SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Grid Reliability and 
Infrastructure Defense Act’’ or the ‘‘GRID Act’’. 
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL POWER ACT. 
(a) CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECU-
RITY.—Part II of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824 
et seq.) is amended by adding after section 215 the fol-
lowing new section: 
‘‘SEC. 215A. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE SECU-
RITY. 
‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 
‘‘(1) BULK-POWER
SYSTEM; ELECTRIC
RELI-
ABILITY
ORGANIZATION; REGIONAL
ENTITY.—The 
terms ‘bulk-power system’, ‘Electric Reliability Or-
ganization’, and ‘regional entity’ have the meanings 
given such terms in paragraphs (1), (2), and (7) of 
section 215(a), respectively. 
‘‘(2) DEFENSE
CRITICAL
ELECTRIC
INFRA-
STRUCTURE.—The term ‘defense critical electric in-
frastructure’ means any infrastructure located in the 
United States (including the territories) used for the 
generation, transmission, or distribution of electric 
energy that— 
‘‘(A) is not part of the bulk-power system; 
and
‘‘(B) serves a facility designated by the 
President pursuant to subsection (d)(1), but is 
not owned or operated by the owner or operator 
of such facility. 
‘‘(3) DEFENSE
CRITICAL
ELECTRIC
INFRA-
STRUCTURE
VULNERABILITY.—The term ‘defense 
critical electric infrastructure vulnerability’ means a 
weakness in defense critical electric infrastructure 
that, in the event of a malicious act using electronic 
communication or an electromagnetic pulse, would 
pose a substantial risk of disruption of those elec-
tronic devices or communications networks, includ-
ing hardware, software, and data, that are essential 
to the reliability of defense critical electric infra-
structure. 
‘‘(4) ELECTROMAGNETIC
PULSE.—The term 
‘electromagnetic pulse’ means 1 or more pulses of 
electromagnetic energy emitted by a device capable 
of disabling, disrupting, or destroying electronic 
equipment by means of such a pulse. 
‘‘(5) GEOMAGNETIC
STORM.—The term ‘geo-
magnetic storm’ means a temporary disturbance of 
the Earth’s magnetic field resulting from solar activ-
ity.
‘‘(6) GRID SECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘grid 
security threat’ means a substantial likelihood of— 
‘‘(A)(i) a malicious act using electronic 
communication or an electromagnetic pulse, or 
a geomagnetic storm event, that could disrupt 
the operation of those electronic devices or com-
munications networks, including hardware, soft-
ware, and data, that are essential to the reli-
ability of the bulk-power system or of defense 
critical electric infrastructure; and 
‘‘(ii) disruption of the operation of such 
devices or networks, with significant adverse ef-
fects on the reliability of the bulk-power system 
or of defense critical electric infrastructure, as 
a result of such act or event; or 
‘‘(B)(i) a direct physical attack on the 
bulk-power system or on defense critical electric 
infrastructure; and 
‘‘(ii) significant adverse effects on the reli-
ability of the bulk-power system or of defense 
critical electric infrastructure as a result of 
such physical attack. 
‘‘(7) GRID
SECURITY
VULNERABILITY.—The 
term ‘grid security vulnerability’ means a weakness 
that, in the event of a malicious act using electronic
communication or an electromagnetic pulse, would 
pose a substantial risk of disruption to the operation 
of those electronic devices or communications net-
works, including hardware, software, and data, that 
are essential to the reliability of the bulk-power sys-
tem. 
‘‘(8) LARGE TRANSFORMER.—The term ‘large 
transformer’ means an electric transformer that is 
part of the bulk-power system. 
‘‘(9) PROTECTED
INFORMATION.—The term 
‘protected information’ means information, other 
than classified national security information, des-
ignated as protected information by the Commission 
under subsection (e)(2)— 
‘‘(A) that was developed or submitted in 
connection with the implementation of this sec-
tion; 
‘‘(B) that specifically discusses grid secu-
rity threats, grid security vulnerabilities, de-
fense 
critical 
electric 
infrastructure 
vulnerabilities, or plans, procedures, or meas-
ures to address such threats or vulnerabilities; 
and 
‘‘(C) the unauthorized disclosure of which 
could be used in a malicious manner to impair
the reliability of the bulk-power system or of 
defense critical electric infrastructure. 
‘‘(10) 
SECRETARY.—The 
term 
‘Secretary’ 
means the Secretary of Energy. 
‘‘(11) SECURITY.—The definition of ‘security’ 
in section 3(16) shall not apply to the provisions in 
this section. 
‘‘(b) EMERGENCY RESPONSE MEASURES.— 
‘‘(1) AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS GRID SECURITY 
THREATS.—Whenever the President issues and pro-
vides to the Commission (either directly or through 
the Secretary) a written directive or determination 
identifying an imminent grid security threat, the 
Commission may, with or without notice, hearing, or 
report, issue such orders for emergency measures as 
are necessary in its judgment to protect the reli-
ability of the bulk-power system or of defense critical 
electric infrastructure against such threat. As soon 
as practicable but not later than 180 days after the 
date of enactment of this section, the Commission 
shall, after notice and opportunity for comment, es-
tablish rules of procedure that ensure that such au-
thority can be exercised expeditiously. 
‘‘(2) NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS.—Whenever 
the President issues and provides to the Commission
(either directly or through the Secretary) a written 
directive or determination under paragraph (1), the 
President (or the Secretary, as the case may be) 
shall promptly notify congressional committees of 
relevant jurisdiction, including the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce of the House of Representa-
tives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the Senate, of the contents of, and jus-
tification for, such directive or determination. 
‘‘(3) CONSULTATION.—Before issuing an order 
for emergency measures under paragraph (1), the 
Commission shall, to the extent practicable in light 
of the nature of the grid security threat and the ur-
gency of the need for such emergency measures, con-
sult with appropriate governmental authorities in 
Canada and Mexico, entities described in paragraph 
(4), the Secretary, and other appropriate Federal 
agencies regarding implementation of such emer-
gency measures. 
‘‘(4) APPLICATION.—An order for emergency 
measures under this subsection may apply to— 
‘‘(A) the Electric Reliability Organization; 
‘‘(B) a regional entity; or
‘‘(C) any owner, user, or operator of the 
bulk-power system or of defense critical electric 
infrastructure within the United States. 
‘‘(5) DISCONTINUANCE.—The Commission shall 
issue an order discontinuing any emergency meas-
ures ordered under this subsection, effective not 
later than 30 days after the earliest of the following: 
‘‘(A) The date upon which the President 
issues and provides to the Commission (either 
directly or through the Secretary) a written di-
rective or determination that the grid security 
threat identified under paragraph (1) no longer 
exists. 
‘‘(B) The date upon which the Commission 
issues a written determination that the emer-
gency measures are no longer needed to address 
the grid security threat identified under para-
graph (1), including by means of Commission 
approval of a reliability standard under section 
215 that the Commission determines adequately 
addresses such threat. 
‘‘(C) The date that is 1 year after the 
issuance of an order under paragraph (1). 
‘‘(6) COST RECOVERY.—If the Commission de-
termines that owners, operators, or users of the
bulk-power system or of defense critical electric in-
frastructure have incurred substantial costs to com-
ply with an order under this subsection and that 
such costs were prudently incurred and cannot rea-
sonably be recovered through regulated rates or 
market prices for the electric energy or services sold 
by such owners, operators, or users, the Commission 
shall, after notice and an opportunity for comment, 
establish a mechanism that permits such owners, op-
erators, or users to recover such costs. 
‘‘(c) MEASURES
TO
ADDRESS
GRID
SECURITY 
VULNERABILITIES.— 
‘‘(1) COMMISSION AUTHORITY.—If the Commis-
sion, in consultation with appropriate Federal agen-
cies, identifies a grid security vulnerability that the 
Commission determines has not adequately been ad-
dressed through a reliability standard developed and 
approved under section 215, the Commission shall, 
after notice and opportunity for comment and after 
consultation with the Secretary, other appropriate 
Federal agencies, and appropriate governmental au-
thorities in Canada and Mexico, promulgate a rule 
or issue an order requiring implementation, by any 
owner, operator, or user of the bulk-power system in 
the United States, of measures to protect the bulk-
power system against such vulnerability. Before pro-
mulgating a rule or issuing an order under this 
paragraph, the Commission shall, to the extent prac-
ticable in light of the urgency of the need for action 
to address the grid security vulnerability, request 
and consider recommendations from the Electric Re-
liability Organization regarding such rule or order. 
The Commission may establish an appropriate dead-
line for the submission of such recommendations. 
‘‘(2) 
CERTAIN
EXISTING
CYBERSECURITY 
VULNERABILITIES.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this section, the Commis-
sion shall, after notice and opportunity for comment 
and after consultation with the Secretary, other ap-
propriate Federal agencies, and appropriate govern-
mental authorities in Canada and Mexico, promul-
gate a rule or issue an order requiring the imple-
mentation, by any owner, user, or operator of the 
bulk-power system in the United States, of such 
measures as are necessary to protect the bulk-power 
system against the vulnerabilities identified in the 
June 21, 2007, communication to certain ‘Electricity 
Sector Owners and Operators’ from the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation, acting in
its capacity as the Electricity Sector Information 
and Analysis Center. 
‘‘(3) RESCISSION.—The Commission shall ap-
prove a reliability standard developed under section 
215 that addresses a grid security vulnerability that 
is the subject of a rule or order under paragraph (1) 
or (2), unless the Commission determines that such 
reliability standard does not adequately protect 
against such vulnerability or otherwise does not sat-
isfy the requirements of section 215. Upon such ap-
proval, the Commission shall rescind the rule pro-
mulgated or order issued under paragraph (1) or (2) 
addressing such vulnerability, effective upon the ef-
fective date of the newly approved reliability stand-
ard. 
‘‘(4) GEOMAGNETIC STORMS.—Not later than 1 
year after the date of enactment of this section, the 
Commission shall, after notice and an opportunity 
for comment and after consultation with the Sec-
retary and other appropriate Federal agencies, issue 
an order directing the Electric Reliability Organiza-
tion to submit to the Commission for approval under 
section 215, not later than 1 year after the issuance 
of such order, reliability standards adequate to pro-
tect the bulk-power system from any reasonably