what actions are necessary to compensate for such viola-
tions.’’.
(b) REPORTING ON DEMARCHES.—(1)(A) Not later
than six months after the date of enactment of this Act,
the President shall submit to the congressional committees
specified in section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act of 1978 an unclassified report that shall state
the number of high-level demarches that was issued or re-
ceived by the United States with respect to activities relat-
ed to the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices.
(B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall
cover demarches issued or received during the period be-
ginning January 1, 1981, and ending December 31, 1993,
and shall identify for each demarche the foreign country
issuing or receiving the demarche, as the case may be.
(2)(A) Section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)), as amended by sec-
tion 101, is further amended—
(i) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ after
the semicolon;
(ii) in paragraph (6), by striking the period and
inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
(iii) by adding after paragraph (6) the following
new paragraph:
‘‘(7) a statement of the number of all high-level
demarches (as defined in section 209(b)(4) of the
Omnibus Nuclear Proliferation Control Act of 1993)
issued by or received by the United States with re-
spect to activities related to the proliferation of nu-
clear explosive devices, and shall identify each for-
eign country issuing or receiving such a demarche,
in the preceding calendar year.’’.
(B) The amendments made by subparagraph (A)
shall take effect on January 1, 1995.
(3) It is the sense of the Congress that the Depart-
ment of State should, in the course of implementing its
reporting responsibilities under section 602(c) of the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, include a summary
of all demarches that the United States has issued or re-
ceived from foreign governments with respect to activities
which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘‘high-
level demarche’’ means any official communication by one
government to another at the presidential, vice presi-
dential, ministerial, or ambassadorial level, by written or
oral means, intended by the originating government to ex-
press—
(A) a concern over a past, present, or possible
future action or activity of the recipient government,
or of a person within the jurisdiction of that govern-
ment, 
contributing 
to 
the 
global 
spread 
of
unsafeguarded special nuclear material or of nuclear
explosive devices;
(B) a request for the recipient government to
counter such action or activity; or
(C) both the concern and request described in
subparagraphs (A) and(B).
SEC. 410. TECHNICAL CORRECTION.
Section 133 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2160c) is amended by striking ‘‘20 kilograms’’ and
inserting ‘‘5 kilograms’’.
TITLE V—INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
SEC. 501. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.
It is the sense of the Congress that in order to main-
tain and enhance international confidence in the effective-
ness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral under-
takings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear explosive
devices and associated technology, the United States
should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups
of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to—
(1) build international support for the principle
that each nuclear supply relationship involving a
non-nuclear weapon state must include a commit-
ment by such state to the application of full-scope
international safeguards;
(2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within
the meaning of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons to undertake a comprehensive
review of its own procedures for declassifying infor-
mation relating to the design or production of nu-
clear explosive devices and to investigate any meas-
ures that would reduce the risk of such information
contributing to the proliferation of such devices;
(3) encourage the deferral of efforts to separate
plutonium or enrich uranium to 20 percent uranium-
235 or more;
(4) pursue greater financial support for the im-
plementation and improvement of safeguards from
all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear
programs, particularly from those nations that are
currently using or planning to use direct-use mate-
rial for commercial purposes;
(5) arrange for the timely payment of annual fi-
nancial contributions by all members of the IAEA,
including the United States;
(6) discourage international commerce in highly
enriched uranium for use in research reactors while
encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and
to use low-enriched alternative nuclear fuels;
(7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states
to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for
purposes of naval propulsion;
(8) pursue an international arrangement that
would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance
aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite
information for safeguards verification purposes;
(9) develop an institutional means for IAEA
member nations to share information with the IAEA
on possible safeguards violations;
(10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear
facility or sensitive nuclear technology to notify the
IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over
that facility or technology, regardless of its destina-
tion;
(11) seek agreement among the parties to the
Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and
to consider the establishment of new limits on the
right to withdraw from the Treaty;
(12) encourage other nations to adopt legisla-
tion that would tighten penalties against companies
and individuals that knowingly and materially assist
any non-nuclear-weapon state or group to acquire a
nuclear explosive device;
(13) encourage the creation under IAEA aus-
pices of international repositories for the long-term
storage of spent nuclear fuel; and
(14) develop measures to ensure the safe and
long-term storage under international auspices of
special fissionable material recovered as a con-
sequence of nuclear disarmament accords.
SEC. 502. REFORMS IN IAEA SAFEGUARDS.
In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in
the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of
the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate
with other nations and groups of nations, including the
IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, to—
(1) improve the access of the IAEA within non-
nuclear weapon states to nuclear facilities that are
capable of producing, processing, or fabricating spe-
cial fissionable material suitable for use in a nuclear
explosive device;
(2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet and
to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion
of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particu-
lar attention to facilities in which there are bulk
quantities of plutonium; and
(B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA
to meet those detection goals in a particular facility,
require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is un-
able to do so;
(3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations
of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for infor-
mation on possible safeguards violations, and to es-
tablish a ‘hot line’ for the reporting of such viola-
tions and other illicit uses of direct-use material;
(4) examine the feasibility of applying safe-
guards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of
equipment or material that is especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use, or production of
special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nu-
clear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device;
(5) examine the feasibility of applying safe-
guards over research and development activities and
facilities involving sensitive nuclear technology, as
defined in section 4(a)(6) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978, or any other technology di-
rectly related to the acquisition or production of nu-
clear explosive devices;
(6) implement special inspections of undeclared
nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safe-
guards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA
to conduct short-notice inspections on demand at
suspected nuclear sites;
(7) expand the scope of safeguards to include
tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste
containing significant quantities of special fission-
able material, and increase the scope of such safe-
guards on heavy water;
(8) revise downward the IAEA’s official mini-
mum amounts of nuclear material (‘‘significant
quantity’’) needed to make a nuclear explosive device
and establish these amounts as national rather than
facility standards;
(9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA
inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities;
(10) require the use of near real time material
accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facili-
ties that use, produce, or store significant quantities
of special fissionable material;
(11) develop with other IAEA member nations
an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of
visa applications by IAEA inspectors;
(12) provide the IAEA the additional funds,
technical assistance, and political support necessary
to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection;
and
(13) make public the annual safeguards imple-
mentation report of the IAEA, establishing a public
registry of commodities in international nuclear com-
merce, including dual-use goods, and creating a pub-
lic repository of current nuclear trade control laws,
agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judi-
cial actions by IAEA member nations.
SEC. 503. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—The President shall, in the
report required by section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Act of 1978, describe—
(1) the steps he has taken to implement sec-
tions 501 and 502, and
(2) the progress that has been made and the
obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to
meet the objectives set forth in sections 501 and
502.
(b) CONTENTS
OF REPORT.—Each report under
paragraph (1) shall describe—
(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that
the President has taken during the period since the
enactment of this Act in pursuit of each of the ob-
jectives set forth in sections 501 and 502;
(2) any obstacles that have been encountered in
the pursuit of those initiatives;
(3) any additional initiatives that have been
proposed by other countries or international organi-
zations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA
safeguards;
(4) all activities of the Federal Government in
support of the objectives set forth in sections 501
and 502;
(5) any recommendations of the President on
additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of
IAEA safeguards; and
(6) any initiatives that the President plans to
take in support of each of the objectives set forth in
sections 501 and 502.
TITLE VI—REVIEW OF
PLUTONIUM USE POLICY
SEC. 601. FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS.
The Congress finds and declares that—
(1) reactor-grade plutonium is a direct-use ma-
terial;
(2) plutonium in all forms is hazardous to the
human and natural environment and is a potential
radiological weapon;
(3) nuclear reprocessing programs that produce,
or are intended to produce, large amounts of pluto-
nium, especially amounts of plutonium that exceed
the reasonable economic needs of a country, for civil-
ian uses jeopardize the efforts of the United States,
other nations, and international organizations to re-
duce the global risks of nuclear weapons prolifera-
tion, nuclear terrorism, and environmental contami-
nation;
(4) the United States Government has sus-
pended the production of military plutonium and has
abandoned civil reprocessing and breeder reactor de-
velopment in the United States;
(5) more than 500 metric tons of plutonium
currently exist in civilian nuclear fuel worldwide,
more than 100 metric tons of plutonium have al-
ready been separated from nuclear fuel irradiated in
civilian reactors, and more than 200 metric tons of
plutonium exist in declared nuclear weapons stock-
piles;
(6) on July 16, 1981, the President announced
a policy that the United States ‘‘will not inhibit or
set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor devel-
opment in nations with advanced nuclear power pro-
grams where it does not constitute a proliferation
risk’’;
(7) much of the world surplus of civil plutonium
has resulted from foreign nuclear reprocessing ac-
tivities undertaken pursuant to agreements for nu-
clear cooperation with the United States that were
negotiated or sustained under this policy and that
grant long-term United States approval for civilian
uses of plutonium recovered from United States-sup-
plied nuclear fuel;
(8) large amounts of additional civil plutonium,
far exceeding the amounts of plutonium now con-
tained in nuclear weapons, may soon be recovered in
reprocessing plants that are about to be started up
or constructed in the European Community and
Japan under this policy;
(9) once these new plants start up and become
contaminated with radiation, the environmental dif-
ficulties of shutdown and clean-up increase dramati-
cally;
(10) abundant and inexpensive global sources of
uranium and uranium enrichment services have
steadily eroded the economic need for the use of plu-
tonium in civilian nuclear reactors;
(11) breeder reactors were once supposed to be
the principal consumers of civil plutonium but have
now encountered major financial and technical prob-
lems and recently have been abandoned or shut
down in Germany, France, and Britain and have
suffered major delays in Japan;
(12) reprocessing was once regarded as an eco-
nomic and efficient approach to nuclear fuel recy-
cling and waste management but is now widely rec-
ognized as extremely costly and posing major envi-
ronmental hazards; and
(13) the Deputy Director of the International
Atomic Energy Agency has recently stated that ‘‘the
excess of plutonium from civilian nuclear programs
poses a major political and security problem world-
wide’’.
SEC. 602. REPORT.
The President shall—
(1) reexamine the policy described in section
601(6); and
(2) not later than 90 days after the date of en-
actment of this Act—
(A) take account of the significant changes
in the global security environment and in the
global nuclear market since 1981 by modifying
the policy described in section 601(6) to avoid
the political and security problems associated
with excess plutonium from civilian nuclear pro-
grams in the world; and
(B) submit a report to the Congress de-
scribing the steps taken to modify the policy.
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