110TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. R. 885 
AN ACT 
To support the establishment of an international regime for 
the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means 
and to authorize voluntary contributions to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency to support the establish-
ment of an international nuclear fuel bank. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 2007’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents. 
TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY 
OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR PEACEFUL MEANS 
Sec. 101. Findings. 
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 103. Statements of policy. 
Sec. 104. Report. 
TITLE II—INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK 
Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations. 
TITLE 
I—INTERNATIONAL 
RE-
GIME FOR THE ASSURED SUP-
PLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR 
PEACEFUL MEANS 
SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 
1946, the United States has believed that an in-
crease in the number of countries that possess nu-
clear weapons and the means to create such weapons 
makes the world less secure and stable by increasing 
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A 
world in which nuclear weapons are used again is
less secure for all concerned, and could well trigger 
a global arms race, as more countries will be tempt-
ed to arm themselves with nuclear weapons to pre-
vent attacks by countries that possess nuclear weap-
ons. 
(2) It is therefore in the general security inter-
est of all countries, and in the vital national security 
interest of the United States, that the number of 
countries that possess a nuclear weapons capability 
necessarily be kept to a minimum and ultimately re-
duced. 
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reproc-
essing facilities produce nuclear material that can ei-
ther be used for peaceful purposes in electricity-gen-
erating reactors, or can be used to produce uranium 
and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these 
facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing 
their possessor to be just months away from the pro-
duction of a nuclear explosive device. 
(4) It is also therefore in the general security 
interest of all countries that the number of countries 
that operate uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re-
processing facilities also be kept to a minimum, con-
sistent with the global demand for nuclear power re-
actor fuel.
(5) The financing and construction of addi-
tional uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocess-
ing facilities in additional states around the world is 
indefensible on economic grounds alone, given cur-
rent and future supplies of uranium and existing 
providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re-
processing services to the world market. 
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment 
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional 
countries, therefore, is often based upon consider-
ations other than economic calculations. The posses-
sion of such facilities is often elevated to a matter 
of national pride—a demonstration to the world that 
the country that possesses this technology has ar-
rived at a level of technological development com-
parable to that of the United States and other coun-
tries with advanced civil nuclear power programs. 
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium en-
richment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be 
perceived as a demonstration of the developing 
world’s independence from technological domination 
by the more developed states. Article IV of the Trea-
ty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 
UST 483; commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) recognizes
that State Parties have an ‘‘inalienable right . . . to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear en-
ergy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.’’. 
However, this is a qualified right conditioned by a 
State Party acting in conformity with the NPT’s ob-
ligation for such countries not to acquire, possess, or 
develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. 
(8) It has been long recognized that the pro-
liferation of national uranium enrichment and spent- 
fuel reprocessing facilities would increase the likeli-
hood of the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. 
Concerned governments, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and individual experts have for decades recog-
nized the need to address this problem through mul-
tilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of 
nuclear fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of 
nuclear energy, an international fuel bank to provide 
fuel if the fuel supply to a country is disrupted, and 
even multilateral participation in international ura-
nium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facili-
ties, as a means of reducing incentives of countries 
to develop and construct such facilities themselves. 
(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced 
little more than reports. However, the revelations of 
a nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment tech-
nology and equipment, combined with the attempt 
by North Korea and Iran to possess such technology 
and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear 
weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with 
a new urgency. 
(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially 
unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor 
fuel as a pretext for developing its own uranium en-
richment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, 
which would enable Iran to also produce weapons- 
grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over 
the last year to address these concerns. The United 
States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium 
of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities pro-
viding nuclear fuel services—fresh fuel and recovery 
of used fuel—to other countries that agree to em-
ploy nuclear energy only for power generation pur-
poses, without possessing national uranium enrich-
ment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. 
(12) The United States also joined France, the 
Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, in proposing 
a ‘‘Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reli-
able Access to Nuclear Fuel’’ that would facilitate or 
create new arrangements between suppliers and re-
cipients to provide fuel to countries with good non-
proliferation credentials in case of market failure. 
(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear 
fuel should meet the condition outlined by President 
George W. Bush on February 11, 2004, that ‘‘The 
world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that 
states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel 
for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce 
enrichment and reprocessing.’’. 
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that 
one of its uranium enrichment facilities be placed 
under international management and oversight, as 
part of a ‘‘Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure’’ 
proposal to create international nuclear fuel cycle 
centers. 
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi- 
tiered system to assure the supply of nuclear reactor 
fuel at current market prices, under appropriate 
safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries 
that are dependent upon or will construct nuclear 
power reactors that they will have an assured supply 
of nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as 
such countries forgo national uranium enrichment
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities and are com-
mitted to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the ‘‘Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism 
for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel’’, proposed by 
the United States, France, the Russian Federation, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands 
on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be ex-
panded upon at the earliest possible opportunity; 
(2) the proposal by the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation to bring one of its uranium enrich-
ment facilities under international management and 
oversight is also a welcome development and should 
be encouraged by the United States; 
(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute 
(NTI) of $50,000,000 in funds to support the cre-
ation of an international nuclear fuel bank by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also 
welcomed, and the United States and other member 
states of the IAEA should pledge collectively at least 
an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to 
fulfill the NTI proposal; and 
(4) the governments, organizations, and experts 
currently engaged in developing the initiatives de-
scribed in paragraphs (1) through (3) and other ini-
tiatives should seek to identify additional incentives 
to be included in an international regime for the as-
sured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at 
current market prices, including participation in 
non-weapons-relevant technology development and 
fuel leasing to further persuade countries that par-
ticipation in such a multilateral arrangement far 
outweighs the temptation and expense of developing 
national uranium enrichment and plutonium reproc-
essing facilities. 
SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 
(a) GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the pol-
icy of the United States to support the establishment of 
an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear 
fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such 
as the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
(b) ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is fur-
ther the policy of the United States to— 
(1) oppose the development of a capability to 
produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon 
state, within or outside of the NPT; 
(2) encourage states party to the NPT to inter-
pret the right to ‘‘develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,’’ as de-
scribed in Article IV of the NPT, as being a quali-
fied right that is conditioned by the overall purpose 
of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weap-
ons and nuclear weapons capability, including by re-
fraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state 
party that has not demonstrated that it is in full 
compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 
(3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
guidelines concerning consultation by members re-
garding violations of supplier and recipient under-
standings by instituting the practice of a timely and 
coordinated response by Nuclear Suppliers Group 
members to all such violations, including termination 
of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that 
discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group mem-
bers from continuing cooperation with such recipient 
until such time as a consensus regarding a coordi-
nated response has been achieved. 
SEC. 104. REPORT. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
a report on the activities of the United States to support