1484 
(2) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.—The President 
shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as 
are necessary to carry out this section. 
(e) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President 
may waive the application of the sanctions under sub-
section (c) if the President— 
(1) determines that such a waiver is in the na-
tional interest of the United States; and 
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees a notice of and justification for the waiv-
er. 
(f) TERMINATION.—The authority to impose sanc-
tions under subsection (b), and any sanctions imposed 
pursuant to such authority, shall expire on the date that 
is 3 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(g) EXCEPTION RELATING
TO IMPORTATION
OF 
GOODS.—The authorities and requirements to impose 
sanctions authorized under this Act shall not include the 
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the im-
portation of goods. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means—
1485 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Com-
mittee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
of the Senate. 
(2) GOOD.—The term ‘‘good’’ means any arti-
cle, natural or man-made substance, material, supply 
or manufactured product, including inspection and 
test equipment, and excluding technical data. 
(3) PERSON
FROM
A
NORTHERN
TRIANGLE 
COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘person from a Northern Tri-
angle country’’ means— 
(A) a citizen of a Northern Triangle coun-
try; or 
(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
a Northern Triangle country or any jurisdiction 
within a Northern Triangle country. 
SEC. 1299P–6. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—Except as otherwise provided, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means—
1486 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate. 
(2) NORTHERN TRIANGLE.—The term ‘‘North-
ern Triangle’’ means the region of Central America 
that encompasses the countries of El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and Honduras. 
(3) NORTHERN
TRIANGLE
COUNTRIES.—The 
term ‘‘Northern Triangle countries’’ means the 
countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 
(4) 
TRANSNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
ORGANIZA-
TION.—The term ‘‘transnational criminal organiza-
tion’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘significant 
transnational criminal organization’’ in Executive 
Order No. 13581 (July 24, 2011). 
Subtitle L—Additional Matters Re-
lating to NATO Allies and Part-
ners 
SEC. 1299Q–1. FOREIGN MILITARY LOAN AUTHORITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Beginning in fiscal year 2021, 
subject to the notification requirements under subsection
1487 
(b) and to the availability of appropriations, the President, 
acting through the Secretary of State, is authorized— 
(1) to make direct loans under section 23 of the 
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to 
NATO member countries that joined the alliance 
after March 1, 1999, notwithstanding the minimum 
interest rate required by subsection (c)(1) of such 
section; and 
(2) to charge fees for such loans under para-
graph (1), which shall be collected from borrowers in 
accordance with section 502(7) of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 and which may be used to cover 
the costs of such loans as defined in section 502 of 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
(b) NOTIFICATION.—A loan may not be made under 
the authority provided by subsection (a) unless the Sec-
retary of State submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees a certification, not fewer than 15 days before 
entering into an agreement to make such loan, that— 
(1) the recipient country is making demon-
strable progress toward meeting its defense spending 
commitments in accordance with the 2014 NATO 
Wales Summit Declaration; and 
(2) the government of such recipient country is 
respecting that country’s constitution and upholds
1488 
democratic values such as freedom of religion, free-
dom of speech, freedom of the press, the rule of law, 
and the rights of religious minorities. 
(c) REPAYMENT.—A loan made under the authority 
provided by subsection (a) shall be repaid in not more than 
12 years, but may include a grace period of up to 1 year 
on the repayment of the principal. 
(d) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. 
SEC. 1299Q–2. AUTHORIZATION OF REWARDS FOR PRO-
VIDING INFORMATION ON FOREIGN ELEC-
TION INTERFERENCE. 
Section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by inserting ‘‘foreign 
election interference,’’ before ‘‘transnational orga-
nized crime’’; 
(2) in subsection (b)—
1489 
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘or (10)’’ 
and inserting ‘‘(10), or (13)’’; 
(B) in paragraph (11), by striking ‘‘or’’ 
after the semicolon at the end; 
(C) in paragraph (12)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘sections’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘section’’; 
(ii) by striking ‘‘or (b)(1)’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘or 2914(b)(1)’’; and 
(iii) by striking the period at the end 
and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 
(D) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(13) the identification or location of a foreign 
person that knowingly engaged or is engaging in for-
eign election interference.’’; and 
(3) in subsection (k)— 
(A) 
by 
redesignating 
paragraphs 
(3) 
through (8) as paragraphs (5) through (10), re-
spectively; 
(B) by inserting after paragraph (2) the 
following new paragraphs: 
‘‘(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘foreign per-
son’ means—
1490 
‘‘(A) an individual who is not a United 
States person; or 
‘‘(B) a foreign entity. 
‘‘(4) FOREIGN ELECTION INTERFERENCE.—The 
term ‘foreign election interference’ means conduct by 
a foreign person that— 
‘‘(A)(i) violates Federal criminal, voting 
rights, or campaign finance law; or 
‘‘(ii) is performed by any person acting as 
an agent of or on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment or criminal enterprise; and 
‘‘(B) includes any covert, fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or unlawful act or attempted act, or 
knowing use of information acquired by theft, 
undertaken with the purpose or effect of under-
mining public confidence in election processes 
or institutions, or influencing, undermining con-
fidence in, or altering the result or reported re-
sult of, a general or primary Federal, State, or 
local election or caucus, including— 
‘‘(i) the campaign of a candidate; or 
‘‘(ii) a ballot measure, including an 
amendment, a bond issue, an initiative, a 
recall, a referral, or a referendum.’’; and
1491 
(C) in paragraph (10), as so redesignated, 
in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘and’’ after 
the semicolon and inserting ‘‘or’’. 
SEC. 1299Q–3. REPORT ON NATO MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, the Sec-
retary of Defense, and the Director of National Intel-
ligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report, in classified form but with an unclassi-
fied annex, that provides an accounting in United States 
dollars and assesses the contributions of NATO member 
countries to the security of the alliance. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.— The report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall also include the following 
with respect to each member country: 
(1) Data for the following categories from 2014 
through 2019: 
(A) Defense spending as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP). 
(B) Year-to-year percent change in defense 
spending as a percentage of GDP. 
(C) Percentage of defense spending spent 
on major equipment.
1492 
(D) Year-to-year percent change in equip-
ment spending as a percentage of defense 
spending. 
(E) Total security assistance or equivalent 
assistance to other NATO member countries or 
members of the NATO Partnership for Peace 
program. 
(F) Total economic and development as-
sistance or equivalent assistance to critical 
NATO partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, and 
others. 
(2) Participation in or contributions to United 
States or NATO-led missions, exercises, and combat 
and non-combat operations since March 24, 1999, 
such as the following: 
(A) NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. 
(B) Global Coalition Against ISIS. 
(C) NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force. 
(D) Operations in Afghanistan. 
(3) Efforts to improve domestic conditions to 
facilitate military mobility in Europe, including rel-
evant infrastructure and legal and regulatory condi-
tions.
1493 
(4) Financial costs and benefits of the host 
countries of United States forces in Europe, includ-
ing permanent basing. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 
SEC. 1299Q–4. REPORT ON CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY RE-
QUIREMENTS 
OF 
MILITARY 
FORCES 
OF 
UKRAINE AND RESOURCE PLAN FOR SECU-
RITY ASSISTANCE. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of State shall jointly submit a report to the 
appropriate committees of Congress on the capability and 
capacity requirements of the military forces of the Govern-
ment of Ukraine, which shall include the following: 
(1) An identification of the capability gaps and 
capacity shortfalls of the military of Ukraine, includ-
ing—
1494 
(A) an assessment of the requirements of 
the Ukrainian navy to accomplish its assigned 
missions; and 
(B) an assessment of the requirements of 
the Ukrainian air force to accomplish its as-
signed missions. 
(2) An assessment of the relative priority as-
signed by the Government of Ukraine to addressing 
such capability gaps and capacity shortfalls. 
(3) An assessment of the capability gaps and 
capacity shortfalls that— 
(A) could be addressed in a sufficient and 
timely manner by unilateral efforts of the Gov-
ernment of Ukraine; or 
(B) are unlikely to be addressed in a suffi-
cient and timely manner solely through unilat-
eral efforts. 
(4) An assessment of the capability gaps and 
capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (3)(B) 
that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely 
manner by— 
(A) the Ukraine Security Assistance Initia-
tive of the Department of Defense;
1495 
(B) Department of Defense security assist-
ance authorized by section 333 of title 10, 
United States Code; 
(C) the Foreign Military Financing and 
Foreign Military Sales programs of the Depart-
ment of State; or 
(D) the provision of excess defense articles 
pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). 
(5) An assessment of the human resource re-
quirements of the Office of Defense Cooperation at 
the United States Embassy in Kyiv and any gaps in 
its capacity to transmit and facilitate security assist-
ance to Ukraine. 
(6) Any recommendations the Secretaries deem 
appropriate concerning coordination of security as-
sistance efforts of the Department of Defense and 
Department of State with respect to Ukraine. 
(b) RESOURCE PLAN.—Not later than February 15, 
2022, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense 
shall jointly submit a report on resourcing United States 
security assistance with respect to Ukraine, which shall 
include the following: 
(1) A plan to resource the following initiatives 
and programs with respect to Ukraine in fiscal year
1496 
2023 and the four succeeding fiscal years to meet 
the most critical capability gaps and capacity short-
falls of the military forces of Ukraine: 
(A) The Ukraine Security Assistance Ini-
tiative of the Department of Defense. 
(B) Department of Defense security assist-
ance authorized by section 333 of title 10, 
United States Code. 
(C) The Foreign Military Financing and 
Foreign Military Sales programs of the Depart-
ment of State. 
(D) The provision of excess defense articles 
pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). 
(2) With respect to the Ukrainian navy: 
(A) A capability development plan, with 
milestones, describing the manner in which the 
United States will assist the Government of 
Ukraine in meeting the requirements described 
in subsection (a)(1)(A). 
(B) A plan for United States cooperation 
with third countries and international organiza-
tions that have the resources and ability to pro-
vide immediate assistance to the Ukrainian 
navy, while maintaining interoperability with
1497 
United States platforms to the greatest extent 
feasible. 
(C) A plan to prioritize Excess Defense Ar-
ticles for the Ukrainian navy to the maximum 
extent practicable during the time period de-
scribed in paragraph (1). 
(D) An assessment of how United States 
security assistance to the Ukrainian navy is in 
the national security interests of the United 
States. 
(3) With respect to the Ukrainian air force— 
(A) a capability development plan, with 
milestones, detailing how the United States will 
assist the Government of Ukraine in meeting 
the 
requirements 
described 
in 
subsection 
(a)(1)(B); 
(B) a plan for United States cooperation 
with third countries and international organiza-
tions that have the resources and ability to pro-
vide immediate assistance to the Ukrainian air 
force, while maintaining interoperability with 
United States platforms to the greatest extent 
feasible; 
(C) a plan to prioritize excess defense arti-
cles for the Ukraine air force to the maximum
1498 
extent practicable during the time period de-
scribed in paragraph (1); 
(D) an assessment of how United States 
security assistance to the Ukrainian air force is 
in the national security interests of the United 
States. 
(4) An assessment of progress on defense insti-
tutional reforms in Ukraine, including in the 
Ukrainian navy and air force, in the time period de-
scribed in paragraph (1) that will be essential for— 
(A) enabling effective use and sustainment 
of capabilities developed under security assist-
ance authorities described in this section; 
(B) enhancing the defense of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
(C) achieving the Government of Ukraine’s 
stated goal of meeting NATO standards; and 
(D) allowing Ukraine to achieve its full po-
tential as a strategic partner of the United 
States. 
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 
and the resource plan required under subsection (b) shall 
each be submitted in a classified form with an unclassified 
summary.
1499 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Armed Services Committees of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives; 
(2) the Foreign Relations Committee of the 
Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(3) the Appropriations Committees of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1299Q–5. EFFORTS TO COUNTER MALIGN AUTHORI-
TARIAN INFLUENCE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND SERBIA.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Government of Russia seeks to under-
mine the security of the United States, its NATO al-
lies, and other close partners in Europe; 
(2) the Government of Russia seeks to under-
mine the legitimate interests of the United States, 
NATO, the European Union, and other allied and 
partner governments in strategically significant re-
gions; 
(3) the values of the Government of Russia are 
inconsistent with the values of freedom, democracy,
1500 
free speech, free press, the respect for the rule of 
law, and other ideals that underpin the international 
rules-based order formed on the basis of Western in-
stitutions including NATO and the European Union; 
(4) the Government of Russia continues its 
campaign to undermine and erode the values of 
NATO and the European Union, institutions that 
Serbia claims to strive to join; 
(5) the Government of Serbia, particularly 
under the leadership of President Alexander Vucic, 
has acted in ways that do not comport with the val-
ues of the United States, NATO, the European 
Union, and member countries of each such organiza-
tion; 
(6) the Government of Serbia, particularly 
under the leadership of President Alexander Vucic, 
has continued to deepen its military ties and co-
operation with the Government of Russia; 
(7) the United States Government should, in its 
bilateral engagements with the Government of Ser-
bia, stress the importance of Serbia reducing its 
military ties with Russia; and 
(8) the Government of Serbia should be sanc-
tioned under appropriate authorities of the Coun-
tering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
1501 
of 2017 if its deepened military ties have facilitated 
transactions between the Government of Serbia and 
the Government of Russia that are deemed ‘‘signifi-
cant’’ for purposes of such Act. 
(b) REPORT ON MALIGN RUSSIAN AND CHINESE IN-
FLUENCE IN SERBIA.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees an unclassified report, which may con-
tain a classified annex, assessing trends of malign influ-
ence from the governments of Russia and China in Serbia 
including with respect to the following: 
(1) Corruption of political institutions and po-
litical leaders in Serbia by Russia or China. 
(2) The use of propaganda, disinformation, and 
other information tools to promote stronger ties be-
tween Serbia and Russia or China or to discourage 
Serbia from advancing toward greater integration 
with Western institutions like the European Union. 
(3) The use of foreign assistance and associated 
media messaging to influence public opinion in Ser-
bia with respect to Russia or China.
1502 
(4) The deepening of military-to-military co-
operation or cooperation in other national security 
and law enforcement sectors between Serbia and 
Russia or China. 
(5) The expansion of economic ties between 
Serbia and Russia or China, especially in the energy, 
mining, and industrial sectors. 
(6) The use of religious or ethnic ties to deepen 
relations between Serbia and Russia. 
(c) REPORT ON POTENTIAL CAATSA VIOLATIONS.— 
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees an unclassified report, 
which may contain a classified annex, that lists each coun-
try that has taken delivery of military equipment manufac-
tured in Russia since the enactment of the Countering 
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, 
and determines whether any transactions described in the 
report constitute a significant transaction as described in 
such Act, including countries that have— 
(1) purchased of Russian equipment from the 
Government of Russia; 
(2) obtained Russian equipment provided by the 
Government of Russia as aid, assistance, or for re-
lated purposes; or
1503 
(3) obtained Russian equipment provided by the 
Government of Russia as a gift. 
(d) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES 
DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate con-
gressional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 
Subtitle 
M—Sudan 
Democratic 
Transition, Accountability, and 
Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020 
SEC. 1299R–1. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Sudan Democratic 
Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act 
of 2020’’. 
SEC. 1299R–2. DEFINITIONS. 
Except as otherwise provided, in this subtitle: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives; and
1504 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate. 
(2) 
INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL
INSTITU-
TIONS.—The term ‘‘international financial institu-
tions’’ means— 
(A) the International Monetary Fund; 
(B) the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development; 
(C) the International Development Asso-
ciation; 
(D) the International Finance Corporation; 
(E) 
the 
Inter-American 
Development 
Bank; 
(F) the Asian Development Bank; 
(G) the Inter-American Investment Cor-
poration; 
(H) the African Development Bank; 
(I) the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development; 
(J) the Multilateral Investment Guaranty 
Agency; and 
(K) any multilateral financial institution, 
established after the date of enactment of this
1505 
Act, that could provide financial assistance to 
the Government of Sudan. 
(3) SOVEREIGNTY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Sov-
ereignty Council’’ means the governing body of 
Sudan during the transitional period that consists 
of— 
(A) five civilians selected by the Forces of 
Freedom and Change; 
(B) five members selected by the Transi-
tional Military Council; and 
(C) one member selected by agreement be-
tween the Forces of Freedom and Change and 
the Transitional Military Council. 
(4) SUDANESE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICES.—The term ‘‘Sudanese security and intel-
ligence services’’ means— 
(A) the Sudan Armed Forces; 
(B) the Rapid Support Forces, 
(C) Sudan’s Popular Defense Forces and 
other paramilitary units; 
(D) Sudan’s police forces; 
(E) the General Intelligence Service, pre-
viously known as the National Intelligence and 
Security Services; and
1506 
(F) related entities, such as Sudan’s Mili-
tary Industry Corporation. 
(5) TRANSITIONAL PERIOD.—The term ‘‘transi-
tional period’’ means the 39-month period beginning 
on August 17, 2019, the date of the signing of Su-
dan’s constitutional charter, during which— 
(A) the members of the Sovereignty Coun-
cil described in paragraph (3)(B) select a chair 
of the Council for the first 21 months of the pe-
riod; and 
(B) the members of the Sovereignty Coun-
cil described in paragraph (3)(A) select a chair 
of the Council for the remaining 18 months of 
the period. 
SEC. 1299R–3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) support a civilian-led political transition in 
Sudan that results in a democratic government, that 
is accountable to its people, respects and promotes 
human rights, is at peace internally and with its 
neighbors, and can be a partner for regional sta-
bility; 
(2) support the implementation of Sudan’s con-
stitutional charter for the transitional period; and
1507 
(3) pursue a strategy of calibrated engagement 
with Sudan that includes— 
(A) facilitating an environment for free, 
fair, and credible democratic elections and a 
pluralistic and representative political system; 
(B) supporting reforms that improve trans-
parency and accountability, remove restrictions 
on civil and political liberties, and strengthen 
the protection of human rights, including reli-
gious freedom; 
(C) strengthening civilian institutions, ju-
dicial independence, and the rule of law; 
(D) empowering civil society and inde-
pendent media; 
(E) promoting national reconciliation and 
enabling a just, comprehensive, and sustainable 
peace; 
(F) promoting the role of women in gov-
ernment, the economy, and society, in recogni-
tion of the seminal role that women played in 
the social movement that ousted former presi-
dent Omar al-Bashir; 
(G) promoting accountability for genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and sex-
ual and gender-based violence;
1508 
(H) encouraging the development of civil-
ian oversight over and professionalization of the 
Sudanese security and intelligence services and 
strengthening accountability for human rights 
violations and abuses, corruption, or other 
abuses of power; 
(I) promoting economic reform, private 
sector engagement, and inclusive economic de-
velopment while combating corruption and illicit 
economic activity, including that which involves 
the Sudanese security and intelligence services; 
(J) securing unfettered humanitarian ac-
cess across all regions of Sudan; 
(K) supporting improved development out-
comes, domestic resource mobilization, and 
catalyzing market-based solutions to improve 
access to health, education, water and sanita-
tion, and livelihoods; and 
(L) promoting responsible international 
and regional engagement. 
