I 
115TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 6010 
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political influence oper-
ations of the Chinese Government and Communist Party with respect 
to the United States, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 5, 2018 
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. 
PERRY, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. PITTENGER, and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) in-
troduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a 
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
A BILL 
To require an unclassified interagency report on the political 
influence operations of the Chinese Government and 
Communist Party with respect to the United States, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be referred to as the ‘‘Countering the 
Chinese Government and Communist Party’s Political In-
fluence Operations Act’’. 
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SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Unless otherwise specified, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) in the House of Representatives— 
(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs; 
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services; 
(iii) the Committee on Appropriations; 
(iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
(v) the Committee on Education and 
the Workforce; and 
(vi) the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence; and 
(B) in the Senate— 
(i) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions; 
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services; 
(iii) the Committee on Appropriations; 
(iv) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
(v) the Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions; and 
(vi) the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence. 
(2) POLITICAL INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—Un-
less otherwise specified, the term ‘‘political influence 
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operations’’ means efforts to coerce and corrupt 
United States interests, institutions, or individuals 
and foster in the United States attitudes, behavior, 
decisions, or outcomes favorable to the Chinese Gov-
ernment or Communist Party through coordinated 
and often concealed application of disinformation, 
press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted in-
vestments, corruption, or academic censorship. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Chinese Government and Communist 
Party employ a wide range of political, informa-
tional, and economic measures to influence, coerce, 
intimidate, or undermine United States interests or 
the interests of United States partners and allies. 
(2) According to the December 2017 National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
‘‘[A]lthough the United States seeks to continue to 
cooperate with China, China is using economic in-
ducements and penalties, influence operations, and 
implied military threats to persuade other states to 
heed its political and security agenda.’’. 
(3) The political influence operations efforts of 
the Chinese Government and Communist Party have 
received less scrutiny than the efforts of the Russian 
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Government, but given China’s economic strength 
and the growing apparatus being used to spread its 
influence globally, efforts to promote its authori-
tarian ideal pose significant and consequential long- 
term challenges to United States interests and val-
ues. 
(4) The Chinese Government and Communist 
Party use both overt and covert means to target the 
political and economic elite, the media and public 
opinion, civil society and academia, and members of 
the Chinese diaspora. 
(5) The Chinese Government and Communist 
Party employs an array of government entities, 
friendship and exchange organizations, and govern-
ment funded foundations, think-tanks, educational 
and other projects to carry out political influence op-
erations, often called ‘‘united front work’’. 
(6) The Chinese Government and Communist 
Party’s political influence operations aim is to secure 
the regime’s political stability domestically and 
spread globally its political and economic model as 
superior to those of Western democracies. 
(7) The Chinese Government and Communist 
Party’s political influence operations take advantage 
of the open and democratic nature of the United 
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States, including constitutional protections for free 
speech and a free press, and the desire by some indi-
viduals or institutions to attract Chinese investment, 
gain access to Chinese markets, or attain greater 
global influence. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the Chinese Government and Communist Par-
ty’s political influence operations are not ‘‘soft power’’ in-
tended to persuade, but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended to pene-
trate or corrupt democratic countries, foster attitudes and 
behavior favorable to the Chinese Government’s interest 
through disinformation, coercion, and other means, and 
to widen the scope of authoritarian influence globally. It 
is further the sense of Congress that Congress and the 
American public need reliable and current information to 
understand the malign goals of these political influence op-
erations, identify the key institutions, individuals, entities, 
and ministries that carry out such operations, and distin-
guish them from the cultural, educational, and people-to- 
people exchanges which benefit both the United States and 
China. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to— 
(1) clearly differentiate between the Chinese 
people and culture and the Chinese Government and 
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Communist Party in official statements, media, and 
messaging, and to ensure that efforts to curtail Bei-
jing’s political influence operations do not lead to 
the targeting of Chinese-Americans or the Chinese 
diaspora, as they are most often the victims and pri-
mary targets of political influence operations; 
(2) take steps to ensure that Chinese nationals 
who are legally studying, living, or working tempo-
rarily in the United States know that intimidation or 
surveillance by the Chinese Government and Com-
munist Party is an unacceptable invasion of their 
rights while they reside in the United States; 
(3) enhance cooperation and coordination with 
Australia, Canada, and Taiwan (Republic of China), 
whose governments and institutions have faced acute 
pressure from the Chinese Government and Com-
munist Party’s political influence operations, and 
with other allies globally, to counter such operations, 
curtail advances of authoritarian ideals that chal-
lenge democratic values and international human 
rights norms, and create strategies to ensure coun-
tries in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast 
Asia, and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp 
power’’ and work collaboratively to counter coercive, 
covert, and corrupting elements; 
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(4) develop a strategic assessment and long- 
term strategy to counter the Chinese Government 
and Communist Party’s political influence oper-
ations, censorship, propaganda, and disinformation 
that undermines democratic institutions, targets 
United States citizens or nationals or intimidates 
their families in China; and uses economic tools, 
market access, cyberattacks, or other capabilities to 
undermine the freedoms of speech, expression, press, 
association, assembly, religion, or academic thought; 
(5) implement more advanced transparency re-
quirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 
actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 
and government officials, among others, and raise 
awareness, through various forums about the goals 
and methods of the Chinese Government and Com-
munist Party’s political influence operations and 
common patterns and approaches used by Chinese 
intelligence agencies or related actors; 
(6) require Confucius Institutes, and any other 
think tanks, academic programs, or nongovern-
mental organizations funded primarily by the Chi-
nese Government or Chinese Government-affiliated 
entities and operating in the United States, to reg-
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ister under section 2 of the Foreign Agents Reg-
istration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 612); 
(7) seek ways to increase Chinese language pro-
ficiency among mid-career professionals; and 
(8) create more flexible tools to screen invest-
ments from Chinese Government or Chinese Govern-
ment-backed sources to protect against the takeover 
of United States companies by Chinese state-owned 
or state-driven entities, and to protect institutions or 
business sectors critically important to United States 
national security and the viability of democratic in-
stitutions. 
SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND COM-
MUNIST PARTY’S POLITICAL INFLUENCE OP-
ERATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal depart-
ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees an unclassified report on Chinese 
Government and Communist Party political influence op-
erations with respect to the United States, including ef-
forts to corrupt United States governmental or nongovern-
mental institutions or individuals, efforts to coerce or 
threaten United States citizens or legal permanent resi-
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dents or their families or relatives living in China, and 
efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the free-
doms of speech, expression, press, association, assembly, 
religion, or academic thought. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall also include recommendations for the 
President and Congress relating to the following: 
(1) Whether additional resources or authorities 
are needed to counter Chinese Government and 
Communist Party’s political influence operations in 
the United States, including in concert with allies. 
(2) Ways to use existing resources to develop 
core competencies among Federal agencies and the 
Armed Forces in the subject area of Chinese polit-
ical influence operations. 
(3) The advisability of establishing, within the 
Department of State, a permanent office relating to 
Chinese Government and Communist Party’s polit-
ical influence operations. 
(4) Whether regular public reports on the Chi-
nese Government and Communist Party’s political 
influence operations are needed to inform Congress 
and the American public of the scale and scope of 
such operations. 
Æ 
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