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(B) Any Federal Government employee may be 
detailed to the Commission without reimbursement 
from the Commission, and such detailee shall retain 
the rights, status, and privileges of his or her regular 
employment without interruption. 
(C) All staff of the Commission shall possess a 
security clearance in accordance with applicable laws 
and regulations concerning the handling of classified 
information. 
(2) CONSULTANT SERVICES.—(A) The Commis-
sion may procure the services of experts and consult-
ants in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, 
United States Code, but at rates not to exceed the 
daily rate paid a person occupying a position at level 
IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
such title. 
(B) All experts and consultants employed by the 
Commission shall possess a security clearance in ac-
cordance with applicable laws and regulations con-
cerning the handling of classified information. 
(i) COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.— 
(1) COMPENSATION.—(A) Except as provided in 
paragraph (2), each member of the Commission may 
be compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent 
of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position
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† HR 5515 EAS 
at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
5315 of title 5, United States Code, for each day dur-
ing which that member is engaged in the actual per-
formance of the duties of the Commission under this 
title. 
(B) Members of the Commission who are officers 
or employees of the United States or Members of Con-
gress shall receive no additional pay by reason of 
their service on the Commission. 
(2) TRAVEL EXPENSES.—While away from their 
homes or regular places of business in the perform-
ance of services for the Commission, members of the 
Commission may be allowed travel expenses, includ-
ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, in the same man-
ner as persons employed intermittently in the Govern-
ment service are allowed expenses under section 5703 
of title 5, United States Code. 
(j) TREATMENT OF INFORMATION RELATING TO NA-
TIONAL SECURITY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—(A) The Director of National 
Intelligence shall assume responsibility for the han-
dling and disposition of any information related to 
the national security of the United States that is re-
ceived, considered, or used by the Commission under 
this title.
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(B) Any information related to the national se-
curity of the United States that is provided to the 
Commission by a congressional intelligence commit-
tees or the congressional armed services committees 
may not be further provided or released without the 
approval of the chairman of such committees. 
(2) ACCESS
AFTER
TERMINATION
OF
COMMIS-
SION.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
after the termination of the Commission under sub-
section (k)(2), only the members and designated staff 
of the congressional intelligence committees, the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence (and the designees of the 
Director), and such other officials of the executive 
branch as the President may designate shall have ac-
cess to information related to the national security of 
the United States that is received, considered, or used 
by the Commission. 
(k) FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.— 
(1) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than September 1, 
2019, the Commission shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees, the congressional intel-
ligence committees, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security a final report on the 
findings of the Commission.
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(2) TERMINATION.—(A) The Commission, and 
all the authorities of this section, shall terminate at 
the end of the 120-day period beginning on the date 
on which the final report under paragraph (1) is sub-
mitted to the congressional defense and intelligence 
committees. 
(B) The Commission may use the 120-day period 
referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of con-
cluding its activities, including providing testimony 
to Congress concerning the final report referred to in 
that paragraph and disseminating the report. 
(l) ASSESSMENTS OF FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 
60 days after receipt of the final report under subsection 
(k)(1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Sec-
retary of Defense shall each submit to the congressional in-
telligence committees and the congressional defense commit-
tees an assessment by the Director or the Secretary, as the 
case may be, of the final report. Each assessment shall in-
clude such comments on the findings and recommendations 
contained in the final report as the Director or Secretary, 
as the case may be, considers appropriate. 
(m) INAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROVISIONS.— 
(1) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.—The 
provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
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† HR 5515 EAS 
U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the activities of the 
Commission under this section. 
(2) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.—The provi-
sions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
(commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information 
Act), shall not apply to the activities, records, and 
proceedings of the Commission under this section. 
(n) FUNDING.— 
(1) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.— 
There is authorized to be appropriated $4,000,000 to 
carry out this section. 
(2) AVAILABILITY
IN
GENERAL.—Subject to 
paragraph (1), the Secretary of Defense shall make 
available to the Commission such amounts as the 
Commission may require for purposes of the activities 
of the Commission under this section. 
(3) 
DURATION
OF
AVAILABILITY.—Amounts 
made available to the Commission under paragraph 
(2) shall remain available until expended. 
(o) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘congressional intelligence 
committees’’ means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; and
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(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1635. PROGRAM TO ESTABLISH CYBER INSTITUTES AT 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING. 
(a) PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of De-
fense may carry out a program to establish a Cyber Insti-
tute at institutions of higher learning selected under sub-
section (b) for purposes of accelerating and focusing the de-
velopment of foundational expertise in critical cyber oper-
ational skills for future military and civilian leaders of the 
Armed Forces and the Department of Defense, including 
such leaders of the reserve components. 
(b) SELECTED INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER LEARN-
ING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
select institutions of higher learning for purposes of 
the program established under subsection (a) from 
among institutions of higher learning that have a Re-
serve Officers’ Training Corps program. 
(2) CONSIDERATION OF SENIOR MILITARY COL-
LEGES.—In selecting institutions of higher learning 
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider the 
senior military colleges with Reserve Officers’ Train-
ing Corps programs.
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(c) ELEMENTS.—Each institute established under the 
program authorized by subsection (a) shall include the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Programs to provide future military and ci-
vilian leaders of the Armed Forces or the Department 
of Defense who possess cyber operational expertise 
from beginning through advanced skill levels. Such 
programs shall include instruction and practical ex-
periences that lead to recognized certifications and de-
grees in the cyber field. 
(2) Programs of targeted strategic foreign lan-
guage proficiency training for such future leaders 
that— 
(A) are designed to significantly enhance 
critical cyber operational capabilities; and 
(B) are tailored to current and anticipated 
readiness requirements. 
(3) Programs related to mathematical founda-
tions of cryptography and courses in cryptographic 
theory and practice designed to complement and rein-
force cyber education along with the strategic lan-
guage programs critical to cyber operations. 
(4) Programs related to data science and courses 
in data science theory and practice designed to com-
plement and reinforce cyber education along with the
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strategic language programs critical to cyber oper-
ations. 
(5) Programs designed to develop early interest 
and cyber talent through summer programs, dual en-
rollment opportunities for cyber, strategic language, 
data science, and cryptography related courses. 
(6) Training and education programs to expand 
the pool of qualified cyber instructors necessary to 
support cyber education in regional school systems. 
(d) PARTNERSHIPS WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
AND THE ARMED FORCES.—Any institute established under 
the program authorized by subsection (a) may enter into 
a partnership with one or more components of the Armed 
Forces, active or reserve, or any agency of the Department 
of Defense to facilitate the development of critical cyber 
skills for students who may pursue a military career. 
(e) PARTNERSHIPS.—Any institute established under 
the program authorized by subsection (a) may enter into 
a partnership with one or more local educational agencies 
to facilitate the development of critical cyber skills. 
(f) SENIOR MILITARY COLLEGES DEFINED.—The term 
‘‘senior military colleges’’ has the meaning given such term 
in section 2111a(f) of title 10, United States Code.
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SEC. 1636. ESTABLISHMENT OF CYBERSECURITY FOR DE-
FENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE MANUFACTURING 
ACTIVITY. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.— 
(1) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense may, 
in consultation with the Director of the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology, establish an ac-
tivity to assess and strengthen the cybersecurity resil-
iency of the defense industrial base of the United 
States. 
(2) DESIGNATION.—The activity that may be es-
tablished under paragraph (1) shall be known as the 
‘‘Cybersecurity for Defense Industrial Base Manufac-
turing Activity’’. 
(b) ACTIVITIES.—If the Secretary of Defense exercises 
the authority under subsection (a), the Secretary shall uti-
lize the activity to explore ways to increase the cybersecu-
rity resilience of the defense industrial supply chain. Such 
exploration may include the following: 
(1) Developing cybersecurity test capabilities to 
support 
identifying 
and 
reducing 
security 
vulnerabilities (as defined in section 102 of the Cyber-
security Information Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 
1501)) in defense industrial base manufacturing proc-
esses.
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(2) Developing in-person and online training to 
help small defense industrial base manufacturers im-
prove their cybersecurity. 