SEC. 1299R–4. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 
RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND FUNDA-
MENTAL FREEDOMS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the political transition in Sudan, following sev-
1509 
eral months of popular protests against the regime of 
Omar al-Bashir, represents an opportunity for the United 
States to support democracy, good governance, rule of law, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Sudan. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (other than the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 or the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), 
the President is authorized to provide assistance under 
part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) 
to— 
(1) provide for democracy and governance pro-
grams that strengthen and build the capacity of rep-
resentative civilian government institutions, political 
parties, and civil society in Sudan; 
(2) support the organization of free, fair, and 
credible elections in Sudan; 
(3) provide technical support for legal and pol-
icy reforms that improve transparency and account-
ability and protect human rights, including religious 
freedom, and civil liberties in Sudan; 
(4) support for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the freedoms of religion or be-
lief; expression, including for members of the press, 
assembly; and association in Sudan;
1510 
(5) support measures to improve and increase 
women’s participation in the political, economic, and 
social sectors of Sudan; and 
(6) support other related democracy, good gov-
ernance, rule of law, and fundamental freedom pro-
grams and activities. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I 
and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) for 
fiscal years 2021 and 2022, $20,000,000 is authorized to 
be appropriated for each such fiscal year to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 1299R–5. SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (other than the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 or the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), 
the President is authorized to provide assistance under 
part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) 
for programs in Sudan to— 
(1) increase agricultural and livestock produc-
tivity;
1511 
(2) promote economic growth, increase private 
sector productivity and advance market-based solu-
tions to address development challenges; 
(3) support women’s economic empowerment 
and economic opportunities for youth and previously 
marginalized populations; 
(4) improve equal access to quality basic edu-
cation; 
(5) support the capacity of universities to equip 
students to participate in a pluralistic and global so-
ciety through virtual exchange and other programs; 
(6) improve access to water, sanitation, and hy-
giene projects; 
(7) build the capacity of national and sub-
national government officials to support the trans-
parent management of public resources, promote 
good governance through combating corruption and 
improving accountability, increase economic produc-
tivity, and increase domestic resource mobilization; 
and 
(8) support other related economic assistance 
programs and activities. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I 
and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act
1512 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) for 
fiscal years 2021 and 2022, $80,000,000 is authorized to 
be appropriated, for each such fiscal year to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 1299R–6. SUPPORT FOR CONFLICT MITIGATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (other than the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 or the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), 
the President is authorized to provide assistance under 
part I and chapters 4, 5, and 6 of part II of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et 
seq., and 2348 et seq.) to— 
(1) support long-term peace and stability in 
Sudan by promoting national reconciliation and ena-
bling a just, comprehensive, and sustainable peace, 
especially in regions that have been underdeveloped 
or affected by war, such as the states of Darfur, 
South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and Kassala; 
(2) support civil society and other organizations 
working to address conflict prevention, mitigation, 
and resolution mechanisms and people-to-people rec-
onciliation in Sudan, especially those addressing 
issues of marginalization and vulnerable groups, 
equal protection under the law, natural resource 
management, compensation and restoration of prop-
1513 
erty, voluntary return, and sustainable solutions for 
displaced persons and refugees; 
(3) strengthen civilian oversight of the Suda-
nese security and intelligence services and ensure 
that such services are not contributing to the perpet-
uation of conflict in Sudan and to the limitation of 
the civil liberties of all people in Sudan; 
(4) assist in the human rights vetting and pro-
fessional training of security force personnel due to 
be employed or deployed by the Sudanese security 
and intelligence services in regions that have been 
underdeveloped or affected by war, such as the 
states of Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Red 
Sea, and Kassala, including members of any security 
forces being established pursuant to a peace agree-
ment relating to such regions; 
(5) support provisions of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement of 2005 and Abyei protocol, as ap-
propriate, unless otherwise superseded by a new 
agreement signed in good faith— 
(A) between stakeholders in this region 
and the Governments of Sudan and South 
Sudan to hold a free, fair, and credible ref-
erendum on the status of Abyei; and
1514 
(B) between stakeholders in this region 
and the Government of Sudan to support pop-
ular consultations on the status of the states of 
South Kordofan and Blue Nile; and 
(6) support other related conflict mitigation 
programs and activities. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I 
and chapters 4 and 6 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq., and 
2348 et seq.) for fiscal years 2021 and 2022, $20,000,000 
is authorized to be appropriated for each such fiscal year 
to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1299R–7. SUPPORT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WAR 
CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND 
GENOCIDE IN SUDAN. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the Secretary of State should conduct robust 
diplomatic engagement to promote accountability and pro-
vide technical support to ensure that credible, transparent, 
and independent investigations of gross violations of 
human rights perpetrated by the Government of Sudan 
under former President Omar al-Bashir and the Transi-
tional Military Council since June 30, 1989.
1515 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law (other than the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 or the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008), 
the President is authorized to provide assistance under 
part I and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.) 
to— 
(1) build the capacity of civilian investigators 
within and outside of Sudan on how to document, 
investigate, develop findings of, identify, and locate 
those responsible for war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, or genocide in Sudan; 
(2) collect, document, and protect evidence of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
in Sudan and preserve the chain of custody for such 
evidence, including by providing support for Suda-
nese, foreign, and international nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and other entities engaged in such in-
vestigative activities; 
(3) build Sudan’s judicial capacity to support 
prosecutions in domestic courts and support inves-
tigations by hybrid or international courts as appro-
priate;
1516 
(4) protect witnesses who participate in court 
proceedings or other transitional justice mechanisms; 
and 
(5) support other related conflict mitigation 
programs and activities. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out part I 
and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. and 2346 et seq.), for 
fiscal years 2021 and 2022, $10,000,000 is authorized to 
be appropriated for each such fiscal year to carry out this 
section. 
SEC. 1299R–8. SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to 
suspend the provision of assistance authorized under sec-
tion 1299R–4, 1299R–5, 1299R–6, or 1299R–7 to the 
Government of Sudan if the President determines that 
conditions in Sudan or the composition of the Government 
of Sudan changes such that it is no longer in the United 
States national interest to continue to provide such assist-
ance. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after making 
a determination under subsection (a), the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
port that describes—
1517 
(1) the political and security conditions in 
Sudan that led to such determination; and 
(2) any planned diplomatic engagement to re-
start the provision of such assistance. 
SEC. 1299R–9. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE. 
(a) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the 
Congress that— 
(1) Sudan’s economic challenges are a legacy of 
decades of kleptocracy, economic mismanagement, 
and war; 
(2) Sudan’s economic recovery will depend on— 
(A) combating corruption and illicit eco-
nomic activity; 
(B) ending internal conflicts in the states 
of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile; and 
(C) promoting inclusive economic growth 
and development; and 
(3) the COVID–19 outbreak constitutes a grave 
danger to Sudan’s economic stability, public health, 
and food security and jeopardizes the transition to 
a civilian-led government that promotes the demo-
cratic aspirations of the Sudanese people. 
(b) RESPONDING TO THE COVID–19 OUTBREAK.— 
During the transitional period in Sudan, and notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the Secretary of the
1518 
Treasury may instruct the United States Executive Direc-
tor at each international financial institution to use the 
voice and vote of the United States to support loans or 
other utilization of the funds of the respective institution 
for Sudan for the purpose of addressing basic human 
needs, responding to the COVID–19 outbreak and its im-
pact on the country’s economic stability, or promoting de-
mocracy, governance, or public financial management in 
Sudan. 
(c) DEBT RELIEF.—Upon the removal of Sudan from 
the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, and once the Sov-
ereignty Council is chaired by a civilian leader, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should 
engage with international financial institutions and other 
bilateral official creditors to advance agreement through 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative to 
restructure, reschedule, or cancel the sovereign debt of 
Sudan. 
(d) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 3 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
not less than every 6 months thereafter during the transi-
tional period, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State, shall report to the appro-
priate congressional committees on the extent to which the 
transitional government of Sudan has taken demonstrable
1519 
steps to strengthen governance and improve fiscal trans-
parency, including— 
(1) establishing civilian control over the fi-
nances and assets of the Sudanese security and in-
telligence services; 
(2) developing a transparent budget that ac-
counts for all expenditures related to the security 
and intelligence services; 
(3) identifying the shareholdings in all public 
and private companies not exclusively dedicated to 
the national defense held or managed by the security 
and intelligence services, and publicly disclosing, 
evaluating, and transferring all such shareholdings 
to the Ministry of Finance of the Government of 
Sudan or to any specialized entity of the Govern-
ment of Sudan established under law for this pur-
pose, which is ultimately accountable to a civilian 
authority; 
(4) ceasing the involvement of the security and 
intelligence services officials, and their immediate 
family members, in the illicit trade in mineral re-
sources, including petroleum and gold; 
(5) implementing a publicly transparent meth-
odology for the Government of Sudan to recover, 
evaluate, hold, manage, or divest any state assets
1520 
and the profits derived from the assets that may 
have been transferred to the National Congress 
Party, an affiliate of the National Congress Party, 
or an official of the National Congress Party in the 
individual capacity of such an official; 
(6) identifying and monitoring the nature and 
purpose of offshore financial resources controlled by 
the security and intelligence services; and 
(7) strengthening banking regulation and su-
pervision and addressing anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorism financing deficiencies. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Financial Services, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; 
and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the United 
States Senate. 
SEC. 1299R–10. COORDINATED SUPPORT TO RECOVER AS-
SETS STOLEN FROM THE SUDANESE PEOPLE. 
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
retary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, shall
1521 
seek to advance the efforts of the Government of Sudan 
to recover assets stolen from the Sudanese people, includ-
ing with regard to international efforts to— 
(1) identify and track assets taken from the 
people and institutions of Sudan through theft, cor-
ruption, money laundering, or other illicit means; 
and 
(2) with respect to assets identified pursuant to 
paragraph (1), work with foreign governments and 
international organizations to— 
(A) share financial investigations intel-
ligence, as appropriate; 
(B) oversee and manage the assets identi-
fied pursuant to paragraph (1); 
(C) as appropriate, advance, advance civil 
forfeiture litigation, including providing tech-
nical assistance to help governments establish 
the necessary legal framework to carry out 
asset forfeitures; and 
(D) work with the Government of Sudan to 
ensure that a credible mechanism is established 
to ensure that any recovered assets are man-
aged in a transparent and accountable fashion 
and ultimately used for the benefit of the Suda-
nese people, provided that—
1522 
(i) returned assets are not used for 
partisan political purposes; and 
(ii) there are robust financial manage-
ment and oversight measures to safeguard 
repatriated assets. 
SEC. 1299R–11. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE SUDA-
NESE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERV-
ICES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may not provide 
assistance (other than assistance authorized under section 
1299R–6) to the Sudanese security and intelligence serv-
ices until the President submits to Congress a certification 
that the Government of Sudan has met the conditions de-
scribed in subsection (c). 
(b) EXCEPTION; WAIVER.— 
(1) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of State may, 
as appropriate and notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, provide assistance for the purpose of 
professionalizing the Sudanese security and intel-
ligence services, through institutions such as the Af-
rica Center for Strategic Studies and the United 
States Institute of Peace. 
(2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the 
limitation on the provision of assistance under sub-
section (a) if, not later than 30 days before the as-
1523 
sistance is to be provided, the President submits to 
the appropriate congressional committees— 
(A) a list of the activities and participants 
to which such waiver would apply; 
(B) a justification that the waiver is in the 
national security interest of the United States; 
and 
(C) a certification that the participants 
have met the requirements of either section 
620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2378d) for programs funded 
through Department of State appropriations or 
section 362 of title 10, United States Code, for 
programs funded through Department of De-
fense appropriations. 
(c) CONDITIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The conditions described in 
this subsection are that the Sudanese security and 
intelligence services— 
(A) have demonstrated progress in under-
taking security sector reform, including reforms 
that professionalize such security and intel-
ligence services, improve transparency, and re-
forms to the laws governing the security forces,
1524 
such as of the National Security Act of 2010 
and the Sudan Armed Forces Act of 2007; 
(B) support efforts to respect human 
rights, including religious freedom, and hold ac-
countable any members of such security and in-
telligence services responsible for human rights 
violations and abuses, including by taking de-
monstrable steps to cooperate with local or 
international mechanisms of accountability, to 
ensure that those responsible for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide com-
mitted in Sudan are brought to justice; 
(C) are under civilian oversight, subject to 
the rule of law, and are not undertaking actions 
to undermine a civilian-led transitional govern-
ment or an elected civilian government; 
(D) have refrained from targeted attacks 
against religious or ethnic minority groups, 
have negotiated in good faith during the peace 
process and constructively participated in the 
implementation of any resulting peace agree-
ments, and do not impede inclusive political 
participation; 
(E) allow unfettered humanitarian access 
by United Nations organizations and specialized
1525 
agencies and domestic and international hu-
manitarian organizations to civilian populations 
in conflict-affected areas; 
(F) cooperate with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and organiza-
tions affiliated with the United Nations to allow 
for the protection of displaced persons and the 
safe, voluntary, sustainable, and dignified re-
turn of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons; and 
(G) take constructive steps to investigate 
all reports of unlawful recruitment of children 
by Sudanese security forces and prosecute those 
found to be responsible. 
(2) FORM.—The certification described in sub-
section (a) containing the conditions described in 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form but may include a classified annex. 
(d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the 
date that is the earlier of— 
(1) the date that is 2 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act; or 
(2) the date on which the President determines 
that a successful rotation of military to civilian lead-
ership in the Sovereignty Council has occurred.
1526 
SEC. 1299R–12. AUTHORIZATION OF IMPOSITION OF SANC-
TIONS WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN GOVERN-
MENT OF SUDAN OFFICIALS AND OTHER IN-
DIVIDUALS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall impose the 
sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any 
senior official of the Government of Sudan and any other 
foreign person that the President determines, on or after 
the date of enactment of this Act— 
(1) is knowingly responsible for, complicit in, or 
has directly or indirectly engaged in— 
(A) significant actions or policies that 
threaten the peace, security, or stability of 
Sudan, including through the use of armed 
groups; 
(B) significant actions or policies that ob-
struct, undermine, delay, or impede, or pose a 
significant risk of obstructing, undermining, de-
laying, or impeding, the civil and political rights 
of the Sudanese people and the political transi-
tion in Sudan; 
(C) corruption, including the misappropria-
tion of state assets, the expropriation of private 
assets for personal gain, corruption related to 
government contracts or the extraction of nat-
ural resources, or bribery;
1527 
(D) serious human rights abuses that may 
include the targeting of civilians through the 
commission of acts of violence, abduction, 
forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hos-
pitals, religious sites, or locations where civil-
ians are seeking refuge, or a violation of inter-
national humanitarian law; or 
(E) illicit exploitation of natural resources 
in Sudan; 
(2) is a leader of an entity that has, or whose 
members have, engaged in any activity described in 
subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1); 
(3) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro-
vided financial, material, logistical, or technological 
support for, or goods or services to or in support 
of— 
(A) any activity described in paragraph 
(1); or 
(B) any person whose property and inter-
ests in property are blocked pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 13400 (2006); or 
(4) is owned or controlled by, or has acted or 
purported to act for or on behalf of, any other per-
son whose property and interests in property are 
blocked pursuant to—
1528 
(A) subsection (b)(1); or 
(B) Executive Order No. 13400 (2006). 
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions to be 
imposed with respect to any foreign person described in 
subsection (a) are the following: 
(1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President 
shall exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi-
dent under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent 
necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in 
property and interests in property of the foreign per-
son if such property and interests in property— 
(A) are in the United States; 
(B) come within the United States; or 
(C) come within the possession or control 
of a United States person. 
(2) INADMISSIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR 
PAROLE.— 
(A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—The 
foreign person is— 
(i) inadmissible to the United States; 
(ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other 
documentation to enter the United States; 
and
1529 
(iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted 
or paroled into the United States or to re-
ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 
seq.). 
(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—The visa 
or other entry documentation of the foreign 
person shall be revoked, regardless of when 
such visa or other entry documentation is or 
was issued. A revocation under this subpara-
graph shall take effect immediately and auto-
matically cancel any other valid visa or entry 
documentation that is in the foreign person’s 
possession. 
(c) EXCEPTIONS TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-
TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.—Sanctions under 
subsection (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to a foreign 
person described in subsection (a) if admitting or paroling 
the foreign person into the United States is necessary to 
permit the United States to comply with the Agreement 
regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed 
at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the 
United States, or other applicable international obliga-
tions.
1530 
(d) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 
(1) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may ex-
ercise all authorities provided under sections 203 
and 205 of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out 
this section and shall issue such regulations, li-
censes, and orders as are necessary to carry out this 
section. 
(2) PENALTIES.—Any person that violates, at-
tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a 
violation of this section or any regulation, license, or 
order issued to carry out paragraph (1) shall be sub-
ject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and 
(c) of section 206 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same 
extent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
scribed in subsection (a) of that section. 
(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica-
tion of sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign person 
pursuant to subsection (a) if the President— 
(1) determines that a waiver is in the national 
interest of the United States; and 
(2) not later than the date on which such waiv-
er will take effect, submits a notice of and justifica-
1531 
tion for such waiver to the appropriate congressional 
committees. 
(f) TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE SANC-
TIONS.—The authority to impose sanctions under this sec-
tion shall terminate on the date that is the earlier of 3 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act or the 
date on which the President determines and certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that the Govern-
ment of Sudan— 
(1) has held free, fair, and credible general elec-
tions in accordance with the 2019 constitutional 
charter for the transitional period and a democrat-
ically elected head of state has been sworn in and 
taken office; 
(2) is making significant progress towards re-
specting the freedoms of religion, speech, press, as-
sembly, and association as described in the 2019 
constitutional charter for the transitional period and 
toward holding free, fair, and credible elections by 
the end of the transitional period; 
(3) is compliant with international norms and 
standards concerning the transparent allocation and 
disbursement of government directed funds;
1532 
(4) respects the right to freedom of religion, 
speech, press, assembly, and association for all Su-
danese citizens; 
(5) has ceased attacks on civilians, including 
through the use of militias; 
(6) has negotiated in good faith to reach formal 
peace agreements with armed movements that had 
been in conflict with the Government of Sudan; and 
(7) has ceased any material support or assist-
ance to groups associated or linked to international 
terrorism. 
(g) EXCEPTION RELATING
TO IMPORTATION
OF 
GOODS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and require-
ments to impose sanctions authorized under this sec-
tion shall not include the authority or requirement 
to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. 
(2) GOOD
DEFINED.—In this subsection, the 
term ‘‘good’’ means any article, natural or man- 
made substance, material, supply or manufactured 
product, including inspection and test equipment, 
and excluding technical data. 
(h) EXCEPTIONS TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL SECU-
RITY.—The following activities shall be exempt from sanc-
tions under this section:
1533 
(1) Activities subject to the reporting require-
ments under title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.). 
(2) Any authorized intelligence or law enforce-
ment activities of the United States. 
(i) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms ‘‘admitted’’ 
and ‘‘alien’’ have the meanings given those terms in 
section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(8 U.S.C. 1001). 
(2) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Com-
mittee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Appropriations, and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs of the Senate. 
(3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per-
son’’ means a person that is not a United States 
person.
1534 
(4) 
KNOWINGLY.—The 
term 
‘‘knowingly’’ 
means, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or 
a result, that a person has actual knowledge, or 
should have known, of the conduct, the cir-
cumstance, or the result. 
(5) 
UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘United States person’’ means— 
(A) a United States citizen, an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence to the 
United States, or any other individual subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States; 
(B) an entity organized under the laws of 
the United States or of any jurisdiction within 
the United States, including a foreign branch of 
such entity; or 
(C) any person in the United States. 
SEC. 1299R–13. REPORTS. 
(a) REPORT
ON
ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR
HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
2 years, the President shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report that— 
(1) summarizes reports of gross violations of 
human rights, including sexual and gender-based vi-
olence, committed against civilians in Sudan, includ-
1535 
ing members of the Sudanese security and intel-
ligence services or any associated militias, between 
December 2018 and the date of the submission of 
the report; 
(2) provides an update on any potential transi-
tional justice mechanisms in Sudan to investigate, 
charge, and prosecute alleged perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights in Sudan since June 30, 
1989, including with respect to the June 3, 2019 
massacre in Khartoum; 
(3) provides an analysis of whether the gross 
violations of human rights summarized pursuant to 
paragraph (1) amount to war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide; and 
(4) identifies specific cases since the beginning 
of the transitional period in which members of the 
Sudanese security and intelligence services have been 
charged and prosecuted for actions that constitute 
gross violations of human rights perpetrated since 
June 30, 1989. 
(b) REPORT ON CERTAIN ACTIVITIES AND FINANCES 
OF
SENIOR
OFFICIALS
OF
THE
GOVERNMENT
OF 
SUDAN.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 1 year,
1536 
the President shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that— 
(1) describes the actions and involvement of any 
previous or current senior officials of the Govern-
ment of Sudan since the establishment of the transi-
tional government in August 2019 in— 
(A) directing, carrying out, or overseeing 
gross violations of human rights; 
(B) directing, carrying out, or overseeing 
the unlawful use or recruitment of children by 
armed groups or armed forces in the context of 
conflicts in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, or other 
countries; 
(C) directing, carrying out, or colluding in 
significant acts of corruption; 
(D) directing, carrying out, or overseeing 
any efforts to circumvent the establishment of 
civilian control over the finances and assets of 
the Sudanese security and intelligence services; 
or 
(E) facilitating, supporting, or financing 
terrorist activity in Sudan or other countries; 
(2) identifies Sudanese and foreign financial in-
stitutions, including offshore financial institutions, 
in which senior officials of the Government of Sudan
1537 
whose actions are described in paragraph (1) hold 
significant assets, and provides an estimate of the 
value of such assets; 
(3) identifies any information United States 
Government agencies have obtained since August 
2019 regarding persons, foreign governments, and 
Sudanese or foreign financial institutions that know-
ingly facilitate, finance, or otherwise benefit from 
corruption or illicit economic activity in Sudan, in-
cluding the export of mineral resources, and, in par-
ticular, if that trade is violating any United States 
restrictions that remain in place by legislation or 
Executive order; 
(4) identifies any information United States 
Government agencies have obtained since August 
2019 regarding senior officials of the Government of 
Sudan who are personally involved in the illicit trade 
in mineral resources, including petroleum and gold; 
and 
(5) identifies any information United States 
Government agencies have obtained since August 
2019 regarding individuals or foreign governments 
that have provided funds to individual members of 
the Sovereignty Council or the Cabinet outside of
1538 
the Central Bank of Sudan or the Ministry of Fi-
nance. 
(c) REPORT ON SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO EXECU-
TIVE ORDER NO. 13400.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
port containing the names of senior Sudanese government 
officials that President determines meet the criteria to be 
sanctionable pursuant to Executive Order No. 13400 (71 
Fed. Reg. 25483; relating to blocking property of persons 
in connection with the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region). 
(d) FORM.—The reports required under subsections 
(b) and (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 1299R–14. UNITED STATES STRATEGY FOR SUPPORT 
TO A CIVILIAN-LED GOVERNMENT IN SUDAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development and the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a strategy that includes— 
(1) a clear articulation of specific United States 
goals and objectives with respect to a successful
1539 
completion of the transitional period and a plan to 
achieve such goals and objectives; 
(2) a description of assistance and diplomatic 
engagement to support a civilian-led government in 
Sudan for the remainder of the transitional period, 
including any possible support for the organization 
of free, fair, and credible elections; 
(3) an assessment of the legal and policy re-
forms that have been and need to be taken by the 
government in Sudan during the transitional period 
in order to promote— 
(A) human rights; 
(B) freedom of religion, speech, press, as-
sembly, and association; and 
(C) 
accountability 
for 
human 
rights 
abuses, including for sexual and gender-based 
violence perpetrated by members of the Suda-
nese security and intelligence services; 
(4) a description of efforts to address the legal 
and policy reforms mentioned in paragraph (3); 
(5) a description of humanitarian and develop-
ment assistance to Sudan and a plan for coordi-
nating such assistance with international donors, re-
gional partners, and local partners;
1540 
(6) a description of monitoring and evaluation 
plans for all forms of assistance to be provided 
under the strategy in accordance with the moni-
toring and evaluation requirements of section 4 of 
the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability 
Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–191), to include a de-
tailed description of all associated goals and bench-
marks for measuring impact; and 
(7) an assessment of security sector reforms 
undertaken by the Government of Sudan, including 
efforts to demobilize or integrate militias and to fos-
ter civilian control of the armed services. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development and the Secretary 
of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that includes— 
(1) a detailed description of the efforts taken to 
implement this subtitle; and 
(2) recommendations for legislative or adminis-
trative measures to facilitate the implementation of 
this subtitle.
1541 
SEC. 1299R–15. AMENDMENTS TO THE DARFUR PEACE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2006. 
Section 8(c)(1) of the Darfur Peace and Account-
ability Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–344; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
note) is amended by striking ‘‘Southern Sudan,’’ and all 
that following through ‘‘Khartoum,’’ and inserting 
‘‘Sudan’’. 
SEC. 1299R–16. REPEAL OF SUDAN PEACE ACT AND THE 
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT. 
(a) SUDAN PEACE ACT.—Effective January 1, 2020, 
the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107–245; 50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is repealed. 
(b) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT.—Effec-
tive January 1, 2020, the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan 
Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–497; 50 U.S.C. note) is re-
pealed. 
Subtitle N—Afghanistan Security 
and 
Reconstruction 
Trans-
parency Act 
SEC. 1299S–1. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Afghanistan Secu-
rity and Reconstruction Transparency Act’’.
1542 
SEC. 1299S–2. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF DATA PERTAINING 
TO MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE OF THE AF-
GHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
FORCES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall make publicly available all data pertaining to meas-
ures of performance of the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces (hereafter in this section referred to as 
‘‘ANDSF’’). 
(b) DATA TO BE INCLUDED.—The data required to 
be made publicly available by subsection (a) shall include 
the following: 
(1) The total quarterly ANDSF attrition rate 
and quarterly attrition rates for ANDSF compo-
nents, including the Afghan National Army, the Af-
ghan National Police, the Afghan Air Force, and the 
Afghan Local Police. 
(2) The total number of ANDSF personnel 
dropped from the rolls for the quarter and the num-
ber of personnel dropped from the rolls by ANDSF 
component for the quarter. 
(3) The total number of ANDSF personnel 
trained to date, the number of new ANDSF per-
sonnel that entered training for the quarter, the 
number of new ANDSF personnel that completed
1543 
training for the quarter, the total number of per-
sonnel trained by ANDSF component to date, the 
number of new personnel by ANDSF component 
that entered training for the quarter, and the num-
ber of new personnel by ANDSF component that 
completed training for the quarter. 
(4) The total number and percentage of unfilled 
ANDSF positions and the number and percentage of 
unfilled positions by ANDSF component. 
(5) The percentage of ANDSF components as-
sessed at full authorized and assigned strength. 
(6) Detailed Afghan Ministry of Defense, Min-
istry of Interior, and ANDSF performance assess-
ments. 
(7) Information about the operational readiness 
of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Po-
lice equipment. 
(8) Afghanistan Special Mission Wing informa-
tion, including the number and type of airframes, 
the number of pilots and aircrew, and the oper-
ational readiness (and associated benchmarks) of 
airframes. 
(9) 
Enemy-initiated 
attacks 
and 
effective 
enemy-initiated attacks on the ANDSF.
1544 
SEC. 1299S–3. DISTRICT-LEVEL STABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
OF AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT 
CONTROL AND INFLUENCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall re-
sume the production of district-level stability assessments 
of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence 
that were discontinued in 2018, to include district, popu-
lation, and territorial control data. 
(b) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary of De-
fense shall make publicly available the assessments and 
all data pertaining to the assessments produced under 
subsection (a). 
Subtitle O—LIFT Act 
SEC. 1299T–1. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Leveraging Infor-
mation on Foreign Traffickers Act’’ or the ‘‘LIFT Act’’. 
SEC. 1299T–2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the annual Trafficking In Persons Report 
prepared by the Department of State pursuant to 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (the 
‘‘TIP Report’’) remains one of the most comprehen-
sive, timely, and important sources of information on 
human trafficking in the world, and currently in-
cludes 187 individual country narratives;
1545 
(2) in January 2019, the statute mandating the 
TIP Report was amended to require that each report 
must cover efforts and activities occurring within the 
period from April 1 of the prior year through March 
31 of the current year, which necessarily requires 
the collection and transmission of information after 
March 31; 
(3) ensuring that the Department of State has 
adequate time to receive, analyze, and incorporate 
trafficking-related information into its annual Traf-
ficking In Persons Report is important to the quality 
and comprehensiveness of that report; 
(4) information regarding prevalence and pat-
terns of human trafficking is important for under-
standing the scourge of modern slavery and making 
effective decisions about where and how to combat 
it; and 
(5) United States officials responsible for moni-
toring and combating trafficking in persons around 
the world should receive available information re-
garding where and how often United States diplo-
matic and consular officials encounter persons who 
are responsible for, or who knowingly benefit from, 
severe forms of trafficking in persons.
1546 
SEC. 1299T–3. ANNUAL DEADLINE FOR TRAFFICKING IN 
PERSONS REPORT. 
Section 110(b)(1) of the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)(1)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘June 1’’ and inserting ‘‘June 30’’. 
SEC. 1299T–4. UNITED STATES ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING. 
(a) EXTENSION.—Section 115(h) of the Justice for 
Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–22; 
129 Stat. 243) is amended by striking ‘‘September 30, 
2021’’ and inserting ‘‘September 30, 2025’’. 
(b) COMPENSATION.—Section 115(f) of the Justice 
for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (Public Law 114– 
22; 129 Stat. 243) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘and’’ after 
the semicolon at the end; 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at 
end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(3) may each receive compensation for each 
day such member is engaged in the actual perform-
ance of the duties of the Council.’’. 
(c) COMPENSATION REPORT.—Not later than 120 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall provide to the relevant congressional
1547 
committees a plan to implement compensation for mem-
bers of the United States Advisory Council on Human 
Trafficking pursuant to paragraph (3) of section 115(f) 
of the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (Pub-
lic Law 114–22; 129 Stat. 243), as added by subsection 
(b). 
SEC. 1299T–5. TIMELY PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE 
OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAF-
FICKING IN PERSONS OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF STATE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 106 of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7104) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(l) INFORMATION
REGARDING
HUMAN
TRAF-
FICKING-RELATED VISA DENIALS.— 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 
shall ensure that the Office to Monitor and Combat 
Trafficking in Persons and the Bureau of Diplo-
matic Security of the Department of State receive 
timely and regular information regarding United 
States visa denials based, in whole or in part, on 
grounds related to human trafficking. 
‘‘(2) DECISIONS
REGARDING
ALLOCATION.— 
The Secretary of State shall ensure that decisions
1548 
regarding the allocation of resources of the Depart-
ment of State related to combating human traf-
ficking and to law enforcement presence at United 
States diplomatic and consular posts appropriately 
take into account— 
‘‘(A) the information described in para-
graph (1); and 
‘‘(B) the information included in the most 
recent report submitted in accordance with sec-
tion 110(b).’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 103 of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 
7102) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(18) GROUNDS
RELATED
TO
HUMAN
TRAF-
FICKING.—The term ‘grounds related to human traf-
ficking’ means grounds related to the criteria for in-
admissibility to the United States described in sub-
section (a)(2)(H) of section 212 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182).’’. 
SEC. 1299T–6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS. 
(a) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall provide to the relevant congressional commit-
tees a report that—
1549 
(1) describes the actions that have been taken 
and that are planned to implement subsection (l) of 
section 106 of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7104), as added by section 
1299T–5; and 
(2) identifies by country and by United States 
diplomatic and consular post the number of visa ap-
plications denied during the previous calendar year 
with respect to which the basis for such denial, in-
cluded grounds related to human trafficking (as 
such term is defined in section 103 of the Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 
7102), as amended by section 1299T–5(b)). 
(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Beginning with the first an-
nual anti-trafficking report required under subsection 
(b)(1) of section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107; enacted as division A of 
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000) that is submitted after the date of the enactment 
of this Act and concurrent with each such subsequent sub-
mission for the following 7 years, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the relevant congressional committees a 
report that contains information relating to the number 
and the locations of United States visa denials based, in 
whole or in part, on grounds related to human trafficking
1550 
(as such term is defined in section 103 of the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7102), as 
amended by section 1299T–5(b)) during the period cov-
ered by each such annual anti-trafficking report. 
SEC. 1299T–7. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) LOCATIONS OF UNITED STATES VISA DENI-
ALS.—The term ‘‘location of United States visa de-
nials’’ means— 
(A) the United States diplomatic or con-
sular post at which a denied United States visa 
application was adjudicated; and 
(B) the city or locality of residence of the 
applicant whose visa application was so denied. 
(2) 
RELEVANT
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘relevant congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen-
ate.
1551 
TITLE XIII—COOPERATIVE 
THREAT REDUCTION 
SEC. 1301. FUNDING ALLOCATIONS; SPECIFICATION OF CO-
OPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION FUNDS. 
(a) FUNDING ALLOCATION.—Of the $373,690,000 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of De-
fense for fiscal year 2021 in section 301 and made avail-
able by the funding table in division D for the Department 
of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program estab-
lished under section 1321 of the Department of Defense 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (50 U.S.C. 3711), the 
following amounts may be obligated for the purposes spec-
ified: 
(1) For strategic offensive arms elimination, 
$2,924,000. 
(2) 
For 
chemical 
weapons 
destruction, 
$12,856,000. 
(3) For global nuclear security, $33,919,000. 
(4) For cooperative biological engagement, 
$216,200,000. 
(5) For proliferation prevention, $79,869,000. 
(6) For activities designated as Other Assess-
ments/Administrative Costs, $27,922,000. 
(b) SPECIFICATION OF COOPERATIVE THREAT RE-
DUCTION FUNDS.—Funds appropriated pursuant to the
1552 
authorization of appropriations in section 301 and made 
available by the funding table in division D for the Depart-
ment of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 
shall be available for obligation for fiscal years 2021, 
2022, and 2023. 
SEC. 1302. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BIOLOGICAL 
THREAT REDUCTION AND COOPERATIVE BIO-
LOGICAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE COOPERA-
TIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) keeping Americans safe means ensuring 
that global health security is prioritized as a na-
tional security issue; 
(2) as highlighted by the 2017 National Secu-
rity Strategy of the United States, biological threats, 
whether ‘‘deliberate attack, accident, or a natural 
outbreak’’, are growing threats and ‘‘require actions 
to address them at their source’’ through programs 
carried out by cooperative engagement, such as 
working ‘‘with partners to ensure that laboratories 
that handle dangerous pathogens have in place safe-
ty and security measures’’; 
(3) the 2017 National Security Strategy of the 
United States appropriately affirms the importance 
of supporting advancements in biomedical innovation
1553 
while mitigating harm caused by advanced bio-
weapons and capabilities; 
(4) the intrinsically linked nature of biological 
threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or 
deliberate, underscores the relationship between the 
Global Health Security Strategy of the United 
States and the National Biodefense Strategy, and 
the national security tools used to prevent and miti-
gate these threats must be similarly connected; 
(5) biological threats are a critical emerging 
threat against the United States and addressing 
these threats through cooperative programs is an op-
portunity to achieve long-standing nonproliferation 
goals; 
(6) cooperative programs to address biological 
threats through improved global capacity in the 
areas of biosafety, biosecurity, bio-surveillance, re-
search oversight, and related legislative and regu-
latory frameworks have become even more important 
as the world faces increasing availability of and ad-
vancements in biotechnology, which has broad dual- 
use and proliferation implications; 
(7) under the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program of the Department of Defense established 
under the Department of Defense Cooperative
1554 
Threat Reduction Act (50 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), 
Congress authorized the Secretary of Defense to ad-
dress such threats through activities to prevent, de-
tect, and report on highly pathogenic diseases or 
other diseases, ‘‘regardless of whether such diseases 
are caused by biological weapons’’; 
(8) in 2014, President Obama declared the 
Ebola virus disease epidemic a national security pri-
ority and exercised the authority under such Pro-
gram to build capacity that mitigated the imminent 
threat posed by the Ebola virus disease and estab-
lished capabilities required to prevent future out-
breaks; 
(9) many of the prevention, detection, and re-
sponse capacities built in response to the Ebola virus 
disease epidemic are also those used to prevent, de-
tect, and respond to the use of biological weapons 
abroad; 
(10) continuing to use cooperative engagement 
programs is in the national security interests of the 
United States because of the important relationships 
established between the United States and partner 
countries, which are based on ideals such as trans-
parency, information sharing, and a shared responsi-
bility in advancing global security;
1555 
(11) the recent coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID–19) global pandemic has illustrated the 
dire consequences resulting from a single disease 
that knows no boundaries, impacting the United 
States economy and the health of United States citi-
zens and members of the Armed Forces, both do-
mestically and abroad; 
(12) in light of the impacts caused by COVID– 
19, and following two congressionally mandated re-
ports that call for better implementation of the bio-
logical cooperative engagement programs of the 
United States and the National Biodefense Strategy 
(the report published by the Government Account-
ability Office on March 11, 2020, titled ‘‘National 
Biodefense Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges 
with Early Implementation’’ and the report pub-
lished by the National Academies of Sciences, Engi-
neering, and Medicine on April 14, 2020, titled ‘‘A 
Strategic Vision for Biological Threat Reduction: 
The U.S. Department of Defense and Beyond’’), it 
is of utmost importance that such programs are 
given due and increased prioritization for national 
security purposes; and 
(13) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
of State should make every effort to prioritize and
1556 
advance the determination, concurrence, and notifi-
cation processes under the Department of Defense 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (50 U.S.C. 3701 
et seq.) to provide for necessary new country deter-
minations in a timely manner and be responsive to 
emerging biological threats. 
