H. R. 1530—307
‘‘(A) grants sanctuary from prosecution to any individ-
ual or group that has committed an act of international
terrorism; or
‘‘(B) otherwise supports international terrorism.
‘‘(b) WAIVER.—(1) The President may waive the application
of subsection (a) to a country if the President determines—
‘‘(A) that it is in the national security interests of the
United States to do so; or
‘‘(B) that the waiver should be granted for humanitarian
reasons.
‘‘(2) The President shall—
‘‘(A) notify the Committee on Armed Services and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Commit-
tee on National Security and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives at least 15 days
before the waiver takes effect; and
‘‘(B) publish a notice of the waiver in the Federal Register.
‘‘(c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘international terror-
ism’ has the meaning given that term in section 140(d) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989
(22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)).’’.
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the begin-
ning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by adding at
the end the following:
‘‘2249a. Prohibition on providing financial assistance to terrorist countries.’’.
SEC. 1342. JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
FOR YUGOSLAVIA AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBU-
NAL FOR RWANDA.
(a) SURRENDER OF PERSONS.—
(1) APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES EXTRADITION LAWS.—
Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), the provisions
of chapter 209 of title 18, United States Code, relating to
the extradition of persons to a foreign country pursuant to
a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and a foreign government, shall apply in the same manner
and extent to the surrender of persons, including United States
citizens, to—
(A) the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia, pursuant
to the Agreement Between the United States and the Inter-
national Tribunal for Yugoslavia; and
(B) the International Tribunal for Rwanda, pursuant
to the Agreement Between the United States and the Inter-
national Tribunal for Rwanda.
(2) EVIDENCE ON HEARINGS.—For purposes of applying sec-
tion 3190 of title 18, United States Code, in accordance with
paragraph (1), the certification referred to in that section may
be made by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States resident in such foreign countries where the
International Tribunal for Yugoslavia or the International
Tribunal for Rwanda may be permanently or temporarily
situated.
(3) PAYMENT OF FEES AND COSTS.—(A) The provisions of
the Agreement Between the United States and the Inter-
national Tribunal for Yugoslavia and of the Agreement Between
the United States and the International Tribunal for Rwanda
shall apply in lieu of the provisions of section 3195 of title
H. R. 1530—308
18, United States Code, with respect to the payment of expenses
arising from the surrender by the United States of a person
to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia or the Inter-
national Tribunal for Rwanda, respectively, or from any
proceedings in the United States relating to such surrender.
(B) The authority of subparagraph (A) may be exercised
only to the extent and in the amounts provided in advance
in appropriations Acts.
(4) NONAPPLICABILITY OF THE FEDERAL RULES.—The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not apply to proceedings for the surrender of
persons to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia or the
International Tribunal for Rwanda.
(b) ASSISTANCE
TO FOREIGN
AND INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
AND TO LITIGANTS BEFORE SUCH TRIBUNALS.—Section 1782(a) of
title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting in the first
sentence after ‘‘foreign or international tribunal’’ the following: ‘‘,
including 
criminal 
investigations 
conducted 
before 
formal
accusation’’.
(c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section:
(1) INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA.—The term
‘‘International Tribunal for Yugoslavia’’ means the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, as established by
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25,
1993.
(2) INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL
FOR
RWANDA.—The term
‘‘International Tribunal for Rwanda’’ means the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Geno-
cide and Other Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States,
as established by United Nations Security Council Resolution
955 of November 8, 1994.
(3) AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE
UNITED
STATES
AND
THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA.—The term ‘‘Agree-
ment Between the United States and the International Tribunal
for Yugoslavia’’ means the Agreement on Surrender of Persons
Between the Government of the United States and the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Law in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia, signed at The Hague, October 5,
1994.
(4) AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE
UNITED
STATES
AND
THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA.—The term ‘‘Agreement
between the United States and the International Tribunal for
Rwanda’’ means the Agreement on Surrender of Persons
Between the Government of the United States and the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States,
signed at The Hague, January 24, 1995.
