H. R. 5682
One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America 
AT THE SECOND SESSION 
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 
the third day of January, two thousand and six 
An Act 
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed 
nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I—UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
NUCLEAR COOPERATION 
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006’’. 
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and 
the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United 
States foreign policy; 
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and 
strengthening 
its 
implementation, 
particularly 
its 
verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States 
nonproliferation policy; 
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining 
a stable international security situation; 
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT 
and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential 
challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken 
the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons 
capabilities; 
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest 
extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not 
States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition 
of any nuclear technology they develop; 
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into 
an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to 
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT 
if—
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(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior 
with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related 
to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them; 
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that 
is congruent to that of the United States, and is working 
with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives 
related to nonproliferation; 
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate 
and implement substantially improved protections against 
the proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons 
and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions 
that would further the development of its nuclear weapons 
program; and 
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 
greater political and material support to the achievement 
of United States global and regional nonproliferation objec-
tives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, 
if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor 
terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire 
a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass 
destruction capability and the means to deliver such 
weapons; 
(7) the United States should continue its policy of engage-
ment, collaboration, and exchanges with and between India 
and Pakistan; 
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national 
interest of the United States; 
(9) the United States and India share common democratic 
values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic 
engagement; 
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
United States and other countries has the potential to benefit 
the people of all countries; 
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change 
in United States policy regarding commerce with countries 
that are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the 
foundation of the international nonproliferation regime; 
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by 
the United States and other countries must be achieved in 
a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or 
regional arms races and maximizes India’s adherence to inter-
national nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the 
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and 
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or 
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any 
other party if such exports are terminated under United States 
law. 
SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies of the 
United States: 
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce 
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or 
outside of the NPT. 
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the 
right to ‘‘develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
H. R. 5682—3
for peaceful purposes’’, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, 
as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is 
consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabili-
ties, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with 
any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obliga-
tions, including its safeguards obligations. 
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines 
for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of 
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and 
Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions 
related to the those guidelines, and the rules and practices 
regarding NSG decisionmaking. 
(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely 
and coordinated response by NSG members to all such viola-
tions, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved 
recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from con-
tinuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a 
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved. 
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and tech-
nologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work 
with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to 
further restrict the transfers of such equipment and tech-
nologies, including to India. 
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant 
to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 
et seq.), or any other United States law. 
(b) WITH RESPECT
TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following shall be 
the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia: 
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium 
on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive pur-
poses by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion 
and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile 
material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States 
and India become parties. 
(3) Secure India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative; 
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
Principles of such Initiative; 
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform 
its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Cri-
teria, and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement; 
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); 
and
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(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done 
at Vienna on September 12, 1997. 
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United 
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction 
and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the 
capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and 
the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. 
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals 
in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual 
elimination. 
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian 
nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States 
except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures 
required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)). 
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium 
described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph 
(2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile 
material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. 
(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional 
Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably 
safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear mate-
rials and equipment. 
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agree-
ment for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet 
the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through 
a.(9) of such section. 
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to 
the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear 
facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor oper-
ating requirements. 
SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—If the President makes the determination 
described in subsection (b), the President may—
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India 
arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of subsection 
a.(2) of such section; 
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports 
to India; and 
(3) waive with respect to India the application of—
(A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and 
(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding 
any actions that occurred before July 18, 2005. 
(b) DETERMINATION
BY
THE PRESIDENT.—The determination 
referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President 
that the following actions have occurred: 
(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA 
with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear 
facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration 
regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.
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(2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps 
required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement 
requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in 
accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices 
(including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 
(1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and pro-
grams as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), 
including materials used in or produced through the use of 
India’s civil nuclear facilities. 
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress 
toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA 
principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India’s 
civil nuclear program. 
(4) India is working actively with the United States for 
the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation 
of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. 
(5) India is working with and supporting United States 
and international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment 
and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already 
possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing 
plants. 
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear 
and other sensitive materials and technology, including 
through—
(A) the enactment and effective enforcement of com-
prehensive export control legislation and regulations; 
(B) harmonization of its export control laws, regula-
tions, policies, and practices with the guidelines and prac-
tices of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
and the NSG; and 
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance 
with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adher-
ence. 
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply 
to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the 
NSG. 
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees the determination made pursu-
ant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis 
for the determination. 
(2) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—To the fullest extent 
available to the United States, the report referred to in para-
graph (1) shall include the following information: 
(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the 
United States and the IAEA to separate India’s civil and 
military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and 
the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying 
India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, 
including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and 
declaration, together with copies of the plan and declara-
tion. 
(B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered 
into between India and the IAEA requiring the application 
of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India’s 
civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described
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in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, 
and a description of the progress toward its full 
implementation. 
(C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion 
and implementation of an Additional Protocol between 
India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope 
of such Additional Protocol. 
(D) A description of the steps that India is taking 
to work with the United States for the conclusion of a 
multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile mate-
rial for nuclear weapons, including a description of the 
steps that the United States has taken and will take to 
encourage India to identify and declare a date by which 
India would be willing to stop production of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilat-
eral moratorium or treaty. 
(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent 
the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrich-
ment and reprocessing technology or materials that can 
be used to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, as well 
as the support that India is providing to the United States 
to further United States objectives to restrict the spread 
of such technology. 
(F) A description of the steps that India is taking 
to secure materials and technology applicable for the 
development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of 
mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons 
through the application of comprehensive export control 
legislation and regulations, and through harmonization 
with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and 
Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance with 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and 
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
(G) A description and assessment of the specific meas-
ures that India has taken to fully and actively participate 
in United States and international efforts to dissuade, iso-
late, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its 
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including 
a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich 
uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver 
weapons of mass destruction. 
