H. R. 7776—1088 
not been fulfilled with respect to an international agreement 
or qualifying non-binding instrument (as such terms are defined 
in such section) to report such instances to the Secretary. 
(5) RULES
AND
REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, 
through the Secretary of State, shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out section 112b 
of title 1, United States Code, as amended by paragraph (1). 
(6) CONSULTATION AND BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.— 
(A) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State shall con-
sult with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives on matters related to the implementation 
of this section and the amendments made by this section 
before and after the effective date described in subsection 
(c). 
(B) BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and once every 90 days 
thereafter for 1 year, the Secretary shall brief the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
regarding the status of efforts to implement this section 
and the amendments made by this section. 
(7) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is author-
ized to be appropriated to the Department of State $1,000,000 
for each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2027 for purposes 
of implementing the requirements of section 112b of title 1, 
United States Code, as amended by paragraph (1). 
(b) SECTION 112A OF TITLE 1, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 
112a of title 1, United States Code, is amended— 
(1) by striking subsections (b), (c), and (d); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following: 
‘‘(b) Copies of international agreements and qualifying non- 
binding instruments in the possession of the Department of State, 
but not published, other than the agreements described in section 
112b(b)(3)(A), shall be made available by the Department of State 
upon request.’’. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS.—The amendments made 
by this section shall take effect on the date that is 270 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 5948. UKRAINE INVASION WAR CRIMES DETERRENCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘Ukraine 
Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and Accountability Act’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) in its premeditated, unprovoked, unjustified, and unlaw-
ful full-scale invasion of Ukraine that commenced on February 
24, 2022, the military of the Government of the Russian Federa-
tion under the direction of President Vladimir Putin has com-
mitted war crimes that include but are not limited to— 
(A) the deliberate targeting of civilians and injuring 
or killing of noncombatants;
H. R. 7776—1089 
(B) the deliberate targeting and attacking of hospitals, 
schools, and other non-military buildings dedicated to reli-
gion, art, science, or charitable purposes, such as the 
bombing of a theater in Mariupol that served as a shelter 
for noncombatants and had the word ‘‘children’’ written 
clearly in the Russian language outside; 
(C) the indiscriminate bombardment of undefended 
dwellings and buildings; 
(D) the wanton destruction of property not justified 
by military necessity; 
(E) unlawful civilian deportations; 
(F) the taking of hostages; and 
(G) rape, or sexual assault or abuse; 
(2) the use of chemical weapons by the Government of 
the Russian Federation in Ukraine would constitute a war 
crime, and engaging in any military preparations to use chem-
ical weapons or to develop, produce, stockpile, or retain chem-
ical weapons is prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion, to which the Russian Federation is a signatory; 
(3) Vladimir Putin has a long record of committing acts 
of aggression, systematic abuses of human rights, and acts 
that constitute war crimes or other atrocities both at home 
and abroad, and the brutality and scale of these actions, 
including in the Russian Federation republic of Chechnya, 
Georgia, Syria, and Ukraine, demonstrate the extent to which 
his regime is willing to flout international norms and values 
in the pursuit of its objectives; 
(4) Vladimir Putin has previously sanctioned the use of 
chemical weapons at home and abroad, including in the 
poisonings of Russian spy turned double agent Sergei Skripal 
and his daughter Yulia and leading Russian opposition figure 
Aleksey Navalny, and aided and abetted the use of chemical 
weapons by President Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and 
(5) in 2014, the Government of the Russian Federation 
initiated its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine 
which resulted in its illegal occupation of Crimea, the unrecog-
nized declaration of independence by the so-called ‘‘Donetsk 
People’s Republic’’ and ‘‘Luhansk People’s Republic’’ by Russia- 
backed proxies, and numerous human rights violations and 
deaths of civilians in Ukraine. 
(c) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United 
States— 
(1) to collect, analyze, and preserve evidence and informa-
tion related to war crimes and other atrocities committed during 
the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that began on Feb-
ruary 24, 2022, for use in appropriate domestic, foreign, and 
international courts and tribunals prosecuting those responsible 
for such crimes consistent with applicable law, including with 
the American Service Members’ Protection Act of 2002 (22 
U.S.C. 7421 et seq.); 
(2) to help deter the commission of war crimes and other 
atrocities in Ukraine by publicizing to the maximum possible 
extent, including among Russian and other foreign military 
commanders and troops in Ukraine, efforts to identify and 
prosecute those responsible for the commission of war crimes 
during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine that began 
on February 24, 2022; and
H. R. 7776—1090 
(3) to continue efforts to identify, deter, and pursue account-
ability for war crimes and other atrocities committed around 
the world and by other perpetrators, and to leverage inter-
national cooperation and best practices in this regard with 
respect to the current situation in Ukraine. 
(d) REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS.—Not later than 90 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report, which may include a classified annex, describing in detail 
the following: 
(1) United States Government efforts to collect, analyze, 
and preserve evidence and information related to war crimes 
and other atrocities committed during the full-scale Russian 
invasion of Ukraine since February 24, 2022, including a 
description of— 
(A) the respective roles of various agencies, depart-
ments, and offices, and the interagency mechanism estab-
lished for the coordination of such efforts; 
(B) the types of information and evidence that are 
being collected, analyzed, and preserved to help identify 
those responsible for the commission of war crimes or other 
atrocities during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine 
in 2022; and 
(C) steps taken to coordinate with, and support the 
work of, allies, partners, international institutions and 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in such 
efforts. 
(2) Media, public diplomacy, and information operations 
to make Russian military commanders, troops, political leaders 
and the Russian people aware of efforts to identify and pros-
ecute those responsible for the commission of war crimes or 
other atrocities during the full-scale Russian invasion of 
Ukraine in 2022, and of the types of acts that may be prosecut-
able. 
(3) The process for a domestic, foreign, or international 
court or tribunal to request and obtain from the United States 
Government information related to war crimes or other atroc-
ities committed during the full-scale Russian invasion of 
Ukraine in 2022. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Armed Services, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
(2) ATROCITIES.—The term ‘‘atrocities’’ has the meaning 
given that term in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide 
and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 
22 U.S.C. 2656 note). 
(3) WAR CRIME.—The term ‘‘war crime’’ has the meaning 
given that term in section 2441(c) of title 18, United States 
Code.
H. R. 7776—1091 
SEC. 5949. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS 
AND SERVICES. 
(a) PROHIBITION ON USE OR PROCUREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of an executive agency may 
not— 
(A) procure or obtain, or extend or renew a contract 
to procure or obtain, any electronic parts, products, or 
services that include covered semiconductor products or 
services; or 
(B) enter into a contract (or extend or renew a contract) 
with an entity to procure or obtain electronic parts or 
products that use any electronic parts or products that 
include covered semiconductor products or services. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in paragraph (1) shall be 
construed— 
(i) to require any covered semiconductor products 
or services resident in equipment, systems, or services 
as of the day before the applicable effective date speci-
fied in subsection (c) to be removed or replaced; 
(ii) to prohibit or limit the utilization of such cov-
ered semiconductor products or services throughout 
the lifecycle of such existing equipment; 
(iii) to require the recipient of a Federal contract, 
grant, loan, or loan guarantee to replace covered semi-
conductor products or services resident in equipment, 
systems, or services before the effective date specified 
in subsection (c); or 
(iv) to require the Federal Communications 
Commission to designate covered semiconductor prod-
ucts or services to its Covered Communications Equip-
ment or Services List maintained under section 2 of 
the Secured and Trusted Communications Networks 
Act of 2019 (47 U.S.C. 1603). 
(B) CONTRACTING PROHIBITION.—Nothing in paragraph 
(1)(B) shall be construed to cover products or services that 
include covered semiconductor products or services in a 
system that is not a critical system. 
(b) WAIVER AUTHORITY.— 
(1) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—The Secretary of Defense may 
provide a waiver on a date later than the effective date 
described in subsection (c) if the Secretary determines the 
waiver is in the critical national security interests of the United 
States. 
(2) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—The Director 
of National Intelligence may provide a waiver on a date later 
than the effective date described in subsection (c) if the Director 
determines the waiver is in the critical national security 
interests of the United States. 
(3) SECRETARY OF COMMERCE.—The Secretary of Commerce, 
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or 
the Secretary of Defense, may provide a waiver on a date 
later than the effective date described in subsection (c) if the 
Secretary determines the waiver is in the critical national 
security interests of the United States. 
(4) SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY.—The Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of
H. R. 7776—1092 
National Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense, may provide 
a waiver on a date later than the effective date described 
in subsection (c) if the Secretary determines the waiver is 
in the critical national security interests of the United States. 
(5) SECRETARY OF ENERGY.—The Secretary of Energy, in 
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence or the 
Secretary of Defense, may provide a waiver on a date later 
than the effective date described in subsection (c) if the Sec-
retary determines the waiver is in the critical national security 
interests of the United States. 
(6) EXECUTIVE AGENCIES.—The head of an executive agency 
may waive, for a renewable period of not more than two years 
per waiver, the prohibitions under subsection (a) if— 
(A) the head of the agency, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Commerce, determines that no compliant 
product or service is available to be procured as, and when, 
needed at United States market prices or a price that 
is not considered prohibitively expensive; and 
(B) the head of the agency, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intel-
ligence, determines that such waiver could not reasonably 
be expected to compromise the critical national security 
interests of the United States. 
(7) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days after 
granting a waiver under this subsection, the head of the execu-
tive agency granting such waiver shall submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress and leadership a report with 
a notification of such waiver, including a justification for the 
waiver. 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATES AND REGULATIONS.— 
(1) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The prohibitions under subsection 
(a) shall take effect five years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
(2) REGULATIONS.—Not later than three years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition 
Regulatory Council shall prescribe regulations implementing 
the prohibitions under subsection (a), including a requirement 
for prime contractors to incorporate the substance of such 
prohibitions and applicable implementing contract clauses into 
contracts for the supply of electronic parts or products. 
(d) OFFICE
OF
MANAGEMENT
AND
BUDGET
REPORT
AND 
BRIEFING.—Not later than 270 days after the effective date 
described in subsection (c)(1), the Director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, in coordination with the Director of National 
Intelligence and the National Cyber Director, shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress and leadership a report and 
briefing on— 
(1) the implementation of the prohibitions under subsection 
(a), including any challenges in the implementation; and 
(2) the effectiveness and utility of the waiver authority 
under subsection (b). 
(e) ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT, AND STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, and the Secretary of Energy and, to the greatest extent
H. R. 7776—1093 
practicable, leveraging relevant previous analyses and assessments, 
shall— 
(1) conduct an analysis of semiconductor design and produc-
tion capacity domestically and by allied or partner countries 
required to meet the needs of the Federal Government, 
including analyses regarding— 
(A) semiconductors critical to national security, as 
determined by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, in accordance with section 9902(a)(6)(A)(i) of 
the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116– 
283); and 
(B) semiconductors classified as legacy semiconductors 
pursuant to section 9902(a)(6)(A)(i) of William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283); 
(2) assess the risk posed by the presence of covered semi-
conductor products or services in Federal systems; 
(3) assess the risk posed by the presence of covered semi-
conductor products or services in the supply chains of Federal 
contractors and subcontractors, including for non-Federal sys-
tems; 
(4) develop a strategy to— 
(A) improve the availability of domestic semiconductor 
design and production capacity required to meet the 
requirements of the Federal Government; 
(B) support semiconductor product and service sup-
pliers seeking to contract with domestic, allied, or partner 
semiconductor producers and to improve supply chain 
traceability, including to meet the prohibitions under sub-
section (a); and 
(C) either certify the feasibility of implementing such 
prohibitions or exercising waiver authorities under sub-
section (b), to ensure uninterrupted Federal Government 
access to required semiconductor products and services; 
and 
(5) provide the results of the analysis, assessment, and 
strategy developed under paragraphs (1) through (4) to the 
Federal Acquisition Security Council. 
(f) GOVERNMENTWIDE TRACEABILITY AND DIVERSIFICATION INI-
TIATIVE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than two years after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the 
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and 
in consultation with industry, shall establish a microelectronics 
traceability and diversification initiative to coordinate analysis 
of and response to the Federal Government microelectronics 
supply chain vulnerabilities. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The initiative established under paragraph 
(1) shall include the following elements: 
(A) Sharing best practices, refining microelectronics 
standards, such as those established pursuant to section 
224 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
H. R. 7776—1094 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), and developing rec-
ommendations to identify and mitigate, through diversifica-
tion efforts, microelectronics supply chain concerns. 
(B) Developing an assessment framework to inform 
Federal decisions on sourcing microelectronics, consid-
ering— 
(i) chain of custody and traceability, including 
origin and location of design, manufacturing, distribu-
tion, shipping, and quantities; 
(ii) 
confidentiality, 
including 
protection, 
verification, and validation of intellectual property 
included in microelectronics; 
(iii) integrity, including— 
(I) security weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
that include potential supply chain attacks; 
(II) risk analysis and consequence to system; 
(III) risk of intentional or unintentional modi-
fication or tampering; and 
(IV) risk of insider threats, including integrity 
of people and processes involved in the design 
and manufacturing of microelectronics; and 
(iv) availability, including— 
(I) 
potential 
supply 
chain 
disruptions, 
including due to natural disasters or geopolitical 
events; 
(II) prioritization of parts designed and manu-
factured in the United States and in allied or 
partner countries to support and sustain the 
defense and technology industrial base; 
(III) risk associated with sourcing parts from 
suppliers outside of the United States and allied 
and partner countries, including long-term impacts 
on availability of microelectronics produced domes-
tically or in allied or partner countries; and 
(IV) obsolescence management and counterfeit 
avoidance and detection. 
(C) 
Developing 
a 
process 
for 
provenance 
and 
traceability from design to disposal of microelectronics 
components and intellectual property contained therein 
implementable across the Federal acquisition system to 
improve reporting, data analysis, and tracking. 
(D) Developing and implementing policies and plans 
to support the following: 
(i) Development of domestic design and manufac-
turing capabilities to replace covered semiconductor 
products or services. 
(ii) Utilization of the assessment framework devel-
oped under subparagraph (B). 
(iii) Implementation of the strategy required under 
subsection (e)(4) as applicable. 
(iv) Identification of and integration with existing 
information reporting and data visualization systems 
in the Federal Government, including modification to 
such systems to track the information. 
(v) A requirement to document microelectronics 
used in systems and subsystems, including origin and
H. R. 7776—1095 
location of design and manufacturing, technologies 
used, and quantities procured. 
(vi) Elimination from Federal Government supply 
chains of microelectronics from entities included on 
the Consolidated Screening List maintained by the 
International Trade Administration of the Department 
of Commerce. 
(3) COORDINATION
REQUIRED.—In carrying out this sub-
section, the Secretary of Commerce shall coordinate, as nec-
essary, with the following entities: 
(A) The National Science and Technology Council Sub-
committee on Microelectronics Leadership. 
(B) The Department of Commerce semiconductor indus-
trial advisory committee established under subsection 
9906(b) of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public 
Law 116–283). 
(C) 
The 
White 
House 
Coordinator 
for 
CHIPS 
Implementation. 
(D) The Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC). 
(E) The Government-Industry Working Group on 
Microelectronics. 
(F) The Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel 
(JDMTP). 
(G) Standards development organizations. 
(g) FEDERAL ACQUISITION SECURITY COUNCIL.—Not later than 
two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal 
Acquisition Security Council, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary 
of Energy, and after engagement with the private sector and other 
nongovernmental stakeholders in accordance with section 1323 of 
title 41, United States Code, shall— 
(1) issue recommendations to mitigate supply chain risks 
relevant to Federal Government acquisition of semiconductor 
products and services, considering— 
(A) the analysis, assessment, and strategy developed 
under subsection (e) and any related updates; 
(B) the standards provided under section 224 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(Public Law 116–92), including any tiers of trust, levels 
of security, or risk-based approaches established under 
such section; 
(C) the extent to which such recommendations would 
enhance the security of critical systems; 
(D) the extent to which such recommendations would 
impact Federal access to commercial technologies; and 
(E) any risks to the Federal Government from con-
tracting with microelectronics suppliers that include cov-
ered semiconductor products or services in non-Federal 
supply chains; and 
(2) make recommendations to the Federal Acquisition Regu-
latory Council and the heads of executive agencies for any 
needed regulations to mitigate supply chain risks. 
(h) APPLICABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF COVERED ENTITIES 
AND CONTRACTORS.—The regulations prescribed pursuant to sub-
section (c)(2) shall—
H. R. 7776—1096 
(1) provide that contractors who supply a Federal agency 
with electronic parts or products are responsible for— 
(A) certifying to the non-use of covered semiconductor 
products or services in such parts or products; 
(B) detecting and avoiding the use or inclusion of such 
covered semiconductor products or services in such parts 
or products; and 
(C) any rework or corrective action that may be 
required to remedy the use or inclusion of such covered 
semiconductor products or services in such parts or prod-
ucts; 
(2) require covered entities to disclose to direct customers 
the inclusion of a covered semiconductor product or service 
in electronic parts, products, or services included in electronic 
parts, products, or services subject to the contracting prohibition 
under subsection (a) as to whether such supplied parts, prod-
ucts, or services include covered semiconductors products or 
services; 
(3) provide that a covered entity that fails to disclose the 
inclusion to direct customers of a covered semiconductor product 
or service in electronic parts, products, or services procured 
or obtained by an executive agency in contravention of sub-
section (a) shall be responsible for any rework or corrective 
action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion 
of such covered semiconductor product or service; 
(4) provide that the costs of covered semiconductor products 
or services, suspect semiconductor products, and any rework 
or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use 
or inclusion of such products are not allowable costs for Federal 
contracts; 
(5) provide that— 
(A) any covered entity or Federal contractor or subcon-
tractor who becomes aware, or has reason to suspect, that 
any end item, component, or part of a critical system pur-
chased by the Federal Government, or purchased by a 
Federal contractor or subcontractor for delivery to the Fed-
eral Government for any critical system, that contains cov-
ered semiconductor products or services shall notify appro-
priate Federal authorities in writing within 60 days; and 
(B) the Federal authorities shall report such informa-
tion to the appropriate committees of Congress and leader-
ship within 120 days; 
(6) provide that Federal bidders and contractors— 
(A) may reasonably rely on the certifications of compli-
ance from covered entities and subcontractors who supply 
electronic parts, products, or services when providing pro-
posals to the Federal Government; and 
(B) are not required to conduct independent third party 
audits or other formal reviews related to such certifications; 
(7) provide that a Federal contractor or subcontractor that 
provides a notification under paragraph (5) that does not regard 
electronic parts or products manufactured or assembled by 
such Federal contractor or subcontractor shall not be subject 
to civil liability nor determined to not be a presently responsible 
contractor on the basis of such notification; and
H. R. 7776—1097 
(8) provide that a Federal contractor or subcontractor that 
provides a notification under paragraph (5) that regards elec-
tronic parts or products manufactured or assembled by such 
Federal contractor or subcontractor shall not be subject to 
civil liability nor determined to not be a presently responsible 
contractor on the basis of such notification if the Federal con-
tractor or subcontractor makes a comprehensive and document-
able effort to identify and remove covered semiconductor prod-
ucts or services from the Federal supply. 
(i) REPORTS.— 
(1) SECRETARY
OF
COMMERCE.—Not later than 60 days 
after completing the assessment required under subsection (e), 
the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress and leadership— 
(A) a report of the findings and recommendations of 
the analyses, assessment, and strategy developed under 
such subsection; and 
(B) a report on development of the microelectronics 
traceability and diversification initiative under subsection 
(f)(1). 
(2) FEDERAL
ACQUISITION
SECURITY
COUNCIL.—Not later 
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and annually thereafter for ten years, the Federal Acquisition 
Security Council shall include in the annual report submitted 
under section 1325 of title 41, United States Code, a description 
of— 
(A) the development of recommendations under sub-
section (g), including the considerations described in para-
graph (1) of such subsection; and 
(B) as applicable, the impact of any recommendations 
or regulations implemented. 
(j) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS AND LEADER-
SHIP.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress and 
leadership’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Science, 
Space, and Technology, the Committee on Oversight and 
Reform, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
on Homeland Security, the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, and the Speaker, the majority leader, and 
the minority leader of the of the House of Representatives. 
(2) COVERED
ENTITY.—The term ‘‘covered entity’’ means 
an entity that— 
(A) develops, domestically or abroad, a design of a 
semiconductor that is the direct product of United States 
origin technology or software; and 
(B) purchases covered semiconductor products or serv-
ices from an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (C) 
of paragraph (3).
H. R. 7776—1098 
(3) COVERED SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCT OR SERVICES.—The 
term ‘‘covered semiconductor product or services’’ means any 
of the following: 
(A) A semiconductor, a semiconductor product, a 
product that incorporates a semiconductor product, or a 
service that utilizes such a product, that is designed, pro-
duced or provided by, Semiconductor Manufacturing Inter-
national Corporation (SMIC) (or any subsidiary, affiliate, 
or successor of such entity). 
(B) A semiconductor, a semiconductor product, a 
product that incorporates a semiconductor product, or a 
service that utilizes such a product, that is designed, pro-
duced, or provided by ChangXin Memory Technologies 
(CXMT) or Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp (YMTC) 
(or any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor of such entities). 
(C) A semiconductor, semiconductor product, or semi-
conductor service produced or provided by an entity that 
the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Commerce, 
in consultation with the Director of the National Intel-
ligence or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, determines to be an entity owned or controlled by, 
or otherwise connected to, the government of a foreign 
country of concern, provided that the determination with 
respect to such entity is published in the Federal Register. 
(4) CRITICAL SYSTEM.—The term ‘‘critical system’’— 
(A) has the meaning given the term ‘‘national security 
system’’ in section 11103(a)(1) of title 40, United States 
Code; 
(B) shall include additional systems identified by the 
Federal Acquisition Security Council; 
(C) shall include additional systems identified by the 
Department of Defense, consistent with guidance provided 
under section 224 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92); and 
(D) shall not include a system to be used for routine 
administrative and business applications (including payroll, 
finance, logistics, and personnel management applications). 
(5) FOREIGN
COUNTRY
OF
CONCERN.—The term ‘‘foreign 
country of concern’’ has the meaning given the term in para-
graph (7) of section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 
U.S.C. 4651), as added by section 103(a)(4) of the CHIPS Act 
of 2022 (division A of Public Law 117–167). 
(k) EXTENSION
OF FEDERAL ACQUISITION SECURITY SUPPLY 
CHAIN ACT OF 2018.— 
(1) SUBCHAPTER III OF CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 41, UNITED 
STATES CODE.—Section 1328 of title 41, United States Code, 
is amended by striking ‘‘the date that is 5 years after the 
date of the enactment of the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain 
Security Act of 2018’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2033’’. 
(2) SECTION 4713 OF TITLE 41, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 
4713(j) of title 41, United States Code, is amended by striking 
‘‘the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment 
of the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018’’ 
and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2033’’. 
(l) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FEDERAL ACQUISI-
TION SECURITY COUNCIL.—
H. R. 7776—1099 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated 
$3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2023 through 2033 for the 
Office of Management and Budget to support the activities 
of the Federal Acquisition Security Council. 
(2) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—The Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget may transfer funds authorized to 
be appropriated under paragraph (1) to other Federal agencies 
for the performance of work for which the funds were author-
ized. 
DIVISION F—INTELLIGENCE AUTHOR-
IZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 
SEC. 6001. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This division may be cited as the ‘‘Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this division 
is as follows: 
DIVISION F—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 
Sec. 6001. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 6002. Definitions. 
Sec. 6003. Explanatory statement. 
TITLE LXI—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
Sec. 6101. Authorization of appropriations. 
Sec. 6102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. 
Sec. 6103. Intelligence Community Management Account. 
Sec. 6104. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities. 
Sec. 6105. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. 
TITLE LXII—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND 
DISABILITY SYSTEM 
Sec. 6201. Authorization of appropriations. 
TITLE LXIII—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS 
Sec. 6301. Modification of requirements for certain employment activities by former 
intelligence officers and employees. 
Sec. 6302. Counterintelligence and national security protections for intelligence 
community grant funding. 
Sec. 6303. Extension of Central Intelligence Agency law enforcement jurisdiction to 
facilities of Office of Director of National Intelligence. 
Sec. 6304. Annual reports on status of recommendations of Comptroller General of 
the United States for the Director of National Intelligence. 
Sec. 6305. Timely submission of classified intelligence budget justification mate-
rials. 
Sec. 6306. Copyright protection for civilian faculty of the National Intelligence Uni-
versity. 
Sec. 6307. Modifications to Foreign Malign Influence Response Center. 
Sec. 6308. Requirement to offer cyber protection support for personnel of intel-
ligence community in positions highly vulnerable to cyber attack. 
Sec. 6309. Enforcement of cybersecurity requirements for national security sys-
tems. 
Sec. 6310. Review and briefing on intelligence community activities under Execu-
tive Order 12333. 
Sec. 6311. Assessing intelligence community open-source support for export con-
trols and foreign investment screening. 
Sec. 6312. Annual training requirement and report regarding analytic standards. 
Sec. 6313. Review of Joint Intelligence Community Council. 
Sec. 6314. Required policy for minimum insider threat standards. 
Sec. 6315. Unfunded priorities of the intelligence community. 
Sec. 6316. Submission of covered documents and classified annexes. 
Sec. 6317. Improvements to program on recruitment and training. 
Sec. 6318. Measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from proliferation and 
use of foreign commercial spyware.
H. R. 7776—1100 
Sec. 6319. Personnel vetting performance measures. 
Sec. 6320. Proactive cybersecurity. 
TITLE LXIV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
Subtitle A—Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
Sec. 6401. Modifications to responsibilities and authorities of Director of National 
Intelligence. 
Sec. 6402. Annual submission to Congress of National Intelligence Priorities 
Framework. 
Sec. 6403. Disposition of records of Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency 
Sec. 6411. Clarification regarding protection of Central Intelligence Agency func-
tions. 
Sec. 6412. Expansion of reporting requirements relating to authority to pay per-
sonnel of Central Intelligence Agency for certain injuries to the brain. 
Sec. 6413. Historical Advisory Panel of Central Intelligence Agency. 
Sec. 6414. Authority of Central Intelligence Agency to provide protection for certain 
personnel. 
Sec. 6415. Notification of use of certain expenditure authorities. 
Sec. 6416. Office supporting Central Intelligence Agency workforce wellbeing. 
Subtitle C—Elements of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise 
Sec. 6421. Inclusion of Space Force as element of intelligence community. 
Sec. 6422. Oversight of Defense Intelligence Agency culture. 
Subtitle D—Other Elements 
Sec. 6431. Modification of advisory board in National Reconnaissance Office. 
Sec. 6432. Establishment of advisory board for National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency. 
Sec. 6433. Elevation of the commercial and business operations office of the Na-
tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. 
Sec. 6435. Study on personnel under Strategic Intelligence Partnership Program. 
Sec. 6436. Briefing on coordination between intelligence community and Bureau of 
Industry and Security. 
TITLE LXV—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Subtitle A—Intelligence Matters Relating to the People’s Republic of China 
Sec. 6501. Report on wealth and corrupt activities of the leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
Sec. 6502. Identification and threat assessment of companies with investments by 
the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 6503. Intelligence community working group for monitoring the economic and 
technological capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 6504. Annual report on concentrated reeducation camps in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 6505. Assessments of production of semiconductors by the People’s Republic of 
China. 
Subtitle B—Miscellaneous Authorities, Requirements, and Limitations 
Sec. 6511. Notice of deployment or transfer of containerized missile systems by 
Russia, China, or Iran. 
Sec. 6512. Intelligence community coordinator for Russian atrocities accountability. 
Sec. 6513. Lead intelligence community coordinator for countering and neutralizing 
proliferation of Iran-origin unmanned aircraft systems. 
Sec. 6514. Collaboration between intelligence community and Department of Com-
merce to counter foreign commercial threats. 
Sec. 6515. Intelligence assessment on foreign weaponization of advertisement tech-
nology data. 
Sec. 6516. Intelligence community assessment regarding Russian gray zone assets. 
Subtitle C—Reports and Other Matters 
Sec. 6521. Report on assessing will to fight. 
Sec. 6522. Report on threat from hypersonic weapons. 
Sec. 6523. Report on ordnance of Russia and China. 
Sec. 6524. Report on activities of China and Russia targeting Latin America and 
the Caribbean.
H. R. 7776—1101 
Sec. 6525. Report on support provided by China to Russia. 
Sec. 6526. Report on global CCP financing of port infrastructure. 
Sec. 6527. Sense of Congress on provision of support by intelligence community for 
atrocity prevention and accountability. 
TITLE LXVI—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WORKFORCE MATTERS 
Sec. 6601. Improving onboarding of personnel in intelligence community. 
Sec. 6602. Report on legislative action required to implement Trusted Workforce 
2.0 initiative. 
Sec. 6603. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community assessment of adminis-
tration of polygraphs in intelligence community. 
Sec. 6604. Timeliness in the administration of polygraphs. 
Sec. 6605. Policy on submittal of applications for access to classified information for 
certain personnel. 
Sec. 6606. Technical correction regarding Federal policy on sharing of covered in-
sider threat information. 
Sec. 6607. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community report on use of space 
certified as sensitive compartmented information facilities. 
Sec. 6608. Improving prohibition of certain personnel practices in intelligence com-
munity with respect to contractor employees. 
Sec. 6609. Definitions regarding whistleblower complaints and information of ur-
gent concern received by inspectors general of the intelligence commu-
nity. 
TITLE LXVII—MATTERS RELATING TO EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Subtitle A—General Matters 
Sec. 6701. Definitions. 
Sec. 6702. Additional responsibilities of Director of National Intelligence for artifi-
cial intelligence policies, standards, and guidance for the intelligence 
community. 
Sec. 6703. Director of Science and Technology. 
Sec. 6704. Intelligence Community Chief Data Officer. 
Subtitle B—Improvements Relating to Procurement 
Sec. 6711. Additional transaction authority. 
Sec. 6712. Implementation plan and advisability study for offices of commercial in-
tegration. 
Sec. 6713. Pilot program on designated emerging technology transition projects. 
Sec. 6714. Harmonization of authorizations to operate. 
Sec. 6715. Plan to expand sensitive compartmented information facility access by 
certain contractors; reports on expansion of security clearances for cer-
tain contractors. 
Sec. 6716. Compliance by intelligence community with requirements of Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation relating to commercially available off-the-shelf 
items and commercial services. 
Sec. 6717. Policy on required user adoption metrics in certain contracts for artificial 
intelligence and emerging technology software products. 
Sec. 6718. Certification relating to information technology and software systems. 
Subtitle C—Reports 
Sec. 6721. Reports on integration of artificial intelligence within intelligence com-
munity. 
Sec. 6722. Report on potential benefits of establishment of ICWERX. 
Sec. 6723. Requirements and report on workforce needs of intelligence community 
relating to science, technology, engineering, and math, and related 
areas. 
Subtitle D—Talent, Education, and Training 
Sec. 6731. Report on establishment of technology acquisition cadre. 
Sec. 6732. Emerging technology education and training. 
Subtitle E—Other Matters 
Sec. 6741. Improvements to use of commercial software products. 
Sec. 6742. Code-free artificial intelligence enablement tools policy. 
TITLE LXVIII—OTHER MATTERS 
Sec. 6801. Improvements relating to continuity of Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board membership. 
Sec. 6802. Modification of requirement for office to address unidentified anomalous 
phenomena.