267
(A), the President may delay, for up to an addi-
tional 90 days, the effective date of an order is-
sued under subsection (c) imposing any sanc-
tion on a foreign person if the President deter-
mines, and certifies in writing to the Congress,
that the appropriate foreign government is in
the process of taking actions described in sub-
paragraph (B).
(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Before the end of
the 90-day period beginning on the date on which an
order is issued under subsection (c), the President
shall submit to the Congress a report on—
(A) the status of consultations under this
subsection with the government referred to in
paragraph (1); and
(B) the basis for any determination under
paragraph (2) that such government has taken
specific corrective actions.
(g) TERMINATION OF THE SANCTIONS.—Any sanc-
tion imposed on any person pursuant to an order issued
under subsection (c) shall—
(1) remain in effect for a period of not less
than 12 months; and
268
(2) cease to apply after the end of such 12-
month period only if the President determines, and
certifies in writing to the Congress, that—
(A) the person has ceased to engage in any
prohibited activity; and
(B) the President has received reliable as-
surances from such person that the person will
not, in the future, engage in any prohibited ac-
tivity.
(h) WAIVER.—The President may waive the contin-
ued application of any sanction imposed on any person
pursuant to an order issued under subsection (c) if the
President determines, and certifies in writing to the Con-
gress, that the continued imposition of the sanction would
have a serious adverse effect on the safety and soundness
of the domestic or international financial system or on do-
mestic or international payments systems.
(i) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.—The Attorney General
may bring an action in an appropriate district court of
the United States for injunctive and other appropriate re-
lief with respect to—
(1) any violation of subsection (b); or
(2) any order issued under subsection (c).
(j) KNOWINGLY DEFINED.—
269
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this section,
the term ‘‘knowingly’’ means the state of mind of a
person with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a
result in which—
(A) such person is aware that such person
is engaging in such conduct, that such cir-
cumstance exists, or that such result is substan-
tially certain to occur; or
(B) such person has a firm belief that such
circumstance exists or that such result is sub-
stantially certain to occur.
(2) KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PAR-
TICULAR CIRCUMSTANCE.—If knowledge of the exist-
ence of a particular circumstance is required for an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is
aware of a high probability of the existence of such
circumstance, unless the person actually believes
that such circumstance does not exist.
(k) SCOPE
OF APPLICATION.—This section shall
apply with respect to prohibited activities which occur on
or after the date this part takes effect.
SEC. 225. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK.
Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of
1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)) is amended in the first sen-
tence by inserting after ‘‘device’’ the following: ‘‘(as de-
270
fined in section 231(4) of the Nuclear Proliferation Pre-
vention Act of 1994), or that any country has willfully
aided or abetted any non-nuclear-weapon state (as defined
in section 231(5) of that Act) to acquire any such nuclear
explosive device or to acquire unsafeguarded special nu-
clear material (as defined in section 231(8) of that Act)’’.
SEC. 226. SANCTIONS AGAINST COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN
TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR DE-
SIGN INFORMATION OR COMPONENTS.
(a) DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT.—Except
as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f), in the event
that the President determines that any country, on or
after the effective date of this part—
(1) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state a
nuclear explosive device,
(2) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and either—
(A) receives a nuclear explosive device, or
(B) detonates a nuclear explosive device,
(3) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state any
design information or component which is deter-
mined by the President to be important to, and
known by the transferring country to be intended by
the recipient state for use in, the development or
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, or
271
(4) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and
receives any design information or component which
is determined by the President to be important to,
and intended by the recipient state for use in, the
development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive
device,
then the President shall forthwith report to the Congress
in writing his determination with respect to that country
and shall forthwith impose the sanctions described in sub-
section (b) against that country.
(b) SANCTIONS.—The sanctions referred to in sub-
section (a) are as follows:
(1) The United States Government shall termi-
nate assistance to that country under the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, except for humanitarian as-
sistance or food or other agricultural commodities.
