I 
112TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1750 
To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United States by imple-
menting and supplementing certain provisions of the New START Treaty 
and the Resolution of Ratification, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 5, 2011 
Mr. TURNER (for himself and Mr. MCKEON) introduced the following bill; 
which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently de-
termined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To strengthen the strategic force posture of the United 
States by implementing and supplementing certain provi-
sions of the New START Treaty and the Resolution 
of Ratification, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘New START Treaty Implementation Act’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Definitions. 
Sec. 3. Use of funds on the modernization of nuclear weapons. 
Sec. 4. Limitation on nuclear force reductions. 
Sec. 5. Nuclear employment strategy. 
Sec. 6. Force analysis and assessment of the capabilities of the nuclear forces 
of the United States. 
Sec. 7. Annual assessment and report on the delivery platforms for nuclear 
weapons and the nuclear command and control system. 
Sec. 8. Missile defense. 
Sec. 9. Annual report on the plan for the modernization of the nuclear weapons 
stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms. 
Sec. 10. Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement nuclear facility and 
Uranium Processing Facility. 
Sec. 11. Policy on non-nuclear weapons systems. 
Sec. 12. Non-strategic nuclear weapon reductions and extended deterrence pol-
icy. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) The term ‘‘congressional defense commit-
tees’’ has the meaning given that term in section 
101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code. 
(2) The term ‘‘covered nuclear systems’’ means 
the following: 
(A) B–52H or B2 bomber aircraft and nu-
clear air-launched cruise missiles. 
(B) Trident ballistic missile submarines, 
launch tubes, and Trident D–5 submarine- 
launched ballistic missiles. 
(C) Minuteman III intercontinental bal-
listic missiles and associated silos. 
(D) Nuclear warheads or gravity bombs 
that can be delivered by the systems specified 
in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
(E) Nuclear weapons delivered by means 
other than the systems specified in subpara-
graph (A), (B), or (C). 
(3) The term ‘‘New START Treaty’’ means the 
Treaty between the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, signed on April 8, 2010. 
SEC. 3. USE OF FUNDS ON THE MODERNIZATION OF NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The President of the United States, in a 
letter dated December 18, 2010, declared that, ‘‘I 
recognize that nuclear modernization requires invest-
ment for the long-term, in addition to this one-year 
budget increase. That is my commitment to the Con-
gress that my Administration will pursue these pro-
grams and capabilities for as long as I am Presi-
dent. In future years, we will provide annual updates 
to the [report required under section 1251 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549)].’’. 
(2) Article 5, Section 1 of the New START 
Treaty declares that, ‘‘Subject to the provisions of 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
this Treaty, modernization and replacement of stra-
tegic offensive arms may be carried out.’’. 
(3) The Secretary of Defense declared on Octo-
ber 28, 2008, that, ‘‘To be blunt, there is absolutely 
no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and re-
duce the number of weapons in our stockpile without 
either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing 
a modernization program.’’. 
(4) The November 2010 update to the report 
required under section 1251 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 
111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) said that, ‘‘Notably, stock-
pile requirements to fully implement the [Nuclear 
Posture Review] and the New START Treaty have 
been refined . . . Based on this additional work, and 
the development of new information and insights, 
the President is prepared to seek additional re-
sources for the Weapons Activities account, over and 
above the FY2011 FYNSP, for the FY 2012 budget 
and for the remainder of the FYNSP period 
(FY2013 to FY 2016). Specifically, the President 
plans to request $7.6 billion for FY 2012 (an in-
crease of $0.6 billion over the planned FY 2012 
funding level . . .). Given the extremely tight budget 
environment facing the Federal Government, these 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority 
the [Administration] places on maintaining the safe-
ty, security, and effectiveness of the deterrent.’’. 
(5) The Stockpile Stewardship Management 
Plan for Fiscal Year 2011, dated May 2010, said 
that, ‘‘The Laboratory Directors will be expected to 
provide findings associated with the full range of 
[life extension program] approaches, and to make a 
set of recommendations based solely on their best 
technical assessments of the ability of each [life ex-
tension program] approach to meet critical stockpile 
management goals (weapons system safety, security, 
and effectiveness).’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the life extension program deadlines described 
in paragraph (2) represent important deadlines that 
must be met to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable 
nuclear stockpile and credible deterrent. 
(2) DEADLINES
DESCRIBED.—The life exten-
sion program deadlines described in this paragraph 
are the deadlines identified in the November 2010 
update to the report required under section 1251 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2549) as 
follows: 
(A) Completion of the W76 build in fiscal 
year 2018. 
(B) Completion of the first production unit 
of the B–61 in fiscal year 2017. 
(C) Beginning of the study of life exten-
sion options for the W78 in fiscal year 2012. 
