In the Senate of the United States,
July 22, 2004.
Resolved, That the resolution from the House of Rep-
resentatives (H. Con. Res. 398) entitled ‘‘Concurrent resolu-
tion expressing the concern of Congress over Iran’s develop-
ment of the means to produce nuclear weapons.’’, do pass
with the following
AMENDMENTS:
Ω1æPage 1, strike out the preamble and insert:
Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and
urgently to seek the agreement of other nations also to op-
pose, any transfer to Iran of any goods or technology, in-
cluding dual-use goods or technology, wherever that trans-
fer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, that
‘‘all States shall refrain from providing any form of sup-
port to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire,
manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons and their means of deliv-
ery’’;
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HCON 398 EAS
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous
times on persons and entities transferring equipment and
technical data to Iran to assist its weapons of mass de-
struction programs;
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-
ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered
into force March 5, 1970 (the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty’’);
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, is obligated never
to develop or acquire nuclear weapons;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA) the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the production-scale Fuel Enrich-
ment Facility under construction at Natanz until Feb-
ruary 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility
was revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment
Plant could produce enough highly enriched uranium for
a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Fa-
cility could, when completed, produce enough highly en-
riched uranium for as many as 25 to 30 nuclear weapons
per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General
of the IAEA stated that Iran had failed to meet its obliga-
tions under its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA to re-
port all nuclear material imported into Iran—specifically,
the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetra-
fluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991—the processing and
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HCON 398 EAS
use of that material, and the facilities involved in the use
and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report
that Iran had produced uranium metal and was building
a uranium metal processing facility, despite the fact that
neither its light water reactors nor its planned heavy
water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June
2003 to promptly rectify its failures to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement, not to introduce nuclear
material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant,
and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving ques-
tions about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of
Governors of the IAEA in August 2003 that Iran had
failed to disclose additional nuclear activities as required
by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail to re-
solve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment
activities, including those raised by the detection of two
types of highly enriched uranium particles at the Natanz
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admit-
ted in a letter that it had carried out uranium conversion
experiments in the early 1990’s, experiments that included
bench scale preparation of uranium compounds and that
should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance with
its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003,
called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment
and any plutonium reprocessing activities, disclose all its
nuclear activities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA, and
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HCON 398 EAS
to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional Pro-
tocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of
safeguards (the ‘‘Additional Protocol’’) to strengthen inves-
tigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and re-
quested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully
with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran’s nuclear
program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront
Iran with discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers
of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a
joint statement in which Iran indicated that it had de-
cided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing
activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran’s ac-
cess to modern technologies and supplies in a range of
areas once certain international concerns regarding Iran
are fully resolved;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran fur-
ther admitted that it had tested uranium enrichment cen-
trifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company between 1998 and
2002 using its previously undeclared imported uranium
hexafluoride;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser
uranium enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilo-
grams of uranium not previously declared to the IAEA,
another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment pro-
gram had achieved uranium enrichment levels of slightly
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HCON 398 EAS
more than 3 percent, but the Director General’s report of
June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later learned that Iran
‘‘had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8
percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approxi-
mately 15 percent’’;
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran’s dec-
laration of October 21, 2003, failed to include information
that should have been provided, including the fact that
‘‘some samples from’’ the laser uranium enrichment project
‘‘had been sent for assessment to the supplier’s laboratory’’;
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted
that it had irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide tar-
gets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, another
violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities
under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it
would sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and would
act in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its
entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the
IAEA Director General that it had decided to suspend all
enrichment and reprocessing activities in Iran, not to
produce feed material for enrichment processes, and not to
import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic ac-
tivities in Iran and elsewhere, has uncovered and con-
fronted Iran about numerous lies concerning its nuclear
activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the
IAEA Board of Governors on November 10, 2003, that
Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities
†
HCON 398 EAS
from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its Safe-
guards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran’s subsequent pledge to, once again, fully
disclose all of its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Direc-
tor General of the IAEA, in a February 24, 2004, report,
found that Iran continued to engage in deception regard-
ing its nuclear activities, including failing to disclose a
more sophisticated enrichment program using more ad-
vanced enrichment centrifuge technology imported from
foreign sources, and providing incomplete and unsup-
ported explanations about experiments to create a highly
toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is useful
as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Director General’s reports of February 24, 2001,
and June 1, 2004, stated that environmental samples from
one room at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and
from equipment that had been present in that workshop
showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to
36 percent U–235, despite finding only negligible traces of
this on imported centrifuge components, and that the types
of uranium contamination at that workshop differed from
those found at Natanz, which would appear to contradict
Iran’s assertion that the source of contamination at both
sites is imported centrifuge components and perhaps also
its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more
than 1.2 percent U–235 using centrifuge technology;
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, re-
port, that ‘‘the contamination is different on domestic and
imported centrifuges,’’ that ‘‘it is unlikely’’ that the 36
percent U–235 contamination was due to components ac-
quired from Iran’s principal supplier country, and that
‘‘important information about the P–2 centrifuge pro-
†
HCON 398 EAS
gramme has frequently required repeated requests, and in
some cases continues to involve changing or contradictory
information’’;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and of Iran’s previous assur-
ances to the IAEA and the international community of full
transparency;
Whereas despite Iran’s commitment to the IAEA and to
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that it would
suspend uranium enrichment activities, it has repeatedly
emphasized that this suspension is temporary and contin-
ued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, ura-
nium enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allow-
ing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment ac-
tivities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan
Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to reveal to
the IAEA its research into more sophisticated ‘‘P2’’ ura-
nium enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other
projects which it has no intention of declaring to the
IAEA, are contrary to—
(1) Iran’s commitment to the IAEA in an October
16, 2003, letter from the Vice President of Iran and the
President of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization that
Iran would present a ‘‘full picture of its nuclear activi-
ties’’ and ‘‘full transparency’’;
(2) Iran’s commitment to the foreign ministers of the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21,
†
HCON 398 EAS
2003, to full transparency and to resolve all outstanding
issues; and
(3) its statement to the IAEA’s Board of Governors
of September 12, 2003, of its commitment to full trans-
parency and to ‘‘leave no stone unturned’’ to assure the
IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology,
and a nuclear weapons design, from the same nuclear
black market that Iran has used, raising the question of
whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon design
that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will
soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with enriched
nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, which,
if implemented, would undercut the international effort to
persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons development
program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of March 13,
2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with ‘‘seri-
ous concern that the declarations made by Iran in October
2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of
Iran’s past and present nuclear programme considered es-
sential by the Board’s November 2003 resolution,’’ and
also noted that the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hid-
den more advanced centrifuge associated research, manu-
facturing, and testing activities, two mass spectrometers
used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot
cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ‘‘with equal concern
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the de-
velopment of its enrichment technology to its current ex-
†
HCON 398 EAS
tent, and that a number of other questions remain unre-
solved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in
Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken
on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature,
extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned
heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims re-
garding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments’’;
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that
IAEA inspections would be indefinitely suspended as a
protest against the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of
March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently agreed to re-
admit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to
others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops be-
longing to the Defence Industries Organization, this sus-
pension calls into serious question Iran’s commitment to
full transparency about its nuclear activities;
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its in-
tent to produce uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the
IAEA concluded would constitute production of feed mate-
rial for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a letter of May
18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment
activities ‘‘does not include suspension of production of
UF6,’’ which contradicted assurances provided in its letter
of November 10, 2003;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of June 18,
2004, which was also adopted unanimously, ‘‘deplores’’ the
fact that ‘‘Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely
and proactive as it should have been’’ and ‘‘underlines
that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more
important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency
to gain a full understanding of Iran’s enrichment pro-
gramme by providing all relevant information, as well as
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HCON 398 EAS
by providing prompt access to all relevant places, data
and persons’’;
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran’s
suspension ‘‘commitments have not been comprehensively
implemented and calls on Iran immediately to correct all
remaining shortcomings’’;
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further con-
fidence-building measures, voluntarily to reconsider its de-
cision to begin production testing at the Uranium Conver-
sion Facility and its decision to start construction of a re-
search reactor moderated by heavy water, as the reversal
of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore
international confidence undermined by past reports of
undeclared nuclear activities in Iran;
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume produc-
tion of centrifuge components, notwithstanding both the
IAEA Board of Governors resolution of September 12,
2003, which called on Iran ‘‘to suspend all further ura-
nium enrichment-related activities,’’ and Iran’s voluntary
suspension of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant
to its agreement of October 21, 2003, with the foreign min-
isters of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany;
Whereas Iran’s pattern of deception and concealment in deal-
ing with the IAEA, the Foreign Ministers of France, Ger-
many, and the United Kingdom, and the international
community, its receipt from other countries of the means
to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nu-
clear weapon design to another country, its production of
centrifuge components at Defence Industries Organization
workshops, and its repeated breaches of its Safeguards
Agreement suggest strongly that Iran has also violated its
legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
†
HCON 398 EAS
liferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in ac-
quiring nuclear weapons; and
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or uranium enrichment or
reprocessing facilities will continue to endanger the main-
tenance of international peace and security and threaten
United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring),
Ω2æPage 8, line 2, strike out all after the resolving clause
and insert:
That Congress—
(1) condemns—
(A) the failure of the Government of Iran
for nearly two decades to report material, facili-
ties, and activities to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in contravention of its
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement; and
(B) Iran’s continuing deceptions and false-
hoods to the IAEA and the international commu-
nity about its nuclear programs and activities;
(2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the
Department of State’s Annual Report on Adherence to
and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Pro-
liferation Agreements and Commitments that Iran is
pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
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HCON 398 EAS
(3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA
whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources
are necessary to enable the IAEA it to fully inves-
tigate Iran’s nuclear activities;
(4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at
Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and
entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this
resolution referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty’’), including the United States, to use ap-
propriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nu-
clear weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear
and other cooperation with Iran, including the provi-
sion of dual use items, until Iran fully implements
the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA (hereafter in this resolution referred to
as the ‘‘Additional Protocol’’) and is clearly in com-
pliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty;
(5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches
during the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement
with the IAEA, has forfeited the right to be trusted
with the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle, espe-
cially with uranium conversion and enrichment and
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HCON 398 EAS
plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and
facilities;
(6) declares that the revelations of Iran’s non-
disclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-
weapons-applicable research activities, as detailed in
the reports of February 24, 2004, and June 1, 2004,
by the Director General of the IAEA, together with
the statement by the Government of Iran that it will
not disclose other research programs, constitute ample
evidence of Iran’s continuing policy of noncompliance
with the letter and spirit of its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol;
(7) recognizes, in contrast with Iran’s behavior,
the positive example of Libya’s decision to renounce
and dismantle its nuclear weapons program and to
provide full, complete, and transparent disclosure of
all its nuclear activities, which has enabled the IAEA
to rapidly understand and verify with high con-
fidence the extent and scope of Libya’s program and
has led to the establishment of direct diplomatic rela-
tions with Libya, the gradual lifting of U.S. sanc-
tions, and the establishment of cooperative programs
between the United States and Libya;
(8) foresees a similar future for Iran, once that
country renounces and dismantles its weapons of
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HCON 398 EAS
mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile pro-
grams and renounces its support for international
terrorist organizations;
(9) notes the assistance that the United States
has provided to southeastern Iran since the Bam
earthquake on December 26, 2003;
(10) calls upon Iran to immediately and perma-
nently cease all efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear
fuel cycle capabilities, in particular all uranium en-
richment activities, including importing, manufac-
turing, and testing of related equipment;
(11) urges Iran to comply with its international
commitments and to rescind its decisions—
(A) to manufacture and construct cen-
trifuges;
(B) to produce feed material that could be
used in those centrifuges; and
(C) to construct a heavy-water moderated
reactor that could be used for plutonium produc-
tion;
(12) calls upon Iran to honor its stated commit-
ments and legal obligations—
(A) to grant IAEA inspectors prompt, full
and unrestricted access;
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HCON 398 EAS
(B) to cooperate fully with the investigation
of its nuclear activities; and
(C) to demonstrate a new openness and
honesty about all its nuclear programs;
(13) welcomes the June 26, 2004, declaration at
the United States-E.U. Summit in Shannon, Ireland,
in which the European Union and the United States
pledged to implement United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1540, which identifies actions states
should take—
(A) to stop the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction;
(B) to establish new measures in accordance
with the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation,
announced June 9, 2004, at the G8 Summit in
Sea Island, Georgia; and
(C) to preserve the integrity of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty;
(14) urges close cooperation between the United
States and the European Union in accordance with
the reaffirmation in their June 26, 2004, declaration
of ‘‘the IAEA Board of Governors’ Iran resolutions,
which deplore Iran’s insufficient cooperation and call
on Iran, inter alia, to cooperate fully and in a timely
and proactive manner, with IAEA investigation of its
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HCON 398 EAS
nuclear programme and suspend all enrichment-re-
lated and reprocessing activities’’;
(15) calls upon the members of the European
Union not to resume discussions with Iran on multi-
lateral trade agreements until the IAEA Director
General reports that Iran has suspended all nuclear
weapons development activity, and not to implement
such trade agreements until Iran has verifiably and
permanently ceased all nuclear weapons development
activity, including a permanent cessation of uranium
conversion and enrichment and plutonium reprocess-
ing activities;
(16) further calls upon the members of the Euro-
pean Union to undertake such additional measures,
including imposing sanctions and sponsoring an
IAEA Board of Governors report on non-compliance
pursuant to Article XII of the IAEA Statute, as may
be necessary to persuade Iran to cease all nuclear
weapons development activity and to fulfill its obliga-
tions and commitments to the IAEA;
(17) in light of ongoing revelations of the non-
compliance of the Government of Iran regarding its
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the con-
sequent and ongoing questions and concerns of the
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HCON 398 EAS
IAEA, the United States, and the international com-
munity regarding Iran’s nuclear activities—
(A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese
commercial entities not proceed with the develop-
ment of Iran’s Azadegan oil field;
(B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure
that French and Malaysian commercial entities
not proceed with their agreement for further co-
operation in expanding Iran’s liquid natural gas
production field;
(C) calls on all countries to intercede with
their commercial entities to ensure that these en-
tities refrain from or suspend all investment and
investment-related activities that support Iran’s
energy industry; and
(D) calls on Member States of the United
Nations to prevent the Government of Iran from
continuing to pursue and develop programs or
facilities that could be used in a nuclear weap-
ons program and to end all nuclear cooperation
with Iran, including the provision of dual use
items, until Iran complies fully with its Safe-
guards Agreement with the IAEA and its obliga-
tions under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea-
ty;
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HCON 398 EAS
(18) deplores any effort by any country to pro-
vide nuclear power-related assistance to Iran at this
time, and calls upon Russia—
(A) to use all appropriate means to urge
Iran to meet fully its obligations and commit-
ments to the IAEA; and
(B) to suspend nuclear cooperation with
Iran and not conclude a nuclear fuel supply
agreement for the Bushehr reactor that would
enter into force before Iran has verifiably and
permanently ceased all nuclear weapons develop-
ment activity, including a permanent cessation
of uranium conversion and enrichment and plu-
tonium reprocessing activities;
(19) calls upon the governments of the countries
whose nationals and corporations are implicated in
assisting Iranian nuclear activities, including Paki-
stan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Germany—
(A) to fully investigate such assistance;
(B) to grant the IAEA all necessary access
to individuals, sites, and information related to
the investigations;
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HCON 398 EAS
(C) to take all appropriate action against
such nationals and corporations under the laws
of those countries; and
(D) to immediately review and rectify their
export control laws, regulations, and practices in
order to prevent further assistance to countries
pursuing nuclear programs that could support
the development of nuclear weapons;
(20) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, in ac-
cordance with Article XII of the IAEA Statute—
(A) to report to the United Nations Security
Council that Iran has been in noncompliance
with its agreements with the IAEA; and
(B) as appropriate, to specify areas in
which Iran continues to be in noncompliance
with its agreements with the IAEA or with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or in which
its compliance is uncertain;
(21) urges the United Nations Security Council,
bearing in mind its decision in Resolution 1540 that
the ‘‘proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, con-
stitutes a threat to international peace and security,’’
to consider measures necessary—
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HCON 398 EAS
(A) to support the inspection efforts by the
IAEA; and
(B) to prevent Iran from further engaging
in clandestine nuclear activities;
(22) further urges the United Nations Security
Council, immediately upon receiving any report from
the IAEA regarding the continuing non-compliance of
Iran with its obligations, to address the threat to
international peace and security posed by Iran’s nu-
clear weapons program and take such action as may
be necessary under Article 39, Article 40, and Article
41 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(23) urges the United Nations Security Council,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee,
and other relevant international entities to declare
that non-nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty that commit significant vio-
lations of their safeguards agreements regarding ura-
nium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing or engage
in activities intended to support a military nuclear
program thereby forfeit their right under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in nuclear fuel-
cycle activities;
(24) further urges the United Nations Security
Council, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger