I 
115TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 6053 
To prohibit the modification of civil penalties under export control and sanc-
tions laws of the United States with respect to Chinese telecommuni-
cation companies. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 8, 2018 
Mr. DEUTCH (for himself and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) introduced the following 
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
A BILL 
To prohibit the modification of civil penalties under export 
control and sanctions laws of the United States with 
respect to Chinese telecommunication companies. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Sanctions Viola-
tors Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) In March 2016 Chinese electronics company 
Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) 
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was found to have breached United States sanctions 
laws by exporting products with American-made 
components to Iran in violation of the Export Ad-
ministration Regulations (15 C.F.R. part 730 et 
seq.) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions 
Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 560). 
(2) In March 2017 the Department of Com-
merce announced that ZTE also shipped 283 micro-
processors, servers, and routers to North Korea in 
violation of United States law. 
(3) The Department of Commerce found that 
ZTE had knowingly made false statements and mis-
led investigators about its business with Iran and 
North Korea, with Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur 
L. Ross, Jr., stating, ‘‘The results of this investiga-
tion and the unprecedented penalty reflects ZTE’s 
egregious scheme to evade U.S. law and systemati-
cally mislead investigators.’’. 
(4) The Department of Commerce found that 
ZTE employees had ‘‘destroyed, removed, or sani-
tized all materials concerning transactions or other 
activities relating to ZTE’s Iran business that post- 
dated March 2012; deleted on a nightly basis all of 
the team’s emails to conceal the team’s activities; 
and required each of the team members to sign a 
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non-disclosure agreement covering the ZTE trans-
actions and activities the team was tasked with hid-
ing.’’. 
(5) The Department of Commerce further dis-
closed a 2011 internal ZTE document detailing its 
ongoing business in Iran, North Korea, Syria, 
Sudan, and Cuba, at the time all listed by the 
United States as state sponsors of terrorism and 
subject to embargoes. 
(6) ZTE plead guilty to the charges and the 
Department of Commerce fined ZTE $1.19 billion, 
the largest-ever combined civil and criminal penalty. 
(7) In announcing the plea and subsequent fine, 
Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., stated, 
‘‘Those who flout our economic sanctions and export 
control laws will not go unpunished—they will suffer 
the harshest of consequences.’’. 
(8) As part of ZTE’s plea agreement with the 
United States, ZTE would be subject to a seven-year 
suspended denial of export privileges, which could be 
quickly activated if any aspect of the deal was not 
met. 
(9) On April 16, 2018, the Department of Com-
merce announced it had imposed a denial of export 
privileges against ZTE due to its determination that 
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‘‘ZTE made false statements to [the Bureau of In-
dustry and Security of the Department of Com-
merce] in 2016, during settlement negotiations, and 
2017, during the probationary period, related to sen-
ior employee disciplinary actions the company said it 
was taking or had already taken.’’. 
(10) In 2012, a report of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives entitled, ‘‘Investigative Report on the 
United States National Security Issues Posed by 
Chinese Telecommunication Companies Huawei and 
ZTE’’, it was recommended that ‘‘U.S. government 
systems, particularly sensitive systems, should not 
include Huawei or ZTE equipment, including in 
component parts. Similarly, government contrac-
tors—particularly those working on contracts for 
sensitive U.S. programs—should exclude ZTE or 
Huawei equipment in their systems.’’. 
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a 
February 2015 Counterintelligence Strategy Part-
nership Intelligence Note stated that, ‘‘Chinese Gov-
ernment-supported telecommunications equipment 
on U.S. networks may be exploited through Chinese 
cyber activity, with China’s intelligence services op-
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erating as an advanced persistent threat to U.S. net-
works.’’. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON MODIFICATION OF CIVIL PEN-
ALTIES UNDER EXPORT CONTROL AND SANC-
TIONS LAWS WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE 
TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the President may not modify any civil pen-
alties, including denial orders, implemented by the Gov-
ernment of the United States with respect to a Chinese 
telecommunication company pursuant to a determination 
that the company has violated an export control or sanc-
tions law of the United States until the date that is 30 
days after the President certifies to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress that— 
(1) the company— 
(A) is fully cooperating with investigations 
conducted by the Government of the United 
States, if any, of activities relating to the viola-
tion of the export control or sanctions law of 
the United States; and 
(B) has not, for a period of at least one 
year after the date on which the civil penalties 
were imposed, conducted any other activities in 
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violation of an export control or sanctions law 
of the United States; and 
(2) the modification of the civil penalties is in 
the vital national security interest of the United 
States and the President includes in the certification 
a specific and detailed rationale for such modifica-
tion. 
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives. 
Æ 
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