Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On September 20, 2001, President George
Bush stated at a joint session of Congress that
‘‘[e]very nation, in every region, now has a decision
to make . . . [e]ither you are with us, or you are
with the terrorists . . . [f]rom this day forward, any
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile re-
gime’’.
(2) On June 24, 2002, President Bush stated
‘‘Syria must choose the right side in the war on ter-
ror by closing terrorist camps and expelling terrorist
organizations’’.
(3) United Nations Security Council Resolution
1373 (September 28, 2001) mandates that all states
‘‘refrain from providing any form of support, active
or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist
acts’’, take ‘‘the necessary steps to prevent the com-
mission of terrorist acts’’, and ‘‘deny safe haven to
those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist
acts’’.
(4) The Government of Syria is currently pro-
hibited by United States law from receiving United
States assistance because it has repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism, as deter-
mined by the Secretary of State for purposes of sec-
tion 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)(1)) and other rel-
evant provisions of law.
(5) Although the Department of State lists
Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and reports
that Syria provides ‘‘safe haven and support to sev-
eral terrorist groups’’, fewer United States sanctions
apply with respect to Syria than with respect to any
other country that is listed as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism.
(6) Terrorist groups, including Hizballah,
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General
Command, maintain offices, training camps, and
other facilities on Syrian territory, and operate in
areas of Lebanon occupied by the Syrian armed
forces and receive supplies from Iran through Syria.
(7) United Nations Security Council Resolution
520 (September 17, 1982) calls for ‘‘strict respect of
the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and polit-
ical independence of Lebanon under the sole and ex-
clusive authority of the Government of Lebanon
through the Lebanese Army throughout Lebanon’’.
(8) Approximately 20,000 Syrian troops and se-
curity personnel occupy much of the sovereign terri-
tory of Lebanon exerting undue influence upon its
government and undermining its political independ-
ence.
(9) Since 1990 the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives have passed seven bills and resolutions
which call for the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces
from Lebanon.
(10) On March 3, 2003, Secretary of State
Colin Powell declared that it is the objective of the
United States to ‘‘let Lebanon be ruled by the Leba-
nese people without the presence of [the Syrian] oc-
cupation army’’.
(11) Large and increasing numbers of the Leb-
anese people from across the political spectrum in
Lebanon have mounted peaceful and democratic
calls for the withdrawal of the Syrian Army from
Lebanese soil.
(12) Israel has withdrawn all of its armed
forces from Lebanon in accordance with United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 425 (March 19,
1978), as certified by the United Nations Secretary
General.
(13) Even in the face of this United Nations
certification that acknowledged Israel’s full compli-
ance with Security Council Resolution 425, Syrian-
and Iranian-supported Hizballah continues to attack
Israeli outposts at Shebaa Farms, under the pre-
tense that Shebaa Farms is territory from which
Israel was required to withdraw by Security Counsel
Resolution 425, and Syrian- and Iranian-supported
Hizballah and other militant organizations continue
to attack civilian targets in Israel.
(14) Syria will not allow Lebanon—a sovereign
country—to fulfill its obligation in accordance with
Security Council Resolution 425 to deploy its troops
to southern Lebanon.
(15) As a result, the Israeli-Lebanese border
and much of southern Lebanon is under the control
of Hizballah, which continues to attack Israeli posi-
tions, allows Iranian Revolutionary Guards and
other militant groups to operate freely in the area,
and maintains thousands of rockets along Israel’s
northern border, destabilizing the entire region.
(16) On February 12, 2003, Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet stated the following with
respect to the Syrian- and Iranian-supported
Hizballah: ‘‘[A]s an organization with capability and
worldwide presence [it] is [al Qaeda’s] equal if not
a far more capable organization . . . [T]hey’re a
notch above in many respects, in terms of in their
relationship with the Iranians and the training they
receive, [which] puts them in a state-sponsored cat-
egory with a potential for lethality that’s quite
great.’’.
(17) In the State of the Union address on Jan-
uary 29, 2002, President Bush declared that the
United States will ‘‘work closely with our coalition to
deny terrorists and their state sponsors the mate-
rials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver
weapons of mass destruction’’.
(18) The Government of Syria continues to de-
velop and deploy short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles.
(19) According to the December 2001 unclassi-
fied Central Intelligence Agency report entitled
‘‘Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic
Missile Threat through 2015’’, ‘‘Syria maintains a
ballistic missile and rocket force of hundreds of
FROG rockets, Scuds, and SS–21 SRBMs [and]
Syria has developed [chemical weapons] warheads
for its Scuds’’.
(20) The Government of Syria is pursuing the
development and production of biological and chem-
ical weapons and has a nuclear research and devel-
opment program that is cause for concern.
(21) According to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Muni-
tions’’, released January 7, 2003: ‘‘[Syria] already
holds a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin but appar-
ently is trying to develop more toxic and persistent
nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign
sources for key elements of its [chemical weapons]
program, including precursor chemicals and key pro-
duction equipment. It is highly probable that Syria
also is developing an offensive [biological weapons]
capability.’’.
(22) On May 6, 2002, the Under Secretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security,
John Bolton, stated: ‘‘The United States also knows
that Syria has long had a chemical warfare program.
It has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and is en-
gaged in research and development of the more toxic
and persistent nerve agent VX. Syria, which has
signed but not ratified the [Biological Weapons Con-
vention], is pursuing the development of biological
weapons and is able to produce at least small
amounts of biological warfare agents.’’.
(23) According to the Central Intelligence
Agency’s ‘‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Muni-
tions’’, released January 7, 2003: ‘‘Russia and Syria
have approved a draft cooperative program on co-
operation on civil nuclear power. In principal, broad-
er access to Russian expertise provides opportunities
for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities,
should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons.’’.
(24) Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483), which entered
force on March 5, 1970, and to which Syria is a
party, Syria has undertaken not to acquire or
produce nuclear weapons and has accepted full scope
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy
Agency to detect diversions of nuclear materials
from peaceful activities to the production of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
(25) Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention or the Biological Weapons Conven-
tion, which entered into force on April 29, 1997, and
on March 26, 1975, respectively.
(26) Syrian President Bashar Assad promised
Secretary of State Powell in February 2001 to end
violations of Security Council Resolution 661, which
restricted the sale of oil and other commodities by
Saddam Hussein’s regime, except to the extent au-
thorized by other relevant resolutions, but this
pledge was never fulfilled.
(27) Syria’s illegal imports and transshipments
of Iraqi oil during Saddam Hussein’s regime earned
Syria $50,000,000 or more per month as Syria con-
tinued to sell its own Syrian oil at market prices.
(28) Syria’s illegal imports and transshipments
of Iraqi oil earned Saddam Hussein’s regime
$2,000,000 per day.
(29) The Government of Syria also utilized the
railway network linking Mosul, Iraq, to Aleppo,
Syria, to transfer a wide range of weaponry and
weapon systems to Saddam Hussein’s regime.
(30) On March 28, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld warned: ‘‘[W]e have information
that shipments of military supplies have been cross-
ing the border from Syria into Iraq, including night-
vision goggles . . . These deliveries pose a direct
threat to the lives of coalition forces. We consider
such trafficking as hostile acts, and will hold the
Syrian government accountable for such ship-
ments.’’.
(31) According to Article 23(1) of the United
Nations Charter, members of the United Nations are
elected as nonpermanent members of the United Na-
tions Security Council with ‘‘due regard being spe-
cially paid, in the first instance to the contribution
of members of the United Nations to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security and to
other purposes of the Organization’’.
(32) Despite Article 23(1) of the United Na-
tions Charter, Syria was elected on October 8, 2001,
to a 2-year term as a nonpermanent member of the
United Nations Security Council beginning January
1, 2002, and served as President of the Security
Council during June 2002 and August 2003.
(33) On March 31, 2003, the Syrian Foreign
Minister, Farouq al-Sharra, made the Syrian re-
gime’s intentions clear when he explicitly stated that
‘‘Syria’s interest is to see the invaders defeated in
Iraq’’.
(34) On April 13, 2003, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld charged that ‘‘busloads’’ of Syrian
fighters entered Iraq with ‘‘hundreds of thousands
of dollars’’ and leaflets offering rewards for dead
American soldiers.
(35) On September 16, 2003, the Under Sec-
retary of State for Arms Control and International
Security, John Bolton, appeared before the Sub-
committee on the Middle East and Central Asia of
the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives, and underscored Syria’s
‘‘hostile actions’’ toward coalition forces during Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom. Under Secretary Bolton
added that: ‘‘Syria allowed military equipment to
flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war.
Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to at-
tack and kill our service members during the war,
and is still doing so . . . [Syria’s] behavior during
Operation Iraqi Freedom underscores the impor-
tance of taking seriously reports and information on
Syria’s WMD capabilities.’’.
(36) During his appearance before the Com-
mittee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives on September 25, 2003, Ambas-
sador L. Paul Bremer, III, Administrator of the Co-
alition Provisional Authority in Iraq, stated that out
of the 278 third-country nationals who were cap-
tured by coalition forces in Iraq, the ‘‘single largest
group are Syrians’’.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Government of Syria should imme-
diately and unconditionally halt support for ter-
rorism, permanently and openly declare its total re-
nunciation of all forms of terrorism, and close all
terrorist offices and facilities in Syria, including the
offices of Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Pal-
estine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine–General Command;
(2) the Government of Syria should—
(A) immediately and unconditionally stop
facilitating transit from Syria to Iraq of individ-
uals, military equipment, and all lethal items,
except as authorized by the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority or a representative, inter-
nationally recognized Iraqi government;
(B) cease its support for ‘‘volunteers’’ and
terrorists who are traveling from and through
Syria into Iraq to launch attacks; and
(C) undertake concrete, verifiable steps to
deter such behavior and control the use of terri-
tory under Syrian control;
(3) the Government of Syria should imme-
diately declare its commitment to completely with-
draw its armed forces, including military, para-
military, and security forces, from Lebanon, and set
a firm timetable for such withdrawal;
(4) the Government of Lebanon should deploy
the Lebanese armed forces to all areas of Lebanon,
including South Lebanon, in accordance with United
Nations Security Council Resolution 520 (September
17, 1982), in order to assert the sovereignty of the
Lebanese state over all of its territory, and should
evict all terrorist and foreign forces from southern
Lebanon, including Hizballah and the Iranian Revo-
lutionary Guards;
(5) the Government of Syria should halt the de-
velopment and deployment of medium- and long-
range surface-to-surface missiles and cease the de-
velopment and production of biological and chemical
weapons;
(6) the Governments of Lebanon and Syria
should enter into serious unconditional bilateral ne-
gotiations with the Government of Israel in order to
realize a full and permanent peace;
(7) the United States should continue to pro-
vide humanitarian and educational assistance to the
people of Lebanon only through appropriate private,
nongovernmental 
organizations 
and 
appropriate
international organizations, until such time as the
Government of Lebanon asserts sovereignty and con-
trol over all of its territory and borders and achieves
full political independence, as called for in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 520; and
(8) as a violator of several key United Nations
Security Council resolutions and as a nation that
pursues policies which undermine international peace
and security, Syria should not have been permitted
to join the United Nations Security Council or serve
as the Security Council’s President, and should be
removed from the Security Council.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States that—
(1) Syria will be held responsible for attacks
committed by Hizballah and other terrorist groups
with offices, training camps, or other facilities in
Syria, or bases in areas of Lebanon occupied by
Syria;
(2) the United States shall impede Syria’s abil-
ity to support acts of international terrorism and ef-
forts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion;
(3) the Secretary of State will continue to list
Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism until Syria
ends its support for terrorism, including its support
of Hizballah and other terrorist groups in Lebanon
and its hosting of terrorist groups in Damascus, and
comes into full compliance with United States law
relating to terrorism and United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1373 (September 28, 2001);
(4) efforts against Hizballah will be expanded
given the recognition that Hizballah is equally or
more capable than al Qaeda;
(5) the full restoration of Lebanon’s sov-
ereignty, political independence, and territorial in-
tegrity is in the national security interest of the
United States;
(6) Syria is in violation of United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 520 (September 17, 1982)
through its continued occupation of Lebanese terri-
tory and its encroachment upon Lebanon’s political
independence;
(7) Syria’s obligation to withdraw from Leb-
anon is not conditioned upon progress in the Israeli-
Syrian or Israeli-Lebanese peace process but derives
from Syria’s obligation under Security Council Reso-
lution 520;
(8) Syria’s acquisition of weapons of mass de-
struction and ballistic missile programs threaten the
security of the Middle East and the national security
interests of the United States;
(9) Syria will be held accountable for any harm
to Coalition armed forces or to any United States
citizen in Iraq due to its facilitation of terrorist ac-
tivities and its shipments of military supplies to
Iraq; and
(10) the United States will not provide any as-
sistance to Syria and will oppose multilateral assist-
ance for Syria until Syria ends all support for ter-
rorism, withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon,
and halts the development and deployment of weap-
ons of mass destruction and medium- and long-
range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.
