1281 
HR 7900 PCS
(A) on May 26, 2015, Mr. Kara-Murza fell 
ill with symptoms indicative of poisoning and 
was hospitalized; and 
(B) on February 2, 2017, he fell ill with 
similar symptoms and was placed in a medically 
induced coma. 
(3) Independent investigations conducted by 
Bellingcat, the Insider, and Der Spiegel found that 
the same unit of the Federal Security Service of the 
Russian Federation responsible for poisoning Mr. 
Kara-Murza was responsible for poisoning Russian 
opposition leader Alexei Navalny and activists Timur 
Kuashev, Ruslan Magomedragimov, and Nikita 
Isayev. 
(4) On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin 
launched another unprovoked, unjustified, and illegal 
invasion into Ukraine in contravention of the obliga-
tions freely undertaken by the Russian Federation to 
respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine under the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the Minsk proto-
cols of 2014 and 2015, and international law. 
(5) On March 5, 2022, Vladimir Putin signed 
a law criminalizing the distribution of truthful state-
ments about the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01281
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1282 
HR 7900 PCS
Federation and mandating up to 15 years in prison 
for such offenses. 
(6) Since February 24, 2022, Mr. Kara-Murza 
has used his voice and platform to join more than 
15,000 citizens of the Russian Federation in peace-
fully protesting the war against Ukraine and mil-
lions more who silently oppose the war. 
(7) On April 11, 2022, five police officers ar-
rested Mr. Kara-Murza in front of his home and de-
nied his right to an attorney, and the next day Mr. 
Kara-Murza was sentenced to 15 days in prison for 
disobeying a police order. 
(8) On April 22, 2022, the Investigative Com-
mittee of the Russian Federation charged Mr. Kara- 
Murza with violations under the law signed on 
March 5, 2022, for his fact-based statements con-
demning the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian 
Federation. 
(9) Mr. Kara-Murza was then placed into pre-
trial detention and ordered to be held until at least 
June 12, 2022. 
(10) If convicted of those charges, Mr. Kara- 
Murza faces detention in a penitentiary system that 
human rights nongovernmental organizations have 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01282
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1283 
HR 7900 PCS
criticized for widespread torture, ill-treatment, and 
suspicious deaths of prisoners. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that Congress— 
(1) condemns the unjust detention and indict-
ing 
of 
Russian 
opposition 
leader 
Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Kara-Murza, who has courageously 
stood up to oppression in the Russian Federation; 
(2) 
expresses 
solidarity 
with 
Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Kara-Murza, his family, and all indi-
viduals in the Russian Federation imprisoned for ex-
ercising their fundamental freedoms of speech, as-
sembly, and belief; 
(3) urges the United States Government and 
other allied governments to work to secure the im-
mediate release of Vladimir Vladimirovich Kara- 
Murza, Alexei Navalny, and other citizens of the 
Russian Federation imprisoned for opposing the re-
gime of Vladimir Putin and the war against 
Ukraine; and 
(4) calls on the President to increase support 
provided by the United States Government for those 
advocating for democracy and independent media in 
the 
Russian 
Federation, 
which 
Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Kara-Murza has worked to advance. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01283
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1284 
HR 7900 PCS
SEC. 1241. TASK FORCE TO TRACK SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
TO UKRAINE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
mit to the congressional defense committees a report on 
best practices for creating a Task Force or Working 
Group to determine how to track and monitor United 
States defense articles and defense services made available 
to Ukraine. Such report shall also identify gaps or needs 
for greater research investment in developing predictive 
modeling that can forecast the movement of weapons, to 
be used for weapons tracking in Ukraine and in future 
conflicts where the United States provides security assist-
ance. 
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the submission of the report required by 
subsection (a), the best practices and recommendations 
identified in such report shall be implemented. 
(c) UPDATE.—The President shall provide to the con-
gressional defense committees quarterly updates on the 
progress of implementation in accordance with subsection 
(b). 
SEC. 1242. REPORT ON RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR IN UKRAINE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense Depart-
ment shall provide Congress with a risk assessment on the 
likelihood of the use of a nuclear weapon as a result of 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01284
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1285 
HR 7900 PCS
the Russian invasion of Ukraine and whether and by how 
much this risk increases the longer that the war continues. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 1243. REPORT ON DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF WEAP-
ONS IN UKRAINE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
submit a report to Congress describing— 
(1) the distribution and use of United States 
weaponry provided to the Ukrainian military includ-
ing compliance with United States law, including 
those prohibiting such weaponry from being provided 
to extremist groups; and 
(2) any efforts underway to prevent the illicit 
distribution or use of such weapons and the effec-
tiveness of any such efforts. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 1244. REPORT FROM COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS 
GENERAL ON UKRAINE. 
Not later than September 1, 2024, the Chairperson 
of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and 
Efficiency shall submit to the congressional defense com-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01285
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1287 
HR 7900 PCS
Subtitle E—Matters Relating to 
Europe and NATO 
SEC. 1261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES DE-
FENSE POSTURE IN EUROPE FOLLOWING 
THE FURTHER INVASION OF UKRAINE. 
It is the sense of Congress as follows: 
(1) The further invasion of Ukraine presents a 
sea change to the security environment in Europe 
that requires a long-term shift in the force posture 
of the United States and its allies, in order to ensure 
the maintenance of collective deterrence. As General 
Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, recently noted, 
‘‘We are witness to the greatest threat to peace and 
security of Europe and perhaps the world in my 42 
years of service in uniform. The Russian invasion of 
Ukraine is threatening to undermine not only Euro-
pean peace and stability but global peace and sta-
bility. * * * We are at a pivot point in the 
geostrategic history of Europe and perhaps the 
globe.’’. 
(2) Adjustments to force posture in Europe 
must be commensurate to this challenge. Alongside 
allied investments, it is necessary for the United 
States to alter its force posture to establish addi-
tional permanently stationed and continuous rota-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01287
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1288 
HR 7900 PCS
tional forces along Europe’s eastern flank. Given the 
current conditions, it would be untenable for the 
United States to seek to revert to United States 
force levels and positioning present in Europe before 
Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, to rely solely 
on allied forces for further force posture enhance-
ments, or adopt a path to transition away from in-
vestments in Europe through the European Deter-
rence Initiative (EDI), except for exceptional cases. 
(3) As General Tod Wolters, Commander of 
U.S. European Command, has stated, investments 
made through EDI since 2014 have proved essential 
to the United States ability to respond to the 
Ukraine crisis, deploying units in 5 days that would 
have taken as long as 21 days. General Wolters fur-
ther stated, ‘‘To take an Armored Brigade Combat 
Team and launch it from the continental United 
States, and put it on European turf, and have the 
tanks that comprise that Brigade Combat Team to 
shoot, move, and communicate and fire on range in 
one week is an amazing accomplishment. And that 
was facilitated by those Army Prepositioned Stocks 
and it was practiced in previous exercises which are 
part of the EDI fund. I would just say that when 
we demonstrated to the European community, and 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01288
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1289 
HR 7900 PCS
to the NATO community, and to the world how well 
we can shoot, move, and communicate and transition 
a large force from CONUS to Europe at that pace, 
it’s something that demonstrates the great value of 
EDI.’’. 
(4) Past decisions made by the Department of 
Defense and Congress about prepositioned stocks, 
mobility, and funding for EDI led directly to this 
ability to quickly reinforce the area of operations in 
this crisis, and EDI investments will be crucial for 
adaptation to the new European security environ-
ment. The Department of Defense should continue 
to strongly support EDI investments with a focus on 
adapting deterrence to the new security environment 
and incorporating lessons learned from the conflict 
in Ukraine, and it should not seek a path to EDI’s 
sunset. 
(5) The United States recognizes that strong 
alliances and partnerships are crucial to the mainte-
nance of United States national and global security. 