TITLE XIV—OTHER 
AUTHORIZATIONS 
Subtitle A—Military Programs 
SEC. 1401. WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the use of the Armed Forces and other 
activities and agencies of the Department of Defense for 
providing capital for working capital and revolving funds, 
as specified in the funding table in section 4501. 
SEC. 1402. CHEMICAL AGENTS AND MUNITIONS DESTRUC-
TION, DEFENSE. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Funds 
are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the Depart-
ment of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for expenses, not oth-
erwise provided for, for Chemical Agents and Munitions 
Destruction, Defense, as specified in the funding table in 
section 4501. 
(b) USE.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
under subsection (a) are authorized for—
1557 
(1) the destruction of lethal chemical agents 
and munitions in accordance with section 1412 of 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 
(50 U.S.C. 1521); and 
(2) the destruction of chemical warfare materiel 
of the United States that is not covered by section 
1412 of such Act. 
SEC. 1403. DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG AC-
TIVITIES, DEFENSE-WIDE. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for ex-
penses, not otherwise provided for, for Drug Interdiction 
and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-wide, as specified in 
the funding table in section 4501. 
SEC. 1404. DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for ex-
penses, not otherwise provided for, for the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, as speci-
fied in the funding table in section 4501. 
SEC. 1405. DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the Defense Health Program for use 
of the Armed Forces and other activities and agencies of 
the Department of Defense for providing for the health
1558 
of eligible beneficiaries, as specified in the funding table 
in section 4501. 
SEC. 1406. NATIONAL DEFENSE SEALIFT FUND. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the National Defense Sealift Fund, 
as specified in the funding tables in section 4501. 
Subtitle B—Other Matters 
SEC. 1411. AUTHORITY FOR TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO JOINT 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-DEPARTMENT OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS MEDICAL FACILITY DEM-
ONSTRATION FUND FOR CAPTAIN JAMES A. 
LOVELL HEALTH CARE CENTER, ILLINOIS. 
(a) AUTHORITY FOR TRANSFER OF FUNDS.—Of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated by section 1405 and 
available for the Defense Health Program for operation 
and maintenance, $137,000,000 may be transferred by the 
Secretary of Defense to the Joint Department of Defense– 
Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Facility Dem-
onstration Fund established by subsection (a)(1) of sec-
tion 1704 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2571). 
For purposes of subsection (a)(2) of such section 1704, 
any funds so transferred shall be treated as amounts au-
thorized and appropriated specifically for the purpose of 
such a transfer.
1559 
(b) USE OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS.—For the pur-
poses of subsection (b) of such section 1704, facility oper-
ations for which funds transferred under subsection (a) 
may be used are operations of the Captain James A. 
Lovell Federal Health Care Center, consisting of the 
North Chicago Veterans Affairs Medical Center, the Navy 
Ambulatory Care Center, and supporting facilities des-
ignated as a combined Federal medical facility under an 
operational agreement covered by section 706 of the Dun-
can Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4500). 
SEC. 1412. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
ARMED FORCES RETIREMENT HOME. 
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for fis-
cal year 2021 from the Armed Forces Retirement Home 
Trust Fund the sum of $70,300,000 for the operation of 
the Armed Forces Retirement Home.
1560 
TITLE XV—AUTHORIZATION OF 
ADDITIONAL 
APPROPRIA-
TIONS FOR OVERSEAS CON-
TINGENCY OPERATIONS 
Subtitle A—Authorization of 
Appropriations 
SEC. 1501. PURPOSE. 
The purpose of this title is to authorize appropria-
tions for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 
to provide additional funds for overseas contingency oper-
ations being carried out by the Armed Forces. 
SEC. 1502. PROCUREMENT. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for procurement accounts for the Army, 
the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and De-
fense-wide activities, as specified in the funding table in 
section 4102. 
SEC. 1503. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUA-
TION. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the use of the Department of Defense 
for research, development, test, and evaluation, as speci-
fied in the funding table in section 4202.
1561 
SEC. 1504. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the use of the Armed Forces and other 
activities and agencies of the Department of Defense for 
expenses, not otherwise provided for, for operation and 
maintenance, as specified in the funding table in section 
4302. 
SEC. 1505. MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the use of the Armed Forces and other 
activities and agencies of the Department of Defense for 
expenses, not otherwise provided for, military personnel 
accounts, as specified in the funding table in section 4402. 
SEC. 1506. WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2021 for the use of the Armed Forces and other 
activities and agencies of the Department of Defense for 
providing capital for working capital and revolving funds, 
as specified in the funding table in section 4502. 
SEC. 1507. DRUG INTERDICTION AND COUNTER-DRUG AC-
TIVITIES, DEFENSE-WIDE. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for ex-
penses, not otherwise provided for, for Drug Interdiction 
and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense-wide, as specified in 
the funding table in section 4502.
1562 
SEC. 1508. DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for ex-
penses, not otherwise provided for, for the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, as speci-
fied in the funding table in section 4502. 
SEC. 1509. DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for 
the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 for ex-
penses, not otherwise provided for, for the Defense Health 
Program, as specified in the funding table in section 4502. 
Subtitle B—Financial Matters 
SEC. 1511. TREATMENT AS ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS. 
The amounts authorized to be appropriated by this 
title are in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act. 
SEC. 1512. SPECIAL TRANSFER AUTHORITY. 
(a) AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER AUTHORIZATIONS.— 
(1) AUTHORITY.—Upon determination by the 
Secretary of Defense that such action is necessary in 
the national interest, the Secretary may transfer 
amounts of authorizations made available to the De-
partment of Defense in this title for fiscal year 2021 
between any such authorizations for that fiscal year 
(or any subdivisions thereof). Amounts of authoriza-
tions so transferred shall be merged with and be
1563 
available for the same purposes as the authorization 
to which transferred. 
(2) LIMITATION.—The total amount of author-
izations that the Secretary may transfer under the 
authority of this subsection may not exceed 
$2,500,000,000. 
(b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Transfers under this section 
shall be subject to the same terms and conditions as 
transfers under section 1001. 
(2) ADDITIONAL
LIMITATION
ON
TRANSFERS 
FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE EQUIP-
MENT.—The authority provided by subsection (a) 
may not be used to transfer any amount from Na-
tional Guard and Reserve Equipment. 
(c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY.—The transfer author-
ity provided by this section is in addition to the transfer 
authority provided under section 1001. 
Subtitle C—Other Matters 
SEC. 1521. AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES FUND. 
(a) CONTINUATION OF PRIOR AUTHORITIES AND NO-
TICE AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—Funds available 
to the Department of Defense for the Afghanistan Secu-
rity Forces Fund for fiscal year 2021 shall be subject to 
the conditions contained in—
1564 
(1) subsections (b) through (f) of section 1513 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181; 122 Stat. 428); 
and 
(2) section 1521(d)(1) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
114–328; 130 Stat. 2577) (as amended by sub-
section (b)). 
(b) EXTENSION OF PRIOR NOTICE AND REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS.—Section 1521(d)(1) of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
114–328; 130 Stat. 2577) is amended by striking 
‘‘through January 31, 2021’’ and inserting ‘‘through Jan-
uary 31, 2023’’. 
(c) EQUIPMENT DISPOSITION.— 
(1) ACCEPTANCE OF CERTAIN EQUIPMENT.— 
Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of Defense 
may accept equipment that is procured using 
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Af-
ghanistan Security Forces Fund by this Act and is 
intended for transfer to the security forces of the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior 
of the Government of Afghanistan, but is not accept-
ed by such security forces.
1565 
(2) CONDITIONS
ON
ACCEPTANCE
OF
EQUIP-
MENT.—Before accepting any equipment under the 
authority provided by paragraph (1), the Com-
mander of United States forces in Afghanistan shall 
make a determination that such equipment was pro-
cured for the purpose of meeting requirements of the 
security forces of the Ministry of Defense and the 
Ministry of the Interior of the Government of Af-
ghanistan, as agreed to by both the Government of 
Afghanistan and the Government of the United 
States, but is no longer required by such security 
forces or was damaged before transfer to such secu-
rity forces. 
(3) ELEMENTS OF DETERMINATION.—In mak-
ing a determination under paragraph (2) regarding 
equipment, the Commander of United States forces 
in Afghanistan shall consider alternatives to the ac-
ceptance of such equipment by the Secretary. An ex-
planation of each determination, including the basis 
for the determination and the alternatives consid-
ered, shall be included in the relevant quarterly re-
port required under paragraph (5). 
(4) TREATMENT AS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
STOCKS.—Equipment accepted under the authority 
provided by paragraph (1) may be treated as stocks
1566 
of the Department of Defense upon notification to 
the congressional defense committees of such treat-
ment. 
(5) QUARTERLY REPORTS ON EQUIPMENT DIS-
POSITION.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
every 90-day period thereafter during which the 
authority provided by paragraph (1) is exer-
cised, the Secretary shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report describing 
the equipment accepted during the period cov-
ered by such report under the following: 
(i) This subsection. 
(ii) Section 1521(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 
2575). 
(iii) Section 1531(b) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 
1088). 
(iv) Section 1532(b) of the Carl Levin 
and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1567 
2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 
3613). 
(v) Section 1531(d) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2014 (Public Law 113–66; 127 Stat. 938; 
10 U.S.C. 2302 note). 
(B) ELEMENTS.—Each report under sub-
paragraph (A) shall include a list of all equip-
ment that was accepted during the period cov-
ered by such report and treated as stocks of the 
Department of Defense and copies of the deter-
minations made under paragraph (2), as re-
quired by paragraph (3). 
(d) SECURITY OF AFGHAN WOMEN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the funds available to the 
Department of Defense for the Afghan Security 
Forces Fund for fiscal year 2021, it is the goal that 
$29,100,000, but in no event less than $10,000,000, 
shall be used for the recruitment, integration, reten-
tion, training, and treatment of women in the Af-
ghan National Defense and Security Forces. 
(2) TYPES OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES.— 
Such programs and activities may include—
1568 
(A) efforts to recruit and retain women 
into the Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces, including the special operations forces; 
(B) programs and activities of the Direc-
torate of Human Rights and Gender Integra-
tion of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan 
and the Office of Human Rights, Gender and 
Child Rights of the Ministry of Interior of Af-
ghanistan; 
(C) development and dissemination of gen-
der and human rights educational and training 
materials and programs within the Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry of Interior of Afghan-
istan; 
(D) efforts to address harassment and vio-
lence against women within the Afghan Na-
tional Defense and Security Forces; 
(E) improvements to infrastructure that 
address the requirements of women serving in 
the Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces, including appropriate equipment for fe-
male security and police forces, and transpor-
tation for policewomen to their station; 
(F) support for Afghanistan National Po-
lice Family Response Units;
1569 
(G) security provisions for high-profile fe-
male police and military officers; 
(H) programs to promote conflict preven-
tion, management, and resolution through the 
meaningful participation of Afghan women in 
the Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces, by exposing Afghan women and girls to 
the activities of and careers available with such 
forces, encouraging their interest in such ca-
reers, or developing their interest and skills nec-
essary for service in such forces; and 
(I) enhancements to Afghan National De-
fense and Security Forces recruitment pro-
grams for targeted advertising with the goal of 
increasing the number of female recruits. 
(e) ASSESSMENT OF AFGHANISTAN PROGRESS ON 
OBJECTIVES.— 
(1) ASSESSMENT
REQUIRED.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, submit to the Committee on 
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and the Committee on
1570 
Foreign Relations of the Senate an assessment de-
scribing— 
(A) the progress of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan toward meeting 
shared security objectives; and 
(B) the efforts of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to manage, em-
ploy, and sustain the equipment and inventory 
provided under subsection (a). 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—In conducting 
the assessment required by paragraph (1), the Sec-
retary of Defense shall include each of the following: 
(A) The extent to which the Government of 
Afghanistan has a strategy for, and has taken 
steps toward, increased accountability and the 
reduction of corruption within the Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry of Interior of Afghan-
istan. 
(B) The extent to which the capability and 
capacity of the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces have improved as a result of 
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund investment, 
including through training, and an articulation 
of the metrics used to assess such improve-
ments.
1571 
(C) The extent to which the Afghan Na-
tional Defense and Security Forces have been 
able to increase pressure on the Taliban, al- 
Qaeda, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan, and other terrorist 
organizations, including by re-taking territory, 
defending territory, and disrupting attacks. 
(D) The distribution practices of the Af-
ghan National Defense and Security Forces and 
whether the Government of Afghanistan is en-
suring that supplies, equipment, and weaponry 
supplied by the United States are appropriately 
distributed to, and employed by, security forces 
charged with fighting the Taliban and other 
terrorist organizations. 
(E) A description of— 
(i) the policy governing the use of Ac-
quisition and Cross Servicing Agreements 
(ACSA) in Afghanistan; 
(ii) each ACSA transaction by type, 
amount, and recipient for calendar year 
2020; and 
(iii) for any transactions from the 
United States to Afghan military forces, 
an explanation for why such transaction
1572 
was not carried out under the authorities 
of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. 
(F) The extent to which the Government 
of Afghanistan has designated the appropriate 
staff, prioritized the development of relevant 
processes, and provided or requested the alloca-
tion of resources necessary to support a peace 
and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. 
(G) A description of the ability of the Min-
istry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior of 
Afghanistan to manage and account for pre-
viously divested equipment, including a descrip-
tion of any vulnerabilities or weaknesses of the 
internal controls of such Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Interior and any plan in place 
to address shortfalls. 
(H) A description of any significant irreg-
ularities in the divestment of equipment to the 
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
during the period beginning on May 1, 2020, 
and ending on May 1, 2021, including any 
major losses of such equipment or any inability 
on the part of the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces to account for equipment so 
procured.
1573 
(I) A description of the sustainment and 
maintenance costs required during the 5-year 
period beginning on the date of the enactment 
of this Act, for major weapons platforms pre-
viously divested, and a description of the plan 
for the Afghan National Defense and Security 
Forces to maintain such platforms in the fu-
ture. 
(J) The extent to which the Government of 
Afghanistan is adhering to conditions for receiv-
ing assistance established in annual financial 
commitment letters or any other bilateral agree-
ments with the United States. 
(K) The extent to which the Government 
of Afghanistan has made progress in achieving 
security sector benchmarks as outlined by the 
United 
States-Afghan 
Compact 
(commonly 
known as the ‘‘Kabul Compact’’) and a descrip-
tion of any other documents, plans, or agree-
ments used by the United States to measure se-
curity sector progress. 
(L) The extent to which the Government of 
Afghanistan or the Secretary has developed a 
plan to integrate former Taliban fighters into 
the Ministries of Defense or Interior.
1574 
(M) Such other factors as the Secretaries 
consider appropriate. 
(N) The extent to which the Government 
of Afghanistan has prioritized the development 
of relevant processes to combat gross human 
rights violation and to promote religious free-
dom and peace in Afghanistan. 
(O) The extent to which the Afghan Na-
tional Defense and Security Forces have been 
able to promote religious freedom by increasing 
pressure on the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani 
network, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria- 
Khorasan, and other terrorist organizations by 
connecting regional peace with the practice of 
freedom of religion or belief. 
(3) FORM.—The assessment required by para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex. 
(4) WITHHOLDING OF ASSISTANCE FOR INSUF-
FICIENT PROGRESS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—If the Secretary of De-
fense determines, in coordination with the Sec-
retary of State and pursuant to the assessment 
under paragraph (1), that the Government of 
Afghanistan has made insufficient progress in
1575 
the areas described in paragraph (2), the Sec-
retary of Defense shall— 
(i) withhold $401,500,000, to be de-
rived from amounts made available for as-
sistance for the Afghan National Defense 
and Security Forces, from expenditure or 
obligation until the date on which the Sec-
retary certifies to the congressional defense 
committees that the Government of Af-
ghanistan has made sufficient progress; 
and 
(ii) notify the congressional defense 
committees not later than 30 days before 
withholding such funds. 
(B) WAIVER.—If the Secretary of Defense 
determines that withholding such assistance 
would impede the national security objectives of 
the United States by prohibiting, restricting, 
delaying, or otherwise limiting the provision of 
assistance, the Secretary may waive the with-
holding requirement under subparagraph (A) if 
the Secretary, in coordination with the Sec-
retary of State, certifies such determination to 
the congressional defense committees not later
1576 
than 30 days before the effective date of the 
waiver. 
(f) ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—The 
Secretary of Defense shall include in the materials sub-
mitted in support of the budget for fiscal year 2022 that 
is submitted by the President under section 1105(a) of 
title 31, United States Code, each of the following: 
(1) The amount of funding provided in fiscal 
year 2020 through the Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund to the Government of Afghanistan in the form 
of direct government-to-government assistance or on- 
budget assistance for the purposes of supporting any 
entity of such government, including the Afghan Na-
tional Defense and Security Forces, the Afghan Min-
istry of Interior, or the Afghan Ministry of Defense. 
(2) The amount of funding provided and antici-
pated to be provided, as of the date of the submis-
sion of the materials, in fiscal year 2021 through 
such Fund in such form. 
(3) To the extent the amount described in para-
graph (2) exceeds the amount described in para-
graph (1), an explanation as to the reason why the 
such amount is greater and the specific entities and 
purposes that were supported by such increase.
1577 
SEC. 1522. REPORT ON TRANSITIONING FUNDING. 
The Secretary of Defense shall include, in the mate-
rials submitted in support of the budget of the President 
(submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 
31, United States Code) for fiscal year 2022— 
(1) a description of each program funded in fis-
cal year 2021 using amounts authorized to be appro-
priated for overseas contingency operations under 
this title; 
(2) the manner and extent to which the Sec-
retary plans to shift the funding of each such pro-
gram in the ensuing fiscal years to use amounts au-
thorized to be appropriated other than for overseas 
contingency operations being carried out by the 
Armed Forces, disaggregated by fiscal year; and 
(3) a plan to return all overseas contingency op-
erations funding to the base budget, as appropriate, 
in accordance with the future-years defense plan set 
forth in the budget of the President for fiscal year 
2021.