(D) Beginning of the study of a common 
warhead for the W78 and the W88 in fiscal 
year 2012. 
(E) Beginning of the development of an 
Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system for the 
W88 in fiscal year 2012. 
(c) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to accomplish the modernization and re-
placement of the nuclear triad; 
(2) to sustain a robust stockpile stewardship 
program and to maintain and modernize the nuclear 
weapons production capabilities and capacities that 
will both— 
(A) ensure the safety, reliability, and per-
formance of the nuclear weapons of the United 
States at the New START Treaty levels; and 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
(B) meet requirements for hedging against 
possible international developments or technical 
problems, in conformance with the policies of 
the United States and in support of nuclear de-
terrence, extended deterrence, assurance, and 
defense; 
(3) to maintain the nuclear weapons labora-
tories of the United States and preserve the core nu-
clear weapons competencies of such laboratories; 
(4) that the President should not take any ac-
tion to retire or dismantle (or to prepare to retire 
or dismantle) any of the covered nuclear systems un-
less modernization or replacement is occurring as 
proposed in the plans under the report required by 
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 
Stat. 2549), the November 2010 update to such re-
port, and the reports required under section 495 of 
title 10, United States Code, as added by section 9; 
and 
(5) that if the modernization plan is not funded 
consistent with the annual report required under 
such section 495, such failure would jeopardize the 
supreme interests of the United States and is poten-
tial grounds for the withdrawal of the United States 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
from the New START Treaty in accordance with 
Article XIV of such Treaty. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Funds 
are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Depart-
ment of Energy for fiscal year 2012 for the activities of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration in carrying 
out programs necessary for national security in the 
amount of $11,782,930,000, of which $7,629,716,000 
shall be for weapons activities of the National Nuclear Se-
curity Administration. 
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR FORCE REDUCTIONS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) As of September 30, 2009, the stockpile of 
nuclear weapons of the United States has been re-
duced by 84 percent from its maximum level in 1967 
and by more than 75 percent from its level when the 
Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. 
(2) The number of non-strategic nuclear weap-
ons of the United States has declined by approxi-
mately 90 percent from September 30, 1991, to Sep-
tember 30, 2009. 
(3) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs stated, ‘‘As 
we implement New START, we’re making prepara-
tions for the next round of nuclear reductions. 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Under the President’s direction, the Department of 
Defense will review our strategic requirements and 
develop options for further reductions in our current 
nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 
5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve 
warheads. To develop these options for further re-
ductions, we need to consider several factors, such 
as potential changes in targeting requirements and 
alert postures that are required for effective deter-
rence.’’. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW START TREATY.— 
(1) LIMITATION.— 
(A) Except as provided by paragraph (2), 
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
Energy may not obligate or expend amounts ap-
propriated or otherwise made available to the 
Department of Defense or the Department of 
Energy for any of fiscal years 2011 through 
2017 to retire any covered nuclear system of 
the United States as required by the New 
START Treaty. 
(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be 
construed to limit any action (including 
verification) required by the New START Trea-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
ty other than retiring any covered nuclear sys-
tem of the United States. 
(2) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy may jointly waive the limi-
tation under paragraph (1)(A) for a covered nuclear 
system if— 
(A) the Secretaries submit to the congres-
sional defense committees written notice of the 
status of carrying out the modernization plan 
described in the most recent report required by 
section 495 of title 10, United States Code, as 
added by section 9; and 
(B) with respect to such notice— 
(i) if the notice describes that such 
plan is being carried out, a period of 30 
days has elapsed following the date on 
which the President submits to the con-
gressional defense committees such report 
that includes written notice of the pro-
posed retirement of such nuclear system, 
as required by subsection (a)(1)(D) of such 
section 495; or 
(ii) if the notice describes that such 
plan is not being carried out, a period of 
180 days has elapsed following the date on 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
weapons stockpile not less than a total of 80 pits per 
year; and 
(3) the processing facility is able to deliver to 
the nuclear weapons stockpile not less than 80 refur-
bished or new canned subassemblies per year. 
(d) PROHIBITION ON UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Part I of subtitle A of title 
10, United States Code, is amended by adding at 
the end the following new chapter: 
‘‘CHAPTER 24—NUCLEAR POSTURE AND 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
‘‘Sec. 
‘‘491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons. 
‘‘§ 491. Prohibition on unilateral reduction of nuclear 
weapons 
‘‘The President may not retire, dismantle, or elimi-
nate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate, any nu-
clear weapon of the United States (including such de-
ployed weapons and nondeployed weapons and warheads 
in the nuclear weapons stockpile) if such action would re-
duce the number of such weapons to a number that is 
less than the level described in the New START Treaty 
(as defined in section 494(c)) unless such action is— 
‘‘(1) required by a treaty or international agree-
ment specifically approved with the advice and con-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
sent of the Senate pursuant to Article II, section 2, 
clause 2 of the Constitution; or 
‘‘(2) specifically authorized by an Act of Con-
gress.’’. 
