heads deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic 
bombers. 
(2) A new low-yield nuclear weapon to be car-
ried on a ballistic missile submarine risks lowering 
the threshold for nuclear use and increasing the 
chance of miscalculation that could escalate into all- 
out nuclear exchange. 
(3) When launched, such a low-yield nuclear 
warhead would be indistinguishable to an adversary 
from the high-yield W76 and W88 submarine- 
launched warheads. 
(4) On January 25, 2018, former Secretary of 
State George Schultz testified before the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate that ‘‘A nuclear 
weapon is a nuclear weapon. You use a small one, 
[and] then you go to a bigger one. I think nuclear 
weapons are nuclear weapons and we need to draw 
the line there.’’. 
(5) Former Senator Sam Nunn and former Sec-
retary of Energy Ernest Moniz stated in an op-ed on 
February 1, 2018, that, ‘‘The most immediate pri-
ority should be to structure and posture U.S. and 
Russian nuclear forces to deter nuclear use and re-
duce the risk of an accidental, mistaken or unau-
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thorized launch. Against this backdrop, the current 
Russian concept of ‘escalate to de-escalate’—i.e., 
limited nuclear use designed to create a pause in the 
conflict and open a pathway for a negotiated settle-
ment on Moscow’s terms—and U.S. calls for more 
‘usable’ nuclear weapons taken together make the 
world a vastly more dangerous place.’’. 
(6) The ballistic missile submarines of the 
United States have never carried low-yield nuclear 
warheads, and setting a historical precedent could 
undermine the unique and paramount role of bal-
listic-missile submarines as the assured, survivable 
second-strike capability of the United States to deter 
large-scale nuclear war. 
(7) The United States should reject policies 
that increase the likelihood of nuclear war and weak-
en national security, including investments in low- 
yield nuclear weapons. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 
PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF TRI-
DENT D5 LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WARHEAD. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, none of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2019 
or any fiscal year thereafter for the Department of De-
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fense or the Department of Energy may be obligated or 
expended for the research and development, production, 
or deployment of the Trident D5 low-yield nuclear war-
head. 
(b) CONFORMING REPEAL AND RESTORATION.—Sec-
tion 3111 of the John S. McCain National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115– 
232; 132 Stat. 2289) is repealed, and the provisions of 
law amended by such section are restored as if such sec-
tion had not been enacted. 
Æ 
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