218 
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, 
AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading 
its influence in the Middle East and North Africa 
through its energy and infrastructure investments, 
technology transfer, and arms sales; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to es-
tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
cally strategic locations in the Middle East and 
North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative 
at the expense of United States national security in-
terests; and 
(3) the export of certain communications infra-
structure from the People’s Republic of China de-
grades the security of partner networks, exposes in-
tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of 
the United States to conduct security cooperation 
with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
China’s authoritarian surveillance model. 
(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
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retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall 
jointly develop and submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives a strategy for countering and limiting the 
PRC’s influence in, and access to, the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s intent with regards to increased co-
operation with Middle East and North African 
countries and how these activities fit into its 
broader global strategic objectives; 
(B) an assessment of how governments 
across the region are responding to the People’s 
Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili-
tary presence in their countries; 
(C) efforts to improve regional cooperation 
through foreign military sales, financing, and 
efforts to build partner capacity and increase 
interoperability with the United States; 
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(D) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s joint research and development with 
the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
the United States national security interests, 
and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s 
Republic of China’s influence in this area; 
(E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
ons technology transfers from the People’s Re-
public of China to the Middle East and North 
Africa, impacts on United States national secu-
rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
gate the People’s Republic of China’s influence 
in this area; 
(F) an assessment of the People’s Republic 
of China’s military sales to the region including 
lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems; 
(G) an assessment of People’s Republic of 
China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
ca, impacts on United States national security 
interests, and recommended steps to mitigate 
the People’s Republic of China’s influence in 
this area; 
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(H) efforts to improve regional security co-
operation with United States allies and partners 
with a focus on— 
(i) maritime security in the Arabian 
Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
terranean; 
(ii) integrated air and missile defense; 
(iii) cyber security; 
(iv) border security; and 
(v) critical infrastructure security, to 
include energy security; 
(I) increased support for government-to- 
government engagement on critical infrastruc-
ture development projects including ports and 
water infrastructure; 
(J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
vate sector and public-private partnerships in 
healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
ment in non-energy sectors; 
(K) efforts to expand youth engagement 
and professional education exchanges with key 
partner countries; 
(L) specific steps to counter increased in-
vestment from the People’s Republic of China 
in telecommunications infrastructure and diplo-
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matic efforts to stress the political, economic, 
and social benefits of a free and open internet; 
(M) efforts to promote United States pri-
vate sector engagement in and public-private 
partnerships on renewable energy development; 
(N) the expansion of public-private part-
nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
gation projects; and 
(O) efforts to warn United States partners 
in the Middle East and North Africa of the 
risks associated with the People’s Republic of 
China’s telecommunications infrastructure and 
provide alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China’s technology. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex as necessary. 
SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND 
NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The United States and the international 
community have long-term interests in the stability, 
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security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
(2) In addition to and apart from military and 
security efforts, the United States should harness a 
whole of government approach, including bilateral 
and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, 
and public diplomacy to compete with and counter 
PRC influence. 
(3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 
United States engagement, transparent governance 
structures, and active civil society engagement help 
counter predatory foreign investment and influence 
efforts. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States that the United States and the international 
community should continue diplomatic and economic ef-
forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that 
support reform efforts to— 
(1) promote greater economic opportunity; 
(2) foster private sector development; 
(3) strengthen civil society; and 
(4) promote transparent and democratic gov-
ernance and the rule of law. 
