IV 
108TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 55
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that United Nations 
weapons inspectors should be given sufficient time for a thorough assess-
ment of the level of compliance by the Government of Iraq with United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and that the United 
States should seek a Security Council resolution specifically authorizing 
the use of force before initiating any offensive military operations against 
Iraq. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 5, 2003
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida submitted the following resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on International Relations 
RESOLUTION 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that 
United Nations weapons inspectors should be given suffi-
cient time for a thorough assessment of the level of 
compliance by the Government of Iraq with United Na-
tions Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002) and that 
the United States should seek a Security Council resolu-
tion specifically authorizing the use of force before initi-
ating any offensive military operations against Iraq.
Whereas on November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1441, stating that Iraq is in 
‘‘material breach’’ of its obligations under previous 
United Nations resolutions, and giving Iraq ‘‘a final op-
•HRES 55 IH 
portunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’’ 
and to accept ‘‘an enhanced inspection regime’’; 
Whereas Iraq formally accepted the return of weapons inspec-
tors under the terms of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1441 on November 13, 2002, and according 
to a joint statement issued January 20, 2003, by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United 
Nations 
Monitoring 
and 
Verification 
Commission 
(UNMOVIC), and Iraq, the Government of Iraq has pro-
vided the weapons inspectors with access to all sites; 
Whereas on December 7, 2002, Iraq provided a 12,000-page 
declaration of past chemical, biological, and nuclear pro-
grams to the Security Council, which declaration, after 
preliminary 
review, 
was 
described 
by 
Mohamed 
ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, as incom-
plete and inconclusive, but which produced no ‘‘smoking 
gun’’; 
Whereas, according to the joint statement made by 
UNMOVIC, IAEA, and Iraq on January 20, 2003, Iraq 
pledged to offer United Nations inspectors more help in 
their search for evidence of weapons of mass destruction 
and expressed a readiness to respond to questions raised 
in connection with the December 7, 2002, declaration; 
Whereas Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, re-
ported to the United Nations Security Council on Janu-
ary 27, 2003, that Iraq has been cooperating with the 
weapons inspectors on process but has failed to dem-
onstrate active cooperation on matters of substance; 
Whereas Dr. Blix earlier characterized the January 27, 2003, 
report to the Security Council as an interim update in-
•HRES 55 IH 
tended to mark ‘‘the beginning of the inspection and 
monitoring process, not the end of it’’; 
Whereas IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the 
Security Council on January 27, 2003, that his agency 
has found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear 
weapons program; 
Whereas Dr. ElBaradei urged the Security Council on Janu-
ary 27, 2003, to allow the inspection process to ‘‘run its 
natural course’’ over the next few months; 
Whereas the United Nations weapons inspectors have failed 
to obtain evidence that would prove that Iraq is in mate-
rial breach of the terms of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1441 (2002); 
Whereas European and Arab officials are reportedly trying to 
persuade Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq voluntarily, and 
senior officials in the executive branch of the United 
States Government have said that they would welcome 
exile for Hussein; 
Whereas the emergence of a nuclear crisis in North Korea, 
and the contradictory responses by the United States to 
the situations in North Korea and Iraq, have cast doubts 
on the consistency and propriety of the United States 
doctrine of preemption, especially in the international 
community; 
Whereas key members of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil, including Great Britain, Germany, the Russian Fed-
eration, France, and China, have expressed their belief 
that the weapons inspectors need more time to continue 
their work and have urged the United States not to rush 
to a decision to invade Iraq without seeking the support 
of the Security Council;
•HRES 55 IH 
Whereas United Nations Security Resolution 1441 (2002) 
does not authorize the use of force but instead stipulates 
that the Security Council will convene immediately to 
consider any failure on the part of Iraq to comply with 
the Resolution; 
Whereas the President, in his September 12, 2002, address 
to the United Nations regarding Iraq’s failure to comply 
with previous United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions, pledged to work with the Security Council for the 
‘‘necessary resolutions’’ and has stated repeatedly since 
that time that he has made no decision on whether to in-
vade Iraq; 
Whereas no evidence has been presented to the House of 
Representatives or the American people to link Iraq with 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United 
States; 
Whereas there is growing concern that war with Iraq would 
greatly heighten the threat of terrorist attacks on United 
States citizens at home, including the possibility of chem-
ical, biological, or nuclear weapon attacks; 
Whereas the terrible cost of war—in lives lost in Iraq and po-
tentially the United States, Israel, and other nations in 
the Middle East and elsewhere, and in the massive drain 
on America’s treasure—is a cost that the United States 
and its allies should strive to avoid if at all possible; and 
Whereas a United States-initiated war with Iraq is likely to 
inflame passions in the Middle East and could precipitate 
further conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians as 
well as a surge in regional terrorism: Now, therefore, be 
it
•HRES 55 IH 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that— 
(1) the United Nations weapons inspectors 
should be given sufficient time to carry out the in-
spections, and collect the data, that are necessary 
for a thorough assessment of the level of compliance 
by the Government of Iraq with United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 1441 (2002); 
(2) the United States and other member na-
tions of the United Nations Security Council should 
work together to exhaust all peaceful and diplomatic 
means for disarming Iraq before launching an inva-
sion of Iraq; 
(3) international emissaries, including Euro-
pean and Arab leaders, should be given adequate 
time to pursue strategies to persuade Saddam Hus-
sein to leave Iraq voluntarily and avert war; 
(4) before initiating any offensive military oper-
ation in Iraq to enforce United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1441 (2002), the United States 
should seek a specific authorization for the use of 
force from the United Nations Security Council; 
(5) the United States should re-engage in the 
Middle East peace process in an effort to end the vi-
•HRES 55 IH 
olence between the State of Israel and the Palestin-
ians; and 
(6) the United States should redouble its efforts 
to secure the United States homeland in light of the 
growing number of intelligence assessments high-
lighting the vulnerability of the United States for 
further terrorist attacks.
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