H. R. 730 
One Hundred Eleventh Congress 
of the 
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 
the fifth day of January, two thousand and ten 
An Act 
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear 
forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nuclear material, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics and Attribution 
Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American 
interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious 
threats to the national security of the United States. In the 
wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of 
utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of a 
nuclear weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except 
the radioactive material in the weapon itself. 
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing 
techniques and those under development, it may be possible 
to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material 
after it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying inter-
cepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre- 
detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post- 
detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the 
challenges are compounded by the pressures and time con-
straints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological 
attack. 
(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the 
source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used 
in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. 
Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel 
improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the 
unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and 
other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to have 
a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, 
analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against 
known signatures of nuclear and radiological material. 
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation 
of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisi-
tion of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past 
several decades, the ability of the United States to gather
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atmospheric samples—often the preferred method of sample 
acquisition—has diminished. This ability must be restored and 
modern techniques that could complement or replace existing 
techniques should be pursued. 
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively 
undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or 
radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques 
in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry 
may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characteriza-
tion of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and 
radiochemists in United States National Laboratories and 
universities has dramatically declined over the past several 
decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this 
critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust 
and credible nuclear forensics program. 
(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, 
it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known 
material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and 
from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities con-
taining such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
samples are available to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries 
maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many 
countries is limited by national security concerns. 
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary 
to have the capability to positively identify the source of nuclear 
or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear 
or radiological material must be aware of that capability. Inter-
national cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing 
sources of nuclear or radiological material. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR 
FORENSICS COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should— 
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international agree-
ments to establish, or seek to establish under the auspices 
of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an inter-
national framework for determining the source of any con-
fiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon, as well 
as the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or 
radiological material used in such a weapon; 
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and dissemina-
tion of sensitive information relating to nuclear or radiological 
materials and samples of controlled nuclear or radiological 
materials, to the extent required by the agreements entered 
into under paragraph (1); and 
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and 
dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly iden-
tify the source of a nuclear detonation. 
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION 
OFFICE. 
(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of the Home-
land Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by Public Law 110– 
53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semi-
colon;
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(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); 
and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following: 
‘‘(10) lead the development and implementation of the 
national strategic five-year plan for improving the nuclear 
forensic and attribution capabilities of the United States 
required under section 1036 of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2010; 
‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to pro-
vide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap anal-
ysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all Federal 
nuclear forensics and attribution activities— 
‘‘(A) to ensure an enduring national technical nuclear 
forensics capability to strengthen the collective response 
of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear 
attacks; and 
‘‘(B) to coordinate and implement the national strategic 
five-year plan referred to in paragraph (10); 
‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise 
Development Program, which— 
‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a vibrant 
and enduring academic pathway from undergraduate to 
post-doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical science 
specialties directly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, 
including radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics, 
nuclear engineering, materials science, and analytical 
chemistry; 
‘‘(B) shall— 
‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate study stu-
dent scholarships, with a duration of up to 4 years 
per student, which shall include, if possible, at least 
1 summer internship at a national laboratory or appro-
priate Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear 
forensics during the course of the student’s under-
graduate career; 
‘‘(ii) make available for doctoral study student 
fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 years per stu-
dent, which shall— 
‘‘(I) include, if possible, at least 2 summer 
internships at a national laboratory or appropriate 
Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear 
forensics during the course of the student’s grad-
uate career; and 
‘‘(II) require each recipient to commit to serve 
for 2 years in a post-doctoral position in a technical 
nuclear forensics-related specialty at a national 
laboratory or appropriate Federal agency after 
graduation; 
‘‘(iii) make available to faculty awards, with a 
duration of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure faculty and 
their graduate students have a sustained funding 
stream; and 
‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on reinvigorating 
technical nuclear forensics programs while encouraging 
the participation of undergraduate students, graduate 
students, and university faculty from historically Black
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colleges and universities, Hispanic-serving institutions, 
Tribal Colleges and Universities, Asian American and 
Native American Pacific Islander-serving institutions, 
Alaska Native-serving institutions, and Hawaiian 
Native-serving institutions; and 
‘‘(C) shall— 
‘‘(i) provide for the selection of individuals to 
receive scholarships or fellowships under this section 
through a competitive process primarily on the basis 
of academic merit and the nuclear forensics and 
attribution needs of the United States Government; 
‘‘(ii) provide for the setting aside of up to 10 percent 
of the scholarships or fellowships awarded under this 
section for individuals who are Federal employees to 
enhance the education of such employees in areas of 
critical nuclear forensics and attribution needs of the 
United States Government, for doctoral education 
under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis; 
‘‘(iii) provide that the Secretary may enter into 
a contractual agreement with an institution of higher 
education under which the amounts provided for a 
scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and 
other authorized expenses are paid directly to the 
institution with respect to which such scholarship is 
awarded; 
‘‘(iv) require scholarship recipients to maintain 
satisfactory academic progress; and 
‘‘(v) require that— 
‘‘(I) a scholarship recipient who fails to main-
tain a high level of academic standing, as defined 
by the Secretary, who is dismissed for disciplinary 
reasons from the educational institution such 
recipient is attending, or who voluntarily termi-
nates academic training before graduation from 
the educational program for which the scholarship 
was awarded shall be liable to the United States 
for repayment within 1 year after the date of such 
default of all scholarship funds paid to such 
recipient and to the institution of higher education 
on the behalf of such recipient, provided that the 
repayment period may be extended by the Sec-
retary if the Secretary determines it necessary, 
as established by regulation; and 
‘‘(II) a scholarship recipient who, for any rea-
son except death or disability, fails to begin or 
complete the post-doctoral service requirements in 
a technical nuclear forensics-related specialty at 
a national laboratory or appropriate Federal 
agency after completion of academic training shall 
be liable to the United States for an amount equal 
to— 
‘‘(aa) the total amount of the scholarship 
received by such recipient under this section; 
and 
‘‘(bb) the interest on such amounts which 
would be payable if at the time the scholarship 
was received such scholarship was a loan