsection (c) of such section, as 
redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is further amended— 
(A) by striking paragraph (14); and 
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (15) and (16) as para-
graphs (14) and (15), respectively. 
(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Subsection (c) of such sec-
tion, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B) and amended by 
paragraph (2), is further amended— 
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘the plan required 
by subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘the summary required 
by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required 
by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be’’; 
(B) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘the plan required 
by subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘the summary required 
by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required 
by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be’’;
H. R. 2810—616 
(C) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘the plan required 
by subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘the summary required 
by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required 
by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be,’’; 
(D) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘the plan required 
by subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘the summary required 
by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required 
by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be,’’; 
and 
(E) in paragraph (10), by striking ‘‘the plan required 
by subsection (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘the summary required 
by paragraph (1) of subsection (b) or the report required 
by paragraph (2) of that subsection, as the case may be,’’. 
SEC. 3134. MODIFICATION TO STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP, MANAGE-
MENT, AND RESPONSIVENESS PLAN. 
Section 4203 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 
2523), as amended by section 3133(c), is further amended— 
(1) in subsection (c)— 
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (7) and (8) as para-
graphs (8) and (9), respectively; and 
(B) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new 
paragraph (7): 
‘‘(7) A summary of the assessment under subsection (d)(8) 
regarding the execution of programs with current and projected 
budgets and any associated risks.’’; and 
(2) in subsection (d)— 
(A) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); 
and 
(B) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new 
paragraph (8): 
‘‘(8) An assessment of whether the programs described 
by the report can be executed with current and projected 
budgets and any associated risks.’’. 
SEC. 3135. ASSESSMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOTYPE NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES. 
(a) STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND RESPONSIVE-
NESS PLAN.—Section 4203(d)(1) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 
(50 U.S.C. 2523(d)(1)) is amended— 
(1) in subparagraph (M), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting 
a semicolon; 
(2) in subparagraph (N), by striking the period at the 
end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(O) as required, when assessing and developing proto-
type nuclear weapons of foreign countries, a report from 
the directors of the national security laboratories on the 
need and plan for such assessment and development that 
includes separate comments on the plan from the Secretary 
of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence.’’. 
(b) STOCKPILE RESPONSIVENESS PROGRAM.—Section 4220(c) of 
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2538b(c)) is amended 
by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(6) The retention of the ability, in consultation with the 
Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop proto-
type nuclear weapons of foreign countries and, if necessary, 
to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes.’’.
H. R. 2810—617 
(c) CONFORMING REPEAL.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Section 4509 of the Atomic Energy 
Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2660) is repealed. 
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents for the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act is amended by striking the items 
relating to sections 4508 and 4509. 
SEC. 3136. PLAN FOR VERIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MONITORING 
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL. 
(a) FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.— 
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(A) A January 2014 Defense Science Board report found 
that ‘‘The nuclear future will not be a linear extrapolation 
of the past... [and] [t]he technologies and processes designed 
for current treaty verification and inspections are inad-
equate to future monitoring realities.’’. 
(B) Section 3133 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 
‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 127 Stat. 3896) 
required an interagency plan for monitoring of nuclear 
weapons and fissile material, and section 3132 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 
(Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2768) required an update 
of such plan. In both instances, the reports submitted failed 
to answer the congressional requirements, and instead pro-
vided only a brief summary of the National Security Council 
structure and processes. 
(2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
verification, detection, and monitoring of nuclear weapons and 
fissile material should be a priority for national security, and 
that the reports submitted to date do not reflect this priority, 
or the current and planned initiatives related to nuclear 
verification and detection. 
(b) PLAN.—The President, in consultation with the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intel-
ligence, shall develop a plan for verification and monitoring relating 
to the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, components of 
such weapons, and fissile material. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The plan developed under subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(1) A plan and road map for verification, detection, and 
monitoring, with respect to policy, operations, and research, 
development, testing, and evaluation, including— 
(A) identifying requirements for such verification, 
detection, and monitoring; 
(B) costs and funding requirements over 10 years for 
such verification, detection, and monitoring; and 
(C) identifying and integrating roles, responsibilities, 
and planning for such verification, detection, and moni-
toring. 
(2) A detailed international engagement plan for building 
cooperation and transparency, including bilateral and multilat-
eral efforts, to improve inspections, detection, and monitoring. 
