U.S., 472 F. Supp. 221 (D. D. Col. 1979) aff’d City 
of Rome, Georgia v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
(11) The Court continued its practice of defer-
ring to congressional factual findings in reviewing 
the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions of 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992. See Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 
512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I) and Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). At 
issue in the Turner cases was Congress’ legislative 
finding that, absent mandatory carriage rules, the 
continued viability of local broadcast television would 
be ‘‘seriously jeopardized’’. The Turner I Court rec-
ognized that as an institution, ‘‘Congress is far bet-
ter equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass and evalu-
ate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon an issue 
as complex and dynamic as that presented here’’. 
512 U.S. at 665–66. Although the Court recognized 
that ‘‘the deference afforded to legislative findings 
does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the 
facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law,’ ’’ its 
‘‘obligation to exercise independent judgment when 
First Amendment rights are implicated is not a li-
cense to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace 
Congress’ factual predictions with our own. Rather, 
it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, 
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on 
substantial evidence.’’ Id. at 666. 
(12) Three years later in Turner II, the Court 
upheld the ‘‘must-carry’’ provisions based upon Con-
gress’ findings, stating the Court’s ‘‘sole obligation 
is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Con-
gress has drawn reasonable inferences based on sub-
stantial evidence.’ ’’ 520 U.S. at 195. Citing its rul-
ing in Turner I, the Court reiterated that ‘‘[w]e owe 
Congress’ findings deference in part because the in-
stitution ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to 
‘‘amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data’’ 
bearing upon’ legislative questions,’’ id. at 195, and 
added that it ‘‘owe[d] Congress’ findings an addi-
tional measure of deference out of respect for its au-
thority to exercise the legislative power.’’ Id. at 196. 
(13) There exists substantial record evidence 
upon which Congress has reached its conclusion that 
a ban on partial-birth abortion is not required to 
contain a ‘‘health’’ exception, because the facts indi-
cate that a partial-birth abortion is never necessary 
to preserve the health of a woman, poses serious
risks to a woman’s health, and lies outside the 
standard of medical care. Congress was informed by 
extensive hearings held during the 104th, 105th, 
and 107th Congresses and passed a ban on partial-
birth abortion in the 104th, 105th, and 106th Con-
gresses. These findings reflect the very informed 
judgment of the Congress that a partial-birth abor-
tion is never necessary to preserve the health of a 
woman, poses serious risks to a woman’s health, and 
lies outside the standard of medical care, and 
should, therefore, be banned. 
(14) Pursuant to the testimony received during 
extensive legislative hearings during the 104th, 
105th, and 107th Congresses, Congress finds and 
declares that: 
(A) Partial-birth abortion poses serious 
risks to the health of a woman undergoing the 
procedure. Those risks include, among other 
things: an increase in a woman’s risk of suf-
fering from cervical incompetence, a result of 
cervical dilation making it difficult or impos-
sible for a woman to successfully carry a subse-
quent pregnancy to term; an increased risk of 
uterine rupture, abruption, amniotic fluid embo-
lus, and trauma to the uterus as a result of
converting the child to a footling breech posi-
tion, a procedure which, according to a leading 
obstetrics textbook, ‘‘there are very few, if any, 
indications for . . .
other than for delivery of 
a second twin’’; and a risk of lacerations and 
secondary hemorrhaging due to the doctor 
blindly forcing a sharp instrument into the base 
of the unborn child’s skull while he or she is 
lodged in the birth canal, an act which could re-
sult in severe bleeding, brings with it the threat 
of shock, and could ultimately result in mater-
nal death.
(B) There is no credible medical evidence 
that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer 
than other abortion procedures. No controlled 
studies of partial-birth abortions have been con-
ducted nor have any comparative studies been 
conducted to demonstrate its safety and efficacy 
compared to other abortion methods. Further-
more, there have been no articles published in 
peer-reviewed journals that establish that par-
tial-birth abortions are superior in any way to 
established abortion procedures. Indeed, unlike 
other more commonly used abortion procedures, 
there are currently no medical schools that pro-
vide instruction on abortions that include the 
instruction in partial-birth abortions in their 
curriculum. 
(C) A prominent medical association has 
concluded that partial-birth abortion is ‘‘not an 
accepted medical practice,’’ that it has ‘‘never 
been subject to even a minimal amount of the 
normal medical practice development,’’ that 
‘‘the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
the procedure in specific circumstances remain 
unknown,’’ and that ‘‘there is no consensus 
among obstetricians about its use’’. The asso-
ciation has further noted that partial-birth 
abortion is broadly disfavored by both medical 
experts and the public, is ‘‘ethically wrong,’’ 
and ‘‘is never the only appropriate procedure’’. 
(D) Neither the plaintiff in Stenberg v. 
Carhart, nor the experts who testified on his 
behalf, have identified a single circumstance 
during which a partial-birth abortion was nec-
essary to preserve the health of a woman. 
(E) The physician credited with developing 
the partial-birth abortion procedure has testi-
fied that he has never encountered a situation 
where a partial-birth abortion was medically
necessary to achieve the desired outcome and, 
thus, is never medically necessary to preserve 
the health of a woman. 
(F) A ban on the partial-birth abortion 
procedure will therefore advance the health in-
terests of pregnant women seeking to terminate 
a pregnancy. 
(G) In light of this overwhelming evidence, 
Congress and the States have a compelling in-
terest in prohibiting partial-birth abortions. In 
addition to promoting maternal health, such a 
prohibition will draw a bright line that clearly 
distinguishes abortion and infanticide, that pre-
serves the integrity of the medical profession, 
and promotes respect for human life. 
(H) Based upon Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992), a governmental interest 
in protecting the life of a child during the deliv-
ery process arises by virtue of the fact that dur-
ing a partial-birth abortion, labor is induced 
and the birth process has begun. This distinc-
tion was recognized in Roe when the Court 
noted, without comment, that the Texas partu-
rition statute, which prohibited one from killing