1578 
TITLE 
XVI—STRATEGIC 
PRO-
GRAMS, CYBER, AND INTEL-
LIGENCE MATTERS 
Subtitle A—Space Activities 
SEC. 1601. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE LAUNCH PROGRAM. 
(a) PHASE TWO ACQUISITION STRATEGY.—In car-
rying out the phase two acquisition strategy, the Secretary 
of the Air Force— 
(1) may not change the mission performance re-
quirements; 
(2) may not change the acquisition schedule; 
(3) may not award phase two contracts after 
September 30, 2024; 
(4) shall award phase two contracts to not more 
than two National Security Space Launch providers; 
(5) shall ensure that launch services are pro-
cured only from National Security Space Launch 
providers that meet the requirements for the phase 
two contracts; 
(6) not later than 180 days after the date on 
which phase two contracts are awarded, shall termi-
nate launch service agreement contracts awarded 
under such phase two acquisition strategy to each 
National Security Space Launch provider that is not
1579 
a down-selected National Security Launch provider; 
and 
(7) may not increase the total amount of fund-
ing included in the initial launch service agreements 
with down-selected National Security Launch pro-
viders. 
(b) REUSABILITY.— 
(1) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 18 months 
after the date on which the Secretary determines the 
down-selected National Security Space Launch pro-
viders, the Secretary shall certify to the appropriate 
congressional committees that the Secretary has 
completed all non-recurring design validation of pre-
viously flown launch hardware for National Security 
Space Launch providers offering such hardware for 
use in phase two contracts or in future national se-
curity space missions. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date on which the Secretary determines the 
down-selected National Security Space Launch pro-
viders, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the progress of 
the Secretary with respect to completing all non-re-
curring design validation of previously flown launch 
hardware described in paragraph (1), including—
1580 
(A) a justification for any deviation from 
the new entrant certification guide; and 
(B) a description of such progress with re-
spect to National Security Space Launch pro-
viders that are not down-selected National Se-
curity Space Launch providers, if applicable. 
(c) FUNDING
FOR CERTIFICATION, INFRASTRUC-
TURE, AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT.— 
(1) AUTHORITY.—Pursuant to section 2371b of 
title 10, United States Code, not later than Sep-
tember 30, 2021, the Secretary of the Air Force 
shall enter into three agreements described in para-
graph (3) with National Security Space Launch pro-
viders— 
(A) to maintain competition in order to 
maximize the likelihood of at least three Na-
tional Security Space Launch providers com-
peting for phase three contracts; and 
(B) to support innovation for national se-
curity launches under phase three contracts. 
(2) COMPETITIVE
PROCEDURES.—The Sec-
retary shall carry out paragraph (1) by conducting 
a full and open competition among all National Se-
curity Space Launch providers that may submit bids 
for a phase three contract.
1581 
(3) AGREEMENTS.—An agreement described in 
this paragraph is an agreement that provides a Na-
tional Security Space Launch provider with not 
more than $150,000,000 for the provider to conduct 
either or both of the following activities: 
(A) Meet the certification and infrastruc-
ture requirements that are— 
(i) unique to national security space 
missions; and 
(ii) necessary for a phase three con-
tract. 
(B) Develop transformational technologies 
in support of the national security space launch 
capability for phase three contracts (such as 
technologies regarding launch, maneuver, and 
transport capabilities for enhanced resiliency 
and security technologies, as identified in the 
National Security Launch Architecture study of 
the Space and Missile Systems Center of the 
Space Force). 
(4) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the 
date on which the Secretary enters into an agree-
ment under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report explaining how the Secretary determined the
1582 
certification and infrastructure requirements and the 
transformational technologies covered under para-
graph (3). 
(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than December 31, 2020, 
the Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense 
committees a briefing on the progress made by the Sec-
retary in ensuring that full and open competition exists 
for phase three contracts, including— 
(1) a description of progress made to establish 
the requirements for phase three contracts, including 
such requirements that the Secretary determines 
cannot be met by the commercial market; 
(2) whether the Secretary determines that addi-
tional development funding will be necessary for 
such phase; 
(3) a description of the estimated costs for the 
development described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) 
of subsection (c)(3); and 
(4) how the Secretary will— 
(A) ensure full and open competition for 
technology development for phase three con-
tracts; and 
(B) maintain competition.
1583 
(e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion may be construed to delay the award of phase two 
contracts. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
(2) The term ‘‘down-selected National Security 
Launch provider’’ means a National Security Space 
Launch provider that the Secretary of the Air Force 
selected to be awarded phase two contracts. 
(3) The term ‘‘phase three contract’’ means a 
contract awarded using competitive procedures for 
launch services under the National Security Space 
Launch program after fiscal year 2024. 
(4) The term ‘‘phase two acquisition strategy’’ 
means the process by which the Secretary of the Air 
Force enters into phase two contracts during fiscal 
year 2020, orders launch missions during fiscal 
years 2020 through 2024, and carries out such
1584 
launches under the National Security Space Launch 
program. 
(5) The term ‘‘phase two contract’’ means a 
contract awarded during fiscal year 2020 using com-
petitive procedures for launch missions ordered 
under the National Security Space Launch program 
during fiscal years 2020 through 2024. 
SEC. 1602. REQUIREMENT TO BUY CERTAIN SATELLITE 
COMPONENT FROM NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY 
AND INDUSTRIAL BASE. 
Section 2534(a) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new para-
graph: 
‘‘(7) STAR TRACKER.—A star tracker used in a 
satellite weighing more than 400 pounds whose prin-
ciple purpose is to support the national security, de-
fense, or intelligence needs of the United States 
Government.’’. 
SEC. 1603. COMMERCIAL SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS CA-
PABILITIES. 
(a) PROCUREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
the Air Force shall procure commercial space domain 
awareness services by awarding at least two contracts for 
such services.
1585 
(b) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be ap-
propriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fis-
cal year 2021 for the enterprise space battle management 
command and control, not more than 75 percent may be 
obligated or expended until the date on which the Sec-
retary of Defense, without delegation, certifies to the con-
gressional committees that the Secretary of the Air Force 
has awarded the contracts under subsection (a). 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than January 31, 2021, the 
Chief of Space Operations, in coordination with the Sec-
retary of the Air Force, shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report detailing the commercial 
space domain awareness services, data, and analytics of 
objects in low-earth orbit that have been purchased during 
the two-year period preceding the date of the report. The 
report shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
(d) COMMERCIAL SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS SERV-
ICES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘commercial 
space domain awareness services’’ means space domain 
awareness data, processing software, and analytics derived 
from best-in-breed commercial capabilities to address 
warfighter requirements in low-earth orbit and fill gaps 
in current space domain capabilities of the Space Force, 
including commercial capabilities to— 
(1) provide conjunction and maneuver alerts;
1586 
(2) monitor breakup and launch events; and 
(3) detect and track objects smaller than 10 
centimeters in size. 
SEC. 1604. RESPONSIVE SATELLITE INFRASTRUCTURE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall es-
tablish a domestic responsive satellite manufacturing ca-
pability for Department of Defense space operations to be 
used— 
(1) for the development of components, sys-
tems, structures, and payloads necessary to reconsti-
tute a national security space asset that has been 
destroyed, failed, or otherwise determined to be in-
capable of performing mission requirements; and 
(2) to rapidly acquire and field necessary space- 
based capabilities needed to maintain continuity of 
national security space missions and limit capability 
disruption to the warfighter. 
(b) PLAN FOR RESPONSIVE SATELLITE INFRASTRUC-
TURE.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Space Oper-
ations, and the Commander of United States Space Com-
mand, shall develop an operational plan and acquisition 
strategy for responsive satellite infrastructure to swiftly 
identify need, develop capability, and launch a responsive 
satellite to fill a critical capability gap in the event of de-
1587 
struction or failure of a space asset or otherwise deter-
mined need. 
(c) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The plan outlined under 
subsection (b) shall include the following: 
(1) A process for determining whether the re-
constitution of a space asset is necessary. 
(2) The timeframe in which a developed sat-
ellite is determined to be ‘‘responsive’’. 
(3) A plan to leverage domestic commercial en-
tities in the ‘‘new space’’ supply chain that have al-
ready demonstrated rapid satellite product develop-
ment and delivery capability to meet new ‘‘mission 
responsiveness’’ requirements being passed down by 
Department of Defense prime satellite contractors 
in— 
(A) power systems and solar arrays; 
(B) payloads and integration features; and 
(C) buses and structures. 
(4) An assessment of acquisition requirements 
and standards necessary for commercial entities to 
meet Department of Defense validation of supply 
chains, processes, and technologies while operating 
under rapid development cycles needed to maintain 
a responsive timeframe as determined by paragraph 
(2).
1588 
(5) Such other matters as the Secretary con-
siders appropriate. 
(d) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to Congress a report detailing the 
plan under subsection (b). 
SEC. 1605. POLICY TO ENSURE LAUNCH OF SMALL-CLASS 
PAYLOADS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall es-
tablish a small launch and satellite policy to ensure re-
sponsive and reliable access to space through the proc-
essing and launch of Department of Defense small-class 
payloads. 
(b) POLICY.—The policy under subsection (a) shall 
include, at a minimum, providing resources and policy 
guidance to sustain— 
(1) the availability of small-class payload launch 
service providers using launch vehicles capable of de-
livering into space small payloads designated by the 
Secretary of Defense as a national security payload; 
(2) a robust small-class payload space launch 
infrastructure and industrial base; 
(3) the availability of rapid, responsive, and re-
liable space launches for national security space pro-
grams to—
1589 
(A) improve the responsiveness and flexi-
bility of a national security space system; 
(B) lower the costs of launching a national 
security space system; and 
(C) maintain risks of mission success at 
acceptable levels; 
(4) a minimum number of dedicated launches 
each year; and 
(5) full and open competition including small 
launch providers and rideshare opportunities. 
(c) ACQUISITION STRATEGY.—The Secretary shall 
develop and carry out a 5-year phased acquisition strat-
egy, including near and long term, for the small launch 
and satellite policy under subsection (a). 
(d) ELEMENTS.—The acquisition strategy under sub-
section (c) shall— 
(1) provide the necessary— 
(A) stability in budgeting and acquisition 
of capabilities; 
(B) flexibility to the Federal Government; 
and 
(C) procedures for fair competition; and 
(2) specifically take into account, as appro-
priate per competition, the effect of—
1590 
(A) contracts or agreements for launch 
services or launch capability entered into by the 
Department of Defense with small-class payload 
space launch providers; 
(B) the requirements of the Department of 
Defense, including with respect to launch capa-
bilities and pricing data, that are met by such 
providers; 
(C) the cost of integrating a satellite onto 
a launch vehicle; 
(D) launch performance history (at least 
three successful launches of the same launch ve-
hicle design) and maturity; 
(E) ability of a launch provider to provide 
the option of dedicated and rideshare launch ca-
pabilities; and 
(F) any other matters the Secretary con-
siders appropriate. 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report describ-
ing a plan for the policy under subsection (a), including 
with respect to the cost of launches and an assessment 
of mission risk.
1591 
SEC. 1606. TACTICALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE LAUNCH OPER-
ATIONS. 
The Secretary of the Air Force shall implement a 
tactically responsive space launch program— 
(1) to provide long-term continuity for tactically 
responsive space launch operations across the fu-
ture-years defense program submitted to Congress 
under section 221 of title 10, United States Code; 
(2) to accelerate the development of— 
(A) responsive launch concepts of oper-
ations; 
(B) tactics; 
(C) training; and 
(D) procedures; 
(3) to develop appropriate processes for 
tactically responsive space launch, including— 
(A) mission assurance processes; and 
(B) command and control, tracking, telem-
etry, and communications; and 
(4) to identify basing capabilities necessary to 
enable tactically responsive space launch, including 
mobile launch range infrastructure.
1592 
SEC. 1607. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
PROTOTYPE PROGRAM FOR MULTI-GLOBAL 
NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVER 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 for 
increment 2 of the acquisition of military Global Posi-
tioning System user equipment terminals, not more than 
80 percent may be obligated or expended until the date 
on which the Secretary of Defense— 
(1) certifies to the congressional defense com-
mittees that the Secretary of the Air Force is car-
rying out the program required under section 1607 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1724); 
and 
(2) provides to the Committees on Armed Serv-
ices of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
a briefing on how the Secretary is implementing 
such program, including with respect to addressing 
each element specified in subsection (b) of such sec-
tion.
1593 
SEC. 1608. LIMITATION ON AWARDING CONTRACTS TO EN-
TITIES OPERATING COMMERCIAL TERRES-
TRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS THAT 
CAUSE INTERFERENCE WITH THE GLOBAL 
POSITIONING SYSTEM. 
The Secretary of Defense may not enter into a con-
tract, or extend or renew a contract, with an entity that 
engages in commercial terrestrial operations using the 
1525–1559 megahertz band or the 1626.5–1660.5 mega-
hertz band unless the Secretary has certified to the con-
gressional defense committees that such operations do not 
cause harmful interference to a Global Positioning System 
device of the Department of Defense. 
SEC. 1609. PROHIBITION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR 
CERTAIN 
PURPOSES 
RELATING 
TO 
THE 
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) On April 19, 2020, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission issued an order and authoriza-
tion granting Ligado Networks LLC the authority to 
operate a nationwide terrestrial communications net-
work using the 1526–1536 megahertz band, the 
1627.5–1637.5 megahertz band, or the 1646.5– 
1656.5 megahertz band. 
(2) In an attempt to address interference to the 
Global Positioning System operating near those
1594 
bands, Ligado Networks LLC has committed to as-
suming the costs mitigating any interference caused 
by their network. 
(3) In the approval order, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission directed that ‘‘Ligado takes 
all necessary mitigation measures to prevent or re-
mediate any potential harmful interference to U.S. 
Government devices, including devices used by the 
military, that are identified both pre- and post-de-
ployment of Ligado’s network.’’. 
(4) In a letter to the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives dated May 
21, 2020, Ligado Networks LLC reaffirmed the 
commitment to bear the costs to the Department of 
Defense, stating that the ‘‘FCC directed Ligado to 
provide protections to GPS devices using its spec-
trum by imposing stringent coordination, coopera-
tion, and replacement obligations on Ligado, so that 
Ligado bears the burden’’ and ‘‘Make no mistake: 
the obligation is ours, and the burden falls solely on 
our company.’’. 
(b) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided by subsection 
(c), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by 
this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2021 
or any subsequent fiscal year for the Department of De-
1595 
fense may be obligated or expended to retrofit any Global 
Positioning System device or system, or network that uses 
the Global Positioning System, in order to mitigate inter-
ference from commercial terrestrial operations using the 
1526–1536 megahertz band, the 1627.5–1637.5 mega-
hertz band, or the 1646.5–1656.5 megahertz band. 
(c) ACTIONS NOT PROHIBITED.—The prohibition in 
subsection (a) shall not apply to any action taken by the 
Secretary of Defense relating to— 
(1) conducting technical or information ex-
changes with the entity that operates the commercial 
terrestrial operations in the megahertz bands speci-
fied in such subsection; 
(2) seeking compensation for interference from 
such entity; or 
(3) Global Positioning System receiver upgrades 
needed to address other resiliency requirements. 
SEC. 1610. REPORT ON RESILIENT PROTECTED COMMU-
NICATIONS SATELLITES. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The national command, control, and com-
munications system of the Department of Defense is 
essential to the national security of the United 
States.
1596 
(2) The Department of Defense requires the 
space segments of such system to be resilient and 
survivable to address advanced threats from Russia 
and China. 
(3) The next-generation overhead persistent in-
frared missile warning satellites are being upgraded 
with enhanced resiliency features to make them 
much less vulnerable to attack and will begin launch 
in 2025. 
(4) Because missile warning satellites rely on 
protected communications satellites to relay warn-
ings and response orders, the next-generation over-
head persistent infrared missile warning satellites 
will require protected communications satellites with 
enhanced resiliency features, however, the current 
plan of the Space Force is to provide those capabili-
ties with the evolved strategic satellite communica-
tions program that will not be available until 2032 
or later. 
(5) As a result, the Chief of Space Operations 
should implement an accelerated plan to achieve 
more resilient protected communications satellites 
without delay. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief of Space Oper-
1597 
ations shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on how the Space Force will address the need 
for resilient protected communications satellites during 
the years 2025 through 2032. 
SEC. 1610A. PERMANENT PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AU-
THORITY FOR SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 
FOR EXPERTS IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEER-
ING. 
(a) PROGRAM AUTHORIZED FOR SPACE DEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY.—Section 1599h(a) of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new paragraph: 
‘‘(7) SDA.—The Director of the Space Devel-
opment Agency may carry out a program of per-
sonnel management authority provided in subsection 
(b) in order to facilitate recruitment of eminent ex-
perts in science or engineering for research and de-
velopment projects and to enhance the administra-
tion and management of the Agency.’’. 
(b) PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY.—Sec-
tion 1599h(b)(1) of such title is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end of subpara-
graph (E); 
(2) by inserting ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon at 
the end of subparagraph (F); and
1598 
(3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
paragraph: 
‘‘(G) in the case of the Space Development 
Agency, appoint individuals to a total of not 
more than 10 positions in the Agency, of which 
not more than 5 such positions may be posi-
tions of administration or management of the 
Agency;’’. 
SEC. 1610B. REPORT ON EFFECT OF COVID–19 ON SPACE IN-
DUSTRIAL BASE AND SPACE PROGRAMS OF 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
current and projected effects of COVID–19 on the space 
industrial base and the space programs of Department of 
Defense. The report shall include an assessment of each 
of the following: 
(1) COVID–19 related and associated impacts 
to cost, timeline, and performance to the space in-
dustrial base and the space programs of Depart-
ment, including with respect to— 
(A) procurement and acquisition; 
(B) research, development, test, and eval-
uation;
1599 
(C) partnerships with non-Federal govern-
mental entities, such as universities and not- 
for-profit organizations; and 
(D) labor force disruptions; 
(2) Regional and sector-specific disruptions and 
concerns. 
(3) Current mitigation strategies by both the 
Federal Government and industry. 
(4) Any supplemental disaster appropriations 
requirements to mitigate impacts to such programs. 
(5) Recommendations to address risks and 
threats to the Federal Government and industry re-
lating to such impacts. 
SEC. 1610C. SATELLITE GROUND NETWORK FREQUENCY LI-
CENSING. 
(a) REPORT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SAT-
ELLITE ANTENNA FREQUENCY LICENSING PROCESSES.— 
(1) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space 
Operations, shall submit to the Committees on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, and to any other appropriate congres-
sional committee upon request, a report on the De-
1600 
partment’s processes and procedures for identifying 
and securing frequency licenses for national security 
space ground assets. 
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The report provided 
under paragraph (1) shall address the following: 
(A) An assessment of current processes, 
procedures, requirements, timelines, and enti-
ties necessary to coordinate and secure fre-
quency licensing for Department of Defense 
space ground antenna and assets. 
