PART 8—ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY FINANCING 
Sec. 9089. Advisory committee. 
PART 9—ENERGY EFFICIENCY BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM 
Sec. 9091. Definitions. 
Sec. 9092. Establishment of program. 
Sec. 9093. Allocations. 
Sec. 9094. Eligible activities. 
Sec. 9095. Requirements. 
Sec. 9096. Review and evaluation. 
Sec. 9097. Technical Assistance and Education Program. 
Sec. 9098. Authorization of appropriations. 
Subtitle B—Smart Grid Facilitation 
Sec. 9101. Short title. 
PART 1—SMART GRID 
Sec. 9111. Statement of policy on modernization of electricity grid. 
Sec. 9112. Grid Modernization Commission. 
Sec. 9113. Grid assessment and report. 
Sec. 9114. Federal matching fund for smart grid investment costs. 
Sec. 9115. Smart Grid technology deployment. 
Sec. 9116. Smart Grid Information Requirements. 
Sec. 9117. State consideration of incentives for Smart Grid. 
Sec. 9118. DOE study of security attributes of Smart Grid systems. 
PART 2—DEMAND RESPONSE 
Sec. 9121. Electricity sector demand response. 
Subtitle C—Loan Guarantees 
Sec. 9201. Amount of loans guaranteed. 
Sec. 9202. Exclusion of categories. 
Subtitle D—Renewable Fuel Infrastructure and International Cooperation 
PART 1—RENEWABLE FUEL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Sec. 9301. Renewable fuel infrastructure development. 
Sec. 9302. Prohibition on franchise agreement restrictions related to renewable 
fuel infrastructure. 
Sec. 9303. Renewable fuel dispenser requirements. 
Sec. 9304. Pipeline feasibility study. 
Sec. 9305. Study of ethanol-blended gasoline with greater levels of ethanol. 
Sec. 9306. Study of the adequacy of railroad transportation of domestically-pro-
duced renewable fuel. 
Sec. 9307. Standard specifications for biodiesel. 
Sec. 9308. Grants for cellulosic ethanol production. 
Sec. 9309. Consumer education campaign relating to flexible-fuel vehicles. 
Sec. 9310. Review of new renewable fuels or new renewable fuel additives. 
Sec. 9311. Domestic manufacturing conversion grant program. 
Sec. 9312. Cellulosic ethanol and biofuels research. 
Sec. 9313. Federal fleet fueling centers.
Sec. 9314. Study of impact of increased renewable fuel use. 
Sec. 9315. Grants for renewable fuel production research and development in 
certain States. 
Sec. 9316. Study of effect of oil prices. 
Sec. 9317. Biodiesel as alternative fuel for CAFE´ purposes. 
PART 2—UNITED STATES-ISRAEL ENERGY COOPERATION 
Sec. 9321. Short title. 
Sec. 9322. Findings. 
Sec. 9323. Grant program. 
Sec. 9324. International Energy Advisory Board. 
Sec. 9325. Definitions. 
Sec. 9326. Termination. 
Sec. 9327. Authorization of appropriations. 
Sec. 9328. Constitutional authority. 
Subtitle E—Advanced Plug-In Hybrid Vehicles and Components 
Sec. 9401. Advanced battery loan guarantee program. 
Sec. 9402. Domestic manufacturing conversion grant program. 
Sec. 9403. Plug-in hybrid vehicle program. 
Sec. 9404. Plug-in hybrid demonstration vehicles. 
Sec. 9405. Incentive for Federal and State fleets for medium and heavy duty 
hybrids. 
Sec. 9406. Inclusion of electric drive in Energy Policy Act of 1992. 
Sec. 9407. Near-term electric drive transportation deployment program. 
Sec. 9408. Studying the benefits of plug-in hybrid electric drive vehicles and 
electric drive transportation. 
Subtitle F—Availability of Critical Energy Information 
Sec. 9501. Findings. 
Sec. 9502. Assessment of resources. 
Subtitle G—Natural Gas Utilities 
Sec. 9511. Natural gas utilities. 
Subtitle H—Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard 
Sec. 9611. Federal renewable portfolio standard. 
Subtitle I—Large and Small Scale Hydropower 
Sec. 9621. Sense of Congress. 
DIVISION B—RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ENERGY CONSERVATION 
TAX ACT OF 2007 
Sec. 10001. Short title; amendment of 1986 Code; table of contents. 
TITLE XI—PRODUCTION INCENTIVES 
Sec. 11001. Extension and modification of renewable energy credit. 
Sec. 11002. Production credit for electricity produced from marine renewables. 
Sec. 11003. Extension and modification of energy credit. 
Sec. 11004. New clean renewable energy bonds.
Sec. 11005. Extension and modification of special rule to implement FERC and 
State electric restructuring policy. 
Sec. 11006. Repeal of dollar limitation and allowance against alternative min-
imum tax for residential solar and fuel cell property credit. 
TITLE XII—CONSERVATION 
Subtitle A—Transportation 
Sec. 12001. Credit for plug-in hybrid vehicles. 
Sec. 12002. Extension and modification of alternative fuel vehicle refueling 
property credit. 
Sec. 12003. Extension and modification of credits for biodiesel and renewable 
diesel. 
Sec. 12004. Credit for production of cellulosic alcohol. 
Sec. 12005. Extension of transportation fringe benefit to bicycle commuters. 
Sec. 12006. Modification of limitation on automobile depreciation. 
Sec. 12007. Restructuring of New York Liberty Zone tax credits. 
Subtitle B—Other Conservation Provisions 
Sec. 12011. Qualified energy conservation bonds. 
Sec. 12012. Qualified residential energy efficiency assistance bonds. 
Sec. 12013. Extension of energy efficient commercial buildings deduction. 
Sec. 12014. Modifications of energy efficient appliance credit for appliances 
produced after 2007. 
Sec. 12015. Five-year applicable recovery period for depreciation of qualified 
energy management devices. 
TITLE XIII—REVENUE PROVISIONS 
Subtitle A—Denial of Oil and Gas Tax Benefits 
Sec. 13001. Denial of deduction for income attributable to domestic production 
of oil, natural gas, or primary products thereof. 
Sec. 13002. 7-year amortization of geological and geophysical expenditures for 
certain major integrated oil companies. 
Sec. 13003. Clarification of determination of foreign oil and gas extraction in-
come. 
Subtitle B—Clarification of Eligibility for Certain Fuel Credits 
Sec. 13011. Clarification of eligibility for renewable diesel credit. 
Sec. 13012. Clarification that credits for fuel are designed to provide an incen-
tive for United States production. 
TITLE XIV—OTHER PROVISIONS 
Subtitle A—Studies 
Sec. 14001. Carbon audit of the tax code. 
Sec. 14002. Comprehensive study of biofuels. 
Subtitle B—Application of Certain Labor Standards on Projects Financed 
Under Tax Credit Bonds 
Sec. 14011. Application of certain labor standards on projects financed under 
tax credit bonds.
DIVISION 
A—NEW 
DIRECTION 
FOR 
ENERGY 
INDEPEND-
ENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
ACT 
TITLE I—GREEN JOBS 
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Green Jobs Act of 
2007’’. 
SEC. 1002. ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
WORKER TRAINING PROGRAM. 
Section 171 of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 
(29 U.S.C. 2916) is amended by adding at the end the 
following: 
‘‘(e) ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLE EN-
ERGY WORKER TRAINING PROGRAM.— 
‘‘(1) GRANT PROGRAM.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 6 
months after the date of enactment of the 
Green Jobs Act of 2007, the Secretary, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall es-
tablish an energy efficiency and renewable en-
ergy worker training program under which the 
Secretary shall carry out the activities described
in paragraph (2) to achieve the purposes of this 
subsection. 
‘‘(B) ELIGIBILITY.—For purposes of pro-
viding assistance and services under the pro-
gram established under this subsection— 
‘‘(i) target populations of eligible indi-
viduals to be given priority for training 
and other services shall include— 
‘‘(I) workers affected by national 
energy and environmental policy; 
‘‘(II) individuals in need of up-
dated training related to the energy 
efficiency and renewable energy indus-
tries; and 
‘‘(III) veterans, or past and 
present members of reserve compo-
nents of the Armed Forces; 
‘‘(IV) unemployed workers; 
‘‘(V) individuals, including at-risk 
youth, seeking employment pathways 
out of poverty and into economic self- 
sufficiency; and 
‘‘(VI) formerly incarcerated, ad-
judicated, non-violent offenders;
‘‘(ii) energy efficiency and renewable 
energy industries eligible to participate in 
a program under this subsection include— 
‘‘(I) the energy-efficient building, 
construction, and retrofits industries; 
‘‘(II) the renewable electric power 
industry; 
‘‘(III) the energy efficient and 
advanced drive train vehicle industry; 
‘‘(IV) the biofuels industry; 
‘‘(V) the deconstruction and ma-
terials use industries; 
‘‘(VI) the energy efficiency as-
sessment industry serving the residen-
tial, commercial, or industrial sectors; 
and 
‘‘(VII) 
manufacturers 
that 
produce sustainable products using 
environmentally sustainable processes 
and materials. 