(2) The United States Government shall—
(A) terminate sales to that country under
the Arms Export Control Act of any defense ar-
ticles, defense services, or design and construc-
tion services, and
(B) terminate and deny licenses for the ex-
port to that country of any item on the United
States Munitions List.
272
(3) The United States Government shall termi-
nate all foreign military financing for that country
under the Arms Export Control Act.
(4) The United States Government shall deny
to that country any credit, credit guarantees, or
other financial assistance by any department, agen-
cy, or instrumentality of the United States Govern-
ment, except that the sanction of this paragraph
shall not apply—
(A) to any transaction subject to the re-
porting requirements of title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (relating to congressional
oversight of intelligence activities), or
(B) to humanitarian assistance.
(5) The United States Government shall op-
pose, in accordance with section 701 of the Inter-
national Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C.
262d), the extension of any loan or financial or tech-
nical assistance to that country by any international
financial institution.
(6) The United States Government shall pro-
hibit any United States bank from making any loan
or providing any credit to the government of that
country, except for loans or credits for the purpose
273
of purchasing food or other agricultural commod-
ities.
(7) The authorities of section 106 of this Act
shall be used to prohibit exports to that country of
specific goods and technology (excluding food and
other agricultural commodities), except that such
prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject
to the reporting requirements of title V of the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 (relating to congres-
sional oversight of intelligence activities).
(8) In addition to the sanctions provided for in
paragraphs (1) through (7), the President may pro-
hibit the importation into the United States of goods
that are the growth, product, or manufacture of that
country. The President shall determine the type and
volume of imports to be prohibited.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section—
(1) the term ‘‘design information’’ means spe-
cific information that relates to the design of a nu-
clear explosive device and that is not available to the
public; and
(2) the term ‘‘component’’ means a specific
component of a nuclear explosive device.
(d) AUTHORITY TO DELAY SANCTIONS RELATING TO
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.—
274
(1) PRESIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATION.—Notwith-
standing subsection (a), the President may, for a pe-
riod of not more than 30 days of continuous session,
delay the imposition of sanctions which would other-
wise be required under subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the
President first transmits to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and to the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate,
a certification that he has determined that an imme-
diate imposition of sanctions on that country would
be detrimental to the national security of the United
States. Not more than one such certification may be
transmitted for a country with respect to the same
detonation, transfer, or receipt of a nuclear explosive
device.
(2) AUTHORITY TO GRANT WAIVER.—(A) If the
President transmits a certification to the Congress
under paragraph (1), a joint resolution which would
permit the President to exercise the waiver authority
of subsection (e) shall, if introduced in either House
within 30 days of continuous session after the Con-
gress receives this certification, be considered in the
Senate in accordance with subparagraph (B).
(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph
shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with
275
the provisions of section 601(b) of the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976.
(C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term
‘‘joint resolution’’ means a joint resolution the mat-
ter after the resolving clause of which is as follows:
‘‘That the Congress having received on ll a cer-
tification by the President under section 226(d)(1)
of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994
with respect to ll, the Congress hereby authorizes
the President to exercise the waiver authority con-
tained in section 226(e) of that Act.’’, with the date
of receipt of the certification inserted in the first
blank and the name of the country inserted in the
second blank.
(e) WAIVER
AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding sub-
section (a), if the Congress enacts a joint resolution under
subsection (d), the President may waive any sanction
which would otherwise be required under subsection (a)(1)
or (2) if he determines and certifies in writing to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the imposition
of such sanction would be seriously prejudicial to the
achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives
or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.
276
The President shall transmit with such certification a
statement setting forth the specific reasons therefor.
(f) SANCTIONS RELATING
TO INFORMATION
AND
COMPONENTS.—
(1) IMPOSITION.—In the event the President is
required to impose sanctions against a country
under subsection (a) (3) or (a)(4), the President
shall forthwith so inform such country and shall im-
pose the required sanctions beginning 30 days after
submitting to the Congress the report required by
subsection (a) unless, and to the extent that, there
is enacted during the 30-day period a law prohibit-
ing the imposition of such sanctions.
