SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of 
Democratic Governance Act of 2017’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress. 
Sec. 4. Requirement for strategy to provide humanitarian assistance to the peo-
ple of Venezuela. 
Sec. 5. Requirement for strategy to coordinate international humanitarian as-
sistance. 
Sec. 6. Support for efforts at the United Nations on the humanitarian and po-
litical crisis in Venezuela. 
Sec. 7. Support for Organization of American States Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter. 
Sec. 8. Concerns and report on the involvement of Venezuelan officials in cor-
ruption and illicit narcotics trafficking. 
Sec. 9. Sanctions on persons responsible for public corruption and undermining 
democratic governance in Venezuela. 
Sec. 10. Concerns over PDVSA transactions with Rosneft. 
Sec. 11. Report on activities of certain governments in Venezuela. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The deterioration of democratic governance 
and the economic crisis in Venezuela have led to an 
unprecedented humanitarian situation in which peo-
ple are suffering from severe shortages of essential 
medicines and basic food products. 
(2) According to the World Health Organiza-
tion, Venezuela had a shortage of necessary medica-
tions and medical supplies of— 
(A) 55 percent in 2014;
(B) 67 percent in 2015; and 
(C) 75 percent in 2016. 
(3) According to a Human Rights Watch 2016 
report, it is increasingly difficult for many Ven-
ezuelans, particularly those in lower- or middle-in-
come families, to obtain adequate nutrition and 
there are reports of symptoms of malnutrition, par-
ticularly in children. 
(4) Maternal deaths in Venezuela increased by 
66 percent from 2015 to 2016 while infant deaths 
increased by 30 percent. 
(5) There were 240,000 confirmed malaria 
cases in Venezuela in 2016—a 76 percent increase 
over 2015. 
(6) A survey—conducted jointly by the Central 
University of Venezuela, the Andre´s Bello Catholic 
University, and the Simo´n Bolivar University— 
found that almost 75 percent of Venezuelans lost an 
average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 as a result 
of a lack of proper nutrition amidst the country’s 
economic crisis. 
(7) Despite massive shortages of basic food-
stuffs and essential medicines, Nicola´s Maduro has 
rejected repeated requests from the Venezuelan Na-
tional Assembly and civil society organizations to 
bring humanitarian aid into the country. 
(8) The International Monetary Fund has esti-
mated that in Venezuela in 2016 the country’s gross 
domestic product contracted by 12 percent and infla-
tion rate reached 720 percent, and has stated that 
Venezuela had the worst growth and inflation per-
formance in the world. 
(9) The International Monetary Fund has not 
convened an Article IV Executive Board consultation 
for Venezuela since September 13, 2004, which 
greatly limits the extent of information available to 
the international community about the severity of 
the Venezuelan economic crisis. 
(10) Venezuela’s political, economic, and hu-
manitarian crisis is fueling social tensions that are 
resulting in growing incidents of public unrest, 
looting, violence among citizens, and an exodus of 
Venezuelans abroad. 
(11) These social distortions are taking place 
amidst an alarming climate of criminal violence. Ac-
cording to the United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crime, Caracas, Venezuela had the highest per cap-
ita homicide rate of any capital city in the world in 
2015 at 120 murders per 100,000 citizens.
(12) In 2016, 18,155 Venezuelans submitted 
asylum requests in the United States, which was the 
greatest number of requests by any nationality, ac-
cording to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv-
ices. 
(13) International and domestic human rights 
groups, such as Foro Penal Venezolano, recognize 
more than 600 political prisoners in Venezuela, in-
cluding opposition leader and former Chacao mayor 
Leopoldo Lo´pez, Judge Marı´a Lourdes Afiuni, Cara-
cas Mayor Antonio Jose´ Ledezma Dı´az, National 
Assembly Deputy Gilber Caro, and former San Cris-
tobal mayor Daniel Ceballos. 
