H. R. 4310—52 
(4) Contributions in the form of providing support, 
including security, for missile defense facilities in the territory 
of the member state. 
(5) Any other contributions being planned by members 
of NATO, including the modification of existing military sys-
tems to contribute to the missile defense capability of NATO. 
(6) A discussion of whether there are other opportunities 
for future contributions, financial and otherwise, to missile 
defense by members of NATO. 
(7) Any other matters the Secretary determines appro-
priate. 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 231. REPORT ON TEST PLAN FOR THE GROUND-BASED MID-
COURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report on the testing 
program for the ground-based midcourse defense element of the 
ballistic missile defense system. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following: 
(1) An explanation of testing options for the ground-based 
midcourse defense system if planned flight tests CTV–01 and 
FTG–06b do not demonstrate the successful correction to the 
problem that caused the failure of the capability enhancement– 
2 kill vehicle in flight test FTG–06a in December 2010, 
including additional testing of the capability enhancement– 
1 kill vehicle. 
(2) An assessment of the feasibility, advisability, and cost 
effectiveness (including the potential benefits, risks, and impact 
on the current test plan and integrated master test plan for 
the ground-based midcourse defense system) of adjusting the 
test plan of the ground-based midcourse defense system to 
accomplish, at an acceptable level of risk— 
(A) accelerating to fiscal year 2014 the date for testing 
such system using a capability enhancement–1 kill vehicle 
against an intercontinental ballistic missile-range target; 
and 
(B) increasing the pace of the flight testing of such 
system to a rate of three tests every two years. 
(3) If the Secretary determines that either option described 
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) would be feasible, 
advisable, and cost effective, a discussion of whether increased 
funding beyond the funding requested in the budget for fiscal 
year 2013 is required to carry out such options and, if so, 
what level of increased funding would be necessary to carry 
out each such option. 
(4) Any additional matters the Secretary determines appro-
priate. 
(c) DOT&E VIEWS.—The Secretary shall include an appendix 
to the report under subsection (a) that contains the views of the 
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation regarding the contents 
of the report.
H. R. 4310—53 
(d) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(e) COMPTROLLER GENERAL VIEWS.—The Comptroller General 
of the United States shall— 
(1) brief the congressional defense committees concerning 
the views of the Comptroller General on the report required 
under subsection (a) by not later than 60 days after the date 
on which the Secretary submits such report; and 
(2) submit to such committees a written report on such 
views as soon as practicable after the date of the briefing 
under paragraph (1). 
SEC. 232. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In a December 18, 2010, letter to the Senate leadership, 
President Obama wrote that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) ‘‘invited the Russian Federation to 
cooperate on missile defense, which could lead to adding Rus-
sian capabilities to those deployed by NATO to enhance our 
common security against common threats. The Lisbon Summit 
thus demonstrated that the Alliance’s missile defenses can be 
strengthened by improving NATO-Russian relations. This 
comes even as we have made it clear that the system we 
intend to pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and 
it will not in any way limit United States’ or NATO’s missile 
defense capabilities.’’. 
(2) In a February 2, 2011, message to the Senate concerning 
its December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to 
Ratification of the New START Treaty, President Obama cer-
tified that ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to continue 
development and deployment of United States missile defense 
systems to defend against missile threats from nations such 
as North Korea and Iran, including qualitative and quantitative 
improvements to such systems. As stated in the Resolution, 
such systems include all phases of the Phased Adaptive 
Approach to missile defense in Europe, the modernization of 
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, and the continued 
development of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor as a 
technological and strategic hedge.’’. 
(3) In a letter dated December 13, 2011, to Senator Mark 
Kirk, Robert Nabors, Assistant to the President and Director 
of the Office of Legislative Affairs, wrote that ‘‘The United 
States remains committed to implementing the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and will not 
agree to any constraints limiting the development or deploy-
ment of United States missile defenses’’ and ‘‘[w]e will not 
provide Russia with sensitive information about our missile 
defense systems that would in any way compromise our national 
security. For example, hit-to-kill technology and interceptor 
telemetry will under no circumstances be provided to Russia.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) pursuant to section 2 of the National Missile Defense 
Act of 1999 (Public Law 106–38; 113 Stat. 205; 10 U.S.C. 