(2) WAIVER.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the sanctions which are required to be
imposed against a country under subsection (a)(3)
or (4) shall not apply if the President determines
and certifies in writing to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Governmental Af-
fairs of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives that the ap-
plication of such sanctions against such country
would have a serious adverse effect on vital United
States interests. The President shall transmit with
277
such certification a statement setting forth the spe-
cific reasons therefor.
(g) CONTINUITY OF SESSION.—For purposes of this
section, continuity of session is broken only by an adjourn-
ment of the Congress sine die and the days on which either
House of Congress is not in session because of an adjourn-
ment of more than three days to a day certain are ex-
cluded in the computation of any period of time in which
the Congress is in continuous session.
(h) AUTHORITY
OF
THE PRESIDENT NOT DELE-
GABLE.—The President may not delegate or transfer his
power, authority, or discretion to make or modify deter-
minations under this section.
SEC. 227. AMENDMENT TO THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL
ACT.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Arms Export Control Act is
amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:
‘‘CHAPTER 10—NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS
‘‘SEC. 101. NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT TRANSFERS.
‘‘(a) PROHIBITIONS; SAFEGUARDS
AND MANAGE-
MENT.—Except as provided in subsection (b), no funds
made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 or this Act may be used for the purpose of provid-
ing economic assistance (including assistance under chap-
278
ter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961),
providing military assistance or grant military education
and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of part
II of that Act, or extending military credits or making
guarantees, to any country which the President deter-
mines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials,
or technology to any other country on or after August 4,
1977, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology
from any other country on or after August 4, 1977, unless
before such delivery—
‘‘(1) the supplying country and receiving coun-
try have reached agreement to place all such equip-
ment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under
multilateral auspices and management when avail-
able; and
‘‘(2) the recipient country has entered into an
agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency to place all such equipment, materials, tech-
nology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such
country, under the safeguards system of such
Agency.
‘‘(b) CERTIFICATION BY PRESIDENT OF NECESSITY
OF CONTINUED ASSISTANCE; DISAPPROVAL
BY CON-
GRESS.—(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Presi-
dent may furnish assistance which would otherwise be pro-
279
hibited under such subsection if he determines and cer-
tifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate that—
‘‘(A) the termination of such assistance would
have a serious adverse effect on vital United States
interests; and
‘‘(B) he has received reliable assurances that
the country in question will not acquire or develop
nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so.
Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting
such determination in each particular case.
‘‘(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date on which the certification is re-
ceived by the Congress. However, if, within 30 calendar
days after receiving this certification, the Congress enacts
a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress
disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the
certification, then upon the enactment of that resolution
the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries
of assistance furnished under the authority of that certifi-
cation shall be suspended immediately.
‘‘(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall
be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provi-
280
sions of section 601(b) of the International Security As-
sistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
‘‘SEC. 102. NUCLEAR REPROCESSING TRANSFERS AND ILLE-
GAL EXPORTS FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DE-
VICES.
‘‘(a) PROHIBITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES
INVOLVED IN TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR REPROCESSING
EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS, OR TECHNOLOGY.—Except as
provided in subsection (b), no funds made available to
carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act
may be used for the purpose of providing economic assist-
ance (including assistance under chapter 4 of part II of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), providing military
assistance or grant military education and training, pro-
viding assistance under chapter 6 of part II of that Act,
or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any
country which the President determines—
‘‘(1) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment,
materials, or technology to any other country on or
after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment,
materials, or technology from any other country on
or after August 4, 1977 (except for the transfer of
reprocessing technology associated with the inves-
tigation, under international evaluation programs in
which the United States participates, of technologies
281
which are alternatives to pure plutonium reprocess-
ing), or
‘‘(2) is a non-nuclear-weapon state which, on or
after August 8, 1985, exports illegally (or attempts
to export illegally) from the United States any mate-
rial, equipment, or technology which would contrib-
ute significantly to the ability of such country to
manufacture a nuclear explosive device, if the Presi-
dent determines that the material, equipment, or
technology was to be used by such country in the
manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.