(H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating 
to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether 
nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agree-
ment for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is 
consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the 
NSG. 
(I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
envisioned by the United States and India that will be 
implemented under the agreement for nuclear cooperation, 
including whether such cooperation will include the provi-
sion of enrichment and reprocessing technology. 
(J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with India 
will not in any way assist India’s nuclear weapons program. 
(d) RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR TRANSFERS.—
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title con-
stitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear cooperation 
between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear-
weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, 
encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. 
(2) NSG 
TRANSFER
GUIDELINES.—Notwithstanding the 
entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India 
arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title, no item 
subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines 
of the NSG, or to NSG decisions related thereto, may be trans-
ferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with 
the transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect on the date of 
the transfer. 
(3) TERMINATION OF NUCLEAR TRANSFERS TO INDIA.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the entry into force 
of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursu-
ant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2153) and pursuant to this title, and except as 
provided under subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and 
nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India 
shall be terminated if there is any materially significant 
transfer by an Indian person of—
(i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, 
or technology that is not consistent with NSG guide-
lines or decisions, or 
(ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment 
or technology that is not consistent with MTCR guide-
lines, 
unless the President determines that cessation of such 
exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement 
of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise 
jeopardize the common defense and security. 
(B) EXCEPTION.—The President may choose not to 
terminate exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, 
equipment, and technology to India under subparagraph 
(A) if—
(i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph 
was made without the knowledge of the Government 
of India; 
(ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Govern-
ment of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian 
person that made the transfer or the Indian person 
that made the transfer is a natural person who acted 
without the knowledge of any entity described in 
subparagraph (B) or (C) of section 110(5); and 
(iii) the President certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees that the Government of India 
has taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other 
enforcement actions against the Indian person with 
respect to such transfer. 
(4) EXPORTS, REEXPORTS, TRANSFERS, AND RETRANSFERS TO 
INDIA
RELATED
TO
ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING, AND
HEAVY 
WATER PRODUCTION.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—
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(i) 
NUCLEAR
REGULATORY
COMMISSION.—The 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission may only issue 
licenses for the export or reexport to India of any 
equipment, components, or materials related to the 
enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water if the 
requirements of subparagraph (B) are met. 
(ii) SECRETARY
OF
ENERGY.—The Secretary of 
Energy may only issue authorizations for the transfer 
or retransfer to India of any equipment, materials, 
or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, 
the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production 
of heavy water (including under the terms of a subse-
quent arrangement under section 131 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if the require-
ments of subparagraph (B) are met. 
(B) 
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
APPROVALS.—Exports, 
reexports, transfers, and retransfers referred to in subpara-
graph (A) may only be approved if—
(i) the end user—
(I) is a multinational facility participating in 
an IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives 
to national fuel cycle capabilities; or 
(II) is a facility participating in, and the 
export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer is associ-
ated with, a bilateral or multinational program 
to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle; 
(ii) appropriate measures are in place at any 
facility referred to in clause (i) to ensure that no sen-
sitive nuclear technology, as defined in section 4(5) 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 
3203(5)), will be diverted to any person, site, facility, 
location, or program not under IAEA safeguards; and 
(iii) the President
determines that the export, 
reexport, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the 
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices 
or the production of fissile material for military pur-
poses. 
(5) NUCLEAR EXPORT ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAM.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall ensure that all 
appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability 
with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and tech-
nology sold, leased, exported, or reexported to India so 
as to ensure—
(i) full implementation of the protections required 
under section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and 
(ii) United States compliance with Article I of the 
NPT. 
(B) MEASURES.—The measures taken pursuant to 
subparagraph (A) shall include the following: 
(i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and 
conditions pursuant to the export licensing authorities 
of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Depart-
ment of Commerce and the authorizing authorities of 
the Department of Energy, including, as appropriate, 
conditions regarding end-use monitoring.
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(ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting 
for technology transfers, including any retransfers in 
India, authorized by the Department of Energy pursu-
ant to section 57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). Such system shall be capable of 
providing assurances that—
(I) the identified recipients of the nuclear tech-
nology are authorized to receive the nuclear tech-
nology; 
(II) the nuclear technology identified for 
transfer will be used only for peaceful safeguarded 
nuclear activities and will not be used for any 
military or nuclear explosive purpose; and 
(III) the nuclear technology identified for 
transfer will not be retransferred without the prior 
consent of the United States, and facilities, equip-
ment, or materials derived through the use of 
transferred technology will not be transferred 
without the prior consent of the United States. 
(iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement 
safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation 
arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate assurance 
that arrangements will be put in place expeditiously 
that are consistent with the requirements of section 
123 a.(1) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding 
the maintenance of safeguards as set forth in the agree-
ment regardless of whether the agreement is termi-
nated or suspended for any reason. 
(C) IMPLEMENTATION.—The measures described in 
subparagraph (B) shall be implemented to provide reason-
able assurances that the recipient is complying with the 
relevant requirements, terms, and conditions of any 
licenses issued by the United States regarding such exports, 
including those relating to the use, retransfer, safe han-
dling, secure transit, and storage of such exports. 
(e) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL REQUIREMENT.—Section 
123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is 
amended in the second proviso by inserting after ‘‘that subsection’’ 
the following: ‘‘, or an agreement exempted pursuant to section 
104(a)(1) of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic 
Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,’’. 
(f) SUNSET.—The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) 
to exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the enactment of 
a joint resolution under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving such an agreement. 
(g) REPORTING TO CONGRESS.—
(1) INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF INDIA.—The 
President shall keep the appropriate congressional committees 
fully and currently informed of the facts and implications of 
any significant nuclear activities of India, including—
(A) any material noncompliance on the part of the 
Government of India with—
(i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken 
in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the 
President of the United States and the Prime Minister 
of India;