(3) Ensuring that cybersecurity for defense in-
dustrial base manufacturing is included in Depart-
ment of Defense research and development roadmaps 
and threat assessments. 
(4) Aggregating, developing, and disseminating 
capabilities to address cybersecurity threats that can 
be provided to and adopted by defense industrial base 
manufacturers of all sizes. 
PART II—MITIGATION OF RISKS POSED BY PRO-
VIDERS 
OF 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
WITH OBLIGATIONS TO FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS 
SEC. 1637. DEFINITIONS. 
In this part: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS 
DEFINED.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate; and
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(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
the Committee on Homeland Security of the 
House of Representatives. 
(2) INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.—The term ‘‘in-
formation technology’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 11101 of title 40, United States Code. 
(3) NATIONAL
SECURITY
SYSTEM.—The term 
‘‘national security system’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 3552(b) of title 44, United States 
Code. 
SEC. 1638. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES OF CONCERN 
REGARDING CYBERSECURITY. 
(a) IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES OF CONCERN.— 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall create a prioritized 
list of countries of concern regarding cybersecurity based 
on information relating to the following: 
(1) A foreign government’s engagement in acts of 
violence against personnel of the United States or coa-
lition forces. 
(2) A foreign government’s willingness and 
record of providing financing, logistics, training or 
intelligence to other persons, countries or entities pos-
ing a force protection or cybersecurity risk to the per-
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sonnel, financial systems, critical infrastructure, or 
information systems of the United States or coalition 
forces. 
(3) A foreign government’s engagement in for-
eign intelligence activities against the United States. 
(4) A foreign government’s direct or indirect 
participation in transnational organized crime or 
criminal activity. 
(5) A foreign government’s ability and intent to 
conduct operations to affect the supply chain of the 
United States Government. 
(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress the 
list created pursuant to subsection (a) and any accom-
panying analysis that contributed to the creation of the list. 
SEC. 1639. MITIGATION OF RISKS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
POSED 
BY 
PROVIDERS 
OF 
INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCTS 
AND 
SERVICES 
WHO HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO FOREIGN GOV-
ERNMENTS. 
(a) DISCLOSURE REQUIRED.—The Department of De-
fense may not use a product, service, or system relating to 
information or operational technology, cybersecurity, an in-
dustrial control system, a weapons system, or computer
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† HR 5515 EAS 
antivirus provided by a person unless that person discloses 
to the Secretary of Defense the following: 
(1) Whether the person has allowed a foreign 
government to review or access the code of a product, 
system, or service custom-developed for the Depart-
ment, or is under any obligation to allow a foreign 
person or government to review or access the code of 
a product, system, or service custom-developed for the 
Department as a condition of entering into an agree-
ment for sale or other transaction with a foreign gov-
ernment or with a foreign person on behalf of such a 
government. 
(2) Whether the person has allowed a foreign 
government listed in section 1638(a) to review or ac-
cess the source code of a product, system, or service 
that the Department is using or intends to use, or is 
under any obligation to allow a foreign person or gov-
ernment to review or access the source code of a prod-
uct, system, or service that the Department is using 
or intends to use as a condition of entering into an 
agreement for sale or other transaction with a foreign 
government or with a foreign person on behalf of such 
a government. 
(3) In a case in which the person is a United 
States person or an affiliate of a United States per-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
son, whether or not the person holds or has sought a 
license pursuant to the Export Administration Regu-
lations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, 
Code of Federal Regulations, the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations under subchapter M of chapter 
I of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations, or successor 
regulations, for information technology products, com-
ponents, software, or services that contain code cus-
tom-developed for the product, system, or service the 
Department is using or intends to use. 
(b) POST PROCUREMENT.—Procurement contracts for 
covered products or systems shall include a clause requiring 
the information contained in subsection (a) be disclosed 
during the period of the contract if an entity becomes aware 
of information requiring disclosure as per that section, in-
cluding any mitigation measures taken or anticipated. 
(c) MITIGATION OF RISKS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If, after reviewing a disclo-
sure made by a person under subsection (a), the Sec-
retary determines that the disclosure relating to a 
product, system, or service entails a risk to the na-
tional security infrastructure or data of the United 
States, or any national security system under the 
control of the Department, the Secretary shall take 
such measures as the Secretary considers appropriate
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† HR 5515 EAS 
to mitigate such risks, including, as the Secretary 
considers appropriate, by conditioning any agreement 
for the use, procurement, or acquisition of the prod-
uct, system, or service on the inclusion of enforceable 
conditions or requirements that would mitigate such 
risks. 
(2) THIRD-PARTY
TESTING
STANDARD.—Not 
later than two years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act the Secretary shall develop such third- 
party testing standard as the Secretary considers ac-
ceptable for commercial off the shelf (COTS) products, 
systems, or services to use when dealing with foreign 
governments. 
(d) EXEMPTION OF DISCLOSURES FROM FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION ACT.—A disclosure under subsection (a) shall 
not be subject to section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Freedom of Information 
Act’’), or any other similar provision of Federal or State 
law requiring the disclosure of information to the public. 
SEC. 1640. ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRY OF DISCLO-
SURES. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF REGISTRY.—Not later than 
one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense shall—
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(1) establish within the operational capabilities 
of the Committee for National Security Systems 
(CNSS) or within such other agency as the Secretary 
considers appropriate a registry containing the infor-
mation disclosed under section 1639; and 
(2) upon request, make such information avail-
able to any agency conducting a procurement pursu-
ant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations or the De-
fense Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
(b) EXEMPTION OF REGISTRY FROM FREEDOM OF IN-
FORMATION ACT.—The contents of the registry established 
under subsection (a)(1) shall not be subject to section 552 
of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the 
‘‘Freedom of Information Act’’), or any other similar provi-
sion of Federal or State law requiring the disclosure of in-
formation to the public. 
(c) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than one year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently 
than once each year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report detailing the number, scope, product classifications, 
and mitigation agreements related to each product, system, 
and service for which a disclosure is made under section 
1639(a).
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Subtitle D—Nuclear Forces 
SEC. 1641. OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COM-
MAND, 
CONTROL, 
AND 
COMMUNICATIONS 
SYSTEM FOR THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF 
THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
designate a single individual to be responsible for 
oversight and strategic portfolio management of the 
command, control, and communications system for 
the national leadership of the United States (as de-
fined in section 171a of title 10, United States Code), 
including— 
(A) nuclear command, control, and commu-
nications; 
(B) senior leadership communications sys-
tems; 
(C) integrated tactical warning and attack 
assessment systems, processes, and enablers; and 
(D) continuity of government functions for 
which the Department of Defense is responsible. 
(2) AUTHORITIES.—Subject to the authority and 
direction of the Secretary, the individual designated 
under paragraph (1) shall have the authority to di-
rect the Secretaries of the military departments and
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† HR 5515 EAS 
officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense with 
respect to matters described in paragraph (1), includ-
ing— 
(A) playing a significant and directive role 
in the decision processes for all annual and 
multi-year planning, programming, budgeting, 
and execution decisions, including the authority 
to realign the elements of the budgets and budget 
requests of the military departments that relate 
to the matters described in paragraph (1); 
(B) ensuring that the military departments 
comply with the standards of the Federal Gov-
ernment and the Department of Defense with re-
spect to matters described in paragraph (1); and 
(C) any other authorities that the Secretary 
of Defense considers necessary. 
(3) CHAIRPERSON OF COUNCIL ON OVERSIGHT 
OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMAND, CONTROL, 
AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.—The individual des-
ignated under paragraph (1) shall serve as the Chair-
person of the Council on Oversight of the National 
Leadership Command, Control, and Communications 
System established under section 171a of title 10, 
United States Code.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(4) STAFF.—The individual designated under 
paragraph (1) shall have sufficient dedicated full-time 
personnel to carry out the responsibilities of that in-
dividual under this subsection and as Chairperson of 
the Council on Oversight of the National Leadership 
Command, Control, and Communications System. 