(3) A detailed description of—
H. R. 2810—618 
(A) current and planned research and development 
efforts to improve monitoring, detection, and in-field inspec-
tion and analysis capabilities, including persistent surveil-
lance, remote monitoring, and rapid analysis of large data 
sets, including open-source data; and 
(B) measures to coordinate technical and operational 
requirements early in the process. 
(4) Engagement of relevant departments and agencies of 
the Federal Government and the military departments 
(including the Open Source Center and the United States 
Atomic Energy Detection System), national laboratories, 
industry, and academia. 
(d) DESIGNATION OF DOE.—The President shall designate the 
Department of Energy as the lead agency for development of the 
plan under subsection (b). 
(e) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, acting through 
the Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall provide to the appro-
priate congressional committees an interim briefing on the plan 
under subsection (b). 
(f) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for 
the Department of Defense for supporting the Executive Office 
of the President, $10,000,000 may not be obligated or expended 
until the date on which the President submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees the plan under subsection (g)(1). 
(g) SUBMISSION.— 
(1) DEADLINE.—Not later than April 15, 2018, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the 
plan developed under subsection (b). 
(2) FORM.—The plan under subsection (b) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but, consistent with the protection 
of intelligence sources and methods, may include a classified 
annex. 
(h) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
(3) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(4) The Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Homeland 
Security of the House of Representatives. 
(5) The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation of the Senate and the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 3137. REVIEW OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL 
TERRORISM PREVENTION STRATEGY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the 
Administrator for Nuclear Security, shall enter into an arrangement 
with the private scientific advisory group known as JASON to 
assess and recommend improvements to the strategies of the United
H. R. 2810—619 
States for preventing, countering, and responding to nuclear and 
radiological terrorism, specifically terrorism involving the use of 
nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radiological dis-
persal or exposure devices, or the sabotage of nuclear facilities. 
(b) REVIEW.—The assessment conducted under subsection (a) 
shall address the adequacy of the strategies of the United States 
described in that subsection and identify technical, policy, and 
resource gaps with respect to— 
(1) identifying national and international nuclear and 
radiological terrorism risks and critical emerging threats; 
(2) preventing state-sponsored actors and non-state actors 
from acquiring the technologies, materials, and critical exper-
tise needed to mount nuclear or radiological attacks, including 
dual-use technologies, materials, and expertise; 
(3) countering efforts by state-sponsored actors and non- 
state actors to mount such attacks; 
(4) responding to nuclear and radiological terrorism 
incidents to attribute their origin and help manage their con-
sequences; and 
(5) other important matters identified by JASON that are 
directly relevant to those strategies. 
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The assessment conducted under sub-
section (a) shall include recommendations to the Secretary of 
Energy, Congress, and such other Federal entities as JASON con-
siders appropriate, for preventing, countering, and responding to 
nuclear and radiological terrorism, including recommendations for— 
(1) closing technical, policy, or resource gaps; 
(2) improving cooperation and appropriate integration 
among Federal entities and Federal, State, and tribal govern-
ments; 
(3) improving cooperation between the United States and 
other countries and international organizations; and 
(4) other important matters identified by JASON that are 
directly relevant to the strategies of the United States described 
in subsection (a). 
(d) LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, 
and the Director of National Intelligence shall appoint appropriate 
liaisons to JASON with respect to supporting the timely conduct 
of the assessment required by subsection (a). 
(e) MATERIALS.—The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, 
and the Director of National Intelligence shall provide access to 
JASON to materials relevant to the assessment required by sub-
section (a), consistent with the protection of sources and methods 
and other critically sensitive information. 
(f) CLEARANCES.—The Secretary of Energy and the Director 
of National Intelligence shall ensure that appropriate members 
and staff of JASON have the necessary clearances, obtained in 
an expedited manner, to conduct the assessment required by sub-
section (a). 
SEC. 3138. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND OPERATING CON-
TRACTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for Nuclear Security 
shall seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research
H. R. 2810—620 
and development center to conduct an assessment of the benefits, 
costs, challenges, risks, efficiency, and effectiveness of the strategy 
of the Administrator with respect to management and operating 
contracts for national security laboratories. The Administrator may 
not award such contract to a federally funded research and develop-
ment center for which the Department of Energy or the National 
Nuclear Security Administration is the primary sponsor. 
