I 
111TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3107 
To prohibit the expenditure of United States taxpayer dollars on nuclear 
assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 26, 2009 
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. MCCAUL, and 
Mr. POE of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
A BILL 
To prohibit the expenditure of United States taxpayer dollars 
on nuclear assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, and 
for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Nuclear Assist-
ance to State Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2009’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives 
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of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribu-
tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that as-
sistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as 
to further any military purpose.’’. 
(2) The United States, via assessed contribu-
tions, is the largest financial contributor to the reg-
ular budget of the IAEA. 
(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 
called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 
primarily through voluntary contributions by mem-
ber states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to 
provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for 
peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 
(4) The United States is the largest financial 
contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 
Fund. 
(5) A March 2009 report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither 
[the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to sys-
tematically limit TC assistance to countries the 
United States has designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even 
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though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 
sanctions.’’. 
(6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 
[Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 
$55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 
2007.’’. 
These 
four 
countries 
received 
over 
$4,400,000 in TC assistance in 2008. 
(7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera-
tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 
provided to certain countries and because nuclear 
equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual- 
use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 
also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel-
opment.’’. 
(8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 
State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 
projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 
nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 
(9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro-
liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 
Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 
States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be-
cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 
TC project information during the proposal develop-
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ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 
documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 
proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in 
U.S. policies and IAEA procedures [including moni-
toring proliferation risks] related to TC program fel-
lowships.’’. 
(10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi-
cials told us that the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 
basis of their status as U.S.-designated state spon-
sors of terrorism or other political considerations’’ 
and that, according to the Deputy Director General 
for the Technical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are 
no good countries and there are no bad countries’’ 
with respect to provision of technical cooperation by 
the IAEA. 
(11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 
the limited information available on TC projects and 
the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 
expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 
can assert with complete confidence that TC assist-
ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc-
tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 
terrorism’’. 
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(12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 
not share [the State Department’s confidence in 
IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 
from contributing to weapons development . . . ]’’. 
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga-
nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 
for the United States proportionate share for pro-
grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, inter alia. 
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ-
ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 
funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 
being made available for programs and projects of 
the IAEA in Cuba. 
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 
the United States to withhold a proportionate share 
of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard-
ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 
Pi Nuclear Research Center. 
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con-
sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 
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share of future annual contributions to the [Tech-
nical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the 
amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 
designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 
is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 
foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such na-
tions.’’. 
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 
the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 
water-related projects and its enrichment of ura-
nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008). 
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 
provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 
shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 
other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 
that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 
that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities . . .’’. 
(19) According to multiple news reports, the 
IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 
of Governors in June of 2009 that the Government 
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of Iran now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for 
enriching uranium, is running almost 5,000 of them, 
and has increased its stockpile of low-enriched ura-
nium to over 1,300 kilograms, considered sufficient 
for further enrichment into enough high-enriched 
uranium for an atomic bomb. 
(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘there re-
main a number of outstanding issues which give rise 
to concerns . . . [regarding] the existence of pos-
sible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme’’. 
(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 
not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 
prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible as-
surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma-
terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 
IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans-
parency measure, access to additional locations re-
lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 
research and development on uranium enrichment, 
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and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 
the Security Council.’’. 
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 
of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con-
nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 
about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 
progress on these issues.’’. 
(23) Iran has refused to comply with resolu-
tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 
September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 
2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 
and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 
and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 
NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 
IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 
of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 
(24) According to multiple news reports, Iran 
recently denied access to its enrichment site at 
Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 
request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 
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surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 
Natanz. 
(25) In April of 2008, United States Govern-
ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build-
ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as-
sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 
a North Korean model capable of producing pluto-
nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 
from becoming operational before an Israeli air 
strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 
2007. 
(26) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay-
den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 
Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 
or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 
(27) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors, on November 19, 
2008, that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 
features that resembled those of an undeclared nu-
clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro-
vided the requested documentation in support of its 
declarations concerning the nature or function of the 
destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 
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other locations which the IAEA has requested to 
visit.’’. 
(28) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 
to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 
that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 
Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter-
mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 
Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 
in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 
that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 
not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 
material.’’. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No funds from any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 
used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 
through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun-
try, including North Korea that— 
(1) is a state sponsor of terrorism; 
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 
obligations regarding— 
(A) its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA; 
(B) the Additional Protocol; 
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(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 
(D) any relevant United Nations Security 
Council Resolution; or 
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 
(3) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with the obligations specified in para-
graph (2). 
(b) WITHHOLDING
OF
VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBU-
TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 
from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 
in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 
its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 
in subsection (a). 
(c) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (b) has not 
been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist-
ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 
to the countries described in subsection (a), an amount 
equal to that specified in subsection (b) shall be withheld 
from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 
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