(b) MODIFICATIONS TO COUNCIL ON OVERSIGHT OF 
THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMAND, CONTROL, AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.— 
(1) MEMBERSHIP.—Subsection (b) of section 
171a of title 10, United States Code, is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘, Tech-
nology, and Logistics’’ and inserting ‘‘and 
Sustainment’’; 
(B) 
by 
redesignating 
paragraphs 
(3) 
through (7) as paragraphs (4) through (8), re-
spectively; and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol-
lowing new paragraph (3): 
‘‘(3) The Under Secretary of Defense for Re-
search and Engineering.’’. 
(2) CHAIRPERSON.—Subsection (c) of such sec-
tion is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(c) CHAIRPERSON.—The Chairperson of the Council 
(in this section referred to as the ‘Chairperson’) shall be
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† HR 5515 EAS 
the individual designated by the Secretary of Defense under 
section 1641(a) of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 as responsible for 
oversight and strategic portfolio management of the com-
mand, control, and communications system for the national 
leadership of the United States.’’. 
(3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Subsection (d) of such 
section is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘over-
sight’’ and inserting ‘‘coordination’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (2)— 
(i) in the matter preceding subpara-
graph (A), by striking ‘‘oversight’’ and in-
serting ‘‘coordination’’; 
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking 
‘‘mitigation’’ and inserting ‘‘recommenda-
tions for mitigation actions’’; 
(iii) by striking subparagraphs (C) 
and (D) and inserting the following new 
subparagraph (C): 
‘‘(C) Making recommendations to the Chair-
person with respect to resource prioritization.’’; 
and 
(iv) by redesignating subparagraph 
(E) as subparagraph (D).
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(4) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Subsection (e) of such 
section is amended, in the matter preceding para-
graph (1), by striking ‘‘the Council shall’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘the Chairperson shall’’. 
(5) COLLECTION OF ASSESSMENTS ON CERTAIN 
THREATS.—Subsection (f) of such section is amended 
by striking ‘‘The Council shall’’ and inserting ‘‘The 
Chairperson shall, in consultation with the Council,’’. 
(6) BUDGET
AND
FUNDING
MATTERS.—Sub-
section (g) of such section is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter pre-
ceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’’ and inserting 
‘‘the Chairperson’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2)— 
(i) in the matter preceding subpara-
graph (A), by striking ‘‘the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff’’ and inserting ‘‘the 
Chairperson’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘the Chairman’’ each 
place it appears and inserting ‘‘the Chair-
person’’; and 
(C) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘the 
Council shall’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chairperson 
shall’’.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(7) REPORTS ON SPACE ARCHITECTURE DEVEL-
OPMENT.—Subsection (i)(1) of such section is amend-
ed by striking ‘‘the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
quisitions, Technology, and Logistics’’ and inserting 
‘‘the Chairperson’’. 
(8) NOTIFICATION OF REDUCTION OF CERTAIN 
WARNING TIME.—Subsection (j)(2) of such section is 
amended— 
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
(A)— 
(i) in the first sentence, by striking 
‘‘the Council’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chair-
person, in consultation with the Council,’’; 
and 
(ii) in the second sentence, by striking 
‘‘the Council’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chair-
person’’; and 
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking ‘‘the 
Council’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chairperson’’. 
(9) STATUS OF ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.—Sub-
section (k) of such section is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (1), in the matter pre-
ceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘the co- 
chairs of the Council, acting through the senior
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† HR 5515 EAS 
steering group of the Council,’’ and inserting 
‘‘the Chairperson’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (2), in the matter pre-
ceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘the co- 
chairs of the Council’’ and inserting ‘‘the Chair-
person’’. 
SEC. 1642. MODIFICATION TO REQUIREMENT FOR CONVEN-
TIONAL LONG-RANGE STANDOFF WEAPON. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 217(a) of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Public Law 
113–66; 127 Stat. 706) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1)— 
(A) by striking subparagraph (A); and 
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) 
and (C) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respec-
tively; and 
(2) in paragraph (2)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘the Secretary may’’ and 
inserting the following: ‘‘the Secretary— 
‘‘(A) may’’; 
(B) by striking the period at the end and 
inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(B) shall begin procurement and fielding 
of a follow-on air-launched cruise missile to the
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† HR 5515 EAS 
AGM–86 for conventional missions not more 
than five years after the successful completion of 
initial operational test and evaluation for such 
a missile for nuclear missions.’’. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to design and procure the long-range standoff 
weapon to provide a nuclear cruise missile capability to 
replace the AGM–86 as part of the modernization of the 
nuclear triad. 
SEC. 1643. EXCHANGE PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
PROGRAM EMPLOYEES. 
(a) PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.—The Chairman of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council established under section 179 of 
title 10, United States Code, and the Administrator for Nu-
clear Security, shall jointly establish an exchange program 
under which— 
(1) the Chairman shall arrange for the tem-
porary assignment of civilian and military personnel 
working on nuclear weapons policy, production, and 
force structure issues in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Navy, or the Air Force 
to the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense 
Programs in the National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration; and
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(2) the Administrator shall arrange for the tem-
porary assignment of civilian personnel working on 
programs related to nuclear weapons in the Office of 
the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to 
the elements of the Department of Defense specified in 
paragraph (1). 
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the exchange pro-
gram established under subsection (a) are— 
(1) to familiarize personnel from the Department 
of Defense and the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration with the equities, priorities, processes, cul-
ture, and employees of the other agency; 
(2) for participants in the exchange program to 
return the expertise gained through their exchanges to 
their original agencies at the conclusion of their ex-
changes; and 
(3) to improve communication between and inte-
gration of the agencies that support the formation 
and oversight of nuclear weapons policy through last-
ing relationships across the chain of command. 
(c) PARTICIPANTS.— 
(1) NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS.—The Chairman 
and the Administrator shall each select not fewer than 
5 and not more than 10 participants per year for 
participation in the exchange program established
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† HR 5515 EAS 
under subsection (a). The Chairman and the Admin-
istrator may determine how many participants to se-
lect under this paragraph without regard to the num-
ber of participants selected from the other agency. 
(2) CRITERIA FOR SELECTION.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The Chairman and the 
Administrator shall select participants for the 
exchange program established under subsection 
(a) from among mid-career employees and based 
on— 
(i) the qualifications and desire to par-
ticipate in the program of the employee; 
and 
(ii) the technical needs and capacities 
of the Department of Defense and the Na-
tional Nuclear Security Administration, as 
applicable. 
(B) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—In select-
ing participants from the Department of Defense 
for the exchange program established under sub-
section (a), the Chairman shall ensure that there 
is a mix of military personnel and civilian em-
ployees of the Department. 
(d) TERMS.—Exchanges pursuant to the exchange pro-
gram established under subsection (a) shall be for terms of
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one to two years, as determined and negotiated by the 
Chairman and the Administrator. Such terms may begin 
and end on a rolling basis. 
(e) GUIDANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION.— 
(1) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman and 
the Administrator shall jointly develop and submit to 
the congressional defense committees interim guidance 
on the form and contours of the exchange program es-
tablished under subsection (a). 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chair-
man and the Administrator shall implement the guid-
ance developed under paragraph (1). 
SEC. 1644. PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN PARTS 
OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE 
FUZES. 
(a) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Notwithstanding sec-
tion 1502(a) of title 31, United States Code, of the amount 
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2019 by sec-
tion 101 and available for Missile Procurement, Air Force, 
as specified in the funding table in division D, $9,841,000 
shall be available for the procurement of covered parts pur-
suant to contracts entered into under section 1645(a) of the 
Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National De-
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fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 
113–291; 128 Stat. 3651). 
(b) COVERED PARTS DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘covered parts’’ means commercially available off-the- 
shelf items as defined in section 104 of title 41, United 
States Code. 
SEC. 1645. PLAN TO TRAIN OFFICERS IN NUCLEAR COM-
MAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, the Sec-
retary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, develop a plan to train, educate, manage, and 
track officers of the Armed Forces in nuclear command, con-
trol, and communications. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall address— 
(1) manpower requirements at various grades; 
(2) desired career paths and promotion timing; 
and 
(3) any other matters the Secretary of Defense 
considers relevant to develop a mature cadre of offi-
cers with nuclear command, control, and communica-
tions expertise. 