(B) A plan to address and streamline pro-
cedures regarding the ingestion and licensing of 
commercial industry antenna in support of the 
augmentation of existing network capacity. 
(C) A review of FOUO classification re-
quirements for information and specifications 
related to the items addressed within this re-
port. 
(D) Such other matters as the Secretary 
considers appropriate. 
(b) DESIGNATION OF ANTENNA SPECIFICATIONS.— 
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with 
the Chief of Space Operations (CSO), shall identify and 
re-designate controlled unclassified information regarding
1601 
details and technical antenna specifications, necessary to 
complete National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA), Federal Communication Commis-
sion (FCC), and Friendly Nation frequency licensing proc-
esses, so that such information may be shared in regards 
to the guidelines of ‘‘Distribution Statement A’’ as defined 
by DoDI 5230.24. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives and the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
Subtitle B—Defense Intelligence 
and Intelligence-Related Activities 
SEC. 1611. VALIDATION OF CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF 
NATIONAL 
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY. 
Section 442 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(f) VALIDATION.—The National Geospatial-Intel-
ligence Agency shall assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff, com-
batant commands, and the military departments in estab-
1602 
lishing, coordinating, consolidating, and validating map-
ping, charting, geodetic data, and safety of navigation ca-
pability requirements through a formal process governed 
by the Joint Staff. Consistent with validated requirements, 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall provide 
aeronautical and nautical charts that are safe for naviga-
tion, maps, books, datasets, models, and geodetic prod-
ucts.’’. 
SEC. 1612. SAFETY OF NAVIGATION MISSION OF THE NA-
TIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGEN-
CY. 
(a) MISSION
OF
NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY.—Section 442 of title 10, United States 
Code, as amended by section 1611, is further amended— 
(1) in subsection (b)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘means of navigating ves-
sels of the Navy and the merchant marine’’ and 
inserting ‘‘the means for safe navigation’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘and inexpensive nautical 
charts’’ and all that follows and inserting 
‘‘geospatial information for use by the depart-
ments and agencies of the United States, the 
merchant marine, and navigators generally.’’; 
and 
(2) in subsection (c)—
1603 
(A) by striking ‘‘shall prepare and’’ and in-
serting ‘‘shall acquire, prepare, and’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘charts’’ and inserting 
‘‘safe-for-navigation charts and datasets’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘geodetic’’ and inserting 
‘‘geomatics’’. 
(b) MAPS, CHARTS, AND BOOKS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Section 451 of title 10, 
United States Code, is amended— 
(A) in the heading, by striking ‘‘and 
books’’ 
and 
inserting 
‘‘books, 
and 
datasets’’; 
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘maps, 
charts, and nautical books’’ and inserting ‘‘nau-
tical and aeronautical charts, topographic and 
geomatics maps, books, models, and datasets’’; 
and 
(C) by amending paragraph (2) to read as 
follows: 
‘‘(2) acquire (by purchase, lease, license, or bar-
ter) all necessary rights, including copyrights and 
other intellectual property rights, required to pre-
pare, publish, and furnish to navigators the products 
described in paragraph (1).’’.
1604 
(2) TABLE
OF
SECTIONS
AMENDMENT.—The 
table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II 
of chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by striking the item relating to section 451 
and inserting the following new item: 
‘‘451. Maps, charts, books, and datasets.’’. 
(c) CIVIL ACTIONS BARRED.—Section 456 of title 10, 
United States Code, is amended by striking subsections 
(a) and (b) and inserting the following: 
‘‘No civil action may be brought against the United 
States on the basis of the content of geospatial informa-
tion prepared or disseminated by the National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency.’’. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—Section 467 of title 10, United 
States Code, is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (4)— 
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph 
(A), by inserting ‘‘or about’’ after ‘‘boundaries 
on’’; 
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘sta-
tistical’’; and 
(C) in subparagraph (B)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘geodetic’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘geomatics’’; and 
(ii) by inserting ‘‘and services’’ after 
‘‘products’’; and
1605 
(2) in paragraph (5), by inserting ‘‘or about’’ 
after ‘‘activities on’’. 
SEC. 1613. NATIONAL ACADEMIES CLIMATE SECURITY 
ROUNDTABLE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary of Defense 
for Intelligence and Security, in coordination with the Di-
rector of National Intelligence, shall enter into a joint 
agreement with the Academies to create a new ‘‘National 
Academies Climate Security Roundtable’’ (in this section 
referred to as the ‘‘roundtable’’). 
(b) PARTICIPANTS.—The roundtable shall include— 
(1) the members of the Climate Security Advi-
sory Council established under section 120 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060); 
(2) senior representatives and practitioners 
from Federal science agencies, elements of the intel-
ligence community, and the Department of Defense, 
who are not members of the Council; and 
(3) key stakeholders in the United States sci-
entific enterprise, including institutions of higher 
education, Federal research laboratories (including 
the national security laboratories), industry, and 
nonprofit research organizations. 
(c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the roundtable is—
1606 
(1) to support the duties and responsibilities of 
the Climate Security Advisory Council under section 
120(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3060(c)); 
(2) to develop best practices for the exchange of 
data, knowledge, and expertise among elements of 
the intelligence community, elements of the Federal 
Government that are not elements of the intelligence 
community, and non-Federal researchers; 
(3) to facilitate dialogue and collaboration 
about relevant collection and analytic priorities 
among participants of the roundtable with respect to 
climate security; 
(4) to identify relevant gaps in the exchange of 
data, knowledge, or expertise among participants of 
the roundtable with respect to climate security, and 
consider viable solutions to address such gaps; and 
(5) to provide any other assistance, resources, 
or capabilities that the Director of National Intel-
ligence or the Under Secretary determines necessary 
with respect to the Council carrying out the duties 
and responsibilities of the Council under such sec-
tion 120(c). 
(d) MEETINGS.—The roundtable shall meet at least 
quarterly, in coordination with the meetings of the Climate
1607 
Security Advisory Council under section 120(c)(1) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060(c)(1)). 
(e) REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS.—The joint agreement 
under subsection (a) shall specify that— 
(1) the roundtable shall organize workshops, on 
at least a biannual basis, that include both partici-
pants of the roundtable and persons who are not 
participants, and may be conducted in classified or 
unclassified form in accordance with subsection (f); 
(2) on a regular basis, the roundtable shall 
produce classified and unclassified reports on the 
topics described in subsection (c) and the activities 
of the roundtable, and other documents in support 
of the duties and responsibilities of the Climate Se-
curity Advisory Council under section 120(c) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3060(c)); 
(3) the Academies shall provide recommenda-
tions by consensus to the Council on both the topics 
described in subsection (c) and specific topics as 
identified by participants of the roundtable; 
(4) not later than March 1, 2021, and annually 
thereafter during the life of the roundtable, the 
Academies shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
congressional committees on the progress and activi-
ties of the roundtable; and
1608 
(5) not later than September 30, 2025, the 
Academies shall submit a final report to the appro-
priate congressional committees on the activities of 
the roundtable. 
(f) SECURITY CLEARANCES.—Each participant of the 
roundtable shall have a security clearance at the appro-
priate level to carry out the duties of the participant under 
this section. A person who is not a participant who attends 
a workshop under subsection (e)(1) is not required to have 
a security clearance, and the roundtable shall ensure that 
any such workshop is held at the appropriate classified 
or unclassified level. 
(g) TERMINATION.—The roundtable shall terminate 
on September 30, 2025. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘Academies’’ means the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
(2) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, the Committee on Armed Services, 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives; and
1609 
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, the Committee on Armed 
Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate. 
(3) The term ‘‘Federal science agency’’ means 
any agency or department of the Federal Govern-
ment with at least $100,000,000 in basic and ap-
plied research obligations in fiscal year 2019. 
(4) The term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the 
meaning given that term in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
(5) The term ‘‘national security laboratory’’ has 
the meaning given the term in section 4002 of the 
Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2501). 
SEC. 1614. REPORT ON RISK TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
POSED 
BY 
QUANTUM 
COMPUTING 
TECH-
NOLOGIES. 
(a) REPORT.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than December 
31, 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees a report con-
taining an assessment of the current and potential 
threats and risks posed by quantum computing tech-
nologies. The Secretary shall conduct the assessment
1610 
in a manner that allows the Secretary to better un-
derstand and prepare to counter the risks of quan-
tum computing to national security. 
(2) MATTERS
INCLUDED.—The report under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) An identification of national security 
systems that are vulnerable to current and po-
tential threats and risks posed by quantum 
computing technologies. 
(B) An assessment of quantum-resistant 
cryptographic standards, including a timeline 
for the development of such standards. 
(C) An assessment of the feasibility of al-
ternate quantum-resistant models. 
(D) A description of any funding shortfalls 
in public and private efforts to develop such 
standards and models. 
(E) Recommendations to counter the 
threats and risks posed by quantum computing 
technologies that prioritize, secure, and re-
source the defense of national security systems 
identified under subparagraph (A). 
(b) BRIEFINGS.—During the period preceding the 
date on which the Secretary submits the report under sub-
section (a), the Secretary shall include in the quarterly
1611 
briefings under section 484 of title 10, United States 
Code, an update on the assessment conducted under such 
subsection. 
(c) FORM.—The report under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form. 
Subtitle C—Cyberspace-Related 
Matters 
SEC. 1621. CYBER MISSION FORCES AND CYBERSPACE OP-
ERATIONS FORCES. 
Subsection (a) of section 238, title 10, United States 
Code, is amended— 
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘The Secretary’’ and in-
serting ‘‘Not later than five days after the sub-
mission by the President under section 1105(a) 
of title 31 of the budget, the Secretary’’; 
(B) by inserting ‘‘in both electronic and 
print formats’’ after ‘‘submit’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘2017’’ and inserting 
‘‘2021’’; 
(2) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘and the 
cyberspace operations forces’’ before the semicolon; 
and 
(3) in paragraph (2), by inserting ‘‘and the 
cyberspace operations forces’’ before the period.
1612 
SEC. 1622. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMISSION. 
Section 1652 of the John S. McCain National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 
115–232), is amended— 
(1) in subsection (b)(1)— 
(A) in subparagraph (A), by— 
(i) striking clauses (i) through (iv); 
and 
(ii) redesignating clauses (v) through 
(viii) as clauses (i) through (iv), respec-
tively; and 
(B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking 
‘‘and who are appointed under clauses (iv) 
through (vii) of subparagraph (A)’’; 
(2) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ‘‘Seven’’ 
and inserting ‘‘Six’’; 
(3) in subsection (h), by— 
(A) striking ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—(A)’’; and 
(B) striking paragraph (2); 
(4) in subsection (i)(1)(B), by striking ‘‘officers 
or employees of the United States or’’; and 
(5) in subsection (k)(2)— 
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘at 
the end of the 120-day period beginning on’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2 years after’’; 
(B) in subparagraph (B), by—
1613 
(i) striking ‘‘may use the 120-day’’ 
and inserting ‘‘shall use the 2-year’’; 
(ii) striking ‘‘for the purposes of con-
cluding its activities, including providing 
testimony to Congress concerning the final 
report referred to in that paragraph and 
disseminating the report’’ and inserting 
the following: ‘‘for the purposes of—’’: 
‘‘(i) collecting and assessing com-
ments and feedback from the Executive 
Branch, academia, and the public on the 
analysis and recommendations contained in 
the Commission’s report; 
‘‘(ii) collecting and assessing any de-
velopments in cybersecurity that may af-
fect the analysis and recommendations 
contained in the Commission’s report; 
‘‘(iii) reviewing the implementation of 
the recommendations contained in the 
Commission’s report; 
‘‘(iv) revising, amending, or making 
new recommendations based on the assess-
ments and reviews required under clauses 
(i)–(iii);
1614 
‘‘(v) providing an annual update to 
the congressional defense committees, the 
congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Secretary of De-
fense, and the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity in a manner and format determined 
by the Commission regarding any such re-
visions, amendments, or new recommenda-
tions; and 
‘‘(vi) concluding its activities, includ-
ing providing testimony to Congress con-
cerning the final report referred to in that 
paragraph and disseminating the report.’’; 
and 
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
‘‘(C) If the Commission is extended, and the ef-
fective date of such extension is after the date on 
which the Commission terminated, the Commission 
shall be deemed reconstituted with the same mem-
1615 
bers and powers that existed on the day before such 
termination date, except that— 
‘‘(i) a member of the Commission may 
serve only if the member’s position continues to 
be authorized under subsection (b); 
‘‘(ii) no compensation or entitlements re-
lating to a person’s status with the Commission 
shall be due for the period between the termi-
nation and reconstitution of the Commission; 
‘‘(iii) nothing in this subparagraph may be 
construed as requiring the extension or reem-
ployment of any staff member or contractor 
working for the Commission; 
‘‘(iv) the staff of the Commission shall 
be— 
‘‘(I) selected by the co-chairs of the 
Commission in accordance with subsection 
(h)(1); 
‘‘(II) comprised of not more than four 
individuals, including a staff director; and 
‘‘(III) resourced in accordance with 
subsection (g)(4)(A); 
‘‘(v) with the approval of the co-chairs, 
may be provided by contract with a nongovern-
mental organization;
1616 
‘‘(vi) any unexpended funds made available 
for the use of the Commission shall continue to 
be available for use for the life of the Commis-
sion, as well as any additional funds appro-
priated to the Department of Defense that are 
made available to the Commission, provided 
that the total such funds does not exceed 
$1,000,000 from the reconstitution of the Com-
mission to the completion of the Commission; 
and 
‘‘(vii) the requirement for an assessment of 
the final report in subsection (l) shall be up-
dated to require annually for a period of 2 
years further assessments of the Federal Gov-
ernment’s responses to the Commission’s rec-
ommendations contained in such final report.’’. 
SEC. 1623. TAILORED CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS ORGANI-
ZATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the 
Navy, in conjunction with the Chief of Naval Operations, 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
study of the Navy Cyber Warfare Development Group 
(NCWDG).
1617 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following: 
(1) An examination of NCWDG’s structure, 
manning, authorities, funding, and operations. 
(2) A review of organizational relationships 
both within the Navy and to other Department of 
Defense organizations, as well as non-Department of 
Defense organizations. 
(3) Recommendations for how the NCWDG can 
be strengthened and improved, without growth in 
size. 
(c) DESIGNATION.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, the Secretary of the Navy shall designate 
the NCWDG as a screened command. 
(d) RELEASE.—The Secretary of the Navy shall 
transmit the study required under subsection (a) to the 
secretaries of the military services and the Commander of 
United States Special Operations Command. 
(e) EXEMPLAR.—The service secretaries and the 
Commander of United States Special Operations Com-
mand are authorized to establish counterpart tailored 
cyberspace operations organizations of comparable size to 
the NCWDG within the military service or command, re-
spectively, of each such secretary and Commander. Such 
counterpart organizations shall have the same authorities
1618 
as the NCWDG. Not later than 30 days after receipt by 
each of the service secretaries and the Commander under 
subsection (d) of the study required under subsection (a), 
each such service secretary and Commander, as the case 
may be, shall brief the congressional defense committees 
regarding whether or not each such service secretary or 
Commander intends to utilize the authority under this 
subsection. 
SEC. 1624. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECTOR RISK MAN-
AGEMENT AGENCY FUNCTION OF THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In this section: 
(A) 
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE.—The 
term ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning 
given such term in section 1016(e) of the Unit-
ing and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act 
of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
(B) SECTOR
RISK
MANAGEMENT
AGEN-
CY.—The term ‘‘Sector Risk Management 
Agency’’ means a Federal department or agen-
cy designated as a Sector Specific Agency under 
Presidential Policy Directive–21 to be respon-
1619 
sible for providing institutional knowledge and 
specialized expertise to, as well as leading, fa-
cilitating, or supporting, the security and resil-
ience programs and associated activities of its 
designated critical infrastructure sector in the 
all-hazards environment. 
(2) REFERENCE.—Any reference to a Sector- 
Specific Agency in any law, regulation, map, docu-
ment, record, or other paper of the United States 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the Sector Risk 
Management Agency of the Federal Government for 
the relevant critical infrastructure sector. 
(b) DESIGNATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
designate the Principal Cyber Advisor of the Department 
of Defense as the lead official, and the Office of the Prin-
cipal Cyber Advisor as the lead component, for the De-
partment’s role and functions as the Sector Risk Manage-
ment Agency for the Defense Industrial Base. 
(c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—As the lead official for the 
Department of Defense’s Sector Risk Management Agency 
functions, the Principal Cyber Advisor of the Department 
shall be responsible for all activities performed by the De-
partment in its support of the Defense Industrial Base, 
as one of the critical infrastructure sectors of the United 
States. Such activities shall include the following:
1620 
(1) Synchronization, harmonization, de-conflic-
tion, and management for the execution of all De-
partment programs, initiatives, efforts, and commu-
nication related to the Department’s Sector Risk 
Management Agency function, including any Depart-
ment program, initiative, or effort that addresses the 
cybersecurity of the Defense Industrial Base. 
(2) Leadership and management of the Defense 
Industrial Base Government Coordinating Council. 
(3) Direct interface and sponsorship of the De-
fense Industrial Base Sector Coordinating Council. 
(4) Organization of quarterly in-person meet-
ings of both the Defense Industrial Base Govern-
ment Coordinating Council and the Defense Indus-
trial Base Sector Coordinating Council. 
(d) ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS.—In carrying out this 
section, the Principal Cyber Advisor of the Department 
of Defense shall— 
(1) coordinate with relevant Federal depart-
ments and agencies, and collaborate with critical in-
frastructure owners and operators, where appro-
priate with independent regulatory agencies, and 
with State, local, territorial, and Tribal entities, as 
appropriate;
1621 
(2) serve as a day-to-day Federal interface for 
the dynamic prioritization and coordination of sec-
tor-specific activities; 
(3) carry out incident management responsibil-
ities; 
(4) provide, support, or facilitate technical as-
sistance and consultations for the Defense Industrial 
Base to identify cyber or physical vulnerabilities and 
help mitigate incidents, as appropriate; and 
(5) support the statutorily required reporting 
requirements of such relevant Federal departments 
and agencies by providing to such departments and 
agencies on an annual basis sector-specific critical 
infrastructure information. 
SEC. 1625. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER WORKFORCE 
EFFORTS. 
(a) RESOURCES FOR CYBER EDUCATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Chief Information Offi-
cer of the Department of Defense, in consultation 
with the Director of the National Security Agency 
(NSA), shall examine the current policies permitting 
National Security Agency employees to use up to 
140 hours of paid time toward NSA’s cyber edu-
cation programs. 
(2) REPORT.—
1622 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Chief Information Officer shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees and the con-
gressional intelligence committees a strategy for 
expanding the policies described in paragraph 
(1) to— 
(i) individuals who occupy positions 
described in section 1599f of title 10, 
United States Code; and 
(ii) any other individuals who the 
Chief Information Officer determines ap-
propriate. 
