mately 75,000 were employed on nuclear weap-
ons-related work. 
(B) Poor wages and living conditions in 
Russian ‘‘nuclear cities’’ have inspired protests 
and strikes among the employees working in 
them. 
(C) Insiders have been caught attempting 
to smuggle nuclear materials out of these facili-
ties, presumably to sell on the lucrative black 
market. 
SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERA-
TION PROGRAMS IN THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in the 
Executive Office of the President an Office of Non-
proliferation Programs (in this section referred to as the 
‘‘Office’’). 
(b) DIRECTOR; ASSOCIATE DIRECTORS.—There shall 
be at the head of the Office a Director who shall be ap-
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, and who shall be compensated at the 
rate provided for level II of the Executive Schedule in sec-
tion 5313 of title 5. The President is authorized to appoint 
not more than four Associate Directors, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, who shall be com-
pensated at a rate not to exceed that provided for level 
III of the Executive Schedule in section 5314 of such title. 
Associate Directors shall perform such functions as the 
Director may prescribe. 
(c) PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTOR.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The primary function of the 
Director is to coordinate and lead—
(A) efforts by the United States to curb 
terrorist access to nuclear technology, mate-
rials, or expertise; and 
(B) other United States nonproliferation 
activities, including nuclear nonproliferation ac-
tivities and activities to counter other weapons 
of mass destruction. 
(2) SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS.—In addition to such 
other functions and activities as the President may 
assign, the Director shall—
(A) advise the President, and others within 
the Executive Office of the President, on the 
role and effect of such nonproliferation activi-
ties on national security and international rela-
tions; 
(B) lead the development and implementa-
tion of a plan (including appropriate budgets, 
other resources, goals, and metrics for assessing
progress) to ensure that all the highest-priority 
actions to prevent terrorists from getting and 
using nuclear weapons are taken in the shortest 
possible time, including but not limited to a 
fast-paced global effort to ensure that every nu-
clear warhead and every kilogram of weapons-
usable nuclear material worldwide is secured 
and accounted for, to standards sufficient to de-
feat 
demonstrated 
terrorist 
and 
criminal 
threats, as rapidly as that objective can be ac-
complished; 
(C) identify obstacles to accelerating and 
strengthening efforts to prevent terrorists from 
getting and using nuclear weapons, and raise 
approaches to overcoming these ostacles for ac-
tion by the President or other appropriate offi-
cials; 
(D) lead an effort, to be carried out jointly 
by the various Federal agencies responsible for 
carrying out such nonproliferation activities, to 
establish priorities among those activities and 
to develop and implement strategies and budg-
ets that reflect those priorities; 
(E) build strong partnerships with respect 
to such nonproliferation activities among Fed-
eral, State, and local governments, foreign gov-
ernments, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations; and 
(F) evaluate the scale, quality, and effec-
tiveness of the Federal effort with respect to 
such nonproliferation activities and advise on 
appropriate actions. 
SEC. 4. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON COOPERATIVE 
THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS. 
(a) REPEAL OF RESTRICTIONS.—
(1) RESTRICTIONS
ON
ASSISTANCE
IN
DE-
STROYING
FORMER
SOVIET
WEAPONS.—Section 
211(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act 
of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) is repealed. 
(2) RESTRICTIONS ON AUTHORITY TO CARRY 
OUT CTR PROGRAMS.—Section 1203(d) of the Coop-
erative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 (title XII of 
Public Law 103–160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)) is re-
pealed. 
(3) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR CHEM-
ICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION.—Section 1305 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2000 (22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is repealed. 
(b) EXEMPTION FROM LIMITATIONS.—Cooperative 
Threat Reduction programs may be carried out notwith-
standing any other provision of law, subject to congres-
sional notification and reporting requirements that apply 
to the use of funds available for Cooperative Threat Re-
duction programs or the carrying out of projects or activi-
ties under such programs. 
(c) INAPPLICABILITY OF OTHER RESTRICTIONS.—
Section 502 of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging 
Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 
1992 (22 U.S.C. 5852) shall not apply to any Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program. 
SEC. 5. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS. 
Section 4301 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 
U.S.C. 2561) is repealed. 
SEC. 6. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO USE COOPERA-
TIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM FUNDS 
OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. 
Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108–136; 117 Stat. 
1662; 22 U.S.C. 5963) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘President’’ each place it ap-
pears and inserting ‘‘Secretary of Defense’’; 
(2) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘each of the 
following’’ and all that follows through the period at
the end and inserting the following: ‘‘that such 
project or activity will—
‘‘(1) assist the United States in the resolution 
of a critical emerging proliferation threat; or 
‘‘(2) permit the United States to take advan-
tage of opportunities to achieve long-standing non-
proliferation goals.’’; 
(3) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and 
(4) by redesignating subsection (e) as sub-
section (c). 
SEC. 7. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO USE INTER-
NATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTEC-
TION AND COOPERATION PROGRAM FUNDS 
OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION. 
Section 3124 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108–136; 117 Stat. 
1747) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘President’’ each place it ap-
pears and inserting ‘‘Secretary of Energy’’; 
(2) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘each of the 
following’’ and all that follows through the period at 
the end and inserting the following: ‘‘that such 
project or activity will—
‘‘(1) assist the United States in the resolution 
of a critical emerging proliferation threat; or
‘‘(2) permit the United States to take advan-
tage of opportunities to achieve long-standing non-
proliferation goals.’’; 
(3) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and 
(4) by redesignating subsection (e) as sub-
section (c). 
SEC. 8. SPECIAL REPORTS ON ADHERENCE TO ARMS CON-
TROL AGREEMENTS AND NONPROLIFERA-
TION COMMITMENTS. 
(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—At least annually, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report on each country in which a Co-
operative Threat Reduction program is being carried out. 
The report shall describe that country’s commitments to—
(1) making substantial national investments in 
infrastructure to secure, safeguard, and destroy 
weapons of mass destruction; 
(2) forgoing any military modernization exceed-
ing legitimate defense requirements, including re-
placement of weapons of mass destruction; 
(3) forgoing any use of fissionable materials or 
any other components of deactivated nuclear weap-
ons in a new nuclear weapons program; 
(4) complying with all relevant arms control 
agreements;
(5) adopting and enforcing national and inter-
national export controls over munitions and dual-use 
items; and 
(6) facilitating the verification by the United 
States and international community of that coun-
try’s compliance with such commitments. 
(b) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 
may be submitted with the report required under section 
403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 
U.S.C. 2593a). 
SEC. 9. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON IMPEDIMENTS TO CER-
TAIN NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES. 
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report identifying im-
pediments (including liability concerns, taxation issues, ac-
cess rights, and other impediments) to—
(1) the ongoing renegotiation of the umbrella 
agreement relating to Cooperative Threat Reduction; 
and 
(2) the ongoing negotiations for the implemen-
tation of the Plutonium Disposition Program, the 
Nuclear Cities Initiative, and other defense nuclear 
nonproliferation programs.
SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO LIABILITY 
PROTECTIONS FOR UNITED STATES NON-
PROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN RUSSIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Administration has failed to negotiate 
an acceptable solution for the continued impasse be-
tween the United States and Russia on negotiations 
over liability protections for United States compa-
nies and personnel conducting nonproliferation work 
in Russia. 
(2) Because Congress requires that both the 
United States and Russian plutonium disposition 
programs proceed in rough parallel, the protracted 
liability negotiations have already resulted in a one-
year delay in the planned construction start in Rus-
sia and the United States from summer 2004 to 
summer 2005. 
(3) As a result, another construction season will 
be missed in Russia, and Congress notes that the 
projected start of construction has now slipped five 
years since the project began in fiscal year 2000. 
(4) Not only does this raise serious concern 
from a national security standpoint, but also it will 
have serious repercussions here in the United States 
as a result of maintaining general parity of the two 
construction schedules.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Based on the foregoing, 
it is the sense of Congress that the Administration should 
find an acceptable solution in the near term for the im-
passe referred to in subsection (a)(1), in order to success-
fully complete negotiations and allow construction to begin 
on mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities in both the 
United States and Russia. 
SEC. 11. ENHANCEMENT OF GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION 
INITIATIVE. 
Section 3132 of the Ronald W. Reagan National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 
108–375; 118 Stat. 2166; 50 U.S.C. 2569) is amended—
(1) in subsection (b)—
(A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
‘‘PROGRAM AUTHORIZED’’ and inserting ‘‘PRO-
GRAM REQUIRED’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘The Secretary of Energy 
may’’ and inserting ‘‘The President, acting 
through the Secretary of Energy, shall’’; and 
(2) in subsection (c)(1), by adding at the end 
the following new subparagraph: 
‘‘(N) Take such other actions as may be nec-
essary to effectively implement the Global Threat 
Reduction Initiative.’’.
SEC. 12. EXPANSION OF PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO PROLIFERA-
TION SECURITY INITIATIVE.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that—
(1) the President should strive to expand and 
strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative an-
nounced by the President on May 31, 2003, placing 
particular emphasis on including countries outside of 
NATO; and 
(2) the United States should engage the United 
Nations to develop a Security Council Resolution to 
authorize the Proliferation Security Initiative under 
international law, including by providing legal au-
thority to stop shipments of weapons of mass de-
struction, their delivery systems, and related mate-
rials. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS RELATING 
TO PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.—There are 
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006, 
$50,000,000 to conduct joint training exercises regarding 
interdiction of weapons of mass destruction under the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative. Particular emphasis should 
be given to allocating funds from such amount—
(1) to invite other countries that do not partici-
pate in the Proliferation Security Initiative to ob-
serve the joint training exercises; and 
(2) to conduct training exercises with countries 
that openly join the Proliferation Security Initiative 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO INTER-
NATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should seek to devise and implement standards to improve 
the security of nuclear weapons and materials by—
(1) establishing with other willing nations a set 
of performance-based standards for the security of 
nuclear weapons and weapons; 
(2) negotiating with those nations an agreement 
to adopt the standards and implement appropriate 
verification measures to assure ongoing compliance; 
and 
(3) coordinating with those nations and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to strongly en-
courage other states to adopt and verifiably imple-
ment the standards.
SEC. 14. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS RELATING 
TO INVENTORY OF RUSSIAN TACTICAL NU-
CLEAR WARHEADS AND DATA EXCHANGES. 
In addition to any other amounts authorized to be 
appropriated for such purposes, there are authorized to 
be appropriated to the Administrator for Nuclear Security 
for fiscal year 2006, $5,000,000 for assistance to Russia 
to facilitate the conduct of a comprehensive inventory of 
the stockpile of Russia of—
(1) non-strategic nuclear weapons; and 
(2) nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-
strategic, that are not secured by PALs or other 
electronic means. 
SEC. 15. REPORT ON ACCOUNTING FOR AND SECURING OF 
RUSSIA’S NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAP-
ONS. 
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. The report 
shall—
(1) detail past and current efforts of the United 
States to encourage a proper accounting for and se-
curing of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons 
and Russia’s nuclear weapons, whether strategic or
non-strategic, that are not secured by PALs or other 
electronic means; 
(2) detail the actions that are most likely to 
lead to progress in improving the accounting for and 
securing or dismantlement of such weapons; and 
(3) detail the feasibility of enhancing the na-
tional security of the United States by developing in-
creased transparency between the United States and 
Russia with respect to the numbers, locations, and 
descriptions of such weapons and of the cor-
responding weapons of the United States. 
SEC. 16. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVOLVING AL-
TERNATIVE USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DE-
STRUCTION EXPERTISE. 
(a) AUTHORITY TO USE FUNDS.—Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law and subject to subsection (c), 
any funds available to a department or agency of the Fed-
eral Government may be used to conduct non-defense re-
search and development in Russia and the states of the 
former Soviet Union on technologies specified in sub-
section (b) utilizing scientists in Russia and the states of 
the former Soviet Union who have expertise in—
(1) nuclear weapons; or 
(2) chemical or biological weapons, but only if 
such scientists no longer engage, or have never en-
gaged, in activities supporting prohibited chemical or 
biological capabilities. 
(b) TECHNOLOGIES.—The technologies specified in 
this subsection are technologies on the following: 
(1) Environmental restoration and monitoring. 
(2) Proliferation detection. 
(3) Health and medicine, including research. 
(4) Energy. 
(c) LIMITATION.—Funds may not be used under sub-
section (a) for research and development if the Secretary 
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy, determines that such research 
and development will—
(1) pose a threat to the security interests of the 
United States; or 
(2) further materially any defense technology. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 
appropriated 
to 
the 
Department 
of 
State 
$20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 for the following 
purposes: 
(A) To make determinations under sub-
section (c). 
(B) To defray any increase in costs in-
curred by the Department of State, or any
other department or agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment, for research and development, or dem-
onstration, as a result of research and develop-
ment conducted under this section. 
(2) AVAILABILITY.—(A) Amounts authorized to 
be appropriated by paragraph (1) are authorized to 
remain available until expended. 
(B) Any amount transferred to a department or 
agency of the Federal Government pursuant to para-
graph (1)(B) shall be merged with amounts available 
to such department or agency to cover costs con-
cerned, and shall be available for the same purposes, 
and for the same period, as amounts with which 
merged. 
SEC. 17. STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERA-
TION TREATY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to 
as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT) (21 
UST 483) states that countries that are parties to 
the treaty have the ‘‘inalienable right . . . to develop 
research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in con-
formity with articles I and II of this treaty.’’.
(2) The rights outlined under article IV include 
all fuel cycle activities, despite the fact that uranium 
enrichment and plutonium production potentially put 
a country in a position to produce weapons usable 
material. 
(3) David Bergmann, former chairman of the 
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, stated: ‘‘. . . by 
developing atomic energy for peaceful uses, you 
reach the nuclear weapon option. There are not two 
atomic energies’’. 
(4) The wording of article IV has made it pos-
sible for countries that are parties to the NPT trea-
ty to use peaceful nuclear programs as a cover for 
weapons programs. In particular, the misuse by 
North Korea and Iran of these provisions threatens 
to undercut the viability of the nuclear nonprolifera-
tion regime and the entire system of international 
nuclear commerce. 
(5) If the international community fails to de-
vise effective measures to deal with the ‘‘loophole’’ in 
article IV, then there is a great likelihood that the 
ranks of countries possessing nuclear weapons will 
increase markedly in the next decade. 
(b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON CONTROL OF NU-
CLEAR FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGIES AND MATERIAL.—
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report identifying ways to 
more effectively control nuclear fuel cycle technologies and 
material, including ways that the United States can mobi-
lize the international community to close the ‘‘loophole’’ 
of article IV of the NPT, without undermining the treaty 
itself. 
SEC. 18. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means—
(A) the Committee on International Rela-
tions, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Homeland Security, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate. 
(2) COOPERATIVE
THREAT
REDUCTION
PRO-
GRAMS.—The term ‘‘Cooperative Threat Reduction
programs’’ means programs and activities specified 
in section 1501(b) of the National Defense Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104–
201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note).
Æ