The NATO alliance has grown more robust and 
more united in response to Russia’s aggression in 
Ukraine. Members of NATO have announced sub-
stantial changes in their defense commitments, 
adopting measures to meet and exceed their Wales 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01289
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1290 
HR 7900 PCS
Pledge commitments to spend 2 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product on defense and increasing com-
mitments to NATO battle group and air policing 
missions, while sending vital defense assistance to 
Ukraine. Congress commends such members of 
NATO for their adoption and sustainment of these 
efforts. Such commitments are vital to the long-term 
effort required to maintain deterrence in the Euro-
pean theater. The United States should continue to 
work with allies on complementary investments to 
establish in Europe a mature, fully integrated deter-
rence platform capable of responding to the ex-
panded threat of Russian aggression and supporting 
NATO allies’ ongoing efforts to collectively resist di-
rect and hybrid threats to shared values, interests, 
and ideals. 
(6) The United States should also redouble ef-
forts to assist NATO allies, particularly on Europe’s 
eastern periphery, in modernizing and integrating 
their defense capabilities taking into account lessons 
from Russia’s war in Ukraine, including efforts to 
provide artillery, MLRS, MANPADS, air defenses, 
and other capabilities. 
(7) As it reinforces deterrence, the United 
States should recognize the acute risks now facing 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01290
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1291 
HR 7900 PCS
allies on Russia’s periphery and pursue national se-
curity investments and strategies commensurate to 
the challenge, including additional EDI programs, in 
the Black Sea, the Baltics, the Arctic, and Central 
Europe, in order to maintain the credibility of the 
‘‘sacred obligation under Article 5 of the North At-
lantic Treaty to defend every inch of NATO terri-
tory.’’. 
(8) Likewise, the United States should keep in 
mind the particularly significant challenges posed to 
non-NATO European partners and seek security 
strategies to continue cooperation and support their 
sovereign rights, while also pursuing security policies 
that support stability in areas of substantial malign 
effort such as the Western Balkans. 
(9) The United States continues to recognize 
the importance of the long-term Baltic Security Ini-
tiative assistance plan that the Department of De-
fense is carrying out under section 333 of title 10, 
United States Code, and the crucial role that such 
investments play in deterring Russian aggression in 
that region. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01291
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1292 
HR 7900 PCS
SEC. 1262. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NATO MEMBERSHIP 
FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN. 
It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
strongly supports membership for Finland and Sweden in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
SEC. 1263. MATTERS RELATING TO CLIMATE CHANGE AT 
NATO. 
The President shall direct the United States Perma-
nent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) to— 
(1) advocate for adequate resources towards un-
derstanding and communicating the threat posed by 
climate change to allied civil security (specifically for 
the climate action and resilience agendas); 
(2) support the establishment of a NATO Cen-
ter of Excellence for Climate and Security; 
(3) advocate for an in-depth critical assessment 
of NATO’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change, building upon the Secretary General’s 2022 
climate change and security impact assessment, that 
evaluates and analyzes NATO’s resilience in re-
sponding to the threat climate change will pose on 
migration, food insecurity, and housing insecurity; 
and 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01292
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1293 
HR 7900 PCS
(4) communicate the core security challenge 
posed by climate change as articulated in NATO’s 
strategic concept. 
SEC. 1264. BALTIC REASSURANCE ACT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Russian Federation seeks to diminish 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and recreate its sphere of influence in Europe using 
coercion, intimidation, and outright aggression. 
(2) Deterring the Russian Federation from 
such aggression is vital for transatlantic security. 
(3) The illegal occupation of Crimea by the 
Russian Federation and its continued engagement of 
destabilizing and subversive activities against inde-
pendent and free states is of increasing concern. 
(4) The Russian Federation also continues to 
disregard treaties, international laws and rights to 
freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and sov-
ereign international borders. 
(5) The Russian Federation’s continued occupa-
tion of Georgian and Ukrainian territories and the 
sustained military buildup in the Russian Federa-
tion’s Western Military District and Kaliningrad has 
threatened continental peace and stability. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01293
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1294 
HR 7900 PCS
(6) The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania are particularly vulnerable to an increas-
ingly aggressive and subversive Russian Federation. 
