design, manufacturing, materials, equipment, or equip-
ment subsystems and components to establish coordinated 
and expanded approaches for protecting critical semicon-
ductor technologies from acquisition by the Chinese Com-
munist Party and other foreign adversaries of the United 
States and its allies and partners. 
(b) COORDINATION OBJECTIVES.—In carrying out 
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall seek to 
achieve— 
(1) alignment of export control policies regard-
ing semiconductor technology manufacturing equip-
ment, including lithography systems, deposition 
equipment, etching tools, thermocompression bond-
ing equipment, resist processing tools, chemical me-
chanical planarization tools, cleaning tools, handling 
tools, assembly, packaging, and test tools, and in-
spection systems and the critical subcomponents 
needed to produce such equipment; 
(2) expanded restrictions on semiconductor 
technology design tools, intellectual property trans-
fers, equipment servicing, and technical assistance 
that could enable indigenous semiconductor tech-
nology development capabilities in countries of con-
cern; 
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(3) harmonized approaches to controlling dual- 
use semiconductor technology materials, including 
photoresists, specialty gases, and advanced sub-
strates; 
(4) joint monitoring, enforcement, and adminis-
tration mechanisms to prevent circumvention of 
semiconductor technology controls through third- 
country entities as well as prevent foreign backfilling 
of restricted items; 
(5) information sharing regarding semicon-
ductor 
technology 
transfer 
risks, 
end-user 
verification, and supply chain security threats; and 
(6) establishment of trusted supplier networks 
for critical semiconductor technology components 
and manufacturing services. 
(c) CONSEQUENCES FOR NON-COOPERATION.— 
(1) ASSESSMENT OF COOPERATION.—The Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Commerce, shall regularly assess the extent to which 
countries engaged pursuant to subsection (a) are im-
plementing measures consistent with United States 
policy described in section 3. 
(2) DETERMINATION OF INSUFFICIENT SECU-
RITY MEASURES.—If the Secretary of State deter-
mines that a country engaged with pursuant to sub-
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section (a) is not implementing security measures 
sufficient to fully prevent semiconductor technology 
transfer to countries of concern, the Secretary 
shall— 
(A) provide a detailed explanation of the 
specific deficiencies in the country’s semicon-
ductor technology protection measures; 
(B) request the Secretary of Commerce to 
convene a meeting of the Export Advisory Re-
view Board to identify and execute a plan of ac-
tion to address the insufficient security meas-
ures within 21 days of the Secretary of State’s 
determination of inadequate cooperation; and 
(C) notify the appropriate congressional 
committees of such determination not later than 
30 days after making such determination and 
provide routine updates on the Export Advisory 
Review Board meeting request and plan of ac-
tion described in subparagraph (B). 
(3) ENHANCED
FOREIGN
DIRECT
PRODUCT 
RULE
APPLICATION.—In carrying out the process 
described in paragraph (2)(B), the Secretary of 
State shall provide to Export Advisory Review 
Board— 
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(A) recommendations for the application of 
Foreign Direct Product Rule restrictions to 
semiconductor technology produced in the non- 
cooperating country that incorporate United 
States-origin technology, software, or equip-
ment; 
(B) recommended entities for the expan-
sion of Entity List designations for semicon-
ductor technology supply chain companies or re-
search institutions in the non-cooperating coun-
try that pose technology transfer risks; and 
(C) guidance on what additional steps may 
be needed to prevent foreign backfilling of U.S. 
technology in restricted sectors or entities in 
countries of concern. 
(d) REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days 
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on— 
(A) the status of diplomatic engagement 
with key semiconductor technology-producing 
countries; 
(B) progress toward achieving the coordi-
nation objectives specified in subsection (b); 
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(C) any determinations of inadequate co-
operation made under subsection (c); and 
(D) the effectiveness of multilateral coordi-
nation in preventing semiconductor technology 
transfer to countries of concern. 
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may include a classified annex. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate. 
(2) COUNTRIES
OF
CONCERN.—The term 
‘‘countries of concern’’ has the meaning given the 
term ‘‘covered nation’’ in section 4872(f) of title 10, 
United States Code. 
(3) ENTITY
LIST.—The term ‘‘Entity List’’ 
means the list maintained by the Bureau of Industry 
and Security of the Department of Commerce and 
set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 
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