H. R. 1530—309
SEC. 1343. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS CONCERNING UNITED STATES-PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA JOINT DEFENSE CONVERSION
COMMISSION.
(a) REPORTS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit
to Congress a semiannual report on the United States-People’s
Republic of China Joint Defense Conversion Commission. Each
such report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the extent to which the activities con-
ducted in, through, or as a result of the Commission could
have directly or indirectly assisted, or may directly or indirectly
assist, the military modernization efforts of the People’s Repub-
lic of China.
(2) A discussion of the activities and operations of the
Commission, including—
(A) United States funding;
(B) a listing of participating United States officials;
(C) specification of meeting dates and locations
(prospective and retrospective);
(D) summary of discussions; and
(E) copies of any agreements reached.
(3) A discussion of the relationship between the ‘‘defense
conversion’’ activities of the People’s Republic of China and
its defense modernization efforts.
(4) A discussion of the extent to which United States busi-
ness activities pursued, or proposed to be pursued, under the
imprimatur of the Commission, or the importation of western
technology in general, contributes to the modernization of Chi-
na’s military industrial base, including any steps taken by
the United States or by United States commercial entities
to safeguard the technology or intellectual property rights asso-
ciated with any materials or information transferred.
(5) An assessment of the benefits derived by the United
States from its participation in the Commission, including
whether or to what extent United States participation in the
Commission has resulted or will result in the following:
(A) Increased transparency in the current and projected
military budget and doctrine of the People’s Republic of
China.
(B) Improved behavior and cooperation by the People’s
Republic of China in the areas of missile and nuclear
proliferation.
(C) Increased transparency in the plans of the People’s
Republic of China’s for nuclear and missile force moderniza-
tion and testing.
(6) Efforts undertaken by the Secretary of Defense to—
(A) establish a list of enterprises controlled by the
People’s Liberation Army, including those which have been
successfully converted to produce products solely for civilian
use; and
(B) provide estimates of the total revenues of those
enterprises.
(7) A description of current or proposed mechanisms for
improving the ability of the United States to track the flow
of revenues from the enterprises specified on the list established
under paragraph (6)(A).
(b) SUBMITTAL OF REPORTS.—A report shall be submitted under
subsection (a) not later than August 1 of each year with respect
H. R. 1530—310
to the first six months of that year and shall be submitted not
later than February 1 of each year with respect to the last six
months of the preceding year. The first report under such subsection
shall be submitted not less than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to the six-
month period preceding the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) FINAL REPORT UPON TERMINATION OF COMMISSION.—Upon
the termination of the United States-People’s Republic of China
Joint Defense Conversion Commission, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit a final report under this section covering the period
from the end of the period covered by the last such report through
the termination of the Commission, and subsection (a) shall cease
to apply after the submission of such report.
TITLE XIV—ARMS CONTROL MATTERS
SEC. 1401. REVISION OF DEFINITION OF LANDMINE FOR PURPOSES
OF LANDMINE EXPORT MORATORIUM.
Section 1423(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 107 Stat. 1832) is amended—
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as subpara-
graphs (A), (B), and (C), respectively;
(2) in subparagraph (C), as so redesignated, by striking
out ‘‘by remote control or’’;
(3) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ before ‘‘For purposes of’’; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
‘‘(2) The term does not include command detonated anti-
personnel land mines (such as the M18A1 ‘Claymore’ mine).’’.
SEC. 1402. REPORTS 
ON 
AND 
CERTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENT
CONCERNING MORATORIUM ON USE BY ARMED FORCES
OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES.
(a) REPORT ON EFFECTS OF MORATORIUM.—Not later than April
30 of each of 1996, 1997, and 1998, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the congressional defense committees
a report on the projected effects of a moratorium on the defensive
use of antipersonnel mines and antitank mines by the Armed
Forces. The report shall include a discussion of the following
matters:
(1) The extent to which current doctrine and practices
of the Armed Forces on the defensive use of antipersonnel
mines and antitank mines adhere to applicable international
law.