(B) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—The report 
required under subparagraph (A) shall detail 
the utilization of the policies in place at the Na-
tional Security Agency, as well as an implemen-
tation plan that describes the mechanisms need-
ed to expand the use of such policies to accom-
modate wider participation by individuals de-
scribed in such subparagraph. Such implemen-
tation plan shall detail how such individuals 
would be able to connect to the instructional 
and 
participatory 
opportunities 
available 
through the efforts, programs, initiatives, and
1623 
investments accounted for in the report re-
quired under section 1649 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(Public Law 116–92), including the following 
programs: 
(i) GenCyber. 
(ii) Centers for Academic Excellence – 
Cyber Defense. 
(iii) Centers for Academic Excellence 
– Cyber Operations. 
(C) DEADLINE.—Not later than 120 days 
after the submission of the report required 
under subparagraph (A), the Chief Information 
Officer of the Department of Defense shall 
carry out the implementation plan contained in 
such report. 
(b) IMPROVING THE TRAINING WITH INDUSTRY PRO-
GRAM.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Prin-
cipal Cyber Advisor of the Department of Defense, 
in consultation with the Principal Cyber Advisors of 
the military services and the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Personnel and Readiness, shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees a review of the
1624 
current utilization and utility of the Training With 
Industry (TWI) programs, including relating to the 
following: 
(A) Recommendations regarding how to 
improve and better utilize such programs, in-
cluding regarding individuals who have com-
pleted such programs. 
(B) An implementation plan to carry out 
such recommendations. 
(2) ADDITIONAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the submission of the report required under para-
graph (1), the Principal Cyber Advisor of the De-
partment of Defense shall carry out the implementa-
tion plan required under paragraph (1). 
(c) ALIGNMENT OF CYBERSECURITY TRAINING PRO-
GRAMS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report containing recommenda-
tions on how cybersecurity training programs de-
scribed in section 1649 of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 can be better 
aligned and harmonized.
1625 
(2) REPORT.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall provide recommendations concerning 
the following topics and information: 
(A) Developing a comprehensive mecha-
nism for utilizing and leveraging the Cyber Ex-
cepted Service workforce of the Department of 
Defense referred to in subsection (a), as well as 
mechanisms for military participation. 
(B) Unnecessary redundancies in such pro-
grams, or in any related efforts, initiatives, or 
investments. 
(C) Mechanisms for tracking participation 
and transition of participation from one such 
program to another. 
(D) Department level oversight and man-
agement of such programs. 
(3) CYBER WORKFORCE PIPELINE AND EARLY 
CHILDHOOD EDUCATION.— 
(A) ELEMENTS.—The Secretary of De-
fense shall, when completing the report required 
under paragraph (1), take into consideration 
existing Federal childhood cyber education pro-
grams, including the programs identified in the 
report required under section 1649 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
1626 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) and the De-
partment of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity 
Education and Training Assistance Program 
(CETAP), that can provide opportunities to 
military-connected students and members of the 
Armed Forces to pursue cyber careers. 
(B) DEFINITION.—In this paragraph, the 
term ‘‘military-connected student’’ means an in-
dividual who— 
(i) is a dependent a member of the 
Armed Forces serving on active duty; and 
(ii) is enrolled in a preschool, an ele-
mentary or secondary school, or an institu-
tion of higher education. 
SEC. 1626. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CROSS DO-
MAIN COMPROMISES AND EXEMPTIONS TO 
POLICIES FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY. 
(a) COMPROMISE REPORTING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Effective beginning in Octo-
ber 2020, the Secretary of Defense and the secre-
taries of the military services shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a monthly report 
in writing that documents each instance or indica-
tion of a cross-domain compromise within the De-
partment of Defense.
1627 
(2) PROCEDURES.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
procedures for complying with the requirements of 
subsection (a) consistent with the national security 
of the United States and the protection of oper-
ational integrity. The Secretary shall promptly notify 
such committees in writing of any changes to such 
procedures at least 14 days prior to the adoption of 
any such changes. 
(3) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 
‘‘cross domain compromise’’ means any unauthorized 
connection between software, hardware, or both de-
signed for use on a network or system built for clas-
sified data and the public internet. 
(b) EXEMPTIONS
TO POLICY
FOR INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY.—Not later than 6 months after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and biannually thereafter, 
the Secretary of Defense and the secretaries of the mili-
tary services shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report in writing that enumerates and de-
tails each current exemption to information technology 
policy, interim Authority To Operate (ATO) order, or 
both. Each such report shall include other relevant infor-
mation pertaining to each such exemption, including relat-
ing to the following:
1628 
(1) Risk categorization. 
(2) Duration. 
(3) Estimated time remaining. 
SEC. 1627. ASSESSING PRIVATE-PUBLIC COLLABORATION 
IN CYBERSECURITY. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense shall— 
(1) conduct a review and assessment of any on-
going public-private collaborative initiatives involving 
the Department of Defense and the private sector 
related to cybersecurity and defense of critical infra-
structure, including— 
(A) the United States Cyber Command’s 
Pathfinder initiative and any derivative initia-
tive; 
(B) the Department’s support to and inte-
gration with existing Federal cybersecurity cen-
ters and organizations; and 
(C) comparable initiatives led by other 
Federal departments or agencies that support 
long-term public-private cybersecurity collabora-
tion; and 
(2) make recommendations for improvements 
and the requirements and resources necessary to in-
1629 
stitutionalize and strengthen the initiatives described 
in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1). 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
a report on the review, assessment, and rec-
ommendations under subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) may be submitted in unclassified or classi-
fied form, as necessary. 
(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘critical 
infrastructure’’ has the meaning given such term in sec-
tion 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 
(42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
SEC. 1628. CYBER CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY 
OF THE NATIONAL GUARD. 
(a) EVALUATION.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense, in conjunction with the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau, shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate a review of the statutes, rules, regulations, and
1630 
standards that pertain to the use of the National Guard 
for the response to and recovery from significant cyber 
incidents. 
(b) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The review required under 
subsection (a) shall address the following: 
(1) Regulations promulgated under section 903 
of title 32, United States Code, to allow the Na-
tional Guard to conduct homeland defense activities 
that the Secretary of Defense determines to be nec-
essary and appropriate in accordance with section 
902 of such title in response to a cyber attack. 
(2) Compulsory guidance from the Chief of the 
National Guard Bureau regarding how the National 
Guard shall collaborate with the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation of the Department of Justice through 
multi-agency 
task 
forces, 
information-sharing 
groups, incident response planning and exercises, 
and other relevant forums and activities. 
(3) A plan for how the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau will collaborate with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to develop an annex to the Na-
tional Cyber Incident Response Plan that details the
1631 
regulations and guidance described in paragraphs 
(1) and (2). 
(c) DEFINITION.—The term ‘‘significant cyber inci-
dent’’ means a cyber incident that results, or several re-
lated cyber incidents that result, in demonstrable harm 
to— 
(1) the national security interests, foreign rela-
tions, or economy of the United States; or 
(2) the public confidence, civil liberties, or pub-
lic health and safety of the American people. 
SEC. 1629. EVALUATION OF NON-TRADITIONAL CYBER SUP-
PORT TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 270 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Principal Cyber 
Advisor to the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with 
the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness of the 
Department of Defense and the Principal Cyber Advisors 
of the military services, shall complete an assessment and 
evaluation of reserve models tailored to the support of 
cyberspace operations for the Department. 
(b) EVALUATION COMPONENTS.—The assessment 
and evaluation required under subsection (a) shall include 
the following components: 
(1) A current assessment of reserve and Na-
tional Guard support to Cyber Operations Forces.
1632 
(2) An enumeration and evaluation of various 
reserve, National Guard, auxiliary, and non-tradi-
tional support models which are applicable to cyber-
space operations, including a consideration of models 
utilized domestically and internationally. 
(3) A utility assessment of a dedicated reserve 
cadre specific to United States Cyber Command and 
Cyber Operations Forces. 
(4) An analysis of the costs associated with the 
models evaluated pursuant to paragraph (2). 
(5) An assessment of the recruitment programs 
necessary for implementation of the models evalu-
ated pursuant to paragraph (2). 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, 
acting through the Principal Cyber Advisor of the 
Department of Defense, shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a report on the assess-
ment and evaluation required under subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) may be submitted in classified or unclassi-
fied form, as necessary.
1633 
SEC. 1630. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTEGRATED CYBER CEN-
TER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Home-
land Security, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
fense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of National In-
telligence, shall submit to the relevant congressional com-
mittees a report on Federal cybersecurity centers and the 
potential for better coordination of Federal cyber efforts 
at an integrated cyber center within the national cyberse-
curity and communications integration center of the De-
partment of Homeland Security established pursuant to 
section 2209 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 659). 
(b) CONTENTS.—To prepare the report required by 
subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
aggregate information from components of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security with information provided to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security by the Secretary of 
Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of National In-
telligence. Such aggregated information shall relate to the 
following topics: 
(1) Any challenges regarding capacity and 
funding identified by the Secretary of Homeland Se-
1634 
curity, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, the Attorney General, the Secretary of De-
fense, or the Director of National Intelligence that 
negatively impact coordination with the national cy-
bersecurity and communications integration center 
of the Department of Homeland Security in further-
ance of the security and resilience of critical infra-
structure. 
(2) Distinct statutory authorities identified by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney 
General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, the Secretary of Defense, or the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence that should not be lever-
aged by an integrated cyber center within the na-
tional cybersecurity and communications integration 
center. 
(3) Any challenges associated with effective 
mission coordination and deconfliction between the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of 
the Department of Homeland Security and other 
Federal agencies that could be addressed with the 
creation of an integrated cyber center within the na-
tional cybersecurity and communications integration 
center.
1635 
(4) How capabilities or missions of existing 
Federal cyber centers could benefit from greater in-
tegration or collocation to support cybersecurity col-
laboration with critical infrastructure at an inte-
grated cyber center within the national cybersecurity 
and communications integration center, including 
the following Federal cyber centers: 
(A) The National Security Agency’s Cyber 
Threat Operations Center. 
(B) United States Cyber Command’s Joint 
Operations Center. 
(C) The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence’s Cyber Threat Intelligence Integra-
tion Center. 
(D) The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force. 
(E) The Department of Defense’s Defense 
Cyber Crime Center. 
(F) The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence’s Intelligence Community Security 
Coordination Center. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-
section (a) shall— 
(1) identify any challenges regarding the Cyber-
security and Infrastructure Security Agency’s cur-
1636 
rent authorities, structure, resources, funding, abil-
ity to recruit and retain its workforce, or inter-
agency coordination that negatively impact the abil-
ity of the Agency to fulfill its role as the central co-
ordinator for critical infrastructure cybersecurity 
and resilience pursuant to its authorities under the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and information on 
how establishing an integrated cyber center within 
the national cybersecurity and communications inte-
gration center would address such challenges; 
(2) identify any facility needs for the Cyberse-
curity and Infrastructure Security Agency to ade-
quately host personnel, maintain sensitive compart-
mented information facilities, and other resources to 
serve as the primary coordinating body charged with 
forging whole-of-government, public-private collabo-
ration in cybersecurity, pursuant to such authorities; 
(3) identify any lessons from the United King-
dom’s National Cybersecurity Center model to deter-
mine whether an integrated cyber center within the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
should be similarly organized into an unclassified en-
vironment and a classified environment; 
(4) recommend any changes to procedures and 
criteria for increasing and expanding the participa-
1637 
tion and integration of public- and private-sector 
personnel into Federal cyber defense and security ef-
forts, including continuing limitations or hurdles in 
the security clearance program for private sector 
partners and integrating private sector partners into 
a Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
integrated cyber center; and 
(5) propose policies, programs, or practices that 
could overcome challenges identified in the aggre-
gated information under subsection (b), including 
the creation of an integrated cyber center within the 
national cybersecurity and communications integra-
tion center, accompanied by legislative proposals, as 
appropriate. 
(d) PLAN.—Upon submitting the report pursuant to 
subsection (a), the Secretary of Homeland Security, in co-
ordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney 
General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall de-
velop a plan to establish an integrated cyber center within 
the national cybersecurity and communications integration 
center. 
(e) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 1 year after 
the submission of the report required under subsection (a), 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
1638 
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Direc-
tor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence, shall begin establishing an in-
tegrated cyber center in the national cybersecurity and 
communications integration center. 
(f) ANNUAL UPDATES.—Beginning 1 year after the 
submission of the report required under subsection (a) and 
annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Attor-
ney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
submit to the relevant congressional committees updates 
regarding efforts to establish and operate an integrated 
cyber center in the national cybersecurity and communica-
tions integration center pursuant to subsection (e), includ-
ing information on progress made toward overcoming any 
challenges identified in the report required by subsection 
(a). 
(g) PRIVACY REVIEW.—The Privacy Officers of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, and the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall review and provide to the relevant congres-
sional committees comment, as appropriate, on each re-
port and legislative proposal submitted under this section.
1639 
(h) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘relevant 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(1) in the House of Representatives— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services; 
(B) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
(C) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence; and 
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security; 
and 
(2) in the Senate— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services; 
(B) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence; 
and 
(D) the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs. 
SEC. 1631. CYBER THREAT INFORMATION COLLABORATION 
ENVIRONMENT. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—In consultation with the Cyber 
Threat Data Standards and Interoperability Council es-
tablished pursuant to subsection (d), the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (acting 
through the Director of the National Security Agency), 
shall develop an information collaboration environment
1640 
and associated analytic tools that enable entities to iden-
tify, mitigate, and prevent malicious cyber activity to— 
(1) provide limited access to appropriate oper-
ationally relevant data about cybersecurity risks and 
cybersecurity threats, including malware forensics 
and data from network sensor programs, on a plat-
form that enables query and analysis; 
(2) allow such tools to be used in classified and 
unclassified environments drawing on classified and 
unclassified data sets; 
(3) enable cross-correlation of data on cyberse-
curity risks and cybersecurity threats at the speed 
and scale necessary for rapid detection and identi-
fication; 
(4) facilitate a comprehensive understanding of 
cybersecurity risks and cybersecurity threats; and 
(5) facilitate collaborative analysis between the 
Federal Government and private sector critical infra-
structure entities and information and analysis orga-
nizations. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION COLLABO-
RATION ENVIRONMENT.— 
(1) EVALUATION.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, acting through the Di-
1641 
rector of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Secu-
rity Agency of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense 
and the Director of National Intelligence (acting 
through the Director of the National Security Agen-
cy), shall— 
(A) identify, inventory, and evaluate exist-
ing Federal sources of classified and unclassi-
fied information on cybersecurity threats; 
(B) evaluate current programs, applica-
tions, or platforms intended to detect, identify, 
analyze, and monitor cybersecurity risks and 
cybersecurity threats; and 
(C) coordinate with private sector critical 
infrastructure entities and, as determined ap-
propriate by the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, other private sector entities, to identify 
private sector cyber threat capabilities, needs, 
and gaps. 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 1 year 
after the evaluation required under paragraph (1), 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through 
the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, in coordination with the Secretary
1642 
of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence 
(acting through the Director of the National Secu-
rity Agency), shall begin implementation of the in-
formation collaboration environment developed pur-
suant to subsection (a) to enable participants in 
such environment to develop and run analytic tools 
referred to in such subsection on specified data sets 
for the purpose of identifying, mitigating, and pre-
venting malicious cyber activity that is a threat to 
government and critical infrastructure. Such envi-
ronment and use of such tools shall— 
(A) operate in a manner consistent with 
relevant privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
policies and protections, including such policies 
and protections established pursuant to section 
1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485); 
(B) account for appropriate data standards 
and interoperability requirements, consistent 
with the standards set forth in subsection (d); 
(C) enable integration of current applica-
tions, platforms, data, and information, includ-
ing classified information, in a manner that 
supports integration of unclassified and classi-
1643 
fied information on cybersecurity risks and cy-
bersecurity threats; 
(D) incorporate tools to manage access to 
classified and unclassified data, as appropriate; 
(E) ensure accessibility by entities the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
of National Intelligence (acting through the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency), deter-
mines appropriate; 
(F) allow for access by critical infrastruc-
ture stakeholders and other private sector part-
ners, at the discretion of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense; 
(G) deploy analytic tools across classifica-
tion levels to leverage all relevant data sets, as 
appropriate; 
(H) identify tools and analytical software 
that can be applied and shared to manipulate, 
transform, and display data and other identified 
needs; and 
(I) anticipate the integration of new tech-
nologies and data streams, including data from 
government-sponsored network sensors or net-
1644 
work-monitoring programs deployed in support 
of State, local, Tribal, and territorial govern-
ments or private sector entities. 
(c) ANNUAL REVIEW OF IMPACTS ON PRIVACY, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES.—The Secretary of Home-
land Security and the Director of National Intelligence 
(acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and In-
frastructure Security Agency and the Director of the Na-
tional Security Agency, respectively) shall direct the Pri-
vacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Officers of their re-
spective agencies, in consultation with Privacy, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties Officers of other Federal agen-
cies participating in the information collaboration environ-
ment, to conduct an annual review of the information col-
laboration environment for compliance with fair informa-
tion practices and civil rights and civil liberties policies. 
Each such report shall be— 
(1) unclassified, to the maximum extent pos-
sible, but may contain a non-public or classified 
annex to protect sources or methods and any other 
sensitive information restricted by Federal law; 
(2) with respect to the unclassified portions of 
each such report, made available on the public inter-
net websites of the Department of Homeland Secu-
1645 
rity and the Office of the Director of National Intel-
ligence— 
(A) not later than 30 days after submis-
sion to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees; and 
(B) in an electronic format that is fully in-
dexed and searchable; and 
(3) with respect to a classified annex, submitted 
to the appropriate congressional committees in an 
electronic format that is fully indexed and search-
able. 
(d) POST-DEPLOYMENT ASSESSMENT.—Not later 
than 2 years after the implementation of the information 
collaboration environment under subsection (b), the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, 
and the Director of National Intelligence (acting through 
the Director of the National Security Agency) shall jointly 
submit to te appropriate congressional committees an as-
sessment of whether to include additional entities, includ-
ing critical infrastructure information sharing and anal-
ysis organizations, in such environment. 
(e) CYBER THREAT DATA STANDARDS AND INTER-
OPERABILITY COUNCIL.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an 
interagency council, to be known as the ‘‘Cyber
1646 
Threat Data Standards and Interoperability Coun-
cil’’ (in this subsection referred to as the ‘‘council’’), 
chaired by the Secretary of Homeland Security, to 
establish data standards and requirements for public 
and private sector entities to participate in the infor-
mation collaboration environment developed pursu-
ant to subsection (a). 
(2) OTHER MEMBERSHIP.— 
(A) PRINCIPAL MEMBERS.—In addition to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the council 
shall be composed of the Director of the Cyber-
security and Infrastructure Security Agency of 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Sec-
retary of Defense, and the Director of National 
Intelligence (acting through the Director of the 
National Security Agency). 
(B) ADDITIONAL
MEMBERS.—The Presi-
dent shall identify and appoint council members 
from public and private sector entities who 
oversee programs that generate, collect, or dis-
seminate data or information related to the de-
tection, identification, analysis, and monitoring 
of cybersecurity risks and cybersecurity threats, 
based on recommendations submitted by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary
1647 
of Defense, and the Director of National Intel-
ligence (acting through the Director of the Na-
tional Security Agency). 
(3) DATA STREAMS.—The council shall identify, 
designate, and periodically update programs that 
shall participate in or be interoperable with the in-
formation collaboration environment developed pur-
suant to subsection (a), which may include the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Network-monitoring and intrusion de-
tection programs. 
(B) Cyber threat indicator sharing pro-
grams. 
(C) Certain government-sponsored network 
sensors or network-monitoring programs. 
(D) Incident response and cybersecurity 
technical assistance programs. 
(E) Malware forensics and reverse-engi-
neering programs. 
(F) The defense industrial base threat in-
telligence program of the Department of De-
fense. 
(4) DATA GOVERNANCE.—The council shall es-
tablish a committee comprised of the privacy officers 
of the Department of Homeland Security, the De-
1648 
partment of Defense, and the National Security 
Agency. Such committee shall establish procedures 
and data governance structures, as necessary, to 
protect sensitive data, comply with Federal regula-
tions and statutes, and respect existing consent 
agreements with private sector critical infrastructure 
entities that apply to critical infrastructure informa-
tion. 
(5) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The council shall, as 
appropriate, submit recommendations to the Presi-
dent to support the operation, adaptation, and secu-
rity of the information collaboration environment de-
veloped pursuant to subsection (a). 
(f) NO ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED.— 
Nothing in section may be construed to— 
(1) alter the responsibility of entities to follow 
guidelines issued pursuant to section 105(b) of the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1504(b); en-
acted as division N of the Consolidated Appropria-
tions Act, 2016 (Public Law 114–113)) with respect 
to data obtained by an entity in connection with ac-
tivities authorized under the Cybersecurity Act of 
2015 and shared through the information collabora-
tion environment developed pursuant to subsection 
(a); or
1649 
(2) authorize Federal or private entities to 
share information in a manner not already permitted 
by law. 
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) in the House of Representatives— 
(i) the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence; 
(ii) the Committee on Homeland Se-
curity; 
(iii) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
and 
(iv) the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices; and 
(B) in the Senate— 
(i) the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence; 
(ii) the Committee on Homeland Se-
curity and Governmental Affairs; 
(iii) the Committee on the Judiciary; 
and 
(iv) the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices.
1650 
(2) CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term 
‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 1016(e) of Public Law 107–56 (42 
U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
(3) 
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
INFORMA-
TION.—The term ‘‘critical infrastructure informa-
tion’’ has the meaning given such term in section 
2222 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 671). 
(4) CYBER
THREAT
INDICATOR.—The term 
‘‘cyber threat indicator’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 102(6) of the Cybersecurity Act of 
2015 (enacted as division N of the Consolidated Ap-
propriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114–113; 6 
U.S.C. 1501(6))). 
(5) CYBERSECURITY RISK.—The term ‘‘cyberse-
curity risk’’ has the meaning given such term in sec-
tion 2209 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 659). 
(6) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘‘cy-
bersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given such term 
in section 102(5) of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 
(enacted as division N of the Consolidated Appro-
priations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114–113; 6 U.S.C. 
1501(5))).
1651 
(7) INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS OR-
GANIZATION.—The term ‘‘information sharing and 
analysis organization’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 2222 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 671). 
SEC. 1632. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE PARTICIPATION IN 
A THREAT INTELLIGENCE SHARING PRO-
GRAM. 
(a) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘defense 
industrial base’’ means the worldwide industrial complex 
with capabilities to perform research and development, de-
sign, produce, deliver, and maintain military weapon sys-
tems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military 
requirements. 
(b) DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE THREAT INTEL-
LIGENCE PROGRAM.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall establish a threat intelligence program to share 
with and obtain from the defense industrial base in-
formation and intelligence on threats to national se-
curity. 
(2) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—At a minimum, 
the Secretary of Defense shall ensure the threat in-
telligence sharing program established pursuant to 
paragraph (1) includes the following:
1652 
(A) Cybersecurity incident reporting re-
quirements that— 
(i) extend beyond current mandatory 
incident reporting requirements; 
(ii) set specific timeframes for all cat-
egories of such mandatory incident report-
ing; and 
(iii) create a single clearinghouse for 
all such mandatory incident reporting to 
the Department of Defense, including cov-
ered unclassified information, covered de-
fense information, and classified informa-
tion. 
(B) A mechanism for developing a shared 
and real-time picture of the threat environment. 
(C) Joint, collaborative, and co-located 
analytics. 
(D) Investments in technology and capa-
bilities to support automated detection and 
analysis across the defense industrial base. 
(E) Coordinated intelligence sharing with 
relevant domestic law enforcement and counter-
intelligence agencies, in coordination, respec-
tively, with the Director of the Federal Bureau
1653 
of Investigation and the Director of National 
Intelligence. 
(F) A process for direct sharing of threat 
intelligence related to a specific defense indus-
trial base entity with such entity. 
(3) EXISTING
INFORMATION
SHARING
PRO-
GRAMS.—The Secretary of Defense may utilize an 
existing Department of Defense information sharing 
program to satisfy the requirement under paragraph 
(1) if such existing program includes, or is modified 
to include, two-way sharing of threat information 
that is specifically relevant to the defense industrial 
base, including satisfying the requirements specified 
in paragraph (2). 
(4) INTELLIGENCE
QUERIES.—As part of a 
threat intelligence sharing program under this sub-
section, the Secretary of Defense shall require de-
fense industrial base entities holding a Department 
of Defense contract to consent to queries of foreign 
intelligence collection databases related to such enti-
ty as a condition of such contract. 
(c) THREAT INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM PARTICIPA-
TION.— 
(1) PROHIBITION
ON
PROCUREMENT.—Begin-
ning on the date that is than 1 year after the date
1654 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense may not procure or acquire, or extend or 
renew a contract to procure or acquire, any item, 
equipment, system, or service from any entity that 
is not a participant in— 
(A) the threat intelligence sharing program 
established pursuant paragraph (1) of sub-
section (b); or 
(B) a comparably widely-utilized threat in-
telligence sharing program described in para-
graph (3) of such subsection. 
(2) APPLICATION
TO
SUBCONTRACTORS.—No 
entity holding a Department of Defense contract 
may subcontract any portion of such contract to an-
other entity unless that second entity— 
(A) is a participant in a threat intelligence 
sharing program under this section; or 
(B) has received a waiver pursuant to sub-
section (d). 
(3) IMPLEMENTATION.—In implementing the 
prohibition under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
Defense— 
(A) may create tiers of requirements and 
participation within the applicable threat intel-
1655 
ligence sharing program referred to in such 
paragraph based on— 
(i) an evaluation of the role of and 
relative threats related to entities within 
the defense industrial base; and 
(ii) cybersecurity maturity model cer-
tification level; and 
(B) shall prioritize available funding and 
technical support to assist entities as is reason-
ably necessary for such entities to participate in 
a threat intelligence sharing program under this 
section. 
(d) WAIVER AUTHORITY.— 
(1) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may 
waive the prohibition under subsection (b)— 
(A) with respect to an entity or class of en-
tities, if the Secretary determines that the re-
quirement to participate in a threat intelligence 
sharing program under this section is unneces-
sary to protect the interests of the United 
States; or 
(B) at the request of an entity, if the Sec-
retary determines there is compelling justifica-
tion for such waiver.
1656 
(2) PERIODIC REEVALUATION.—The Secretary 
of Defense shall periodically reevaluate any waiver 
issued pursuant to paragraph (1) and promptly re-
voke any waiver the Secretary determines is no 
longer warranted. 
(e) REGULATIONS.— 
(1) RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations as are necessary to carry out this 
section. 
(2) CMMC HARMONIZATION.—The Secretary of 
Defense shall ensure that the threat intelligence 
sharing program requirements set forth in the rules 
and regulations promulgated pursuant to paragraph 
(1) consider an entity’s maturity and role within the 
defense industrial base, in accordance with the ma-
turity certification levels established in the Depart-
ment of Defense Cybersecurity Maturity Model Cer-
tification program. 
SEC. 1633. ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL MANUFACTURERS IN 
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
ON MATTERS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of ap-
propriations, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
1657 
with the Director of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, may award financial assistance to a Cen-
ter for the purpose of providing cybersecurity services to 
small manufacturers. 
(b) CRITERIA.—If the Secretary carries out sub-
section (a), the Secretary, in consultation with the Direc-
tor, shall establish and publish on the grants.gov website, 
or successor website, criteria for selecting recipients for 
financial assistance under this section. 
(c) USE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.—Financial as-
sistance under this section— 
(1) shall be used by a Center to provide small 
manufacturers with cybersecurity services relating 
to— 
(A) compliance with the cybersecurity re-
quirements of the Department of Defense Sup-
plement to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 
including awareness, assessment, evaluation, 
preparation, and implementation of cybersecu-
rity services; and 
(B) achieving compliance with the Cyberse-
curity Maturity Model Certification framework 
of the Department of Defense; and
1658 
(2) may be used by a Center to employ trained 
personnel to deliver cybersecurity services to small 
manufacturers. 
(d) BIENNIAL REPORTS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not less frequently than 
once every 2 years, the Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees, the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Sen-
ate, and the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology of the House of Representatives a bien-
nial report on financial assistance awarded under 
this section. 
(2) CONTENTS.—To the extent practicable, 
each report submitted under paragraph (1) shall in-
clude the following with respect to the years covered 
by the report: 
(A) The number of small manufacturing 
companies assisted. 
(B) A description of the cybersecurity serv-
ices provided. 
(C) A description of the cybersecurity mat-
ters addressed. 
(D) An analysis of the operational effec-
tiveness and cost-effectiveness of the cybersecu-
rity services provided.
1659 
(e) TERMINATION.—The authority of the Secretary 
to award of financial assistance under this section shall 
terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of 
the enactment of this Act. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘Center’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 25(a) of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 
278k(a)). 
(2) The term ‘‘small manufacturer’’ has the 
meaning given that tern in section 1644(g) of the 
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232; 10 
U.S.C. 2224 note). 
SEC. 1634. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CYBERSECURITY 
THREAT HUNTING AND SENSING, DISCOVERY, 
AND MITIGATION. 
(a) DEFINITION.—In this section: 
(1) DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL
BASE.—The term 
‘‘defense industrial base’’ means the worldwide in-
dustrial complex with capabilities to perform re-
search and development, design, produce, deliver, 
and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, 
components, or parts to meet military requirements.
1660 
(2) ADVANCED DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE.— 
The term ‘‘advanced defense industrial base’’ means 
any entity in the defense industrial base holding a 
Department of Defense contract that requires a cy-
bersecurity maturity model certification of level 4 or 
higher. 
(b) DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CYBERSECURITY 
THREAT HUNTING STUDY.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a study of the feasibility and 
resourcing required to establish the Defense Indus-
trial Base Cybersecurity Threat Hunting Program 
(in this section referred to as the ‘‘Program’’) de-
scribed in subsection (c). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The study required under 
paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) establish the resources necessary, gov-
ernance structures, and responsibility for execu-
tion of the Program, as well as any other rel-
evant considerations determined by the Sec-
retary; 
(B) include a conclusive determination of 
the Department of Defense’s capacity to estab-
1661 
lish the Program by the end of fiscal year 2021; 
and 
(C) identify any barriers that would pre-
vent such establishment. 
(c) DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CYBERSECURITY 
THREAT HUNTING PROGRAM.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Upon a positive determina-
tion of the Program’s feasibility pursuant to the 
study required under subsection (b), the Secretary of 
Defense shall establish the Program to actively iden-
tify cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities within 
the information systems, including covered defense 
networks containing controlled unclassified informa-
tion, of entities in the defense industrial base. 
(2) PROGRAM
LEVELS.—In establishing the 
Program in accordance with paragraph (1), the Sec-
retary of Defense shall develop a tiered program 
that takes into account the following: 
(A) The cybersecurity maturity of entities 
in the defense industrial base. 
(B) The role of such entities. 
(C) Whether each such entity possesses 
controlled unclassified information and covered 
defense networks.
1662 
(D) The covered defense information to 
which such an entity has access as a result of 
contracts with the Department of Defense. 
(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—The Program 
shall— 
(A) include requirements for mitigating 
any vulnerabilities identified pursuant to the 
Program; 
(B) provide a mechanism for the Depart-
ment of Defense to share with entities in the 
defense industrial base malicious code, indica-
tors of compromise, and insights on the evolv-
ing threat landscape; 
(C) provide incentives for entities in the 
defense industrial base to share with the De-
partment of Defense, including the National Se-
curity 
Agency’s 
Cybersecurity 
Directorate, 
threat and vulnerability information collected 
pursuant to threat monitoring and hunt activi-
ties; and 
(D) mandate a minimum level of program 
participation for any entity that is part of the 
advanced defense industrial base. 
(d) THREAT IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM PARTICIPA-
TION.—
1663 
(1) PROHIBITION
ON
PROCUREMENT.—If the 
Program is established pursuant to subsection (c), 
beginning on the date that is 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense may not procure or obtain, or extend or renew 
a contract to procure or obtain, any item, equip-
ment, system, or service from any entity in the de-
fense industrial base that is not in compliance with 
the requirements of the Program. 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION.—In implementing the 
prohibition under paragraph (1), the Secretary of 
Defense shall prioritize available funding and tech-
nical support to assist affected entities in the de-
fense industrial base as is reasonably necessary for 
such affected entities to commence participation in 
the Program and satisfy Program requirements. 
(3) WAIVER AUTHORITY.— 
(A) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense 
may waive the prohibition under paragraph 
(1)— 
(i) with respect to an entity or class 
of entities in the defense industrial base, if 
the Secretary determines that the require-
ment to participate in the Program is un-
1664 
necessary to protect the interests of the 
United States; or 
(ii) at the request of such an entity, 
if the Secretary determines there is a com-
pelling justification for such waiver. 
(B) PERIODIC REEVALUATION.—The Sec-
retary of Defense shall periodically reevaluate 
any waiver issued pursuant to subparagraph 
(A) and revoke any such waiver the Secretary 
determines is no longer warranted. 
(e) USE OF PERSONNEL AND THIRD-PARTY THREAT 
HUNTING AND SENSING CAPABILITIES.—In carrying out 
the Program, the Secretary of Defense may— 
(1) utilize Department of Defense personnel to 
hunt for threats and vulnerabilities within the infor-
mation systems of entities in the defense industrial 
base that have an active contract with Department 
of Defense; 
(2) certify third-party providers to hunt for 
threats and vulnerabilities on behalf of the Depart-
ment of Defense; 
(3) require the deployment of network sensing 
technologies capable of identifying and filtering mali-
cious network traffic; or
1665 
(4) employ a combination of Department of De-
fense personnel and third-party providers and tools, 
as the Secretary determines necessary and appro-
priate, for the entity described in paragraph (1). 
(f) REGULATIONS.— 
(1) RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations as are necessary to carry out this 
section. 
(2) CMMC HARMONIZATION.—In promulgating 
rules and regulations pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
Secretary of Defense shall consider how best to inte-
grate the requirements of this section with the De-
partment of Defense Cybersecurity Maturity Model 
Certification program. 
SEC. 1635. DEFENSE DIGITAL SERVICE. 
(a) RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES DIGITAL 
SERVICE.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Administrator of the United States Digital Service shall 
establish a direct relationship between the Department of 
Defense and the United States Digital Service to address 
authorities, hiring processes, roles, and responsibilities.
1666 
(b) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense and the Administrator of the United States Dig-
ital Service shall jointly certify to the congressional de-
fense committees that the skills and qualifications of the 
Department of Defense personnel assigned to and sup-
porting the core functions of the Defense Digital Service 
are consistent with the skills and qualifications United 
States Digital Service personnel. 
SEC. 1636. LIMITATION OF FUNDING FOR NATIONAL DE-
FENSE UNIVERSITY. 
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
Act for fiscal year 2021 for the National Defense Univer-
sity, not more than 60 percent of such funds may be obli-
gated or expended until the Joint Staff and the National 
Defense University present to the congressional defense 
committees the following: 
(1) A comprehensive plan for resourcing and 
growing the student population of the College of In-
formation and Cyberspace, including by— 
(A) enrolling a minimum of 350 cyber 
workforce students per academic year; and 
(B) graduating a minimum of 42 students 
(including a minimum of 28 United States mili-
tary students) in the Joint Professional Military
1667 
Education Phase II War College 10- month 
resident program in fiscal year 2021, and im-
plementing a plan to graduate a minimum of 
70 students (including a minimum of 50 United 
States military and civilian students) in fiscal 
year 2023 and in each year thereafter through 
the Future Year Defense Program. 
(2) Budget documents for the Future Year De-
fense Program which show funding for the College 
of Information and Cyberspace to support the com-
prehensive plan described in subsection (a). 
(3) A comprehensive presentation of how pro-
grams of study on cyber-related matters are being 
expanded and integrated into Joint Professional 
Military Education at all National Defense Univer-
sity constituent colleges. 
SEC. 1637. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBER INCIDENT 
REPORTING PROCEDURES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting 
through the Director, and in consultation with Sector Risk 
Management Agencies and other appropriate Federal de-
partments, shall, after notice and an opportunity for com-
ment, establish requirements and a process for covered 
critical infrastructure entities to report a covered cyberse-
1668 
curity incident to the national cybersecurity and commu-
nications integration center of the Department of Home-
land Security, in furtherance of its mission with respect 
to cybersecurity risks as set forth in section 2209. 
(b) PROCEDURES.—The cybersecurity incident re-
porting requirements and process described in subsection 
(a) shall, at a minimum, include— 
(1) a definition of covered critical infrastructure 
entities that are required to comply with the report-
ing requirements of this section, based on threshold 
criteria related to— 
(A) the likelihood that such entity may be 
targeted by a malicious cyber actor, including a 
foreign country; 
(B) consequences that disruption to or 
compromise of such entity could cause to na-
tional security, economic security, or public 
health and safety; and 
(C) maturity of security operations in de-
tecting, investigating, and mitigating a cyberse-
curity incident; 
(2) criteria for the types and thresholds for a 
covered cybersecurity incident to be reported under 
this section, including the sophistication or novelty 
of the cyber attack, the type, volume, and sensitivity