(c) SUBMISSION OF PLAN.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
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of Defense shall submit the plan required by subsection (a) 
to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—The plan required by sub-
section (a) shall be implemented not later than 18 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 1646. PLAN FOR ALIGNMENT OF ACQUISITION OF WAR-
HEAD LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS AND DE-
LIVERY VEHICLES FOR SUCH WARHEADS. 
Not later than February 15, 2019, the Chairman of 
the Nuclear Weapons Council established under section 179 
of title 10, United States Code, shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a plan containing a proposal for 
better aligning the acquisition of warhead life extension 
programs by the National Nuclear Security Administration 
with the acquisition of the planned delivery vehicles for such 
warheads by the Department of Defense. 
SEC. 1647. EXTENSION OF ANNUAL REPORT ON PLAN FOR 
THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE, NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX, NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS 
DELIVERY 
SYSTEMS, 
AND 
NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. 
Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
1576), as most recently amended by section 1665 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Pub-
lic Law 115–91), is further amended in subsection (a)(1) 
by striking ‘‘2019’’ and inserting ‘‘2024’’. 
SEC. 1648. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR ACTIVITIES 
TO MODIFY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT TO IM-
PLEMENT OPEN SKIES TREATY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for 
fiscal year 2019 for research, development, test, and engi-
neering or aircraft procurement, Air Force, for the digital 
visual imaging system may be obligated or expended to 
carry out any activities to modify any United States air-
craft for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty 
until— 
(1) the Secretary of Defense submits to the ap-
propriate congressional committees the certification 
described in paragraph (2) of section 1235(b) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2018 (Public Law 115–91); and 
(2) the President submits to the appropriate con-
gressional committees the certification described in 
paragraph (3) of such section. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
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(1) 
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives. 
(2) OPEN
SKIES
TREATY.—The term ‘‘Open 
Skies Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open Skies, done 
at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force 
January 1, 2002. 
SEC. 1649. SENSE OF SENATE ON NUCLEAR POSTURE RE-
VIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in 
his opening statement before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives on February 
6, 2018, ‘‘Maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent 
is much less expensive than fighting a war that we 
were unable to deter.’’. 
(2) In the same statement, Secretary Mattis said, 
‘‘Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons complex of lab-
oratories and plants is also long past due . . . Due 
to consistent underfunding, significant and sustained
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investments will be required over the coming decade 
to ensure that the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration will be able to deliver at the rate needed to 
support nuclear deterrence into the 2030s and be-
yond.’’. 
(3) Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter re-
cently wrote that ‘‘it is essential to recapitalize the 
nuclear Triad, because it is the bedrock of deterrence. 
During the past 25 years, the United States has made 
no major new investments in its nuclear forces, yet 
other countries have conducted vigorous buildups. 
This history does not support the contention that U.S. 
investments fuel the nuclear programs of others. My 
views are reflected in the latest Nuclear Posture Re-
view.’’. 
(4) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy Jim Miller recently wrote, ‘‘Secretary of Defense 
Jim Mattis’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review offers con-
tinuity with past U.S. policy and plans, including 
those in the 2010 NPR. It deserves broad bipartisan 
support.’’. 
(5) The Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, 
said in a statement on February 3, 2018, ‘‘Japan 
highly appreciates the latest NPR which clearly ar-
ticulates the U.S. resolve to ensure the effectiveness of
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its deterrence and its commitment to providing ex-
tended deterrence to its allies including Japan, in 
light of the international security environment which 
has been rapidly worsened since the release of the pre-
vious 2010 NPR, in particular, by continued develop-
ment of North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams.’’. 
(6) In testimony before the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate on April 30, 2018, Secretary 
of Defense Jim Mattis said, ‘‘Modernizing the na-
tion’s nuclear deterrent delivery systems and our nu-
clear command and control is the [Department of De-
fense’s] top priority.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that— 
(1) the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is a meas-
ured and appropriate response to the current security 
environment, taking into account the developments in 
other nuclear weapons states such as the People’s Re-
public of China and the Russian Federation and the 
return to great power competition as identified by 
two successive Secretaries of Defense and outlined in 
the 2018 National Defense Strategy; 
(2) Congress should fully fund the complete nu-
clear modernization program of the Department of
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Defense, including the Columbia-class submarine, the 
Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the B–21 long- 
range bomber, the Long-Range Stand-Off weapon, the 
re-engining of the B–52H bomber, and dual-capable 
aircraft; 
(3) the Department of Defense should organize 
itself appropriately to engineer, acquire, and operate 
nuclear command, control, and communications sys-
tems that are secure, reliable, and modernized; 
(4) Congress should fully fund the National Nu-
clear Security Administration component of the nu-
clear modernization program, including— 
(A) the existing warhead life extension pro-
grams and major alterations, including the 
W76–2 warhead modification program and the 
W80–4 life extension program; and 
(B) the recapitalization of infrastructure for 
production and processing of plutonium pits, 
uranium, tritium, lithium, and trusted strategic 
radiation-hardened microelectronics; 
(5) in order to execute the programs described in 
this subsection in the timely fashion required by the 
Nuclear Posture Review, the National Nuclear Secu-
rity Administration must balance workload, improve 
management of large programs, and better integrate
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its acquisition programs with those of the Department 
of Defense; 
(6) the United States maintains a steadfast com-
mitment to the policy of extended deterrence in Eu-
rope and East Asia, and the nuclear modernization 
program will ensure that commitment remains cred-
ible; 
(7) the United States should continue to honor 
long-held arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear 
security commitments, and should seek to increase 
transparency and predictability through strategic 
dialogue, risk-reduction communication channels, and 
the sharing of best practices; 
(8) when complied with by all parties, effective 
nuclear nonproliferation and arms control measures 
and agreements can support the security of the 
United States and countries that are allies or part-
ners of the United States by— 
(A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
rials, technology, and expertise; 
(B) decreasing the risk of misperception 
and miscalculation; and 
(C) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
competition; and
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(9) the United States should continue to affirm 
its commitments to arms control efforts that advance 
the security of the United States and countries that 
are allies or partners of the United States, and are 
verifiable and enforceable, including the Treaty be-
tween the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 
on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 
5, 2011 (commonly known as the ‘‘New START Trea-
ty’’), which is in effect through February 2021, and 
with mutual agreement may be extended for up to five 
years. 
Subtitle E—Missile Defense 
Programs 
SEC. 1651. EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION RELATING TO MIS-
SILE DEFENSE INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS. 
Section 130h(e) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ‘‘January 1, 2019’’ and inserting 
‘‘January 1, 2021’’. 
SEC. 1652. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY FOR 
STANDARD MISSILE–3 IB GUIDED MISSILES. 
(a) AUTHORITY FOR MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT.— 
Subject to section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, the 
Secretary of Defense may enter into one or more multiyear
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contracts, beginning with the fiscal year 2019 program 
year, for the procurement of Standard Missile–3 Block IB 
guided missiles. 
(b) AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT.—The 
Secretary may enter into one or more contracts for advance 
procurement associated with the missiles for which author-
ization to enter into a multiyear procurement contract is 
provided under subsection (a). 
(c) COST ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary 
may not exercise the authority provided under subsection 
(a) or (b) until the Secretary submits to the congressional 
defense committees the report and confirmation required 
under subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, of section 
2306b(i)(2) of title 10, United States Code. 
(d) CONDITION
FOR
OUT-YEAR
CONTRACT
PAY-
MENTS.—A contract entered into under subsection (a) shall 
provide that any obligation of the United States to make 
a payment under the contract for a fiscal year after fiscal 
year 2019 is subject to the availability of appropriations 
for that purpose for such later fiscal year.
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SEC. 1653. EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS ON 
UNFUNDED PRIORITIES OF MISSILE DEFENSE 
AGENCY. 
Section 1696 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (130 Stat. 2638; Public Law 114– 
328) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘Not later than’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘Each year, not later than’’ 
(B) by striking ‘‘for each of fiscal years 
2018 and 2019’’; and 
(2) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘the budget if’’ 
and all that follows through the period at the end and 
inserting ‘‘the budget if additional resources had been 
available for the budget to fund the program, activity, 
or mission requirement.’’. 
SEC. 1654. IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM AND ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE 
DEFENSE PROGRAM CO-DEVELOPMENT AND 
CO-PRODUCTION. 
(a) IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise 
made available for fiscal year 2019 for procurement, 
Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense
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† HR 5515 EAS 
Agency, not more than $70,000,000 may be provided 
to the Government of Israel to procure components for 
the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense system 
through co-production of such components in the 
United States by industry of the United States. 
(2) CONDITIONS.— 
(A) 
AGREEMENT.—Funds 
described 
in 
paragraph (1) for the Iron Dome short-range 
rocket defense program shall be available subject 
to the terms and conditions in the Agreement Be-
tween the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of 
the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome De-
fense System Procurement, signed on March 5, 
2014, as amended to include co-production for 
Tamir interceptors. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 
days prior to the initial obligation of funds de-
scribed in paragraph (1), the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees— 
(i) a certification that the amended bi-
lateral international agreement specified in
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† HR 5515 EAS 
subparagraph (A) is being implemented as 
provided in such agreement; and 
(ii) an assessment detailing any risks 
relating to the implementation of such 
agreement. 
(b) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, DAVID’S
SLING
WEAPON
SYSTEM
CO-PRODUC-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2019 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $50,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel to pro-
cure the David’s Sling Weapon System, including for 
co-production of parts and components in the United 
States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a certifi-
cation that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreement and the bilat-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
eral co-production agreement for the David’s 
Sling Weapon System; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); and 
(C) the level of co-production of parts, com-
ponents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) in 
the United States by United States industry for 
the David’s Sling Weapon System is not less 
than 50 percent. 
(c) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, ARROW 3 UPPER TIER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM CO- 
PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2019 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $80,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel for the 
Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program, including 
for co-production of parts and components in the 
United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided by 
paragraph (3), the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
quisition and Sustainment shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a certification that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreements for the 
Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); 
(C) the United States has entered into a bi-
lateral international agreement with Israel that 
establishes, with respect to the use of such 
funds— 
(i) in accordance with subparagraph 
(D), the terms of co-production of parts and 
components on the basis of the greatest 
practicable co-production of parts, compo-
nents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) 
by United States industry and minimizes 
nonrecurring engineering and facilitization
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† HR 5515 EAS 
expenses to the costs needed for co-produc-
tion; 
(ii) complete transparency on the re-
quirement of Israel for the number of inter-
ceptors and batteries that will be procured, 
including with respect to the procurement 
plans, acquisition strategy, and funding 
profiles of Israel; 
(iii) technical milestones for co-produc-
tion of parts and components and procure-
ment; 
(iv) a joint affordability working 
group to consider cost reduction initiatives; 
and 
(v) joint approval processes for third- 
party sales; and 
(D) the level of co-production described in 
subparagraph (C)(i) for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program is not less than 50 percent. 
(3) WAIVER.—The Under Secretary may waive 
the certification required by paragraph (2) if the 
Under Secretary certifies to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that the Under Secretary has re-
ceived sufficient data from the Government of Israel 
to demonstrate—
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(A) the funds specified in paragraph (1) are 
provided to Israel solely for funding the procure-
ment of long-lead components and critical hard-
ware in accordance with a production plan, in-
cluding a funding profile detailing Israeli con-
tributions for production, including long-lead 
production, of the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Inter-
ceptor Program; 
(B) such long-lead components have success-
fully completed knowledge points, technical mile-
stones, and production readiness reviews; and 
(C) the long-lead procurement will be con-
ducted in a manner that maximizes co-produc-
tion in the United States without incurring non-
recurring engineering activity or cost other than 
such activity or cost required for suppliers of the 
United States to start or restart production in 
the United States. 
(d) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) and paragraph (2) of subsection (c), the Under 
Secretary may submit— 
(1) one certification covering both the David’s 
Sling Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program; or
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(2) separate certifications for each respective sys-
tem. 
(e) TIMING.—The Under Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees the certifications under 
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) and paragraph (2) of sub-
section (c) by not later than 60 days before the funds speci-
fied in paragraph (1) of subsections (b) and (c) for the re-
spective system covered by the certification are provided to 
the Government of Israel. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1655. METRICS FOR EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTEGRATED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
SYSTEM 
AGAINST 
OPERATIONALLY 
REAL-
ISTIC BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACKS. 
(a) DEVELOPMENT OF METRICS REQUIRED.—The Di-
rector of the Missile Defense Agency shall, in coordination 
with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense System Operational 
Test Agency, the Commander of the Joint Forces Combatant
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† HR 5515 EAS 
Command-Integrated Missile Defense, the service acquisi-
tion executives (as defined in section 101 of title 10, United 
States Code), and the commanders of the combatant com-
mands, develop operationally relevant metrics for evalu-
ating the effectiveness of the integrated Ballistic Missile De-
fense System (BMDS) and its components and elements 
against operationally realistic ballistic missile attacks into 
areas defended by United States combatant commands. 
(b) INCORPORATION OF METRICS INTO ANNUAL RE-
PORTS.—Beginning in February 2019, the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency shall incorporate the metrics devel-
oped under subsection (a) into the annual reports of the 
Director to the congressional defense committees, including 
an assessment of progress against such metrics on the acqui-
sition baseline of the Missile Defense Agency. 
(c) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated for fiscal year 2019 by this Act and available for 
the Command and Control, Battle Management and Com-
munications (C2BMC) program, not more than 50 percent 
may be obligated or expended until the Director develops 
the metrics required by subsection (a).
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† HR 5515 EAS 
SEC. 1656. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT RELATING TO 
TRANSITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
PROGRAMS TO MILITARY DEPARTMENTS. 
Section 1676(b)(2) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91) is 
amended by inserting ‘‘or equivalent approval’’ before the 
period at the end. 
SEC. 1657. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ACCELERATION OF 
MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that the Missile Defense Agency should— 
(1) accelerate the fielding, if technically feasible, 
of the planned additional 20 ground-based intercep-
tors with Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at Missile 
Field 4 at Fort Greely, Alaska, and to mate the Rede-
signed Kill Vehicles with the newest booster tech-
nology; 
(2) weigh the rapid growth in missile and nu-
clear threats against the cost and risk of accelerating 
the Redesigned Kill Vehicle and the Multi-Object Kill 
Vehicle development and deployment; 
(3) ensure, prior to its operational deployment, 
that the Redesigned Kill Vehicle has demonstrated the 
ability to accomplish its intended mission through a 
successful, operationally realistic flight test;
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(4) rapidly develop and deploy a persistent, 
space-based sensor architecture to ensure our missile 
defenses are more effective against ballistic missile 
threats and more responsive to new and emergent 
threats from hypersonic and cruise missiles; 
(5) pursue innovative concepts for existing tech-
nologies, such as a missile defense role for the F–35 
aircraft; and 
(6) invest in advanced technologies, such as 
boost-phase warning, tracking, and intercept. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the con-
gressional defense committees a report on ways the 
Missile Defense Agency can accelerate the construction 
of Missile Field 4 at Fort Greely, Alaska, as well as 
the deployment of 20 ground-based interceptors with 
Redesigned Kill Vehicles (RKV) at such missile field, 
by at least one year. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A threat-based description of the bene-
fits and risks of accelerating the construction 
and deployment referred to in paragraph (1).
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(B) A description of the technical and ac-
quisition risks and potential effects on the reli-
ability of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle if deploy-
ment is accelerated as described in paragraph 
(1). 
(C) A description of the cost implications of 
accelerating the construction and deployment re-
ferred to in paragraph (1). 
(D) A description of the effect such accelera-
tion would have on the Redesigned Kill Vehicle 
flight test schedule and the overall Integrated 
Master Test Plan. 
(E) A description of the effect that the accel-
eration described in paragraph (1) would have 
on re-tipping currently deployed exoatmospheric 
kill vehicles with the Redesigned Kill Vehicle. 
(F) A description of how such acceleration 
would align with the deployment of the long 
range discrimination radar and the homeland 
defense radar-Hawaii. 
(G) A cost-benefit analysis and a feasibility 
assessment for construction of a fifth missile field 
at Fort Greely, Alaska.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 1658. INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FOR 
EVOLVING THEATER MISSILE THREATS. 
