I 
111TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3922 
To ensure that companies operating in the United States that receive United 
States Government funds are not conducting business in Iran, and for 
other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OCTOBER 23, 2009 
Mr. KLEIN of Florida (for himself, Mr. MICA, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. PENCE, Mr. 
PETERS, Mr. KIRK, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. WEXLER, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. 
SCHOCK, Ms. BERKLEY, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. LINDER, Mr. PATRICK J. 
MURPHY of Pennsylvania, Mr. HALL of New York, Mr. MACK, Mr. 
CROWLEY, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. BRALEY of Iowa, Mr. INGLIS, 
Mr. KAGEN, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, Mr. SHULER, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. 
LANCE, Mr. ISRAEL, Ms. KILROY, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, Ms. 
WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Mr. HIMES, Mr. WEINER, and Mr. GUTIERREZ) 
introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, and in addition to the Committees 
on Financial Services and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subse-
quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To ensure that companies operating in the United States 
that receive United States Government funds are not 
conducting business in Iran, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Accountability for 
Business Choices in Iran Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is a party to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) and a member of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
(2) Since 1987, successive United States ad-
ministrations have issued executive orders to ban im-
ports of Iranian-origin goods and services, participa-
tion of United States persons or entities in the de-
velopment of Iran’s energy sector and investment by 
and in Iranian banks in order to address the un-
usual and extraordinary threat to the national secu-
rity, foreign policy and economy of the United 
States posed by an Iranian nuclear weapons pro-
gram. 
(3) On August 5, 1996, the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act was signed into law. In 2006, the title 
of this law was changed to the Iran Sanctions Act 
(ISA). The ISA notes that ‘‘the efforts of the Gov-
ernment of Iran to acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion and the means to deliver them and its support 
of acts of international terrorism endanger the na-
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tional security and foreign policy interests of the 
United States and those countries with which the 
United States shares common strategic and foreign 
policy objectives,’’ and therefore requires the Presi-
dent to sanction United States and foreign compa-
nies if the President determines that such companies 
have invested in Iran’s petroleum or natural gas sec-
tors. 
(4) On March 14, 2000, the Iran Nonprolifera-
tion Act was signed into law, ‘‘to provide for the ap-
plication of measures to foreign persons who trans-
fer to Iran certain goods, services, or technology, 
and for other purposes.’’. 
(5) On September 30, 2006, the Iran Freedom 
Support Act (IFSA) was signed into law ‘‘to hold 
the current regime in Iran accountable for its 
threatening behavior’’ and recommended that the 
President initiate investigations upon the receipt of 
credible information that a United States or foreign 
person is investing in Iran’s petroleum or natural 
gas sector in violation of the ISA. The IFSA ex-
tended the ISA until December 31, 2011. 
(6) In response to its ‘‘serious concern’’ over 
Iran’s nuclear program, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has passed several resolutions call-
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ing on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and re-
processing activities and instituting rounds of sanc-
tions on Iran, taking all necessary measures to pre-
vent the supply of certain goods or technologies that 
could contribute to Iran’s uranium enrichment, re-
processing, or heavy water-related activities, or to 
the development of a nuclear weapon. 
(7) Iran is in violation of these UNSC resolu-
tions. 
(8) Effective November 10, 2008, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) revoked authorization for ‘‘U-turn’’ 
transfers involving Iran. As of that date, United 
States depository institutions are no longer author-
ized to process transfers involving Iran that origi-
nate and end with non-Iranian foreign banks. 
(9) According to a June 5, 2009, IAEA report, 
Iran ‘‘has not suspended its enrichment related ac-
tivities or its work on heavy water related projects 
as required by the Security Council,’’ nor has Iran 
‘‘cooperated with the [IAEA] in connection with the 
remaining issues which give rise to concerns and 
which need to be clarified to exclude the possibility 
of military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme.’’. 
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(10) On September 25, 2009, President 
Obama, British Prime Minister Brown, and French 
President Sarkozy revealed that Iran has been cov-
ertly enriching uranium in Qom, Iran. 
(11) Iran had concealed the existence and pur-
pose of the Qom facility, and had not disclosed the 
Qom enrichment facility to the IAEA until Sep-
tember 21, 2009. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the illicit nuclear activities of the Govern-
ment of Iran—combined with its development of un-
conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, and sup-
port for international terrorism—represent a serious 
threat to the security of the United States and 
United States allies in Europe, the Middle East, and 
around the world; 
(2) the United States should continue to sup-
port diplomatic efforts in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency and the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) to end Iran’s illicit nuclear activi-
ties; 
(3) the United Nations Security Council should 
take further measures beyond UNSC Resolutions 
1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835 to tighten sanctions on 
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Iran, including preventing new investment in Iran’s 
energy sector, as long as Iran fails to comply with 
the international community’s demand to halt its 
nuclear enrichment campaign; 
(4) the United States should take all possible 
measures to discourage and, if possible, prevent for-
eign banks from providing export credits to foreign 
entities seeking to invest in the Iranian energy sec-
tor; 
(5) the United States should encourage foreign 
governments to direct state-owned entities to cease 
all investment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports 
of refined petroleum products to Iran and to per-
suade, and, where possible, require private entities 
based in their territories to cease all investment in 
Iran’s energy sector and all exports of refined petro-
leum products to Iran; 
(6) moderate Arab countries have a vital and 
perhaps existential interest in preventing Iran from 
acquiring nuclear arms, and therefore such coun-
tries, particularly countries with large oil deposits, 
should use their economic leverage to dissuade other 
countries, including the Russian Federation and the 
People’s Republic of China, from assisting Iran’s nu-
clear program directly or indirectly and to persuade 
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other countries, including Russia and China, to be 
more forthcoming in supporting UNSC efforts to 
halt Iran’s nuclear program; 
(7) with Iran’s economy weakened, effective 
economic measures to isolate the regime may make 
the difference between a diplomatic resolution and a 
nuclear standoff; 
(8) to make a diplomatic solution possible, 
international firms doing business in Iran should not 
continue to provide the last crutch of support to the 
Iranian economy; and 
(9) this Act seeks to prohibit those entities that 
do business with the United States from doing busi-
ness with Iran. 
SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS. 
(a) CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The head of 
each executive agency shall ensure that each contract with 
a company entered into by such executive agency for the 
procurement of goods or services or agreement for the use 
of Federal funds as part of a grant, loan, or loan guar-
antee to a company, includes a clause that requires the 
company to certify to the contracting officer that the com-
pany does not conduct business operations in Iran de-
scribed in section 7. 
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(b) REMEDIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of an executive 
agency may impose remedies as provided in this sub-
section if the head of the executive agency deter-
mines that the contractor has submitted a false cer-
tification under subsection (a) after the date the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation is revised pursuant 
to subsection (e) to implement the requirements of 
this section. 
(2) TERMINATION.—The head of an executive 
agency may terminate a covered contract with a 
company upon the determination of a false certifi-
cation under paragraph (1). 
(3) SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT.—The head 
of an executive agency may debar or suspend a con-
tractor from eligibility for Federal contracts upon 
the determination of a false certification under para-
graph (1). The debarment period may not exceed 3 
years. 
(4) INCLUSION ON LIST OF PARTIES EXCLUDED 
FROM FEDERAL PROCUREMENT AND NONPROCURE-
MENT
PROGRAMS.—The Administrator of General 
Services shall include on the List of Parties Ex-
cluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocure-
ment Programs maintained by the Administrator 
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under part 9 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
issued under section 25 of the Office of Federal Pro-
curement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421) each con-
tractor that is debarred, suspended, proposed for de-
barment or suspension, or declared ineligible by the 
head of an executive agency on the basis of a deter-
mination of a false certification under paragraph 
(1). 
(5) RULE
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—This section 
shall not be construed to limit the use of other rem-
edies available to the head of an executive agency or 
any other official of the Federal Government on the 
basis of a determination of a false certification 
under paragraph (1). 
(c) WAIVER.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The President may waive 
the requirement of subsection (a) on a case-by-case 
basis if the President determines and certifies in 
writing to the appropriate congressional committees 
that it is in the national interest to do so. 
(2) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act 
and semi-annually thereafter, the Administrator for 
Federal Procurement Policy shall submit to the ap-
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