(2) CLERICAL
AMENDMENTS.—The table of 
chapters at the beginning of subtitle A of title 10, 
United States Code, and at the beginning of part I 
of such subtitle, are each amended by inserting after 
the item relating to chapter 23 the following new 
item: 
‘‘24. Nuclear posture and missile defense ................................
491’’. 
SEC. 5. NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Section 1057 of H.R. 5136, as passed by 
the House of Representatives during the 111th Con-
gress, included a requirement that any future reduc-
tions of the nuclear forces of the United States 
below the level described in the New START Treaty 
be contingent on the certification by the Secretary of 
Defense that ‘‘such reduction does not require a 
change in targeting strategy from counterforce tar-
geting to countervalue targeting’’. 
(2) On March 29, 2011, the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs stated, ‘‘As 
we implement New START, we’re making prepara-
tions for the next round of nuclear reductions. 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
Under the President’s direction, the Department of 
Defense will review our strategic requirements and 
develop options for further reductions in our current 
nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 
5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve 
warheads. To develop these options for further re-
ductions, we need to consider several factors, such 
as potential changes in targeting requirements and 
alert postures that are required for effective deter-
rence.’’. 
(b) CHANGES TO STRATEGY.—Chapter 24 of title 10, 
United States Code, as added by section 4, is further 
amended by adding at the end the following new section: 
‘‘§ 492. Nuclear employment strategy 
‘‘The President may not make any changes to the nu-
clear employment strategy of the United States unless— 
‘‘(1) the President submits to the congressional 
defense committees a report on such proposed 
changes, including— 
‘‘(A) the implication of such changes on 
the flexibility and resilience of the strategic 
forces of the United States and the ability of 
such forces to support the goals of the United 
States with respect to nuclear deterrence, ex-
tended deterrence, assurance, and defense; and 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
‘‘(B) certification that such proposed 
changes do not require a change in targeting 
strategy from counterforce targeting to counter-
value targeting; and 
‘‘(2) a period of 90 days has elapsed after the 
date on which such report under paragraph (1) is 
submitted.’’. 
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 
at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 491 the following new 
item: 
‘‘492. Nuclear employment strategy.’’. 
SEC. 6. FORCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPA-
BILITIES OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2012, the 
Secretary of Defense shall conduct a force analysis and 
net assessment of the current and proposed nuclear forces 
of the United States to determine whether such forces are 
capable of meeting the nuclear deterrence, extended deter-
rence, assurance, and defense objectives of the United 
States in the context of the current and anticipated nu-
clear and non-nuclear forces of the Russian Federation 
and other countries. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The force analysis and net assess-
ment under subsection (a) shall include the following: 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
(1) Specific metrics to define and measure the 
strategic sufficiency of the nuclear forces of the 
United States and the sufficiency of forces necessary 
to meet the nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, 
assurance, and defense requirements of the United 
States. 
(2) An identification and assessment of the nu-
clear strategies of the United States, and the role of 
nuclear weapons in those strategies, as of the date 
of the force analysis and net assessment, including— 
(A) how the United States is prepared to 
limit damage to the United States and its allies 
if deterrence fails; and 
(B) if the United States requires such ca-
pabilities, an assessment of such capabilities. 
(3) An identification of the nuclear force pos-
ture of the United States required to fulfill the nu-
clear deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance, 
and defense strategies of the United States, includ-
ing the planning assumptions on which such posture 
is based. 
(4) Force-on-force exchange modeling analyses 
to determine the vulnerability, survivability, and ef-
fectiveness of current and proposed nuclear capabili-
ties of the United States in various scenarios (in-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
cluding a surprise attack and an electromagnetic 
pulse attack by potential adversaries, including Rus-
sia, China, North Korea, Iran, or terrorists armed 
with nuclear weapons) and taking into account var-
ious nuclear postures (including day-to-day alert and 
generated alert). 
(5) An assessment of the implications of dis-
parities between the strategic and non-strategic nu-
clear weapons of the United States and the strategic 
and non-strategic nuclear weapons of other countries 
with respect to deterrence, extended deterrence, as-
surance, and defense. 
(6) An assessment of the implications that var-
ious force levels of the nuclear forces of the United 
States have on nuclear proliferation, and the effect 
that such lower force levels have on the motivation 
or inclination of other countries to increase their nu-
clear capabilities, and the contingency plans of the 
United States to respond to such an increase. 
(7) An assessment of the effect of the conven-
tional prompt global strike capabilities of the United 
States and other countries on the ability of the 
United States to meet its deterrence, extended deter-
rence, assurance, and defense requirements. 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
00:09 May 10, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1750.IH
H1750
smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS