H. R. 2471—967 
(B) Such recommendations as the Director and the 
Secretary determine appropriate with respect to legislative 
or administrative action relevant to such policy. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COVERED
INSIDER
THREAT
INFORMATION.—The term 
‘‘covered insider threat information’’— 
(A) means information that— 
(i) is relevant with respect to adjudications relating 
to determinations of eligibility for access to classified 
information; 
(ii) an agency or department of the Federal Govern-
ment has vetted and verified; and 
(iii) according to Director of National Intelligence 
policy, is considered relevant to the ability of a con-
tractor employee to protect against insider threats as 
required by section 117.7(d) of title 32, Code of Federal 
Regulations, or successor regulation; and 
(B) includes pertinent information considered in the 
counter-threat assessment, as authorized by a provision 
of Federal law or Executive Order. 
(2) 
CONTRACTOR
EMPLOYEE.—The 
term 
‘‘contractor 
employee’’ means an employee of a contractor, subcontractor, 
grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor, of a depart-
ment or agency of the Federal Government. 
SEC. 807. GOVERNANCE OF TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0 INITIATIVE. 
(a) GOVERNANCE.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting 
as the Security Executive Agent, and the Director of the Office 
of 
Personnel 
Management, 
acting 
as 
the 
Suitability 
and 
Credentialing Executive Agent, in coordination with the Deputy 
Director for Management in the Office of Management and Budget, 
acting as the chairman of the Performance Accountability Council, 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security 
shall jointly— 
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, publish, in the Federal Register as appropriate, 
a policy with guidelines and standards for Federal Government 
agencies and industry partners to implement the Trusted 
Workforce 2.0 initiative; 
(2) not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act and not less frequently than once every 6 months 
thereafter, submit to Congress a report on the timing, delivery, 
and adoption of Federal Government agencies’ policies, prod-
ucts, and services to implement the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative, including those associated with the National Back-
ground Investigation Service; and 
(3) not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, submit to Congress performance management 
metrics for the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative, including performance metrics regarding timeliness, 
cost, and measures of effectiveness. 
(b) INDEPENDENT STUDY ON TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0.— 
(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall enter into an agreement with an entity that 
is not part of the Federal Government to conduct a study
H. R. 2471—968 
on the effectiveness of the initiatives of the Federal Government 
known as Trusted Workforce 1.25, 1.5, and 2.0. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The study required by paragraph (1) shall 
include the following: 
(A) An assessment of how effective such initiatives 
are or will be in determining who should or should not 
have access to classified information. 
(B) A comparison of the effectiveness of such initiatives 
with the system of periodic reinvestigations that was in 
effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
Act. 
(C) Identification of what is lost from the suspension 
of universal periodic reinvestigations in favor of a system 
of continuous vetting. 
(D) An assessment of the relative effectiveness of 
Trusted Workforce 1.25, Trusted Workforce 1.5, and 
Trusted Workforce 2.0. 
(3) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report 
on the findings from the study conducted under paragraph 
(1) to the following: 
(A) The congressional intelligence committees. 
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate. 
(C) The Committee on Armed Services and the Com-
mittee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Represent-
atives. 
Subtitle B—Matters Relating to 
Organizations and Capabilities 
SEC. 
811. 
PLAN 
TO 
ESTABLISH 
INTEGRATED 
COMMERCIAL 
GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE DATA PROGRAM OFFICE. 
(a) PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office 
and the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
jointly develop and submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees a plan to establish an integrated commercial geospatial intel-
ligence data program office. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The plan under subsection (a) shall include 
the following: 
(1) An explanation of how the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office will elevate the commercial space pro-
gram office within the organizational structure of the National 
Reconnaissance Office. 
(2) An explanation of how the Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office and the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency will integrate the commercial 
space program office within the National Reconnaissance Office 
to include empowered functional manager personnel to ensure 
imagery purchases are responsive to functional manager-pro-
vided requirements and priorities. 
(3) An explanation of—
H. R. 2471—969 
(A) an approach that will rapidly leverage innovative 
commercial geospatial intelligence data capabilities to meet 
new intelligence challenges and inform operational require-
ments; 
(B) how the Directors will annually evaluate new 
commercially available capabilities and provide opportuni-
ties for new entrants; and 
(C) how the Directors will synchronize the procurement 
of commercial geospatial intelligence data and commercial 
geospatial intelligence analytic services, respectively. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 812. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACQUISITION INNOVATION 
CENTER REPORT, STRATEGY, AND PLAN. 
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT AND STRATEGY.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees— 
(1) a report stating the mission and purpose of the Acquisi-
tion Innovation Center of the Agency; and 
(2) a strategy for incorporating the Acquisition Innovation 
Center into the standard operating procedures and procurement 
and acquisition practices of the Agency. 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
shall, using the findings of the Director with respect to the report 
submitted under subsection (a)(1), submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees an implementation plan that addresses— 
(1) how the Director will ensure the contracting officers 
of the Agency and the technical representatives of the Acquisi-
tion Innovation Center for the contracting officers have access 
to the technical expertise required to inform requirements 
development, technology maturity assessments, and monitoring 
of acquisitions; 
(2) how the plan specifically applies to technical industries, 
including telecommunications, software, aerospace, and large- 
scale construction; and 
(3) projections for resources necessary to support the 
Acquisition Innovation Center, including staff, training, and 
contracting support tools. 
SEC. 813. REPORT ON UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND INTEL-
LIGENCE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, in consultation with such other Federal Government enti-
ties as the Director considers relevant, and consistent with the 
protection of intelligence sources and methods, shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the 
status of the intelligence collection, analysis, and operational 
capabilities of the United States Southern Command to support 
Latin America-based missions.
H. R. 2471—970 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees. 
SEC. 814. REPORT ON PROJECT MAVEN TRANSITION. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency, in consultation with such other Federal 
Government entities as the Director considers appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the transition of Project Maven to operational mission support. 
(b) PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES.—The report required 
by subsection (a) shall include a detailed plan of action and mile-
stones that identifies— 
(1) the milestones and decision points leading up to the 
transition of successful geospatial intelligence capabilities 
developed under Project Maven to the National Geospatial- 
Intelligence Agency; and 
(2) the metrics of success regarding the transition described 
in paragraph (1) and mission support provided to the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for each of fiscal years 2022 
and 2023. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall be sub-
mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(2) the congressional defense committees. 
SEC. 815. REPORT ON FUTURE STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE CENTER. 
(a) ASSESSMENT AND REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall— 
(1) conduct an assessment as to the future structure, 
responsibilities, and organizational placement of the Foreign 
Malign Influence Center; and 
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report on the findings of the Director with respect to the assess-
ment conducted under paragraph (1). 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment conducted under subsection 
(a)(1) shall include— 
(1) an assessment of whether the statutory functions of 
the Foreign Malign Influence Center are optimized to the needs 
of the intelligence community and policymakers; 
(2) a description of potential changes to the statutory func-
tions of the Foreign Malign Influence Center that might further 
advance the counter-foreign malign influence mission of the 
Center and the intelligence community, including whether the 
Director of the Foreign Malign Influence Center should continue 
to report directly to the Director of National Intelligence and 
whether the Foreign Malign Influence Center should remain 
a separate, stand-alone center; and
H. R. 2471—971 
(3) an assessment of the risks, benefits, and feasibility 
of predominantly staffing the Foreign Malign Influence Center 
with detailees from other agencies, including from outside the 
intelligence community. 
Subtitle C—Other Matters 
SEC. 821. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new section (and conforming the table of contents 
at the beginning of such Act accordingly): 
‘‘SEC. 1111. BIENNIAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN BIOLOGICAL THREATS. 
‘‘(a) REPORTS.—On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 
years after the date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2022, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a com-
prehensive report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibil-
ities of the intelligence community with respect to foreign biological 
threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered 
country. 
‘‘(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—Each report under subsection (a) 
shall include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating 
from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to such 
threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence commu-
nity, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities. 
‘‘(2) A detailed description of all duties and responsibilities 
relating to such threats explicitly authorized or otherwise 
assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element of the intel-
ligence community, and an assessment of any identified gaps 
in such duties or responsibilities. 
‘‘(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant 
elements of the intelligence community with respect to the 
activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and respon-
sibilities specified in paragraph (2). 
‘‘(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and 
interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating 
to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and attribu-
tion of such threats, and an assessment of any identified gaps 
therein. 
‘‘(5) A description of the coordination and interactions 
among the relevant elements of the intelligence community 
and non-intelligence community partners. 
‘‘(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts 
relating to such threats, including any foreign academics 
engaged in such efforts, and a description of how the intel-
ligence community contributes to efforts by non-intelligence 
community partners to counter such foreign malign influence. 
‘‘(c) FORM.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) may 
be submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include 
an unclassified executive summary. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
H. R. 2471—972 
‘‘(1) COVERED
COUNTRY.—The term ‘covered country’ 
means— 
‘‘(A) China; 
‘‘(B) Iran; 
‘‘(C) North Korea; 
‘‘(D) Russia; and 
‘‘(E) any other foreign country— 
‘‘(i) from which the Director of National Intel-
ligence determines a biological threat emanates; or 
‘‘(ii) that the Director determines has a known 
history of, or has been assessed as having conditions 
present for, infectious disease outbreaks or epidemics. 
‘‘(2) FOREIGN
BIOLOGICAL
THREAT.—The term ‘foreign 
biological threat’ means biological warfare, bioterrorism, natu-
rally occurring infectious diseases, or accidental exposures to 
biological materials, without regard to whether the threat origi-
nates from a state actor, a non-state actor, natural conditions, 
or an undetermined source. 
‘‘(3) FOREIGN
MALIGN
INFLUENCE.—The term ‘foreign 
malign influence’ has the meaning given such term in section 
119C(e) of this Act. 
‘‘(4) NON-INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
PARTNER.—The term 
‘non-intelligence community partner’ means a Federal depart-
ment or agency that is not an element of the intelligence 
community.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first 
report required under section 1111 of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as added by subsection (a). 
SEC. 822. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES 
PROCURED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCIAL PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by section 821, is further 
amended by adding at the end the following new section (and 
conforming the table of contents at the beginning of such Act 
accordingly): 
‘‘SEC. 1112. ANNUAL REPORTS ON CERTAIN CYBER VULNERABILITIES 
PROCURED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCIAL PROVIDERS OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES. 
‘‘(a) ANNUAL REPORTS.—On an annual basis through 2026, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of 
the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing information on foreign 
commercial providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by 
the intelligence community through foreign commercial providers. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, 
with respect to the period covered by the report, the following: 
‘‘(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured 
through a foreign commercial provider, including— 
‘‘(A) a description of the vulnerability; 
‘‘(B) the date of the procurement; 
‘‘(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that 
vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
H. R. 2471—973 
‘‘(D) the cost of the procurement; 
‘‘(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if 
the commercial provider was not the original supplier of 
the vulnerability, a description of the original supplier; 
‘‘(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and 
‘‘(G) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence 
community to use the vulnerability, including whether such 
use will be operational or for research and development, 
and the approximate timeline for such use. 
‘‘(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that— 
‘‘(A) pose a significant threat to the national security 
of the United States; or 
‘‘(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any foreign 
government that— 
‘‘(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to target 
United States persons, the United States Government, 
journalists, or dissidents; or 
‘‘(ii) has an established pattern or practice of vio-
lating human rights or suppressing dissent. 
‘‘(3) An assessment of whether the intelligence community 
has conducted business with the foreign commercial providers 
identified under paragraph (2) during the 5-year period pre-
ceding the date of the report. 
‘‘(c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (a) may be submitted 
in classified form. 
‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) COMMERCIAL PROVIDER.—The term ‘commercial pro-
vider’ means any person that sells, or acts as a broker, for 
a cyber vulnerability. 
‘‘(2) CYBER VULNERABILITY.—The term ‘cyber vulnerability’ 
means any tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code that is intended 
to compromise a device, network, or system, including such 
a tool, exploit, vulnerability, or code procured by the intelligence 
community for purposes of research and development.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency shall 
jointly submit the first report required under section 1112 of the 
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a). 
SEC. 823. PERIODIC REPORTS ON TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY OF INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
(a) PERIODIC REPORTS REQUIRED.—Title XI of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), as amended by 
section 822, is further amended by adding at the end the following 
new section (and conforming the table of contents at the beginning 
of such Act accordingly): 
‘‘SEC. 1113. PERIODIC REPORTS ON TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY OF INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
‘‘(a) REPORTS.—On a basis that is not less frequent than once 
every 4 years, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination 
with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 
the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of such other agencies 
as the Director considers appropriate, shall submit to the congres-
sional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the tech-
nology strategy of the intelligence community, which shall be 
designed to support the maintenance of the leadership of the United
H. R. 2471—974 
States in critical and emerging technologies essential to the national 
security of the United States. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
‘‘(1) An assessment of technologies critical to the national 
security of the United States, particularly those technologies 
with respect to which foreign countries that are adversarial 
to the United States have or are poised to match or surpass 
the technology leadership of the United States. 
‘‘(2) A review of current technology policies of the intel-
ligence community, including long-term goals. 
‘‘(3) An identification of sectors and supply chains the 
Director determines to be of the greatest strategic importance 
to national security. 
‘‘(4) An identification of opportunities to protect the leader-
ship of the United States, and the allies and partners of the 
United States, in critical technologies, including through tar-
geted export controls, investment screening, and counterintel-
ligence activities. 
‘‘(5) An identification of research and development areas 
the Director determines critical to the national security of the 
United States, including areas in which the private sector does 
not focus. 
‘‘(6) Recommendations for growing talent in key critical 
and emerging technologies and enhancing the ability of the 
intelligence community to recruit and retain individuals with 
critical skills relating to such technologies. 
‘‘(7) An identification of opportunities to improve the leader-
ship of the United States in critical technologies, including 
opportunities to develop international partnerships to reinforce 
domestic policy actions, develop new markets, engage in collabo-
rative research, and maintain an international environment 
that reflects the values of the United States and protects the 
interests of the United States. 
‘‘(8) A technology annex to establish an approach for the 
identification, prioritization, development, and fielding of 
emerging technologies critical to the mission of the intelligence 
community. 
‘‘(9) Such other information as the Director determines 
may be necessary to inform Congress on matters relating to 
the technology strategy of the intelligence community and 
related implications for the national security of the United 
States. 
‘‘(c) FORM OF ANNEX.—Each annex submitted under subsection 
(b)(8) may be submitted in classified form.’’. 
(b) FIRST REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the first 
report required under section 1113 of the National Security Act 
of 1947, as added by subsection (a). 
SEC. 824. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND REPORTS ON FOREIGN 
RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMISTS. 
(a) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—
H. R. 2471—975 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence, acting through the Director of the National Counterter-
rorism Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis, and in consultation with 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees an intelligence 
assessment on significant threats to the United States associ-
ated with foreign racially motivated violent extremist organiza-
tions. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
include the following: 
(A) A list of foreign racially motivated violent extremist 
organizations that pose a significant threat to the national 
security of the United States. 
(B) With respect to each such organization— 
(i) an overview of the membership, ideology, and 
activities; 
(ii) a description of any transnational links to the 
United States or United States persons; 
(iii) a description of the leadership, plans, inten-
tions, and capabilities; 
(iv) whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign 
governments or their proxies provide any manner of 
support to such organizations, including a list of each 
such foreign government or proxy; 
(v) a description of the composition and character-
istics of the members and support networks, including 
whether (and if so, to what extent) the members are 
also a part of a military, security service, or police; 
(vi) a description of financing and other forms of 
material support; 
(vii) an assessment of trends and patterns relative 
to communications, travel, and training (including 
whether and to what extent the organization is 
engaged in or facilitating military or paramilitary 
training); 
(viii) an assessment of the radicalization and 
recruitment, including an analysis of the extremist 
messaging motivating members and supporters; and 
(ix) whether (and if so, to what extent) foreign 
governments have sufficient laws and policies to 
counter threats to the United States associated with 
the organization, including best practices and gaps. 
(C) An assessment of the status and extent of informa-
tion sharing, intelligence partnerships, foreign police 
cooperation, and mutual legal assistance between the 
United States and foreign governments relative to coun-
tering threats to the United States associated with foreign 
racially motivated violent extremist organizations. 
(D) An assessment of intelligence gaps and rec-
ommendations on how to remedy such gaps. 
(E) An opportunity analysis regarding countering such 
threats, including, at a minimum, with respect to miti-
gating and disrupting the transnational nexus.