H. R. 815—49 
(4) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘financial institu-
tion’’ means a financial institution specified in subparagraph 
(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Z) of 
section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code. 
(5) G7.—The term ‘‘G7’’ means the countries that are 
member of the informal Group of 7, including Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
(6) RUSSIAN SOVEREIGN ASSET.—The term ‘‘Russian sov-
ereign asset’’ means any of the following: 
(A) Funds and other property of— 
(i) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; 
(ii) the Russian National Wealth Fund; or 
(iii) the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(B) Any other funds or other property that are owned 
by the Government of the Russian Federation, including 
by any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of that 
government. 
(7) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United States’’ means the 
several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin 
Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United 
States. 
(8) UNITED
STATES
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTION.—The term 
‘‘United States financial institution’’ means a financial institu-
tion organized under the laws of the United States or of any 
jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch 
of such an institution. 
(9) SEIZE OR SEIZURE.—The term ‘‘seize’’ or ‘‘seizure’’ means 
confiscation of all right, title, and interest whatsoever in a 
Russian sovereign asset or a Russian aggressor state sovereign 
asset and vesting of the same in the United States. 
TITLE II—REPURPOSING OF RUSSIAN 
SOVEREIGN ASSETS 
SEC. 101. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian 
Federation violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of Ukraine by engaging in a premeditated, second illegal inva-
sion of Ukraine. 
(2) The international community has condemned the illegal 
invasions of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, as well as 
the commission of the crime of aggression, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide by officials of the Russian 
Federation, including through the deliberate targeting of 
civilians and civilian infrastructure, the forcible transfer of 
children, and the commission of sexual violence. 
(3) The leaders of the G7 have called the Russian Federa-
tion’s ‘‘unprovoked and completely unjustified attack on the 
democratic state of Ukraine’’ a ‘‘serious violation of inter-
national law and a grave breach of the United Nations Charter 
and all commitments Russia entered in the Helsinki Final
H. R. 815—50 
Act and the Charter of Paris and its commitments in the 
Budapest Memorandum’’. 
(4) On March 2, 2022, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted Resolution ES–11/1, entitled ‘‘Aggression 
against Ukraine’’, by a vote of 141 to 5. That resolution 
‘‘deplore[d] in the strongest terms the aggression by the Russian 
Federation against Ukraine in violation of Article 2(4) of the 
[United Nations] Charter’’ and demanded that the Russian 
Federation ‘‘immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine’’ 
and ‘‘immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw 
all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within 
its internationally recognized borders’’. 
(5) On March 16, 2022, the International Court of Justice 
issued a provisional measures order requiring the Russian Fed-
eration to ‘‘immediately suspend the military operations that 
it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine’’ 
and, in this regard, observed that ‘‘orders on provisional meas-
ures . . . have binding effect’’. 
(6) On November 14, 2022, the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted a resolution— 
(A) recognizing that the Russian Federation has com-
mitted a serious breach of the most fundamental norms 
of international law and its gross and systematic refusal 
to obey its obligations has affected the entire international 
community; 
(B) recognizing the need for the establishment, in 
cooperation with Ukraine, of an international mechanism 
for compensation for financially assessable damages caused 
by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful acts; 
and 
(C) recommending ‘‘the creation . . . of an international 
register of damage to serve as a record . . . of evidence 
and claims information on damage, loss or injury to all 
natural and legal persons concerned, as well as the State 
of Ukraine, caused by internationally wrongful acts of the 
Russian Federation in or against Ukraine . . . .’’. 
(7) The Russian Federation bears international legal 
responsibility for its aggression against Ukraine and, under 
international law, must cease its internationally wrongful acts. 
Because of this breach of the prohibition on aggression under 
international law, the United States is legally entitled to take 
counter measures that are proportionate and aimed at inducing 
the Russian Federation to comply with its international obliga-
tions. 
(8) Approximately $300,000,000,000 of Russian sovereign 
assets have been immobilized worldwide. Only a small fraction 
of those assets, 1 to 2 percent, or between $4,000,000,000 
and $5,000,000,000, are reportedly subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States. 