‘‘(2) ACTIVITIES.— 
‘‘(A) NATIONAL
RESEARCH
PROGRAM.— 
Under the program established under para-
graph (1), the Secretary, acting through the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, where appropriate,
(5) The United States, along with 189 other 
countries, is a party to the Convention, agreed to in 
New York on May 9, 1992, and entered into force 
in 1994. The Convention’s stated objective is ‘‘to 
achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system’’. 
(6) The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention was 
adopted by the third Convention Conference of the 
Parties (COP–3) in December 1997, in Kyoto, 
Japan, and stipulated legally binding reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions at an average of 5.2 per-
cent below 1990 levels for industrialized countries, 
but it did not specify policies for its implementation. 
The Kyoto Protocol also did not stipulate binding re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions for rapidly in-
dustrializing countries such as China, India, and 
Brazil. 
(7) Before negotiations were completed on the 
mechanisms for implementing Kyoto Protocol com-
mitments on greenhouse gas emissions, George W. 
Bush took office as President of the United States, 
and in March 2001, announced opposition to contin-
ued negotiations over implementation of the Pro-
tocol, stating that the Protocol was ‘‘fatally flawed’’ 
from the Administration’s point of view. 
(8) President Bush unveiled an ‘‘alternative’’ 
strategy to the Kyoto Protocol for halting global 
warming on February 14, 2002. The President’s 
plan did not contain any international component to 
amend or supplant the Kyoto Protocol or any kind 
of blueprint for committing major developing econo-
mies such as China, India, and Brazil to reduce fu-
ture greenhouse gas emissions. The President’s plan 
set a voluntary ‘‘greenhouse gas intensity’’ target for 
the United States that specified an 18 percent re-
duction in ‘‘emissions intensity’’ by 2012. This re-
duction would allow actual emissions to increase by 
at least 12 percent over the same period. 
(9) On February 16, 2005, after Russia’s ratifi-
cation, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force. With 
entry into force, the emissions targets of the Pro-
tocol became legally binding commitments for those 
industrialized countries that ratified the Protocol. 
Because the United States and Australia did not 
ratify the Protocol, and because developing countries 
are not subject to its limits, the Protocol currently 
restricts the emissions of countries accounting for 
only 32 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
(10) The Kyoto Protocol required that parties 
to the Protocol begin negotiating in 2005 toward a 
second round of commitments to begin after the ex-
piration of the first emissions budget period in 2012. 
The eleventh Convention Conference of the Parties 
(COP–11) in November and December 2005 in 
Montreal, Canada launched the negotiations on the 
second round of commitments by parties to the Pro-
tocol and initiated a dialogue (a ‘‘parallel process’’) 
under the Convention that engaged both the United 
States and developing countries in discussions on fu-
ture efforts. 
(11) At the twelfth Convention Conference of 
the Parties (COP–12) in November 2006 in Nairobi, 
Kenya, parties continued discussions on a second 
round of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol as 
a successor to the first commitment period (2008 
through 2012) and, in the parallel process, discussed 
enhanced cooperation under the Convention that 
would engage countries that did not have commit-
ments under the Protocol. 
(12) At a summit in Brussels, Belgium in 
March 2007, the head of governments of the Euro-
pean Union committed its Member States to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions 20 percent below 1990 lev-
els by 2020 and committed to move this target up 
to 30 percent if the United States and other major 
emitters joined the commitment. 
(13) On April 17, 2007, the United Nations Se-
curity Council held its first ever ‘‘open meeting’’ on 
the impact of climate change on international secu-
rity. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, in 
her capacity as President of the Security Council, 
declared in her opening statement that the Council 
has a ‘‘security imperative’’ to tackle climate change 
because it can exacerbate problems that cause con-
flicts and because it threatens the entire planet. 
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told 
the Council that ‘‘issues of energy and climate 
change have implications for peace and security’’. 
(14) Working Group III of the IPCC met from 
April 30 through May 4, 2007, in Bangkok, Thai-
land to assess technologies and policies needed to 
avert dangerous climate change and to provide back-
ground for negotiations on a post-2012 climate 
change regime. The draft report by the IPCC Work-
ing Group III concludes that by quickly adopting 
technological options that are available or are being 
developed, the global concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere can be stabilized at 450–
550 parts per million (ppm). The IPCC scientists 
believe that a 450 to 550 ppm ceiling might limit 
the global rise in temperatures to no more than 3.6 
degrees Fahrenheit and avert impacts of escalating 
scale, scope, and costs, potentially including the de-
stabilization of large polar ice sheets that could con-
tribute to long-term, catastrophic sea level rise at 
higher temperatures. 
(15) The United Nations Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon has indicated that one of his top goals 
is to forge a more comprehensive agreement under 
the Convention to ensure there is no gap when the 
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
ends in 2012. In order to reach this goal, critical ne-
gotiations involving all of the major greenhouse gas 
emitters, along with the vulnerable countries, must 
be initiated immediately and be completed by 2009. 
On May 1, 2007, the Secretary-General named three 
Special Envoys on Climate Change to assist in ‘‘con-
sultations with Governments’’. The Secretary-Gen-
eral will host a ‘‘high-level meeting’’ on climate 
change at the United Nations General Assembly in 
September 2007 to give ‘‘political direction’’ to the 
thirteenth Convention Conference of the Parties
(COP–13) to take place in December 2007 in Bali, 
Indonesia. 
SEC. 2102. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
Congress declares the following to be the policy of the 
United States: 
(1) To promote United States and global secu-
rity through leadership in cooperation with other na-
tions of the global effort to reduce and stabilize 
global greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize atmos-
pheric concentration of such gases. As such, the 
United States will seek to obtain mitigation commit-
ments from all major greenhouse gas emitting coun-
tries under the institutional framework provided by 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (hereinafter in this section referred to 
as the ‘‘Convention’’). 
(2) To facilitate progress in global negotiations 
toward a comprehensive agreement under the Con-
vention, and in service of this goal, the United 
States will, during the course of 2007, engage in 
high level dialogue on climate change within the 
Group of Eight (G–8), with the European Union, 
with Japan and other industrialized countries, and 
with China, India, Brazil, and other major devel-
oping countries. The United States will also partici-
pate in the initiative of the United Nations Sec-
retary-General to build consensus among govern-
ments on enhanced international cooperation on 
these matters. 
(3) To participate more actively and construc-
tively in the intergovernmental climate change proc-
ess, including at the thirteenth Convention Con-
ference of the Parties (COP–13) to take place in De-
cember 2007 in Bali, Indonesia. As such, at the 
COP–13 meeting, the United States will be rep-
resented by a high-level delegation composed of cli-
mate experts and career foreign service officers with 
extensive diplomatic experience, including experience 
in multi-lateral negotiations, headed by the Sec-
retary of State, the Secretary’s Deputy, or the Un-
dersecretary for Global Affairs of the Department of 
State. 
(4) To engage in serious discussion of possible 
future commitments under the Convention. These 
discussions will seek to develop a plan of action and 
time-table with the goal of adopting a new inter-
national agreement under the Convention that stipu-
lates commitments from all major greenhouse gas 
emitters, including the United States and other 
countries listed in Annex 1 to the Convention,
China, India, and Brazil, at the fifteenth Convention 
Conference of the Parties (COP–15) to take place in 
2009. This process will seek as its objective that a 
new instrument will come into force by the time the 
first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
ends in 2012. 