(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the Sense of the 
Senate that— 
(1) the United States should utilize regional mis-
sile defense assets to counter and deter against cruise, 
short-to-medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic mis-
sile threats; 
(2) the United States should continue to rapidly 
work toward the interoperability of all United States 
missile defense systems for a more effective layered de-
fense; and 
(3) the United States Army should increase its 
attention, focus, and resources developing an inte-
grated air-and-missile defense architecture to protect 
both land and air forces from cruise, short-to-me-
dium-range ballistic, and hypersonic missile threats. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, if consistent 
with the direction or recommendations of the Missile 
Defense Review that commenced in 2017, the Sec-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional de-
fense committees a report on the Department’s plan 
for the creation of a fully interoperable and inte-
grated air and missile defense architecture. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—Elements of the report required 
by paragraph (1) are as follows: 
(A) An intelligence assessment of cruise, 
short-to-medium-range ballistic, and hypersonic 
missile threats to the United States and its de-
ployed forces. 
(B) An examination of current United 
States capabilities to defeat the threats included 
in the report required by subparagraph (A) and 
an analysis of the existing capability and re-
source gaps. 
(C) An analysis of the level of integration 
and interoperability of United States missile de-
fense systems and the future requirements needed 
to become fully integrated and interoperable to 
defeat the threats included in the report required 
by subparagraph (A). 
(D) A description of the current state of 
survivability of United States missile defense 
systems against the full spectrum of air and mis-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
sile threats from near-peer threats and any 
planned efforts to increase survivability. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 1659. ACCELERATION OF HYPERSONIC MISSILE DE-
FENSE PROGRAM. 
(a) ACCELERATION OF PROGRAM.—The Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency shall accelerate the hypersonic mis-
sile defense program of the Missile Defense Agency. 
(b) DEPLOYMENT.—The Director shall deploy such 
program in conjunction with a persistent space-based mis-
sile defense sensor program. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
report on how hypersonic missile defense can be accel-
erated to meet emerging hypersonic threats. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) An estimate of the cost of such accelera-
tion.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(B) The technical requirements and acquisi-
tion plan needed for the Director to develop and 
deploy a hypersonic missile defense program. 
(C) A testing campaign plan that acceler-
ates the delivery of hypersonic defense systems to 
the warfighter. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 1660. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON ALLIED PARTNER-
SHIPS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. 
It is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) the United States should seek additional op-
portunities, at the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels, to provide missile defense capabilities, doctrine, 
interoperability, and planning to allies and trusted 
partners of the United States; 
(2) an expedited foreign military sales arrange-
ment would be beneficial in delivering such missile 
defenses to allies and trusted partners; and 
(3) it is important to continue to work with al-
lies and trusted partners, such as Israel, to learn from 
their experience deploying successful missile defense 
technologies.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
SEC. 1660A. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON RESULTS OF TESTS 
CARRIED OUT BY MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY. 
It is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) tests carried out by the Missile Defense Agen-
cy, which do not achieve an intercept or the main ob-
jective, should not be considered failures; 
(2) the Missile Defense Agency—in an effort to 
deliver capabilities at the speed of relevance—should 
recognize the learning value of individual advance-
ments made by all test events, rather than viewing 
any total outcome as an indication of the reliability 
of entire missile defense systems; 
(3) the Missile Defense Agency should, as part of 
its test program, continue to build an independently 
accredited modeling and simulation element to better 
inform missile defense performance assessments and 
test criteria; and 
(4) the Missile Defense Agency should continue to 
pursue an increasingly rigorous testing regime, in co-
ordination with the Office of the Director, Oper-
ational Test and Evaluation, to more rapidly deliver 
capabilities to the warfighter as the threat evolves. 
SEC. 1660B. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON DISCRIMINATION 
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. 
(a) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that prioritizing discrimination capabilities to improve
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† HR 5515 EAS 
missile defense effectiveness against current and future 
threats is critically important. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
the Missile Defense Agency shall submit to the con-
gressional defense committees a report on the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Needed discrimination improvements 
within the missile defense architecture. 
(B) The Missile Defense Agency’s plan to 
rapidly field advanced discrimination capabili-
ties. 
(C) An analysis of efforts to address dis-
crimination challenges against emerging adver-
sary threats, including hypersonic and cruise 
missiles. 
(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 1660C. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF PER-
SISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR ARCHITEC-
TURE. 
(a) DISSOCIATION WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE DE-
FENSE REVIEW.—Subsection (a) of section 1683 of the Na-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Pub-
lic Law 115–91) is amended by striking ‘‘If consistent’’ and 
all that follows through ‘‘develop’’ and inserting ‘‘Not later 
than December 31, 2018, the Director of the Missile Defense 
Agency shall, in coordination with the Secretary of the Air 
Force and the Director of the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, commence developing’’. 
(b) DEPLOYMENT DEADLINE.—Such subsection is fur-
ther amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—’’ and insert-
ing the following: 
‘‘(a) DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT.— 
‘‘(1) DEVELOPMENT.—’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new para-
graph: 
‘‘(2) DEPLOYMENT.—The Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency shall ensure that the sensor architec-
ture developed under paragraph (1) is deployed on or 
before December 31, 2022.’’. 
(c) COMPATIBILITY WITH EFFORTS OF DEFENSE AD-
VANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY.—Such section is 
amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as 
subsection (f) and (g), respectively; and
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following 
new subsection (e): 
‘‘(e) COMPATIBILITY WITH EFFORTS OF DEFENSE AD-
VANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY.—The Director 
shall ensure that the sensor architecture developed under 
subsection (a) is compatible with efforts of the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency relating to space-based 
sensors for missile defense.’’. 
(d) REPORT ON PROGRESS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees a report on the progress of all efforts being 
made by the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, and the Air Force 
relating to space-based sensing and tracking capabili-
ties for missile defense and how each of such organi-
zations will work together to avoid duplication of ef-
forts. 
(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
SEC. 1660D. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP 
A SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE INTER-
CEPT LAYER. 
(a) DISSOCIATION WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE DE-
FENSE REVIEW.—Subsection (a) of section 1688 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Pub-
lic Law 115–91) is amended, in the matter before para-
graph (1), by striking ‘‘If consistent’’ and all that follows 
through ‘‘the Director’’ and inserting ‘‘The Director’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subsection (b) of such 
section is amended, in the matter before paragraph (1), by 
striking ‘‘If the Director carries out subsection (a), not 
later’’ and inserting ‘‘Not later’’. 
Subtitle F—Other Matters 
SEC. 1661. ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPA-
BILITIES OF RUSSIA AND CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees and the congressional intelligence committees 
(as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3003)) country-wide assessments of the electronic 
warfare capabilities of the Russian Federation and the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
(b) CONTENTS.—The assessments submitted under sub-
section (a) shall include, for the countries concerned, the 
following: 
(1) The electronic warfare doctrine. 
(2) The order of battle on land, sea, air, space, 
and cyberspace. 
(3) The current status of expected direction of 
technology and research over the next 10 years. 
SEC. 1662. BUDGET EXHIBIT ON SUPPORT PROVIDED TO EN-
TITIES OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) shall include in the budget justification mate-
rials submitted to Congress in support of the Department 
of Defense budget for each fiscal year (as submitted with 
the budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 
31, United States Code) a single budget exhibit containing 
relevant details pertaining to support provided by the De-
partment of Defense to the Executive Office of the President 
related to senior leader communications and continuity of 
government programs. 
(b) INCLUSIONS.—The budget exhibit required by sub-
section (a) shall include— 
(1) support provided by the White House Mili-
tary Office, the White House Communications Agen-
cy, special mission area activities of the Defense In-
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† HR 5515 EAS 
formation Systems Agency, and other relevant pro-
grams; and 
(2) specific appropriation and line numbers 
where appropriate. 
(c) FORM.—The budget exhibit required by subsection 
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 1663. DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTROMAGNETIC BATTLE 
MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY FOR JOINT ELEC-
TROMAGNETIC OPERATIONS. 
(a) DESIGNATION OF EXECUTIVE AGENT.—Not later 
than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee shall designate 
a military service with the responsibility for acting as exec-
utive agent for the development of an Electromagnetic Bat-
tle Management capability for joint electromagnetic oper-
ations. 