(2) The effects that a moratorium would have on the defen-
sive use of the current United States inventory of remotely
delivered, self-destructing antitank systems, antipersonnel
mines, and antitank mines.
(3) The reliability of the self-destructing antipersonnel
mines and self-destructing antitank mines of the United States.
(4) The cost of clearing the antipersonnel minefields cur-
rently protecting Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and
other United States installations.
(5) The cost of replacing antipersonnel mines in such mine-
fields with substitute systems such as the Claymore mine,
and the level of protection that would be afforded by use of
such a substitute.
H. R. 1530—311
(6) The extent to which the defensive use of antipersonnel
mines and antitank mines by the Armed Forces is a source
of civilian casualties around the world, and the extent to which
the United States, and the Department of Defense particularly,
contributes to alleviating the illegal and indiscriminate use
of such munitions.
(7) The extent to which the threat to the security of United
States forces during operations other than war and combat
operations would increase as a result of such a moratorium.
(b) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BEFORE OBSERVANCE OF MORATO-
RIUM.—Any moratorium imposed by law (whether enacted before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act) on the use
of antipersonnel landmines by the Armed Forces may be imple-
mented only if (and after) the Secretary of Defense, after consulta-
tion with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, certifies to
Congress that—
(1) the moratorium will not adversely affect the ability
of United States forces to defend against attack on land by
hostile forces; and
(2) the Armed Forces have systems that are effective sub-
stitutes for antipersonnel landmines.
SEC. 1403. EXTENSION AND AMENDMENT OF COUNTER-PROLIFERA-
TION AUTHORITIES.
(a) ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF PROGRAM.—Section 1505 of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (title XV of
Public Law 102–484; 22 U.S.C. 5859a) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a), by striking out ‘‘during fiscal years
1994 and 1995’’;
(2) in subsection (e)(1), by striking out ‘‘fiscal years 1994
and 1995’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘a fiscal year during
which the authority of the Secretary of Defense to provide
assistance under this section is in effect’’; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
‘‘(f) TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority of the Sec-
retary of Defense to provide assistance under this section terminates
at the close of fiscal year 1996.’’.
(b) PROGRAM AUTHORITIES.—(1) Subsections (b)(2) and (d)(3)
of such section are amended by striking out ‘‘the On-Site Inspection
Agency’’ and inserting in lieu thereof ‘‘the Department of Defense’’.
(2) Subsection (c)(3) of such section is amended by striking
out ‘‘will be counted’’ and all that follows and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘‘will be counted as discretionary spending in the national
defense budget function (function 050).’’.
(c) AMOUNT
OF ASSISTANCE.—Subsection (d) of such section
is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1)—
(A) by striking out ‘‘for fiscal year 1994’’ the first
place it appears and all that follows through the period
at the end of the second sentence and inserting in lieu
thereof ‘‘for any fiscal year shall be derived from amounts
made available to the Department of Defense for that fiscal
year.’’; and
(B) by striking out ‘‘referred to in this paragraph’’;
and
(2) in paragraph (3)—
H. R. 1530—312
(A) by striking out ‘‘may not exceed’’ and all that
follows through ‘‘1995’’; and
(B) by inserting before the period at the end the follow-
ing: ‘‘, may not exceed $25,000,000 for fiscal year 1994,
$20,000,000 for fiscal year 1995, or $15,000,000 for fiscal
year 1996’’.
SEC. 1404. LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT OR DISMANTLEMENT OF
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that,
unless and until the START II Treaty enters into force, the Sec-
retary of Defense should not take any action to retire or dismantle,
or to prepare to retire or dismantle, any of the following strategic
nuclear delivery systems:
(1) B-52H bomber aircraft.
(2) Trident ballistic missile submarines.
(3) Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(4) Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(b) LIMITATION
ON USE
OF FUNDS.—Funds available to the
Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended during
fiscal year 1996 for retiring or dismantling, or for preparing to
retire or dismantle, any of the strategic nuclear delivery systems
specified in subsection (a).
SEC. 1405. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS
CONCERNING TREATY VIOLATIONS.
(a) REAFFIRMATION
OF
PRIOR
FINDINGS
CONCERNING
THE
KRASNOYARSK RADAR.—Congress, noting its previous findings with
respect to the large phased-array radar of the Soviet Union known
as the ‘‘Krasnoyarsk radar’’ stated in paragraphs (1) through (4)
of section 902(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100–180; 101 Stat. 1135)
(and reaffirmed in section 1006(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law
101–189; 103 Stat. 1543)), hereby reaffirms those findings as
follows:
(1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each
party from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars
except at locations along the periphery of its national territory
and oriented outward.
(2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each
party from deploying an ABM system to defend its national
territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide
defense.
(3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during nego-
tiation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long
lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic
missiles.
(4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction,
in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of
Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subse-
quently been judged to be for ballistic missile early warning
and tracking.
(b) FURTHER
REFERENCE
TO
1987 CONGRESSIONAL
STATE-
MENTS.—Congress further notes that in section 902 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public
Law 100–180; 101 Stat. 1135) Congress also—
H. R. 1530—313
(1) noted that the President had certified that the
Krasnoyarsk radar was an unequivocal violation of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
(2) stated it to be the sense of the Congress that the
Soviet Union was in violation of its legal obligation under
that treaty.
(c) FURTHER
REFERENCE
TO
1989 CONGRESSIONAL
STATE-
MENTS.—Congress further notes that in section 1006(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991
(Public Law 101–189; 103 Stat. 1543) Congress also—
(1) again noted that in 1987 the President declared that
radar to be a clear violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and noted that on October 23, 1989, the Foreign Minister
of the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk radar is
a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
(2) stated it to be the sense of the Congress that the
Soviet Union should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar expedi-
tiously and without conditions and that until such radar was
completely dismantled it would remain a clear violation of
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
(d) ADDITIONAL FINDINGS.—Congress also finds, with respect
to the Krasnoyarsk radar, that retired Soviet General Y.V.
Votintsev, Director of the Soviet National Air Defense Forces from
1967 to 1985, has publicly stated—
(1) that he was directed by the Chief of the Soviet General
staff to locate the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk
despite the recognition by Soviet authorities that the location
of such a radar at that location would be a clear violation
of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and
(2) that Marshal D.F. Ustinov, Soviet Minister of Defense,
threatened to relieve from duty any Soviet officer who continued
to object to the construction of a large-phased array radar
at Krasnoyarsk.
(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING SOVIET TREATY VIOLA-
TIONS.—It is the sense of Congress that the government of the
Soviet Union intentionally violated its legal obligations under the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to advance its national
security interests.
(f) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE BY RUSSIA
WITH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS.—In light of subsections (a)
through (e), it is the sense of Congress that the United States
should remain vigilant in ensuring compliance by Russia with its
arms control obligations and should, when pursuing future arms
control agreements with Russia, bear in mind violations of arms
control obligations by the Soviet Union.
SEC. 1406. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RATIFICATION OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION AND START II TREATY.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Proliferation of chemical or nuclear weapons materials
poses a danger to United States national security, and the
threat or use of such materials by terrorists would directly
threaten United States citizens at home and abroad.
(2) Events such as the March 1995 terrorist release of
a chemical nerve agent in the Tokyo subway, the threatened
use of chemical weapons during the 1991 Persian Gulf War,
and the widespread use of chemical weapons during the Iran-
H. R. 1530—314
Iraq War of the 1980’s are all potent reminders of the menace
posed by chemical weapons, of the fact that the threat of
chemical weapons is not sufficiently addressed, and of the need
to outlaw the development, production, and possession of chemi-
cal weapons.
(3) The Chemical Weapons Convention negotiated and
signed by President Bush would make it more difficult for
would-be proliferators, including terrorists, to acquire or use
chemical weapons, if ratified and fully implemented, as signed,
by all signatories.