(14) According to media accounts, over 125 
people lost their lives as the result of public dem-
onstrations and protests in Venezuela since April 
2017. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Nicola´s Maduro should permit the delivery 
of international humanitarian assistance to address 
the widespread and deeply concerning shortages of 
essential medicines and basic food products faced by 
the people of Venezuela;
(2) it is in the best interest of the Venezuelan 
people for the Government of Venezuela to engage 
with multilateral institutions to ameliorate the ef-
fects of the country’s ongoing economic, social, and 
humanitarian crisis; 
(3) Nicola´s Maduro should immediately release 
all political prisoners and respect internationally rec-
ognized human rights in order to facilitate the con-
ditions for political negotiations and dialogue in 
Venezuela; 
(4) Nicola´s Maduro and the Supreme Tribunal 
of Justice of Venezuela should take steps to rein-
state the full powers and authorities of the National 
Assembly of Venezuela in accordance with the Con-
stitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; 
(5) Venezuela’s National Electoral Council 
should establish a specific timeline to hold national, 
regional, and municipal elections in accordance with 
the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela and allow supervision of credible international 
electoral observers; and 
(6) the United States should support meaning-
ful efforts towards a substantive dialogue through 
which all parties uphold their commitments and 
agree to specific deadlines to restore respect for Ven-
ezuela’s constitutional mechanisms and resolve the 
country’s political, economic, and humanitarian cri-
sis. 
SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO PROVIDE HU-
MANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE 
OF VENEZUELA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall submit 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate a strategy to provide humanitarian assistance 
to the people of Venezuela through credible and inde-
pendent nongovernmental organizations operating in Ven-
ezuela or in neighboring countries to alleviate the suffering 
of the Venezuelan people. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
quired under subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A description of how and to what extent the 
following assistance will be provided: 
(A) Public health commodities for Ven-
ezuelan health facilities and services, including
medicines on the World Health Organization’s 
List of Essential Medicines and basic medical 
supplies and equipment. 
(B) Basic food commodities and nutritional 
supplements needed to address growing mal-
nutrition and improve food security for the peo-
ple of Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on 
the most vulnerable populations. 
(C) Technical assistance to ensure health 
and food commodities are appropriately se-
lected, procured, and distributed, predominantly 
through local nongovernmental organizations. 
(2) An identification of United States Agency 
for International Development best practices in de-
livering humanitarian assistance and how such best 
practices are being utilized in providing humani-
tarian assistance to Venezuela. 
SEC. 5. REQUIREMENT FOR STRATEGY TO COORDINATE 
INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN 
ASSIST-
ANCE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the appropriate United Nations humanitarian 
agencies should conduct and publish an independent as-
sessment on—
(1) the extent and impact of the shortages of 
food and medicine in Venezuela; and 
(2) the efforts needed to resolve such shortages. 
(b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall submit 
a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives that— 
(1) describes how the United States will secure 
support from international donors, including re-
gional partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the 
people of Venezuela; and 
(2) identifies governments that are willing to 
provide financial and technical assistance for the 
provision of such humanitarian assistance to the 
people of Venezuela and a description of such assist-
ance. 
SEC. 6. SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 
ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND POLITICAL CRI-
SIS IN VENEZUELA. 
(a) INITIAL EFFORTS.—The President shall instruct 
the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
United Nations to use the voice and vote of the United 
States to secure the necessary votes— 
(1) to place the humanitarian and political cri-
sis in Venezuela on the agenda at the United Na-
tions; and 
(2) to secure a Presidential Statement from the 
United Nations urging the Government of Venezuela 
to allow the delivery of humanitarian relief and to 
lift bureaucratic impediments or any other obstacles 
so that independent nongovernmental organizations 
can provide the proper assistance to the people of 
Venezuela without any interference by such govern-
ment. 
(b) ADDITIONAL EFFORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If the Government of Ven-
ezuela refuses to allow the delivery of humanitarian 
relief and lift bureaucratic impediments and any 
other obstacles described in subsection (a)(2), then 
beginning not later than 30 days after the conclu-
sion of the efforts of the United Nations described 
in such subsection, the President shall instruct the 
Permanent Representative of the United States to 
the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the 
United States to secure the adoption of a resolution 
described in paragraph (2).
(2) RESOLUTION DESCRIBED.—The resolution 
of the United Nations described in paragraph (1) is 
a resolution— 
(A) directing the Government of Venezuela 
to promptly allow safe and unhindered access 
for humanitarian agencies and their imple-
menting partners, including possible support 
from neighboring countries; and 
(B) calling on the Government of Ven-
ezuela to— 
(i) allow the delivery of food and med-
icine; 
(ii) end human rights violations; 
(iii) agree to free, fair and trans-
parent elections with credible international 
observers; 
(iv) cease violence; and 
(v) release all political prisoners. 
SEC. 7. SUPPORT FOR ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES 
INTER-AMERICAN 
DEMOCRATIC 
CHARTER. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, adopted by the Organization of American
States in Lima on September 11, 2001, affirms, 
‘‘The peoples of the Americas have a right to democ-
racy and their governments have an obligation to 
promote and defend it.’’. 
(2) Article 19 of the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter states ‘‘an unconstitutional interrup-
tion of the democratic order or an unconstitutional 
alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order in a member state, 
constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable ob-
stacle to its government’s participation in sessions of 
the General Assembly . . . and other bodies of the 
Organization.’’. 
(3) Article 20 of the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter provides— 
(A) ‘‘In the event of an unconstitutional al-
teration of the constitutional regime that seri-
ously impairs the democratic order in a member 
state, any member state or the Secretary Gen-
eral may request the immediate convocation of 
the Permanent Council to undertake a collective 
assessment of the situation and to take such de-
cisions as it deems appropriate.’’; and 
(B) ‘‘The Permanent Council, depending 
on the situation, may undertake the necessary
diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to 
foster the restoration of democracy.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) Nicola´s Maduro, the National Electoral 
Council of Venezuela, and the Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice of Venezuela have carried out systematic ef-
forts to undermine, block, and circumvent the au-
thorities and responsibilities of the Venezuelan Na-
tional Assembly as mandated in the Constitution of 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; 
(2) such efforts by Nicola´s Maduro and the Su-
preme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela amount to 
an unconstitutional alternation of the constitutional 
regime that seriously impairs the democratic order 
in Venezuela; and 
(3) the Secretary of State, working through the 
United States Permanent Mission to the Organiza-
tion of American States, should take additional steps 
to support ongoing efforts by the Secretary General 
of the Organization of American States— 
(A) to invoke the Inter-American Demo-
cratic Charter; 
(B) to advance a collective assessment of 
the situation in Venezuela; and
(C) to promote diplomatic initiatives to 
foster the restoration of Venezuelan democracy. 
SEC. 8. CONCERNS AND REPORT ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF 
VENEZUELAN 
OFFICIALS 
IN 
CORRUPTION 
AND ILLICIT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The deterioration of governance in Ven-
ezuela has been exacerbated by the involvement of 
senior officials of the Government of Venezuela, in-
cluding members of the National Electoral Council, 
the judicial system, and the Venezuelan security 
forces, in acts of corruption and illicit narcotics traf-
ficking and related money laundering. 
(2) In March 2015, the Department of the 
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
determined that approximately $2,000,000,000 had 
been siphoned from Venezuela’s public oil company, 
Petro´leos de Venezuela S.A., in conjunction with its 
designation of the Banca Privada d’Andorra as a 
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money 
Laundering Concern. 
(3) On August 1, 2016, General Nestor 
Reverol, Venezuela’s current Minister of Interior and 
former National Guard commander, was indicted in
a United States district court for participating in an 
international cocaine trafficking conspiracy. 
(4) On November 18, 2016, Franqui Francisco 
Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores, 
nephews of Nicola´s Maduro and Venezuelan First 
Lady Cilia Flores, were convicted in a United States 
district court on charges of conspiring to import co-
caine into the United States. 
(5) On February 13, 2017, the Department of 
the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control des-
ignated Tareck Zaidan El Aissami Maddah for his 
involvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant 
to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 
(21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.; title VIII of Public Law 
106–120). 
(6) The Department of the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control has designated additional in-
dividuals and senior Venezuelan officials for their in-
volvement in illicit narcotics trafficking, pursuant to 
such Act, including— 
(A) Venezuelan national Samark Jose 
Lopez Bello, who is the primary front man and 
money launderer for Tareck Zaidan El Aissami 
Maddah;
(B) Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, who 
is the current National Assembly Deputy and 
the former Director of Venezuela’s Military In-
telligence Directorate; 
(C) Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, who is 
the current Governor of Trujillo State and the 
former Director of Venezuela’s Directorate of 
Intelligence and Prevention Services; 
(D) Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, who 
previously served as the Minister of Interior; 
and 
(E) Freddy Alirio Bernal Rosales, who pre-
viously served as the Mayor of the Libertador 
municipality of Caracas. 
(7) On September 12, 2017, Ambassador Wil-
liam Brownfield testified before the Senate Caucus 
on International Narcotics Control that drug traf-
ficking organizations in Venezuela have ‘‘completely 
penetrated virtually every security, law enforcement, 
and justice-related institution’’ and that ‘‘there will 
be no long-term, democratic, prosperous and secure 
solution in Venezuela until there is a solution to the 
drug trafficking organization presence’’. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) 
CORRUPTION.—The 
term 
‘‘corruption’’ 
means the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including by bribery, nepotism, 
fraud, or embezzlement. 
(2) GRAND
CORRUPTION.—The term ‘‘grand 
corruption’’ means corruption committed at a high 
level of government that— 
(A) distorts policies or the central func-
tioning of the country; and 
(B) enables leaders to benefit at the ex-
pense of the public good. 
(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, acting through the Bureau of Intel-
ligence and Research, and in consultation with the 
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3003(4))), shall submit a report to Congress that 
describes the involvement of senior officials of the 
Government of Venezuela, including members of the 
National Electoral Council, the judicial system, and 
the Venezuelan security forces, in acts of corruption 
in Venezuela, with a specific emphasis on acts of 
grand corruption.
(2) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The report sub-
mitted under paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) describe how the acts of corruption de-
scribed in the report pose direct challenges for 
United States national security and inter-
national security; 
(B) identify individuals that frustrate the 
ability of the United States to combat illicit 
narcotics trafficking; and 
(C) include input from the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, the Office of Foreign As-
sets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network. 
(3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex. The unclassified portion of 
the report shall be made available to the public. 
SEC. 9. SANCTIONS ON PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUB-
LIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERMINING DEMO-
CRATIC GOVERNANCE IN VENEZUELA. 
(a) FINDING.—Executive Order 13692 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note), which was signed on March 8, 2015, estab-
lished sanctions against individuals responsible for under-
mining democratic processes and institutions and involved 
in acts of public corruption that were not included in the
Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act 
of 2014 (Public Law 113–278). 
(b) SANCTIONS.—Section 5 of the Venezuela Defense 
of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 (Public 
Law 113–278) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘or’’ at 
the end; 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (3) as 
paragraph (5); 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 
following: 
‘‘(3) is responsible for, or complicit in, ordering, 
controlling, or otherwise directing, significant actions 
or policies that undermine democratic processes or 
institutions; 
‘‘(4) is a government official, or a senior asso-
ciate of such an official, that is responsible for, or 
complicit in, ordering, controlling, or otherwise di-
recting, acts of significant corruption, including the 
expropriation of private or public assets for personal 
gain, corruption related to government contracts or 
the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the 
facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption 
to foreign jurisdictions; or’’; and
(D) in paragraph (5) (as redesignated), by 
striking ‘‘paragraph (1) or (2)’’ and inserting 
‘‘paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4)’’; and 
(2) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘December 31, 
2019’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2022’’. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President and Secretary of State should 
seek to encourage partner countries of the Organization 
of American States, the European Union, and the United 
Nations to impose sanctions with respect to Venezuelan 
individuals that are similar to sanctions imposed by the 
United States with respect to such Venezuelan individuals. 
SEC. 10. CONCERNS OVER PDVSA TRANSACTIONS WITH 
ROSNEFT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) In late 2016, Venezuelan state-owned oil 
company Petro´leos de Venezuela, S.A. (referred to in 
this section as ‘‘PDVSA’’), through a no-compete 
transaction, secured a loan from Russian govern-
ment-controlled oil company Rosneft, using 49.9 per-
cent of PDVSA’s American subsidiary, CITGO Pe-
troleum Corporation, including its assets in the 
United States, as collateral. As a result of this
transaction, 100 percent of CITGO is held as collat-
eral by PDVSA’s creditors. 
(2) CITGO, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
PDVSA, is engaged in interstate commerce and 
owns and controls critical energy infrastructure in 
19 States in the United States, including an exten-
sive network of pipelines, 48 terminals, and 3 refin-
eries, with a combined oil refining capacity of 
749,000 barrels per day. CITGO’s refinery in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana is the sixth largest refinery in the 
United States. 
(3) The Department of the Treasury imposed 
sanctions on Rosneft, which is controlled by the Rus-
sian Government, and its Executive Chairman, Igor 
Sechin, following Russia’s military invasion of 
Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 
2014. 
(4) The Department of Homeland Security has 
designated the energy sector as critical to United 
States infrastructure. 
(5) The growing economic crisis in Venezuela 
raises the probability that the Government of Ven-
ezuela and PDVSA will default on their inter-
national debt obligations, resulting in a scenario in
which Rosneft could come into control of CITGO’s 
United States energy infrastructure holdings. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) control of critical United States energy in-
frastructure by Rosneft, a Russian government-con-
trolled entity currently under United States sanc-
tions, would pose a significant risk to United States 
national security and energy security; 
(2) the President should take all necessary 
steps to prevent Rosneft from gaining control of 
critical United States interstate energy infrastruc-
ture; 
(3) a default by PDVSA on its loan from 
Rosneft, resulting in Rosneft coming into possession 
of PDVSA’s United States CITGO assets, would 
warrant careful consideration by the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States; 
(4) if PDVSA defaults on its debt obligations, 
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Asset Control should review CITGO’s transactions 
with United States persons to assess and ensure 
compliance with United States sanctions policies and 
regulations; and
(5) the Department of Homeland Security 
should conduct an assessment of the security risks 
posed by foreign control of CITGO’s United States 
energy infrastructure holdings and keep the relevant 
committees of Congress fully informed of its findings 
and 
any 
subsequent 
strategy 
to 
address 
vulnerabilities to United States energy security as a 
result. 
SEC. 11. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN GOVERN-
MENTS IN VENEZUELA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
acting through the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
of the Department of State and in consultation with the 
intelligence community, shall submit to Congress a report 
that describes the full extent of cooperation by the Govern-
ments of the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic 
of China, Cuba, and Iran with the Government of Ven-
ezuela and the Venezuelan armed forces. 
(b) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex. The unclassified portion of the report shall be 
made available to the public. 
(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘intel-
ligence community’’ has the meaning given such term in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3003(4)). 
Passed the House of Representatives December 7, 
2017. 
Attest: 
Clerk.
115TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. R. 2658 
AN ACT 
To provide humanitarian assistance for the Ven-
ezuelan people, to defend democratic governance 
and combat widespread public corruption in Ven-
ezuela, and for other purposes.