(b) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Along with the 
budget for each fiscal year submitted by the President pur-
suant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, 
the Secretary of Defense shall include a certification from 
the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee whether suffi-
cient funds have been budgeted for the development of an 
Electromagnetic Battle Management capability for joint 
electromagnetic operations.
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† HR 5515 EAS 
TITLE 
XVII—COMMITTEE 
ON 
FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 
IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign Investment 
Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018’’. 
SEC. 1702. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) foreign investment provides substantial eco-
nomic benefits to the United States, including the 
promotion of economic growth, productivity, competi-
tiveness, and job creation, and the majority of foreign 
investment transactions pose little or no risk to the 
national security of the United States, especially 
when those investments are truly passive in nature; 
(2) maintaining the commitment of the United 
States to open and fair investment policy also encour-
ages other countries to reciprocate and helps open new 
foreign markets for United States businesses and their 
products; 
(3) it should continue to be the policy of the 
United States to enthusiastically welcome and sup-
port foreign investment, consistent with the protection 
of national security;
816 
† HR 5515 EAS 
(4) at the same time, the national security land-
scape has shifted in recent years, and so has the na-
ture of the investments that pose the greatest potential 
risk to national security, which warrants a mod-
ernization of the processes and authorities of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
and of the United States export control system; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States plays a critical role in protecting the 
national security of the United States, and, therefore, 
it is essential that the member agencies of the Com-
mittee are adequately resourced and able to hire ap-
propriately qualified individuals in a timely manner, 
and that those individuals’ security clearances are 
processed as a high priority; 
(6) the President should conduct a more robust 
international outreach effort to urge and help allies 
and partners of the United States to establish proc-
esses that parallel the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States to screen foreign invest-
ments for national security risks and to facilitate co-
ordination; 
(7) the President should lead a collaborative ef-
fort with allies and partners of the United States to 
strengthen the multilateral export control regime to
817 
† HR 5515 EAS 
more effectively address the unprecedented industrial 
policies of certain countries of special concern, includ-
ing aggressive efforts to acquire United States tech-
nology, and the blending of civil and military pro-
grams; 
(8) any penalties imposed by the United States 
Government with respect to an individual or entity 
pursuant to a determination that the individual or 
entity has violated sanctions imposed by the United 
States or the export control laws of the United States 
should not be reversed for reasons unrelated to the na-
tional security of the United States; and 
(9) the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States should continue to review transactions 
for the purpose of protecting national security and 
should not consider issues of national interest absent 
a national security nexus. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CONSIDERATION OF COV-
ERED TRANSACTIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that, 
when considering national security risks, the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States may consider— 
(1) whether a transaction involves a country of 
special concern that has a demonstrated or declared 
strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical tech-
nology or critical infrastructure that would affect
818 
† HR 5515 EAS 
United States technological and industrial leadership 
in areas related to national security; 
(2) the potential national security-related effects 
of the cumulative market share of or a pattern of re-
cent transactions in any one type of infrastructure, 
energy asset, critical material, or critical technology 
by foreign persons; 
(3) whether any foreign person that would ac-
quire an interest in a United States business or its 
assets as a result of a transaction has a history of 
complying with United States laws and regulations; 
(4) the extent to which a transaction is likely to 
expose, either directly or indirectly, personally identi-
fiable information, genetic information, or other sen-
sitive data of United States citizens to access by a 
foreign government or foreign person that may exploit 
that information in a manner that threatens national 
security; and 
(5) whether a transaction is likely to have the ef-
fect of exacerbating or creating new cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in the United States or is likely to re-
sult in a foreign government gaining a significant 
new capability to engage in malicious cyber-enabled 
activities against the United States, including such
819 
† HR 5515 EAS 
activities designed to affect the outcome of any elec-
tion for Federal office. 
SEC. 1703. DEFINITIONS. 
Section 721(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 
(50 U.S.C. 4565(a)) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) ACCESS.—The term ‘access’ means the abil-
ity and opportunity to obtain information, subject to 
regulations prescribed by the Committee. 
‘‘(2) COMMITTEE; 
CHAIRPERSON.—The terms 
‘Committee’ and ‘chairperson’ mean the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States and the 
chairperson thereof, respectively. 
‘‘(3) CONTROL.—The term ‘control’ means the 
power to determine, direct, or decide important mat-
ters affecting an entity, subject to regulations pre-
scribed by the Committee. 
‘‘(4) COUNTRY OF SPECIAL CONCERN.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘country of 
special concern’ means a country that poses a 
significant threat to the national security inter-
ests of the United States. 
‘‘(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This para-
graph shall not be construed to require the Com-
820 
† HR 5515 EAS 
mittee to maintain a list of countries of special 
concern. 
‘‘(5) COVERED TRANSACTION.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Except as otherwise 
provided, the term ‘covered transaction’ means— 
‘‘(i) any transaction described in sub-
paragraph (B)(i); and 
‘‘(ii) any transaction described in 
clauses (ii) through (v) of subparagraph (B) 
that is proposed, pending, or completed on 
or after the effective date specified in section 
1732(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Investment 
Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018. 
‘‘(B) TRANSACTIONS DESCRIBED.—A trans-
action described in this subparagraph is any of 
the following: 
‘‘(i) Any merger, acquisition, or take-
over that is proposed or pending after Au-
gust 23, 1988, by or with any foreign per-
son that could result in foreign control of 
any United States business. 
‘‘(ii) Subject to subparagraph (C), the 
purchase or lease by a foreign person of, or 
a concession offered to a foreign person with
821 
† HR 5515 EAS 
respect to, private or public real estate 
that— 
‘‘(I) is located in the United 
States; 
‘‘(II)(aa) is, is located at, or will 
function as part of, a land, air, or 
maritime port; or 
‘‘(bb)(AA) is in close proximity to 
a United States military installation 
or another facility or property of the 
United States Government that is sen-
sitive for reasons relating to national 
security; 
‘‘(BB) could reasonably provide 
the foreign person the ability to collect 
information on activities being con-
ducted at such an installation, facility, 
or property; or 
‘‘(CC) could otherwise expose na-
tional security activities at such an in-
stallation, facility, or property to the 
risk of foreign surveillance; and 
‘‘(III) meets such other criteria as 
the Committee prescribes by regulation, 
as long as such criteria do not expand
822 
† HR 5515 EAS 
the categories of real estate to which 
this clause applies beyond the cat-
egories described in subclause (II). 
‘‘(iii) Any other investment (other than 
a passive investment) by a foreign person in 
any United States critical technology com-
pany or United States critical infrastruc-
ture company that is unaffiliated with the 
foreign person, subject to regulations pre-
scribed under subparagraph (C). 
‘‘(iv) Any change in the rights that a 
foreign person has with respect to a United 
States business in which the foreign person 
has an investment, if that change could re-
sult in— 
‘‘(I) foreign control of the United 
States business; or 
‘‘(II) an investment described in 
clause (iii). 
‘‘(v) Any other transaction, transfer, 
agreement, or arrangement the structure of 
which is designed or intended to evade or 
circumvent the application of this section, 
subject to regulations prescribed by the 
Committee.
823 
† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(C) FURTHER DEFINITION THROUGH REG-
ULATIONS.— 
‘‘(i) EXCEPTION
FOR
CERTAIN
REAL 
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS.—A real estate pur-
chase or lease described in subparagraph 
(B)(ii) does not include a lease or purchase 
of— 
‘‘(I) a single ‘housing unit’, as de-
fined by the Census Bureau; or 
‘‘(II) real estate in ‘urbanized 
areas’, as defined by the Census Bu-
reau in the most recent census, except 
as otherwise prescribed by the Com-
mittee in regulations in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense. 
‘‘(ii) CERTAIN OTHER INVESTMENT.— 
The Committee shall prescribe regulations 
further defining covered transactions de-
scribed in subparagraph (B)(iii) by ref-
erence to the technology, sector, subsector, 
transaction type, or other characteristics of 
such transactions. 
‘‘(iii) EXEMPTION FOR TRANSACTIONS 
FROM IDENTIFIED COUNTRIES.—
824 
† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(I) IN
GENERAL.—The Com-
mittee shall, by regulation, define cir-
cumstances 
and 
procedures 
under 
which a transaction otherwise de-
scribed in clause (ii) or (iii) of sub-
paragraph (B) is excluded from the 
definition of ‘covered transaction’ if 
each foreign person that is a party to 
the transaction, and each foreign per-
son with ownership or control over a 
party to the transaction, is from (as 
determined by the Committee pursuant 
to regulations prescribed by the Com-
mittee), a country or part of a country 
identified by the Committee for pur-
poses of this clause based on factors es-
tablished by the Committee, such as— 
‘‘(aa) whether, in the sole 
judgment of the Committee, the 
process of the country for review-
ing the national security effects of 
foreign investment and associated 
international cooperation effec-
tively safeguards national security
825 
† HR 5515 EAS 
interests the country shares with 
the United States; 
‘‘(bb) whether the country is 
a member country of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization or 
is designated as a major non- 
NATO ally pursuant to section 
517 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321k); 
‘‘(cc) whether the country ad-
heres to nonproliferation control 
regimes, including treaties and 
multilateral 
supply 
guidelines, 
which shall be informed by sources 
such as the annual report on ‘Ad-
herence to and Compliance with 
Arms Control, Nonproliferation 
and 
Disarmament 
Agreements 
and Commitments’ required by 
section 403 of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 
2593a); 
‘‘(dd) 
whether 
excluding 
transactions by foreign persons 
from the country advances the na-
826 
† HR 5515 EAS 
tional security objectives of the 
United States; and 
‘‘(ee) any other factors that 
the Committee determines to be 
appropriate. 
‘‘(II) RECURRING ASSESSMENT OF 
IDENTIFIED
COUNTRIES.—The Com-
mittee shall reconsider on a regular 
basis the identification of countries 
and parts of countries under subclause 
(I). 
‘‘(iv) 
EXCEPTION
FOR
AIR
CAR-
RIERS.—For 
purposes 
of 
subparagraph 
(B)(iii), the term ‘other investment’ does not 
include an investment involving an air car-
rier, as defined in section 40102(a)(2) of 
title 49, United States Code, that holds a 
certificate issued under section 41102 of 
that title. 
‘‘(v) TRANSFERS OF CERTAIN ASSETS 
PURSUANT
TO
BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS 
OR
OTHER
DEFAULTS.—The Committee 
shall prescribe regulations to clarify that 
the term ‘covered transaction’ includes any 
transaction described in subparagraph (B)
827 
† HR 5515 EAS 
that arises pursuant to a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding or other form of default on debt. 
‘‘(D) PASSIVE INVESTMENT DEFINED.— 
‘‘(i) IN
GENERAL.—For purposes of 
subparagraph (B)(iii), the term ‘passive in-
vestment’ means an investment, direct or 
indirect, by a foreign person in a United 
States critical infrastructure company or 
United States critical technology company 
that meets the following criteria: 
‘‘(I) The investment is not de-
scribed in subparagraph (B)(i). 
‘‘(II) The investment does not af-
ford the foreign person— 
‘‘(aa) access to any material 
nonpublic technical information 
in the possession of the United 
States critical infrastructure com-
pany or United States critical 
technology company; 
‘‘(bb) membership or observer 
rights on the board of directors or 
equivalent governing body of the 
United States critical infrastruc-
ture company or United States
828 
† HR 5515 EAS 
critical technology company or the 
right to nominate an individual 
to a position on the board of di-
rectors or equivalent governing 
body; or 
‘‘(cc) any involvement, other 
than through voting of shares, in 
substantive decisionmaking relat-
ing to the management, govern-
ance, or operation of the United 
States critical infrastructure com-
pany or United States critical 
technology company. 
‘‘(III) The foreign person does not 
have a material parallel strategic part-
nership or other material financial re-
lationship, as described in regulations 
prescribed by the Committee, with the 
United States critical infrastructure 
company or United States critical 
technology company. 
‘‘(IV) Such other criteria as the 
Committee may prescribe by regula-
tion, which shall be consistent with the
829 
† HR 5515 EAS 
criteria specified in subclauses (I), 
(II), and (III). 
‘‘(ii) MATERIAL
NONPUBLIC
TECH-
NICAL
INFORMATION
DEFINED.—For pur-
poses of clause (i)(II)(aa), the term ‘mate-
rial nonpublic technical information’ has 
the meaning given that term in regulations 
prescribed by the Committee, except that the 
term does not include financial information 
regarding the performance of a United 
States critical infrastructure company or 
United States critical technology company. 
‘‘(iii) EFFECT OF LEVEL OF OWNER-
SHIP INTEREST.— 
‘‘(I) IN GENERAL.—A determina-
tion of whether an investment is a pas-
sive investment under clause (i) shall 
be made without regard to how low the 
level of ownership interest a foreign 
person would hold or acquire in a 
United States critical infrastructure 
company or United States critical 
technology company would be as a re-
sult of the investment. 
‘‘(II) REGULATIONS.—
830 
† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(aa) 
IN
GENERAL.—The 
Committee may prescribe regula-
tions specifying that any invest-
ment (other than an investment 
described in item (bb)) greater 
than a certain level or amount 
shall not be considered a passive 
investment under clause (i). 
‘‘(bb) 
INVESTMENT
DE-
SCRIBED.—An 
investment 
de-
scribed in this item is an invest-
ment— 
‘‘(AA) by a foreign per-
son in a United States crit-
ical infrastructure company 
or United States critical 
technology company through 
an investment fund; 
‘‘(BB) that does not re-
sult in the foreign person’s 
control of the United States 
critical technology or United 
States critical infrastructure 
company; and
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† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(CC) 
that 
otherwise 
meets the requirements of 
clauses (i) and (iv), as appli-
cable. 
‘‘(iv) SPECIFIC CLARIFICATION FOR IN-
VESTMENT FUNDS.— 
‘‘(I) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN IN-
VESTMENTS
AS
PASSIVE
INVEST-
MENTS.—Notwithstanding 
clause 
(i)(II)(bb) and subject to regulations 
prescribed by the Committee, an indi-
rect investment by a foreign person in 
a United States critical infrastructure 
company or United States critical 
technology company through an invest-
ment fund that affords the foreign per-
son (or a designee of the foreign per-
son) membership as a limited partner 
on an advisory board or a committee 
of the fund shall be considered a pas-
sive investment if— 
‘‘(aa) the fund is managed 
exclusively by a general partner, a 
managing member, or an equiva-
lent;
832 
† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(bb) the general partner, 
managing member, or equivalent 
is not a foreign person; 
‘‘(cc) the advisory board or 
committee does not have the abil-
ity to approve, disapprove, or oth-
erwise control— 
‘‘(AA) investment deci-
sions of the fund; or 
‘‘(BB) decisions made 
by the general partner, man-
aging member, or equivalent 
related to entities in which 
the fund is invested; 
‘‘(dd) the foreign person does 
not otherwise have the ability to 
control the fund, including the au-
thority— 
‘‘(AA) to approve, dis-
approve, or otherwise control 
investment decisions of the 
fund; 
‘‘(BB) to approve, dis-
approve, or otherwise control 
decisions made by the general
840 
† HR 5515 EAS 
‘‘(16) UNITED
STATES.—The term ‘United 
States’ means the several States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and any territory or possession of the United 
States. 
‘‘(17) UNITED
STATES
BUSINESS.—The term 
‘United States business’ means a person engaged in 
interstate commerce in the United States.’’. 
SEC. 1704. ACCEPTANCE OF WRITTEN NOTICES. 
Section 721(b)(1)(C)(i) of the Defense Production Act 
of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(b)(1)(C)(i)) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘Any party’’ and inserting the 
following: 
‘‘(I) IN
GENERAL.—Any party’’; 
and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(II) COMMENTS
AND
ACCEPT-
ANCE.— 
‘‘(aa) IN GENERAL.—Subject 
to item (cc), the Committee shall 
provide comments on a draft or 
final written notice or accept a 
final written notice submitted 
under subclause (I) with respect 
to a covered transaction not later 
than the date that is 10 business