(b) COOPERATION.—The Administrator, and the director of each 
national security laboratory, shall provide to the federally funded 
research and development center conducting the assessment under 
subsection (a) the information the center requires to conduct such 
assessment. 
(c) SUBMISSION.— 
(1) NNSA.—Not later than 90 days after the date on which 
the Administrator and a federally funded research and develop-
ment center enter into the contract under subsection (a), the 
center shall submit to the Administrator a report on the assess-
ment conducted under such subsection. Such report shall 
include the following: 
(A) An assessment of the acquisition strategy and the 
contract oversight process of the Administrator, and of 
the use of for-profit management and operating contractors 
at national security laboratories, and whether such 
strategy, process, and contractors provide the best outcomes 
to the Federal Government with respect to performance, 
cost, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
(B) An assessment of the total costs, for each national 
security laboratory, that are incurred because of using a 
for-profit model for the management and operating contract 
that would not be incurred under a nonprofit model, and 
whether performance, costs, efficiency, and effectiveness 
would be expected to increase or decrease under a nonprofit 
model. 
(C) An assessment of whether the Administrator is 
appropriately using, managing, and overseeing the national 
security laboratories with respect to the nature of the lab-
oratories as federally funded research and development 
centers. 
(2) CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after the date on 
which the Administrator receives the report under paragraph 
(1), the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees such report, without change, together with any 
comments the Administrator determines appropriate. 
(3) LIMITATION.— 
(A) AWARD OR EXTENSION OF CONTRACT.—None of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or other-
wise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the National 
Nuclear Security Administration may be obligated or 
expended to issue a final award, or issue a decision to 
extend, a management and operating contract for a national 
security laboratory until the date on which the Adminis-
trator submits to the congressional defense committees the 
report under paragraph (2). 
(B) WAIVER FOR EXTENSION.—The Secretary of Energy 
may waive the limitation in subparagraph (A) with respect 
to the extension of a management and operating contract 
for a national security laboratory if the Secretary—
H. R. 2810—621 
(i) determines such waiver is required in the 
interest of national security; and 
(ii) notifies the Committees on Armed Services 
of the House of Representatives and the Senate of 
such determination. 
(d) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
nothing in this section should be construed to mandate or encourage 
an extension of an existing management and operating contract 
for a national security laboratory. 
(e) NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORY DEFINED.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘national security laboratory’’ has the meaning given 
that term in section 4002(7) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act 
(50 U.S.C. 2501(7)). 
SEC. 3139. EVALUATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN DEFENSE 
NUCLEAR WASTE. 
(a) EVALUATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall conduct an 
evaluation of the feasibility, costs, and cost savings of classifying 
covered defense nuclear waste as other than high-level radioactive 
waste, without decreasing environmental, health, or public safety 
requirements. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—In conducting the evaluation under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall consider— 
(1) the estimated quantities and locations of covered 
defense nuclear waste; 
(2) the potential disposal paths for such waste; 
(3) the estimated disposal timeline for such waste; 
(4) the estimated costs for disposal of such waste, and 
potential cost savings; 
(5) the potential effect on existing consent orders, permits, 
and agreements; 
(6) the basis by which the Secretary would make a decision 
on reclassification of such waste; and 
(7) any such other matters relating to defense nuclear 
waste or other reprocessing waste that the Secretary deter-
mines appropriate. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2018, the Secretary 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the evaluation under subsection (a), including a description 
of— 
(1) the consideration by the Secretary of the matters under 
subsection (b); 
(2) any actions the Secretary has taken or plans to take 
to change the processes, rules, regulations, orders, or directives, 
relating to defense nuclear waste, as appropriate; 
(3) any recommendations for legislative action the Sec-
retary determines appropriate; and 
(4) the assessment of the Secretary regarding the benefits 
and risks of the actions and recommendations of the Secretary 
under paragraphs (1) and (2). 
(d) DIFFERENTIATION OF WASTE.—In conducting the evaluation 
under subsection (a) and preparing the report required by sub-
section (c), the Secretary shall distinguish between covered nuclear 
waste described in subparagraph (A) of subsection (e)(2) and covered 
nuclear waste described in subparagraph (B) of that subsection. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: