IV 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 332
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a safeguards agree-
ment with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement 
by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop nuclear 
weapons. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NOVEMBER 20, 2003
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. KIRK, Mr. BER-
MAN, Mr. SOUDER, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. 
MEEK of Florida, Mr. NUNES, Mr. LAHOOD, Mr. JONES of North Caro-
lina, Mr. CASE, Mr. DEUTSCH, and Mr. SHAW) submitted the following 
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the fail-
ure of the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its 
obligations under a safeguards agreement with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the engagement by 
Iran in activities that appear to be designed to develop 
nuclear weapons.
Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered 
into force March 5, 1970 (the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty’’);
•HCON 332 IH 
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, Iran has 
committed itself to permanently abstaining from the de-
velopment or acquisition of nuclear weapons; 
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran was 
constructing a facility to enrich uranium, a key compo-
nent of nuclear weapons; 
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran’s 
Natanz nuclear facility revealed the presence of highly 
enriched uranium that can be used to develop nuclear 
weapons; 
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by 
the IAEA at the Natanz facility and the Kalaye Electric 
Company could indicate that Iran has been secretly at-
tempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these fa-
cilities; 
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of 
the IAEA expressed concern over the failure of the Gov-
ernment of Iran to report material, facilities, and activi-
ties at its nuclear facilities, including those that have the 
potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, 
in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards 
agreement it signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty; 
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a reso-
lution on September 12, 2003, that called on Iran to pro-
vide the IAEA a full declaration of all imported material 
and components relevant to the uranium enrichment pro-
gram, to grant unrestricted access, including environ-
mental sampling, to the IAEA, to resolve questions re-
•HCON 332 IH 
garding the conclusion of the IAEA experts who tested 
gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete infor-
mation regarding the conduct of uranium conversion ex-
periments, and to provide such other information and ex-
planations and take such other steps as the IAEA deter-
mines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, all out-
standing issues involving Iran’s nuclear materials and nu-
clear activities; 
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran 
reached an agreement with 3 European foreign ministers 
in which it promised to extend full cooperation to the 
IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence 
ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with 
the provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to 
ratification, and voluntarily suspend all uranium enrich-
ment and processing activities; 
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue 
with Iran to ease Iran’s access to a variety of modern 
technologies and supplies once certain international con-
cerns regarding Iran are fully resolved; 
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the Euro-
pean foreign ministers to suspend enriching and proc-
essing uranium, Iran has explicitly indicated that it re-
serves the right to resume this activity at a time of its 
choosing; 
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it 
claims is a full statement about the nature of its nuclear 
activities, the IAEA has indicated it may take some 
months to fully evaluate the Iranian declaration, and 
IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated 
that the documents show that Iran failed to comply with
•HCON 332 IH 
some of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty; 
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted ac-
cess to conduct inspections that the IAEA believes are 
necessary to resolve issues concerning Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram; 
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran pro-
vided the IAEA with a declaration that it described as a 
complete and accurate history of its nuclear program; 
Whereas Iran’s National Security Council Chief, Hassan 
Rouhani, stated on October 21, 2003, that Iran was not 
prepared to abandon its uranium enrichment program, 
and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on October 
26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrich-
ment but was merely studying the issue; 
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of 
the 800-mile range Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also 
seeking to produce a 1,200-mile Shahab-4 missile; and 
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, coupled with its ties to 
terrorist groups, will continue to constitute a severe 
threat to international peace and security and to vital 
American national interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), That Congress—
(1) deplores the development by Iran of a nu-
clear weapons program and the failure of the Gov-
ernment of Iran for well over a decade to report ma-
terial, facilities, and activities to the International
•HCON 332 IH 
Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its obli-
gations under the safeguards agreement it signed in 
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force 
March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this resolution referred 
to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’); 
(2) concurs with the view of the Department of 
State, as delivered in testimony to the U.S.—Israel 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 17, 
2003, by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification and Compliance that the explanations 
provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear 
activities are not credible; 
(3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the 
Department of State’s Annual Report on Adherence 
to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Pro-
liferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is 
pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons; 
(4) acknowledges the agreement reached be-
tween the Government of Iran and the foreign min-
isters of Germany, France, and the United King-
dom, but questions whether it signifies a sincere and 
lasting decision by the Government of Iran to aban-
don its nuclear weapons program;
•HCON 332 IH 
(5) believes that Iran must come into full com-
pliance with its obligations; 
(6) calls on the President to use all appropriate 
means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weap-
ons, including—
(A) urging the Government of Iran to end 
its nuclear weapons program and comply fully 
and unconditionally with the terms of the reso-
lution adopted by the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency on Sep-
tember 12, 2003 (hereafter in this resolution 
referred to as the ‘‘IAEA resolution’’), that 
calls on Iran to—
(i) provide the Agency a full declara-
tion of all imported material and compo-
nents relevant to the uranium enrichment 
program; 
(ii) grant unrestricted access, includ-
ing environmental sampling, to the Agency; 
(iii) resolve questions regarding the 
conclusion of the Agency experts who test-
ed gas centrifuges in that country; 
(iv) provide complete information re-
garding the conduct of uranium conversion 
experiments; and
•HCON 332 IH 
(v) provide such other information 
and explanations and take such other steps 
as the Agency determines necessary to re-
solve by October 31, 2003, all outstanding 
issues involving Iran’s nuclear materials 
and nuclear activities; and 
(B) taking such diplomatic measures as 
are necessary to encourage other nations, espe-
cially Russia, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, to urge the Government of Iran to 
fully and immediately comply with the such res-
olution; 
(7) calls on Russia to—
(A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran 
to accept in full the IAEA resolution; 
(B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with 
Iran, particularly the completion of the Bushehr 
nuclear reactor and the delivery of fuel for that 
reactor, until Iran fully and completely complies 
with the IAEA resolution and fully implements 
the Model Additional Protocol; 
(C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to 
the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to re-
turn all spent fuel to Russia; and
•HCON 332 IH 
(D) put into effect procedures to ensure 
that Iran cannot divert any spent fuel; 
(8) calls on member states of the United Na-
tions to prevent the Government of Iran from con-
tinuing to pursue and develop programs or facilities 
that could be used in a nuclear weapons program 
and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including 
the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies 
fully with the IAEA resolution and fully implements 
the Model Additional Protocol; 
(9) calls on the European Union to condition 
economic and commercial agreements with Iran on 
the full compliance by Iran with its commitment not 
to pursue nuclear weapons and to stipulate that any 
rights that Iran obtains under such agreements will 
be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with the 
work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to ac-
quire nuclear weapons; 
(10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its 
own regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its No-
vember 20, 2003, board meeting and refer the mat-
ter to the United Nations Security Council for fur-
ther action;
•HCON 332 IH 
(11) calls on the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, immediately upon receiving any violations report 
from the IAEA, to address the threat to inter-
national peace and security posed by Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program by passing a Security Council res-
olution, or take such other action that may be nec-
essary to impose stringent diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against Iran; and 
(12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease 
all efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities 
and to end the enrichment and processing of ura-
nium until it is able to provide specific, verifiable as-
surances that it is not engaged in a clandestine nu-
clear weapons program by—
(A) coming into complete and verifiable 
compliance with its obligations under the IAEA 
resolution, including the prompt and uncondi-
tional implementation of the Model Additional 
Protocol; and 
(B) fully meeting its obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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