I 
109TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3184 
To ensure that countries that have signed a Small Quantities Protocol also 
sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol and provide access 
by IAEA inspectors to their nuclear-related facilities and to direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to make every 
effort to rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol and ensure 
compliance by all Member States of the IAEA with IAEA obligations 
and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 30, 2005 
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself and Mr. LANTOS) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations 
A BILL 
To ensure that countries that have signed a Small Quantities 
Protocol also sign, ratify, and implement the Additional 
Protocol and provide access by IAEA inspectors to their 
nuclear-related facilities and to direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the IAEA to make every 
effort to rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Pro-
tocol and ensure compliance by all Member States of 
the IAEA with IAEA obligations and the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) There are 87 countries that are signatories 
to the Small Quantities Protocol as part of their ex-
isting safeguards and inspection agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
(2) The Small Quantities Protocol was origi-
nally intended to conserve limited safeguards re-
sources by foregoing inspections in small countries 
in stable regions that had little or no nuclear mate-
rials and no nuclear facilities. 
(3) Unfortunately, at a time when terrorism 
and private nuclear ‘‘black-market’’ supplier net-
works exist and flourish by taking advantage of 
small countries with lax government regulations and 
oversight, the Small Quantities Protocol may become 
a hindrance to the timely detection by the IAEA of 
illicit nuclear proliferation activities. 
(4) It has also become clear that some coun-
tries, such as Saudi Arabia, are not in secure and 
stable regions of the world and concerns have been 
raised about their possible interest in nuclear tech-
nology. 
(5) Saudi Arabia, a signatory to a Small Quan-
tities Protocol as of June 16, 2005, is one of 27 
non-nuclear members of the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) (com-
monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) but is only ‘‘willing to pro-
vide’’ the IAEA with additional information and ac-
cess ‘‘if all other parties’’ are required to comply. 
(6) The Small Quantities Protocol allows coun-
tries to possess up to the following amounts of nu-
clear material without having to report such to the 
IAEA: 
(A) Ten tons of natural uranium. 
(B) Twenty tons of depleted uranium, de-
pending on the degree of enrichment. 
(C) One kilogram of plutonium. 
(7) Countries party to the Small Quantities 
Protocol can continue to secretly work on nuclear fa-
cilities for up to six months before such facilities are 
operational. 
(8) The Small Quantities Protocol therefore 
makes it difficult for the IAEA to evaluate the nu-
clear program of a Small Quantities Protocol coun-
try or to verify that such a country meets the condi-
tions required to operate under the Small Quantities 
Protocol. 
(9) According to an IAEA report circulated to 
the Member States on the Board of Governors of the
IAEA, the Small Quantities Protocol ‘‘has the effect 
of holding in abeyance the implementation of most 
of the safeguard’s measures’’ as well as limiting ‘‘ob-
ligations to provide certain information’’ and the 
‘‘right to request access to relevant locations’’. 
(10) The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreements between the IAEA and Member States 
of the IAEA empowers the IAEA to seek a broad 
range of information about all aspects of a country’s 
nuclear and nuclear-related activities. The Addi-
tional Protocol also provides broader right of access 
for IAEA inspectors to nuclear and nuclear-related 
facilities and contains measures to improve the effec-
tiveness of safeguards for such activities. 
(11) The Additional Protocol is therefore an 
important means of addressing some of the concerns 
outlined above, particularly concerning rights of ac-
cess to certain information. 
(b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress declares 
that, in light of the findings described in subsection (a), 
the United States should use all diplomatic, political, and 
economic means necessary to persuade all countries cur-
rently with a Small Quantities Protocol to renounce their 
Small Quantities Protocol and to sign, ratify, and imple-
ment the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date.
(c) UNITED STATES POLICY.— 
(1) REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use 
all available political, economic, and diplomatic 
tools to ensure that each United States ally or 
recipient of United States assistance that has 
signed a Small Quantities Protocol with the 
IAEA, also signs, ratifies, and implements the 
Additional Protocol and provides immediate ac-
cess for IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related 
facilities. 
(B) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the 
term ‘‘United States assistance’’ means assist-
ance under any provision of law with respect to 
which amounts are appropriated under the for-
eign operations, export financing, and related 
programs appropriations Act for a fiscal year. 
(2) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—If a country 
has signed a Small Quantities Protocol with the 
IAEA but does not satisfy the requirements specified 
in paragraph (1), the President shall prohibit the 
provision or transfer of each of the following to the 
country: 
(A) Assistance under part II of the For-
eign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.),