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PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 
SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.— 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment— 
(A) creates new national and regional secu-
rity challenges due to increased military activity 
in the Arctic; 
(B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing 
strategic competition; 
(C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol 
the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
els of sea ice; 
(D) impacts public safety due to increased 
human activity in the Arctic region where 
search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
ited; and 
(E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s 
fragile and pristine environment and the unique 
and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
tic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and 
(2) the United States should reduce the con-
sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by— 
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(A) carefully evaluating the wide variety 
and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
folding in the Arctic; 
(B) developing policies and making prep-
arations to mitigate and respond to threats and 
risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to 
work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
gion to deter potential aggressive activities and 
build Arctic competencies; 
(C) adequately funding the National Earth 
System Prediction Capability to substantively 
improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on 
the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
curity and trans-Arctic shipping; 
(D) investing in resources, including a sig-
nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure 
that the United States has adequate capacity to 
prevent and respond to security threats in the 
Arctic region; and 
(E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 
all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree-
ment for— 
(i) maintaining peace and stability in 
the Arctic region; 
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(ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
gion; 
(iii) ensuring safe and efficient man-
agement of commercial maritime traffic in 
the Arctic; 
(iv) promoting responsible natural re-
source management and economic develop-
ment; 
(v) countering China’s Polar Silk 
Road initiative; 
(vi) examining the possibility of recon-
vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense 
Forum; and 
(vii) reducing black carbon and meth-
ane emissions in the Artic Region, includ-
ing by working with observers of the Arctic 
Council, including India and the PRC, to 
adopt mitigation plans consistent with the 
findings and recommendations of the Arc-
tic Council’s Framework for Action on 
Black Carbon and Methane. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
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(1) to recognize only the states enumerated in 
subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all 
other claims to this status; and 
(2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 
serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the 
interests of United States allies and partners. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ 
means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, 
and Iceland. 
(2) ARCTIC
REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Re-
gion’’ means the geographic region north of the 
66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator. 
(d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR 
ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the De-
partment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Af-
fairs (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), 
appointed in accordance with paragraph (1). 
(1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be 
appointed by the President, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
(2) DUTIES.— 
(A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Sub-
ject to the direction of the President and the 
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Secretary of State, the Ambassador is author-
ized to represent the United States in matters 
and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in— 
(i) contacts with foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and spe-
cialized agencies of the United Nations, 
the Arctic Council, and other international 
organizations of which the United States is 
a member; and 
(ii) multilateral conferences and meet-
ings relating to Arctic affairs. 
(B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The 
Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arc-
tic Council when the United States holds the 
Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 
(3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambas-
sador shall coordinate United States policies related 
to the Arctic Region, including— 
(A) meeting national security, economic, 
and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af-
fairs; 
(B) protecting the Arctic environment and 
conserving its biological resources; 
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(C) promoting environmentally sustainable 
natural resource management and economic de-
velopment; 
(D) strengthening institutions for coopera-
tion among the Arctic Nations; 
(E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 
decisions that affect them; 
(F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
search on local, regional, and global environ-
mental issues; 
(G) integrating scientific data on the cur-
rent and projected effects of climate change in 
the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 
applied to the development of security strategies 
for the Arctic Region; 
(H) making available the methods and ap-
proaches on the integration of climate science 
to other regional security planning programs in 
the Department of State to better ensure that 
broader decision-making processes may more 
adequately account for the effects of climate 
change; and 
(I) reducing black carbon and methane 
emissions in the Arctic Region. 
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(e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—Arctic Re-
gion Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and 
implement plans, policies, and actions— 
(1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 
United States in Arctic states, including through en-
hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, 
participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United 
States initiatives and assistance programs across 
agencies to protect the national security of the 
United States and its allies and partners; 
(2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 
states to the effects of environmental change and in-
creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states 
and other states that may result from increased ac-
cessibility of the Arctic Region; 
(3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic 
Region and Arctic states that— 
(A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
environment; and 
(B) are strategically significant to the 
United States; 
(4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
mental change and national security risk and vulner-
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ability assessments into the decision-making process 
on foreign assistance awards with Greenland; 
(5) to advance principles of good governance by 
encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on 
collaborative approaches— 
(A) to responsibly manage natural re-
sources in the Arctic Region; 
(B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
time safety in the Arctic Region; 
(C) to prevent the escalation of security 
tensions by mitigating against the militarization 
of the Arctic Region; 
(D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
tilateral policies among Arctic states on the 
management of maritime transit routes through 
the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the 
transit policies for access to and transit in the 
Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and 
(E) to facilitate the development of Arctic 
Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability 
and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
mane and responsible fashion; 
(6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
vivability, and resiliency of United States interests 
and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and 
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(7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis-
sions in the Arctic. 