For purposes of paragraph (2), an export (or attempted
export) by a person who is an agent of, or is otherwise
acting on behalf of or in the interests of, a country shall
be considered to be an export (or attempted export) by
that country.
‘‘(b) EXCEPTION.—(1) Notwithstanding subsection
(a), the President in any fiscal year may furnish assist-
ance which would otherwise be prohibited under that sub-
section if he determines and certifies in writing during
that fiscal year to the Speaker of the House of Represent-
atives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate that the termination of such assistance would be seri-
ously prejudicial to the achievement of United States non-
proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the
282
common defense and security. The President shall trans-
mit with such certification a statement setting forth the
specific reasons therefor.
‘‘(2)(A) A certification under paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date on which the certification is re-
ceived by the Congress. However, if, within 30 calendar
days after receiving this certification, the Congress enacts
a joint resolution stating in substance that the Congress
disapproves the furnishing of assistance pursuant to the
certification, then upon the enactment of that resolution
the certification shall cease to be effective and all deliveries
of assistance furnished under the authority of that certifi-
cation shall be suspended immediately.
‘‘(B) Any joint resolution under this paragraph shall
be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 601(b) of the International Security As-
sistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
‘‘SEC. 103. DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
‘‘As used in this chapter, the term ‘nuclear explosive
device’ has the meaning given that term in section 231(4)
of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.’’.
(b) REPEALS.—Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 are hereby repealed.
(c) REFERENCES IN LAW.—Any reference in law as
of the effective date of this part to section 669 or 670
283
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall, on and after
such date, be deemed to be a reference to section 101 or
102 of the Arms Export Control Act, or section 226 of
this Act, as the case may be.
SEC. 228. REWARD.
Section 36(a) of the State Department Basic Au-
thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(a)) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through
(3) as subparagraphs (A) through (C), respectively;
(2) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(a)’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘act
of international terrorism’ includes any act substantially
contributing to the acquisition of unsafeguarded special
nuclear material (as defined in section 231(8) of the Nu-
clear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994) or any nuclear
explosive device (as defined in section 231(4) of that Act)
by an individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state (as
defined in section 231(5) of that Act).’’.
SEC. 229. REPORTS.
(a) CONTENT OF ACDA ANNUAL REPORT.—Section
51 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amend-
ed by section 717 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
284
(A) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of para-
graph (5);
(B) by striking the period at the end of
paragraph (6) and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(C) by adding after paragraph (6) the fol-
lowing new paragraph:
‘‘(7) a discussion of any material noncompliance
by foreign governments with their binding commit-
ments to the United States with respect to the pre-
vention of the spread of nuclear explosive devices (as
defined in section 231(4) of the Nuclear Prolifera-
tion Prevention Act of 1994) by non-nuclear-weapon
states (as defined in section 231(5) of that Act) or
the acquisition by such states of unsafeguarded spe-
cial nuclear material (as defined in section 231(8) of
that Act), including—
‘‘(A) a net assessment of the aggregate
military significance of all such violations;
‘‘(B) a statement of the compliance policy
of the United States with respect to violations
of those commitments; and
‘‘(C) what actions, if any, the President
has taken or proposes to take to bring any na-
tion committing such a violation into compli-
ance with those commitments.’’; and
285
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section:
‘‘(c) REPORTING CONSECUTIVE NONCOMPLIANCE.—
If the President in consecutive reports submitted to the
Congress under this section reports that any designated
nation is not in full compliance with its binding non-
proliferation commitments to the United States, then the
President shall include in the second such report an as-
sessment of what actions are necessary to compensate for
such violations.’’.
(b) REPORTING ON DEMARCHES.—(1) It is the sense
of the Congress that the Department of State should, in
the course of implementing its reporting responsibilities
under section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, include a summary of demarches that the United
States has issued or received from foreign governments
with respect to activities which are of significance from
the proliferation standpoint.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘de-
marche’’ means any official communication by one govern-
ment to another, by written or oral means, intended by
the originating government to express—
(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible
future action or activity of the recipient government,
or of a person within the jurisdiction of that govern-
286
ment, 
contributing 
to 
the 
global 
spread 
of
unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear
explosive devices;
(B) a request for the recipient government to
counter such action or activity; or
(C) both the concern and request described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B).