(7) In a declaration to celebrate 100 years of 
independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
issued on April 3, 2018, the Trump Administration 
reaffirmed United States commitments to these Bal-
tic countries to ‘‘improve military readiness and ca-
pabilities through sustained security assistance’’ and 
‘‘explore new ideas and opportunities, including air 
defense, bilaterally and in NATO, to enhance deter-
rence across the region’’. 
(8) These highly valued NATO allies of the 
United States have repeatedly demonstrated their 
commitment to advancing mutual interests as well 
as those of the NATO alliance. 
(9) The Baltic countries also continue to par-
ticipate in United States-led exercises to further pro-
mote coordination, cooperation, and interoperability 
among allies and partner countries, and continue to 
demonstrate their reliability and commitment to pro-
vide for their own defense. 
(10) Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia each hosts 
a respected NATO Center of Excellence that pro-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01294
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1295 
HR 7900 PCS
vides expertise to educate and promote NATO allies 
and partners in areas of vital interest to the alliance. 
(11) United States support and commitment to 
allies across Europe has been a lynchpin for peace 
and security on the continent for over 70 years. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress as follows: 
(1) The United States is committed to the secu-
rity of the Baltic countries and should strengthen 
cooperation and support capacity-building initiatives 
aimed at improving the defense and security of such 
countries. 
(2) The United States should lead a multilat-
eral effort to develop a strategy to deepen joint ca-
pabilities with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, NATO al-
lies, and other regional partners, to deter against ag-
gression from the Russian Federation in the Baltic 
region, specifically in areas that would strengthen 
interoperability, joint capabilities, and military readi-
ness necessary for Baltic countries to strengthen 
their national resilience. 
(3) The United States should explore the feasi-
bility of providing long range, mobile air defense sys-
tems in the Baltic region, including through 
leveraging cost-sharing mechanisms and multilateral 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01295
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1296 
HR 7900 PCS
deployment with NATO allies to reduce financial 
burdens on host countries. 
(c) DEFENSE ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall, in consultation with appropriate 
counterparts of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and 
other regional partners, conduct a comprehensive, 
multilateral assessment of the military requirements 
of such countries to deter and resist aggression by 
the Russian Federation that— 
(A) provides an assessment of past and 
current initiatives to improve the efficiency, ef-
fectiveness, readiness, and interoperability of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia’s national de-
fense capabilities; and 
(B) assesses the manner in which to meet 
those objectives, including future resource re-
quirements and recommendations, by under-
taking activities in the following areas: 
(i) Activities to increase the rotational 
and forward presence, improve the capa-
bilities, and enhance the posture and re-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01296
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1298 
HR 7900 PCS
(ix) Activities and training to enhance 
cyber security and electronic warfare capa-
bilities. 
(x) Bilateral and multilateral training 
and exercises. 
(xi) New and existing cost-sharing 
mechanisms 
with 
United 
States 
and 
NATO allies to reduce financial burden. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report that includes each of the fol-
lowing: 
(A) A report on the findings of the assess-
ment conducted pursuant to subsection (a). 
(B) A list of any recommendations result-
ing from such assessment. 
(C) An assessment of the resource require-
ments to achieve the objectives described in 
subsection (a)(1) with respect to the national 
defense capability of Baltic countries, including 
potential investments by host countries. 
(D) A plan for the United States to use 
appropriate security cooperation authorities or 
other authorities to— 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01298
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1299 
HR 7900 PCS
(i) facilitate relevant recommendations 
included in the list described in paragraph 
(2); 
(ii) expand joint training between the 
Armed Forces and the military of Lith-
uania, Latvia, or Estonia, including with 
the participation of other NATO allies; and 
(iii) support United States foreign 
military sales and other equipment trans-
fers to Baltic countries especially for the 
activities described in subparagraphs (A) 
through (I) of subsection (a)(2). 
(d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘congres-
sional defense committees’’ includes— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate. 
SEC. 1265. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF NATO TO COUNTER 
MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit 
to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01299
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1300 
HR 7900 PCS
a report on efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) and NATO member states to counter misin-
formation and disinformation. 
(b) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The 
congressional committees specified in this subsection are 
the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall— 
(1) assess— 
(A) vulnerabilities of NATO member states 
and 
NATO 
to 
misinformation 
and 
disinformation and describe efforts to counter 
such activities; 
(B) the capacity and efforts of NATO 
member states and NATO to counter misin-
formation and disinformation, including United 
States cooperation with other NATO members 
states; and 
(C) misinformation and disinformation 
campaigns carried out by authoritarian states, 
particularly Russia and China; and 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01300
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1301 
HR 7900 PCS
(2) include recommendations to counter misin-
formation and disinformation. 
SEC. 1266. IMPROVEMENTS TO THE NATO STRATEGIC COM-
MUNICATIONS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE. 
(a) PRIORITIZATION.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall seek to prioritize funding through NATO’s common 
budget to— 
(1) enhance the capability, cooperation, and in-
formation sharing among NATO, NATO member 
countries, and partners, with respect to strategic 
communications and information operations; and 
(2) facilitate education, research and develop-
ment, lessons learned, and consultation in strategic 
communications and information operations. 
(b) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
Defense shall certify to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees that the Secretary has assigned executive agent 
responsibility for the Center to an appropriate organiza-
tion within the Department of Defense, and detail the 
steps being under taken to strengthen the role of Center 
in fostering strategic communications and information op-
erations within NATO. 
(c) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01301
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1302 
HR 7900 PCS
Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
port outlining— 
(1) the recommendations of the Secretary with 
respect to improving strategic communications with-
in NATO; and 
(2) the recommendations of the Secretary with 
respect to strengthening the role of the Center in 
fostering strategic communications and information 
operations within NATO. 
(d) BRIEFINGS REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De-
fense shall brief the appropriate congressional committees 
on a biannual basis on— 
(1) the efforts of the Department of Defense to 
strengthen the role of the Center in fostering stra-
tegic communications and information operations 
within NATO; 
(2) how the Department of Defense is working 
with the NATO Strategic Communications Center of 
Excellence and the interagency to improve NATO’s 
ability to counter and mitigate disinformation, active 
measures, propaganda, and denial and deception ac-
tivities of Russia and China; and 
(3) how the Department of Defense is devel-
oping ways to improve strategic communications 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01302
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1303 
HR 7900 PCS
within NATO, including by enhancing the capacity 
of and coordination with the NATO Strategic Com-
munications Center of Excellence. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
SEC. 1267. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING STRA-
TEGIC PARTNERSHIP, DEFENSE AND SECU-
RITY COOPERATION WITH GEORGIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Georgia is a valued friend and strategic 
partner of the United States and a NATO aspirant 
that has consistently sought to advance shared val-
ues and mutual interests to include deploying along-
side United States forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
(2) Over the past 30 years of partnership, the 
United States has contributed to strengthening 
Georgia’s progress on the path of European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01303
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1304 
HR 7900 PCS
(3) Security in the Black Sea region is a matter 
of strategic importance for the United States, espe-
cially amid Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war 
on Ukraine. Enhancing Georgia’s self-defense and 
whole-of-government resistance and resilience capac-
ity is critical for Euro-Atlantic security, the United 
States’s national security objectives and strategic in-
terests in the Black Sea region. 
(4) Georgia is a significant economic, energy 
transit, and international trade hub. Georgia is an 
integral part of the East-West corridor that is vital 
to European energy security and diversification of 
strategic supply-chain routes for the United States 
and Europe. 
(5) Continuous illegal occupation of two Geor-
gian regions by Russia, its accelerated attempts of 
de-facto annexation of both regions and hybrid war-
fare tactics including political interference, cyber-at-
tacks, and disinformation and propaganda cam-
paigns pose immediate challenges to the national se-
curity of Georgia and the security of Europe. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the United States should— 
(1) reaffirm support and take steps to enhance 
and deepen the steadfast strategic partnership in all 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01304
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1305 
HR 7900 PCS
priority areas of the 2009 United States—Georgia 
Charter on Strategic Partnership and in line with 
the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding on Deep-
ening the Defense and Security Partnership between 
the United States and Georgia; 
(2) continue firm support to Georgia’s sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity within its inter-
nationally recognized borders; 
(3) intensify efforts towards de-occupation of 
Georgia’s territories and peaceful resolution of Rus-
sia-Georgia conflict, including through consolidation 
of decisive international action to ensure full and un-
conditional fulfilment by the Russian Federation of 
its international obligations, inter alia implementa-
tion of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire 
Agreement; 
(4) continue strong support and meaningful 
participation in the Geneva International Discus-
sions for ensuring implementation of the Ceasefire 
Agreement by the Russian Federation and achieving 
lasting peace and security in Georgia; 
(5) continue working to strengthen press free-
dom, democratic institutions, and the rule of law in 
Georgia in order to help secure its path of Euro-At-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01305
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1306 
HR 7900 PCS
lantic integration and aspirant NATO and EU mem-
bership; 
(6) prioritize and deepen defense and security 
cooperation with Georgia, including the full imple-
mentation and potential acceleration of the Georgia 
Defense and Deterrence Enhancement Initiative, in-
creased military financing of Georgia’s equipment 
modernization plans to enhance Georgia’s deter-
rence, territorial defense, whole-of-government re-
sistance and resilience capacity, and to foster readi-
ness and NATO interoperability; 
(7) support existing and new cooperation for-
mats to bolster cooperation among NATO, Georgia 
and Black Sea regional partners to enhance Black 
Sea security especially in the changed security envi-
ronment including increasing the frequency, scale 
and scope of exercises such as NATO Article 5 exer-
cises and assistance to Georgia’s Defense Forces 
modernization efforts; 
(8) enhance assistance to Georgia in the cyber 
domain through training, education, and technical 
assistance to enable Georgia to prevent, mitigate and 
respond to cyber threats; and 
(9) continue support and assistance to Georgia 
in countering Russian disinformation and propa-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01306
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1307 
HR 7900 PCS
ganda campaigns intended to undermine the sov-
ereignty of Georgia, credibility of its democratic in-
stitutions and European and Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. 
SEC. 1268. REPORT ON IMPROVED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH ALBA-
NIA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, 
jointly with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees an assessment of the 
viability of military infrastructure in Durre¨s, Albania, and 
Vlore¨, Albania, as locations for cooperative security activi-
ties, including NATO activities and exercises that advance 
NATO and shared security objectives and enhance inter-
operability. The report shall also include a description 
of— 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01307
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1308 
HR 7900 PCS
(1) opportunities for the United States to sup-
port training for Albania’s military forces; 
(2) the current status of such training activities 
with Albania, including the level of progress toward 
interoperability, absorption of assistance, ability to 
sustain equipment provided, and other relevant fac-
tors that enhance Albania’s ability to contribute to 
NATO objectives and maritime security; and 
(3) a cost estimate for any potential U.S. in-
vestments and activities. 
SEC. 1269. RESTRICTION OF ENTITIES FROM USING FED-
ERAL FUNDS FROM ENGAGING, ENTERING 
INTO, AND AWARDING PUBLIC WORKS CON-
TRACTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 33 of title 40, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘§ 3320. Restriction of entities from using Federal 
funds to engage, enter into, and award 
public works contracts 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, Federal funds may not be provided to any 
covered entity for any covered public works project. 
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.—Any entity receiving funds 
for any covered public works project shall be free from 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01308
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1309 
HR 7900 PCS
any obligations, influences, or connections to any covered 
entity. 
‘‘(c) EXCEPTION.—This section shall only apply to 
projects that are located in the United States. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘covered en-
tity’ means any entity that— 
‘‘(A) is headquartered in China; 
‘‘(B) is owned, directed, controlled, fi-
nanced, or influenced directly or indirectly by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, the CCP, or the Chinese military, in-
cluding any entity for which the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, the CCP, or the 
Chinese military have the ability, through own-
ership of a majority or a dominant minority of 
the total outstanding voting interest in an enti-
ty, board representation, proxy voting, a special 
share, contractual arrangements, formal or in-
formal arrangements to act in concert, or other 
means, to determine, direct, or decide for an 
entity in an important manner; or 
‘‘(C) is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of 
any entity described in subparagraph (B). 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01309
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1310 
HR 7900 PCS
‘‘(2) COVERED PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT.—The 
term ‘covered public works project’ means any 
project of the construction, repair, renovation, or 
maintenance of public buildings, structures, sewers, 
water works, roads, bridges, docks, underpasses and 
viaducts, as well as any other improvement to be 
constructed, repaired or renovated or maintained on 
public property to be paid, in whole or in part, with 
public funds or with financing to be retired with 
public funds in the form of lease payments or other-
wise.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chap-
ter 33 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by add-
ing at the end the following: 
‘‘3320. Restriction of entities from using Federal funds to engage, enter into, 
and award public works contracts.’’. 
(c) NON-FEDERAL PUBLIC WORKS.—Chapter 35 of 
title 40, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
‘‘§ 3506. Restriction of States and local governments 
from using Federal funds to engage, 
enter into, and award public works con-
tracts 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—A State or local government re-
ceiving Federal funds may not provide such funds to any 
covered entity for any covered public works project. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01310
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1311 
HR 7900 PCS
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.—A State or local government 
shall verify that any entity receiving funds for any covered 
public works project is free from any obligations, influ-
ences, or connections to any covered entity. 
‘‘(c) EXCEPTION.—This section shall only apply to 
projects that are located in a State. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) COVERED ENTITY.—The term ‘covered en-
tity’ means any entity that— 
‘‘(A) is headquartered in China; 
‘‘(B) is owned, directed, controlled, fi-
nanced, or influenced directly or indirectly by 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, the CCP, or the Chinese military, in-
cluding any entity for which the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China, the CCP, or the 
Chinese military have the ability, through own-
ership of a majority or a dominant minority of 
the total outstanding voting interest in an enti-
ty, board representation, proxy voting, a special 
share, contractual arrangements, formal or in-
formal arrangements to act in concert, or other 
means, to determine, direct, or decide for an 
entity in an important manner; or 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01311
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1312 
HR 7900 PCS
‘‘(C) is a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of 
any entity described in subparagraph (B). 
‘‘(2) COVERED PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT.—The 
term ‘covered public works project’ means any 
project of the construction, repair, renovation, or 
maintenance of public buildings, structures, sewers, 
water works, roads, bridges, docks, underpasses and 
viaducts, as well as any other improvement to be 
constructed, repaired or renovated or maintained on 
public property to be paid, in whole or in part, with 
public funds or with financing to be retired with 
public funds in the form of lease payments or other-
wise.’’. 
(d) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chap-
ter 35 of title 40, United States Code, is amended by add-
ing at the end the following: 
‘‘3506. Restriction of States and local governments from using Federal funds 
to engage, enter into, and award public works contracts.’’. 
(e) UPDATING REGULATIONS.—The Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Reg-
ulation shall be revised to implement the provisions of this 
Act. 
(f) RULE
OF APPLICABILITY.—The amendments 
made by this section shall take effect, and shall apply to 
projects beginning on or after, 180 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act. 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01312
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
1313 
HR 7900 PCS
SEC. 1270. MODIFICATION TO UNITED STATES MEMBER-
SHIP IN INTERPARLIAMENTARY GROUP. 
Section 1316(b) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 135 
Stat. 2001) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(b) MEMBERSHIP.—The Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and 
the United States 3+1 Interparliamentary Group shall in-
clude a group, to be known as the ‘United States group’, 
that consists of— 
‘‘(1) not more than 6 United States Senators, 
who shall be appointed jointly by the majority leader 
and the minority leader of the Senate; and 
‘‘(2) not more than 6 Members of the United 
States House of Representatives, who shall be ap-
pointed jointly by the Speaker and minority leader 
of the House of Representatives.’’. 
SEC. 1271. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F–16 AIRCRAFT. 
The President may not sell or authorize a license for 
the export of new F–16 aircraft or F–16 upgrade tech-
nology or modernization kits pursuant to any authority 
provided by the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 
et seq.) to the Government of Turkey, or to any agency 
or instrumentality of Turkey unless the President provides 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:10 Aug 04, 2022
Jkt 029200
PO 00000
Frm 01313
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H7900.PCS
H7900
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS