699
is used for storing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials
and is not yet protected by such measures.
(b) POLICY WORLDWIDE.—It is the policy of the
United States to seek to cooperate with all appropriate
nations—
(1) to attempt to ensure that all nuclear weap-
ons and nuclear materials worldwide are secure and
accounted for according to stringent standards; and
(2) to minimize the number of facilities world-
wide at which separated plutonium and highly en-
riched uranium are present, so as to achieve the
highest and most sustainable levels of security for
such facilities in the most cost-effective manner.
(c) EXPANSION OF PROGRAM TO ADDITIONAL COUN-
TRIES AUTHORIZED.—(1) The Secretary of State may es-
tablish an international nuclear materials protection and
cooperation program with respect to countries other than
the Russian Federation and the other independent states
of the former Soviet Union.
(2) In carrying out such program, the Secretary of
State may provide such funds as are needed to remove
nuclear materials from potentially vulnerable facilities, in-
cluding funds to cover the costs of—
(A) transporting such materials from those fa-
cilities to secure facilities;
700
(B) purchasing such materials;
(C) converting those facilities to a use that no
longer requires nuclear materials; and
(D) providing incentives to facilitate the re-
moval of such materials from such facilities.
(3)(A) The Secretary of Energy may provide tech-
nical assistance to the Secretary of State in the efforts
of the Secretary of State, in carrying out the program,
to assist such countries to review and improve their secu-
rity programs with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear
materials.
(B) The technical assistance provided under subpara-
graph (A) may, where consistent with the treaty obliga-
tions of the United States, include the sharing of tech-
nology or methodologies to the countries referred to in
that subparagraph. Any such sharing shall take into ac-
count the sovereignty of the country concerned and the
nuclear weapons programs of such country, as well as the
sensitivity of any information involved regarding United
States nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons systems.
(C) The Secretary of State may include the Russian
Federation in activities under this paragraph if the Sec-
retary determines that the experience of the Russian Fed-
eration under the International Nuclear Materials Protec-
tion and Cooperation program of the Department of En-
701
ergy would make the participation of the Russian Federa-
tion in those activities useful in providing technical assist-
ance under subparagraph (A).
Subtitle 
B—Administration 
and
Oversight of Threat Reduction
and Nonproliferation Programs
SEC. 3621. ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON THREAT REDUCTION
AND 
NONPROLIFERATION 
PROGRAMS 
OF
CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 
MEASURES
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PROGRAMS.
(a) ANALYSIS OF AND REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT MEASURES.—(1) The National Academy of
Sciences shall carry out an analysis of the effect on threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs of applicable con-
gressional oversight measures. The analysis shall take into
account—
(A) the national security interests of the United
States;
(B) the need for accountability in the expendi-
ture of funds by the United States;
(C) the effect of such congressional oversight
measures on the continuity and effectiveness of such
programs; and
(D) the oversight responsibilities of Congress
with respect to such programs.
702
(2) In carrying out the analysis, the National Acad-
emy of Sciences shall consult with the chairs and ranking
minority members of the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(b) REPORT.—Not later than November 1, 2004, the
National Academy of Sciences shall submit to Congress
a report on the analysis required by subsection (a). The
report shall—
(1) identify, and describe the purpose of, each
congressional oversight measure; and
(2) set forth such recommendations as the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences considers appropriate as
to whether the measure should be retained, amend-
ed, or repealed, together with the reasoning under-
lying that determination.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) the term ‘‘congressional oversight measure’’
means—
(A) the restrictions in subsection (d) of
section 1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 1993 (22 U.S.C. 5952);
(B) the eligibility requirements in para-
graphs (1) through (4) of section 502 of the
FREEDOM Support Act (22 U.S.C. 5852);
703
(C) the prohibition in section 1305 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 113 Stat. 512;
22 U.S.C. 5952 note); and
(D) any restriction or prohibition on the
use of funds otherwise available for threat re-
duction and nonproliferation programs that ap-
plies absent the submission to Congress (or any
one or more officers or committees of Congress)
of a report, certification, or other matter.
(2) The term ‘‘threat reduction and non-
proliferation programs’’ means—
(A) the programs specified in section
1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–201;
110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note); and
(B) any programs for which funds are
made available under the defense nuclear non-
proliferation account of the Department of En-
ergy.
704
SEC. 3622. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF FUNDS APPRO-
PRIATED FOR THREAT REDUCTION AND NON-
PROLIFERATION IN STATES OF THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each
year, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress
a report on the use, during the fiscal year ending Sep-
tember 30 of that year, of funds appropriated for threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Russian
Federation and the other independent states of the former
Soviet Union. The report shall be prepared in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and shall include the fol-
lowing:
(1) A description of the use of such funds and
the manner in which such funds are being monitored
and accounted for, including—
(A) the amounts obligated, and the
amounts expended, for such activities;
(B) the purposes for which such amounts
were obligated and expended;
(C) the forms of assistance provided, and
the justification for each form of assistance pro-
vided;
(D) the success of each such activity, in-
cluding the purposes achieved for each such ac-
tivity;
705
(E) a description of the participation in
such activities by private sector entities in the
United States and by Federal agencies; and
(F) any other information that the Sec-
retary of Energy considers appropriate to pro-
vide a complete description of the operation and
success of such activities.
(2) An accounting of the financial commitment
made by the Russian Federation, as of the date of
the end of the fiscal year covered by the report, to
the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction
and to threat reduction and nonproliferation pro-
grams.
(3) A description of the efforts made by the
United States to encourage the Russian Federation
to continue to maintain its current level of financial
commitment at a level not less than the level of its
commitment for fiscal year 2003, and the response
of the Russian Federation to such efforts.
(4) A description of the access provided by the
Russian Federation to the United States during the
fiscal year covered by the report to the facilities with
respect to which the United States is providing as-
sistance under threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs.
706
(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—In preparing the re-
port, the Secretary of Energy shall consult with the chairs
and ranking minority members of the following congres-
sional committees:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services, Com-
mittee on Appropriations, and Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services, Com-
mittee on Appropriations, and Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate.
(c) INFORMATION FROM RUSSIAN FEDERATION.—In
the case of activities covered by the report that are carried
out in the Russian Federation, the Secretary of Energy
shall, in preparing the report, include information pro-
vided by the Russian Federation with respect to those ac-
tivities.
(d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs’’ has the mean-
ing given such term in section 3621.
SEC. 3623. PLAN FOR AND COORDINATION OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERA-
TION 
PROGRAMS 
WITH 
STATES 
OF 
THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION.
(a) CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PLAN.—
Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act
707
for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–107; 115 Stat.
1247), as amended by section 1205 of the Bob Stump Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107–314; 116 Stat. 2664) is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as sub-
section (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
lowing new subsection (d):
‘‘(d) CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.—(1)
Not later than June 1, 2004, the President shall develop
with the President of the Russian Federation and submit
to Congress a comprehensive, detailed plan—
‘‘(A) to account for, secure, and destroy all
chemical and biological weapons, and the chemical
and biological materials designed for use in such
weapons, that are located in Russia and the inde-
pendent states of the former Soviet Union; and
‘‘(B) to prevent the outflow from those states of
the technology and scientific expertise that could be
used for developing those weapons, including delivery
systems.
‘‘(2) The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
‘‘(A) Specific goals and measurable objectives
for the programs that are designed to carry out the
708
objectives specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (1).
‘‘(B) Identification of all significant obstacles to
achieving those objectives and the means for over-
coming those obstacles.
‘‘(C) Criteria for success for those programs
and a strategy for eventual termination of United
States contributions to those programs and assump-
tion of the ongoing support of those programs by the
Russian Federation.
‘‘(D) Specification of the fiscal and other re-
sources necessary in each of the eight fiscal years
after fiscal year 2003 to achieve those objectives, in-
cluding contributions from the international commu-
nity.
‘‘(E) Arrangements for United States oversight
and access to sites.
‘‘(F) Recommendations for any changes—
‘‘(i) in the structure or organization of the
programs for carrying out those objectives; and
‘‘(ii) in regulations or legislation that
would increase the efficiency and coordination
of those programs or would otherwise con-
tribute to the achievement of those objectives.
709
‘‘(3) In developing the plan required by paragraph
(1), the President shall consult with—
‘‘(A) the majority and minority leadership of
the appropriate committees of Congress; and
‘‘(B) appropriate officials of the states of the
former Soviet Union.
‘‘(4)(A) The President, after consultation with the
majority and minority leadership of the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress, shall designate a senior official of the
Executive Branch, and provide that official with sufficient
authority and staffing and other resources, to coordinate
the programs referred to in paragraph (2)(A).
‘‘(B) The President shall designate that official not
later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of
this subsection.’’.
(b) REPORT REQUIRED TO COVER BOTH PLANS.—
Subsection (e) of section 1205 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–
107; 115 Stat. 1247), as redesignated by subsection (a),
is amended—
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking
‘‘PLAN.—’’ and inserting ‘‘PLANS.—’’;
(2) in paragraph (1)—
(A) by striking ‘‘January 31, 2003,’’ and
inserting ‘‘January 31, 2005,’’; and
710
(B) by striking ‘‘plan required by sub-
section (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘plans required by
subsections (a) and (d)(1)’’; and
(3) in paragraph (2)—
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘plan
required by subsection (a)’’ and inserting
‘‘plans required by subsections (a) and (d)(1)’’;
and
(B) in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) by
striking ‘‘plan’’ each place it appears and in-
serting ‘‘plans’’.
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The heading of sec-
tion 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107–107; 115 Stat. 1247)
is amended to read as follows:
‘‘SEC. 1205. PLANS FOR SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MA-
TERIAL, AND EXPERTISE OF, AND FOR CO-
ORDINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
WITH, STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION.’’.
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE FOR FIRST REPORT COVERING
BOTH PLANS.—The amendments made by subsection (b)
shall apply with respect to the first report due after Janu-
ary 31, 2004.
711
Subtitle C—United States—Russia
Relations
SEC. 3631. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EX-
CHANGES ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS-GRADE MA-
TERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that inventories of
nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons
should be tracked in order, among other things—
(1) to make it more likely that the Russian
Federation can fully account for its entire inventory
of nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear
weapons; and
(2) to make it more likely that the sources of
any such material or weapons possessed or used by
any foreign state or terrorist organization can be
identified.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—To the extent that the
President considers prudent, it is the policy of the United
States to seek to establish jointly with the Russian Fed-
eration comprehensive inventories and data exchanges of
Russian Federation and United States nuclear weapons-
grade material and nuclear weapons, with particular at-
tention to tactical warheads and warheads that are no
longer operationally deployed.
712
(c) ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE
INVENTORIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the United States should seek to work with the Rus-
sian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of
Russian highly enriched uranium, weapons-grade pluto-
nium, and assembled warheads, with special attention to
be focused on tactical warheads and warheads that are
no longer operationally deployed.
(d) DATA EXCHANGES.—As part of the development
of inventories under subsection (c), to the maximum ex-
tent practicable and without jeopardizing United States
national security interests, the United States may ex-
change data with the Russian Federation on categories of
material and weapons described in subsection (c).
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 12 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
until a comprehensive inventory is created and the infor-
mation collected from the inventory is exchanged between
the United States and the Russian Federation, the Presi-
dent shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified
and unclassified form as necessary, describing the
progress that has been made toward creating an inventory
and exchanging the information.
713
SEC. 3632. ESTABLISHMENT OF DUMA-CONGRESS NUCLEAR
THREAT REDUCTION WORKING GROUP.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP.—There
is hereby established a working group to be known as the
‘‘Nuclear Threat Reduction Working Group’’ as an inter-
parliamentary group of the United States and the Russian
Federation.
(b) PURPOSE OF WORKING GROUP.—The purpose of
the Working Group established by subsection (a) shall be
to explore means to enhance cooperation between the
United States and the Russian Federation with respect
to nuclear nonproliferation and security, and such other
issues related to reducing nuclear weapons dangers as the
delegations from the two legislative bodies may consider
appropriate.
(c) MEMBERSHIP.—(1) The majority leader of the
Senate, after consultation with the minority leader of the
Senate, shall appoint 10 Senators to the Working Group
established by subsection (a).
(2) The Speaker of the House of Representatives,
after consultation with the minority leader of the House
of Representatives, shall appoint 30 Representatives to the
Working Group.
714
SEC. 3633. JOINT UNITED STATES/NORTH ATLANTIC TREA-
TY ORGANIZATION COOPERATION WITH RUS-
SIA ON THEATER-LEVEL BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSES.
(a) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
that the President should seek to ensure that the United
States takes the lead in arranging for the United States,
in conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, to enter into appropriate cooperative relationships
with the Russian Federation with respect to the develop-
ment and deployment of theater-level ballistic missile de-
fenses.
(b) PURPOSE OF COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS.—It
is the policy of the United States—
(1) that the purpose of the cooperative relation-
ships described in subsection (a) is to increase trans-
parency and confidence with the Russian Federation;
(2) that United States defense and security co-
operation with the Russian Federation should con-
tribute to defining a new bilateral strategic frame-
work that is not rooted in the concept of ‘‘mutual
assured destruction’’; and
(3) that that new bilateral strategic framework
should be based upon improving the security of the
United States and the Russian Federation by pro-
715
moting transparency and confidence between the two
countries.
(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall transmit to Congress a report (in unclassified or clas-
sified form as necessary) on the feasibility of increasing
cooperation with the Russian Federation on the subject
of theater-level ballistic missile defenses and on the pur-
poses and objectives set forth in subsection (b). The report
shall include—
(1) recommendations from the Department of
Defense and Missile Defense Agency;
(2) a threat assessment; and
(3) an assessment of possible benefits to missile
defense programs of the United States.
SEC. 3634. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENHANCED COLLABORA-
TION TO ACHIEVE MORE RELIABLE RUSSIAN
EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) the innovative United States-Russian space-
based remote sensor research and development pro-
gram known as the Russian-American Observation
Satellite (RAMOS) program addresses a variety of
defense concerns while promoting enhanced trans-
716
parency and confidence between the United States
and the Russian Federation; and
(2) an initial concept of co-orbiting United
States and Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo
observations is complete and should be continued.
(b) POLICY.—To the exent that the President con-
siders prudent, it is the policy of the United States—
(1) to encourage joint efforts by the United
States and the Russian Federation to reduce the
chances of a Russian nuclear attack anywhere in the
world as the result of misinformation or miscalcula-
tion by developing the capabilities and increasing the
reliability of Russian ballistic missile early-warning
systems, including the Russian-American Observa-
tion Satellite (RAMOS) program; and
(2) to encourage other United States-Russian
programs to ensure that the Russia Federation has
reliable information, including real-time data, re-
garding launches of ballistic missiles anywhere in the
world.
(c) INTERIM RAMOS FUNDING.—To the extent that
the Secretary of Defense considers prudent, the Secretary
of Defense shall ensure that, pending the execution of a
new agreement between the United States and the Rus-
sian Federation providing for the conduct of the RAMOS
717
program, sufficient amounts of funds appropriated for
that program are used in order to ensure the satisfactory
continuation of that program during fiscal years 2004 and
2005.
SEC. 3635. TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) Edward Teller of the United States and
Igor Kurchatov of the former Soviet Union were ar-
chitects of the nuclear weapons programs in their re-
spective countries;
(2) these outstanding individuals both expressed
a longing for peace and opposition to war; and
(3) as the United States and the Russian Fed-
eration work together to redirect the nations of the
world towards the peaceful use of nuclear energy,
seeking to improve the quality of life for all human
beings, it is appropriate to establish an alliance for
peace in the names of Edward Teller and Igor
Kurchatov.
(b) TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.—
(1) To the extent that the Secretary of Energy considers
prudent, the Secretary shall seek to enter into an agree-
ment with the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian
Federation to carry out a cooperative venture, to be known
as the Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, to develop and
719
proliferation to scientists who, as demonstrated by their
academic or professional achievements, show particular
promise of making significant contributions in that field.
(3) A fellowship awarded to a scientist under the pro-
gram shall be for study and training at (and, where appro-
priate, at an institution of higher education in the vicinity
of)—
(A) the Kurchatov Institute, in the case of a
scientist employed at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; and
(B) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
in the case of a scientist employed at the Kurchatov
Institute.
(4) The duration of a fellowship under the program
may not exceed two years. The Administrator may provide
for a longer duration in an individual case to the extent
warranted by extraordinary circumstances, as determined
by the Administrator.
(5) In a calendar year, the Administrator may not
award more than—
(A) one fellowship to a scientist employed at the
Kurchatov Institute; and
(B) one fellowship to a scientist employed at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
(6) A fellowship under the program shall include—
720
(A) travel expenses;
(B) any tuition and fees at an institution of
higher education for study or training under the fel-
lowship; and
(C) any other expenses that the Administrator
considers appropriate, such as room and board.
(b) FUNDING.—Amounts available to the Depart-
ment of Energy for defense nuclear nonproliferation ac-
tivities shall be available for the fellowships authorized by
subsection (a).
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—
(1) the term ‘‘institution of higher education’’
means a college, university, or other educational in-
stitution that is empowered by an appropriate au-
thority, as determined by the Administrator, to
award degrees higher than the baccalaureate level;
(2) the term ‘‘nuclear nonproliferation sciences’’
means bodies of scientific knowledge relevant to de-
veloping or advancing the means to prevent or im-
pede the proliferation of nuclear weaponry; and
(3) the term ‘‘scientist’’ means an individual
who has a degree from an institution of higher edu-
cation in a science that has practical application in
the field of nuclear nonproliferation.
721
Subtitle D—Other Matters
SEC. 3641. PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND
RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY AND SAFETY BE-
TWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(1) cooperative programs to control potential
threats from any fissile and radiological materials,
whatever and wherever their sources, should be ex-
panded to include additional states and international
organizations; and
(2) addressing issues of nuclear weapons and
materials, as well as the issue of radiological dis-
persal bombs, in new forums around the world is
crucial to the generation of innovative mechanisms
directed at addressing the threats.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INITIATION OF
DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE IAEA AND THE OECD.—It is
the sense of Congress that—
(1) the United States should seek to initiate
discussions between the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development for the purpose of exploring
722
issues of nuclear and radiological security and safe-
ty, including the creation of new sources of revenue
(including debt reduction) for states to provide nu-
clear security; and
(2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1)
should also provide a forum to explore possible
sources of funds in support of the G-8 Global Part-
nership Against the Spread of Weapons and Mate-
rials of Mass Destruction.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 12 months after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
mit to Congress a report on—
(1) the efforts made by the United States to
initiate the discussions described in subsection (b);
(2) the results of those efforts; and
(3) any plans for further discussions and the
purposes of such discussions.
Passed the House of Representatives May 22, 2003.
Attest:
Clerk.