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constituted these programs since the Gulf War. 
We know he’s out trying once again to produce 
nuclear weapons and we know that he has a 
long-standing relationship with various terrorist 
groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.’’; 
(G) on March 17, 2003, President George 
W. Bush stated that ‘‘The danger is clear: 
using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear 
weapons obtained with the help of Iraq, the ter-
rorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and 
kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of in-
nocent people in our country or any other.’’; 
(H) on May 1, 2003, President George W. 
Bush stated that ‘‘[t]he liberation of Iraq . . . 
removed an ally of al Qaeda.’’; 
(I) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘the Iraqi 
intelligen[ce] service had a relationship with al 
Qaeda that developed throughout the decade of 
the 90’s. That was clearly official policy.’’; 
(J) on September 14, 2003, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney stated that ‘‘[i]f we’re suc-
cessful in Iraq . . . we will have struck a major 
blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, 
the geographic base of the terrorists who have 
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had us under assault now for many years, but 
most especially on 9/11.’’; and 
(K) on March 21, 2006, President George 
W. Bush said at a press conference, ‘‘But we 
realized on September the 11th, 2001, that kill-
ers could destroy innocent life. And I’m never 
going to forget it. And I’m never going to for-
get the vow I made to the American people that 
we will do everything in our power to protect 
our people. Part of that meant to make sure 
that we didn’t allow people to provide safe 
haven to an enemy. And that’s why I went into 
Iraq.’’. 
(d) INADEQUATE
PLANNING
AND
INSUFFICIENT 
TROOP LEVELS.—The House of Representatives finds the 
following: 
(1) The intelligence community judged in Janu-
ary 2003 that ‘‘[t]he ouster of Iraqi dictator Sad-
dam Hussayn would pose a variety of significant pol-
icy challenges for whoever assumes responsibility for 
governing Iraq’’ including ‘‘political transformation, 
controlling internal strife, solving economic and hu-
manitarian challenges, and dealing with persistent 
foreign policy and security concerns.’’. 
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(2) The intelligence community judged in Janu-
ary 2003 that ‘‘a post-Saddam authority would face 
a deeply divided society with a significant chance 
that domestic groups would engage in violent conflict 
with each other unless an occupying force prevented 
them from doing so.’’. 
(3) These judgments were delivered to the 
White House and Office of the Vice President. 
(4) Then Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki 
testified on February 25, 2003, that ‘‘something on 
the order of several hundred thousands soldiers’’ 
would be needed to secure Iraq following a success-
ful completion of the war. 
(5) General Abizaid, then-CENTCOM com-
mander, testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on November 15, 2006, that ‘‘General 
Shinseki was right that a greater international force 
contribution, United States force contribution and 
Iraqi force contribution should have been available 
immediately after major combat operations.’’. 
(6) After President George W. Bush declared 
the end of major combat operations in Iraq, there 
were insufficient troops to prevent the outbreak of 
violence and lawlessness that contributed to the 
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•HRES 625 IH 
flight of millions of Iraqis and the deaths of tens of 
thousands of Iraqis. 
(7) The Government Accountability Office pro-
vided testimony to the Subcommittee on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, on March 22, 
2007, that due to insufficient troop levels, United 
States forces were unable to secure conventional 
weapons stockpiles in Iraq that continue to pose a 
threat to American servicemembers. 
(8) President George W. Bush failed to ensure 
that plans were prepared and implemented to ad-
dress the challenges that the intelligence community 
predicted would occur after the ouster of Saddam 
Hussein, and in particular failed to ensure that 
there were sufficient coalition troops in Iraq after 
major combat operations ended to maintain security 
and secure weapons stockpiles. 
(e) STRAIN ON MILITARY AND UNDERMINING HOME-
LAND SECURITY.—The House of Representatives finds 
the following: 
(1) Retired Major General John Batiste, former 
commander of the First Infantry Division in Iraq, 
testified before the House Committee on Inter-
national Relations on June 27, 2007, that ‘‘[o]ur 
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Army and Marine Corps are at a breaking point at 
a time in history when we need a strong military the 
most. The cycle of deployments is staggering. Amer-
ican formations continue to lose a battalion’s worth 
of dead and wounded every month with little to show 
for it. The current recruiting system falls drastically 
short of long-term requirements and our all-volun-
teer force can not sustain the current tempo for 
much longer. The military is spending over 
$1,000,000,000 a year in incentives in a last ditch 
effort to keep the force together. Young officers and 
noncommissioned officers are leaving the service at 
an alarming rate.’’. 
(2) Extended deployments of 15 months, and 
insufficient time to rest and train between deploy-
ments, have undermined the readiness of the Army. 
(3) The Army National Guard reported as early 
as July 2005 that equipment transfers to deploying 
units ‘‘had largely exhausted its inventory of more 
than 220 critical items, including some items useful 
to nondeployed units for training and domestic mis-
sions.’’. 
(4) The Government Accountability Office 
found, in September 2006, that ‘‘[a]mong the items 
for which the Army National Guard had shortages 
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of over 80 percent of the authorized inventory were 
chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination 
equipment and night vision goggles’’. 
(5) President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq 
have undermined homeland security by depleting the 
personnel and equipment needed by the National 
Guard. 
(f) INSURGENCY IN ‘‘LAST THROES’’.—The House of 
Representatives finds the following: 
(1) Multi-National Force-Iraq reports indicate 
that the number of attacks on coalition forces has 
increased since the beginning of military action. 
(2) The Government Accountability Office, in 
March 2007, reported that attacks using improvised 
explosive devices continued to increase between 2005 
and July 2006. 
(3) On June 23, 2005, General John Abizaid, 
in his capacity as head of Central Command, testi-
fied before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
about the state of the insurgency that ‘‘[i]n terms 
of comparison from 6 months ago, in terms of for-
eign fighters I believe there are more foreign fighters 
coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago. In 
terms of the overall strength of the insurgency, I’d 
say it’s about the same as it was.’’. 
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(4) President George W. Bush’s Initial Bench-
mark Assessment report from July 12, 2007, states 
that ‘‘[a]s a result of increased offensive operations, 
Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased 
attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and 
Salah ad Din.’’. 
(5) Vice President Richard B. Cheney made 
misleading statements that the insurgency in Iraq 
was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ including— 
(A) on May 30, 2005, Vice President Rich-
ard B. Cheney said, ‘‘The level of activity that 
we see today from a military standpoint, I 
think, will clearly decline. I think they’re in the 
last throes, if you will, of the insurgency.’’; and 
(B) on June 19, 2006, Vice President 
Richard B. Cheney was asked whether he still 
supported the comment he made in 2005, re-
garding the fact that the insurgency in Iraq 
was in its ‘‘last throes,’’ to which he responded 
‘‘I do.’’ 
SEC. 2. CENSURE BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 
The House of Representatives censures President 
George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney 
for— 
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(1) misleading the American people about the 
basis for going to war in Iraq; 
(2) failing to plan adequately for the war; 
(3) pursuing policies in Iraq that have strained 
our military and undermined our homeland security; 
and 
(4) misleading the American people about the 
insurgency in Iraq. 
Æ 
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