I 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 5912 
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy 
to disrupt growing cooperation among the People’s Republic of China, 
the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries of the 
United States, and mitigate the risks posed to the United States. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
NOVEMBER 4, 2025 
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI (for himself and Mr. MOYLAN) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in ad-
dition to the Committees on Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent 
Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-govern-
ment strategy to disrupt growing cooperation among the 
People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, which are the foremost adversaries 
of the United States, and mitigate the risks posed to 
the United States. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Defending Inter-
national Security by Restricting Unacceptable Partner-
ships and Tactics Act’’ or ‘‘DISRUPT Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The People’s Republic of China, the Rus-
sian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are each 
considered— 
(A) a foreign adversary (as defined in sec-
tion 825(d) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 
118–31; 137 Stat. 322; 46 U.S.C. 50309 
note)); 
(B) a country of risk (as defined in section 
6432(a) of the Servicemember Quality of Life 
Improvement and National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 
118–159; 138 Stat. 2488; 42 U.S.C. 7144b 
note)) for purposes of assessing counterintel-
ligence risks posed by certain visitors to Na-
tional Laboratories; 
(C) a foreign country of concern (as de-
fined in section 10612(a) of the Research and 
Development, Competition, and Innovation Act 
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(Public Law 117–167; 136 Stat. 1635; 42 
U.S.C. 19221 note)); 
(D) a covered foreign country (as defined 
in section 164 of the Servicemember Quality of 
Life Improvement and National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public 
Law 118159; 138 Stat. 1818; 10 U.S.C. 4651 
note prec.)) for purposes of a prohibition on op-
eration, procurement, and contracting relating 
to foreign-made light detection and ranging 
technology; and 
(E) a covered foreign country (as defined 
in section 1622 of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public 
Law 11781; 135 Stat. 2086; 10 U.S.C. 421 
note prec.)) for purposes of a strategy and plan 
to implement certain defense intelligence re-
forms. 
(2) According to the 2025 Intelligence Commu-
nity Annual Threat Assessment, the United States 
faces an increasingly contested and dangerous global 
landscape as the four adversaries named in para-
graph (1) deepen cooperation in a manner that— 
(A) reinforces threats posed by each such 
adversary individually; and 
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(B) poses new challenges to the strength 
and power of the United States globally. 
(3) Much of the cooperation referred to in para-
graph (2) is occurring bilaterally, as the People’s 
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea strengthen diplomatic, economic, 
and military ties in accordance with bilateral agree-
ments, which include— 
(A) the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance between China and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, signed 
at Beijing July 11, 1961; 
(B) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Re-
public of Iran and the People’s Republic of 
China, issued on March 27, 2021; 
(C) the Joint Statement of the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Republic of China 
on International Relations Entering a New Era 
and Global Sustainable Development, issued on 
February 4, 2022; 
(D) the Treaty on Comprehensive Stra-
tegic Partnership between the Russian Federa-
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tion and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, signed at Pyongyang June 18, 2024; 
(E) the Iranian-Russian Treaty on Com-
prehensive Strategic Partnership, signed at 
Moscow January 17, 2025; and 
(F) traditional relations of friendship and 
cooperation between the Islamic Republic of 
Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea. 
(4) The most concerning forms of such coopera-
tion with respect to the interests of the United 
States occur bilaterally in the realm of defense co-
operation. Examples include the following: 
(A) TRANSFER AND SHARING OF WEAPONS 
AND MUNITIONS.—Since 2022, the Islamic Re-
public of Iran has supplied the Russian Federa-
tion with drones and ballistic missiles, and the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has pro-
vided artillery ammunition and ballistic mis-
siles. Likewise, the Russian Federation has 
agreed to provide the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with Su–35 fighter jets and air defense assist-
ance. 
(B) TRANSFER
AND
SHARING
OF
DUAL- 
USE TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES.—Dual- 
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use goods supplied by the People’s Republic of 
China have enabled the Russian Federation to 
continue defense production in the face of wide- 
ranging sanctions and export controls intended 
to prevent the Russian Federation from access-
ing the necessary components to fuel its defense 
industry. In turn, reporting indicates that the 
Russian Federation has provided technical ex-
pertise on satellite technology to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea and is working 
closely with the People’s Republic of China on 
air defense and submarine technology. 
(C) JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EX-
ERCISES.—The military forces of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea are actively 
participating in the Russian Federation’s inva-
sion of Ukraine, and joint military exercises be-
tween the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation are expanding in scope, 
scale, and geographic reach, including in close 
proximity to territory of the United States. 
