1950 So the whole purpose of the bill 8. 3937, @ bill to authorize the President to ex- tend the enlistments in Armed Forces of the United States. te is to hold the men who are now in the various branches of the armed services long enough until replacements can be ob- tained by enlistment, by call of Reserves and the National Guard, or by the draft, and properly trained to take their place. Now that is all the bill provides for. It is bad policy for the Government to break a contract with any of its citizens, It is tough for a 30-year-old man, fiight- ing in the rice paddies of Korea, his wife and a ooupie of kids in Japan or back home in the States, to be held on at the expiration of his 3- or 4-year service, particularly when there are some unmarried individuals between the ages of 26 and 30 back home who perhaps are not contributing their full share in this crisis, to the defense of the Nation. But, ladies and gentlemen, liberty is the first casualty of war. Truth is usu- ally next. When you engage in an armed conflict, freedom is gone. All of us are going to be required to do things we do not want to do. We are going to have our activities curbed. There will be al- locations, priorities, rationing, and cer- tain controls, no doubt, if the flames touched off in Korea engulf the world. Painful as that is, it is inescapable. You cannot fight a painless war. It is just impossibie. I want to say one or two things in a general way, aaide from this bill, par- ticularly since our distinguished and able chairman took considerable time to talk about the over-all picture. In order to win a modern, mechanized war, the victor must possess at least three materials. He has to have iron and steel, rubber, and oil. Soviet Russia has secured a lot of iron and steel and in- dustry in Manchuria, a territory twice as large as the State of Texas, which is the industrial heart of all Asia. And she would not have that steel if the Chinese, after being promised at the Cairo Con- ference that Manchuria would be re- turned to them at the end of the war, had not been sold down the river, and Manchuria turned over to Soviet Russia. Who is responsible for that action? Russia has got to have not only fron and steel in Manchuria and the rich metals and minerals of China that has gone completely under. Everyone knows China is the head, the heart, the bowels, and legs of Asia; and because of the recent weak, indecisive, vacillating, con- tradictory foreign policy, all China has been lost to Red communism. Who is responsible for that? What Members of the House and Senate have stood and pled week after week, month after month, for a strong far eastern foreign policy? The Republicans, as the record will show. Now that China has gone under, after being told that we should keep hands off until the dust settled; after being told by the Secretary of De- fense that it was not our responsibility to defend Korea, or any other spot in the Orient; and after being told by the Secretary of State we will have nothing te do with the defense of Formosa ; after the Secretary of Defense told us repeat- edly, before our committee and in public CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE addresses during the past 6 months, that if we were attacked at any place at 4 o’clock in the morning we would be ready to answer at 5 o’clock; after being repeatedly told by members of the ad- ministration that South Korea was capa- ble of defending herself; after ail of these miscaiculations and misrepresen- tations, not only to the American people but to your Committee on Armed Serv- ices, we have now completely reversed our foreign policy in Asia, and we have decided to go into the one spot with its tough terrain, with its foul weather, the most difficult place on earth to pit our strength against the force of the ground armies of Soviet Russia, namely, Korea. Russia's strength always has been in her ground forces. Recently the President of the United States has repeatedly told the American People, at the commencement exercises at the University of Missouri in Colum- bia last month and at the dedication of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial in St. Louis the following day, that we are closer to peace than any time since the shooting stopped in 1945. At Korea, a little sort of finger, an appendix of the Asiatic continent about the size of Illinois, 600 miles long, 135 miles wide, we go in to defend only the south half of :t, and defend it with what? Who withdrew Lieutenant General Hodge and his 40,000 American troops from Korea south of the thirty-eighth Parallel a year ago last month, in June 1949? The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Sixes], the gentleman from California {Mr Jomnson], and others here with me in 1946 were in Korea. We went up and down that arbitrary thirty-eighth par- allel that has no military significance: there is not a mountain range, there ts no river, there is nothing geographical about it; it is just a line that was blindly, arbi- trarily, and stubbornly drawn so that the Japs north of the thirty-eighth parallel would surrender to the Rus- sians, and the Japs south of the thirty- eighth parallel would surrender to the Americans, General Hodge, with his 40,000 troops, repatriated over 6,000,000 Japanese soldiers, not only from Korea but from Manchuria and China. When we returned from our trip in October 1946 we unanimously agreed that the moment we pulled out of Korea the Russians or the Communists would move in. That is what we told the Con- gress; that is what the gentleman from Florida [Mr. S1xxs] and I told the Amer- ican people in a broadcast over a Wash- ington radio, with Ernest K. Lindley act- ing as moderator. Oh, yes, Mr. Chairman, we are in for it; for the third time in our generation we are engaged in a bloody and devastat-~ ing war. Of course, in 1916 an admin- istration was elected to power because it kept us out of war; in 1940 another administration for the third time was re- turned to power because it promised again, and again, and again, that Amer- ican boys would not have to fight and die on foreign soil; and now, today for the third time we are engaged in war, and Congress has not declared it, We were not requested or asked for counsel or advice; but we were told on a 10987 half sheet of paper when we were called down to the White House 4 weeks ago on Tuesday, I think it was 4 weeks ago to- day, that the Chief Executive, the Com- mander in Chief, had ordered naval and air support for the ground forces in Ko- rea after we had withdrawn our own forces over a year ago. We cannot now debate the legality or constitutionality of the action of the President, “The die is cast.” The poor southern Korecns, most of them farmers—it is an agricul. tural section—with bamboo poles and spears trying to stop 60-ton Russian tanks, Oh, yes; I feel that there will be no peace in our time; there will be intermit- tent wars the rest of our days The mo- ment we squelch the war in Korea tt will break out in Formosa, it will pop up in Iran; it is just lfke the measles, you do not know whether they are going to break out around your ankles or your neck. You can rest pretty well assured that we will not be able to confine this con- flict to Korea We cannot contain it in that narrow theater. Much as I hope and pray we can hold the area, there is a very small foothold left for us to stand on and perhaps within the next few days we will be driven into the sea. Of course only time will tell, XY am no military strategist or tactician, but our best ex- perts themselves do not know. I want to be realistic. I am tired of being kidded. Iam tired of men in high places in our Government, from the Commander in Chief and the Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff, all the way down the line, assuring us we will be ready, Oh, yes, Mr. Chairman, I will say to my beloved friend from Georgia, I fear there is too littie, too late. But who is respon- sible for that? We have appropriated $50,000,000,000 for national defense in the past 4 years—~ fifty thousand million dollars. Where has the money gone? What have we got to show for it? Why were the weapons placed in moth balls and cocoons and put away? Oh, those tanks, those B-29’s, my beloved chairman, in moth balls are not helping the poor, young inexperi- enced doughboys in Korea who are up against some of the toughest men, bat- tle-scarred, most experienced troops in all the world, because these same North Koreans fought to help defend Stalin- grad, they fought the Japanese not only in Korea but in Manchuria, they fought in the Chinese civil war. It is not going to be very pleasant for a@ lot of American fathers and mothers to know that we have given to the dif- ferent nations under the ECA and other programs in Europe and in the Near East over $35,000,000,000; yet today our kids are fighting with inadequate weap- ons, with an insufficient supply of ma- tériel, with ineffective guns in their hands. Had ‘we not given away 50 much of our civilian military production to other nations, perhaps our own troops in Korea would not now be so short of sup- plies and ammunition. Mr. Chairman, the ridiculous and silly charge has been made by the left-wing new Dealers in the Democratic Party that the Republicans are to blame for the Korean crisis because we did not vote
10988 for economic aid for Korea. Nothing could be more stupid or unfair, because a school child knows that it would be su- preme folly to vote economic aid for Ko- rea without backing it up by military assistance. Had we sent fertilizer, farm machinery, hydroelectric equipment, and other industrial machines to develop South Korea, we would simply have but up a greater and richer prize for Russia to take over. The only reason that the Communists have not moved into south- ern Korea, which we abandoned more than a@ year ago, was in the hope that we would send much of our wealth and ma- terials over theré for her to seize, Too little, too late? Oh, yes, Cart, but I want to ask my friend from Geor- gia, and he is a peach because all of the peaches do not grow on trees in Geor- gia, who is responsible for this too little, too late? Who is responsible for the miscalculations, for the gross misrepre- sentations? Certainly no one can blame the Congress of the United States, and most of all our Committee on the Armed Services. Heaven knows, we have bent over backward to go along with the mili- tary. We have tried to comply with practically every request they made. No minority party ever tried or voted with the majority as have we. Certainly the Republicans cannot be blamed for our present debacle. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Rivers], sitting in front of me, knows we have gone further than that. We have tried year after year to get them to build up the Air Force to 40 groups. We had to cram that down their throats. We were told, “Oh, we cannot afford it, we do not need it.” Who did that? This administration canceled the big, modern aircraft carrier for the construc- tion of which this Congress twice specif- ically appropriated funds It was ar- rogantly, it was defiantly canceled. Why? By whom? I have received letters from two or three of my Navy friends during the past week in which they stated: “What a shame it is we do not have two or three more carriers out here in this opera- tional area between Korea and Formosa.” God knows, if anything has proven the worth of the House Armed Services Committee’s B-36 hearings of last fall, the events of the past month have cer- tainly done so. We know that there will always and must be a Navy and a Marine Corps; we have got to have them just as we have got to have an Air Force for strategic bombing and just as we have to have Army ground forces to go in and take over, then hold what we take. All are indispensable. Now I want to drive home this point. Do you know that under this proposed expansion program, bringing the forces up to the previously planned 1952 level in the year 1951, 1t will still be less than what we had in 1949? We have had only one battleship, of course, the Missouri, in commission those 3 years, but we have fewer cruisers not only today, but we will have fewer cruisers next year than we had in 1949, we will have fewer heavy aircraft carriers, we will have fewer destroyers, fewer submarines, fewer escort vessels, and all other types of ships. Who is responsible? What CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE party has been in power all these years? What party holds the purse strings of these United States? No; we do not want to try to assess the blame or put the responsibility upon any particular person or group of persons, because that is water under the bridge and over the dam. But we cannot afford, as a na- tion, to blind our eyes to grievous mis- takes that have been made in the past, We must look back to our mistakes, ad- mit them in order to avoid them in the future. I think if we had a general, a thorough housecleaning, in both our State and our Defense Departments, we could become much stronger. Now that is not a pleasant thing to say; do not think I enjoy saying it. If I did not say a word about it perhaps I would be more popular. I am not seeking popularity but I am concerned about my country. But there is so much more I might say and that I will say, too, in the days that are ahead, Of course, we want to tighten our belts, pull ourselves together, stop our petty bickering, and join hands and heads and hearts for the welfare of the Nation. Oh, just listen to the jeers from the majority side. You are seeing displayed here today the very spirit that we are fighting to destroy abroad. Even in time of war you cannot throttle freedom of speech: and certainly, in time of war, realizing that the blood of men and women of all faiths, parties, and creeds are mingled and shed in the defense of this Nation, 1t 111 behooves some of you little peewees of narrow minds and shriveled souls to display the arrogant attitude of intolerance, unwilling to lis- ten to anybody who might possibly differ in the least with you. Well, you are going to have to hsten whether you hke it or not. And when you are here for @ while, you certainly will know better. Mr ARENDS Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SHORT, I yield to the gentleman from. Illinois. Mr. ARENDS. I think, in passing, that the gentleman should not miss this opportunity to call the attention of the House to this very fact, that had it not been for the B-36 investigation this last year by the Committee on Armed Serv- ices, let me ask the membership of this House, where would our Marine Corps and where would our Navy be? How much would be left? Ask yourselves that question. Mr. SHORT. There is just one other thought I want to leave before I stop, and that is to follow the sound advice that will be given to you soon by the dis- tinguished and able gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. DurHam], He has been studying the Stock Piling Act for many years, I participated in many of those sessions. He knows more about that problem than any other Member of Congress. Let me tell you, if you knew the facts as they actually exist on our stockpiling program, you would shudder in your boots today. We need manga- nese more than any other material. It is the one indispensable item. You can- not manufacture steel without it, and unless we somehow or other build up our manganese stockpile I fear what the outcome of this global conflict might be. JULY 25 Mr Chairman, earlier in this address I said that to win a modern, mechanized war, the victor must possess at least three materials: iron or steel, rubber, and oil. I tried to point out that Russia has the iron and steel in Manchuria She does not yet have a sufficient quantity of rub- ber and oil to conduct a global war. However, most of the world knows, certainly we do, that Russia has her eyes cast on Indonesia and Malaya, Sumatra, Java, and Singapore to get the rubber after the fall of Indochina. She also has her eyes cast upon Iran, Iraq, and Saudi- Arabia, in fact the whole Near East with its rich oil deposits in order that she might complete her program to have steel, rubber, and oil to fight a global conflict. Sir, we cannot permit the Russian bear to reach out her paws and gather in all the little, weak countries on her perimeter to secure the materials with which to conquer the world. Mr. Chairman, there is another quality which 1s necessary for any coun- try to win in any armed conflict. That is a spiritual quality and a moral force which dictators often overlook or under- estimate. The love of liberty, the devotion to a great and righteous cause, the in- domitable spirit of men which believes in the dignity of the human soul and the love of a just and lasting peace. These ethical principles cannot be conquered by the might of materialism. In the be- ginning of a conflict, brute force may triumph for a while, but the undying faith, the resolute will, the indomitable courage born of Christian idealism will ultimately triumph. These virtues which belong to the United States and western civilization will eventually triumph over the ruthless instincts and barbarous tactics of a Godless atheistic communism. We will give Russia and the whole world to understand that much as we might differ among ourselves in a country ot free men on domestic is- sues, we shall ever rise as a united Na- tion and a united people to fight and die to preserve our Republic against all ruthless aggressors. Mr, VINSON. Mr. Chairman, to clear up what was perhaps a musinterpreta- tion of my earlier remarks, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr Chairman, I take this time in the hope that no misunderstanding can de- velop from any remark that I make. I do not intend to convey the thought that the Committee on Appropriations has failed to give every dollar the budget has recommended. The Appropriations Committee has done that The Appro- priations Committee and certain mem- bers of it, particularly the gentleman from California [Mr, SHEPPARD], the gen- tleman from Florida [Mr. Snes], and the distinguished former chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Naval Affairs [Mr, PLUMLEY], all partici- pated in the fight on the floor of the House 2 years ago for more money for naval aviation, which the House, after debate, rejected by a vote of approxi- mately 65 for to 125 against. The House of Representatives is not subject to any criticism, for we have not failed to provide far more, repeatedly,
1950 than the budget has recommended. As @ result of going on behalf of the Armed Services Committee to the Appropria- tions Committee in 1949, the budget was increased $800,000,000 specifically for the Air Force. I do not want anybody to think I am criticizing the Appropriations Commit- tee, because the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Manon] and his committee, par- ticularly Mr. Suxes, Mr. PLuMiry, and Mr, Suerparp in the forefront, were try- ing to write into the appropriation bill the items the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in their minds, which were oftentimes cur- tailed by the budect. Mr. Chairman, there are no further re- quests for time on this side. If there are no requests for time on the other side, I ask that the bill be read for amendment. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such tiine as he may desire to the gen- tleman from Michigan | Mr. Forp].° Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, in a syndi- cated article published July 21, 1950, in the Grand Rapids Press, and other news- papers throughout the United States, the prominent columnist, Mr. David Law- rence, had the following to say: Out in Korea the American boys are fight- ing bravely and many are dying, but inside Washington there is a bitter fecling of criti- cism concerning certain decisions of the top command—General Collings of the Army and General Vandenberg of the Air Force—who are charged with having combined to squelch the oppo-tunity of the United States Marine aviation units to fight in the Far East. From oth:r sources similar informa- tion has also been received. In addition, an interesting letter was recently for- warded to me by a constituent and for the information of the Members of the House the pertinent portions are as follows: I am a raval reservist and expect to be called back to active duty at any time. My first gripe is aimed at the high brass at that huge office building, the Pentagon. We've enjoyed the benefits of unification since 1948, and I think it stinks. What kind of unification is it that calls the Marine Re- serve ground forces to active duty and leaves Marine Reserve air units at home? What’s the matter with Naval Air Reserve units? This war 1s supposed to be an air war, let's use all our air forces. * * * If it isn’t going to be an air war, this country has been sold a4 bill of goods, Our Marine Corps, the best fighting group we have had in any war, has been rendered virtually useless as &@ result of unification. A marine by virtue of his training 1s imbued with that elusive esprit de corps, morale, or plain guts to fight and win. In World War II no other branch of the service could show the same qualities to any marked degree. I’m sure any military critic will say our last war in the Pacific was a Marine victory—with a slight assist by the Army and Navy. Let’s give the marines in this fight the support of their own air units. Also, let's get the Marine Corps back up to somewhere near their wartime strength and keep it up there through the years ahead. It would be as good insurance as a 70-group air force. I’m like fil sailors: I have a dislike for marines along with a hearty respect for their ability. In the city of Grand Rapids, Mich., a Marine Reserve unit has been faithfully training for the past few years. It is D Company of the Eighth Infantry, Bat- talion. This unit either has or is sched- XCVI——692 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE uled for a call to active duty. In my esti- mation it would be tragic for this unit of the Marines or any other fighting Ma- rine outfit to be sent into che front in Korea or elsewhere without the bene- fit of trained Marine air group tactical support. I strongly urge that any plan be abandoned for the splitting up of Marine ground units from Marine air groups, This rumored plan to break up the long-established and highly effective Marine air-ground coordination has been in the minds of some of our Army and Air Force leaders for a number of years, but despite this pressure the in- tegrity of the entire Marine program has been maintained except for slashes in numbers all along the line. However, the present Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, seems to have been vic- timized by this unsound thinking, for he is quoted as having said: We cannot afford to have three separate air forces—Navy, Marine, and Air Force. It is obvious that the rumors men- tioned in Mr. Lawrence's column are in line with Mr. Johnson's basic thinking. It is important to understand a few basic and fundamental facts’ in discuss- ing this problem. In the first place, ma- rine aviation is not separate; it is a legal and administrative fact that marine aviation is administratively and techni- cally a part of naval aviation under the applicable statutes. Marine aviation or- ganizations are like the rest of the ma- rines—part of the Naval Establishment. All procurement of the matériel and training of any pilots for marine avia- tion is included in the naval air pro- gram. During World War II Admiral King, in an effort to determine any possible savings in the Naval Establishment, con- vened a board within the Navy Depart- ment to determine what would be the effect from the economy standpoint of abolishing marine aviation in toto. Aft- er exhaustive inquiries this board con- cluded and actually placed upon record certain important conclusions. It was the board’s decision that, because of the very close integration of marine air training and operations into the naval air program, there would be, in fact, no savings resulting from the elimination of the marine air program, The assign- ment of strictly naval air units for the performance of functions previously handled by marine air groups was not recommended. It was found there would be no economies and the effective- ness of this vital military weapon would be abolished by such a plan. Anyone who is at all familiar with marine air group operations knows that marine air units are trained to operate off either Navy carriers or advanced Jand bases. Marine air units exist for one primary reason, and one reason alone: The support, very close support, of the ground troops. In this connec- tion it should be recalled that it was ma-~ rine preoccupation with the amphibious specialty that resulted in the marine em. ployment of our present-day close air support doctrine which, as it is used in the Marine Corps, is the most effective 10989 close air-support program possessed by any armed forces in the world. Marine close air support not only includes iso- lation of the battle fleld, but such sup- port is predicated upon the actual as- sistance of ground units by attacking specific targets opposing marine ground effort. As a result, the marine system of close air support is designed to bring down on an enemy an air strike when- ever required by the front-line ground commander. This is in contrast to the theory of saturation of area targets and the control of supporting aircraft by the top echelon of ground commanders away from the fighting front. Unlike other United States air-support doctrine, marines have carried air- ground integration to such a point that in every front-line battalion and in other specially designated units there is a marine air-control officer. This offi- cer is trained in both air and ground techniques. He is a marine aviator, but basically, as are all marines, a marine first, last, and always. Marine air, rath- er than being separated from the ground effort, as has been the case of the tech- nical support of Army units resulting from the creation of a separate air force is based upon the air-ground team con- cept. Some people may well ask this ques- tion: How does this powerful close air support conception fiteinto the otherwise completely unique Marine Corps idea? Th answer is simple and understand- able. The Marine Corps usefulness as a military outfit lies largely in its adher- ence to the team idea. The Marine Corps fec's it is their mandate to be ready with a team—not a very big one perhaps—but still a complete team to answer the call at any time. Since in operations across the water such as we are now fighting in Korea, the Marine Corps cannot always have the tanks and artillery they need right at the moment of landing, the Marine Corps must rely more extensively on this extremely flexible weapon, namely, close support planes. Without them the ma- rines are only a partial team and cannot be expected to be completely effective in all the complex operations assigned them. However, with their own close support planes the marines have the necessary balance and the striking pow- er and the readiness to move into action whic: gives modern significance to the cld marine saying “first to fight.” To give this teamwork real effect, the Marine Corps puts specially trained air personnel directly with the front line troops to observe closely the progress of the battle and to call for and direct these vital close support air attacks, The Marine Corps is the only military organ- ization in the world that does this with such thoroughgoing detail, and needless to say it has paid tremendous dividends in the past. Consequently, it would be most unwise to change this method at this crucial hour when the marines are again going to be called upon to do their job in a new Pacific war. Marines had to develop a close air support doctrine simply because the na- ture of amphibious operations was such that there had to be an effective type of
10990 immediate, front-line controlled, air support in order to cover the ground at- tacks in an amphibious operation prior to the landing of heavier items of ar- tillery and other supporting weapons. It should not be forgotten that marines pioneered dive bombing and logistical support of ground troops by air. In pass- ing, it might be worth noting that in 1938, when Major Udet of the German e was watching a marine avia- tion squadron put on a demonstration at the Cleveland air races that he was so impressed by marine dive bombing that he stated he was going to recom- mend the German Air Force adopt a similar technique. The record of marine aviation in World War II was outstanding in the annals of close air-support history. Car- rier- or land-based marine close air-sup- port aviation was able to deliver bat- talion-controlled air strikes with but a few minutes notice and it was very nor- mal to deliver strafing, bombing. and rocket attacks against enemy positions as close as 100 yards to our own front lines. It is reported that on at least one occasion on Iwo Jima a close air support attack was launched within 50 yards of our own troops. Another point that should be consid- ered 1s the fact that there is no real dup- lication or competition between the Air Force generally and marine and naval close air-support programs. For ex- ample, the Air Force is today preoccu- pied with long-range strategic bombing and jet intercepter planes. It is no secret that everything else 1s secondary as far as operations within the Air Force are concerned Accordingly, and quite properly, the Air Force has today de- veloped, due to its preoccupation and emphasis on long-range bombing, the finest long-range bomber in the world, namely, the B-36. On the other hand, it must be remembered that while making this great advance in strategic air, no basic improvement has been made by the Air Force in close air support doc- trine or matériel. This is best evidenced by the immediate calling up of P-51 con- ventional type aircraft for the Air Force's operations in Korea. Fortunately the marine and naval aviation experts have not been preoc- cupied with long-range strategic bomb- ing, but in contrast have emphasized and focused their attention on naval air operations involving close air support of ground troops in amphibious and related operations, As a result of this activity which is so important to expeditionary troops of the fleet marine forces there has been continued perfection of our close air-support doctrines and tech- niques. For example, we are now re- ported to have the finest kind of sup- port aircraft in the new Martin Mauler. The point should carefully be noted that this aircraft was conceived and pro- QGueed not by the Air Force, to which close air support is of secondary im- portance, but rather by naval aviation and marines whose specialty is close air- support activity. The different inter- ests of the Air Force and marine-naval aviation has given our Nation comple- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE mentary—not conflicting—types of air power, To now withhold marine avia- tion units from active participation with marine ground units in Korea would be disastrous, to say the least. In conclusion, Mr, Chairman, let me emphasize again the absolute need and necessity for maintaining the close co- operation and integrity of marine ground and marine alr units. I trust that the decisions in the Korean opera- tion are unfounded, for history shows that in Pacific warfare a full marine team—ground and air—is essential in the jobs assigned to the Corps. Mr. SHORT. I have no further re- quests for time, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the bill for amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Be it enacted, etc, That until July 9, 1051, the President shall be authorized to extend all enlistments in any component of the Army of the United States, the United States Navy, and the United States Marine Corps, includ- ing the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve, and in any component of the Air Force of the United States for a period of not 10 exceed 12 months Provided, That all per- sons whose terms of enlistments are extended in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall continue during such extensions to be subject in all respects to the laws and regu- lations for the government of their respective service. Sec. 2. Personnel of the uniformed services entitled to benefits under section 615 of the Career Compensation Act af 1949 (63 Stat. 831) shall not suffer any reduction in total compensation by reason of any extended service performed under the terms of this act. Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Mr. Chairman, I take this time for the purpose of raising two or three ques- tions. They may not be answered; it may be impossible to answer them. In doing this, I realize that war is the most expensive game that man ever played or ever will play, not only in materials but in so-called finance as well as in human blood and suffering. Wars have to be financed either by compulsion or by voluntary service and voluntary contri- butions in the way of purchase of Treas- ury issues and in the payment of taxes which after all is samewhat voluntary because in this country you do not have to work and earn income which can be taxed—you can just lie down and quit and the welfare agencies will feed your wife and children. So paying taxes is more or less a voluntary proposition. The great chairman of the committee that has brought this bill to the floor has discussed the question of dollars—and I am not up here to put dollars against human bodies now or at any other time, but the people in my district are very much concerned about the mental atti- tude of those in the defense arms of Gov- ernment who disburse the dollars which are provided by the taxpayers and the bond buyers and therefore they have not had answered to them in a satisfactory manner, to say the least, what the ad- ministrators of the defense program have done with between sixty and ninety billion dollars which has been provided for defense during the past few years, JULY 25 Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CRAWFORD. I yield to the gen- tleman to give us any comfort on that that he may. Mr. VINSON. I will state to the dis- tinguished gentleman that I do not know that I can answer his question, but I am trying to find information to answer it, But I can say this: Out of every dollar appropriated for national defense, 60 cents goes to what ts called housekeeping in the Defense Department. Now, the gentieman is absolutely correct and the country does want to know what is the character of our defense; what kind of tank program we have; how much ar- tillery we have; how many men we have; how many airplanes we have. The Committee on Armed Services started yesterday on a hearing to find out what the situation is. Just as soon as we get the iriformation, I propose to bring it to the floor of the House and tell the coun- try how much defense we have Mr. CRAWFORD. I thank the chair- man for that information. I did not have it before and I do not know how many other Members of the House had it, either. The people did not have it and that is exactly what I think should be done—we should proceed just along that line. Just one other thought. So many bil- lions of dollars have been thrown at the feet of the administrators of national de- fense during the past 15 years that it is only human that those administrators have become ruthless in the expenditure of those funds, The situation now is that we are starting out with a $260,000,- 000,000 debt. We started out on the last war with about a $49,000,000,000 debt and by the time we wind up after a 2-, 3-, 4-, 5- or 10-year war, we may have six or eight trillion dollars in the national debt, unless we do get better sense in the op- eration of the administration of these funds. I hope that the Committee on Armed Services will do the necessary things to put the throttle on those who are to administer these funds so that they will have a little respect for the use of mate- rial and the burdens that are placed on the citizens insofar as dollars are con- cerned. Dollars just represent material. And if we win any wars or keep a little peace in the world we will still nsed a few pieces of material for those who are at peace to use after the wars have finished. Mrs, ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CRAWFORD. I yield. Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetis. Has the gentleman any idea how much we have in stockpiles? I understand that Members are having great difficulty in finding how much we have in our stock- piles. Mr. CRAWFORD. I have been read- ing stockpile hearings allday. I started early this morning. I have a bunch of them here. I think our stockpile situa~- tion will prove to be even more distress- ing and more disappointing than the situation with reference to equipment,
1950 The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired. Mr. CRAWFORD. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to proceed for one additional minute. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? There was no objection. Mr. CRAWFORD. Here is one illus- tration: You cannot run an army or a navy without good rope. In the Philippine Islands we have several thou- sand bales of manile hemp. That should have been put into the United States 6 to 9 mcnths age’ Have the foices down here in charge of the administration moved those bales of fiber? Have they tried tomove them? No. Let this com- mittee get the answer why that stuft was not moved over here for defense. Take any stockpile you want, and it 1s 75 to 90 percent deficient. We will have some more talk about that tomorrow after- noon, The CHAIRMAN The time of the gentleman has expired, Mr PRICE Mr Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Mr Chuirman, of course, when all such measures come to the floor there are some Members who cannot resist the opportunity to inject politics. Even on legislation so vital to our national security and the preservation of our American way of life The question has been asked today, “Where did all this defense money go?” Where did the $45,000,000,000 go that we appropriated for defense since the close of World War II? I think if any Mem- ber is sincere in wanting to find that answer he would have little difficulty and little trouble in finding it. First of all, he could call the defense establishment and they would tell him promptly and accurately. If he did not care to call the defense establishment, all he would have to do is to keep himself well in- formed by reading the daily newspapers. Mr WALSH. Mr Chairman, will the gentleman yield? My. PRICE. I yield. Mr. WALSH. I wonder if you have observed as a member of the Armed Ser- vices Committee that a lot of people at this time have 20-20 vision in their hindsight. Mr. PRICE. I agree with the gen- tleman from Indiana. Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr, will the gentleman yield? Mr. PRICE. I am sorry, I have only 5 minutes I have followed the daily newspapers very closely and I know you do not even have to goa to the defense establishment to get the answer to this very important question. I inserted in yesterday’s Recorp an editorial from the Evening Star of last Saturday which cleared up this subject pretty well. I am golng to read to the House some of the figures quoted in that editorial. Those who are interested can read the complete editorial in the Appendix on page A5328 of the Recorp. This newspaper was interested enough to check the figures and they got their information from the defense establishment without difficulty, Out of every dollar expended for na- tional defense over the past years, since Chairman, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE the war, 40 cents of it goes for salaries: food, clothing, and transportation. ‘Twenty-six cents goes for operation and maintenance of equipment. Eighteen cents for weapons, planes, ships, and so forth. Five cents goes for research and development. Four and one-half cents goes of administration and secret work. Four cents goes for the reserves and the National Guard. One cent goes for in- dustrial mobilization Less than one cent goes to retired pay, and one-half of 1 cent goes for construction and public works, Now, what situation have we had con- fronting us during the past 5 years? Where is this $45,000,000,0002? I am going to read the last two paragraphs frem this editorial: Defense officials say the best measure of military spending, ag it relates to what we have to show for our money today, 1s the authorized outlays for the 4-year period fiom July 1, 1946, to June 30, 1950 During this time Congiess authorized $49,300,000,000 for the military, of which $48,400,000,000 has been spent to date and nearly a billion more will have been spent by the end of this fiscal year Almost $20,000,000,000 went for pay- rolls, food, clothing, and travel, $13,000,000,- 000 for operating and maintaining military installations and tactical equipment sround the globe, and €8,500,00U,000 for procurement of planes, tanks, rifles, artillery, ships, and other combat tvols During this cold-war era, it should be re- membered, occurred the costly airlift oper- ations and the support of our occupation troops in Europe and Japan—expenses not ordinarily budgeted in time of so-called peace In summation, our defense dollar has had a huge chunk eaten out of it by ordinary and extraordinary expenses that produced no tangible equipment for our foot soldiers, flyers, sailors,and marines In tact, 70 cents of the dollar went for housekeeping and oper- ational costs If there is any possible way to reduce the drain on the defense dollar, the Defense Depaitment has been unable to find it. For our fighting men must not only be supplied with arms but must be paid, fed, clothed, housed, and transported It is for such essential things that our money—nearly $100,000,000,000 of it—has gone during the past half decade of an uneasy peace, That information was not very difficult to obtain Anyone who wanted to, could have easily obtained it. It was as close at hand as the telephone on your desk, the paper on your newsstand Let us suspend politics while we con- sider important defense legislation, This is not the time for politics as usual. Mr. SASSCER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Mr. Chairman, there are several things on which there is no uncertainty: One is that the Americans in all the forces, Air, Ground, and Navy, are valiantly fighting to the highest degree that can be expected of any soldier. We know that the Armed Services Committee in an effort to make this country strong had passed various enabling bills, and we Know that the appropriations have been made by this Congress to make a strong, balanced armed service. I shall not, and will not, attempt to place blame anywhere; this is not the time; it is a time for America to look forward rather than back and exert every possible effort to bring forth a strong, well-rounded armed service. But in doing that, let us, not in the spirit 10991 of placing blame, but in the hope of be- coming strong, analyze our difficulties. Let us analyze the past, yes, so that cor- rections may be made if corrections are needed and unhesitatingly make them if necessary This Congress has a grave responsibility. Unfortunately Congress voted away and delegated much of its authority in the second Unification Act, an act directed to the concentration of power in the Department of Defense. I am glad that I was in the little group of about a dozen who voted against it. That is water over the dam, The power is gone to a great extent, but let us con- serve and exercise that power which is left. There is a definite obligation on this Congress to see that the spirit of the Unification Act is carried out, and the autonomy of these various services is preserved, and to check a tendency first apparent, then admitted, of having but one ground army, practically no Marine Coips, a weakened Navy, the naval air arm and the carriers withered in strength. Many of us have protested consistently and vigorously that course, yet it has been progressively carried on. Not in the Congress but in the Depart- ment of Defense. Now it is the obliga- tion of the Congress to see that that pattern 1s completely abandoned. Mr. Chairman, I made a speech on the floor of the House on August 2, 1949, in which I quoted Admiral Halsey. I want to again quote from Admiral Hal- sey. It indicates some of the apprehen- sion that existed in my mind at that time. He made the following statement: The concept of what each weapon can or cannot do theoretically is very ridiculous, The only thing I can think of that is more ri- diculous is the fact that you have a weapon and, through legislative or other act, you cunnot use that weapon because it might interfere with the glory of some other per- s0n who has a similar wenpon I think the object in war is to strike with as many Weapons as possible as often and as fast as possible, I think that is the surest and best way to terminate a war. I would go further than that, and say I do not think any weap- on should be in any way restricted, whether it belongs to the Army, Navy, or the Air Force, or is used only for a special purpose. In other words, they should be used where they are most needed. My thoughts boiled down are these: We know—as has been discussed infor- mally in cloakrooms and in commit- tees—that there has been a tendency to build up the vertical chain of command to the detriment of the offensive essen- tial potential of the Navy, the Marine Corps, their air arm, the National Guard, and Reserves. The hour has ar- rived when the Congress must demand balanced services. Of course, the Con- gress voted away a good deal of power, but the Congress can demand that through administrative action in the Defense Department the intent of the Congress is not thwarted. There has been much talk about ap- propriations. We have appropriated large sums of money. Then after the appropriations have been made, pos- sibly for a given service—yes, for car- riers and aircraft, or for any other thing that this Congress might have appro- priated—we see by administrative action the intent of the Congress diverted or
