132
agement and Budget and the Federal Communications
Commission shall each submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report which shall—
(A) set forth the anticipated schedule (including
specific dates) for—
(i) preparing and conducting the competi-
tive bidding process required by subsection (a);
and
(ii) depositing the receipts of the competi-
tive bidding process;
(B) set forth each signficant milestone in the
rulemaking process with respect to the competitive
bidding process;
(C) include an explanation of the effect of each
requirement in subsection (a) on the schedule for the
competitive bidding process and any post-bidding ac-
tivities (including the deposit of receipts) when com-
pared with the schedule for the competitive bidding
and any post-bidding activities (including the deposit
of receipts) that would otherwise have occurred
under section 337(b)(2) of the Communications Act
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 337(b)(2)) if not for the enact-
ment of subsection (a);
133
(D) set forth for each spectrum auction held by
the Federal Communications Commission since 1993
information on—
(i) the time required for each stage of
preparation for the auction;
(ii) the date of the commencement and of
the completion of the auction;
(iii) the time which elapsed between the
date of the completion of the auction and the
date of the first deposit of receipts from the
auction in the Treasury; and
(iv) the dates of all subsequent deposits of
receipts from the auction in the Treasury; and
(E) include an assessment of how the stages of
the competitive bidding process required by sub-
section (a), including preparation, commencement
and completion, and deposit of receipts, will differ
from similar stages in the auctions referred to in
subparagraph (D).
(2) Not later than October 5, 2000, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget and the Federal
Communications Commission shall each submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees the report which
shall—
134
(A) describe the course of the competitive bid-
ding process required by subsection (a) through Sep-
tember 30, 2000, including the amount of any re-
ceipts from the competitive bidding process depos-
ited in the Treasury as of September 30, 2000; and
(B) if the course of the competitive bidding
process has included any deviations from the sched-
ule set forth under paragraph (1)(A), an explanation
for such deviations from the schedule.
(3) The Federal Communications Commission may
not consult with the Director in the preparation and sub-
mittal of the reports required of the Commission by this
subsection.
(4) In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following:
(A) The Committees on Appropriations, the
Budget, and Commerce of the Senate.
(B) The Committees on Appropriations, the
Budget, and Commerce of the House of Representa-
tives.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT
OF OPERATION DESERT FOX AND OPERATION AL-
LIED FORCE
SEC. 8129. (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than
January 31, 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall submit
to the congressional defense committees in both classified
135
and unclassified form a report on the conduct of Operation
Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force (also referred to
as Operation Noble Anvil). The Secretary of Defense shall
submit to such committees a preliminary report on the
conduct of these operations not later than October 15,
1999. The report (including the preliminary report) should
be prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of the
United States Central Command, and the Commander in
Chief of the United States European Command.
(b) REVIEW OF SUCCESSES AND DEFICIENCIES.—
The report should contain a thorough review of the suc-
cesses and deficiencies of these operations, with respect
to the following matters:
(1) United States military objectives in these
operations.
(2) With respect to Operation Allied Force, the
military strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) to obtain said military objectives.
(3) The command structure for the execution of
Operation Allied Force.
(4) The process for identifying, nominating, se-
lecting, and verifying targets to be attacked during
Operation Desert Fox and Operation Allied Force.
136
(5) A comprehensive battle damage assessment
of targets prosecuted during the conduct of the air
campaigns in these operations, to include—
(A) fixed targets, both military and civil-
ian, to include bridges, roads, rail lines, air-
fields, power generating plants, broadcast facili-
ties, oil refining infrastructure, fuel and muni-
tions storage installations, industrial plants pro-
ducing military equipment, command and con-
trol nodes, civilian leadership bunkers and mili-
tary barracks;
(B) mobile military targets such as tanks,
armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces,
trucks, and air defense assets;
(C) with respect to Operation Desert Fox,
research and production facilities associated
with Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs, and any military
units or organizations associated with such ac-
tivities within Iraq; and
(D) a discussion of decoy, deception and
counter-intelligence techniques employed by the
Iraqi and Serbian military.
(6) The use and performance of United States
military equipment, weapon systems, munitions, and
137
national and tactical reconnaissance and surveillance
assets (including items classified under special ac-
cess procedures) and an analysis of—
(A) any equipment or capabilities that
were in research and development and if avail-
able could have been used in these operations’
respective theater of operations;
(B) any equipment or capabilities that
were available and could have been used but
were not introduced into these operations’ re-
spective theater of operations; and
(C) any equipment or capabilities that
were introduced to these operations’ respective
theater of operations that could have been used
but were not.
(7) Command, control, communications and
operational security of NATO forces as a whole and
United States forces separately during Operation Al-
lied Force, including the ability of United States air-
craft to operate with aircraft of other nations with-
out degradation of capabilities or protection of
United States forces.
(8) The deployment of United States forces and
supplies to the theater of operations, including an
assessment of airlift and sealift (to include a specific
138
assessment of the deployment of Task Force Hawk
during Operation Allied Force, to include detailed
explanations for the delay in initial deployment, the
suitability of equipment deployed compared to other
equipment in the U.S. inventory that was not de-
ployed, and a critique of the training provided to
operational personnel prior to and during the deploy-
ment).
(9) The use of electronic warfare assets, in par-
ticular an assessment of the adequacy of EA–6B air-
craft in terms of inventory, capabilities, deficiencies,
and ability to provide logistics support.
(10) The effectiveness of reserve component
forces including their use and performance in the
theater of operations.
(11) The contributions of United States (and
with respect to Operation Allied Force, NATO) in-
telligence and counterintelligence systems and per-
sonnel, including an assessment of the targeting se-
lection and bomb damage assessment process.
(c) The report should also contain:
(1) An analysis of the transfer of operational
assets from other United States Unified Commands
to these operations’ theater of operations and the
139
impact on the readiness, warfighting capability and
deterrence value of those commands.
(2) An analysis of the implications of these op-
erations as regards the ability of United States
armed forces and intelligence capabilities to carry
out 
the 
current 
national 
security 
strategy,
including—
(A) whether the Department of Defense
and its components, and the intelligence com-
munity and its components, have sufficient
force structure and manning as well as equip-
ment (to include items such as munitions
stocks) to deploy, prosecute and sustain oper-
ations in a second major theater of war as
called for under the current national security
strategy;
(B) which, if any aspects, of currently pro-
grammed manpower, operations, training and
other readiness programs, and weapons and
other systems are found to be inadequate in
terms of supporting the national military strat-
egy; and
(C) what adjustments need to be made to
current defense planning and budgets, and spe-
140
cific programs to redress any deficiencies identi-
fied by this analysis.
SEC. 8130. None of the funds provided in this Act
may be used to transfer to any nongovernmental entity
ammunition held by the Department of Defense that has
a center-fire cartridge and a United States military no-
menclature designation of ‘‘armor penetrator’’, ‘‘armor
piercing (AP)’’, ‘‘armor piercing incendiary (API)’’, or
‘‘armor-piercing incendiary-tracer (API–T)’’.
SEC. 8131. None of the funds made available in this
Act may be used by the Armed Forces to participate in,
or to provide support for, any airshow or trade exhibition
held outside the United States.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2000’’.
Passed the House of Representatives July 22, 1999.
Attest:
Clerk.