(D) 
COORDINATION.—Coordination 
on 
disinformation and cyber operations, including 
coordinated messaging aimed at denigrating 
and isolating the United States internationally. 
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(5) Adversaries of the United States are also 
cooperating in a manner that may circumvent 
United States and multilateral economic tools. Ex-
amples include the following: 
(A) The continued purchase by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China of oil from the Islamic 
Republic of Iran despite sanctions imposed by 
the Treasury of the United States on oil from 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
(B) The veto by the Russian Federation 
of, and abstention by the People’s Republic of 
China in a vote on, a United Nations Security 
Council resolution relating to monitoring United 
Nations Security Council-levied sanctions on the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
(6) Adversaries of the United States are cooper-
ating multilaterally in international institutions such 
as the United Nations and through expanded multi-
lateral groupings, such as the Brazil-Russia-India- 
China-South Africa group (commonly known as 
‘‘BRICS’’), to isolate and erode the influence of the 
United States. 
(7) Such increased cooperation and alignment 
among the People’s Republic of China, the Russian 
Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the 
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to an un-
precedented extent, poses a significant threat to 
United States interests and national security. 
(8) Such increasing alignment— 
(A) allows each such adversary to mod-
ernize its military more quickly than previously 
anticipated; 
(B) enables unforeseen breakthroughs in 
capabilities through the sharing among such ad-
versaries of critical military technologies, which 
could erode the technological edge of the United 
States Armed Forces; 
(C) presents increasing challenges to strat-
egies of isolation or containment against such 
individual adversaries, since the People’s Re-
public of China, the Russian Federation, the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea now provide critical 
lifelines to each other; 
(D) threatens the effectiveness of United 
States economic tools, as such adversaries co-
operate to evade United States sanctions and 
export controls and seek to establish alternative 
payment mechanisms that do not require trans-
actions in United States dollars; and 
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(E) increases the chances of United States 
conflict or tensions with any one of such adver-
saries drawing in another, thereby posing a 
greater risk that the United States will have to 
contend with simultaneous threats from such 
adversaries in one or more theaters. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to disrupt or frustrate the most dangerous 
aspects of cooperation between and among the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea, including by using the 
threat of sanctions and export controls, bringing 
such cooperation to light, and sharing information 
with United States allies and partners who may— 
(A) share the concerns and objectives of 
the United States; and 
(B) have influence over such adversaries; 
(2) to constrain such grouping from expanding 
its footprint or capabilities across the world; and 
(3) to prepare for the increasing likelihood that 
the United States could face simultaneous challenges 
or conflict with multiple such adversaries in multiple 
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theaters, including by bolstering deterrence across 
all priority theaters. 
SEC. 4. TASK FORCES AND REPORTS. 
(a) TASK FORCES ON ADVERSARY ALIGNMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall 
each— 
(A) establish a task force on adversary 
alignment; and 
(B) designate a point of contact on adver-
sary alignment, who shall serve as the head of 
the task force for the applicable department, of-
fice, or agency. 
(2) REQUIREMENTS.—Each task force estab-
lished pursuant to paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) comprise— 
(i) subject matter experts covering 
each of— 
(I) the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(II) the Russian Federation; 
(III) the Islamic Republic of 
Iran; and 
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(IV) the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea; 
(ii) representatives covering all core 
functions of the department, office, or 
agency of the Secretary or Director estab-
lishing the task force; and 
(iii) a mix of analysts, operators, and 
senior management; 
(B) ensure that the task force members 
have the requisite security clearances and ac-
cess to critical compartmented information 
streams necessary to assess and understand the 
full scope of adversary cooperation, including 
how events in one theater might trigger actions 
in another; and 
(C) not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, submit to the Sec-
retary or Director who established the task 
force, and to the appropriate committees of 
Congress, a report— 
(i) evaluating the impact of adversary 
alignment on the relevant operations car-
ried out by the individual department, of-
fice, or agency of the task force; and 
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(ii) putting forth recommendations for 
such organizational changes as the task 
force considers necessary to ensure the de-
partment, office, or agency of the task 
force is well positioned to routinely evalu-
ate and respond to the rapidly evolving na-
ture of adversary cooperation and the at-
tendant risks. 
(3) QUARTERLY INTERAGENCY MEETING.—Not 
less frequently than quarterly, the heads of the task 
forces established under this section shall meet to 
discuss findings, problems, and next steps with re-
spect to adversary alignment. 
(b) REPORT ON NATURE, TRAJECTORY, AND RISKS 
OF BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN, AND MULTILAT-
ERAL
COOPERATION
AMONG, ADVERSARIES
OF
THE 
UNITED STATES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of National Intelligence, in coordination with the 
head of any Federal agency the Director considers 
appropriate, shall submit to the President, any Fed-
eral officer of Cabinet-level rank the Director con-
siders appropriate, and the appropriate committees 
of Congress, a report on bilateral and multilateral 
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cooperation among adversaries of the United States 
and the resulting risks of such cooperation. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the current nature 
and extent of bilateral or multilateral coopera-
tion among the People’s Republic of China, the 
Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea across the diplomatic, information, mili-
tary, and economic spheres, and an assessment 
of the advantages that accrue to each adversary 
from such cooperation. 
(B) An assessment of the trajectory for co-
operation among the adversaries described in 
subparagraph (A) during the 5-year period be-
ginning on the date on which the report is sub-
mitted. 
(C) An outline of the risks to the United 
States and allied diplomatic, military, intel-
ligence, and economic operations, and broader 
security interests around the world, including 
the following: 
(i) The risk of technology transfers 
dramatically increasing the military capa-
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bilities of adversaries of the United States 
and the impact on the relative balance of 
United States and allied capabilities as 
compared to that of the adversary. 
(ii) The risk posed to the United 
States by efforts made by adversaries to 
establish alternate payment systems, in 
particular with respect to the dominance of 
the United States dollar and the effective-
ness of United States sanctions and export 
control tools. 
(iii) The risk that an adversary of the 
United States might assist or otherwise en-
able another adversary of the United 
States in the event that one or more adver-
saries become party to a conflict with the 
United States. 
(iv) The risk that adversary coopera-
tion poses a growing threat to United 
States intelligence collection efforts. 
(D) An evaluation of the vulnerabilities 
and tension points within such adversary bilat-
eral or multilateral relationships, and an assess-
ment of the likely effect of efforts by the United 
States to separate adversaries. 
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(3) USE OF OTHER REPORTING.—The report 
required by paragraph (1) may be completed using 
reports submitted by the Director of National Intel-
ligence to satisfy other statutory requirements. 
(4) FORM.—The report submitted required by 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form. 
(c) REPORT ON STRATEGIC APPROACH.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report outlining the stra-
tegic approach of the United States to adversary 
alignment and the necessary steps to disrupt, frus-
trate, constrain, and prepare for adversary coopera-
tion during the two-year period beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A detailed description of the methods 
and tools available to the United States to dis-
rupt the most dangerous elements of adversary 
cooperation, including the growing connectivity 
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between the defense industrial bases of each ad-
versary. 
(B) A timeline for using diplomatic en-
gagement, intelligence diplomacy, security co-
operation, and foreign assistance, as appro-
priate— 
(i) to educate allies and partners 
about the increasing risk of adversary 
alignment; 
(ii) to secure the support of allies and 
partners in combating adversary align-
ment; and 
(iii) to assess and help address, as ap-
propriate, the vulnerabilities and capability 
gaps of allies and partners to counter 
threats from adversary alignment. 
(C) A plan for ensuring the integrity of 
United States methods of economic statecraft, 
including an assessment of the efficiency of the 
United States sanctions and export control en-
forcement apparatus and any accompanying 
resourcing requirements. 
(D) A clear plan to bolster deterrence 
within the priority theaters of the Indo-Pacific 
region, Europe, and the Middle East by— 
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(i) increasing United States and allied 
munitions stockpiles, particularly such 
stockpiles that are most critical for sup-
porting frontline partners such as Israel, 
Taiwan, and Ukraine in the event of ag-
gression by a United States adversary; 
(ii) facilitating collaborative efforts 
with allies for the co-production, co-main-
tenance, and co-sustainment of critical mu-
nitions and platforms required by the 
United States and allies and partners of 
the United States in the event of a future 
conflict with the People’s Republic of 
China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, or the Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea; and 
(iii) more effectively using funding 
through the United States Foreign Mili-
tary Financing program to support allied 
and partner domestic defense production 
that can contribute to deterrence in each 
such priority theater. 
(E) A plan for digitizing and updating 
war-planning tools of the Department of De-
fense not later than 1 year after the date on 
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which the report is submitted to ensure that 
United States war planners are better equipped 
to update and modify war plans in the face of 
rapidly evolving information on adversary co-
operation. 
(F) An assessment of the capability gaps 
and vulnerabilities the United States would face 
in deterring an adversary in the event that the 
United States is engaged in a conflict with an-
other adversary, and a plan to work with allies 
and partners to address such gaps and 
vulnerabilities. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in classified form. 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropria-
tions, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
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mittee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appro-
priations, the Committee on Financial Services, and 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
House of Representatives. 
Æ 
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