(9) The vast majority of immobilized Russian sovereign 
assets, approximately $190,000,000,000, are reportedly subject 
to the jurisdiction of Belgium. The Government of Belgium 
has publicly indicated that any action by that Government 
regarding those assets would be predicated on support by the 
G7. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, 
having committed an act of aggression, as recognized by the United
H. R. 815—51 
Nations General Assembly on March 2, 2022, the Russian Federa-
tion is to be considered as an aggressor state. The extreme illegal 
actions taken by the Russian Federation, including an act of aggres-
sion, present a unique situation, justifying the establishment of 
a legal authority for the United States Government and other 
countries to confiscate Russian sovereign assets in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING IMPORTANCE OF THE RUS-
SIAN 
FEDERATION 
PROVIDING 
COMPENSATION 
TO 
UKRAINE. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Russian Federation bears responsibility for the 
financial burden of the reconstruction of Ukraine and for count-
less other costs associated with the illegal invasion of Ukraine 
by the Russian Federation that began on February 24, 2022; 
(2) the most effective ways to provide compensation for 
the damages caused by the Russian Federation’s internationally 
wrongful acts should be assessed by an international mecha-
nism charged with determining compensation and providing 
assistance to Ukraine; 
(3) at least since November 2022 the Russian Federation 
has been on notice of its opportunity to comply with its inter-
national obligations, including to make full compensation for 
injury, or, by agreement with Ukraine, to authorize an inter-
national mechanism to resolve issues regarding compensation 
to Ukraine; 
(4) the Russian Federation can, by negotiated agreement, 
participate in any international process to assess the damages 
caused by the Russian Federation’s internationally wrongful 
acts and make funds available to compensate for these damages, 
and if it fails to do so, the United States and other countries 
should explore all avenues for ensuring compensation to 
Ukraine; 
(5) the President should lead robust engagement on all 
bilateral and multilateral aspects of the response by the United 
States to acts by the Russian Federation that undermine the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including on 
any 
policy 
coordination 
and 
alignment 
regarding 
the 
repurposing or ordered transfer of Russian sovereign assets 
in the context of determining compensation and providing 
assistance to Ukraine; 
(6) as part of the robust engagement on bilateral and 
multilateral responses to acts by the Russian Federation that 
undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, 
the President should endeavor to facilitate creation of, and 
United States participation in, an international mechanism 
regarding the repurposing or seizure of sovereign assets of 
the Russian Federation for the benefit of Ukraine. 
(7) the repurposing of Russian sovereign assets is in the 
national interests of the United States and consistent with 
United States and international law; 
(8) the United States should work with international allies 
and partners on the repurposing of Russian sovereign assets 
as part of a coordinated, multilateral effort, including with 
G7 countries and other countries in which Russian sovereign 
assets are located; and
H. R. 815—52 
(9) any effort by the United States to confiscate and repur-
pose Russian sovereign assets should be undertaken alongside 
international allies and partners as part of a coordinated, multi-
lateral effort, including with G7 countries, the European Union, 
Australia, and other countries in which Russian sovereign 
assets are located. 
SEC. 103. PROHIBITION ON RELEASE OF BLOCKED RUSSIAN SOV-
EREIGN ASSETS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No Russian sovereign asset that is blocked 
or effectively immobilized by the Department of the Treasury before 
the date specified in section 104(j) may be released or mobilized, 
except as otherwise authorized by this division, until the date 
on which the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that— 
(1) hostilities between the Russian Federation and Ukraine 
have ceased; and 
(2)(A) full compensation has been made to Ukraine for 
harms resulting from the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian 
Federation; or 
(B) the Russian Federation is participating in a bona fide 
international mechanism that, by agreement, will discharge 
the obligations of the Russian Federation to compensate 
Ukraine for all amounts determined to be owed to Ukraine. 
(b) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days before the release 
or mobilization of a Russian sovereign asset that is blocked or 
effectively immobilized by the Department of the Treasury, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees— 
(1) a notification of the decision to take the action that 
releases or mobilizes the asset; and 
(2) a justification in writing for such decision. 
(c) JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—No Russian sovereign asset that is 
blocked or effectively immobilized by the Department of the 
Treasury may be released or mobilized if, within 30 days of 
receipt of the notification and justification required under sub-
section (b), a joint resolution is enacted into law prohibiting 
the proposed release or mobilization. 
(2) EXPEDITED PROCEDURES.—Any joint resolution described 
in paragraph (1) introduced in either House of Congress shall 
be considered in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) 
of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976 (Public Law 94–329; 90 Stat. 765), except 
that any such resolution shall be subject to germane amend-
ments. If such a joint resolution should be vetoed by the Presi-
dent, the time for debate in consideration of the veto message 
on such measure shall be limited to 20 hours in the Senate 
and in the House of Representatives shall be determined in 
accordance with the Rules of the House. 
(d) COOPERATION ON PROHIBITION OF RELEASE OF CERTAIN RUS-
SIAN
SOVEREIGN
ASSETS.—Notwithstanding subsection (a), the 
President may take such actions as may be necessary to seek 
to obtain an agreement or arrangement to which the Government 
of Ukraine is party that discharges the Russian Federation from 
further obligations to compensate Ukraine.