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(D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated), by 
striking ‘‘paragraph (1) or (2)’’ and inserting 
‘‘paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)’’; and 
(2) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘December 31, 
2019’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2022’’. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President and Secretary of State should 
seek to encourage partner countries of the Organization 
of American States, the European Union, and the United 
Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan 
individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the 
United States with respect to such Venezuelan individuals. 
SEC. 10. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH 
ROSNEFT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil 
company Petro´leos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in 
this section as ‘‘PDVSA’’), through a no-compete 
transaction, secured a loan from Russian govern-
ment-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 per-
cent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Pe-
troleum Corporation, including its assets in the 
United States, as collateral. As a result of this 
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transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collat-
eral by PDVSA’s creditors. 
(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and 
owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 
19 States in the United States, including an exten-
sive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refin-
eries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 
749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana is the sixth largest refinery in the 
United States. 
(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed 
sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Rus-
sian Government, and its Executive Chairman, Igor 
Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of 
Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 
2014. 
(4) The Department of Homeland Security has 
designated the energy sector as critical to United 
States infrastructure. 
(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela 
raises the probability that the Government of Ven-
ezuela and PDVSA will default on their inter-
national debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in 
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which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO’s 
United States energy infrastructure holdings. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) control of critical United States energy in-
frastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-con-
trolled entity currently under United States sanc-
tions, would pose a significant risk to United States 
national security and energy security; 
(2) the President should take all necessary 
steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of 
critical United States interstate energy infrastruc-
ture; 
(3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from 
Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession 
of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would 
warrant careful consideration by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States; 
(4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, 
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Asset Control should review CITGO’s transactions 
with United States persons to assess and ensure 
compliance with United States sanctions policies and 
regulations; and 
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(5) the Department of Homeland Security 
should conduct an assessment of the security risks 
posed by foreign control of CITGO’s United States 
energy infrastructure holdings and keep the relevant 
committees of Congress fully informed of its findings 
and 
any 
subsequent 
strategy 
to 
address 
vulnerabilities to United States energy security as a 
result. 
SEC. 11. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN GOVERN-
MENTS IN VENEZUELA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
of the Department of State and in consultation with the 
intelligence community, shall submit to Congress a report 
that describes the full extent of cooperation by the Govern-
ments of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic 
of China, Cuba, and Iran with the Government of Ven-
ezuela and the Venezuelan armed forces. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be 
made available to the public. 
(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘intel-
ligence community’’ has the meaning given such term in 
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section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3003(4)). 
Passed the House of Representatives December 7, 
2017. 
Attest: 
KAREN L. HAAS, 
Clerk. 
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