of the centrifuge through a foreign intermediary 
around 1987. 
(B) The Iranian authorities described the pro-
gram as having consisted of three phases: activities 
during the first phase, from 1985 until 1997, had 
been located mainly at the Atomic Energy Organiza-
tion of Iran (AEOI) premises in Tehran; during the 
second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities 
had been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Com-
pany in Tehran; during the third phase, 2002 to the 
present, the research and development and assembly 
activities were moved to the Natanz facility. 
(7) In the August 19, 2003, letter from Iran, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency was in-
formed that, in the past, apart from planned co-op-
eration in laser fusion and laser spectroscopy which 
never materialized, there had been a research thesis 
on laser spectroscopy prepared by a university stu-
dent in co-operation with the laser division of the 
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Such a study 
by the AEOI could later prove to be relevant to the 
implementation of laser enrichment programs in 
Iran. 
(8) In September 2003, Britain, France, and 
Germany nevertheless offered western technology to
Iran if it stopped its nuclear fuel enrichment pro-
gram and accepted more intrusive United Nations 
inspections of its nuclear facilities, all in defiance of 
the United States efforts to achieve a united front 
to counter the burgeoning Iranian nuclear program. 
(9) European oil investment and credit provi-
sions have unquestionably helped the Iranian econ-
omy by enabling it to build its nuclear program. The 
Iranians 
are 
boasting 
that 
as 
much 
as 
$20,000,000,000 in oil agreements have been signed 
between Iran and European Union countries since 
1995. 
(10) France’s Totalfina formed a multi-billion 
dollar consortium to develop Iranian oil fields of 
South Pars in 1995 and has been adding to its de-
velopment ever since. Britain has issued credit guar-
antees to back up its oil investments in Iran as well. 
(11) Germany is actively seeking to increase its 
exports to Iran and in 2001 it quadrupled its export 
insurance to that country. The French bank BNP 
Paribas has arranged $2,230,000,000 in loans for 
Iran since 1990. 
(12) Europe has also been actively seeking a 
European Union–Iran trade pact, formally giving 
the go-ahead to pursue investments in Iran.
(13) The Assistant Secretary of State for Non-
proliferation, John S. Wolf, in testimony before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on 
March 19, 2003, stated that: ‘‘Libya has crossed the 
nuclear threshold and is among the list of nuclear 
wannabees. These wannabees seek nuclear weapons 
capabilities even though they are all parties to the 
[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons].’’. 
(14) In testimony before the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate on February 10, 2003, 
the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. 
Tenet, remarked: ‘‘Libya clearly intends to reestab-
lish its offensive chemical weapons capability and 
has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents 
at its Rabta facility.’’. 
(15) In addition to manufacturing and pos-
sessing chemical weapons, Libya has a history of 
employing them. According to the Department of 
Defense, in 1987 Libya employed chemical agents 
against troops from its neighboring country of Chad. 
Libya has used missiles and aircraft in combat. 
Libya also ‘‘fired SCUD missiles at an Italian island 
in 1987’’, according to the 2001 Department of De-
fense ‘‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’’ Report.
(16) According to the same report, Libya may 
be capable of producing small quantities of biological 
agents. And, ‘‘with the suspension of UN sanctions, 
Libya’s ability to acquire biological-related equip-
ment and expertise will increase’’. 
(17) The Government of Libya continues to 
seek ballistic missile delivery systems that could be 
used for chemical or nuclear warfare. On October 
31, 2002, the director of the United States Missile 
Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, 
stated: ‘‘The Libyans have been pretty active in try-
ing to get missile capability, and not just short-
range. They have enough money to buy it . . . We 
worry a lot about Libya in the Missile Defense 
Agency.’’. 
TITLE I—AMENDMENTS TO THE 
IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS 
ACT OF 1996
SEC. 101. MULTILATERAL REGIME. 
(a) MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.—Section 4(a) of 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is amended—
(1) by inserting ‘‘and Libya’’ after ‘‘Iran’’; and 
(2) by striking ‘‘Iran’s efforts’’ and inserting 
‘‘the efforts of both Iran and Libya’’.
(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 4(b) of the 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
note) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—The President shall 
prepare and transmit to the appropriate congressional 
committees not later than 6 months after the date of en-
actment of the ILSA Enhancement and Compliance Act, 
and once every 6 months thereafter, a report on the spe-
cific diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection 
(a), the results of these efforts, and a description of pro-
posed diplomatic efforts pursuant to such subsection. 
Each report shall include—
‘‘(1) the countries that have agreed to under-
take measures to further the objectives of section 3 
with respect to either Iran or Libya; 
‘‘(2) a description of those measures, includ-
ing—
‘‘(A) government actions with respect to 
public or private entities (or their subsidiaries) 
located in their territories, that are engaged in 
Iran or Libya; 
‘‘(B) any decisions by the governments of 
these countries to rescind or continue the provi-
sion of credits, guarantees, or other govern-
mental assistance to these entities; and
‘‘(C) actions taken in international fora to 
further the objectives of section 3; and 
‘‘(3) the countries that have not agreed to un-
dertake measures to further the objectives of section 
3 with respect to Iran or Libya, and the reasons 
therefor.’’. 
(c) SUSPENSION.—Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘(c) SUSPENSION.—The President may suspend the 
application of section 5(a) with respect to nationals of a 
country on a case by case basis for a period of not more 
than 6 months, if the President certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees at least 30 days before the sus-
pension is to take effect that—
‘‘(1) the suspension is vital to the national secu-
rity of the United States; and 
‘‘(2) the country has undertaken substantial 
measures, including economic sanctions, to prevent 
the acquisition and development of weapons of mass 
destruction by the Government of Iran or Libya, as 
the case may be, and to carry out activities de-
scribed in section 2 of this Act.’’. 
(d) INVESTIGATIONS.—Section 4 of the Iran and 
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(f) INVESTIGATIONS.—
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Upon public or private dis-
closure of activity related to investment in Iran or 
Libya as described in this Act, the President shall 
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate an 
investigation into the possible imposition of sanc-
tions with respect to such activity and to provide a 
recommendation to the President for such purposes. 
‘‘(2) DETERMINATION
AND
NOTIFICATION.—
Not later than 90 days after the date of the disclo-
sure of activity described in paragraph (1), the 
President shall make a determination whether or not 
to impose sanctions with respect to the activity and 
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees 
of the basis for this determination.’’. 
SEC. 102. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS. 
(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT 
OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES.—Section 5(a) of the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) 
is amended—
(1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘TO IRAN’’ and 
inserting ‘‘TO DEVELOPMENT OF PETROLEUM RE-
SOURCES’’;
(2) by striking ‘‘, with actual knowledge,’’; and 
(3) by striking ‘‘Iran’s ability to develop petro-
leum resources in Iran’’ and inserting ‘‘the ability of 
Iran or Libya to develop petroleum resources, as the 
case may be’’. 
(b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPMENT 
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR OTHER MILI-
TARY CAPABILITIES.—Section 5(b) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR 
OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the President shall impose 2 or 
more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through 
(6) of section 6 if the President determines that a person 
has, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to Iran or 
Libya any goods, services, technology, or other items the 
provision of which significantly and materially—
‘‘(1) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya 
to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons 
or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced con-
ventional weapons or enhanced the military or para-
military capabilities of Iran or Libya; or
‘‘(2) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya 
to maintain its aviation capabilities.’’. 
(c) PERSONS AGAINST WHICH THE SANCTIONS ARE 
TO BE IMPOSED.—Section 5(c)(2) of the Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amend-
ed—
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘or’’ 
at the end; 
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the 
period and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
‘‘(D) is a private or government lender, in-
surer, underwriter, re-insurer, or guarantor of 
the person referred to in paragraph (1).’’. 
SEC. 103. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS. 
Paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 of the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended by striking ‘‘may’’ each place it occurs and in-
serting ‘‘shall’’. 
SEC. 104. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS. 
Section 8 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking the heading;
(B) in the introductory matter preceding 
paragraph (1)—
(i) by inserting ‘‘or Libya’’ after 
‘‘Iran’’ the first place it appears; and 
(ii) by inserting ‘‘or Libya, as the case 
may be’’ after ‘‘Iran’’ the second place it 
appears; 
(C) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ‘‘and’’ 
at the end; 
(D) in paragraph (2), by striking the pe-
riod at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(E) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(3) poses no threat to the national security of 
the United States, its interests, or allies.’’; and 
(2) by striking subsection (b). 
SEC. 105. SUNSET. 
Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 
1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is hereby repealed. 
SEC. 106. DEFINITIONS. 
(a) INVESTMENT.—Section 14(9) of the Iran and 
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended in the last sentence by striking ‘‘does not in-
clude’’ and inserting ‘‘includes’’.