10992 nuilified. If America is to stay strong, and America in this hour must be strong, we have to have balanced services, we have to have three stmong services, and the only way you are going to have them is for this Coneress to demand that the money be spent In the manver we have appropriated it and not in furtherance of amy structural plan directed to the weakening and elimination of any of the services. Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word. Mr. Chairman, I am one of the junior members of the Armed Services Commit- tee. I was gratified at the speech made by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. It gave us all confi- dence and hope. The first week after the Korean war started, the gentleman from Georgia { Mr. Vrerson! was required to be away from Washington It was with a sense of relief personalty to me that I learnedc he had returned to Wash- ington. = admire the straightforward manner in which he spoke here today to the Congress of the United States and I think the peopie of America tomeht will steep in their beds with a little more feeling of relief. I know I shail. Mr. Chairman, there appear to be a lot of prophets today upon this ficor. Where have thase prophets been during the last 2 years? Why have they not raised their vaices? ‘Why have they not given the President the advantage of their great hindsight? I spoke here a few days ago and I said at that time I thought it was about time we tnid aside partisanship. Mr. Chairman, I am not interested in what happened in Korea. I am not in- terested in the fact that Secretary John- son may have been wrong when he did away with the building of the carmer United States. Tam not interested in the misiakes that have been made in our committee. Iam one of the members of the Committee on the Armefi Services whe believes in a strong Air Force. I may personaily bave been wrong ua my views about the Navy, but that is water over the dam, as the distinguished gen- tleman from Missouri has said. I think it 1s a shame today that we have seen the blame for three great wars placed upon a certaia side of this aisle. I can- not help but remember during my short tenure of being a Member of this House the cry fram a certain side af this House asking for ecomamy, ecanomy, economy, when 7@ percent of our budget was going for the military, aad we were hearing from the well of this House constantly the words thai we must have a balanced budget, that we owst reduce mulitary spending, we must reduce damestic spending. I agree with our distin- guiahed chairman thai every dollar we can save domestically now must be saved, but I can say to you mow thai there are a lot of prophets here in the Honse of Representatives, and I am one of them, that have a great hindsight as to what has happened during the past 2 years, and I think the sooner we lay aside partisan politics and pass this legislation that 1s coming from our commiltiee, and we farget the bitterness thai has taken CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE place in the past, that we are going to be suze of victory; whether it is mext year or 10 years from now. We may be tu for & Jong, jong duration; we may never see peace in our times, but it ts up to us as Members of this Conezess to vote every cent possible for military preparation. This war may be tomorrow on @ uni- versal scale; it may be § months, i may be 1 year from now, and we pray to God it will never be, but I heand our distin- guished chairman say yesterday, in executive session, that by being strong we May preserve the peace of this Nation. It is only, gentlemen, by remaining Strong, that we have any hope at all for peace. I hope this legistation is promptly enacted by the House today. . The Clerk read as follows: Sac. 8 That portion of section 1422 af the Revised Statutes (16 Stat. 484) which reads as follows: “All persons who shall be 90 de- tained beyond their terms of enlistment or who shall, after the termination of thetr en- listment, voluntarily reenter to serve until the return to an Atlantic or Pacific port of the veasel to which they belong and their regu- lar dtecharge therefrom, shall receive for the time during which they are mo detained, or shall so serve beyond their original terms of enltstment, an eddition of one-fourth of thetr former pay:” shail be suepended with Tespect to enlistments extended in accord- ance with this act. Mr VINGON (interrupting the read- ing of the bill). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the further reading of the bill, that # be printed tn the Recor at this point, and that all debate on the hid] and all amend- ments thereto close in 1 hour. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentieman from Georgia? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN, The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vorys). Mr. VORYS. Adr. Chairman, this first bill of a group we are to pass is a very serious Measure. We are changing the contract we made with enlisted men m the armed services because of dire neces- sity, involving the security of our coun- try, in carrying out our mission under the United Nations. We had betier bear that an mind when later we come to other contracts that may be need to be Changed because of such * There has been discussion here about lowering the drain on defense dollars. I have a suggestion I should like to make along that line, and I hope I may have the attention of the distinguished mem- bers of the Commitiee on Armed Serv- ices, I want to recall some recent his- tory that will, I am sure, entail no de- bate or recrimination, because the House action was unanimous. This was on an amendment I offered in committee that Was unanimously adopted there, and when it came to the floor as a committes amendment on August 18, 1949, it was unanimously adopted in the House, and when we went to conference it was unan. imously adopted there. Last year we were cansidering the mu. tual degense assistance bill and I offered what I then called the “anti-five” per- JULY 25 cent or “antl-deep-freese amendment.” I want to read it. This ts section 412 of what is now Public Law 339 of the Eighty-first Congress, the Mutual De- fense Assistance Act of 1949: Whoever offers or gives to anyone who is now or in the past 2 years has been an em- plopee or officer of the United States any commission, payment, or gift, jn connection with the procurement of equipment, mate- Nala, or eervices under this act, and who- ever, being or having been an employee or officer of the United States in the past 2 years, solicits, accepts, or offers to socept any such commission, payment, or gift, shall upan ocouviction thereaf be subject to a fine of not to exceed 610,000 or imprieonment for not te exceed 3 years, or both. That amendment both in committee and in conference was objected to by the executive departments They said it was too broad. However, both Houses of the Congress in their wisdom adopted that amendment exactly as I had drafted 1t. In conference I said that, if experience showed it was too broad, we could have amendments brought in when mutual defense assistance was extended this year ‘¥o such recommendations came from the executive departments this year when the act was extended Apparentiy my original amendment ts not too broad. However, it is confined solety to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Note that it is limited to “procurement under this act.” It seems to me that at this time, when we are changing the con- tracts of enlisted men, when we are thinking of clanging other contracts, and when we want to conserve the de- fense dollar, we ought, before any trou- ble or scandal or suspicion starts, to put into the laws that come from our great Committee on Armed Services such a provision as this. It will take care of those who are already Ifke vultures over the kill, starting to circle around the Capital to see what pickings they can make out of war contracts. Many patri- otéc businessmen are offering their plants to provide what we need. Their offers should be considered on their merits and on our needs. We do not want word to get around that they have to sce the right people who can put on the fix. We ought at least to provide that there are not going to be any deals between those Persons amd those that are now offiners or have been officers ar emplayees of the Government, so there will not be any 5 bercent or any other arrangements made. Therefore we should put a strong meas- ure into the legislation which I hope will come from the Cammitiee on Armed Services in a few days, a deterrent to prevent any persons inside or outside the Government
1950 ing our voluiteers to fight longer than they contracted for, we are going to pre- vont anyone from getting any improper profit out of this great effort. Mr. VINSON. I will say to the gen- tleman from Ohio that I will introduce tomorrow a bill dealing with the ques- tion of renegotiation providing that every contract not only for armaments but every other contract of the Govern- ment will be subject to renegotiation, We should try to write into law some- thing that wil prohibit and stop this situation of 5 percenters on Govern- ment contracts, Mr, VORYS. I thank the gentleman, The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Massachu- setts [Mr Putter]. Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee has given a most comprehensive report on the current diplomatic and military situation now confronting the Nation and the world. I do not desire at this time to elabo- rate upon his remarks and recommenda- tions which I know have made a very deep impression upon this House as they will upon the country. But in view of the great crisis which faces us as a Nation, I feel bound as a member of the Armed Services Committee to pre- sent, or rather to reiterate in substance some very concrete views regarding the world situation which I have held for some time and which upon many occa- sions I have heretofore expressed. First, let me say that I agree that there isno further time to lose in putting the resources and strength of this Nation into a full state of prepara- tion to meet any and every contingency. The world about us is threatening any day, any moment, to break out into another dreadful conflagration. The ruthless, tyrannical forces of organized world communism have spread their tentacles far and wide over the face of the earth. They have subjugated and enslaved millions of helpless peoples. Their demonstrated aim 1s world con- quest. Only America, and Amcrica standing practically alone, has the power, the strength, the will and pur- pose to bar the way to these evil forces from reaching their goal and enslaving Americans and all other free peoples and destroying the civilization which has been built up throughout the centuries with so much sacrifice and bloodshed. Certainly the present situation requires immediate and vigorous action by Con- gress and the Executive, We must move with utmost dispatch. There can he no delay. We can brook no interference. We can tolerate no disloyalty. We can shelter no half-heartedness, There must be an immediate full-scaled, intensive, yes, I will say advisedly, an urgent, united effort to build up a military force and an industrial potential that will be able and adequate to protect and defend this Nation and carry out our commit- ments for the defense of human liberty and our free way of life. Military and economic power is not enough to cope with this situation, in- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE dispensable as this is. We must have an immediate clarification of foreign policy designed to inform the American people and the world, clearly and frankly, of our objectives for the attainment of a peaceful world through cooperative in. ternational action and the neutralization of Communist efforts to enslave man- kind. Early stepping up of our activities to bring accurate information and en- lightenment to all peoples is highly desirable. Measures to protect the internal se- curity are most urgent, immediately mandatory. We cannot permit Trojan horses filled with Communist conspira- tors to rove through this Nation ready at a signal to disgorge a flood of sabotage and destruction upon our communica- tions, our vital public services, and our nationa] defense industries. This is of paramount importance now Every appropriate Government agency, na- tional, State, and local, must be organ- ized, mobilized, and alerted to combat these internal enemies who threaten us so despicably from within It is also very essential that we immediately organize civilian defense and disaster components. Our armed services, all of them, must be alerted to the possibilities of further attack anywhere. Let us wakeup Any- thing can happen at any moment, and for God’s sake let us be ready Let us not be taken again by surprise. Let us marshal all our strength, build additional forces as the world situation requires, and unite the entire American people and the decent, freedom-loving peoples of the world against the evils of organized Communist tyranny. Mr Chairman, I ask unanimous con- sent that the balance of my time be allotted to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr Vinson] The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr Case] Mr CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I was interested in the gen-~ tleman’s statement that he expects on tomorrow to introduce a bill which will reactivate renegotiation. Is that cor- rect? Mr. VINSON. It has already been prepared If we did not have this bill up here this afternoon, I would drop it in the hopper this afternoon, The gen- tleman understands that his committee already has a provision written in law that all contracts relating to the Army, Navy, and Air Force for the fiscal year 1951 are subject to renegotiation. But this is broader and applies to all Gov- ernment contracts. Myr. CASE of South Dakota. Is this a complete reactivation of the renego- tiation statute as we developed it during World War IT? Mr. VINSON, It is along the same line as was established before and the whole thing is considered along that line, It is very constructive legislation and 10993 comes from Secretary Symington's hands, . Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Of course the gentleman recalls that we in- stituted renegotiation by a very simple amendment at the outset during the con~ sideration of the sixth supplemental de- fense bill in 1942, and it was revised in a tax bill by the Committee on Ways and Means in 1943, It became quite a broad statute covering all phases of defense procurement. Does this bill cover the same scope? Mr. VINSON. This is so broad that while I think the Committee on Armed Services might have jurisdiction, I to- day requested the Speaker of the House that even though our committee did have jurisdiction to refer the bill to the Committee on Ways and Means Mr CASE of South Dakota. I appre- ciate the information the gentleman has given, Iam glad to know that steps are being taken in that direction. As the gentleman knows, I was much concerned in the development of the renegotiation statute Mr. VINSON. May I say in this con- nection I think it was the gentleman's amendment which started the whole thing during the World War. The gen- tleman is entitled to recognition for hav- ing originated it, or at least putting it in the statute. The gentleman has al- ways been strong for renegotiation. But we must go one step further in this pre- paredness program—and that is all this is—we must stop, by language, if it can so be drafted, people—or to use the ex- pression of the gentleman from Ohio— almost vultures, standing around here trying to make 5 percent or 10 percent out of Government contracts. It is the most difficult thing to find language to cover {t. We went through it in World War II. But something along that line, as well as renegotiation should be enacted as early as possible, The House and the country can just understand that we have to enter into a worthwhile pre- paredness Jefensive program and the first thought of the Congress and the Nation has to be the defense of this country. Mr. CASE of South Dakota. There is no question about that. Mr, WHITTEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield. Mr. WHITTEN. At this point, since this legislation is before the House, I want to urge, in view of the report of the Comptroller General, that we see to it that in any legislation which is passed the Comptroller General shall have a right to go into these matters more fully than has been true in the past. Mr. CASE of South Dakota, I also hope that is incorporated in the bill. As the gentleman from Georgia [Mr, Vinson | has suggested, I followed the de- velopment of the renegotiation proposi- tion from the outset. Again, in 1948 when we provided funds for a 17-group air force, we reactivated renegotiation for the procurement under the speed-up funds then provided. Unfortunately,
10994 the 1948 money for the 70-group air force was frozen, in large part, and that is partly responsible for the situation we have today. We were also distressed in the Appro- priations Committee, in the spring of 1948, to find that other money which had been provided for research and develop- ment was being used for other purposes under direction of the President's Budget Bureau. Gen. Curtis LeMay, who was in charge of the strategic air command at that time, testified in our hearings that this taking of the funds away from research and development set back that program at least 18 months. And the President wrote a letter to agency heads restricting them to supporting budget action Today we are paying some of the price for that. Now, it is not a matter of bringing up these matters to show we had foresight, but it is to let the people know how things could be different. The American people are interested in knowing how they can get some assurance that these mistakes will not be repeated in the future. We will not avoid them unless they are recognized. I have here a letter which I received from the comptroller of the Air Force under date of April 8, 1950, in response to my own letter of April 6, 1950, in re- gard to the effect of the freezing of the Air Force funds for this fiscal year 1950. When we return to the House I shall ask permission to place that in the Recorp at this point. It shows the effect of the freezing of the $735,000,000 which the Congress, and I may say on the initiative of the House of Representatives, put into the appropriation bill for the defense establishment last year. I shali also in- sert a letter from the Treasury giving the record on the expenditures for the first 6 months of this year. The letters referred to follow: DEPARTMENT OF THE Alen Force, Heavquagters, Unrren STATES Am FORCE, Washington, D. C., April 19, 1950. Hon Prancam Cask, House of Representatives, Dear MR. Case: This is in reply to your letter of April 6, 1950, in which you requested information regarding Department of the Air Force fiscal year 1950 funds which were frozen by the President. Following the enactment of the fiecal year 1950 appropriations bill, the President di- rected the Secretary of Defense to reserve the additional funds added by the Congress to the President's 48 group budget for the purpose of building up toward a 58 group Air Force. As a result, the following funds were placed in reserve. Appropriation: Construction of aircraft and related procurement...._. $577, 155, 000 Special procurement........ 8, 388, 000 Maintenance and operations. 180, 928, 000 Research and development... 18, 000, 000 Contingencies... 138, 000 Total .....---.-----.. - 735, 754, 000 Had the Air Force been authorized to obli- gate the entire appropriations enacted by the Congress for fiscal year 1950, the aircraft- procurement program for that fiscal year would have been expanded from 1,260 to 1,882 aircraft and the Air Force would heve can- tinued its build-up toward a 58 group level. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE In the case of research and development, the reservation of funds in this appropriation resulted in the slowing down of the rate of development, and, in some instances, the elimination of certain projects The placing of these funds in reserve had no effect on the radar screen, and this pro- gram is being prosecuted as originally planned. However, it should be pointed out that the fiscal year 1950 appropriations bill did not provide funds specifically for this ac- tivity Provision was made in the bill, how- ever, for the transfer to the “acquisitiongand construction of real property” appropriation of the funds required to finance this pro- gram. Such action necessitated the repro- graming of activities in the “aircraft and re~ lated procuement” and “maintenance and operations’ appropriations to the extent necessary to finance the fiscal year 1950 incre- ment of the radar screen. The total amount which the conferees of the House and the Senate added to the ap- propriation estimates of the Department of the Air Force for fiscai year 1950, as passed by the Congress, was $735,754,000. The amount set aside In reserve by direction of the President also totaled $735,754,000 Gincerely yours, E W RaAwtines, Lieutenant General, Untted States Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. —e Treasury DEPARTMENT, Fiscar Service, Washington, July 12, 1950. Hon. JoHn Taper, House of Representatives, Room 1126, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. Deaa ConcressMaN TaBER' Pursuant to yeur telephone request, I am enclosing a table that shows the budget estimates of January 1950 for the fiacal year 195C, compared with actual receipts and expenditures for that fiscal year, on the basis of daily Treasury statement classifications. I hope this will give you the information that you desire. Very truly yours, E. F. BAasretr, Fiscal Assistant Secretary. Actual budget receipts and expenditures, fiscal year 1950, compared with buttget estimates of January 1950 {in millions of dollars) Budget Actual esti- soal { mates Classification of Jan- 1950 Receipts Internal revenue’ Jacome ta: Withheld by employers___| 10, 9, 830 Other... wee eee 18, 159 19, wT Miserlaneous internal reve- ee 8,303 | 8,328 Social sucurity taxes Employinent taxes ...._.. 2, 106 2, 245 Tax on employers of 8 or more... 226 223 Taxes upon carriers and dheir employees... 2.0. oe FEG 570 Railroad unemployment in- suraneds contributions for administrative expenses. ____ 9 10 Customs. oe, eee eee 423 375 Surplus property {act Oct 3, wens 24 224 Other misooilaneous | receipts... J 166 1, 065 Total budgct receipts. ...... rr 311] 42, 185 Deduct Appropriation to Federal old-agy and survivors in suranes trust fand......... 2,106 2, 245 Refunds of receipts.........-| 2,160 | 2,177 Net budget receipts. _.._.. 37,046 | 37, 768 [SS |S JULY 25 Actual budget receipts and expenditures, Ascal year 1950, compared with budget estimates of January 1950—Continued {In millions 0, dollars} Classification usar 196 Expenditures Leginiative establishment... ..... 62 The Judiciery........ ewes o pt Agriculture De partment Farmers Home Adininistra tion. -. 180 Production and. “Marketing: Administration Commodity Credit Cor 1, 556 baa € Atomic t Eneray Commission 673 Civil Service Commission Employeos’ retirement funds (United States share).._....- $03 ther... 02. 2... - B Commerce Department: Civil Aeronautios -. 193 Maritime Activities. 162 a 1: 508 eens ceecene 133 Detene TE Department Orton of the Beer ‘tary of De- Retired pny ~military gerv- HOB. eee eee 28 Other.__- - 11 Aw Foros... - 8, 745 Army... 6, 151 Navy.... .. 4 413 Eoanomic Cooperation Adminia- jon Economic Cooperation Act... 3, 808 Other... eee ee Int Executive Office of the President. 12 Export-Import Bank of Washing- Lh rs UW Federal Security Agency Social Seourtty Administra- onan. a 1,175 : 308 General & Servieos Administration 707 Bee and Homo Finance (eNC ‘Omcc of Administrator... ... 7 Feder at Housing Administra- CS ) , 18 Home Loan Bank Bourd...... £197 Public Housing Administra- tion... - neneesowes 13 Interior Departaient. Bureau of Reclamation. 334 Other...2020. 2.08. Ky Justice | ent. 136 Korean a 70 Labor Departmant.. 727777 218 Mutual dcfense assistance... .. 100 Post oe Depertment (dei i Railroad Retirerent Hoard: Railroad retirement account... 602 Other... ep --ee eee uu joonstruction Finance Corpora- 1,084 Binte ‘Department a 365 Tenncasee Valley Authority... 82 Treusury Departn Interest on the  iblic debt... 6, 725 Other... 22. ween eee 663 Veterans® ‘Administration National sei vice life dusuuranoa f a. §11 0 6, 265 438 Total budget expenditures. | 40,167 | 43, 207 a en eeeeneenwnnee §, 533 1 Based upon net transactions On cotmpurable basis with expenditures in dafly Treasury statements this figure would be $166,000,000 * Exoess of credits, deduct, The CHAIRMAN, The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from South Caro- lina (Mr, Rivers]. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I am reluctant to impose upon your time at this time for 5 minutes, but I do believe
1950 I should make my position clear in this matter right now, once and for all. First of all, I want to make this state- ment. Ten years I have sat at the feet of the gentleman from Georgia, CaRL VINSON; 10 years I have sat at the feet of the greatest chairman that any com- mittee has ever had in the history of this Nation. I will say to you that the gen- tleman from Georgia, Chairman Vinson, has exhibited more vision than all the Presidents and all the members of the executive branch on matters of defense, since time began. He built for this Na- tion the largezt Navy the world has ever known. It kicked from the seas every- thing the Japanese had, and it roamed the Pacific at will. He built the largest Marine Corps and naval air arm this Nation has ever had He was the leader in this 70-group air-force fight. He wanted to give the Nation the best Air Force the world could provide. He wanted to give the Nation the best Army the world could provide. But his advice was not heeded, and we might just as well face the facts. Who is responsible for that? The executive brarch of the Government, and you know it. I want to say right here and now that I will not have any part of that. Mr, ELSTON. I think the gentleman will agree that every member of the Committee on the Armed Services sup- ported our chairman; did he not? Mr RIVERS. I was coming to that. With very few exceptions in each of the 10 years I have served on the commit- tee, 6 with the Committee on Naval Affairs, we got more bills passed through this Congress than any committee in the history of all the Congresses of the United States, as the gentleman from Missouri! well knows. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vinson] saw to that, He, with his great leadership, tells you this bill is necessary and you will follow him; certainly I shall. But I want the world to know, I want the Nation to know, that the Committee on Armed Services is not responsible for the de- bacle this country faces today; it is the executive branch of the Government, not the Congress of the United States, or the Armed Services Committee under the Jeadership of the gentleman from Geor- gia, CaRL VINSON. This is not a time for recrimination; you know that, and I know that; but we have got to go forward; we have got to face the facts which my chairman has called to your attention. We are in one bad situation; only a miracle can save usin Korea, You know that, but I want the recorcs to be crystal-clear that had the executive branch of Government fol- lowed the leadership of Cart Vinson this Nation today could tell the world where to go in a very few minutes. Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. will the gentleman yield? Mr. RIVERS. I yield. Mr. CRAWFORD. I do not think the gentleman overstated what he said about the chairman of this committee. Does the gentleman recall of a single bill brought out of this committee that we did not accept? Chairman, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Mr. RIVERS. I know of none, and we are going to accept this one; all Amer- icans are. Mr. CRAWFORD. Certainly. Mr. RIVERS. We appropriated money here, but it was withheld by the executive branch of the Government, We might just as well face the fact. We have got that same ox in the ditch, the very same one the gentleman from Georgia was talking about; and you and I have got to pull that same ox out of the ditch. But I want no part of the blame for our present situation to be saddled on the Congress of the United States; it cannot be, and you know it. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Chio [Mr. Brown] is recognized. (Mr. CANnFigLp asked and was given permission to yield the time allotted to him to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr, brown.) Mr BROWN of Chio. Mr, Chairman, I have asked for this time because I have been extremely interested in the debate which is taking place here today, a de- bate which I believe may be good for the American people and the future peace of the world. I have been especially inter- ested in the remarks of the chairman of the Committee on the Armed Services, the gentleman from Georgia {Mr. Vin- son], the remarks of the Republican member of the committee on the Armed Services, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SHorT], the remarks of the gentle- man from Indiana [Mr. WatsH], and those of the gentleman from South Car- olina, also a member of the committee [Mr. Rivers). I wish at the very outset to say to you that America is at the crossroads, indeed, the whole world 1s at the crossroads to- day. These are critical hours. I am sure every individual Member of Con- gress, yea, every American citizen, is be- hind our boys in uniform who are fight- ing alone today. I have my own ideas as to how this state of affairs came about, and, if I desired, perhaps I could be quite critical of some persons and some of the policies responsible for our being where we are, but the fact remains American boys are fighting 7,000 mileg away from home with their backs to the sea, and that we are trying to do some- thing about it, and to give them the equipment and the tools of war with which to defend their lives. I regret—yes, I deeply regret—that while we are engaged in fighting the spread of communism in Korea 7,000 miles away, for some reason or other some people are dragging their feet here at home, and we are encountering diffi- culty in our attempts to get brought up in the Congress for consideration the measures which would at least restrict the activities of those Communists and their helpers who would destroy us from within while our foreign foes seek to destroy us from without. But this is not a time to attempt to fix blame or re- sponsibility for that which has gone on before, I am sure the American people in their wisdom will reach a decision in due time as to who is responsible and who is to blame, 10995 We now have before us a bill to break the contract, or the word, of the Govern- ment of the United States, as the gentle- man from Ohio [Mr. Vorys] has pointed out, with the American boys who have voluntarily. entered the armed services in recent months and years. That sort of legislation cannot be approached lightly, as Iam sure the gentleman from Georgia will agree. In that connection, because we are going to pass this bill— that seems apparent—I believe it is nec- essary that the American people know certain things, For instance, Mr. Chairman, the Amer-~ ican people should know the Congress provided a ceiling of approximately 2,000,000 men for the Armed Forces, and that of this date we are nearly 600,000 men below that ceiling. It is not the responsibility of or because of any failure of the Congress of the United States that this particular situation exists. I hope the chairman of the great Com- mittee on the Armed Services, the gen- tleman from Georgia [Mr. Vinson], will point out later in his remarks, either on this bill or on the bill which follows, just what the Congress has done to pro- vide for the defense of this country. I suggest this because I am fearful that once we vote the powers and the appro- priations being requested by the admin- istration, and pethaps the Congress ad- journs, as the majority leader suggested yesterday, so we will no longer have the opportunity and the benefit of free de- bate in the well of this House, or on the floor of the other body, some officials may attempt to place the responsibility and the blame for the mistakes and the failures of the past and present, on the Congress of the United States I do not want that to happen. So I feel 1t 1s time we make it clear here and now that cer- tain things have been done by the Con- gress for the common defense. This Congress did pass the Unification Act at the request of the administration, and I would like to say for the benefit of the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vin- son] that I went along with the admin- istration on the passage of that act when the gentleman, in his wisdom, pointed out the dangers involved. I am not so sure we were as wise as we thought in the action we took in following the re- quest of the administration in this con- nection. “Perhaps the chairman of the Committee on the Armed Services had much clearer vision and better judg- ment at that time than some of the rest of us. We enacted the stockpiling bill under which practically nothing has been done. And, as I mentioned a moment ago, we voted more manpower, about 600,000 more men, for the armed services, than the military has seen fit to call to the colors. Our military leaders could now have 2,000,000 trained men under arms if they had seen fit to use the authority Congress voted them. We have appro- priated, and Chairman Vinson, I want you to correct me if I am wrong, some- thing like $1,500,000,000 more money for the National Defense Establishment,
10996 since World War Ii ended, than has been spent or obligated by that agency. I believe the gentleman from Georgia will agree with me, and I want the gentleman from Indiana {Mr. WatsH] to listen to this if he is here, that never once, regardiess of the political party Members might belong to, was there more than one single vote against any defense appropriation or any defense measure during the war years. I would like also to point out with all the vigor at my command that the Con- gress has gone along on every other re- quest of the military and the administra- tion to strengthen our national defense. For instance, we set up the Central In- telligence Agency to keep America in- formed as to what was going on through- out the world. We also created the National Security Council during the Eightieth Congress. In order that we might give security to our Nation and to our people, we also set up the National Security Resources Board, so we might be prepared in a material way in case of danger. Oh, yes, we voted more naval aircraft and plane carriers than have been con- structed. It was not the Congress who refused to continue such construction or ordered the partially finished aircraft carriers abandoned; that was another agency of the Government. We have appropriated nearly $60,000,- 000,000 for national defense purposes since the war ended; and we ’ if you please, sirs, for a 70-group air force, not once, but three different times. It was not until just a week or so ago, not until then, that we finally did get the consent of the administration to go ahead with the 70-group air force pro- gram, We have spent about $35,000,000,000 on economic and other aid for foreign countries, because we were told we had to decide whether we wanted to spend a few billion dollars now for economic aid to guarantee peace, or whether, in- stead, we wanted to spend $100,000,- 000,000 or much more each year for war. Well, that program simply has not worked out. At least it certainly has not given us a peaceful world or eliminated the dangerous threat of world war III. And I am not unmindful, Mr. Chairman, in fact, I rather resent deep down in my heart, may I say to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SHorT], the fact that the American boys who are fighting and dying on the battlefields in Korea today, with their backs to the sea, do not have a single soldier from a single nation we have helped so much, outside of Korea fighting alongside them. That is a sad and disillusioning situation. May I also point out that not more than 6 or 7 weeks ago a committee of this Congress was told the military budget for next year would not be any larger than it was for this year, and per- haps considerably less. Neither am I unmindful of the fact that the military Jeaders of our Nation more than a year ago told us Korea was not defensible, and was of no strategic value to us. It was upon their orders, not ours, that American troops were withdrawn from Korea, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on and talk about many other things the Congress has done in the belief we were contributing to the building of an ade- quate national defense, and I could point out numerous high-level mistakes of the past to show the responsibility for the present unsatisfactory situation which exists today does not rest upon the Congress. I hope that the gentleman from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, able as he is, will point in measured words, for the benefit of this Congress and the country, & complete list of the many things the Congress of the United States has done to strengthen our national defense and to assure the security of the American people. Such action is important, Mr. Chairman, and, I am sure, will be most helpful to a proper understanding of what has gone on before, what our pres- ent defense situation really is, and what we must do to prepare for the days ahead. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from California Mr, Ho.irre.p]. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the gentieman from Georgia [Mr. Vuvwsow] made one of the finest speeches that I have ever listened to in this House, and I want the membership of this House to know that I am following his leadership 100 percent in regard to this emergency bill. I think some things that have been brought up during this debate, particu- larly by the gentleman from Missouri {[Mr. Suort], a dear friend of mine, should be considered by this House. In the first place, the United States is com- mitted to the principle of the United Nations. Rightly or wrongly we are com- mitted to it. Now, let us consider Korea. Who drew the thirty-eighth parallel line in Korea? Who approved it? Was it the United States? It was approved by the United Nations. Then there happens to be an- other principle of the United Nations, and that is the self-determination of peoples. When the people of the free Republic of South Korea wanted to hold an election, we particpated under the auspices of the United Nations in holding that free election in July of 1948, over 2 years ago, and the free Republic of South Korea was born, and the North Korean Republic refused to let the United Na- tions come in to supervise and see that their election was free. So, some other forces have been at work besides our own, Of course, when that constitutional gov- ernment was established in Korea we withdrew our troops, because our military people said that we had no business there; it was a country on its own, and later on we ‘vent in only in an advisory position. Now I want to ask the gentlemen who are finding so much fault with the situa- tion as it has developed in Korea would they be willing at this time to mass 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 men on the east- west German line in anticipation of something which might happen? If that something did happen, would the Mon- day morning quarterbacks say we were at fault because we did not mass those JULY 25 2,000,000 men on the east-west German line? Mr. CASE of South Dakote. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr, HOLIFIELD. I cannot yield at this time. Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I should like to answer the gentleman's challenge. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Once aggression took place in Korea from the Commu- nist-led people in the north, the United Nations appealed to the member nations of the United Nations to oppose that aggression. Because we are probably the greatest and most powerful and out- standing nation that is supporting the true principles of the United Nations, we responded to that call, and we are doing the best we can. We did not pick the battleground, we did not pick the murky weather, we did not pick the swamps or mountains of Korea in which to fight. Someone else picked that battleground, and picked it by aggressive action. We are doing our best to oppose it. The program of opposition to com- munism since World War II ended is an all-over program. It is not just a mili- tary action in Korea, it is not just an oc- cupation in Germany, it is not an airlift to Berlin, it is an all-over program. It is an economic program to strengthen those nations of Europe that are known as the ECA nations, so that they can re- sist communism within their own bor- ders, so that they can sustain constitu- tional government and the freedom and liberty of their people. I want to ask some of these Monday morning quarterbacks like my good friend from Missouri [Mr. SHort], how did he vote on the motion to recommit the Korean aid bill? How did he vote on economic aid to the ECA countries in Europe? How did he follow through on the Korean aid bill, I should like to know. Mr. SHORT. Yes; I voted against the Korean aid bill. Many of the stanchest supporters of the United Nations voted against 1t. I voted against it for the reason that it was absolutely silly to send economic aid to build up a rich prize over there unless you were ready to de- fend it. Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right; how about the European ECA bill? Mr. SHORT. I voted against it. Mr. HOLIFIELD. The gentleman says he wanted military aid to Korea, but he is not committing himself on how he was calling the play on the economic aid to Europe the purpose of which was to de- feat communism within the borders of Europe. Yes; and there is something else I want to call to the attention of the gen- tleman, and that is the economy drive. What caused the mothballing of planes? What caused the mothballing of battle- ships and cruisers? It was the economy drive of the gentleman from Missouri and his colleagues of the same persua- Mr. SHORT. I will tell the gentleman why: Because the Eightieth Congress voted more than this administration would spend. Mr. HOLIFIELD. I refuse to yield further, Mr. Chairman.
1950 Mr. SHORT. The gentleman does not want to hear it. The CHAIRMAN, The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for three additional minutes, so I may an- swer my friend from Missouri. The CHAIRMAN. The Chairman can- not entertain that request, because the time for debate has been allotted. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Crawrorp]. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CRAWFORD. I yield. Mr. SHORT. The fact is the Presi- dent cut back $735,000,000 in our air program that we offered last year. He impounded it. General Joh.:son im- pounded it at the suggestion and recom- mendation of the Chief Executive for economy. There is where your economy comes from. Mr, CASE of South Dakota. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. CRAWFORD I yield. Mr CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, in answer to what the gentle- man from California said about th? situ- ation in Europe and Germany, I want to simply go on record saying again, as I said before, long ago we should have been taking steps to build up a military potential in western Germany, Under permission granted by the House, I place here a colloquy which took place between the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Jupp] and myself dur- ing the debate on the military aid bill, from the CONGRESSIONAL ReEcorp of Au-~ gust 17, 1949, a year ago: Mr Jupp. I yield. Mr. CasE of South Dakota. Is western Ger- many included, and if not, why not? Mr. Jupp. Western Germany is not in- cluded. You can think of some obvious rea~ sons, of course Probably the best natural defense line available is the Rhine. That is a sizable barrier, but most of the German armament plants are east of that barrier. I think it is understood that the German econ- omy will contribute basic things, such as coal, steel, chemicals, and so forth, but not finithed armaments. Mr. Cass of South Dakota. Where is the greatest industrial-producing capacity for armaments in Europe? Mr Jupp. The greatest industrial-produc- ing capacity for armaments is in Germany, but unfortunately it 1s tn an area which because of our retreat from defense barriers further east like the Elbe, could not be kept under our control Mr, Case of South Dakota. Where is the greatest reserve of trained fighting manpower in Europe? Mr. Jupp. Excepting Russia, it is in Ger- many. So, I will say to the gentleman from California that it is not hindsight today to point out that we should have been doing something in western Germany while the Russians were building up their so-called police force in eastern Ger- many—and there were earlier observa- tions by the Member from South Dakota in the Herter committee report of 1947-48. Mr CRAWFORD. Mr. Chairman, I take the floor again to try to straighten oat the record on what the gentleman CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE from Illinois [Mr. Price} had to say, I think about me, a while ago when he was on the floor. I asked him to yield to me and he did not. In ro way did I inject politics in my statement when I raised the question as to what had oc- curred to the moneys that have been appropriated. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr Price] directed me to read the editorials of the newspapers for in- formation for the people in my district. Muay I say to the gentleman from Illinois I am a little bit more energetic than that, and anyone who knows me would know better than to challenge me in such away. Ido not generally inject politics into my statements here. I try to get some facts. He has referred us to edi- torials The distinguished chairman of the committee said that his committee was going into this problem and I accepted that as a complete answer to my ques- tion Also, I see that the distinguished committee of which the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Price] is a member, is not going to depend upon newspaper edi- torials for their answers, either. Then the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. WatLsH]—I just read his statement in the CONGRESSIONAL REcORD—I would like to say this to him, not as advice but as a mere suggestion: As he goes down through life, it might be well for him to consider the errors of the past when he is dealing with the dollars put up by the stockholders or taxpayers or bond buyers. There are three groups who like to know what their dollars are used for. If the gentleman ever becomes a success industrially, he will certainly try to find out who made the error, in- stead of washing the thing out and pay- ing no attention to the errors of the past as he appropriates for the future. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Virginia [Mr, Harpy. Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. HARDY, I yield. Mr. DOYLE. I think it is appropriate for me briefly to call the attention of the Members of the House to two votes, First, I call your attention to the vote on ald to Korea on January 19, 1950. The vote “aye” was 191. The vote “no” was 193. It lost by only two votes. The second vote was on February 9, 1950. The “aye” vote was 240, and the ‘‘no” vote 134. My suggestion is that all of us ought to hesitate very emphatically at this tragic time in the world’s history be- fore being hypercritical of what mistakes may or may not have been made, His- tory itself will best be the judge of events of the past. Some of the gentlemen who today are saying things designed to condemn and find fault with others are those who voted against the proposed help of 60,000 to Korea just in Janu- ary and February of this year. I think some of us ought to review what we did on those two occasions. Self-inspec- tion will remove much criticism of others. Let us not be partisan, Let us be truly objective. Mr. GAVIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? 10997 Mr. HARDY. I am sorry I cannot yield to my friend from Pennsylvania. I would lke to yield but the time is lin cited. Mr. Chairman, many of my colleagues have spoken about the mistakes that have been made, particularly by the De- fense Department and the State Depart- ment Hindsight is a whole lot better than foresight. We can look back at a lot of mistakes that have been made, and I suppose it may be a question of Judg- ment to determine whether they were mistakes. I can think of a good many things that have occurred during the past few years that seem to me to have been mistakes. I think if they had been handled differently, we might be in a better situation today. Some of the questions raised by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHorr] are difficult, if not impossible to answer. But I do not think it does us much good at this moment to enumerate mistakes, or to focus too much attention on them in this critical hour. We need to think about them. We need to take action to prevent their re- currence. And to the extent that the same people who made those mistakes are governing our policies now, we need to make some changes. But let us not air this on the floor of the House when our tempers become a little frayed, Mine does occasionally. My chairman called that to my attention in committee yesterday, so I am going to try to be careful, because, like my good friend from South Carolina [Mr. Rivers], I have learned a great deal under Mr. Vinson’s tutelage. However, there are a few things that I think should be men- tioned. Not all of the mistakes have been made by the Defense Establishment. I think some of them have been made in the Congress, and I want to mention one that we made in this Congress, in my judgment. I think we made a mistake when we amended the Unification Act. We did that. Perhaps we were a little gullible. Perhaps we were influenced by the demand for economy. Perhaps we placed a little too much confidence in the report of the Hoover Commission as to what savings could be accomplished. Whatever may have been the reason, we did it. I have a deep and abiding conviction that some of our immediate difficulties stem from that very act, and perhaps we ought to change it again. But out of this unification squabble— and it was a squabble—arose the hear- ings which were conducted by the Com- mittee on Armed Services not so long ago, starting out with the so-called B-36 investigation, and then going into a study of unification. What was the real question about unification? It was a struggle between the components of the Military Estab- lishment to put into effect their inter- pretations of what unification meant, We did a great deal of good in those hearings. In my humble Judgment, if it had not been for those hearings the Navy would have been scuttled. We would not have any Marine Corps. Maybe that is a little strong, but, thank God, we had those hearings, and thank God we had a chairman who would pursue that thing
10998 to a conclusion and come up with recom- mendations, and stand firmly by those recommendations. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Harpy] has expired. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. HarpyY]. Mr, HARDY. I thank you very much. I do not want to take all of my chair- man’s time, but I would like to conclude with one or two observations. In the Armed Services Committee we are not frustrated with politics. When we are dealing with national defense we must not permit political considerations to be injected. We do not do it in the committee. Let us not do it in the House. Let us come farth and correct the errors that have been made and take steps to prevent a repetition of those errors. Let us do the best that we can now and do it quickly, to meet whatever the needs may be immediately before us. Let us prepare ourselves to the fullest to meet any threat, wherever it may occur in the world. But Jet us not so con- centrate our strength in one spot as to become too weak in another—more im- portant and more vulnerable spot. We are receiving help from some other nations, but let us keep in mind this fact, that whether or not we have the support of the other members of the United Nations, we have no course ex- cept to stand up and fight for the de- mocracy that we enjoy, to fight against the encroachment of communism wher- ever it may arise. Any other course leads us to eventual destruction and slavery. Let me express my appreciation to my chairman for yielding me these few minutes. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog- nizes the gentleman from Alabama [Mr, DEGRAFFENRIED ], Mr. pEGRAFFENRIED. Mr. Chair- man, as a member of the Committee on Armed Services I could not remain si- lent here this afternoon and not say a few words. In the beginning let me state that I did not rise in a spirit of criticism toward anyone, although I think con- structive criticism is oftentimes very good; but I do want to say that since I have been, for just a short time, on the Committee on Armed Services I have been impressed with the leadership of the majority and also of the minority on that committee. As my distinguished colleague from Virginia said a moment ago, we have not had any politics on that committee in the bills that have come from that committee. When those bills have come up on the floor of the House you have seen both sides of the aisle fighting for those bills to go through. I think it is a tribute to both parties and the House that that has existed. I voted for aid to Korea, I voted for the Marshal) plan, I have voted with the ad- ninistration on many measures although thave consistently fought against the so- ‘alled civil rights issues and I expect to io 80 as @ southerner as long as I am 1ere on the floor of the House. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE We have had distinguished leadership on our committee. How easy it would be for the gentleman from Georgia to stand here on the floor today and tell you: “Yes, I told you so long ago; I have been telling you this all along.” Instead of that, what does he do? Does he stand here and tell you about the money that we appropriated that was not used, al- though he knows it full well? He wrote me back in December of last year when I was at Tuscaloosa, Ala., to please write him and give him some of my reactions to the investigation that we had just had, and I wrote him this, among other things, and I quote from my letter of which I sent a copy to every member of the Com- mittee on Armed Services: The responsibility of Congress for appro- priations should remain tnviolate. Steps ehould be taken by Congress to retain unim- patred use of this responsibility. The Bu- reau of the Budget has an importent func- tion to perform but should not be permitted to control the amount of the appropriation. When Congress appropriates money for cer- tatn designated agencies and uses, nefther the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, nor any other person or department should be permitted to limit or curtall or reduce the expenditure or use of such appropriation as designated by the Congress. I wrote that last December, and it was not hindsight when I wrote that letter. We in the Armed Services Committee knew that some of the money that was being appropriated by this Congress was not being used, had not been used. I have figures here to show where it had not been used. I do not criticize any particular individual for this, because no doubt the administration was trying to do like many members of the minority party and many members of the majority party, reduce expenditures where it could possibly do so. In reducing those ex- penditures the administration was try- ing to act in the best interests of our country. The point, however, is that we, the Congress, have the responsibility for the appropriations. If we appropri- ate too much, that is our responsibility, and if we appropriate too little that is our responsibility; but the executive branch of the Government should not have the right to control the appropria- tions of Congress, because it is given to the Congress by the Constitution of the United States. The situation in Korea is bad. Whose fault it is it will do no good to say. Our chairman has taken this position, and rightfully so. I think it would not do any good for him to stand here and tell you about what he has been trying to get done that has not been done. He says action must be taken now regardless of whose fault it was that we failed of ac- tion in the past; that we have got to get our program under way. That is the position we have got to take in this Congress, The bill before us today is not a pleas- ant bill to vote for. As has been pointed out, these men have a contract that has expired or will expire and we are requiring them by our votes here today to extend that contract, JuLy 25 Many of them we are placing in a posi- tion of danger by casting our votes. We are extending their contracts knowing that we are placing many of them in a position of danger. But we have got to think about our country’s welfare above everything else. It will not do to have those men discharged over there now from the service when they are perform- ing their duty and in the middle of it be sent back here and force us to send over other men. There are probably some 40,000 or more men—I do not know the exact number—that could be dis- charged from the forces over there in Japan or in Korea, although many of them would reenlist. We cannot afford to lose any of them now. So acting in what I think is our best interest and in the best interest of our country’s wel- fare I intend to vote for and support this measure, although I do it with reluc- tance. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, T move that the Committee do now rise and report the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass, The motion was agreed to. Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr, Younc, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (S, 3937) to authorize the President to extend enlistments in the Armed Forces of the United States, had directed him to report the bill back to the House with the recommendation that the bill do pass. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the bill to final passage. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. The question is on the third reading of the Senate bill. The bill was ordered to be read a third time and was read the third time. The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill. ‘The bill was passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. The SPEAKER. Without objection the bill, H. R. 9177, will be laid upon the table, it being similar to a Senate bill passed by the House. There was no objection. SUSPENDING RESTRICTIONS ON THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF THE ARMED FORCES Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9178) to suspend the authorized personnel strength of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, The motion was agreed to. Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the con- sideration of the bill H. R. 9178, with Mr. Wuirten in the chair. The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the firat read- ing of the bill was dispensed with,
1950 Mr. VINSON. Mr, Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman, I do not think this bill will result in the extended debate that the previous bill produced, although I think it was highly important that we had that debate. Later on we are going to have more debate and it 1s going to be pinpointed more than this recent de- bate was Now, this is the second bill before the House as a result of the Korean war, It is another measure which responds to the needs imposed upon our country by the difficulties we face in the world I will explain very briefly the need for phe legislation and what its effect will e, Existing law fixes a statutory ceiling of 2,005,882 on the personnel strengths of the Armed Forces. That authority is contained in the Selective Service Act and in the Army-Air Force Composition bill approved only a couple of weeks ago by the President. . That two million cejling is composed of these strengths 1n each of the armed services, The Army’s ceiling is 837,000, The Navy’s ceiling is 666,882. The Air Force’s ceiling is 502,000. The build-up of our Armed Forces en- visaged under the program recom- mended by the President last week will exceed these strength ceilings in each service except possibly in the Army. As regards the Army, the build-up will come so close to the present ceiling, un- der present plans, that a slight increase in manpower needs would exceed the statutory limit. It is necessary, there~ fore, to suspend these ceilings, and this bill does that for an indefinite period. In the meantime, after enactment of this measure, the strength of our Armed Forces will still be governed by available funds. As a result, the Congress will at all times have clear-cut control over the extent to which the Armed Forces will expand. This legislation is a precautionary measure taken in advance to meet, first, the present plans to strengthen the Armed Forces, as proposed by the Presi- dent in his July 19 message, and, sec- ond, to provide the statutory leeway that will be required should a much larger expansion of the Armed Forces become necessary in the future. Mr, BAILEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentle- man from West Virginia. Mr BAILEY. I would like to ask the distinguished gentleman from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, whether this committee has given or plans to give consideration to the restoration of the dependency pay- ments. Mr, VINSON. We have not reached that yet. If through the draft or through the ordering into Federal serv- ice of the Reserves or National Guard that question gets acute, we will promptly give it consideration. Mr, BAILEY. I thank the gentleman. Mr. VINSON. For the time being we have not gotten around to it because we CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE are concentrating right now to find out how much strength we actually have and how much more we have to get. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Montana. Mr. MANSFIELD. I want to compli- ment the gentleman on his statement. I was very pleased to note where the Marine Corps is going to be increased by 57,000. I would like to ask the distin- guished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services if anything is contem- plated being done along the line of his committee suggestion that the Com- mandant of the Marine Corps be given a voice on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr VINSON I introduced a bill to do that, and it has the support of an overwhelming majority of the members of the Armed Services Committee. But, we have been so bogged down with other matters that we Just have not gotten around to it, We just cannot detour to handle those kinds of things right now when the house is on fire, and we have to get busy to put it out Mrs ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr, Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentle- woman from Massachusetts. Mrs, ROGERS of Massachusetts. The gentleman is convinced now that the national defense authorities see the necessity for keeping a strong Marine Corps and also a strong Navy. I know the gentleman has fought for that over the years and has been very helpful. Mr VINSON. Well, I do not think it is exactly fair to say that the national de- fense, meaning the Peniagon hierarchy, was ever in favor of complete elimina- tion of the Marine Corps; I do not think that is exactly correct. Perhaps some- one thought that it was a little bit larger than the facts warranted, but to my way of thinking, when we finish with our present hearings on* the state of our defenses, I am satisfied that we will be asking for more than the newspapers state is being asked for now as far as the Marine Corps 1s concerned. The newspapers stated yesterday that some- body said this and somebody said that about the proposed program, but re- gardless of that, I think the Marine Corps has to be strengthened consider- ably because it is a very effective fight- ing organization, and it must be strong both on the ground and in the ar. Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts, That is true of the Navy also. Mr. VINSON. Yes, I know that, Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. VINSON. I yield. Mr HOFFMAN of Michigan. I am very glad to hear what the gentleman said, It is encouraging because I have a very distinct and vivid recollection, and it is in the printed Recorp of the hearings on the unification bill, that General Eisenhower did recommend that the Marine Corps be reduced to a police force status. Mr, VINSON, The Committee on Armed Services knows what the Marine Corps can do, and the Marine Corps will 10999 always be in existence as long as we have the power to bring it before the House for its consideration. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr VINSON. I yield to the gentle- man from Missouri. Mr SHORT. I think it would be helpful, perhaps, to the Members, if the able chairman would point out what our present authorized strength is in the Army and the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, and our present ac- tual strength in those different cate- gories, Mr VINSON. The legislative ceiling as far as the Army is concerned {s 837,- 000 and the 1951 appropriated strength is 630,000. The statutory ceiling of the Navy, including the Marines, is 666,882 and the 1951 appropriated strength is 461,000. In the Air Force the author- ized ceiling is 502,000 and the 1951 ap- propriated strength is 416,000. Mr. SHORT. I am very happy that the chairman has put those figures in the Recorp, because it clearly shows that we have not as yet come up by any means to our authorized strength. Mr. VINSON. That is right. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr Towel. Mr. TOWE Mr. Chairman, when the bill now under consideration was before the Armed Services Committee last Fri- day, I urged that action be postponed for a short time so that the Armed Serv- ices Committee, the Congress, and the people of this country might have some definite information as to where the country is going. The present man- power ceilings in the Defense Establish- ment are sufficient for today, tomorrow, and possibly for several months. My sole prrpose In opposing the reporting of the bills and my only purpose in speaking today is to draw the attention of the American people to the fact that we may be embarking upon a course of action which will require manpower and re- sources beyond our capacity. No matter what we may call the pres- ent engagement in which we are in- volved, the fact is that we are at war, and it should be noted at this point that neither the people of our country nor the Congress has participated in that decision. Technically, the defense of South Korea is a United Nations under- taking but actually the United States is the sole defender. If there should be other outbreaks, especially in the Far East, it is reasonable to assume that the United States alone will undertake to stop the enemy. I assume that the Congress will ap- prove the legislation which is before us but when it does, it should understand that it is placing in the hands of the President the power to call into the serv-= ice as many men as he chooses and to send them to any part of the world that he decides we must defend. In other words, we are placing great additional power in the hands of those men who have been running our Defense Estab- lishment and the executive branch of our Government since the termination of
