and public opinion, civil society and academia, and 
members of the Chinese diaspora. 
(5) The Government of China and the Com-
munist Party of China employ an array of govern-
ment entities, friendship and exchange organiza-
tions, private entities and businesspeople, and gov-
ernment-funded foundations, think tanks, edu-
cational and other projects to carry out political in-
fluence operations, which is often referred to as 
united front work. 
(6) These political influence operations violate 
national sovereignty, and as such, are fundamentally 
different from traditional efforts by states to shape 
international policy debates and improve their public 
image through public diplomacy and strategic com-
munications campaigns. 
(7) The aims of the political influence oper-
ations of the Government of China and the Com-
munist Party of China are— 
(A) to protect the political security of the 
Chinese Communist Party, both within China 
and globally; 
(B) to domestically and globally promote 
the idea that the Chinese Communist Party’s 
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political and economic model is superior to the 
governments of Western democracies; and 
(C) to promote the interests of the regime 
globally. 
(8) The political influence operations of the 
Government of China and the Communist Party of 
China take advantage of the open and democratic 
nature of the United States, including— 
(A) constitutional protections for free 
speech and a free press; and 
(B) the desire of some individuals or insti-
tutions to attract Chinese investment, gain ac-
cess to Chinese markets, or attain greater glob-
al influence. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the political influence operations of the Gov-
ernment of China and the Communist Party of 
China are not ‘‘soft power’’ intended to persuade, 
but ‘‘sharp power’’ intended— 
(A) to penetrate or corrupt democratic 
countries and undermine democratic institu-
tions and freedoms; 
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, laws, and 
policies favorable to the Government of China’s 
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interest through disinformation, coercion, cor-
ruption, and other means; 
(C) to widen the scope of Chinese authori-
tarian influence around the world, including— 
(i) to suppress political opposition to 
the Chinese Communist Party; and 
(ii) to violate the internationally rec-
ognized human and civil rights of Chinese 
citizens living in nations around the world; 
and 
(D) to undermine the strength of American 
alliances around the world; and 
(2) the American people need reliable and cur-
rent information— 
(A) to identify the key institutions, individ-
uals, entities, and ministries that carry out such 
operations; and 
(B) to distinguish between malign political 
influence operations intended to undermine core 
American freedoms, democratic institutions, 
and cultural, educational, business, and people- 
to-people exchanges that may benefit the 
United States and China. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
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(1) to clearly differentiate between the Chinese 
people and culture and the Government of China 
and the Communist Party of China in official state-
ments, media, and messaging, and to ensure that ef-
forts to curtail Beijing’s political influence oper-
ations do not lead to the targeting of Chinese-Ameri-
cans or the Chinese diaspora; 
(2) to clearly differentiate between legal, inter-
nationally accepted public diplomacy and strategic 
communications campaigns and illicit activities to 
undermine democratic institutions or freedoms; 
(3) to protect United States citizens and legal 
residents from malign or coercive political influence 
operations; 
(4) to enhance cooperation and coordination 
with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Taiwan (offi-
cially known as the ‘‘Republic of China’’), and Mon-
golia, whose governments and institutions have faced 
acute pressure from the political influence operations 
of the Government of China and the Communist 
Party of China, and with other allies throughout the 
world; 
(5) to create strategies to ensure that countries 
in Africa, the Western Hemisphere, Southeast Asia, 
and elsewhere are aware of China’s ‘‘sharp power’’ 
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and provide needed capacity to counter them effec-
tively; 
(6) to implement more advanced transparency 
requirements concerning collaboration with Chinese 
actors for media agencies, universities, think tanks, 
and government officials; 
(7) to use various forums to raise awareness 
about— 
(A) the goals and methods of the political 
influence operations of the Government of 
China and the Communist Party of China; and 
(B) common patterns and approaches used 
by Chinese intelligence agencies or related ac-
tors; 
(8) to require greater transparency for Confu-
cius Institutes, think tanks, academic programs, and 
nongovernmental organizations funded primarily by 
the Government of China, the Communist Party of 
China, or by individuals or public or private organi-
zations with a demonstrable affiliation with the Gov-
ernment of China or the Communist Party of China 
that are operating in the United States to register 
through the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) or a comparable mech-
anism; 
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