PART VII—OCEANIA 
SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-
GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA. 
It shall be the policy of the United States— 
(1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a 
strategic national security and economic priority of 
the United States Government; 
(2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
democratic governance across Oceania as part of a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region; 
(3) to broaden and deepen relationships with 
the Freely Associated States of the Republic of 
Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the 
Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
changes that promote the goals of individual states 
and the entire region; 
(4) to work with the governments of Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance 
goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
ing, maritime security, and economic development; 
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(5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
national structures to promote the national security 
and economic goals of the United States and coun-
tries of the Oceania region; 
(6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 
States strategy that will enhance youth engagement 
and advance long-term growth and development 
throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-
tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
tries of the Oceania region against current and fu-
ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se-
vere changes in the environment; 
(7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 
influence and corruption aimed at undermining the 
political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
bility of the people and governments of the countries 
of Oceania; 
(8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
tries of Oceania to address public health challenges 
and improve global health security; 
(9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
ket-based private sector investments that adhere to 
best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
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ability, and environmental and social safeguards as 
an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
thoritarian governments; 
(10) to ensure the people and communities of 
Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
grading munitions hazards and other debris that 
threaten health and livelihoods; 
(11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering 
United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s dip-
lomatic partners in Oceania; and 
(12) to work cooperatively with all governments 
in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
mains of members of the United States Armed 
Forces that are missing in action from previous con-
flicts in the Indo-Pacific region. 
SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP. 
(a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening 
United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared 
concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security 
and resiliency in the countries of Oceania. 
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(6) Recommendations for additional United 
States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources 
necessary to execute the strategic roadmap. 
(7) Any other elements the Secretary considers 
appropriate. 
SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States- 
based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be 
known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring 
and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, 
and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce-
ania. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by 
subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following: 
(1) A review of the ability of the Department 
of State to participate in a public-private sponsored 
security dialogue. 
(2) An assessment of the potential locations for 
conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju-
risdiction of the United States. 
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(3) Consideration of dates for conducting an 
Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par-
ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific 
countries of Oceania. 
(4) A review of the funding modalities available 
to the Department of State to help finance an Oce-
ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au-
thorities available to the Department of State. 
(5) An assessment of any administrative, statu-
tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent 
the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue 
with participation and support of the Department of 
State as described in subsection (a). 
(6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration 
on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the 
changing environment as the greatest existential 
threat to countries of Oceania. 
(7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of 
existing regional structures and organizations dedi-
cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as 
the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental 
Security Forum. 
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(8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 
Dialogue would help with implementation of the 
strategic roadmap required by section 292 and ad-
vance the National Security Strategy of the United 
States. 
(c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent 
practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the 
Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the 
lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Stud-
ies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasi-
bility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 
Dialogue. 
SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 
Peace Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strate-
gies for to reasonably and safely expand the number of 
Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of— 
(1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps 
to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 
(2) working with regional and international 
partners of the United States to expand the presence 
of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
communities in support of climate resilience initia-
tives. 
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(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall— 
(1) assess the factors contributing to the cur-
rent absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers 
in Oceania; 
(2) examine potential remedies that include 
working with United States Government agencies 
and regional governments, including governments of 
United States allies— 
(A) to increase the health infrastructure 
and medical evacuation capabilities of the coun-
tries of Oceania to better support the safety of 
Peace Corps volunteers while in those countries; 
(B) to address physical safety concerns 
that have decreased the ability of the Peace 
Corps to operate in Oceania; and 
(C) to increase transportation infrastruc-
ture in the countries of Oceania to better sup-
port the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and 
their access to necessary facilities; 
(3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy-
ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the 
countries of Oceania address social, economic, and 
development needs of their communities that require 
specific professional expertise; and 
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(4) explore potential new operational models to 
address safety and security needs of Peace Corps 
volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including— 
(A) changes to volunteer deployment dura-
tions; and 
(B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers 
to regional or United States-based healthcare 
facilities for routine physical and behavioral 
health evaluation. 
(c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU-
NITIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential 
to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in 
low-income Oceania communities under subsection 
(a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall con-
sider the development of initiatives described in 
paragraph (2). 
(2) INITIATIVES
DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de-
scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives 
that help the countries of Oceania address social, 
economic, and development needs of their commu-
nities, including by— 
(A) addressing, through appropriate resil-
ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that 
communities in Oceania face as result of ex-
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treme weather, severe environmental change, 
and other climate related trends; and 
(B) improving, through smart infrastruc-
ture principles, access to transportation and 
connectivity infrastructure that will help ad-
dress the economic and social challenges that 
communities in Oceania confront as a result of 
poor or nonexistent infrastructure. 
(d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘Oceania’’ includes the following: 
(1) Easter Island of Chile. 
(2) Fiji. 
(3) French Polynesia of France. 
(4) Kiribati. 
(5) New Caledonia of France. 
(6) Nieu of New Zealand. 
(7) Papua New Guinea. 
(8) Samoa. 
(9) Vanuatu. 
(10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus-
tralia. 
(11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand. 
(12) The Coral Islands of Australia. 
(13) The Federated States of Micronesia. 
(14) The Norfolk Island of Australia. 
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(15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King-
dom. 
(16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands. 
(17) The Republic of Palau. 
(18) The Solomon Islands. 
(19) Tokelau of New Zealand. 
(20) Tonga. 
(21) Tuvalu. 
(22) Wallis and Futuna of France. 
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS 
SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE. 
This part may be cited as the ‘‘Boosting Long-term 
U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act’’ or the ‘‘BLUE Pa-
cific Act’’. 
SEC. 296. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Pacific Islands— 
(A) are home to roughly 10 million resi-
dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New 
Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul-
tures and peoples; 
(B) are spread across an expanse of the 
Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the 
Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions 
of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and 
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(C) face shared challenges in development 
that have distinct local contexts, including cli-
mate change and rising sea levels, geographic 
distances from major markets, and vulnerability 
to external shocks such as natural disasters. 
(2) The United States is a Pacific country with 
longstanding ties and shared values and interests 
with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com-
pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated 
States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 
Palau. 
(3) The United States has vital national secu-
rity interests in the Pacific Islands, including— 
(A) protecting regional peace and security 
that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations; 
(B) advancing economic prosperity free 
from coercion through trade and sustainable de-
velopment; and 
(C) supporting democracy, good govern-
ance, the rule of law, and human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
(4) Successive United States administrations 
have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, 
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including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic 
documents, including the following: 
(A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, 
which first declared the rebalance to Asia and 
the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa-
cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent 
United States engagement with the Pacific Is-
lands, including several new policies focused on 
conservation and resilience to climate change 
announced in September 2016. 
(B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, 
which includes a commitment to ‘‘shore up 
fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands re-
gion to reduce their vulnerability to economic 
fluctuations and natural disasters’’. 
(C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-
port, which identified the Pacific Islands as 
‘‘critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared 
values, interests, and commitments’’ and com-
mitted the United States to ‘‘building capacity 
and resilience to address maritime security; Ille-
gal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug 
trafficking; and resilience to address climate 
change and disaster response’’. 
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(5) The United States has deepened its diplo-
matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through 
several recent initiatives, including— 
(A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 
additional 
$100,000,000 
in 
2019 
and 
$200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approxi-
mately $350,000,000 that the United States 
provides annually to the region to support 
shared priorities in economic and human devel-
opment, climate change, and more; and 
(B) the Small and Less Populous Island 
Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in 
March 2021 to strengthen United States col-
laboration with island countries and territories, 
including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID-19 
economic challenges, long-term economic devel-
opment, climate change, and other shared inter-
ests. 
