I 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1221
To provide for the stabilization of prices for gasoline, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 12, 2003
Mr. DEFAZIO (for himself, Ms. KAPTUR, and Mr. SANDERS) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce, and in addition to the Committees on International Relations, 
Ways and Means, and Resources, for a period to be subsequently deter-
mined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions 
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To provide for the stabilization of prices for gasoline, and 
for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Gasoline Price Sta-
bilization Act of 2003’’. 
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR PRICE STABILIZATION. 
(a) PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY.—The President is 
authorized to issue such orders and regulations as he may 
deem appropriate, including price caps, to stabilize prices
for wholesale and retail gasoline to levels at or below levels 
prevailing on March 1, 2002. 
(b) PENALTY.—Whoever willfully violates any order 
or regulation issued under this section shall be fined 
$1,000,000 per violation. 
(c) INJUNCTIONS.—Whenever it appears to any agen-
cy of the United States, authorized by the President to 
exercise the authority contained in this subsection to en-
force orders and regulations issued under this section, that 
any person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage 
in any acts or practices constituting a violation of any reg-
ulation or order under this section, it may in its discretion 
bring an action, in the proper district court of the United 
States or the proper United States court of any territory 
or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper 
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restrain-
ing order shall be granted without bond. Upon application 
of the agency, any such court may also issue mandatory 
injunctions commanding any person to comply with any 
regulation or order under this section. 
(d) EXPIRATION.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), this section shall cease to have effect 1 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not af-
fect enforcement relating to a violation of this sec-
tion occurring before the expiration date in para-
graph (1). 
SEC. 3. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE DRAWDOWN. 
(a) DRAWDOWNS AUTHORIZED TO ADDRESS STATE 
OR REGIONAL ECONOMIC HARM.—Section 161(d)(2)(C) 
of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 
6241(d)(2)(C)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, or on a State 
or regional economy’’ after ‘‘national economy’’. 
(b) DRAWDOWNS AUTHORIZED TO COMBAT ANTI-
COMPETITIVE CONDUCT.—Section 161(d) of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6241(d)) is fur-
ther amended by adding at the end the following new para-
graph: 
‘‘(3) REDUCTION
IN
SUPPLY
CAUSED
BY
ANTI-
COMPETITIVE CONDUCT.—
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—For the purposes of this 
section, in addition to the circumstances set forth in 
section 3(8) and in paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
a severe energy supply interruption shall be deemed 
to exist if the President determines that—
‘‘(i) there is a significant reduction in sup-
ply that—
‘‘(I) is of significant scope and dura-
tion; and 
‘‘(II) has caused a significant increase 
in the price of petroleum products; 
‘‘(ii) the increase in price is likely to cause 
a significant adverse impact on the national 
economy, or on a State or regional economy; 
and 
‘‘(iii) a substantial cause of the reduction 
in supply is the anticompetitive conduct of—
‘‘(I) 1 or more foreign countries or 
international entities; or 
‘‘(II) 1 or more producers, refiners, or 
marketers of petroleum products. 
‘‘(B) DEPOSIT AND USE OF PROCEEDS.—Pro-
ceeds from the sale of petroleum drawn down pursu-
ant to a Presidential determination under subpara-
graph (A) shall—
‘‘(i) be deposited in the SPR Petroleum 
Account; and 
‘‘(ii) be used only for the purposes speci-
fied in section 167.’’. 
(c) REPORTING
AND
CONSULTATION
REQUIRE-
MENTS.—When the price of a barrel of crude oil exceeds 
$25 (in constant 2003 United States dollars) on the New
York Mercantile Exchange for a period greater than 14 
days, the President, through the Secretary of Energy, 
shall, not later than 30 days after the end of the 14-day 
period, submit to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce of the House of Representatives a report 
that—
(1) states the results of a comprehensive review 
of the causes and potential consequences of the price 
increase; 
(2) provides an estimate of the likely duration 
of the price increase, based on analyses and fore-
casts of the Energy Information Administration; 
(3) provides an analysis of the effects of the 
price increase on the cost of gasoline at the whole-
sale and retail levels; and 
(4) states whether, and provides a specific ra-
tionale for why, the President does or does not sup-
port the drawdown and distribution of a specified 
amount of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
(d) GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY.—The 
Comptroller General of the United States shall, not later
than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
transmit to the Congress a review of the drawdown au-
thority of the President with respect to the Strategic Pe-
troleum Reserve, addressing—
(1) how and why the authority has changed 
over time; 
(2) under what circumstances Presidents have 
actually exercised the authority; 
(3) what the impact on oil prices was as a re-
sult of the exercising of the presidential authority; 
and 
(4) the implications of expanding the drawdown 
authority beyond the ‘‘severe energy supply interrup-
tion’’ standard, and instead allowing the release of 
oil as a regular hedging tool for oil companies, in 
which such companies could tap the Strategic Petro-
leum Reserve as necessary to dampen price shocks, 
but would be required to replace the oil, along with 
additional barrels, at some predetermined time in 
the future. 
SEC. 4. MINIMUM INVENTORY LEVELS. 
(a) ESTABLISHING MINIMUM LEVELS.—The Sec-
retary of Energy shall establish minimum inventory levels 
that producers, refiners, and marketers of crude oil and 
petroleum products must maintain in order to limit the 
impact unexpected supply disruptions have on prices at 
the wholesale and retail level.
(b) DIFFERENT INDUSTRY SEGMENTS.—For the 
purposes of setting the minimum inventory levels, the Sec-
retary may set varying levels for each segment of the oil 
industry as he determines appropriate. 
(c) DIFFERENT PRODUCTS.—For the purposes of 
setting the minimum inventory levels, the Secretary may 
set different levels for the various crude oil and petroleum 
products, including gasoline, home heating oil, and jet 
fuel. 
(d) SEASONAL ADJUSTMENT.—The Secretary may 
propose to adjust minimum inventory levels to reflect sea-
sonal adjustments. 
(e) REGIONAL VARIATIONS.—The minimum inven-
tory levels set by the Secretary shall take into account re-
gional variations in supply and demand, and market struc-
ture. 
SEC. 5. BAN ON EXPORTING OF ALASKAN OIL. 
(a) REPEAL
OF
PROVISION
AUTHORIZING
EX-
PORTS.—Subsection (s) of section 28 of the Mineral Leas-
ing Act (30 U.S.C. 185(s)) is repealed.
(b) REIMPOSITION OF PROHIBITION ON EXPORTS.—
Subsection (d) of Section 7 of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2406(d)) shall be effective 
as of the date of the enactment of this Act, and those 
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (in-
cluding sections 11 and 12) shall apply to the extent nec-
essary to carry out such section 7(d), notwithstanding sec-
tion 20 of that Act and notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law that would otherwise allow the export of oil 
to which such section 7(d) applies.
SEC. 6. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING OPEC AND THE 
WTO. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) No free market exists in oil production be-
cause of collusion among large oil-producing coun-
tries. 
(2) The Organization of the Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC) and other oil-producing coun-
tries have repeatedly agreed to coordinated cutbacks 
in production, thus manipulating world oil markets, 
resulting in de facto price fixing. 
(3) This manipulation led to the highest price 
per barrel of oil in nearly a decade, substantial in-
creases in consumer prices for items such as home 
heating oil and gasoline, and continued price vola-
tility. 
(4) Rising oil prices greatly harm consumers, 
farmers, small businesses, and manufacturers, in-
crease the likelihood of inflation, increase the cost of
conducting interstate and international commerce, 
and pose a strong threat to continued economic 
growth. 
(5) Article XI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) prohibits members 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from set-
ting quantitative restrictions on the import or export 
of resources or products across their borders; specifi-
cally the language reads: ‘‘No prohibitions or restric-
tions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or 
export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted 
or maintained by any contracting party on the im-
portation of any product of the territory of any 
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale 
for export of any product destined for the territory 
of any other contracting party.’’. 
(6) The precise meaning of this provision was 
spelled out in a GATT Panel Report issued in 1988 
entitled ‘‘Japan—Trade in Semi-conductors’, which 
noted, ‘‘. . . this wording [in article XI] was com-
prehensive: it applied to all measures instituted or 
maintained by a contracting party prohibiting or re-
stricting the importation, exportation or sale for ex-
port of products other than measures that take the
form of duties, taxes, or other charges. . . . This 
wording indicated clearly that any measure insti-
tuted or maintained by a contracting party which re-
stricted the exportation or sale for export of prod-
ucts was covered by this provision, irrespective of 
the legal status of the measure.’’. 
(7) Oil production restrictions clearly qualify as 
a ‘‘quantitative restriction’’ based on the original 
WTO rules and the 1988 GATT panel report, which 
certify that only ‘‘duties, taxes or other charges’’ are 
allowable, not pacts among countries to limit produc-
tion of a product for export. 
(8) Article XX of GATT 1994, which sets out 
a series of exceptions to article XI, notes that none 
of the exceptions are valid if they are ‘‘applied in a 
manner which would constitute . . . a disguised re-
striction on international trade’’, a phrase which de-
scribes OPEC’s production restrictions. 
(9) Of the 11 OPEC countries, 6 are members 
of the WTO (Kuwait, Indonesia, Nigeria, Qatar, 
Venezuela, and United Arab Emirates), 2 have ob-
server status and have applied to join the WTO 
(Saudi Arabia and Algeria), and only 3 have no rela-
tionship with the WTO (Libya, Iran, and Iraq).
(10) Of the remaining large oil-producing coun-
tries, Mexico and Norway are members of the WTO, 
and Russia and Oman have applied for membership. 
(11) Given the substantial WTO membership 
and pending membership of oil-producing countries, 
filing a complaint would likely have an immediate 
impact on the current and future behavior of these 
countries. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Congress strongly 
urges the President to instruct the United States Rep-
resentative to the World Trade Organization to file a com-
plaint in the World Trade Organization against oil-pro-
ducing countries for violating their obligations under the 
rules of that organization.
Æ