IB 
Union Calendar No. 341 
109TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 5682 
[Report No. 109–590, Part I] 
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 26, 2006 
Mr. HYDE (for himself, Mr. LANTOS, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. ACKERMAN, 
Mr. BURTON
of Indiana, Mr. WILSON
of South Carolina, Mr. 
FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. CROWLEY, and Mr. ETHERIDGE) intro-
duced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a pe-
riod to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for con-
sideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
JULY 21, 2006 
Additional sponsors: Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. MILLER of North 
Carolina, 
Ms. 
MILLENDER-MCDONALD, 
Mr. 
STRICKLAND, 
Mr. 
MCDERMOTT, Mr. KING of New York, Mr. DELAHUNT, Mr. BOUSTANY, 
Mr. SESSIONS, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. HALL, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mr. 
NEUGEBAUER, Mr. CARTER, Mr. BONILLA, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. SAM JOHN-
SON of Texas, Mr. LINDER, Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. HENSARLING, Mr. 
MCCAUL of Texas, Mr. KOLBE, Ms. GRANGER, Mr. MARCHANT, Mr. 
LEWIS of Kentucky, and Mr. MILLER of Florida 
JULY 21, 2006 
Reported from the Committee on International Relations with an amendment 
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 
JULY 21, 2006 
Committee on Rules discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6652
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June 26, 2006] 
A BILL 
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for coopera-
tion with India. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United States and India 
Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006’’. 
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to 
produce them, and the means to deliver them are crit-
ical objectives for United States foreign policy; 
(2) sustaining the NPT and strengthening its 
implementation, particularly its verification and 
compliance, is the keystone of United States non-
proliferation policy; 
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in 
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capa-
bilities and maintaining a stable international secu-
rity situation; 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
(4) countries that have never become a party to 
the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal re-
gime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of 
the overall goals of global nonproliferation, because 
those countries have not undertaken the NPT’s inter-
national obligation to prohibit the spread of dan-
gerous nuclear technologies; 
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to 
the fullest extent possible to ensure that those coun-
tries that are not NPT members are responsible with 
any nuclear technology they develop; 
(6) it may be in the interest of the United States 
to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as 
set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has never 
been an NPT member with respect to civilian nuclear 
technology if— 
(A) the country has demonstrated respon-
sible behavior with respect to the nonprolifera-
tion of technology related to weapons of mass de-
struction programs and the means to deliver 
them; 
(B) the country has a functioning and un-
interrupted democratic system of government, 
has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
the United States, and is working with the 
United States in key foreign policy initiatives 
related to non-proliferation; 
(C) such cooperation induces the country to 
implement 
the 
highest 
possible 
protections 
against the proliferation of technology related to 
weapons of mass destruction programs and the 
means to deliver them, and to refrain from ac-
tions that would further the development of its 
nuclear weapons program; and 
(D) such cooperation will induce the coun-
try to give greater political and material support 
to the achievement of United States global and 
regional nonproliferation objectives, especially 
with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if nec-
essary, sanctioning and containing states that 
sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, that are 
seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability 
or other weapons of mass destruction capability 
and the means to deliver such weapons; and 
(7)(A) India meets the criteria described in this 
subsection; and 
(B) it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to deepen its relationship with India 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
across a full range of issues, including peaceful nu-
clear cooperation. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies 
of the United States: 
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to 
produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 
state, within or outside of the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; com-
monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’). 
(2) Encourage states party to the NPT to inter-
pret the right to ‘‘develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’’, as de-
scribed in Article IV of the NPT, as being a qualified 
right that is conditioned by the overall purpose of the 
NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining 
from all nuclear cooperation with any state party 
that has not demonstrated that it is in full compli-
ance with its NPT obligations, as determined by the 
IAEA. 
(3) Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
guidelines concerning consultation by members re-
garding violations of supplier and recipient under-
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
standings by instituting the practice of a timely and 
coordinated response by NSG members to all such vio-
lations, including termination of nuclear transfers to 
an involved recipient, that discourages individual 
NSG members from continuing cooperation with such 
recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a 
coordinated response has been achieved. 
(b) WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following 
shall be the policies of the United States with respect to 
South Asia: 
(1) Achieve a moratorium on the production of 
fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by 
India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China 
at the earliest possible date. 
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the con-
clusion and implementation of a treaty banning the 
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to 
which both the United States and India become par-
ties. 
(3) Secure India’s— 
(A) full participation in the Proliferation 
Security Initiative; 
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of 
Interdiction Principles; 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
(C) public announcement of its decision to 
conform its export control laws, regulations, and 
policies with the Australia Group and with the 
Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control 
Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement; 
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress 
toward implementing the decision described in 
subparagraph (C); and 
(E) ratification of or accession to the Con-
vention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 
12, 1997. 
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation 
in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if 
necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nu-
clear weapons capability (including the capability to 
enrich or process nuclear materials), and the means 
to deliver weapons of mass destruction. 
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon 
arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduc-
tion and eventual elimination. 
(6) To ensure that spent fuel generated in In-
dia’s civilian nuclear power reactors is not trans-
ferred to the United States except pursuant to the 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
Congressional review procedures required under sec-
tion 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2160 f.). 
(7) Pending implementation of a multilateral 
moratorium, encourage India not to increase its pro-
duction of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities. 
SEC. 4. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL AP-
PROVAL. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, if the President makes the determination de-
scribed in subsection (b), the President may— 
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear co-
operation with India (arranged pursuant to section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
2153)) from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of 
such Act, and such agreement for cooperation may 
only enter into force in accordance with subsections 
(f) and (g); 
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with re-
spect to India, provided that such waiver shall cease 
to be effective if the President determines that India 
has engaged in any activity described section 129 of 
such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than section 129 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such Act, at any 
time after the date of the enactment of this Act; and 
(3) with respect to India— 
(A) waive the restrictions of section 129 
a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any activity that oc-
curred on or before July 18, 2005; and 
(B) section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act. 
(b) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—The deter-
mination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination 
by the President that the following actions have occurred: 
(1) India has provided the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible 
plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration 
regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA. 
(2) India and the IAEA have concluded an 
agreement requiring the application of IAEA safe-
guards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA stand-
ards, principles, and practices (including IAEA 
Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to 
India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and pro-
grams as declared in the plan described in paragraph 
(1), including materials used in or produced through 
the use of India’s civil nuclear facilities. 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial 
progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol 
consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and poli-
cies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear pro-
gram. 
(4) India is working actively with the United 
States for the early conclusion of a multilateral 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 
(5) India is working with and supporting 
United States and international efforts to prevent the 
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. 
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure 
nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, 
including through— 
(A) the enactment and enforcement of com-
prehensive export control legislation and regula-
tions; 
(B) harmonization of its export control 
laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the 
policies and practices of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group; and 
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in 
accordance with the procedures of those regimes 
for unilateral adherence. 
VerDate Aug 31 2005 
23:06 Jul 21, 2006
Jkt 049200
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6203
E:\BILLS\H5682.RH
H5682
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS