ons and the means to create such weapons makes the 
world less secure and stable by increasing the chances 
that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in 
which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure 
for all concerned, and could well trigger a global arms 
race, as more countries will be tempted to arm them-
selves with nuclear weapons to prevent attacks by 
countries that possess nuclear weapons. 
(2) It is therefore in the general security interest 
of all countries, and in the vital national security in-
terest of the United States, that the number of coun-
tries that possess a nuclear weapons capability nec-
essarily be kept to a minimum and ultimately re-
duced. 
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reproc-
essing facilities produce nuclear material that can ei-
ther be used for peaceful purposes in electricity-gener-
ating reactors, or can be used to produce uranium 
and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As such, these fa-
cilities are inherently a proliferation risk, allowing 
their possessor to be just months away from the pro-
duction of a nuclear explosive device. 
(4) It is also therefore in the general security in-
terest of all countries that the number of countries 
that operate uranium enrichment and spent-fuel re-
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processing facilities also be kept to a minimum, con-
sistent with the global demand for nuclear power re-
actor fuel. 
(5) The financing and construction of additional 
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing fa-
cilities in additional states around the world is inde-
fensible on economic grounds alone, given current and 
future supplies of uranium and existing providers of 
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing serv-
ices to the world market. 
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment 
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities by additional 
countries, therefore, is often based upon considerations 
other than economic calculations. The possession of 
such facilities is often elevated to a matter of national 
pride—a demonstration to the world that the country 
that possesses this technology has arrived at a level of 
technological development comparable to that of the 
United States and other countries with advanced civil 
nuclear power programs. 
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium en-
richment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be 
perceived as a demonstration of the developing world’s 
independence from technological domination by the 
more developed states. Article IV of the Treaty on the 
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Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) recog-
nizes that State Parties have an ‘‘inalienable right 
. . .to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimina-
tion.’’. However, this is a qualified right conditioned 
by a State Party’s acting in conformity with the 
NPT’s obligation for such countries not to acquire, 
possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explo-
sive devices. 
(8) It has been long recognized that the prolifera-
tion of national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
reprocessing facilities would increase the likelihood of 
the emergence of new nuclear weapon states. Con-
cerned governments, nongovernmental organizations, 
and individual experts have for decades recognized the 
need to address this problem through multilateral as-
surances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, 
the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, 
an international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel 
supply to a country is disrupted, and even multilat-
eral participation in international uranium enrich-
ment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, as a 
means of reducing incentives of countries to develop 
and construct such facilities themselves. 
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(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced lit-
tle more than reports. However, the revelations of a 
nuclear black-market in uranium enrichment tech-
nology and equipment, combined with the attempt by 
North Korea and Iran to possess such technology and 
equipment to provide the basis for nuclear weapons 
programs, have rekindled this debate with a new ur-
gency. 
(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially 
unreliable international supply of nuclear reactor fuel 
as a pretext for developing its own uranium enrich-
ment and spent-fuel reprocessing capability, which 
would enable Iran to also produce weapons-grade ura-
nium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. 
(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over 
the last year to address these concerns. The United 
States has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Part-
nership (GNEP), which envisions a consortium of 
countries with advanced nuclear capabilities pro-
viding nuclear fuel services—fresh fuel and recovery 
of used fuel—to other countries that agree to employ 
nuclear energy only for power generation purposes, 
without possessing national uranium enrichment and 
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. 
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(12) The United States also joined France, the 
Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, in proposing 
a ‘‘Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 
Access to Nuclear Fuel’’ that would facilitate or create 
new arrangements between suppliers and recipients to 
provide fuel to countries with good nonproliferation 
credentials in case of market failure. 
(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel 
should meet the condition outlined by President 
George W. Bush on February 11, 2004, that ‘‘The 
world’s leading nuclear exporters should ensure that 
states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for 
civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce en-
richment and reprocessing.’’. 
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that 
one of its uranium enrichment facilities be placed 
under international management and oversight, as 
part of a ‘‘Global Nuclear Power Infrastructure’’ pro-
posal to create international nuclear fuel cycle cen-
ters. 
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered 
system to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at 
current market prices, under appropriate safeguards 
and conditions, could reassure countries that are de-
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