11080 the war and who are directly responsible for our confused foreign policy, but more important, it is the same group who are directly responsible for the almost com- plete lack of preparedness which we now find exists, despite the fact that since the termination of the war Con- gress hes appropriated $95,000,000,000 for the Defense Establishment, The country was told not so long ago that the prospects for peace were brighter than they had ever been since the termination of the war; that we did not need a Navy of any account; that amphibious landings and tank warfare were outmoded. In other words, the judgment of the top leaders in this ad- ministration has been wrong. I have no desire to be unduly critical of them. I suspect that their hearts are heavy, but the fact still remains that their judg- ment was not good. And I say again that we are now preparing to place great additional power at an extremely criti- cal moment in the same hands. Yesterday the President submitted a request for additional funds to increase the strength of our Defense Establish- ment. In the light of what is happen- ing in the world today and what may very well happen tomorrow, the sum of money requested is obviously insufficient. The fact is that it will not do much more than bring our Defense Estatlish- ment up to the efficiency that it would have had about 2 years ago if funds re- quested at that time had not been slashed in what was described by the heads of the Department of Defense as an econ- omy measure. {J think, Mr. Chairman, that the people of this country are entitled to know ex- actly where they are being led. They should be told just how we can carry on the defense of the world without com- pletely wrecking our own economy and reducing ourselves to a totalitarian state. It is interesting to note that although the present undertaking is technicaily the stand of the United Nations, Amer- ica, and the American people alone, will pay the price, not only with our men but with our resources. The only aid which we have received up to this point comes in the form of laudatory resolutions ap- proving what we are doing but not offer- ing real assistance of any kind. I sus- pect that if there are other Koreas and we decide to defend them we will be alone in those undertakings. Ten billion dollars is a drop in the bueket compared to what the actual cost will be, to say nothing of the toss of our ‘ young men. If we in a laudable effort to assist other nations ruin America we will have done exactly what Mr. Stalin would like to see accomplished. There will then be very tittle hope for the future of the From 1932 down to date whenever any emergency has arisen, either at home or abroad, the solution offered by the New Deal has been the acquisition of greater power and contro] and, of course, fur- ther expenditure of billions of dollars. These schemes have produced nothing up to now, except a weakening of Amer. ica and involvements all over the worid, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE which, i alowed to continue, will cer- tainly ruin the createst Nation on earth. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have reached the point where the Congress must assert itself and ‘before it yields further to Execoutive pressure for more power it should insist on knowing exactly where we are being taken. If the Con- gress and the peapie of this country want to travel a road that may very weil lead to ruination, they should make the deci- sion. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. TOWE. I yield. Mr. GROES. I commend the gentie- man on his excellent statement. I cer- tainly agree with him. Mr. TOWE. I thank the gentieman very much. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Wansworta.! Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that the measure now pending is intended to parmit a very sub- stantial increase im the sumerical strength of our Armed Forces, I think it is not irrelevant that J refer to the prob- lem invoived in increasing that strength. It is a very serious problem. There is nothing very dramatic about it, but it hits home. Under existing iaw each of the three services has endeavored 4o build up a re- serve on a wotuniary system. For the moment I am not imctuding the National Guard whieh I believe should be consid- the Anny, the Naval Reserve and the M. rine Corps and Air Force Reserve. The figures given to the Comumitéee on Armed Services and aiso te the Commit- tee on Approprintions look rather good at first glance, but an examination into the actual situation does uot bring much encouragement. Five hundred and twenty thousand men are now included in the Arery Reserve. Only 250,000 of them are taking anything lke what may be tenned training. The rest are in what might be termed a pool, undergoing little or no training. The huge majority of the 520,000 are veterans af World War I1. Their average age ic approcching 26 years. Many of those men volunteered in the Reserves from the most patriotic motives as they were discharged from active duty at the conciusion of the war, but have undertaken heavy domestic burdens since then. Thousands and thousands ef them have married and have chikiren—dependenta. Undoubt- edty a few are not as strong physically as they were § or 6 years azo, due to some accident or illness, Of course, other ele- ments may enter into the situation namely, 837,000. The gap must be filled by men inducted under the draft, and they will come for- ward as raw recruits, or the gap may be JULY 25 filled in part by new men whe will volun- They, too, will be raw recruits. The Army is contemplating—and it is no secret—filiing:-up 10 divisions. We have only about three divisions now, and they are not at war strength. To fill up seven more divisions, largely with raw re- cruits, will take months and months. Not until next spring can we expect to have a usable division made up in such fashion, Our reserves are not sufficient. Now we fook at the Navy. The Navy Reserve contains 1,103,0@0 men. Only 204,008 are on an active training basis. The rest constitute a huge pool. The Navy is in better shape than the Army with respect to reserves. Landaman that I am, I venture an explanation of that, if you will bear with me, because this is exceedingly important when you talk about increasing the Armed Forces of the United States. The Army Reserve is expected to be organived finally into tactical units—divisions, regiments, bat- talions, companies, platoons, and squads, The Navy Reserve, by contrast, is not ex- pected to be organized into crews of ships. None of the personnel of the Naval Reserve, and very properly the Navy follows that course, is organized to man a ship completely from skipper down. Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mir. Chetrman, will the gentleman yiekt? Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield. Mr, YVAN ZANDT. There ts one ex- ception in the Navy, they do have mits of nircraft and subrrarine. Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes; that fs true. Iam speaking of the general pool The Navy also is in better contiition than the £rmy because in The Naval Beserve— and I may not use the correct expres- sions—there is a great pool of men who are subject to special assignments, men who have atreatty had experience in the last war, They can be placed on a ship and assigned in a particular station and instantly go to work with the crew. The Air Force has a reserve vf 354.08D men. Qnty 68.000 of them are on an ac- tive training basis. Those men do thetr best, in 28 Air Force stations senttered over the country, to get somr training onee a week in flying and in the care of planes. The rest of that 35€00D men get training confined almost entirely to correspondence anc! Netening to lee- tures; that ts all. Myr. EBERFARTER. Mr. Chairmen, will the gentleman yield? Mr. WADS I yield, Mr. EBERHARTER. It eocurs to me that many of these 68,000 men would petpans be a little ald for real active uly, Mr, WADSWORTH. The same obsar- vation applies ito all three of Shase cate- gories. They are all getting older. Now, we have relied up to this point, mis- takenly I believe—and now I am going to utter some sentiments which may not arouse uproarious applause—we have re- Ned upon the volunteer system to main- tain the reserve, and it has failed. Make no mistake about it, it has fafied. Our Reserve strength ought to be dhree or four times the strength of our first-line
1950 forces. And it should - Reserve. be a well-trained Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield at that point? Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield. Mr. SHORT. I think that is hardly fair, to say it has failed because it is on a volunteer basis, because there have been literally hundreds of thousands of veterans of the different branches of our armed services who had combat experi- ence in the last war who have done their very test to get into Reserve training but have been unable to do so, and it has not been altogether due to the lack of funds. As far as the Air Force is con- cerned we gave them $75,000,000 which they never did spend. This proves that it is not the fault of Congress or the Committee on the Armed Services. Mr. WADSWORTH. I did not mean to start the argument again as to where the vlame lies. Mr. SHORT. I want to get it very clear and unmistakable that the blame does not rest on the Congress. We have got to face the facts as they are. Mr. WADSWORTH. I am endeavor- ing to face the facts as they are and to look ahead. My. SHORT. That is all right, and Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman five additional minutes—I want to give him all the time I have. The only way to improve is to recognize mistakes and to be honest and courageous enough to ad- mit that they are mistakes. The CHAIRMAN, The gentleman from New York is recognized for five additional minutes, Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I do not dispute the good objective of this legislation; I support it enthusias- tically. It is going to take 8 or 9 months to fill up these units. We have not a large enough reserve that is trained; we must resort to the draft to a considerable extent, From the draft we get raw re- cruits who must be trained. I can remember some experiences in World War II with respect to the Na- tional Guard. I remember the Twenty- seventh National Guard Division which was mobilized along with all the other divisions. Tt lacked 3,000 men of being at war strength. When it was mobil- ized that division had to spend 6 months training those new 3,000 recruits. Had it been at war strength when it was called into service it could have taken the field. None of these divisions that we are now talking about can take the field short of 6, 8 or 9 months. That does not disturb me so deeply with respect to Korea alone. What I am thinking about is the long pull. How are we going to be sure of getting an ade- quate reserve composed of trained citi- zens? I say again, and I have been saying this for 30 years, that it can be done only by universal military training. It cannot be done in any other way. Suppose that in 1947 we had passed the UM™ pbill—incidentally the gentleman from New Jersey was the sponsor of it— and suppose that it had gone into effect immediately or within 4 reasonable period thereafter. Here we are in 1950, ‘We would have had in our trained reserve CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE by this time two complete classes, each having had 1 year of training and com- posed of 800,000 me: each, available for service when a great military mobiliza- tion might come along, and completely adequate. Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. WADSWORTH. gentleman from Ohio. Mr. ELSTON. What assurance would we have had that the President or the administration would not have cut back the funds or would not have permitted that training? Mr. WADSWORTH. I cannot tell, of course. I am trying to point out what I have believed for a great many years, that the only sound way for a democracy to preserve itself from a savage ageres- sion is to rely upon trained citizens, trained in time of peace and subject to service only when war comes along, rather than to rely completely upon pro- fessional Regulars whom we cannot sup- port in time of peace in large enough numbers and in sufficient strength to keep the country safe in war. We have got to face this thing some day. If this row in Korea expands into something much larger—God knows I hope it does not—we will be up against this question cf reserves and we will find ourselves without them. You will simply have to call into the services through the draft raw recruits and thus for 6, 8, or 10 months break down the efficiency of your military units. Mr. McSWEENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. WADS'VORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio. Mr. McSWEENEY. Is it not true that Australia and other countries are con- templating rejecting voluntary enlist- ments, and going to the compulsory method, so that there will be an even distribution of service? Mr. WADSWORTH. I am not aware of what is going on in other countries, I am not in favor of rejecting volunteers, I am not in favor of rejecting men vol- untarily enlisting in the Regular Army or National Guard or in the Reserves, but when you have not enough reserves and you have no means of knowing how many you will have a year from now or 2 years from now or 3 year's from now, you have not the slightest idea where you are, which means you do not know where you are going. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michi- gan (Mr. Forp!. Mr.FORD. Mr. Chairman, this after- noon we have heard the excellent and very apropos remarks of the distin- guished gentleman from Georgia in which he pointed out some of the mili- tary weaknesses and some of the things that may be necessary to remedy them. Subsequently we heard the comments of the distinguished gentleman from Mis- souri [Mr, SHort] in which he pointed out, I think very adequately, the pos- sible reasons for our present military condition and pointed out with justifi- cation the responsibility for our present circumstances. I yield to the 11001 Subsequently during the debate on the bill, H. R. 9177, the gentleman from In- diana [Mr. WatsH! very piously took the floor and stated that bygones should be bygones, that we should now forget the errors and mistakes of the past and go ahead from here on. He also compli- mented, and in that I join, the distin- guished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. I say again that I join with him in that statement. However, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr, Waus#], not too long ago, was tak- ing an opposite point of view concerning the distinguished chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services. You all are very familiar with the B-36 probe of last year. In October of 1949 the Committee on Armed Services held extensive hear- ings on procurement of the B-36 and re- lated matters. Subsequently the com- mittee filed a report, but during the hearings, if my recollection is correct, the gentleman from Indiana stomped out of the committee room and said he would not have one more thing to do with the investigation. If I am in error in regard to this, I would like to have the gentle- man from Indiana correct me. Mr. WALSH. At the completion of the gentleman’s remarks I will ask for time to answer. Mr. FORD. Very well. The Commit- tee on Armed Services, following that in- vestigation, in House Document 600, en~ titled “Unification and Strategy,” sum- mary of views and recommendations of the House Armed Services Committee, came to certain conclusions, 33 in num- ber. All but No. 33 were approved unani- mously. Eight of the members of the Committee on Armed Services objected to the approval of recommendation No. 33. Included in the minority was the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. WALSH], For your information I will read what recommendation 33 included: The removal of Admiral Denfeld was a re- prisal against him for giving testimony to the House Armed Services Committee. This act is a blow against effective representative government in that it tends to intimidate witnesses and hence discourages the rend- ering of free and honest testimony to the Congress; it violated promises made to the witnesses by the committee, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense; and it violated the Unification Act, into which a provision was written specifically to prevent actions of this nature against the Nation's highest military and naval officers. I say this, Members of the Committee, that I wholeheartedly approve of the ac- tion of the Committee on Armed Services under the distinguished chairmanship of the gentleman from Georgia. Iconcur in his statement made today. I also whole- heartedly support the point of view of the gentleman from Missouri. We can- not forget bygones; we must analyze our present position by realizing what errors we have made in the past. We cannot progress in the future unless we know where we have failed heretofore. I do not intend to let statements get by on the floor of this House that gloss over and try to cover up actions of individuals and groups within our borders,
11002 I would like to also make a statement regarding several other comments made by the gentleman from Indiana. He said that 70 percent of our appropriations for the last few years were for military ex- penses. That is not accurate. What he meant to say, and I am sure he will cor- rect it in the Recor», is that 70 percent of our appropriations are for past wars, including military appropriations for future wars, appropriations for veterans’ benefits and other miscellaneous items, But, he definitely said they were for mili- tary expenses and such a statement was inaccurate. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from In- diana (Mr. Watsx]. Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, my re- marks must have been misunderstood by a few here in the House today. My re- marks, following those of my distin- guished friend from Missouri, were meant as an appeal for understanding and cooperation. Perhaps I was not as restrained as I should be because I dis- agreed somewhat with his remarks. It is very apparent that we should get some of these things out of our system, and apparently we are doing so today. I agree with the distinguished gentleman that preceded me that my remarks should be that 70 percent of our budget is going for wars past and present and in preparation for possible future conflicts, I have at times disagreed with my dis- tinguished chairman [Mr. Vinson], Anyone that sits in the Committee on Armed Services recognizes his worth and his leadership. But sometimes Mr. Vin- son, if he will pardon me, is not the most patient individual. He has a tendency toward running the committee in a style that is not inimitable. As a freshman member of the Com- mittee on Armed Services I became dis- turbed in the hearings on the B—36 inves- tigation. As I felt that the younger members were not being given a chance to participate in the same, and I walked out in a huff. I saw a newspaperman friend of mine, and he asked me what had occurred. I thought I was talking largely off the record, but much to my sorrow the next day the headlines said that I accused the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Vryson] of being a Navy stooge. I later corrected this, because I had not used those words. However, the newspaperman apparently had, and I had acquiesced. I have often been sorry for those remarks, I recognize the worth of the gentleman from Georgia, but I still say that the manner in which the inves- tigation was being held at that time did not please me. I did feel that we in the backfield, the younger members, were not given the opportunity to express our~ selves fully. However, I have noticed since then that our chairman has been most considerate of the younger mem- bers of the committee. I am positive that he does not hold that against me, and I certainly do not against him, be- cause I think the gentleman from Georgia knows more about the military needs of this country than any other man in the Nation. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE I want to say something about the B-36 investigation. I signed the minor- ity report. I am proud of that fact, and I would have signed it again. I am a lawyer. I told the House yesterday that I had practiced law for 16 years, I do not believe in hearsay evidence. I be- lieve any man accused should be allowed to face his accuser. I think it is an out- rage when any man in this body, or the other one, who has congressional immu- nity accuses a person of someting and the individua) that is accused, even though he is later vindicated, has no right of redress. I attended practically every one of the hearings in the B-36 investigation. They were concluded only a few days after my outburst. I want to say that Secretary Matthews wa: unjustly ac- cused, as was Secretary Johnson, and largely upon hearsay evidence. I felt then that the criticism leveled at Secre- tary Matthews was unjust, that we had heard only one side of the issue. I agree with my good friend from Illinois (Mr. ArENps! when he says that good resulted from the B-86 investigation. But I am making no apology for the B-36 bomber, It is the greatest plane now in existence, and our investigation proved this fact. I heard the late General Arnold tell us what it could do. Mr. Chairman, where would we be to- day without the atomic bomb. Where would we be? Russia would be at our doorstep. The atomic bomb is a deter- rent against all-out Soviet aggression. Who is going to carry the atomic bomb in case of a world conflict? Today there is only one airplane, in my opinion, that can carry it to Europe and return, and that is not giving any secrets away. It is the B-36 bomber. Unjustly and unfairly the B-36 bomber was attacked in our committee. It was attacked upon the floor of the House and in the newspapers. After the investigation was concluded we all unanimously agreed that the charges against the B-36 and its acquisition were absolutely false. I do not feel that Ad- miral Denfeld was unjustiy treated, and T am still standing by that statement, I can still say to you today that I am standing behind the minority report. We only disagreed in this report in one item. Seven members of the committee voted the same as I did, but on the other 29 or 30 items, I have forgotten how many there were, we were unanimous in our report, Of course, a committee of this size and importance disagrees. We disagree here today violently in our feel- ings. But I think if there is one thing we can do is to get it out of our systems and we can fight here on the floor of the House, but tomorrow and henceforth we will go forward fighting together to win this war. I could point out to this Member and other Members their voting records in the past. I could, if necessary, point out where he failed to vote for what I consider to be the best interest of the defense of our country. I know that I, too, have cast bad votes, but what Iam saying now and wanted to point out in my earlier remarks, is that these things do not matter now. JULY 25 Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. WALSH. I yield. Mr. FORD. Tell me where. Mr. WALSH. I said I am not going to do it. . Mr, FORD. Well, Iam asking you to. Mr. WALSH. I will produce the record here tomorrow, if you want it brought forth. . Mr. FORD. I certainly do. Mr. WALSH. You are the one who brought this argument up—not me. I do not care to indulge in personalities. Mr. FORD. But you certainly did. Mr. WALSH. After all, my good friend, you are the one who took the floor first. I did not know you from Adam. I will have your record tomor- row and show it in the Recorp {if you wish. Mr. FORD. You can come to my office and I will give it to you to save time. Mr. WALSH. Mr. Chairman, I de- cline to yield further. I do not care to get in any discussion. The point I am trying to make is that tempers are flaring here today. I hope when it {s all said and done we can for- get the votes we have cast in the past and the mistakes that we have made— and we have made plenty of them, all of us—and go out of this Chamber united, because we are certainly in a world con- flict which we may never see the end. As the father of four children, and I am proud of it, Iam going to do my level best to see to it that those children have the opportunity to live in a free world, free of communism. I hope my vote in the future, as I hope it has been in the past, will mever be cast along po- litical lines, especially at this time when the fate of the world rests to a great extent upon us, the Members of the Con- gress of the United States. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. DurHam), Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, I can- not add much more information on these two measures, but tempers seem to be flaring here this afternoon. After all, you know it is very pleasing to me to see the difference in the debate today and the unanimous cooperation in a matter which probably means the life or death of our Nation in the years to come. There is a big difference between now and 1939, 1940, and 1941, when we were voting on measures far into the night. Roll call after roll call occurred at that period and this body at that time was seriously divided. Not so today. These measures, which are very far-reaching, are going to pass unanimoualy. It has also been pointed out to you the difficulties under which we are orperat- ing today. Ido not believe it is any time to point out the faults or mistakes that may have occurred in the past. I think it is best for us at the present time, in this hour, to confine ourselves to the job ahead and not forget about the situa- tion and the predicament and obligations that this Nation has taken upon itself, We have listened, and I particularly have listened, for the last year to the intelligence reports around the world. We, of course, have had a policy of con- finement against communism, and they
