HCON 7 RFS 
Whereas estimates indicate that 400,000 people may have 
been killed by the Government of Sudan and its 
Janjaweed allies since the crisis began in 2003, more 
than 2,000,000 people have been displaced from their 
homes, and more than 250,000 people from Darfur re-
main in refugee camps in Chad; 
Whereas the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General 
for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, in late August 
2006 stated that ‘‘[i]nsecurity is at its highest level since 
2004, access at its lowest levels since that date, and we 
may well be on the brink of a return to all-out war’’; 
Whereas despite the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
in May 2006, violence against civilians, peacekeepers, and 
humanitarian workers continues unabated, including the 
killing of an estimated 12 humanitarian workers and 16 
African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeepers; 
Whereas in August 2006, the Government of Sudan began to 
deploy thousands of government troops for a major offen-
sive in Darfur, once again threatening a major humani-
tarian catastrophe and risking the safety and security of 
millions of civilians; 
Whereas, according to the Government of Sudan’s plan, in a 
document submitted to the United Nations Secretary- 
General, Kofi Annan, the Government of Sudan planned 
to deploy approximately 26,500 additional troops and 
7,050 additional police to Darfur; 
Whereas the objectives of this deployment were ‘‘to deal with 
the threats posed by the activities of groups that have re-
jected the Darfur Peace Agreement and to gain control 
over the security situation and achieve stability in 
Darfur’’; 
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HCON 7 RFS 
Whereas on August 31, 2006, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 1706, expanding the mandate 
of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for 
the additional deployment of 17,300 peacekeeping troops 
and 3,300 civilian police personnel as well as 16 formed 
police units to Darfur; 
Whereas implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) is slow, 
raising serious concern about the commitment of the 
Government of Sudan to fulfill its responsibilities; 
Whereas President Omar Hassan El-Bashir of Sudan re-
jected the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping 
force to Darfur, even as First Vice President Salva Kiir 
publicly stated his support for the deployment of a 
United Nations peacekeeping mission to Darfur; 
Whereas in March 2006, at the Khartoum summit, Arab 
leaders worked against a plan to transform the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) into a United Nations 
protection force with a mandate to protect civilians; 
Whereas on August 20, 2006, in Cairo, Egypt, the League 
of Arab States met and backed Sudan’s refusal of a 
United Nations peacekeeping force in the war-wracked 
Darfur region; 
Whereas in September 2006, a resolution passed by the 
League of Arab States Council of Foreign Ministers 
called for the United Nations Security Council to give the 
Sudanese Government more time to implement its ‘‘plan 
to improve conditions and preserve security’’ in Darfur; 
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HCON 7 RFS 
Whereas on November 30, 2006, the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union approved a decision to ex-
tend the mandate of AMIS in Darfur through July 2007; 
Whereas, although the United Nations was authorized and 
prepared to send peacekeeping forces to Darfur under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), 
the League of Arab States worked to obstruct the deploy-
ment of such forces or had sought to reduce their man-
date; 
Whereas the November 30, 2006, Abuja Communique of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union en-
dorsed the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-Afri-
can Union peacekeeping force and stated the following: 
(1) The Special Representative shall be jointly ap-
pointed by the Chairperson of the Commission of the Af-
rican Union and the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, after appropriate consultations as per the practice. 
(2) The Force Commander, who should be an Afri-
can, shall be appointed by the Chairperson of the Com-
mission in consultation with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
(3) The Mission shall benefit from United Nations 
backstopping and command and control structures and 
systems. 
(4) The size of the force shall be determined by the 
African Union and the United Nations, taking into ac-
count all relevant factors and the situation on the 
ground, as well as the requirements for it to effectively 
discharge its mandate. 
Whereas in March 2007, ongoing negotiations between the 
United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and 
President Omar Hassan El-Bashir of Sudan took place 
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