(5) To protect United States national and eco-
nomic interests and United States competitiveness in 
all sectors by negotiating a new agreement under the 
Convention that is cost effective, comprehensive, 
flexible, and equitable. Such an agreement shall, at 
a minimum— 
(A) require binding mitigation commit-
ments from all major emitting countries based 
on their level of development; 
(B) provide for different forms of commit-
ments, including economy-wide emissions tar-
gets, policy-based commitments, sectoral agree-
ments, and no-regrets targets; 
(C) increase cooperation on clean and effi-
cient energy technologies and practices; 
(D) target all greenhouse gases, including 
sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases, and should expand the current scope of 
the Kyoto Protocol and Convention to sectors
not covered, such as the international aviation 
and maritime sectors; 
(E) include mechanisms to harness mar-
ket-based solutions, building upon the joint im-
plementation, clean development mechanism, 
and international emissions trading developed 
under the Protocol; 
(F) include incentives for sustainable for-
estry management that reflect the value of 
avoided deforestation; 
(G) address the need for adaptation, espe-
cially for the most vulnerable and poorest coun-
tries on the planet; 
(H) consider the impact on United States 
industry and contain effective mechanisms to 
protect United States competitiveness; and 
(I) include the perspectives and address 
the concerns of impacted indigenous and tribal 
populations. 
(6) To seek international consensus on long- 
term objectives including a target range for stabi-
lizing greenhouse gas concentrations. The target 
range should reflect the consensus recommendations 
of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) scientists, who believe that concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the Earth’s atmosphere must be 
stabilized at a level that would provide a reasonable 
chance of limiting the rise in global temperatures to 
a level that might avert the most dangerous impacts 
of climate change. 
SEC. 2103. OFFICE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.—There is estab-
lished within the Department of State an Office on Global 
Climate Change (hereinafter in this section referred to as 
the ‘‘Office’’). 
(b) HEAD OF OFFICE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Office shall 
be the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Climate 
Change (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 
‘‘Ambassador-at-Large’’). 
(2) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador-at-Large 
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. 
(c) DUTIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The primary responsibility 
of the Ambassador-at-Large shall be to advance the 
goals of the United States with respect to reducing 
the emissions of global greenhouse gases and ad-
dressing the challenges posed by global climate 
change.
(2) ADVISORY
ROLE.—The Ambassador-at- 
Large— 
(A) shall be a principal adviser to the 
President and the Secretary of State on matters 
relating to global climate change; and 
(B) shall make recommendations to the 
President and the Secretary of State on policies 
of the United States Government with respect 
to international cooperation on reducing the 
emission of global greenhouse gases and ad-
dressing the challenges posed by global climate 
change. 
(3) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Subject to 
the direction of the President and the Secretary of 
State, the Ambassador-at-Large is authorized to 
represent the United States in matters relating to 
global climate change in— 
(A) contacts with foreign governments, 
intergovernmental organizations, and special-
ized agencies of the United Nations, the Orga-
nization on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope, and other international organizations of 
which the United States is a member; and 
(B) multilateral conferences and meetings 
relating to global climate change.
(d) FUNDING.—The Secretary of State shall provide 
the Ambassador-at-Large with such funds as may be nec-
essary for the hiring of staff for the Office, the conduct 
of investigations by the Office, and for necessary travel 
to carry out the provisions of this section. 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than September 1 of each 
year, the Secretary of State, with the assistance of the 
Ambassador-at-Large, shall prepare and submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on the strat-
egy, policies, and actions of the United States for reducing 
the emissions of global greenhouse gases and addressing 
the challenges posed of global climate change. 
SEC. 2104. REPORT ON PROGRESS MADE IN PROMOTING 
TRANSPARENCY IN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
RESOURCE PAYMENTS. 
(a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to— 
(1) ensure greater United States energy secu-
rity by combating corruption in the governments of 
foreign countries that receive revenues from the sale 
of their natural resources, and 
(2) enhance the development of democracy and 
increase political and economic stability in such re-
source-rich foreign countries. 
(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings:
(1) The United States is the world’s largest 
consumer of oil. The United States accounts for 25 
percent of global daily oil demand—despite having 
less than 3 percent of the world’s proven reserves. 
(2) 6 of the top 10 suppliers of United States 
crude oil imports rank in the bottom third of the 
world’s most corrupt countries, according to Trans-
parency International. 
(3) Corrupt and non-transparent foreign gov-
ernments have a much higher risk of instability and 
violent unrest, often leading to disruptions of energy 
supplies. In addition, the citizens of such countries 
often remain impoverished despite significant re-
source wealth. 
(4) Oil is a fungible commodity. Therefore sup-
ply disruptions due to political instability in other 
parts of the world affect United States domestic 
price and supply regardless of the source of supply. 
(5) Transparency in extractive revenue trans-
actions is important to decreasing corruption and in-
creasing energy security. 
(6) The Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) serves to improve investment cli-
mates through the audited disclosure of revenue pay-
ments.