(4) United States military authorities, including Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, have
stated that United States military forces will deter and respond
to chemical weapons threats with a robust chemical defense
and an overwhelming superior conventional response, as dem-
onstrated in the Persian Gulf War, and have testified in support
of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
(5) The United States intelligence community has testified
that the Convention will provide new and important sources
of information, through regular data exchanges and routine
and challenge inspections, to improve the ability of the United
States to assess the chemical weapons status in countries of
concern.
(6) The Convention has not entered into force for lack
of the requisite number of ratifications.
(7) Russia has signed the Convention, but has not yet
ratified it.
(8) There have been reports by Russian sources of continued
Russian production and testing of chemical weapons, including
a statement by a spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Defense
on December 5, 1994, that ‘‘We cannot say that all chemical
weapons production and testing has stopped altogether.’’.
(9) The Convention will impose a legally binding obligation
on Russia and other nations that possess chemical weapons
and that ratify the Convention to cease offensive chemical
weapons activities and to destroy their chemical weapons stock-
piles and production facilities.
(10) The United States must be prepared to exercise fully
its rights under the Convention, including the request of chal-
lenge inspections when warranted, and to exercise leadership
in pursuing punitive measures against violators of the Conven-
tion, when warranted.
(11) The United States should strongly encourage full
implementation at the earliest possible date of the terms and
conditions of the United States-Russia bilateral chemical weap-
ons destruction agreement signed in 1990.
(12) The START II Treaty negotiated and signed by Presi-
dent Bush would help reduce the danger of potential
proliferators, including terrorists, acquiring nuclear warheads
and materials, and would contribute to United States-Russian
bilateral efforts to secure and dismantle nuclear warheads,
if ratified and fully implemented as signed by both parties.
(13) It is in the national security interest of the United
States to take effective steps to make it more difficult for
proliferators or would-be terrorists to obtain chemical or nuclear
materials for use in weapons.
H. R. 1530—315
(14) The President has urged prompt Senate action on,
and advice and consent to ratification of, the START II Treaty
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
(15) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified
to Congress that ratification and full implementation of both
treaties by all parties is in the United States national interest
and has strongly urged prompt Senate advice and consent
to their ratification.
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that
the United States, Russia, and all other parties to the START
II Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention should promptly
ratify and fully implement, as negotiated, both treaties.
SEC. 1407. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.
(a) FUNDING.—Of the amounts appropriated pursuant to
authorizations in sections 102, 103, 104, 201, and 301, the Secretary
of Defense may use an amount not to exceed $239,941,000 for
implementing arms control agreements to which the United States
is a party.
(b) LIMITATION.—(1) Funds made available pursuant to sub-
section (a) for the costs of implementing an arms control agreement
may not (except as provided in paragraph (2)) be used to reimburse
expenses incurred by any other party to the agreement for which
(without regard to any executive agreement or any policy not part
of an arms control agreement)—
(A) the other party is responsible under the terms of the
arms control agreement; and
(B) the United States has no responsibility under the agree-
ment.
(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) does not apply to a use
of funds to carry out an arms control expenses reimbursement
policy of the United States described in subsection (c).
(c) COVERED ARMS CONTROL EXPENSES REIMBURSEMENT POLI-
CIES.—Subsection (b)(2) applies to a policy of the United States
to reimburse expenses incurred by another party to an arms control
agreement if—
(1) the policy does not modify any obligation imposed by
the arms control agreement;
(2) the President—
(A) issued or approved the policy before the date of
the enactment of this Act; or
(B) entered into an agreement on the policy with the
government of another country or approved an agreement
on the policy entered into by an official of the United
States and the government of another country; and
(3) the President has notified the designated congressional
committees of the policy or the policy agreement (as the case
may be), in writing, at least 30 days before the date on which
the President issued or approved the policy or has entered
into or approved the policy agreement.
(d) DEFINITIONS.—For the purposes of this section:
(1) The term ‘‘arms control agreement’’ means an arms
control treaty or other form of international arms control agree-
ment.
(2) The term ‘‘executive agreement’’ means an international
agreement entered into by the President that is not authorized