SEC. 5. PENALTIES AND AUTHORIZATION.
(a) PENALTIES.—Until the President makes the de-
termination that Syria meets all the requirements de-
scribed in paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (d)
and certifies such determination to Congress in accord-
ance with such subsection—
(1) the President shall prohibit the export to
Syria of any item, including the issuance of a license
for the export of any item, on the United States Mu-
nitions List or Commerce Control List of dual-use
items in the Export Administration Regulations (15
C.F.R. part 730 et seq.); and
(2) the President shall impose two or more of
the following sanctions:
(A) Prohibit the export of products of the
United States (other than food and medicine)
to Syria.
(B) Prohibit United States businesses from
investing or operating in Syria.
(C) Restrict Syrian diplomats in Wash-
ington, D.C., and at the United Nations in New
York City, to travel only within a 25-mile ra-
dius of Washington, D.C., or the United Na-
tions headquarters building, respectively.
(D) Prohibit aircraft of any air carrier
owned or controlled by Syria to take off from,
land in, or overfly the United States.
(E) Reduce United States diplomatic con-
tacts with Syria (other than those contacts re-
quired to protect United States interests or
carry out the purposes of this Act).
(F) Block transactions in any property in
which the Government of Syria has any inter-
est, by any person, or with respect to any prop-
erty, subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.
(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
tion of paragraph (2) of subsection (a) for one or more
6-month periods if the President determines that it is in
the vital national security interest of the United States
to do so and transmits to Congress a report that contains
the reasons therefor.
(c) AUTHORITY
TO
PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE
TO
SYRIA.—If the President—
(1) makes the determination that Syria meets
the requirements described in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of subsection (d) and certifies such de-
termination to Congress in accordance with such
subsection;
(2) determines that substantial progress has
been made both in negotiations aimed at achieving
a peace agreement between Israel and Syria and in
negotiations aimed at achieving a peace agreement
between Israel and Lebanon; and
(3) determines that the Government of Syria is
strictly respecting the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon
under the sole and exclusive authority of the Govern-
ment of Lebanon through the Lebanese army
throughout Lebanon, as required under paragraph
(4) of United Nations Security Council Resolution
520 (1982),
then the President is authorized to provide assistance to
Syria under chapter 1 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (relating to development assistance).
(d) CERTIFICATION.—A certification under this sub-
section is a certification transmitted to the appropriate
congressional committees of a determination made by the
President that—
(1) the Government of Syria has ceased pro-
viding support for international terrorist groups and
does not allow terrorist groups, such as Hamas,
Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General
Command to maintain facilities in territory under
Syrian control;
(2) the Government of Syria has withdrawn all
Syrian military, intelligence, and other security per-
sonnel from Lebanon;
(3) the Government of Syria has ceased the de-
velopment and deployment of medium- and long-
range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, is not pur-
suing or engaged in the research, development, ac-
quisition, production, transfer, or deployment of bio-
logical, chemical, or nuclear weapons, has provided
credible assurances that such behavior will not be
undertaken in the future, and has agreed to allow
United Nations and other international observers to
verify such actions and assurances; and
(4) the Government of Syria has ceased all sup-
port for, and facilitation of, all terrorist activities in-
side of Iraq, including preventing the use of territory
under its control by any means whatsoever to sup-
port those engaged in terrorist activities inside of
Iraq.
SEC. 6. REPORT.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months there-
after until the conditions described in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of section 5(d) are satisfied, the Secretary of
State shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report on—
(1) Syria’s progress toward meeting the condi-
tions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of sec-
tion 5(d);
(2) connections, if any, between individual ter-
rorists and terrorist groups which maintain offices,
training camps, or other facilities on Syrian terri-
tory, or operate in areas of Lebanon occupied by the
Syrian armed forces, and the attacks against the
United States that occurred on September 11, 2001,
and other terrorist attacks on the United States or
its citizens, installations, or allies; and
(3) how the United States is increasing its ef-
forts against Hizballah given the recognition that
Hizballah is equally or more capable than al Qaeda.
(b) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
(a) shall be in unclassified form but may include a classi-
fied annex.
SEC. 7. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on International Relations
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Passed the House of Representatives October 15,
2003.
Attest:
Clerk.