1950 have @ policy of expansion. So I think anyone could come to the conclusion that this beginning which has happened in Korea is only the beginning. I think we can expect Russia to do evervthing she can to divide us and our allies. That is very evident. They are master minds at propaganda. They have already con- vinced the world of that. I do not know how many more measures will come be- fore this House during the next few weeks. I hope and know that this House will pass every measure that is neces- sary. I am satisfled that the things we do on the floor of this House and the things we say here are broadcast every night in Moscow. We cannot hear it, but I am convinced of that. Of course, Iam not qualified to lecture the press. Neither am I qualified to lecture this body. There are men here who have had much more experience than I have had, like the chairman of our commit- tee. Certainly he is qualified to speak, and he has spoken today for the national defense of this country. I never heard more comprehensive over-all statement with reference to our national defense than he made today. I have tried, as a member of the Armed Services Commit- tee, to study the problems at all times and to do what I could as an individual to help and assist my country to be pre- pared in case of danger. We all realize today that probably the bargain-counter days of Democracy are over, and we are going to have to pay for it from now on, because the fact is that God grants lib- erty only to those who love it and are willing and able to guard and defend it at all times. We have a great country. Let us be Americans first and forget about our little differences. The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross]. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to speak out of order. The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection. Mr. GROSS. Mr, Chairman, in his July 19 message to Congress, President Truman asserted the Nation’s economic resources will require substantial redirec- tion, but up to this time his National Security Resources Board has not seen fit to consult with America’s farmers, the producers of the all-essential food and fiber. The Security and Resources Board has consulted with industry and labor, and granted a committee, representing much of labor, at least semiofficial advisory recognition, That is commendable as far as it goes but it certainly does not go far enough. I insist that American farmers, who produce each year 65 percent of the Na- tion’s new wealth and who must be de- pended upon to feed the Nation, its mili- tary forces, and perhaps part of the world, be given an equal voice with any and all other segments of the economy in war-planning procedures, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE The brush-off they have received from the war planners in Washington is un- thinkable. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I have only one more request for time on this side. I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Martin). Mr. MARTIN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate these few minutes to dis. cuss the problem facing us at this moment. I hope this bill passes without any objection, and I hope that our de- fense officials immediately get busy to build a Navy, an Air Force, and an Army as quickly as we make the funds avail- able for them, because we have a long road ahead. I know that these recruits we are taking in now will have to have basic training for approximately 17 weeks. Then they will be only ready to start their team training. The armed services have got to develop fighting teams before they commit these young men to the battle line. I cannot con- ceive of the Notre Dame football teams mobilizing today a group of high school rookies, and putting them out against the all-stars tomorrow morning, nor can I further conceive of the Reserves, as the gentleman from New York (Mr. Waps- worTH] mentioned, who have been inac- tive the past 4 years being used immedi- ately. ertainly you would not expect the Notre Dame football team to collect its varsity members of 4 years ago and put them on the firing line tomorrow without running signals in a thorough practice and conditioning program. I do not think we should gamble with the lives of our untrained or unseasoned boys. We must profit from the lessons of World War II; we must train these boys, and the sooner we get started the better. As I have stated here on other occa- sions, it was my privilege and oppor- tunity to teach military history and mili- tary policy some 30 years ago, in one of the State universities. You will remem. ber on July 18 in the debate on the ex- tension of Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, I mentioned the statement of de Toqueville in 1835, of Lord Palmerson in 1853, and of Commodore Perry in 1856 regarding the role of Russia in the family of nations. What we must realize is that this is not a temporary passing situation that we are facing here, I think many of us fail to realize what we are up against. We are at the place now where we must maintain our Nation’s position in this world or we are going to face defeat and humiliation, and we cannot win by com- mitting untrained, unskilled teams—not teams, but groups of boys—to combat prematurely. What we must do is to train adequately the young men of our country for the ground forces, the air forces, and the Navy. We have got to make this decision quickly if we are to give these boys basic training of 15 to 17 weeks, then adequate team training, be- fore we put them into combat units on the firing line. I listened with great interest a few minutes ago to the remarks made by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Waps- worTH] regarding the matter of uni- versal military training. While I was 11003 still on active duty in the Regular Army in 1919, I recall my following the out- standing work of Senator WapswortTH, then chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, when he tried to secure a universal military training pro- Bram. The proposed training at that time was for 3 months with an addi- tional 1 month of training optional. That length of training was then con- sidered adequate for basic training only. I recall also working with the American Legion leaders of my State for a mili- tary-training program, for some 20 years starting with my assignment to the University of Iowa in 1921 as assistant professor of military science and tactics and continuing up to our entry into World War II. While I have always op- posed compulsory military service in peacetime, I have just as vigorously sup- ported universal military training as a permanent policy in order to prepare our young men better to defend themselves and their Nation whenever we might suddenly become involved in war. If our young men today who were too young to take part in World War IT all had basic military training our armed services could now save 3 months of nec- essary delay in placing them in fighting teams for fleld training, whereas all of our untrained young men must now be given that basic training before we should even think of placing them in combat teams for field maneuvers pre- ceding their commitment to combat. Another thing I must mention is that the gentleman from North Carolina and T have been fighting shoulder to shoulder for many years to build up stockpiles of strategic and critical materials. I am very pleased to read the headlines in the papers today saying that the President now states that we must take immediate steps to build up adequate stockpiles of strategic and critical materials. That is something that is absolutely essential, for we cannot fight wars with our airplanes and our new weapons still on the drawing boards and in blueprints. We had bet- ter speed up this stockpile program just as fast as we can. Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentle- man from Pennsylvania [Mr. Van ZANDT). Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, in 1945 the United States Air Force had 273 groups and was the most powerful in the world. In 1946 it was reduced to 38 groups. The House Armed Services Commit- tee, of which I am a member, early in 1948 realized that the Nation's Air Force strength was deteriorating to a point where the security of the country was in danger and took action on April 1, 1948, to establish as a peacetime mini- mum a 70-group air force. In the light of current events it is plainly evident that the House Commit- tee on Armed Services was way ahead of both the executive department and the Department of National Defense in planning for the air defense of this Na- tion in time of emergency. We all recall the efforts of Hon. W. Stuart Symington, former Secretary of
STORY OF THE YO-GROUP PROGRAM First. Pre-VJ-day background: by the end of World War II the Air Force was working toward a goal of a balanced peacetime establishment capable of (a) meeting the requirements of national se- curity; (b) providing a “roper mobiliza- tion potential in the form of a sound and adequate aircraft industry; (c) provid- demobilixing. By June 30, 1947, the Air Porce had sunk to a level of 38 groups— manned nor equipped. At that point, the downward trend was halted and the Air Force gradually began to rebuild its strength. Third. Rebuilding of Air Force air strength: From the 88-group level of June 30, 1947, the initial objective of the Air Foree was to reach a level of 55 groups by December 31, 1947. These groups were to be fully manned and to have at least a minimum of training, though equipped largely with World War YI aircraft Six months later—that is, by June 30, 1948—theee 55 groups were to be in full operational status. The next interim step toward the 70-group goal was established as a strength of 66 groups by June 30, 1949. The remain- ing four groups were to be activated dur- ing fiscal year 1950. Pourth. Executive branch and con- gressional committee endorsement of 70 groups: On December 20, 1947, the Pres- dent’s Air Policy Commission, headed by Mr. Finietter, reported officially that “the country must have a new strategic con- cept for its defense and the core of this concept is air power,” and that “the minimum force necessary at the present time ts an Air Force organized into 70 combat groups, and 22 special squad- rons, supplemented by 27 National Guard groupe and 34 groups of Air Reserve.” ‘This Commission's studies and report were followed by the report, on March 1, 1948, of the Joint Congressional Avia- tion Policy Board which found a 70 com- bat air group Air Force to be imperative for the Nation to “mount promptly an CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE effective, continuing, and successful air offensive against a major enemy.” Both of these reports were important factors in substantiating Air Force policy. Both prompt action to time of peace. Fifth. First congressional actions to require a 70-group program: On April 1, 1948, before the House Armed Services Committee meeting in executive session, Hon. Cart Vireson moved that the com- mittee go on record in favor of the 70- group program recommended by the Air Force. The motion was taken under ad- Hon, Charles Clason, with direction to report back to the full committee on April 7%, 1948. On April 8, 1948, the chairman of sub- committee No. 5 reported to the full committee that the subcommittee had unanimously approved a resolution pro- posed by Hon. Caan Vietsow regarding the current status of appropriations for the Air Porce. This resolution concluded with the following: Resolved, That it is hereby expreamed as the sense cf the Committee on Armed Services cf the House of Representatives that this Na- tion should have an Air Force with a mint- mum strength of 70 combat groups, supple- mented by the necemary special squadrons, air National Guard and air Reserve groups, which would require the expenditure of $5.442,000,000 during the fiscal year commenc- ing July 1, 1948, and since the estimate of the Bureau of the Budget contains a request for approximately $3,054,000,000: ‘Therefore be ft further Resolved, That it is the sense of this cam- mittee that an additional budget request of $2,338,000,000 for the United Etates Air Force should be promptly submitted to the Con- gress. The above resolution was adopted by a hand vote of 22 of the 23 members present. Copies were transmitted to the President, Secretary of Defense, Speaker of the House, and the Secretary of De- fense was asked to express his own views on the subject at a later time before the committee. On April 14, 1948, Hon. Charles Clason introduced a bill, H. R. 6247, establish- ing the composition of the Air Force. That bill authorized a peacetime Air Force of 70 Regular Air Force groups, 22 separate Regular Air Force squad- rons, supplemented by such reserve forces, including 27 Air National Guard and %4 Air Force Reserve groups, as might be required. On the following day, April 15, 1948, the House approved, by a vote of 343 to 8, the Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1948, which contained $1,687,000,000 for Air Force procurement of aircraft, a sum $822,000,000 more than requested by the administration. This additional sum was termed the first year’s program of a 5-year undertaking having the ob- jective of a 70-group program for the Air On June 3, 1948, the bill H. R. 6247, cited above, was reported unanimously by the House Armed Services Cammittee to the House of Representatives, On JULY 25 June 14, 1948, the bill passed the House vote. Sixth. Executive branch resistance to %0-group program: By the end of June, 1948, the Air Porce had reached a level of 59 activated groups en route to the 70-group goal. in June 25, 1948, how- ever, the President placed specific limi- tations on the Services to the effect that budget ceilings for fiscal year 1950 would have to be well under the amount necessary to carry out previously planned programs. It was determined that the budget ceiling forecast for the Air Force would support no more than 48 groups. At this point, then, the prob- lem within the Air Force became one of cancellation of many of the procure- ment, stations, manpower, recruiting, and training programs which had been established. The situation would have been clear at this point had it not been for indi- cations in the Congress that it did not firmly support this military retrench- ment as it applied against the Air Force. On January 13, 1948, Hon. Cra. of the Army and Air Force. This bill again placed before the Congress the 70- group program, for it specifically authorized the program as the peace- time goal of the Untted States Air Force. On February 8, 1949, by a vote of 29 to 0, the House Armed Services Committee unanimously reported H. R. 1437 to the House of Representatives. Also on Feb- ruary 8, 1949, the House Committee on Armed Services officially endorsed, with- out dissenting vote, the appearance of Chairman Vinson before the House Committee on Appropriations to request an increase in the Air Force 1950 budget in the amount of $800,000,009. These moves made clearly apparent the unani- mous support of the House Armed Ser- vices Committee for the 70-group pro- gram, both in funds and in legislative authorization. The position of the entire House of Representatives was made eminently clear on Air Force air power later in March, 1949. On March 22, by a vote of 395 to 4, the House passed H. R. 1437, the so-called 70-group bill. On March 28, 1949, Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee presented his recommendations, on behalf of the Armed Services Committee, to the Armed Forces Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in re- spect to the 1950 military budget. Those recommendations, endorsed by the Armed Services Committee, included the recommendation that the Air Force budget be increased in the amount of $800,000,000 {n order to increase the Air Force from 48 groups—established by the executive branch—to 68 groups, thereby urging the Congress to continue its efforts eventually to reach the 70- group program goal. On April 9, 1049, the Appropriations Committee favorably reported to the House H. R. 4146 which contained $851,000,000 for the Air Force over and above the budget recommenda~ tions. This-sum wes intended to main- tain an Afr Force strength of 58 groups instead of 48 groups, and was considered
1950 to be the second year increment of the 70-group program. On April 13, 1949, H. R. 4146 passed the House, after a vote of 271 to 1 had defeated a motion to recommit the bill. The bill was ap- ie by the President on October 29, On October 29, in signing the National Military Establishment Appropriation Act, 1950 (H. R. 4146) the President issued a statement indicating objections to the action of the Congress in increas- ing funds for the Air Force and direct- ing the Secretary of Defense to place in reserve the amounts provided by the Congress in H. R. 4146 for increasing the structure of the Air Force. The amount placed in reserve by the President was $735,754,000. As the year 1949 came to a close, therefore, the Congress was in the posi- tion of having insisted upon a 58-group program as the second-year increment of the 70-group program, whereas the President insisted upon maintaining a strength of 48 groups. Seventh. The 70-group program in the second session, Eighty-first Con- gress: By virtue of the President’s ac- tion of October 29, 1949, the 70-group issue remained quiescent during the early part of 1950. On April 4, 1950, however, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, in an address to the House of Representatives, called for an increase in the 1951 military budget in the amount of $583,289,221— $200,000,000 more for the Air Force—to maintain 48 groups—and $383,289,221 for the Navy for aircraft procurement. This effort subsequently produced an increase of $350,000,000 in the 1951 military budget passed by the House of Representatives—$200,000,000 addi- tional for the Air Force and $150,000,- 000 for the Navy. However, on June 30, 1950, the House of Representatives approved a confer- ence report on H. ®. 1487 which estab- lished in law the 70-group program, thereby again insisting upon this pro- gram over the opposition of the execu- tive branch which had succeeded in ob- taining the elimination of this expres- sion in the law in the Senate. On July 11, 1950, the President ap- proved H. R. 1437. The 70-group pro- gram, as a peacetime ceiling on the Air Force, has therefore been enacted into law. As of July 12, 1950, however, the appropriated strength of the Air Force remains at the level demanded by the President—48 groups. Mr. BRYSON. Mr. Chairman, having just voted for 8S. 3937 it is my purpose to vote for H. R. 9178. The fact is, when given the opportunity, I intend to vote for every measure that will accelerate our program for national defense and security. This does not mean that I have just been converted to the neces- sity of drastic action in order to protect our free democratic way of life. The record will show that I have con- sistently urged adequate national de- fense. On February 24 1949; on March 16, 1949; and, on October 10, 1949, I spoke from the well of the House stress- ing the importance of being prepared XOVI——688 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE for any emergency. And, in the interim, I have pointed out the need for greater national defense. Along with the majority of the Mem- bers of this body, I have advocated the establishment of a 70-group air force as will be seen from the following ex- cerpt of one of my speeches: During the past 2 years a great deal has been said about an adequate national de- Tense. When the flush of victory had re- ceded after the last war we discovered that the possibility of still another war was not nearly so remote as we had assumed. Fur- thermore, we discovered that our national defense program had sadly lagged, and that, in the words of the wartime commander of the Air Forces, this country's Air Force had become a one-punch outfit. All leading au- thorities of mititary concepts agree that air power is essential either for an adequate de- fensive or an offensive force. The time when this country could feel secure against a sud- den attack because of our geographical loca- tion {s gone forever. The science of aero- nautics has brought the nations of the world so close together that none may feel secure against attack. It is obvious, therefore, that we must maintain an adequate Air Force. All who are interested in the welfare of the United States concur on that point. The question is not whether we should maintain a strong Air Force—everyone agrees to that. The question is what size Air Force we should maintain in order to have an adequate na- tional defense. I am in favor of a force com~ posed of 70 groups. It is not by accident or at random that I have chosen that figure. I am not a military man, but civilians, as well as the military, can, in times of peace, examine the available data and draw conclusions. During an emer- gency we must rely upon our military forces and accept thetr decisions. When speed of action is a requisite civilians must place their trust in their professional servicemen and aid them in every possible way to accomplish the results that are necessary for the security of all. In peacetime the situation is different. We are prone to look distrustfully at the requests of the military men, and we gen- erally feel that they are asking for more than they expect when we examine their demands for appropriations. Such accusa- tions cannot be made against disinterested civilians who study a situation and then make recommendations. Within the past 18 months two civilian groups have thoroughly examined the national defense picture and made recommendations concerning an ade- quate Air Force. These two groups were the President's Air Policy Commission and our own Congressional Aviation Policy Board. It is significant that both recommended the same number of planes that our military men deem essential—70 groups. If it were not for the cost, there would be little opposition to the 70-group program, Our expenditures for national defense must, of course, be kept within the country’s abil- ity to pay for them. I believe our economy can easily stand the 70 groups. Even tf supporting an air force this size should prove quite expensive, it seems to me that we have no alternative. The element of time which has been on our side in previous conflicts 1s not likely to be with us again. If it should prove necessary to build our defenses from the bottom up after a war atarted, the task might be impossible. In addition the nucleus of a powerful air force should be a strong deterrent to any nation considering an attack upon this country. Maintaining a force of 70 groups will be more expensive than a smaller force, but in the long run it may prove much cheaper, The cost of a war will be far greater than the comparatively low cost of keeping an adequate air force tn time of peace. There 11005 is no denying that an aggressor nation might not risk an attack if the possibilities of losing the ensuing conflict are strong. There seems to be a great misconception in the minds of some as to the purpose of those who advocate an aftr force of 10 groups. Certainly butiding a force of this size cannot be construed as a preparation for war. It would take a far greater num- ber of planes to win a war. The advocates of 70 groups feel that a force this size would be sufficient to hold any enemy until we could fully arm and take the offensive. A force this size is merely a defensive arrange- ment, Building an adequate air force is not a matter of days, weeks, or months. It is a matter of years. Over a year ago the Presi- dent's Air Policy Commission made their rec- ommendations. Comparatively little has been done since that time. The Air Force now has only about 50 groups. Approval of the 70-group program does not mean that we will have 70 groups by next year or even the next. As Secretary of Defense Forrestal summed up the situation, this program merely places a ceiling upon the size of the Air Force, with the yearly appropriations de- termining the actual strength. It is essen- tial that we get this program approved and underway. There are numerous factors and problems involved in butiding up our air power. The new technology has greatly in- tensified the engineering and research prob- lems of the aircraft industry upon which the Air Force is dependent for its planes. A strong and healthy industry is indispensable to our national security. If the plane manu- facturers are not able to turn out the needed planes for the Air Force upon short notice, we might well lose a war before getting started. Getting this program of expansion underway will be a breath of life to the aircraft industry, which has not been healthy since the end of the war. In terms of air- frame weight the industry has produced less than half what it turned out during the war and has at times fallen to about one- fourth the amount produced during the war years. This is an alarming situation in that these low-production figures made it difficult to keep adequately trained personnel on hand, and in the event of a national emer- gency the plants would be slow in producing their quota of planes. We must assume that if we are attacked the enemy will be well prepared, and a delay in our production any- where along the line could be disastrous. These facts demonstrate that the expansion of the Air Force to 70 groups will also bol« ster our defenses from another angle, since the expansion will aid the ailing aircraft industry. In supporting the 70-group program, let me state that I do not consider this step a panacea for all of our military problems. Everyone must realize that there {s no abso- lute defense against an enemy equipped with modern weapons. All that is possible for any nation to do in these dangerous times is to be so well prepared as to discourage any possible aggressor. The threat of a strong retaliatory force is more eloquent than words. It is a striking paradox that peace may be achieved by air power, that implement which has become the greatest force for destruction in the history of the world. While a strong Air Force cannot give us absolute security, it does provide relative security from two direc- tions. The first I have jfust mentioned. This relative security is provided by the fact that any nation would hesitate to attack us if we are well armed. The second state of relative security which an adequate air strength provides is the ability to smash any attack which might come. National security demands that we equip and maintain an ade- quate force. This is not preparation for war, It ts preparation for the possibility of war, and between those two goals lesa a
11006 world of difference. After the last war wish- ful thinking on the part of many people in this country caused us to disarm at an alarm- ing rate. No one wished war, and we even refused to accept the possibility. We placed our hopes for peace in the newly created United Nations and let our military affairs lag. Today the error of thet policy is very much in evidence. Another powerful nation chose to place its trust in its military strength rather than in the United Nations. Now our country is in the position of having to rearm or face disaster. We do not have to face disaster. Our resources and wealth are such that we can build up adequate defenses without seriously upsetting the economy. While we are building up our air power, we must continue our efforts for peace through the United Nations. The fact that we ex- pected too much from such a young organ- ization must not be allowed to hamper its future possibilities. We are striving for peace, and, while we must now place our faith in a strong air defense, perhaps our children or grandchildren can place theirs in a strong United Nations rather than in their military potential. Less than a year ago the Congressional Aviation Policy Board completed an extensive survey of this country’s air-defense needs and reached many of the same conclusions that the President's commission had reached. To any civilian interested in military affairs this is highly important. The interservice squabbles over what we need for defense have often put Congress in the awkward position of determining who is right and what 1s best for the country regarding strictly mili- tary affairs, We face no such dilemma in the matter of an expanded Air Force. The recommendations of both the Board and the Commission were explicit as to the minimum needs. Both emphasized that weakness and uncertain national security are greater risks than the cost of this program. Both re- ports were made after months of exhaustive study. Both were made by groups who were interested in nothing but the security of our country. In the light of these facts it is necessary that we give sober consideration to their findings and recommendations The Boerd's statement that “Anything less than complete supremacy in the air is self-decep- tion” is especially significant It ts em- phasis of the fact that an inadequate Air Force is not far from being as bad as no Air Force at all. It was in recognition of the Importance of air power that the Air Force was created as an autonomous military service by the National Security Act of 1947. Quite re- cently the Chief of Staff of that service listed the tasks of the Air Force in a given military situation. These tasks include the delivery of an immediate and powerful offensive against the basic sources of the enemy's war- making capacity; the defense of United States bases against air attack, and the tac- tical support of the Army and Navy in ex- ploitation of the opportunities presented through the success of the first two tasks. Our present air strength would not allow the Air Force to accomplish these objectives. It must be placed in a condition of readiness to handle any situation which might arise. Where our national security is involved we are not at liberty to gamble, and anything less than an expansion toward 70 groups seems like a gamble. The President's Air Policy Commission divided the threat of an attack against this country into two phases. We are in the first phase now. This phase represents the eondition of world affairs, If war comes, it will be by accident not by design, since the enemy is not fully prepared. The Commis- sion assumed the enemy would be fully pre- pared by January 1, 1953. In other words the enemy can be expected to have the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE atomic bomb also, and phase two will begin, During this phase we can expect a deliberate and unprovoked attack. It is well to re~ member that during World War II most of the initial attacks were sudden and unex- pected. The beginnings of any new war will undoubtedly follow the same pattern, and it is not at all unlikely that our country will be the target this time The date at which one phase will merge into another is nothing but an intelligent guess. Although it seems unlikely, this year could concelv- ably be the beginning of phase two. We suspect that the enemy is not yet fully pre- pared, we know that we are not. Our military men and two separate civilian groups have informed us of the size and type of Air Force that is essential for na- tional security. The size is a force of 70 groups. We must take immediate steps and plan to reach that goal within the next 4 years. Our present force is inadequate. The national security is at stake, and we have no alternative but to remedy the situation by expansion of the Air Force. To say that any other course would be disastrous is highly arbitrary, since no one knows for certain that war will come. To say that any other course would be inviting disaster expresses the situation clearly and accurately. It is within our power to reject this invita- tion. We must not fail to do so. In view of the trend of affairs in Ko- rea, I believe it is imperative that the President declare a state of national emergency without delay, and, therefore, call upon him for such action now. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, there are no further requests for time. The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the bill for amendment. The Clerk read as follows: Be it enacted, etc, That provisions of law imposing restrictions on the authorized per- sonnel strength of any component of the Armed Forces, including section 2 (a) of the act of April 18, 1946 (60 Stat. 92), and sec~ tion 2, title I, of the Selective Service Act of 1948 (62 Stat 605), as amended, and sections 102 and 202 of the act of July 10, 1950 (Pub- lic Law 604, 81st Cong ), are hereby suspend- ed until July 9, 1951. With the following committee amend- ments: Page 1, line 5, after the figure "2", strike out “(a)” Page 1, line 9, after the word “suspended”, insert a period and strike out the remainder of the bill. The committee amendments were agreed to. Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chair- man, I move to strike out the last word for the purpose of the Recorp to inquire of the chairman of the committee as to the reason why the time limitation origi- nally contained in the bill was stricken out. Mr VINSON. I may say to my col- league from New York that the draft act expires on July 9, 1951. At that time the entire subject will be again reviewed. Mr. COLE of New York. My purpose in raising the question was to indicate to the members of the committee that this is not a permanent lifting of the ceiling on the size of our Military Estab- lishment. Actually, the whole problem will be re- evaluated in July 1951, when the Draft Act expires. Mr. VINSON. The gentleman from New York is absolutely correct. JULY 25 The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired. Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise and re- port the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recom- mendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass. The motion was agreed to, Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chatr, Mr. Wuirten, Chairman of the Commit- tee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 2178) to suspend the authorized personnel strength of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, had directed him to report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, with the recom- mendation that the amendments be agreed to and that the bill as amended do pass, Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros. The amendments were agreed to. The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time. The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill, The bill was passed. The title was amended to read as follows: “A bill to suspend restrictions on the authorized personnel strength of the Armed Forces, and for other pur- poses.” A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the two bills just considered and passed by the House. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia? There was no objection. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS IN KOREA Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my re- marks at this point in the Recorp. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama? There was no objection, Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Speaker, the in- ternational crisis in Korea emphasizes the fact that the action of people in other nations directly affects our daily lives. And almost evcry move we make has a terrific impact upon the peoples of for- eign nations. Our relations determine whether or not we have war, which is one of the greatest factors in our every- day living. The lives that are being sac- rificed in Korea at the present time give
1950 testimony to our shortcomings in this respect. It is estimated that 71 percent of our budget goes to pay for past wars and the prevention of future wars. Our relations with foreign countries largely determine our standard of living, the amount of taxes we will have to pay, how much money we can spend on domestic pro- grams and how much money must be spent for military defense. So our for- eign affairs and domestic affairs have be- come interwoven to such an extent that intelligent decisions can only be made by consideration of them both at the same time as two parts of one over-all national policy, The constitution gives the chief re- sponsibility for our foreign affairs to the President. Through necessity the Con- gress of the United States is being brought more into the international pic- ture every day. With the grave respon- sibilities and iar-reaching influence of our world leadership, the foreign aspects of our national policy can no longer be merely an executive function. The base on which the foreign portion of our pol- icy is formulated and interpreted should be broadened. The responsibility of shaping the course of democracy in the free world we are striving for is too grave a burden for the Executive alone. In- deed, it is a problem too great for the executive and legislative branches com- bined, or for government officials alone. The foreign phase of our national policy must be built on a broader base which will not only bring trained minds with varying backgrounds into use, but will produce a medium through which the public and Congress will feel a direct participation in the formulation of pol- icies which affect them so directly and which they are later called upon to sup- port. This broadening of responsibility would provide a means of reassuring the public and Congress and establishing added confidence in the foreign side of our national policy. It is with these thoughts in mind that I introduce a bill calling for the creation of @ Foreign Affairs Advisory Commission to advise and consult with the President and thereby broaden the base on which our policy is formed. This Commission would be composed of 12 members, broadly representative of the public and well informed in national and international affairs, including rep- resentatives of the Congress and the ex- ecutive. They should be chosen on a nonpartisan basis and will serve only in an advisory capacity in order to conform with the provisions of our constitution. I invite your attention and consideration of this legislation. TEXAS CITY TIN SMELTER OPERATION Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 714 and ask for its immediate consideration, The Clerk read as follows: Resolved, That immrediately upon the adoption of this resolution tt shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 8569) to strengthen the common defense by extending for 5 years the authority for the Texas City tin smelter operation. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE That after general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to ex- ceed 1 hour, to be equally divided and con. trolled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Banking and Currency, the bill shall be read for amend- ment under the 5-minute rule. At the con- clusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted and the previous question shall be considered 4s ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit, Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio {Mr. Brown], and pending that, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Speaker, this resolution makes in order the consideration of H. R. 8569, which would extend the Texas City tin Smelter operation for an additional 5 years. This legislation comes from the Committee on Banking and Currency. It is made necessary by virtue of the short- age of tin production in this country. This operation was necessitated orig- inally during World War II, and this bill would merely continue that opera- tion, and comes at a most appropriate time since the Committee on Banking and Currency saw fit to institute the continuation of this operation prior to the Korean incident. I am sure that there will be no ex- tended debate on or opposition to either the resolution or the bill because I think we might just as well realize that we are going to have to do many of these things that we would much prefer not to do, and we will have to foster many enterprises that we would prefer to leave to private industry were it not for the world situa- tion being what it is today. That is all I have to say at present, Mr. Speaker. Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may desire. Mr. Speaker, there is no opposition that I know of to the adoption of this rule. As the gentleman explained, it does provide consideration of the bill to continue for 5 years the operation or the authority for the operation of the Texas City tin smelter. That operation would come to an end in 1951 unless this legislation is enacted and, of course, there must be adequate advance notice given if the operation is to continue after next year. The continuation of this operation is reported to be of vital im- portance to our defense effort. It is the largest tin smelting plant, and one of the very few, we have in America. I believe it is of interest to note that prior to World War II there were no tin smelting plants anywhere in the United States; in fact, prior to World War IT we were not permitted to refine tin here in America, and were not even permitted the privilege of hauling tin in our own American vessels. The tin we obtained had to be first refined and then pur- chased from Great Britain or The Neth- erlands. Under the pressure of World War II the great smelter at Texas City was set up with the aid of our Federal Government, and certainly, because of the importance of tin to our national ecohomy and in our defense effort we 11007 should continue this plant operation for at least five more years. Mr. Speaker, I hope this rule will be adopted. I have no further requests for time. Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution. The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution. The resolution was agreed to. Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 8569) to strengthen the common defense by extending for 5 years the authority for the Texas City tin smelter operation. The motion was agreed to. Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consid- eration of the bill H. R. 8569, with Mr. Freston in the chatr. The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first read- ing of the bill was dispensed with. Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. Chairman, this bill would con- tinue the operation of the Texas City tin smelter for 5 years from June 30, 1951, The Texas City tin smelter, as has been said, is the only tin smelter of any sub- stantial capacity in the Western Hemi- sphere. Tin is a critical material at this time. Since we reported this bill there has been a material advance in the price of tin. The capacity of the Texas City smelter is 36,000 tons a year. The con- sumption of the United States is about 65,000 tons a year. It is essential to continue the opera- tion of this smelter for 5 years in order that contracts may be made for the fu- ture delivery of the product and in order that the personnel may be retained, be- cause if they find other employment men do not serve corporations they think will soon cease to exist. It is absolutely es- sential, if we desire to continue the oper- ations of this plant, to pass this bill. It ic absolutely essential to pass it in order that we may have an adequate supply of tin, which is so essential to our war effort and for the preservation of our food. This is a Government-owned project. No private enterprise would go into a precarious business like this. The Gov- ernment had to finance this smelter in order to be assured of the product. It was built primarily to handle the low- grade Bolivian ores, so that in time of war the refined product would not have to be transported to us through the sea lanes with all the perils of that trans- portation. Mr. Chairman, I am sure there is no objection to the bill, I do not intend to take the time of the House further on this subject. Mr. WOLCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Saytor}. Mr. SAYLOR. Myr. Chairman, the presentation of this bill at this time is probably one of many examples that may be presented tu us in the future of
11008 trying to pass legislation at a time of hysteria. I hate to disagree with the chairman of the Committee on Banking and Cur- rency as to the amount of tin used in this country, but the Departments of Com- merce and Interior have published cer- tain figures which do not bear out his statements. According to data published by the Departments of Commerce and Interior in May and June of this year, we now have in this country over 170,000 long tons of tin, more than the equivalent of a 3-year supply of pig tin now within our borders. The Texas City tin smelter, when originally constructed in 1941, was constructed with the understanding that they had a system by which they could produce high-grade tin from low-grade Bolivian ores, Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? Mr. SAYLOR. I yield to the gentle- man from Kentucky. Mr. SPENCE. I did not make any statement which the gentleman does not corroborate by his statement. I said that the consumption of tin in the United States was about 65,000 tons a year. Now the gentleman is talking about the stockpile. I made no statement with re- gard to that. Mr. SAYLOR. That is correct. Further, may I say for the information of the gentleman from Kentucky that the same data published by the Depart- ments of Commerce and Interior shows the average consumption from 1942 to 1949 in the United States was 55,000 tons of pig tin a year. Last year we only consumed 50,273 tons of pig tin, and the average consumption even during the War years was only 55,806 tons. At the time this Texas City tin smelter was erected in 1941 it was done with the distinct understanding that the Billiton Co., which is a Dutch corporation, had a@ system by which they could produce high-grade tin from low-grade Bolivian ores exclusively. According to the information at the hearings which were held there has never been produced at the Texas City tin smelter any high-grade tin using solely low-grade Bolivian ore. Every time they have produced any pig tin it has been necessary for them to use a mixture of high-grade alluvial concen- trates from the Far East or Africa. Fortunately in the United States sub- stantial quantities of such high-grade concentrates have been available for use since this smelter began its operations in 1942. It appears highly probable that during a future world war, if not sooner, the flow of tin metal and high-grade al- luvial tin ore concentrates from Malaya, Siam, Indonesia, and other sources in the Far East and from Africa will be cut off completely. When that happens, the tin requirements of the United States and possibly those of our allies, aside from the supply on hand, must be ob- tained entirely from Bolivian tin ore concentrates and any other Western Hemisphere sources that can be found and developed. Bolivian tin ore concen- trates, unlike high-grade alluvial con- centrvates, have a lower tin content, con- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE tain many objectionable impurities, and are difficult to smelt. In fact, only one plant in the world, a small one recently completed by American private enter- prise at Sewaren, N. J., is known to have facilities capable of successfully produc- ing grade-A tin from low-grade Boliv- jan cencentrates exclusively, without the admixture of high-grade alluvial con- centrates. The total tin requirements of the United States could be obtained from Bolivia if the great losses of tin incurred at the mines were eliminated by concen- trating the ores to # much lesser degree than is now practiced and required by the trade and if processing facilities were available in the United States to convert such low-grade concentrates to grade-A tin metal, A substantial part of the tin require- ments of the United States could be ob- tained from Bolivian tin ore concen- trates exclusively if facilities were avail- able in the United States to produce grade-A tin metal from the grades and quantities of tin concentrates now avail- able from Bolivia. Although the Gov- ernment-owned tin smelter at Texas City, Tex., was constructed in 1941 for this very purpose it has proved to be un- successful. Few realize that the Texas City tin smelter cannot produce signifi- cant quantities of grade-A tin metal from average grade Bolivian tin con- centrates without the admixture of high- grade alluvial tin concentrates from the Far East or Africa. The Billiton Co.—N. V. Billiton Maat- schappij—a Dutch corporation, through its wholly owned subsidiary, the Tin Processing Corp., was selected in 1941 to design, construct, operate, and manage our Government-owned tin smelter at Texas City, Tex., in preference to com- petent American private enterprise be- cause it claimed to have a tried and proven process for obtaining grade A tin metal from Bolivian tin concentrates ex- clusively without the admixture of high- grade alluvial tin concentrates obtain- able only from outside the Western Hemisphere, The record stands in glaring testimony that the Dutch Billiton Co. had no suc- cessful process for obtaining grade A tin from Bolivian concentrates exclusively and that our Government-owned tin smelter has not and cannot now function for the purpose for which it was origi- nally conceived and planned. The original lease and smelting agree- ments entered into on April 8, 1941, be- tween the Reconstruction Finance Cor- poration and the Tin Processing Corpo- ration, the wholly owned subsidiary of the Dutch Billiton Co., provided for the design, construction, operation, and management of a plant with a capacity for the smelting and refining of Bolivian tin ores sufficient to yield not less than 18,000 long tons of tin per year and to be readily capable of expansion into a plant with a capacity sufficient to yield not less than 48,000 tons of fine tin per year, Subsequent amendments to the lease agreement provided for a plant with a capacity to smelt and refine, first, Bo- livian tin ores sufficient to yield not less than 51,600 tons of fine tin per year; and JULY 25 second, alluvial tin ores sufficient to yield approximately 43,200 tons of fine tin per year, or a total capacity to yield 94,800 long tons of fine tin per year. Under the original tin-smelting agree- ment, the RFC agreed that the average tin content of the Bolivian ore to be de- livered to the plant would be not less than 35 percent. In turn, the Tin Proc- essing Corp. agreed and guaranteed to smelt such Bolivian ores without the use of high-grade alluvial ores, so that not less than 75 percent of the tin delivered would be in the form of grade A tin metal; that the balance of the tin deliv- ered not exceeding 25 percent, would contain not less than 98 percent pure tin; but that in the event RFC required more than 75 percent of the tin delivered to meet grade A specifications, then al: the tin delivered or such part as the RFC required would meet such grade A speci- fications of the Treasury Department. The Tin Processing Corp. further agreed that in the event the RFC acquired tin ores other than from Bolivia, such as high-grade alluvial ores, the guaranties would be adjusted so as to take account of the quantity and quality of such other ores, Contrary to its claims, agreements, and guaranties, the Dutch Billiton Co. and its subsidiary, the Tin Processing Corp., designed and constructed a tin smelter for the United States Govern- ment which is not adapted to the suc- cessful treatment of Bolivian ores exclu- sively. The production and metallurgi- cal records of the Texas City tin smelter furnish conclusive evidence of this fact. The records show that the Texas City tin smelter has never produced grade A tin from Bolivian ores exclusively. It has always been necessary for the smelter to use substantial amounts of high grade alluvial tin concentrates from the Far East and Africa to smelt Boliv- ian ores. Even then, the results are relatively poor and fall far short of the guaranties given for Bolivian ores alone, Until the past year or a little longer, when the amount of tin in high grade alluvial tin ores received at the smelter has equaled or exceeded the amount of tin in Bolivian ores received, a substan- tial proportion of the tin in Bolivian concentrates, instead of being converted to grade A tin metal, constantly flowed out of the plant in rejects and slimes re- sulting from the processing of Bolivian concentrates before smelting. The tin- bearing slimes and rejects have accumu- lated in outdoor ponds and are included in the tin inventories of the RFC. The actual tin content of the slimes is not known. Although 6,000 tons of rejects have been shipped to England for treat- ment, there is some doubt as to whether the tin in the slimes and the remainder of the rejects can be salvaged and, if so, at what cost. Tin-bearing slimes con- tinue to be produced and accumulated at Texas City. The annual report and financial state- ments of the RFC and subsidiary also shows that in the fiscal year ending June 80, 1949, when 4714 percent or almost half of the tin in concentrates treated at the Government's Texas City smelter was in the form of easily smelted, high grade