I 
109TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. R. 474 
To ensure that the courts of the United States may provide an impartial 
forum for claims brought by United States citizens and others against 
any railroad organized as a separate legal entity, arising from the depor-
tation of United States citizens and others to Nazi concentration camps 
on trains owned or operated by such railroad, and by the heirs and 
survivors of such persons. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 1, 2005 
Mrs. MALONEY (for herself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. NADLER, 
and Mr. WEINER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary 
A BILL 
To ensure that the courts of the United States may provide 
an impartial forum for claims brought by United States 
citizens and others against any railroad organized as 
a separate legal entity, arising from the deportation of 
United States citizens and others to Nazi concentration 
camps on trains owned or operated by such railroad, 
and by the heirs and survivors of such persons. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. 
Congress finds as follows:
(1) During World War II, more than 75,000 
Jews and thousands of other persons were deported 
from France to Nazi concentration camps, on trains 
operated for profit by the Socie´te´ Nationale des Che-
mins de Fers Franc¸ais (in this Act referred to as 
‘‘SNCF’’), including deportations to Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald. Numerous citizens and residents of the 
United States were among those on the trains or 
had relatives on the trains. United States servicemen 
who were pilots shot down over France were also 
among the persons deported on the SNCF trains to 
Nazi concentration camps. 
(2) United States citizens and others have 
sought redress against SNCF by filing a class action 
suit in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York. The named plaintiffs 
and class members include United States Army Air 
Force pilots and United States citizens. 
(3) The complaint filed alleges that SNCF, a 
separate corporate entity which remained inde-
pendent during World War II, operated the deporta-
tion trains for a profit, as ordinary commercial 
transactions. SNCF remained under French civilian 
control throughout World War II and is alleged to
have collaborated willingly with the German Nazi re-
gime. 
(4) The complaint alleges that SNCF provided 
the necessary rolling stock, scheduled the depar-
tures, and supplied the employees to operate the 
trains bound for the concentration camps. SNCF al-
legedly charged an ordinary passenger coach fare for 
the deportations, calculated per person and per kilo-
meter, and considered these trains as ordinary com-
mercial activities. The plaintiffs further contend that 
SNCF herded as many people as possible into each 
car, requiring passengers of all ages and sexes, in-
cluding the elderly and young children, to stand 
throughout the trip of several days’ duration, with 
no provision for food or water and no sanitary facili-
ties. The complaint further alleges that SNCF 
cleaned the trains after each trip, removing the 
corpses of persons who perished during transit due 
to the execrable conditions of the train cars. The 
destination was in each case a camp in which the de-
portees were to be exterminated, worked to death, or 
made to suffer terrible and inhuman conditions. 
(5) The complaint contends that SNCF’s ac-
tions violated the Principles of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal, 1950, relating to crimes under international
law (earlier recognized by the Martens Clause of the 
Hague Convention IV of 1907), and aided and abet-
ted the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. SNCF has not denied its actions and has 
never disgorged the money that it was paid for the 
deportations or otherwise compensated the deportees 
or their heirs. 
(6) SNCF’s records concerning the deportation 
trains have not been made available to the plaintiffs, 
and SNCF archives concerning its wartime activities 
remain closed to the general public. 
(7) SNCF moved to dismiss the lawsuit on a 
claim of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. 1330 and 
1602 et seq.), even though it is one of the 500 larg-
est corporations in the world, earns hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars from its commercial activities in the 
United States, and is not accorded sovereign immu-
nity under the laws of France. SNCF’s motion to 
dismiss the lawsuit has been granted by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, their ap-
peal was granted, and the case was remanded for 
further proceedings. In November 2004, on remand, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deter-
mined that SNCF was entitled to immunity and af-
firmed the dismissal of the complaint. 
(8) This lawsuit presents issues of substantial 
importance to citizens and veterans of the United 
States and finds that the courts of the United States 
are and should be a proper forum for this lawsuit 
and similar suits. 
(9) SNCF is attempting to use the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, enacted 30 years 
after the events at issue occurred, to evade liability 
for conduct for which it would otherwise be held ac-
countable, rather than accepting responsibility for its 
actions. Under the rule of separate entities applica-
ble at the time of the events in question, SNCF 
would not be immune from suit in United States 
courts. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 was not intended to expand the reach of im-
munity in these circumstances. 
SEC. 2. ACCESS TO UNITED STATES COURTS FOR HOLO-
CAUST DEPORTEES. 
(a) JURISDICTION
OF
DISTRICT
COURTS.—The 
United States district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion, without regard to the amount in controversy, of any 
civil action for damages for personal injury or death 
that—
(1) arose from the deportation of persons to 
Nazi concentration camps during the period begin-
ning on January 1, 1942, and ending on December 
31, 1944; and 
(2) is brought by any such person, or any heir 
or survivor of such person, against a railroad that— 
(A) owned or operated the trains on which 
the persons were so deported; and 
(B) was organized as a separate legal enti-
ty at the time of the deportation, whether or 
not any of the equity interest in the railroad 
was owned by a foreign state. 
(b) OTHER LAWS NOT APPLICABLE.—Sections 1330 
and 1601 through 1611 of title 28, United States Code, 
or any other law limiting the jurisdiction of the United 
States courts, whether by statute or under common law, 
shall not preclude any action under subsection (a). 
(c) INAPPLICABILITY
OF STATUTES
OF LIMITA-
TION.—No action described in subsection (a) shall be 
barred by a defense that the time for bringing such action 
has expired under a statute of limitations. 
(d) APPLICABILITY.—This section shall apply to any 
action pending on January 1, 2002, and to any action 
commenced on or after that date. 
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