Republic of China or that receives any funding from 
the People’s Republic of China, for the purposes of 
gain-of-function research. 
(c) PENALTY FOR LACK OF CANDOR.—With respect 
to any official or employee of the National Institutes of 
Health, or grantee or employee or contractor of a grantee 
of the National Institutes of Health, who is determined 
by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services to have intentionally misled, or omitted 
information in a disclosure to, Congress, the National In-
stitutes of Health, or any relevant Inspector General about 
the direction, scope, or extent of Federal funding of inter-
national gain-of-function research, in addition to being 
subject to all other applicable criminal penalties— 
(1) such person shall not be eligible for any new 
Federal grant or other funding; 
(2) if such person previously received a Federal 
grant or other funding, such grant or other funding 
shall be immediately terminated and any unexpended 
funds shall be rescinded; and 
(3) such person shall not be eligible for Federal 
employment. 
(d) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 30 months 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the 
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Department of Health and Human Services, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, 
the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department 
of State, shall submit, in both classified and unclassified 
forms, a report to the appropriate committees of Congress 
providing an assessment of— 
(1) the United States capacity to determine the 
extent of gain-of-function research conducted by any 
laboratories of research institutions in the People’s 
Republic of China, including the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology, and safety protocols followed by labora-
tories or research institutions in the People’s Repub-
lic of China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virol-
ogy, in conducting any gain-of-function research; 
(2) the United States capacity to determine 
whether cooperation or relationships between labora-
tories or research facilities in the People’s Republic 
of China conducting gain-of-function research and 
the People’s Liberation Army exist; 
(3) costs and potential risks or benefits of any 
United States cooperation or funding with labora-
tories or research facilities in the People’s Republic 
of China conducting gain-of-function research; 
(4) a recommendation of whether the United 
States should resume or continue to suspend any co-
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operation or funding of laboratories or research fa-
cilities in the People’s Republic of China conducting 
gain-of-function research; 
(5) a list of all gain-of-function research cur-
rently being funded with financial support of any 
agency of the Federal Government, including the 
purpose, cost, pathogens, and location of research; 
(6) a detailed list of all Federal funding for re-
search being conducted in or with the People’s Re-
public of China; and 
(7) a determination of whether the Chinese lab-
oratories identified in the report have had, or con-
tinue to have, a connection to the proliferation of 
fentanyl and fentanyl-analogues in the United 
States. 
(e) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—The President 
may waive the limitation under subsection (b) with respect 
to particular research described in such subsection upon 
a determination that such a waiver would be in the na-
tional security interest. Such waiver shall be made publicly 
available at the time of its issuance. 
Æ 
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