(6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 
2018, affirmed that climate change ‘‘remains the 
single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and 
wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’’ and asserted 
‘‘the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its 
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national affairs free of external interference and co-
ercion’’. 
(7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated 
that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of 
$2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 
2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate 
mitigation and adaptation over the same period. 
(8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective 
policies to prevent and contain the spread of the 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as 
‘‘COVID–19’’) pandemic to their populations. The 
United States has provided over $130,000,000 in as-
sistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19 
response. However, priorities must be met to ensure 
continued success in preventing the spread of the 
COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and wide-
spread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term eco-
nomic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including 
through— 
(A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi-
tion of needed medical supplies, including avail-
able COVID-19 vaccines and supporting vac-
cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain; 
(B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and 
reopening of economic and social activities; and 
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(C) mitigating and recovering from the im-
pacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health 
system and the reliance on food and energy im-
ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other 
economic and food security damages caused by 
the pandemic. 
(9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps vol-
unteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, 
building strong people-to-people relationships and 
demonstrating the United States commitment to 
peace and development in the region. Prior to the 
COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained 
presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. 
Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high de-
mand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested 
across the region. 
SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy in 
the Pacific Islands that— 
(A) promotes peace, security, and pros-
perity for all countries through a rules-based 
regional order that respects the sovereignty and 
political independence of all nations; 
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(B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open 
and vibrant corridor for international maritime 
trade and promotes trade and sustainable devel-
opment that supports inclusive economic growth 
and autonomy for all nations and addresses so-
cioeconomic challenges related to public health, 
education, 
renewable 
energy, 
digital 
connectivity, and more; 
(C) supports regional efforts to address the 
challenges posed by climate change, including 
by strengthening resilience to natural disasters 
and through responsible stewardship of natural 
resources; 
(D) improves civil society, strengthens 
democratic governance and the rule of law, and 
promotes human rights and the preservation of 
the region’s unique cultural heritages; 
(E) assists the Pacific Islands in pre-
venting and containing the spread of the 
COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long- 
term economic recovery; and 
(F) supports existing regional architecture 
and international norms; 
(2) to support the vision, values, and objectives 
of existing regional multilateral institutions and 
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frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 
the Pacific Community, including— 
(A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Re-
gionalism; 
(B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional 
Security; and 
(C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan; 
(3) to extend and renew the provisions of the 
Compacts of Free Association and related United 
States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau 
unless they are extended and renewed; and 
(4) to work closely with United States allies 
and partners with existing relationships and inter-
ests in the Pacific Islands, including Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing 
common goals. 
SEC. 298. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Except as otherwise provided, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
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(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate. 
(2) PACIFIC ISLANDS.—The terms ‘‘Pacific Is-
lands’’ means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, 
the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, 
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the 
Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, 
the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of 
Vanuatu. 
SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM 
OF REPORTS. 
(a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any 
reports required to be submitted to the appropriate con-
gressional committees under this Act that are subject to 
deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of 
time may be consolidated into a single report that is sub-
mitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant 
to such deadlines and that contains all information re-
quired under such reports. 
(b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by 
this Act shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
contain a classified annex. 
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SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS-
LANDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Is-
lands necessitates an examination of whether United 
States diplomatic, economic, and development en-
gagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region 
is sufficient to effectively support United States ob-
jectives and meaningful participation in regional 
fora; 
(2) improving shared understanding of and 
jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti-
nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of 
the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi-
tally important to our shared long-term interests of 
stability, security, and prosperity; 
(3) the United States should seek to participate 
in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re-
sponse toward maritime security, including through 
continued United States and Pacific Islands partici-
pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and 
Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust 
cooperation with regional allies; and 
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(4) the United States Government should com-
mit to sending appropriate levels of representation to 
regional events. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on the 
diplomatic and development presence of the United 
States in the Pacific Islands. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the Department of 
State, United States Agency for International 
Development, United States International De-
velopment Finance Corporation, Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, and United States Com-
mercial Service presence, staffing, program-
ming, and resourcing of operations in the Pa-
cific 
Islands, 
including 
programming 
and 
resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pa-
cific Islands. 
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(B) A description of gaps in such presence, 
including unfilled full-time equivalent positions. 
(C) A description of limitations and chal-
lenges such gaps pose to United States stra-
tegic objectives, including— 
(i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is-
lands due to operations being conducted 
from the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development offices in Manila and 
Suva; and 
(ii) 
gaps 
in 
programming 
and 
resourcing. 
(D) A strategy to expand and elevate such 
presence to fill such gaps, including by estab-
lishing new missions, expanding participation in 
regional forums, and elevating United States 
representation in regional forums. 
(c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO-
NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em-
ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of pro-
moting increased diplomatic engagement and economic 
and commercial engagement between the United States 
and the Pacific Islands. 
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(d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT-
EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, and every 5 years thereafter, the Admin-
istrator of the United States Agency for International De-
velopment shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a regional development cooperation strategy 
for the Pacific Islands. 
SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall con-
sult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, in-
cluding Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and re-
gional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 
the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to pro-
vide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs 
established by this Act, including for purposes of— 
(1) deconflicting programming; 
(2) ensuring that any programming does not 
adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pa-
cific Islands; and 
(3) ensuring complementary programs benefit 
the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac-
ticable. 
(b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Sec-
retary of State shall establish a formal consultative proc-
ess with such regional allies and partners to coordinate 
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with respect to such programs and future-years program-
ming. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that includes— 
(1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 
programs undertaken by regional allies and part-
ners, including multilateral organizations, to advance 
priorities identified in this Act; 
(2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 
programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors 
that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in 
any way detrimental to one or more countries of the 
Pacific Islands; 
(3) an assessment of United States programs in 
the Pacific Islands and their alignment and 
complementarity with the efforts of regional allies 
and partners identified in paragraph (1); and 
(4) a review of the formal consultative process 
required in subsection (b) to summarize engage-
ments held and identify opportunities to improve co-
ordination with regional allies and partners. 
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SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA-
CIFIC ISLANDS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States Government should lever-
age the full range of authorities and programs avail-
able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their 
development goals; 
(2) United States development assistance 
should seek to build on existing public and private 
sector investments while creating new opportunities 
toward a favorable environment for additional such 
investments; and 
(3) United States development efforts should be 
coordinated with and seek to build on existing ef-
forts by like-minded partners and allies and regional 
and international multilateral organizations. 
(b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall de-
velop and implement a strategy to— 
(1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 
including transport connectivity, information and 
communications technology, food security, coastal 
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elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the es-
tablishment of open and direct democratic elections 
for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Coun-
cil; 
(6) to support the robust exercise by residents 
of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, 
and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the 
Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
(7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw-
ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong 
Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the 
Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights; 
(8) to draw international attention to any viola-
tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda-
mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as pro-
vided by the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, and any encroachment upon the au-
tonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law 
and the Joint Declaration; 
(9) to protect United States citizens and long- 
term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as 
well as people visiting and transiting through Hong 
Kong; 
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ties with respect to both mitigation and adapta-
tion in continuation of their existing obligations 
under the Convention’’; 
(T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 
institution for climate financing, as the Green 
Climate Fund ensures— 
(i) balanced governance between de-
veloped and developing countries; 
(ii) stakeholder engagement and dis-
course; 
(iii) a balanced approach between 
mitigation and adaptation; 
(iv) fair and equal labor and working 
conditions; 
(v) conservation of biodiversity and 
critical habitats; and 
(vi) strong environmental, social, and 
gender protections; 
(U) the Green Climate Fund— 
(i) promotes and protects human 
rights and the rights of marginalized 
groups, 
including 
indigenous 
peoples, 
women, children, and people with disabil-
ities; 
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