SEC. 230. TECHNICAL CORRECTION.
Section 133 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2160c) is amended by striking ‘‘20 kilograms’’ and
inserting ‘‘5 kilograms’’.
SEC. 231. DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this part—
(1) the term ‘‘foreign person’’ means—
(A) an individual who is not a citizen of
the United States or an alien admitted for per-
manent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other
nongovernment entity which is created or orga-
nized under the laws of a foreign country or
which has its principal place of business outside
the United States;
(2) the term ‘‘goods or technology’’ means—
(A) nuclear materials and equipment and
sensitive nuclear technology (as such terms are
287
defined in section 4 of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978), all export items des-
ignated by the President pursuant to section
309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of
1978, and all technical assistance requiring au-
thorization under section 57 b. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954; and
(B) in the case of exports from a country
other than the United States, any goods or
technology that, if exported from the United
States, would be goods or technology described
in subparagraph (A);
(3) the term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ means the
safeguards set forth in an agreement between a
country and the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy, as authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute
of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
(4) the term ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’ means
any device, whether assembled or disassembled, that
is designed to produce an instantaneous release of
an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear
material that is greater than the amount of energy
that would be released from the detonation of one
pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT);
288
(5) the term ‘‘non-nuclear-weapon state’’ means
any country which is not a nuclear-weapon state, as
defined by Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
(6) the term ‘‘special nuclear material’’ has the
meaning given that term in section 11 aa. of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014aa);
(7) the term ‘‘United States person’’ means—
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the
United States or an alien admitted for perma-
nent residence to the United States; or
(B) a corporation, partnership, or other
nongovernment entity which is not a foreign
person; and
(8) the term ‘‘unsafeguarded special nuclear
material’’ means special nuclear material which is
held in violation of IAEA safeguards or not subject
to IAEA safeguards (excluding any quantity of ma-
terial that could, if it were exported from the United
States, be exported under a general license issued by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
289
SEC. 232. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The provisions of this part, and the amendments
made by this part, shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act.
PART C—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY
SEC. 241. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.
It is the sense of the Congress that in order to main-
tain and enhance international confidence in the effective-
ness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral under-
takings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons,
the United States should seek to negotiate with other na-
tions and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board
of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—
(1) build international support for the principle
that nuclear supply relationships must require pur-
chasing nations to agree to full-scope international
safeguards;
(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within
the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a com-
prehensive review of its own procedures for declas-
sifying information relating to the design or produc-
tion of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate
any measures that would reduce the risk of such in-
formation contributing to nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion;
290
(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce
weapons-grade nuclear material for large-scale com-
mercial uses until such time as safeguards are devel-
oped that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis,
the diversion of significant quantities of such mate-
rial for nuclear explosive purposes;
(4) pursue greater financial support for the im-
plementation and improvement of safeguards from
all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear
programs, particularly from those nations that are
currently using or planning to use weapons-grade
nuclear material for commercial purposes;
(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual fi-
nancial contributions by all members of the IAEA,
including the United States;
(6) pursue the elimination of international com-
merce in highly enriched uranium for use in research
reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation
to develop and to use low-enriched alternative nu-
clear fuels;
(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states
to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for
purposes of naval propulsion;
(8) pursue an international open skies arrange-
ment that would authorize the IAEA to operate sur-
291
veillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access
to satellite information for safeguards verification
purposes;
(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA
member nations to share intelligence material with
the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without
compromising 
national 
security 
or 
intelligence
sources or methods;
(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear
facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nu-
clear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to ex-
port and to require safeguards over that facility or
technology, regardless of its destination; and
(11) seek agreement among the parties to the
Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and
to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from
the Treaty.
SEC. 242. IAEA INTERNAL REFORMS.
In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in
the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of
the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate
with other nations and groups of nations, including the
IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, to—
292
(1) improve the access of the IAEA within nu-
clear facilities that are capable of producing, proc-
essing, or fabricating special nuclear material suit-
able for use in a nuclear explosive device;
(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet and
to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion
of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particu-
lar attention to facilities in which there are bulk
quantities of plutonium; and
(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA
to meet those detection goals in a particular facility,
require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is un-
able to do so;
(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations
of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for infor-
mation on possible safeguards violations, and to es-
tablish a ‘‘hot line’’ for the reporting of such viola-
tions and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear
material;
(4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in
the manufacture of equipment or material that is es-
pecially designated or prepared for the processing,
use, or production of special fissionable material or,
in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nu-
clear explosive device;
293
(5) establish safeguards over nuclear research
and development activities and facilities;
(6) implement special inspections of undeclared
nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safe-
guards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA
to conduct challenge inspections on demand at sus-
pected nuclear sites;
(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include
tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste
containing special fissionable material, and increase
the scope of such safeguards on heavy water;
(8) revise downward the IAEA’s official mini-
mum amounts of nuclear material (‘‘significant
quantity’’) needed to make a nuclear explosive device
and establish these amounts as national rather than
facility standards;
(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA
inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;
(10) promote the use of near real time material
accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facili-
ties that use, produce, or store significant quantities
of special fissionable material;
(11) develop with other IAEA member nations
an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of
visa applications by IAEA inspectors;
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(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds,
technical assistance, and political support necessary
to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection;
and
(13) make public the annual safeguards imple-
mentation report of the IAEA, establishing a public
registry of commodities in international nuclear com-
merce, including dual-use goods, and creating a pub-
lic repository of current nuclear trade control laws,
agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judi-
cial actions by IAEA member nations.
SEC. 243. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—The President shall, in the
report required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978, describe—
(1) the steps he has taken to implement sec-
tions 241 and 242, and
(2) the progress that has been made and the
obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to
meet the objectives set forth in sections 241 and
242.
(b) CONTENTS
OF REPORT.—Each report under
paragraph (1) shall describe—
(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that
the President has taken during the period since the
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enactment of this Act in pursuit of each of the ob-
jectives set forth in sections 241 and 242;
(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in
the pursuit of those initiatives;
(3) any additional initiatives that have been
proposed by other countries or international organi-
zations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA
safeguards;
(4) all activities of the Federal Government in
support of the objectives set forth in sections 241
and 242;
(5) any recommendations of the President on
additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of
IAEA safeguards; and
(6) any initiatives that the President plans to
take in support of each of the objectives set forth in
sections 241 and 242.
SEC. 244. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this part—
(1) the term ‘‘highly enriched uranium’’ means
uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the iso-
tope U–235;
(2) the term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
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(3) the term ‘‘near real time material account-
ancy’’ means a method of accounting for the loca-
tion, quantity, and disposition of special fissionable
material at facilities that store or process such mate-
rial, in which verification of peaceful use is continu-
ously achieved by means of frequent physical inven-
tories and the use of in-process instrumentation;
(4) the term ‘‘special fissionable material’’ has
the meaning given that term by Article XX(1) of the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on
October 26, 1956;
(5) the term ‘‘the Treaty’’ means the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at
Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
and
(6) the terms ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’, ‘‘non-nu-
clear-weapon state’’, ‘‘nuclear explosive device’’, and
‘‘special nuclear material’’ have the meanings given
those terms in section 231 of this Act.
PART D—REPEAL OF DUPLICATIVE PROVISIONS
SEC. 251. REPEAL.
Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act—
(1) title VIII of the Foreign Relations Author-
ization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, the
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amendments made by that title, and the items relat-
ing to such title in the table of contents of that Act,
are repealed; and
(2) with respect to any provisions of law re-
pealed by title VIII of that Act, such title shall be
deemed not to have been enacted.
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