2431 note), it is the policy of the United States ‘‘to deploy 
as soon as is technologically possible an effective National 
Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of
H. R. 4310—54 
the United States against limited ballistic missile attack 
(whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate)...’’; 
(2) defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for new 
deterrent strategies and for new strategies should deterrence 
fail; 
(3) further limitations on the missile defense capabilities 
of the United States are not in the national security interest 
of the United States; 
(4) the New Start Treaty and the April 7, 2010, unilateral 
statement of the Russian Federation on missile defense do 
not limit in any way, and shall not be interpreted as limiting, 
activities that the Federal Government of the United States 
currently plans or that might be required over the duration 
of the New START Treaty to protect the United States pursuant 
to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, or to protect 
the Armed Forces of the United States and allies of the United 
States from limited ballistic missile attack, including further 
planned enhancements to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
system and all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to 
missile defense in Europe; 
(5) it was the Understanding of the Senate in its December 
22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification 
of the New START Treaty that, ‘‘any additional New START 
Treaty limitations on the deployment of missile defenses beyond 
those contained in paragraph 3 of Article V, including any 
limitations agreed under the auspices of the Bilateral Consult-
ative Commission, would require an amendment to the New 
START Treaty which may enter into force for the United States 
only with the advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth 
in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the 
United States’’; and 
(6) section 303(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)) requires that ‘‘no action shall be taken 
pursuant to this or any other Act that would obligate the 
United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or 
armaments of the United States in a militarily significant 
manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the 
President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
Constitution.’’. 
(c) NEW START TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘New START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the United States 
of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed on 
April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011. 
SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS 
OF THE HOMELAND DEFENSE HEDGING POLICY AND 
STRATEGY REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. 
It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) the homeland defense hedging policy and strategy report 
required by section 233 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81; 125 Stat. 1340) 
is necessary to inform Congress on options to protect the United 
States homeland against the evolving ballistic missile threat, 
including potential options prior to the deployment of Phase 
4 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense; 
and
H. R. 4310—55 
(2) the Secretary of Defense should comply with the require-
ments of such section 233 by submitting the homeland defense 
hedging policy and strategy report to Congress. 
Subtitle D—Reports 
SEC. 241. MISSION PACKAGES FOR THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 2013, the 
Secretary of the Navy shall, in consultation with the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation, submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the mine countermeasures warfare, 
antisubmarine warfare, and surface warfare mission packages for 
the Littoral Combat Ship. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
set forth the following: 
(1) A plan for the mission packages demonstrating that 
preliminary design review for every capability increment pre-
cedes Milestone B or equivalent approval for that increment. 
(2) A plan for demonstrating that the capability increment 
for each mission package, combined with a Littoral Combat 
Ship, on the basis of a preliminary design review and post- 
preliminary design review assessment, will achieve the capa-
bility specified for that increment. 
(3) A plan for demonstrating the survivability and lethality 
of the Littoral Combat Ship with its mission packages suffi-
ciently early in the development phase of the system to mini-
mize costs of concurrency. 
SEC. 242. STUDY ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES OF THE 
MARINE CORPS. 
(a) STUDY.—The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall con-
duct a study on the future capabilities of the Marine Corps with 
respect to electronic warfare. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Commandant shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report on the study 
conducted under subsection (a). 
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report under paragraph (1) 
shall include the following: 
(A) A detailed plan for the disposition of EA–6B 
Prowler aircraft squadrons. 
(B) A solution for the replacement of the capability 
provided by such aircraft. 
(C) Concepts of operation for future air-ground task 
force electronic warfare capabilities of the Marine Corps. 
(D) Any other issues that the Commandant determines 
appropriate. 
SEC. 243. CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT ON AMPHIBIOUS 
ASSAULT VEHICLES FOR THE MARINE CORPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—If the ongoing Marine Corps ground combat 
vehicle fleet mix study recommends the acquisition of a separate 
Marine Personnel Carrier, the Secretary of the Navy and the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps shall jointly submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report that includes the following: