should not continue. The current approach violates 
practically every sound principle of police oversight 
and accountability applicable to narcotics interdic-
tion.’’ Most recently the Texas legislature passed a 
law that ends the ability of a narcotics task force to 
operate as an entity with no clear accountability. 
The legislation transfers authority for multicounty 
drug task forces to the Department of Public Safety 
and channels one-quarter of asset forfeiture proceeds 
received by the task forces to a special fund to sup-
port drug abuse prevention programs, drug treat-
ment and other programs designed to reduce drug 
use in the county where the assets are seized. 
(7) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law was passed 
thanks to a coalition of Christian conservatives and 
civil rights activists. As one Texas preacher related, 
requiring corroboration ‘‘puts a protective hedge 
around the ninth commandment, ‘You shall not bear 
false witness against your neighbor.’ As long as peo-
ple bear false witness against their neighbors, this 
Biblical law will not be outdated.’’ 
(8) During floor debate, conservative Texas leg-
islators pointed out that Mosaic law requires cor-
roboration: ‘‘One witness shall not rise up against a 
man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that
he sinneth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the 
mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be estab-
lished.’’ Deuteronomy 19:15. Jesus concurred with 
the corroboration rule: ‘‘If thy brother shall trespass 
against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee 
and him alone. . . . But if he will not hear thee, then 
take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth 
of two or three witnesses every word may be estab-
lished.’’ Matthew 18:15–16. 
(9) Texas’s ‘‘corroboration’’ law had an imme-
diate positive impact. Once prosecutors needed more 
than just the word of one person to convict someone 
of a drug offense they began scrutinizing law en-
forcement tactics. This new scrutiny led to the un-
covering of massive corruption and civil rights abuse 
by the Dallas police force. In what became known 
nationally as the ‘‘Sheetrock’’ scandal, Dallas police 
officers and undercover informants were found to 
have set up dozens of innocent people, mostly Mexi-
can immigrants, by planting fake drugs on them 
consisting of chalk-like material used in Sheetrock 
and other brands of wallboard. The revelations led 
to the dismissal of over 40 cases (although some of 
those arrested were already deported). In April 
2005, a former Dallas narcotics detective was sen-
tenced to 5 years in prison for his role in the 
scheme. Charges against others are pending. 
(10) Many regional antidrug task forces receive 
up to 75 percent of their funding from the Byrne 
grant program. As such, the United States Govern-
ment is accountable for corruption and civil rights 
abuses inherent in their operation. It is the sense of 
Congress that Byrne grants should be prohibited for 
States that do not exercise effective control over 
these task forces. At a bare minimum, no State that 
fails to prohibit criminal convictions based solely on 
the testimony of a law enforcement officer or in-
formants should receive a Byrne grant. Corrobora-
tive evidence (video or audio tape, drugs, and money, 
etc.) should always be required for such convictions 
to be sustained. 
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON RECEIPT OF BYRNE GRANT FUNDS 
AND OTHER DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE. 
(a) LIMITATION.—For any fiscal year, a State shall 
not receive any amount that would otherwise be allocated 
to that State under section 506 of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3756), 
or any amount from any other law enforcement assistance 
program of the Department of Justice, unless the State—
(1) does not fund any drug task forces for that 
fiscal year; or 
(2) has in effect throughout the State laws that 
ensure— 
(A) a person is not convicted of a drug of-
fense unless the fact that a drug offense was 
committed, and the fact that the person com-
mitted that offense, are each supported by evi-
dence other than the eyewitness testimony of a 
law enforcement officer or individuals acting on 
behalf of law enforcement officers; and 
(B) a law enforcement officer does not par-
ticipate in a drug task force unless the honesty 
and integrity of that officer is evaluated and 
found to be at an appropriately high level. 
(b) REGULATIONS.—The Attorney General shall pre-
scribe regulations to carry out subsection (a). 
(c) REALLOCATION.—Amounts not allocated by rea-
son of subsection (a) shall be reallocated to States not dis-
qualified by failure to comply with subsection (a). 
SEC. 4. COLLECTION OF DATA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—A State recipient of funds under 
section 3(a)(2) shall collect data, for the last year funds 
were allocated, as to the—
(1) racial distribution of charges made during 
that year; 
(2) nature of the criminal law specified in the 
charges made; and 
(3) city or law enforcement jurisdiction in 
which the charge was made. 
(b) REPORT.—The data collected under subsection 
(a) shall be reported to Congress within 180 days prior 
to the award of funds for each fiscal year of eligibility to 
receive grants. 
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