1129 
tion plans and other related public diplo-
macy goals, as appropriate. 
(iii) Opportunities for networking with 
YSEALI alumni and professionals and ex-
perts who are American and Southeast 
Asian. 
(iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop 
program, offering networking, mentoring, 
hands-on training, and the tools necessary 
to lead communities in addressing eco-
nomic, environmental, educational, and 
civic engagement issues. 
(v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Fu-
ture program, providing small, competitive 
grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia 
to improve their communities, countries, 
and the region towards one or more of the 
themes of civic engagement, economic em-
powerment and social entrepreneurship, 
education, or environmental issues. 
(vi) The YSEALI Academy at Ful-
bright University Vietnam, offering execu-
tive-level seminars for entry to mid-level 
professionals around the themes of tech-
1130 
nology and innovation, public policy, and 
entrepreneurship. 
(vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leader-
ship Academy Program, enhancing people- 
to-people ties and engagement with young 
and emerging leaders by promoting gender 
equality and advancing the status of 
women and girls, such as in the public 
health sector. 
(C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of 
State is authorized to convene current YSEALI 
participants and YSEALI alumni through a 
platform to promote networking opportunities 
within the YSEALI community. 
(D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 
paragraph, United States diplomatic and con-
sular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency 
external partners managing and implementing 
the YSEALI program— 
(i) shall promote United States policy 
goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools 
and resources to help young Southeast 
Asian leaders develop important skills and 
connections, including through online cam-
paigns and public diplomacy initiatives;
1131 
(ii) shall establish a system for moni-
toring, evaluating, and improving the 
YSEALI program; and 
(iii) may accept financial contribu-
tions from foundations, corporations, pri-
vate donors, program partners, and imple-
menting agency external partners intended 
to foster the goals of the YSEALI pro-
gram. 
(5) REPORTS.— 
(A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a strategy for implementing the 
YSEALI program, including the following: 
(i) YSEALI program goals, targets, 
and planned outcomes for each year and, 
separately, for the YSEALI program gen-
erally during the duration of its implemen-
tation. 
(ii) The continuation of YSEALI pro-
gram monitoring and evaluation plan, in-
cluding metrics for measuring YSEALI 
program progress identification of annual 
YSEALI program goals, and targets.
1133 
tion and outcomes during the entire duration of 
YSEALI program operation, including rec-
ommendations regarding whether the YSEALI 
program should be reauthorized and any 
changes that would improve its effectiveness. 
(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(A) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COM-
MITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives; 
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives; 
(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate; and 
(iv) the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate. 
(B) IMPLEMENTING
AGENCY
EXTERNAL 
PARTNERS.—The term ‘‘implementing agency 
external partners’’ means any external partner 
that is not a United States Government agency, 
and may include one or more of the following 
entities: 
(i) Local or multinational corpora-
tions.
1134 
(ii) Nongovernmental organizations. 
(iii) Universities. 
(iv) Regional institutions. 
(C) 
YSEALI 
THEME.—The 
term 
‘‘YSEALI theme’’ means— 
(i) civic engagement; 
(ii) economic empowerment and social 
entrepreneurship; 
(iii) education; 
(iv) environmental issues; or 
(v) any other theme included by the 
Secretary of State. 
(D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The 
term ‘‘YSEALI partner countries’’ includes 
each member country of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations and each other coun-
try or political entity the Secretary of State de-
termines appropriate to include in the programs 
established under this section. 
SEC. 30207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH 
G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES. 
It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting 
through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda 
with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to eco-
1135 
nomic and democratic freedoms, including relating to the 
following: 
(1) Building support for international infra-
structure standards, including standards agreed to 
at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018. 
(2) The erosion of democracy and human 
rights. 
(3) The security of 5G telecommunications. 
(4) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
nies, and other policies and practices. 
(5) Predatory international sovereign lending 
that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and Paris Club prin-
ciples. 
(6) International influence campaigns. 
(7) Environmental standards. 
(8) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
ners that are not in the G7 and G20. 
SEC. 30208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN 
PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States— 
(1) to support the close economic, political, and 
security relationship between Taiwan and the United
1136 
States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 
approach to the United States Indo-Pacific; 
(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its 
democracy a vital national security interest of the 
United States; 
(3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov-
ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with 
the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8) and 
the ‘‘Six Assurances’’; 
(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 
asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 
identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept; 
(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense 
spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
egy; 
(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop 
and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti- 
ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad-
vanced command, control, communications, com-
puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 
and resilient command and control capabilities, into 
its military forces;
1137 
(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in international organiza-
tions, including the World Health Assembly, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization, and other 
international bodies as appropriate; 
(8) to advocate for information sharing with 
Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 
Cancer; 
(9) to promote meaningful cooperation among 
the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 
partners; 
(10) to enhance bilateral trade, through re-
sumption of talks under the Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement; 
(11) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
logical cooperation, including improving supply chain 
security; 
(12) to support United States educational and 
exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
tory, and politics in Taiwan; and 
(13) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
tween the United States and Taiwan.
1138 
(b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL 
AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.— 
(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES- 
TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The 
Secretary of State should consider establishing an 
independent nonprofit entity that— 
(A) is dedicated to deepening ties between 
the future leaders of Taiwan and the United 
States; and 
(B) works with State and local school dis-
tricts and educational institutions in the United 
States to send high school and university stu-
dents to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, 
culture, history, politics, and other relevant sub-
jects. 
(2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 
and educational institutions, including public univer-
sities, in the United States are encouraged to part-
ner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
resentative Office in the United States to establish 
programs to promote an increase in educational and 
cultural exchanges. 
SEC. 30209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
1139 
(1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 
U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United 
States to ‘‘promote extensive, close, and friendly 
commercial, cultural, and other relations between 
the people of the United States and the people of 
Taiwan’’. 
(2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to 
the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs, was renamed 
the ‘‘Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs’’. 
(3) It is the policy of the United States to refer 
to Taiwan as ‘‘Taiwan’’, not ‘‘Taipei’’ or ‘‘Chinese 
Taipei’’. 
(4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to 
cultivate the extensive, close, and friendly commer-
cial, cultural, and other relations between the people 
of the United States and the people, organizations, 
and enterprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Tai-
pei. 
(b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective 
of the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and 
the United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to 
enter into negotiations with appropriate officials of the 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the
1140 
United States with the objective of renaming its office in 
Washington, DC, the Taiwan Representative Office in the 
United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United 
States, accordingly. 
SEC. 30210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Taiwan Peace and Stability Act’’. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate. 
(2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term 
‘‘international organization’’ includes United Na-
tions funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, 
and bodies, as well as other organizations outside of 
the United Nations system that the Secretary of 
State determines appropriate, in consultation with 
other relevant Federal departments and agencies. 
(3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term ‘‘One- 
China Principle’’ means only the PRC’s policy to-
ward Taiwan.
1141 
(4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term 
‘‘civil society organizations’’ means international 
civil society organizations that are critical to main-
taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling 
Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in 
the global community. 
(5) POTENTIAL
PLA
CAMPAIGNS.—The term 
‘‘potential PLA campaigns’’ means— 
(A) a naval blockade of Taiwan; 
(B) an amphibious assault and ground in-
vasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion de-
signed to accomplish a fiat accompli before 
intervention is possible; or 
(C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s 
outlying islands. 
(c) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The United States has consistently sought 
to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a cen-
tral element of United States foreign policy toward 
the region. 
(2) The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai 
Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-
paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-
1142 
cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to 
erode United States policy and create a fait accompli 
on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future. 
(3) In order to ensure the longevity of United 
States policy and preserve the ability of the people 
of Taiwan to determine their future independently, 
it is necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and physical space. 
(4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-
tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases 
such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever 
in countries around the world. During the COVID– 
19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of 
personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests 
to countries in need. 
(5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sa˜o Tome´ and 
Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina 
Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and 
Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-
wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China. 
(6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the 
World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making 
body of the World Health Organization, as an ob-
server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 
2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in-
1143 
creasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the 
WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA 
in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021. 
(7) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-
portedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 
passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan 
International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the 
world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating 
at the International Civil Aviation Organization 
since 2013. 
(8) United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of rep-
resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United 
Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep-
resent the people on Taiwan. 
(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to— 
(1) maintain the position that peace and sta-
bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se-
curity, and economic interests of the United States, 
and are matters of international concern; and 
(2) work with allies and partners to promote 
peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter 
military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that 
would undermine regional stability.
1144 
(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.— 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, 
is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important 
contributor to the global community; 
(2) multiple United States Government Admin-
istrations have taken important steps to advance 
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international 
organizations and to enhance cooperation with Tai-
wan to provide global public goods, including 
through development assistance, humanitarian as-
sistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multi-
lateral fora; 
(3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, 
and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation in the international com-
munity; and 
(4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with 
other parts of the global community could be further 
enhanced through a systematic approach, along with 
greater attention from Congress and the American 
public to such efforts. 
(f) STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—
1145 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this section, the 
Secretary of State, in consultation with other Fed-
eral departments and agencies as appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a strategy— 
(A) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par-
ticipation in a prioritized set of international 
organizations; and 
(B) that responds to growing pressure 
from the PRC on foreign governments, inter-
national organizations, commercial actors, and 
civil society organizations to comply with its 
‘‘One-China Principle’’ with respect to Taiwan. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 
required under paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) an assessment of the methods the PRC 
uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its 
‘‘One-China Principle’’, including those em-
ployed against governments, international orga-
nizations, and civil society organizations and 
pressure on commercial actors, to the extent 
relevant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful 
participation international organizations;
1146 
(B) an assessment of the policies of foreign 
governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to 
identify likeminded allies and partners who 
might become public or private partners in the 
strategy; 
(C) a systematic analysis of all inter-
national organizations, as practicable, to iden-
tify those that best lend themselves to advanc-
ing Taiwan’s participation, including— 
(i) the organization’s policy on the re-
quirements to obtain membership and ob-
server status, as well as the foundational 
documents defining membership require-
ments and observer status within the orga-
nization; 
(ii) the organization’s participation 
rules; 
(iii) the processes for developing mem-
bership requirements and participation 
rules; 
(iv) the policies of current members 
regarding Taiwan’s political status; and 
(v) the organization’s relative reliance 
on contributions from the PRC and how it 
may affect internal decision-making;
1147 
(D) an evaluation of the feasibility and ad-
visability of expanding economic, security, and 
diplomatic engagement with countries that have 
demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-
graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns 
with United States interests; 
(E) a survey of international organizations 
that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful partici-
pation, including an assessment of whether any 
erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred 
within those organizations and how Taiwan’s 
participation has positively strengthened the ca-
pacity and activity of these organizations, pro-
viding positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in 
other similar forums; 
(F) a list of not more than 20 inter-
national organizations at which the United 
States Government will prioritize using its 
voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s 
meaningful participation over the three-year pe-
riod following the date of enactment of this Act, 
to be derived from the organizations identified 
pursuant to subparagraph (C); and 
(G) a description of the diplomatic strate-
gies and the coalitions the United States Gov-
1148 
ernment plans to develop to implement subpara-
graph (F). 
(3) FORM.—The strategy required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but 
may include an unclassified summary. 
(4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State 
and the heads of other Federal departments and 
agencies as appropriate shall consult with the appro-
priate congressional committees and the Committee 
on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Finance of the Senate— 
(A) not later than 90 days after the date 
of enactment of this Act, with respect to the 
international organizations identified pursuant 
to paragraph (2)(C); and 
(B) not later than 180 days after the date 
of the submission of the strategy required 
under paragraph (1), and every 180 days there-
after for 2 years, regarding the development 
and implementation of the strategy required. 
(g) EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-
MENT COOPERATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International
1149 
Development (USAID), in consultation with the 
United States International Development Finance 
Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on cooperation 
with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral develop-
ment initiatives, through the American Institute in 
Taiwan as appropriate. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required in paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A comprehensive review of existing co-
operation mechanisms and initiatives between 
USAID or DFC and relevant departments and 
agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited 
to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and De-
velopment Fund (ICDF). 
(B) An assessment of how USAID and 
DFC development cooperation with relevant de-
partments and agencies in Taiwan compares to 
comparable cooperation with partners of similar 
economic size and foreign assistance capacity. 
(C) An analysis of the opportunities and 
challenges the cooperation described in subpara-
graph (A) has offered to date, including— 
(i) opportunities collaboration has of-
fered to expand USAID’s and DFC’s abil-
1150 
ity to deliver assistance into a wider range 
communities; 
(ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, 
ICDF, other relevant agencies and depart-
ments in Taiwan, or the organizations’ im-
plementing partners, have a comparative 
advantage in providing assistance; and 
(iii) opportunities to transition virtual 
capacity building events relevant depart-
ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the 
Global Cooperation and Training Frame-
work and other forums, into in-person, en-
during forms of development cooperation. 
(D) An assessment of any legal, policy, 
logistical, financial, or administrative barriers 
to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multi-
lateral development, including— 
(i) availability of personnel at the 
American Institute in Taiwan responsible 
for coordinating development assistance co-
operation; 
(ii) volume of current cooperation ini-
tiatives and barriers to expanding it; 
(iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal bar-
riers facing the United States or other
1151 
partners to including Taiwan in formal 
and informal multilateral development co-
operation mechanisms; 
(iv) resource or capacity barriers to 
expanding cooperation facing the United 
States or Taiwan; and 
(v) geopolitical barriers that com-
plicate United States-Taiwan cooperation 
in third countries. 
(E) Recommendations to address the chal-
lenges identified in subparagraph (D). 
(F) A description of any additional re-
sources or authorities that expanding coopera-
tion might require. 
(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
include a classified annex. 
(h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED 
STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the 
sense of the Congress that— 
(1) expanding United States economic relations 
with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the 
United States and Taiwan; and
1152 
(2) the United States should explore opportuni-
ties to deepen, and where possible expand, economic 
ties between Taiwan and the United States. 
(i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY 
IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-
ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space 
near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises 
near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United 
States position that differences in cross-Strait rela-
tions must be resolved peacefully; 
(2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict 
to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-
crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and 
obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most 
viable means to prevent war; 
(3) Taiwan should continue to implement its 
asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in 
cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also 
strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve 
and civil defense forces, and those capabilities in-
clude, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise 
missiles; and
1153 
(4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-
tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-
tion and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to 
reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, 
conflict. 
(j) STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A 
CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the President 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a whole-of-government strategy to enhance 
deterrence over a cross-Strait military conflict be-
tween the PRC and Taiwan. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 
shall include the following: 
(A) A comprehensive review of existing 
diplomatic, economic, and military tools to es-
tablish deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict 
and an assessment of their efficacy. 
(B) An examination of the present and fu-
ture capabilities of the United States and Tai-
wan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns 
against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The 
analysis shall include an assessment of the 
progress Taiwan has made in developing the
1154 
cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to 
respond to its strategic environment, as well as 
any additional personnel, procurement, or train-
ing reforms required. 
(C) An evaluation of the feasibility of ex-
panding coordination with United States allies 
and partners to enhance deterrence over a 
cross-Strait conflict. The review shall include a 
review of the following matters: 
(i) Expanding coordination of public 
or private messaging on deterrence vis-a`- 
vis Taiwan. 
(ii) Coordinating use of economic tools 
to raise the costs of PRC military action 
that could precipitate a cross-Strait con-
flict. 
(iii) Enhancing codevelopment and co-
deployment of military capabilities related 
to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, 
or enhancing coordination on training of 
Taiwan’s military forces. 
(D) Recommendations on significant addi-
tional diplomatic, economic, and military steps 
available to the United States Government, uni-
laterally and in concert with United States al-
1155 
lies and partners, to enhance the clarity and 
credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait con-
flict. 
(E) A description of any additional re-
sources or authorities needed to implement the 
recommendations identified in subparagraph 
(D). 
(3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted classified form but may in-
clude an unclassified annex. 
(4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less 
frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 
years, the President (or a designee), as well as rep-
resentatives from the agencies and departments in-
volved in developing the strategy required in para-
graph (1), shall consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees regarding the development 
and implementation of the strategy required in this 
subsection. The representatives from the relevant 
agencies and departments shall be at the Under Sec-
retary level or above. 
(k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE 
PROFESSIONALS.—
1156 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, shall present to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a plan for strengthening the com-
munity of civilian defense professionals in Taiwan, 
facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan 
as appropriate. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
quired by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A comprehensive review of existing 
United States Government and non-United 
States Government programmatic and funding 
modalities to support Taiwan’s civilian defense 
professionals in pursuing professional develop-
ment, educational, and cultural exchanges in 
the United States, including— 
(i) opportunities through Department 
of State-supported programs, such as the 
International Visitor Leaders Program; 
and 
(ii) opportunities offered through non-
governmental institutions, such as think 
tanks, to the extent the review can prac-
ticably make such an assessment.
1157 
(B) A description of the frequency that ci-
vilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue 
or are selected for the programs reviewed pur-
suant to subparagraph (A). 
(C) An analysis of any funding, policy, ad-
ministrative, or other barriers preventing great-
er participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense 
professionals in the opportunities identified pur-
suant to subparagraph (A). 
(D) An evaluation of the value expanding 
the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
graph (A) would offer for strengthening Tai-
wan’s existing civilian defense community, and 
for increasing the perceived value of the field 
for young professionals in Taiwan. 
(E) An assessment of options the United 
States Government could take individually, with 
partners in Taiwan, or with foreign govern-
ments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand 
the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
graph (A). 
(F) A description of additional resources 
and authorities required by the options assessed 
pursuant to subparagraph (E).
1158 
(3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 
include a classified annex. 
SEC. 30211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Taiwan International Solidarity Act’’. 
(b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.—Subsection (a) 
of section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection 
and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Pub-
lic Law 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new paragraphs: 
‘‘(10) United Nations General Assembly Reso-
lution 2758 (1971) established the representatives of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China as 
the only lawful representatives of China to the 
United Nations. The resolution did not address the 
issue of representation of Taiwan and its people in 
the United Nations or any related organizations, nor 
did the resolution take a position on the relationship 
between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan 
or include any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sov-
ereignty.
1159 
‘‘(11) The United States opposes any initiative 
that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the 
consent of the people.’’. 
(c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSI-
TION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Pro-
tection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 
(relating to the policy of the United States regarding Tai-
wan’s participation in international organizations) is 
amended— 
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after 
the semicolon at the end; 
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives 
of the United States Government in all organizations 
described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States to advocate such 
organizations to resist the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s efforts to distort the decisions, language, poli-
cies, or procedures of such organizations regarding 
Taiwan.’’.
1160 
(d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 
EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN’S TIES AND PARTNER-
SHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of 
the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhance-
ment Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to 
strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after 
the semicolon at the end; 
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States 
allies and partners to oppose the People’s Republic 
of China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official 
diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with 
countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic 
relations.’’. 
(e) REPORT
ON
THE
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF 
CHINA’S ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ PO-
SITION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 
of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (re-
lating to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended
1161 
by inserting before the period at the end the fol-
lowing: ‘‘, as well as information relating to any 
prior or ongoing attempts by the People’s Republic 
of China to undermine Taiwan’s membership or ob-
server status in all organizations described in section 
(4)(1) and Taiwan’s ties and relationships with 
other countries in accordance with subsection (a) of 
this section’’. 
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made 
by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the 
enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the 
first report required under subsection (b) of section 
5 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 
Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as 
amended by paragraph (1), that is required after 
such date. 
SEC. 30212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 
‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 
(b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.— 
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 
96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United 
States policy ‘‘to preserve and promote exten-
sive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural,
1162 
and other relations between the people of the 
United States and the people on Taiwan, as 
well as the people on the China mainland and 
all other peoples of the Western Pacific area’’. 
(B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), 
the United States has grown its strategic part-
nership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 
23,000,000 people. 
(C) Despite a concerted campaign by the 
People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 
from its diplomatic partners and from inter-
national organizations, including the World 
Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a 
global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic 
response, including by donating more than 
2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical 
equipment to the United States. 
(D) The creation of a United States fellow-
ship program with Taiwan would support— 
(i) a key priority of expanding people- 
to-people exchanges, which was outlined in 
President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na-
tional Security Strategy;
1163 
(ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com-
mitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy 
and a critical economic and security part-
ner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 In-
terim National Security Strategic Guid-
ance; and 
(iii) April 2021 guidance from the De-
partment of State based on a review re-
quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 
2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF 
of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage 
U.S. government engagement with Taiwan 
that reflects our deepening unofficial rela-
tionship’’. 
(2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section 
are— 
(A) to further strengthen the United 
States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broad-
en understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by 
temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the 
United States Government to Taiwan for inten-
sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 
as Fellows with the governing authorities on 
Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;
1164 
(B) to expand United States Government 
expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills 
and understanding of the politics, history, and 
culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region 
by providing eligible United States personnel 
the opportunity to acquire such skills and un-
derstanding through the Taiwan Fellowship 
Program established under subsection (c); and 
(C) to better position the United States to 
advance its economic, security, and human 
rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
(c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.— 
(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(A) AGENCY
HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency 
head’’ means, in the case of the executive 
branch of United States Government, or in the 
case of a legislative branch agency specified in 
subparagraph (B), the head of the respective 
agency. 
(B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United 
States Government’’ includes the Government 
Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget 
Office, the Congressional Research Service, and
1165 
the United States-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission of the legislative branch, as 
well as any agency of the executive branch. 
(C) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COM-
MITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(i) the Committee on Appropriations, 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(ii) the Committee on Appropriations 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate. 
(D) 
DETAILEE.—The 
term 
‘‘detailee’’ 
means an employee of an agency of the United 
States Government on loan to the American In-
stitute in Taiwan, without a change of position 
from the agency at which such employee is em-
ployed. 
(E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term 
‘‘implementing partner’’ means any United 
States 
organization 
described 
in 
section 
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of 
such Code that—
1166 
(i) is selected through a competitive 
process; 
(ii) performs logistical, administrative, 
and other functions, as determined by the 
Department of State and the American In-
stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Tai-
wan Fellowship Program; and 
(iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
ment with the American Institute in Tai-
wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship 
Program. 
(2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP 
PROGRAM.— 
(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of 
State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship 
Program’’ (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship opportunity 
in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United 
States citizens through the cooperative agree-
ment established in subparagraph (B). The Sec-
retary of State, in consultation with appropriate 
counterparts at the American Institute in Tai-
wan and the implementing partner, may modify 
the name of the Program. 
(B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—
1167 
(i) IN GENERAL.—The American In-
stitute in Taiwan shall use amounts appro-
priated pursuant to the authorization 
under paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an 
annual or multi-year cooperative agree-
ment with an appropriate implementing 
partner. 
(ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the American 
Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, 
the implementing partner, shall award to 
eligible United States citizens, subject to 
available funding— 
(I) not fewer than five fellow-
ships during the first two years of the 
Program; and 
(II) not fewer than ten fellow-
ships during each of the remaining 
years of the Program. 
(C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE-
MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, shall—
1168 
(i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Representative Of-
fice, or with another appropriate entity, for 
the purpose of entering into an agreement 
to facilitate the placement of fellows in an 
agency of the governing authorities on Tai-
wan; and 
(ii) begin the process of selecting an 
implementing partner, which— 
(I) shall agree to meet all of the 
legal requirements required to operate 
in Taiwan; and 
(II) shall be composed of staff 
who demonstrate significant experi-
ence managing exchange programs in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(D) CURRICULUM.— 
(i) FIRST
YEAR.—During the first 
year of each fellowship under this sub-
section, each fellow should study— 
(I) the Mandarin Chinese lan-
guage; 
(II) the people, history, and polit-
ical climate on Taiwan; and
1169 
(III) the issues affecting the rela-
tionship between the United States 
and the Indo-Pacific region. 
(ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the sec-
ond year of each fellowship under this sec-
tion, each fellow, subject to the approval of 
the Secretary of State, the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan, and the implementing 
partner, and in accordance with the pur-
poses of this section, shall work in— 
(I) a parliamentary office, min-
istry, or other agency of the governing 
authorities on Taiwan; or 
(II) an organization outside of 
the governing authorities on Taiwan, 
whose interests are associated with 
the interests of the fellow and the 
agency of the United States Govern-
ment from which the fellow had been 
employed. 
(E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.— 
Notwithstanding any requirement under this 
section, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
appropriate, the implementing partner, may
1170 
award fellowships that have a duration of be-
tween nine months and two years, and may 
alter the curriculum requirements under sub-
paragraph (D) for such purposes. 
(F) SUNSET.—The Program shall termi-
nate ten years after the date of the enactment 
of this section. 
(3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.— 
(A) 
ELIGIBILITY
REQUIREMENTS.—A 
United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship 
under this section if he or she— 
(i) is an employee of the United 
States Government; 
(ii) has at least two years of experi-
ence in any branch of the United States 
Government; 
(iii) has received at least one exem-
plary performance review in his or her cur-
rent United States Government role within 
at least the last three years prior to begin-
ning the fellowship; 
(iv) has a demonstrated professional 
or educational background in the relation-
ship between the United States and coun-
tries in the Indo-Pacific region; and
1171 
(v) has demonstrated his or her com-
mitment to further service in the United 
States Government. 
(B) RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
FELLOWS.— 
Each recipient of a fellowship under this section 
shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship— 
(i) to maintain satisfactory progress 
in language training and appropriate be-
havior in Taiwan, as determined by the 
Department of State, the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its im-
plementing partner; 
(ii) to refrain from engaging in any 
intelligence or intelligence-related activity 
on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment; and 
(iii) to continue Federal Government 
employment for a period of not less than 
four years after the conclusion of the fel-
lowship, or for not less than two years for 
a fellowship that is one year or shorter. 
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING 
PARTNER.— 
(i) SELECTION
OF
FELLOWS.—The 
implementing partner, in close coordination
1172 
with the Secretary of State and the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan, shall— 
(I) make efforts to recruit fellow-
ship candidates who reflect the diver-
sity of the United States; 
(II) select fellows for the Pro-
gram based solely on merit, with ap-
propriate supervision from the De-
partment of State and the American 
Institute in Taiwan; and 
(III) prioritize the selection of 
candidates willing to serve a fellow-
ship lasting one year or longer. 
(ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing 
partner should provide each fellow in the 
first year (or shorter duration, as jointly 
determined by the Secretary of State and 
the American Institute in Taiwan, for 
those who are not serving a two-year fel-
lowship) with— 
(I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 
language training; and 
(II) courses in the politic, cul-
ture, and history of Taiwan, China, 
and the broader Indo-Pacific.
1173 
(iii) WAIVER
OF
REQUIRED
TRAIN-
ING.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
tion with the American Institute in Taiwan 
and, as appropriate, the implementing 
partner, may waive any of the training re-
quired under clause (ii) to the extent that 
a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language 
skills, knowledge of the topics described in 
clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons 
approved by the Secretary of State and the 
American Institute in Taiwan. If any of 
the training requirements are waived for a 
fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the 
training portion of his or her fellowship 
may be shortened to the extent appro-
priate. 
(iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
menting partner, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State and the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office 
and at least one full-time staff member in 
Taiwan to— 
(I) liaise with the American In-
stitute in Taiwan and the governing 
authorities on Taiwan; and
1174 
(II) serve as the primary in-coun-
try point of contact for the recipients 
of fellowships under this section and 
their dependents. 
(v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
menting partner should perform other 
functions in association in support of the 
Program, including logistical and adminis-
trative functions, as included in the cooper-
ative agreement entered into pursuant to 
paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State 
and the American Institute in Taiwan. 
(D) NONCOMPLIANCE.— 
(i) IN
GENERAL.—Any fellow who 
fails to comply with the requirements 
under this section shall reimburse the 
American Institute in Taiwan for— 
(I) the Federal funds expended 
for the fellow’s participation in the 
fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) 
and (iii); and 
(II) interest accrued on such 
funds (calculated at the prevailing 
rate).
1175 
(ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub-
paragraph (B) shall reimburse the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
(I) all of the Federal funds ex-
pended for the fellow’s participation 
in the fellowship; and 
(II) interest on the amount speci-
fied in subclause (I), which shall be 
calculated at the prevailing rate. 
(iii) PRO
RATA
REIMBURSEMENT.— 
Any fellow who violates subparagraph 
(B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the 
difference between— 
(I) the amount specified in clause 
(ii); and 
(II) the product of— 
(aa) the amount the fellow 
received in compensation during 
the final year of the fellowship, 
including the value of any allow-
ances and benefits received by 
the fellow; multiplied by
1176 
(bb) the percentage of the 
period specified in subparagraph 
(B)(iii) during which the fellow 
did not remain employed by the 
United States Government. 
(E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 
days after the selection of the first class of fel-
lows under this section and annually thereafter 
for 10 years, the Secretary of State shall offer 
to brief the appropriate congressional commit-
tees regarding the following: 
(i) An assessment of the performance 
of the implementing partner in fulfilling 
the purposes of this section. 
(ii) The number of applicants each 
year, the number of applicants willing to 
serve a fellowship lasting one year or 
longer, and the number of such applicants 
selected for a fellowship. 
(iii) The names and sponsoring agen-
cies of the fellows selected by the imple-
menting partner and the extent to which 
such fellows represent the diversity of the 
United States.
1177 
(iv) The names of the parliamentary 
offices, ministries, other agencies of the 
governing authorities on Taiwan, and non-
governmental institutions to which each 
fellow was assigned. 
(v) Any recommendations, as appro-
priate, to improve the implementation of 
the Program, including added flexibilities 
in the administration of the program. 
(vi) An assessment of the Program’s 
value upon the relationship between the 
United States and Taiwan or the United 
States and Asian countries. 
(F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.— 
(i) 
IN
GENERAL.—The 
financial 
records of any implementing partner shall 
be audited annually in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards by 
independent certified public accountants or 
independent licensed public accountants 
who are certified or licensed by a regu-
latory authority of a State or another po-
litical subdivision of the United States. 
(ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under 
clause (i) shall be conducted at the place
1178 
or places where the financial records of the 
implementing partner are normally kept. 
(iii) ACCESS
TO
DOCUMENTS.—The 
implementing partner shall make available 
to the accountants conducting an audit 
under clause (i)— 
(I) all books, financial records, 
files, other papers, things, and prop-
erty belonging to, or in use by, the 
implementing partner that are nec-
essary to facilitate the audit; and 
(II) full facilities for verifying 
transactions with the balances or se-
curities held by depositories, fiscal 
agents, and custodians. 
(iv) REPORT.— 
(I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 
180 days after the end of each fiscal 
year, the implementing partner shall 
provide a report of the audit con-
ducted for such fiscal year under 
clause (i) to the Secretary of State 
and the American Institute in Taiwan. 
(II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re-
port under subclause (I) shall—
1179 
(aa) set forth the scope of 
the audit at issue; 
(bb) 
include 
such 
state-
ments, along with the auditor’s 
opinion of those statements, as 
may be necessary to present fair-
ly the implementing partner’s as-
sets and liabilities, surplus or 
deficit, with reasonable detail; 
(cc) include a statement of 
the implementing partner’s in-
come and expenses during the 
year; and 
(dd) include a schedule of— 
(AA) all contracts and 
cooperative agreements re-
quiring 
payments 
greater 
than $5,000; and 
(BB) any payments of 
compensation, salaries, or 
fees at a rate greater than 
$5,000 per year. 
(III) COPIES.—Each audit report 
shall be produced in sufficient copies 
for distribution to the public.
1180 
(4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOV-
ERNMENT SERVICE.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.— 
(i) DETAIL
AUTHORIZED.—With the 
approval of the Secretary of State, an 
agency head may detail, for a period of not 
more than two years, an employee of the 
agency of the United States Government 
who has been awarded a fellowship under 
this Act, to the American Institute in Tai-
wan for the purpose of assignment to the 
governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-
ganization 
described 
in 
paragraph 
(2)(D)(ii)(II). 
(ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall 
enter into a written agreement with the 
Federal Government before receiving a fel-
lowship, in which the fellow shall agree— 
(I) to continue in the service of 
the sponsoring agency at the end of 
fellowship for a period of at least four 
years (or at least two years if the fel-
lowship duration is one year or short-
er) unless such detailee is involun-
1181 
tarily separated from the service of 
such agency; and 
(II) to pay to the American Insti-
tute in Taiwan any additional ex-
penses incurred by the United States 
Government in connection with the 
fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 
separates from service with the spon-
soring agency before the end of the 
period for which the detailee has 
agreed to continue in the service of 
such agency. 
(iii) 
EXCEPTION.—The 
payment 
agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be 
required of a detailee who leaves the serv-
ice of the sponsoring agency to enter into 
the service of another agency of the United 
States Government unless the head of the 
sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
fore the effective date of entry into the 
service of the other agency that payment 
will be required under this subsection. 
(B) 
STATUS
AS
GOVERNMENT
EM-
PLOYEE.—A detailee under this paragraph—
1182 
(i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
serving allowances, privileges, rights, se-
niority, and other benefits, to be an em-
ployee of the sponsoring agency; 
(ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 
benefits from funds available to such agen-
cy, which is deemed to comply with section 
5536 of title 5, United States Code; and 
(iii) may be assigned to a position 
with an entity described in paragraph 
(2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position 
does not involve— 
(I) the taking of an oath of alle-
giance to another government; or 
(II) the acceptance of compensa-
tion or other benefits from any foreign 
government by such detailee. 
(C) RESPONSIBILITIES
OF
SPONSORING 
AGENCY.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the 
United States Government from which a 
detailee is detailed should provide the fel-
low allowances and benefits that are con-
sistent with Department of State Stand-
1183 
ardized Regulations or other applicable 
rules and regulations, including— 
(I) a living quarters allowance to 
cover the cost of housing in Taiwan; 
(II) a cost of living allowance to 
cover any possible higher costs of liv-
ing in Taiwan; 
(III) a temporary quarters sub-
sistence allowance for up to seven 
days if the fellow is unable to find 
housing immediately upon arriving in 
Taiwan; 
(IV) an education allowance to 
assist parents in providing the fellow’s 
minor children with educational serv-
ices 
ordinarily 
provided 
without 
charge by public schools in the United 
States; 
(V) moving expenses to transport 
personal belongings of the fellow and 
his or her family in their move to Tai-
wan, which is comparable to the al-
lowance given for American Institute 
in Taiwan employees assigned to Tai-
wan; and
1184 
(VI) an economy-class airline 
ticket to and from Taiwan for each 
fellow and the fellow’s immediate fam-
ily. 
(ii) MODIFICATION
OF
BENEFITS.— 
The American Institute in Taiwan and its 
implementing partner, with the approval of 
the Department of State, may modify the 
benefits set forth in clause (i) if such 
modification is warranted by fiscal cir-
cumstances. 
(D) 
NO
FINANCIAL
LIABILITY.—The 
American Institute in Taiwan, the imple-
menting partner, and any governing authorities 
on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Tai-
wan at which a fellow is detailed during the sec-
ond year of the fellowship may not be held re-
sponsible for the pay, allowances, or any other 
benefit normally provided to the detailee. 
(E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be 
detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse-
ment to the United States by the American In-
stitute in Taiwan. 
(F) 
ALLOWANCES
AND
BENEFITS.— 
Detailees may be paid by the American Insti-
1185 
tute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits 
listed in subparagraph (C). 
(5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year be-
fore the sunset of the Program pursuant to para-
graph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United 
States shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on For-
eign Affairs of the House of Representatives a re-
port that includes the following: 
(A) An analysis of United States Govern-
ment participants in the Program, including the 
number of applicants and the number of fellow-
ships undertaken, and the places of employ-
ment. 
(B) An assessment of the costs and bene-
fits for participants in the Program and for the 
United States Government of such fellowships. 
(C) An analysis of the financial impact of 
the fellowship on United States Government of-
fices that have detailed fellows to participate in 
the Program. 
(D) Recommendations, if any, on how to 
improve the Program. 
(6) FUNDING.—
1186 
(A) 
AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated to the American Institute in Taiwan— 
(i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, 
of which $500,000 should be made avail-
able to an appropriate implementing part-
ner to launch the Program; and 
(ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000. 
(B) 
PRIVATE
SOURCES.—The 
imple-
menting partner selected to implement the Pro-
gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or 
donations of services or property in carrying 
out such program, subject to the review and ap-
proval of the American Institute in Taiwan. 
SEC. 30213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-
SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of 
State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific 
region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance re-
sources, including as authorized by section 201(b) of 
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public
1187 
Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 
in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement budg-
et. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the 
diplomatic engagement budget and only 4 percent of 
the total Department of State-USAID budget. 
(2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engage-
ment budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific 
averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign 
assistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the 
total. 
(3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 
process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-
mands of great-power competition, including in the 
Indo-Pacific. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the size of the United States diplomatic 
corps must be sufficient to meet the current and 
emerging challenges of the 21st century, including 
those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere; 
(2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary 
for the success of the United States diplomatic corps 
and integral to its ability to meet national security 
objectives;
1188 
(3) the increase must be designed to meet the 
objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on 
strengthening the good governance and sovereignty 
of countries that adhere to and uphold the rules- 
based international order; and 
(4) the increase must be implemented with a 
focus on increased numbers of economic, political, 
and public diplomacy officers, representing a cumu-
lative increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer 
generalists, to— 
(A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade 
and open investment environments for United 
States entities, and engaged in increased com-
mercial diplomacy in key markets; 
(B) better articulate and explain United 
States policies, strengthen civil society and 
democratic principles, enhance reporting on 
global activities, promote people-to-people ex-
changes, and advance United States influence; 
and 
(C) increase capacity at small- and me-
dium-sized embassies and consulates in the 
Indo-Pacific and other regions around the 
world, as necessary.
1189 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States to— 
(1) ensure Department of State funding levels 
and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect 
the region’s high degree of importance and signifi-
cance to United States political, economic, and secu-
rity interests; and 
(2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign 
assistance funding and the quantity of personnel 
dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the 
Department of State’s total budget. 
(d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall provide to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees (including the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate) of Congress an 
action plan that includes the following elements: 
(1) Identification of requirements to advance 
United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific 
and the personnel and budgetary resources for the 
Department of State needed to satisfy such objec-
tives, assuming an unconstrained resource environ-
ment.
1190 
(2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
partment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in 
terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
nomic, and security assistance. 
(3) A plan to increase the number of positions 
at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with 
responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 
description of increases at each post or bureau, a 
breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of 
how such increases in personnel will advance United 
States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 
(4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese- 
language speakers and translation specialists at 
posts in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau 
offices with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, 
including in INR. 
(5) A description of any staffing or other train-
ing or personnel reforms that may be required to 
quickly increase departmental capacity to address 
the inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities 
and challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, includ-
ing but not limited to issues related to climate 
change, public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, 
and digital technology issues.
1191 
(6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 
that the Department will meet in implementing the 
action plan. 
(7) A description of any barriers to imple-
menting the action plan and recommendations to ad-
dress these barriers, noting whether additional au-
thorities or resources from Congress is needed to ad-
dress these barriers. 
(e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 
180 days after the submission of the action plan described 
in subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary 
of State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate 
congressional committees (including the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate) 
on the implementation of such action plan, with sup-
porting data and including a detailed assessment of bench-
marks reached. 
(f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, 
$2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assist-
ance resources to carry out the purposes of part I and 
chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific
1192 
region and $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement re-
sources to the Indo-Pacific region. 
(g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.— 
Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection 
(f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant 
to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
of 2018 (Public Law 115–409). 
(h) BENCHMARKS UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State shall report to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees on the extent to which the strategic objectives de-
scribed in the action plan in subsection (d) have been sat-
isfied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made. 
SEC. 30214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING. 
(a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND 
SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a written report de-
tailing— 
(1) a description of United States Government 
efforts to gain a commitment from the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit
1193 
unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to 
controls; 
(2) a plan for future steps the United States 
Government will take to urge the PRC to combat il-
licit fentanyl production and trafficking originating 
in the PRC; 
(3) an assessment of the intersection between 
illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and 
illicit environmental trade and possible relationships 
of trade-based money laundering; 
(4) an assessment of the intersection between 
illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and 
counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the 
United States; and 
(5) an assessment of the intersection between 
illicit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and 
the illicit fentanyl trafficked over the United States- 
Mexico border into the United States. 
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 
subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 
a classified annex.
1194 
SEC. 30215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-
MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF 
INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 
ACT OF 2018. 
(a) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM 
ACT OF 1990.—Section 1421(c) of the Better Utilization 
of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 
U.S.C. 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT RE-
FORM ACT OF 1990.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
graphs (B) and (C), support provided under 
paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be 
considered to be a Federal credit program that 
is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 
1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of ap-
plying the requirements of such Act to such 
support. 
‘‘(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.— 
‘‘(i) IN
GENERAL.—For purposes of 
section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Re-
form Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et 
seq.) the cost of support provided under 
paragraph (1) with respect to a project 
shall be the net present value, at the time
1195 
when funds are disbursed to provide the 
support, of the following estimated cash 
flows: 
‘‘(I) The purchase price of the 
support. 
‘‘(II) 
Dividends, 
redemptions, 
and other shareholder distributions 
during the term of the support. 
‘‘(III) Proceeds received upon a 
sale, redemption, or other liquidation 
of the support. 
‘‘(IV) Adjustments for risk of es-
timated losses, if any. 
‘‘(ii) 
CHANGES
IN
TERMS
IN-
CLUDED.—The estimated cash flows de-
scribed in subclauses (I) through (IV) of 
clause (i) shall include the effects of 
changes in terms resulting from the exer-
cise of options included in the agreement 
to provide the support. 
‘‘(C) REESTIMATE
OF
COST.—When the 
estimated cost of support provided under para-
graph (1) with respect to a project made in a 
single fiscal year is reestimated in a subsequent 
year, the difference between the reestimated
1196 
cost and the previous cost estimate shall be 
paid from the balances available in the Cor-
porate Capital Account established under sec-
tion 1434.’’. 
(b) MAXIMUM
CONTINGENT
LIABILITY.—Section 
1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended 
by 
striking 
‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ 
and 
inserting 
‘‘$100,000,000,000’’. 
(c) FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.— 
Section 1434(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments 
Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b)) 
is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 
end; 
(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para-
graph (7); and 
(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pur-
suant to section 1421(c); and’’. 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer 
of the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation shall submit to the appropriate congressional
1197 
committees and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate a report on— 
(1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financ-
ing to support United States national security and 
development priorities in critical regions; and 
(2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic 
resources that would be required in order to carry 
out the plan required by this subsection. 
SEC. 30216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE 
CORPORATION 
FOR 
VACCINE 
MANUFAC-
TURING, DISTRIBUTION, STORAGE, AND DE-
LIVERY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Cor-
poration is authorized to provide financing to entities in 
India and in other less developed countries to increase vac-
cine manufacturing, distribution, storage, and delivery ca-
pacity for the following purposes: 
(1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Au-
thorization (SRA) or World Health Organization 
(WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vac-
cines. 
(2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency 
Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re-
lated to COVID–19.
1198 
(3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies 
needed for preventing, detecting and treating 
COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective 
equipment, oxygen, diagnostics, auto-disable sy-
ringes, therapeutics and vaccines. 
(4) Enhancing the cold chain necessary for the 
production, delivery, storage, and distribution of vac-
cines. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corpora-
tion, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall pro-
vide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees— 
(1) outlining the countries where DFC financ-
ing could be most impactful for vaccine manufac-
turing, distribution, storage, and delivery and to 
achieve the goal of manufacturing, distributing, and 
delivering 1 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022; 
(2) including a detailed explanation of the 
United States and partner country interests served 
by the United States providing support to such 
projects; 
(3) including a detailed description of any sup-
port provided by other United States allies and part-
1199 
ners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection 
(a); and 
(4) including a detailed description of any sup-
port provided by the People’s Republic of China in 
support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a). 
(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 
a classified annex if necessary. 
SEC. 30217. ACTIONS TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF THE 
COVID–19 PANDEMIC. 
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Ad-
ministrator for the US Agency for International Develop-
ment, shall to the extent practicable, expand testing capac-
ity, vaccination distribution, and acquisition of needed 
medical supplies, including available COVID–19 vaccines 
and supporting vaccination efforts, to— 
(1) ensure continued success in preventing the 
spread of the COVID–19 pandemic, 
(2) achieve swift and widespread vaccinations, 
pursuing long-term economic recovery globally, and 
(3) demonstrate American commitment to glob-
al engagement and diplomatic support.
1200 
SEC. 30218. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS 
ALIGN 
WITH 
AMERICAN 
STRATEGIC 
NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC-
TIVES. 
(a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other rep-
resentative offices globally, China now has more diplo-
matic posts around the world than any other country, in-
cluding the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions 
can be found in countries that recently broke ties with Tai-
wan (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
the Gambia, and Sa˜o Tome´ and Principe) or do not have 
any United States diplomatic physical presence despite 
these countries asking for increased United States engage-
ment and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Domi-
nica). 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress, that the Department of State should conduct an 
assessment of all United States diplomatic missions and 
posts to verify such missions and posts align with United 
States national security and economic interests, as well as 
ensuring that these locations position the United States 
appropriately with its strategic competitors to advance the 
national interest in every country worldwide, including 
those countries currently lacking any physical United 
States diplomatic presence, whether an embassy, consulate 
general, or principal officer post.
1201 
(c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter 
for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees (including the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate) a report assessing the number, location, 
and objectives of each of its diplomatic missions and posts 
worldwide, including an assessment of any gaps that exist 
compared to other country strategic competitors. The Sec-
retary of State shall coordinate with the heads of other 
Federal departments and agencies having an overseas 
presence at any United States diplomatic mission or post 
to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Government 
equities and viewpoints. 
SEC. 30219. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated, for the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 
2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, training, re-
search, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright- 
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the 
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
1202 
(b) NULLIFICATION.—Section 3(i) of Executive 
Order No. 13936 (relating to the termination of the Ful-
bright exchange program with regard to China and Hong 
Kong with respect to future exchanges for participants 
traveling both from and to China or Hong Kong) is nul-
lified and shall have no force or effect, and Fulbright ex-
changes with China and Hong Kong shall carry on as if 
such section had not be included in such Executive Order. 
SEC. 30219A. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND 
COUNTERING DISINFORMATION. 
(a) 
AUTHORIZATION
OF
USAGM 
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated for the 
United States Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and 
new programs to support local media, build independent 
media, combat CCP disinformation inside and outside of 
the People’s Republic of China, invest in technology to 
subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate such pro-
grams, of which— 
(1) not less than $70,000,000 shall be directed 
to a grant to Radio Free Asia language services; 
(2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made 
available to serve populations in China through 
Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan lan-
guage services; and
1203 
(3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made 
available for digital media services— 
(A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese 
populations in foreign countries; and 
(B) to counter propaganda of Chinese pop-
ulations in China through ‘‘Global Mandarin’’ 
programming. 
(b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of 
State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International De-
velopment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for 
Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly 
support and train foreign journalists on investigative tech-
niques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote 
transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of 
the public to develop informed opinions about pressing 
issues facing their countries. 
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue 
to support internet freedom programs. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 
and United States Agency for International Development 
$170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
1204 
for ongoing and new programs in support of press free-
dom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized 
to remain available until expended and shall be in addition 
to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to 
support press freedom, training, and protection of journal-
ists. 
SEC. 30219B. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER. 
(a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
gagement Center to ‘‘direct, lead, and coordinate efforts’’ 
of the Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand, ex-
pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda 
and disinformation globally’’. 
(b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 
U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that 
is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ 
and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2027’’. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand 
its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through 
the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments 
and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and coun-
tering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the
1205 
Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations 
Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 
2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign 
state 
and 
non-state 
sponsored 
propaganda 
and 
disinformation. 
SEC. 30219C. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PAN-
DEMIC. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) understanding the origins of the COVID-19 
pandemic may help the United States better pre-
pare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health 
threats in the future; 
(2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pan-
demic on all Americans, the American people deserve 
to know what information the United States Govern-
ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as 
appropriate; 
(3) it is critical for independent experts to have 
full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
ronmental data, biological sample, research, and per-
sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak 
relevant to determining how this pandemic emerged;
1206 
(4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by 
the United States Government and 13 other foreign 
governments that the international team of experts 
dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was ‘‘significantly 
delayed and lacked access to complete, original data 
and samples’’; 
(5) the G7 communique expressing support for 
full implementation of the International Health Reg-
ulations, including ‘‘a timely, transparent, expert- 
led, and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 
COVID–19 
Origins 
study 
including, 
as 
rec-
ommended by the experts’ report, in China’’ is a val-
uable commitment by the United States and its al-
lies to investigating the origins of COVID–19 in 
order to better prepare for future pandemics; and 
(6) Congress supports the effort announced by 
President Biden, directing the intelligence commu-
nity to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze 
information pointing to the origins of COVID–19, 
which resulted in broad intelligence community 
agreement that the ‘‘virus was not developed as a bi-
ological weapon’’ and ‘‘two hypotheses remain plau-
1207 
sible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a 
laboratory-associated incident’’. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report con-
sisting of— 
(1) an assessment of the most likely source or 
origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a de-
tailed review of all information the United States 
possesses that it has identified as potentially rel-
evant to the source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 
virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, 
or other sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, 
based on the information the United States Govern-
ment has to date; 
(2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and 
(3) challenges identified to its ability to make 
such an assessment. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 
a classified annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means—
1208 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the Senate; 
(5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives; and 
(7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 30219D. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIA-
TIVE ACT OF 2018. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of 
the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-
portunities, as well as many challenges to United 
States interests and values as a result of the growth 
in authoritarian governance in the region and by 
broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the
1209 
changing environment, and deteriorating adherence 
to human rights principles and obligations; 
(2) the People’s Republic of China poses a par-
ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally 
recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic 
and trade practices, disregards international laws 
and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign 
influence operations, and enables global digital 
authoritarianism; 
(3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 
(‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the United States’ commitment 
in the Indo-Pacific region by— 
(A) expanding its defense cooperation with 
its allies and partners; 
(B) investing in democracy and the protec-
tion of human rights; 
(C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; 
and 
(D) supporting people-to-people engage-
ment and other shared priorities; and 
(4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pa-
cific Strategy Report concludes that ARIA ‘‘en-
shrines a generational whole-of-government policy 
framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region’’.
1210 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—The 
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115– 
409) is amended— 
(1) 
in 
section 
201(b), 
by 
striking 
‘‘$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 
through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026’’; 
(2) in section 215(b), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 
inserting ‘‘2026’’; 
(3) in section 306(a)— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘5 
years’’ and inserting ‘‘8 years’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2026’’; 
(4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2026’’; 
(5) in section 410— 
(A) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 
and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 
(B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
ceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 
inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 
(6) in section 411, by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in-
serting ‘‘2026’’.
1211 
SEC. 30219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant of-
fices and bureaus of the Department of State, shall imple-
ment a ‘‘China Watcher Program’’ within the Department 
of State to— 
(1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influ-
ence across economic and political sectors in foreign 
countries; and 
(2) augment the capacity of United States Gov-
ernment engagement with foreign countries and re-
gional and international economic and political orga-
nizations and institutions relating to policy coordina-
tion regarding China and such Chinese malign influ-
ence. 
(b) PLACEMENT.—In carrying out the China Watch-
er Program under this section, the Secretary of State shall 
place Foreign Service officers in positions in select United 
States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of 
the Secretary of State, to engage both Chinese and third- 
country nationals, including host governments, on the 
matters described in subsection (a). 
(c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Each diplomatic or consular 
post with a China Watcher Program shall produce an an-
nual report outlining the steps each such post has taken
1212 
to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature 
and extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influ-
ence in key economic and political sectors, including tech-
nology, manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, ag-
riculture, and real estate. 
(d) 
AUTHORIZATION
OF
ANNUAL
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—There 
is 
authorized 
to 
be 
appropriated 
$5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year there-
after to carry out this section. 
SEC. 30219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHI-
NESE LANGUAGE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the 
United States Government should invest heavily into 
alternative programs and institutions that ensure 
there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learn-
ing China’s many languages; and 
(2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by 
a strategic competition between the United States 
and China, it is in the national security interests of 
the United States to ensure that Americans continue 
to invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Ti-
betan, Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while en-
1213 
suring they can do so in a context free of malign po-
litical influence from foreign state actors. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR 
STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.—The Secretary of 
State shall establish in the Department of State the ‘‘Liu 
Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language’’ to fund 
study by United States persons of Mandarin and Can-
tonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other 
contemporary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the 
United States. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of 
State for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter, 
$10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study 
of the Chinese Language. 
(d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—Amounts authorized to 
be appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) shall— 
(1) be designed to advance the national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States, as 
determined by the Secretary of State; 
(2) favor funding mechanisms that can maxi-
mize the total number of United States persons 
given the opportunity to acquire full conversational 
linguistic proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese
1214 
Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other 
contemporary spoken languages of China; 
(3) favor funding mechanisms that provide op-
portunities for such language study to areas tradi-
tionally under-served by such opportunities; 
(4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative proc-
ess taking into account design inputs of— 
(A) civil society institutions, including Chi-
nese diaspora community organizations; 
(B) language experts in Mandarin and 
Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongo-
lian, and other contemporary spoken languages 
of China; 
(C) organizations representing historically 
disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the 
United States; and 
(D) human rights organizations; and 
(5) favor opportunities to fund the study of 
Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, 
Mongolian, and other contemporary spoken lan-
guages of China at Alaska Native-serving institu-
tions, Asian American and Native American Pacific 
Islander-serving institutions, Hispanic-serving insti-
tutions, historically Black college or universities, Na-
tive American-serving nontribal institutions, Native
1215 
Hawaiian-serving institutions, Predominantly Black 
institutions, Tribal Colleges or Universities. 
(e) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and an-
nually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the heads of appropriate 
Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report detailing 
activities and disbursements made to carry out this 
Act over the immediately preceding academic year. 
(2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required 
under paragraph (1) shall include details on— 
(A) which institutions, programs, or enti-
ties received funds through the Liu Xiaobo 
Fund for Study of the Chinese Language; 
(B) funds distribution disaggregated by in-
stitution, program, or entity, including identi-
fication of the State or country in which such 
institution, program, or entity is located; 
(C) the number of United States persons 
who received language study under the Liu 
Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Lan-
1216 
guage, and the average amount disbursed per 
person for such study; 
(D) a comparative analysis of per dollar 
program effectiveness and efficiency in allowing 
United States persons to reach conversational 
proficiency Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Ti-
betan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other contem-
porary spoken languages of China; 
(E) an analysis of which of the languages 
referred to in subparagraph (D) were studied 
through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund 
for Study of the Chinese Language; and 
(F) any recommendations of the Secretary 
of State for improvements to the authorities, 
priorities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo 
Fund for Study of the Chinese Language. 
(f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZA-
TION.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-
retary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be 
transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal de-
partments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to 
prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate. Such heads shall consult with
1217 
the Secretary in the preparation of the report required 
under subsection (e). 
(g) LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appro-
priated to carry out this Act may only be made available 
for the costs of language study funded and administration 
incurred by the Department of State or programs carried 
out by the Department of State (or by another Federal 
department or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry 
out this section. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ALASKA
NATIVE-SERVING
INSTITUTION.— 
The term ‘‘Alaska Native-serving institution’’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1059d(b)). 
(2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN 
PACIFIC
ISLANDER-SERVING
INSTITUTION.—The 
term ‘‘Asian American and Native American Pacific 
Islander-serving institution’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)). 
(3) 
HISPANIC-SERVING
INSTITUTION.—The 
term ‘‘Hispanic-serving institution’’ has the meaning 
given such term in section 502 of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
1218 
(4) HISTORICALLY
BLACK
COLLEGE
OR
UNI-
VERSITY.—The term ‘‘historically Black college or 
university’’ means a part B institution described in 
section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(22 U.S.C. 1061(2)). 
(5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL IN-
STITUTION.—The term ‘‘Native American-serving 
nontribal institution’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)). 
(6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.— 
The term ‘‘Native Hawaiian-serving institution’’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1059d(b)). 
(7) PREDOMINANTLY
BLACK
INSTITUTION.— 
The term ‘‘Predominantly Black institution’’ has the 
meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the 
Higher 
Education 
Act 
of 
1965 
(20 
U.S.C. 
1067q(c)). 
(8) TRIBAL
COLLEGE
OR
UNIVERSITY.—The 
term ‘‘Tribal College or University’’ has the meaning 
given such term in section 316(b) of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).
1219 
SEC. 30219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE 
THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT 
OF 2021. 
(a) AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.—Amounts au-
thorized and appropriated under title X of the American 
Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry 
out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 
et seq.) shall be subject to the applicable authorities and 
conditions for funds made available to carry out the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and 
division K of Public Law 116–260. 
(b) OVERSIGHT
AND ACCOUNTABILITY.—Amounts 
authorized and appropriated under sections 10001 and 
10002 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be 
transferred to the Inspector General of the Department 
of State and the Inspector General of the United States 
Agency for International Development to expand the ca-
pacity of such Inspectors General to conduct effective 
oversight of the foreign assistance programs and activities 
under such Act. 
(c) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOB-
AL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA 
COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.—United States con-
tributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria COVID–19 Response Mechanism
1220 
under section 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act 
of 2021— 
(1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner 
that incentivizes other public and private donor con-
tributions; and 
(2) shall be subject to the reporting and with-
holding 
requirements 
under 
subsections 
(c), 
(d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of 
section 202 of the United States Leadership Against 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 
(22 U.S.C. 7622). 
SEC. 30219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE 
BRANDING. 
The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated 
or otherwise procured and financed by the United States 
Government shall be clearly branded with the United 
States flag. 
SEC. 30219I. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON ESCA-
LATION AND DE-ESCALATION OF GRAY ZONE 
ACTIVITIES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The conventional power of the United 
States has driven foreign adversaries to a level of 
competition that does not always depend on military 
confrontation with the United States.
1221 
(2) Rather than challenging the United States 
in a manner that could provoke a kinetic military re-
sponse, foreign adversaries of the United States have 
turned to carrying out gray zone activities to ad-
vance the interests of such adversaries, weaken the 
power of the United States, and erode the norms 
that underpin the United States-led international 
order. 
(3) Gray zone activity falls on a spectrum of at-
tribution and deniability that ranges from covert ad-
versary operations, to detectible covert adversary op-
erations, to unattributable adversary operations, to 
deniable adversary operations, to open adversary op-
erations. 
(4) To adequately address such a shift to gray 
zone activity, the United States must understand 
what actions tend to either escalate or de-escalate 
such activity by our adversaries. 
(5) The laws, principles, and values of the 
United States are strategic advantages in great 
power competition with authoritarian foreign adver-
saries that carry out gray zone activities, because 
such laws, principles, and values increase the appeal 
of the governance model of the United States, and
1222 
the United States-led international order, to states 
and peoples around the world. 
(6) The international security environment has 
demonstrated numerous examples of gray zone ac-
tivities carried out by foreign adversaries, including 
the following activities of foreign adversaries: 
(A) Information operations, such as efforts 
by Russia to influence the 2020 United States 
Federal elections (as described in the March 15, 
2021, intelligence community assessment of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
made publicly available on March 15, 2021). 
(B) Adversary political coercion operations, 
such as the wielding of energy by Russia, par-
ticularly in the context of Ukrainian gas pipe-
lines, to coerce its neighbors into compliance 
with its policies. 
(C) Cyber operations, such as the use by 
China of cyber tools to conduct industrial espio-
nage. 
(D) Provision of support to proxy forces, 
such as the support provided by Iran to 
Hezbollah and Shia militia groups. 
(E) Provocation by armed forces controlled 
by the government of the foreign adversary
1223 
through measures that do not rise to the level 
of an armed attack, such as the use of the 
China Coast Guard and maritime militia by 
China to harass the fishing vessels of other 
countries in the South China Sea. 
(F) Alleged uses of lethal force on foreign 
soil, such as the 2018 attempts by Russia to 
poison Sergei Skripal in London. 
(G) The potential use by an adversary of 
technology that causes anomalous health inci-
dents among United States Government per-
sonnel. 
(b) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National 
Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence 
Council, shall produce a National Intelligence Esti-
mate on how foreign adversaries use gray zone ac-
tivities to advance interests, what responses by the 
United States (or the allies or partners of the 
United States) would tend to result in the escalation 
or de-escalation of such gray zone activities by for-
eign adversaries, and any opportunities for the 
United States to minimize the extent to which for-
eign adversaries use gray zone activities in further-
ance of great power competition.
1224 
(2) MATTERS INCLUDED.—To the extent deter-
mined appropriate by the National Intelligence 
Council, the National Intelligence Estimate produced 
under paragraph (1) may include an assessment of 
the following topics: 
(A) Any potential or actual lethal or harm-
ful gray zone activities carried out against the 
United States by foreign adversaries, including 
against United States Government employees 
and United States persons, whether located 
within or outside of the United States. 
(B) To the extent such activities have oc-
curred, or are predicted to occur— 
(i) opportunities to reduce or deter 
any such activities; and 
(ii) any actions of the United States 
Government that would tend to result in 
the escalation or de-escalation of such ac-
tivities. 
(C) Any incidents in which foreign adver-
saries could have used, but ultimately did not 
use, gray zone activities to advance the inter-
ests of such adversaries, including an assess-
ment as to why the foreign adversary ultimately 
did not use gray zone activities.
1225 
(D) The effect of lowering the United 
States Government threshold for the public at-
tribution of detectible covert adversary oper-
ations, unattributable adversary operations, and 
deniable adversary operations. 
(E) The effect of lowering the United 
States Government threshold for responding to 
detectible 
covert 
adversary 
operations, 
unattributable adversary operations, and deni-
able adversary operations. 
(F) The extent to which the governments 
of foreign adversaries exercise control over any 
proxies or parastate actors used by such gov-
ernments in carrying out gray zone activities. 
(G) The extent to which gray zone activi-
ties carried out by foreign adversaries affect the 
private sector of the United States. 
(H) The international norms that provide 
the greatest deterrence to gray zone activities 
carried out by foreign adversaries, and opportu-
nities for strengthening those norms. 
(I) The effect, if any, of the strengthening 
of democratic governance abroad on the resil-
ience of United States allies and partners to 
gray zone activities.
1226 
(J) Opportunities to strengthen the resil-
ience of United States allies and partners to 
gray zone activities, and associated tactics, car-
ried out by foreign adversaries. 
(K) Opportunities for the United States to 
improve the detection of, and early warning for, 
such activities and tactics. 
(L) Opportunities for the United States to 
galvanize international support in responding to 
such activities and tactics. 
(3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director shall submit to the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives the National Intel-
ligence Estimate produced under paragraph (1), 
including all intelligence reporting underlying 
the Estimate. 
(B) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If 
at any time before the deadline specified in sub-
paragraph (A), the Director determines that the 
National Intelligence Estimate produced under 
paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by such
1227 
deadline, the Director shall (before such dead-
line) submit to the Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
resentatives a report setting forth the reasons 
why the National Intelligence Estimate cannot 
be submitted by such deadline and an estimated 
date for the submission of the National Intel-
ligence Estimate. 
(C) FORM.—Any report under subpara-
graph (B) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form. 
(4) PUBLIC VERSION.—Consistent with the pro-
tection of intelligence sources and methods, at the 
same time as the Director submits to the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives the National Intelligence 
Estimate under paragraph (1), the Director shall 
make publicly available on the internet website of 
the Director an unclassified version of the key find-
ings of the National Intelligence Estimate. 
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection:
1228 
(A) GRAY
ZONE
ACTIVITY.—The term 
‘‘gray zone activity’’ means an activity to ad-
vance the national interests of a State that— 
(i) falls between ordinary statecraft 
and open warfare; 
(ii) is carried out with an intent to 
maximize the advancement of interests of 
the state without provoking a kinetic mili-
tary response by the United States; and 
(iii) falls on a spectrum that ranges 
from 
covert 
adversary 
operations, 
to 
detectible covert adversary operations, to 
unattributable adversary operations, to de-
niable adversary operations, to open adver-
sary operations. 
(B) COVERT
ADVERSARY
OPERATION.— 
The term ‘‘covert adversary operation’’ means 
an operation by an adversary that— 
(i) the adversary intends to remain 
below the threshold at which the United 
States detects the operation; and 
(ii) does stay below such threshold. 
(C) DETECTIBLE COVERT ADVERSARY OP-
ERATION.—The term ‘‘detectible covert adver-
1229 
sary operation’’ means an operation by an ad-
versary that— 
(i) the adversary intends to remain 
below the threshold at which the United 
States detects the operation; but 
(ii) is ultimately detected by the 
United States at a level below the level at 
which the United States will publicly at-
tribute the operation to the adversary. 
(D) UNATTRIBUTABLE ADVERSARY OPER-
ATION.—The term ‘‘unattributable adversary 
operation’’ means an operation by an adversary 
that the adversary intends to be detected by the 
United States, but remain below the threshold 
at which the United States will publicly at-
tribute the operation to the adversary. 
(E) DENIABLE ADVERSARY OPERATION.— 
The term ‘‘deniable adversary operation’’ means 
an operation by an adversary that— 
(i) the adversary intends to be de-
tected and publicly or privately attributed 
by the United States; and 
(ii) the adversary intends to deny, to 
limit the response by the United States, 
and any allies of the United States.
1230 
(F) OPEN
ADVERSARY
OPERATION.—The 
term ‘‘open adversary operation’’ means an op-
eration by an adversary that the adversary 
openly acknowledges as attributable to the ad-
versary. 
(c) REQUIREMENT TO DEVELOP LEXICON.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National 
Intelligence, acting through the National Intelligence 
Council, shall develop a lexicon of common terms 
(and corresponding definitions for such terms) for 
concepts associated with gray zone activities. 
(2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In developing the lexi-
con under paragraph (1), the National Intelligence 
Council shall include in the lexicon each term (and 
the corresponding definition for each term) specified 
in subsection (b)(5), unless the National Intelligence 
Council determines that an alternative term (or al-
ternative definition)— 
(A) more accurately describes a concept as-
sociated with gray zone activities; or 
(B) is preferable for any other reason. 
(3) REPORT.— 
(A) PUBLICATION.—The Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall publish a report con-
1231 
taining the lexicon developed under paragraph 
(1). 
(B) FORM.—The report under subpara-
graph (A) shall be published in unclassified 
form. 
SEC. 30219J. PRIORITIZING DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND CONNECTIVITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1451 of the Better Utili-
zation of Investments Leading to Development Act 2018 
(22 U.S.C. 9613) is amended by inserting after subsection 
(i) the following: 
‘‘(j) PRIORITIZING DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
CONNECTIVITY.—The Corporation should prioritize sup-
port to projects that— 
‘‘(1) 
increase 
digital 
infrastructure 
and 
connectivity, including operators of voice and data 
networks, development options for countries with the 
greatest need for digital infrastructure investment 
and in cases in which competing digital infrastruc-
ture financing proposals lack high standards for 
data security and protection of users’ human rights; 
and 
‘‘(2) align with the Corporation’s authorities re-
lating to provisions of support as outlined in section 
1421(a).’’.
1232 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the United States Inter-
national Development Financing Corporation shall submit 
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate a report that includes an identification and de-
scription of— 
(1) regions and countries with the greatest need 
for investment in digital infrastructure, including 
the types of such digital infrastructure; 
(2) regions and countries in which investment 
in digital infrastructure will be most effective in pro-
moting high standards for data security and protec-
tion of users’ human rights; and 
(3) efforts of partner governments to provide 
digital infrastructure development financing initia-
tives and efforts of the Corporation to coordinate 
with such partner governments with respect to such 
digital infrastructure development financing.
1233 
SEC. 30219K. REPORT ON MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO AD-
DRESS LATIN AMERICAN FENTANYL TRAF-
FICKING 
AND 
EFFORTS 
BETWEEN 
LATIN 
AMERICA AND CHINA ON FENTANYL TRAF-
FICKING. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Attorney General and the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a written report that contains— 
(1) a description of United States Government 
efforts to gain a commitment from the governments 
of Latin American countries to combat the produc-
tion and flow of illicit fentanyl products and the 
metrics used to measure the success of existing bi-
lateral agreements with individual Latin American 
countries; 
(2) a plan for future steps the United States 
Government will take to urge the Latin American 
governments to combat illicit fentanyl production 
and trafficking originating in their respective coun-
tries; 
(3) a description of efforts between China and 
Latin American countries to combat the production 
and flow of illicit fentanyl products originating in 
China and Latin America;
1234 
(4) a description of United States Government 
efforts to urge China and Latin American countries 
to detect and deter the financing of the production 
and flow of illicit fentanyl products originating in 
China and Latin America, to trace the proceeds of 
their sale, and to combat related corruption; and 
(5) a plan for future steps the United States 
Government will take to urge the Latin American 
governments and Chinese Government to address 
transnational criminal organizations and combat il-
licit fentanyl production and trafficking originating 
in their respective countries. 
(b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 
a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on 
Financial Services of the House of Representatives; 
and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.
1235 
SEC. 30219L. REPORT GENERATION AND SHARING ON LONG 
TERM COST OF BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
TO THIRD COUNTIRES. 
The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the Sec-
retary of Treasury and the heads of other Federal agen-
cies as relevant a report for each country participating or 
considering participating in the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s One Belt, One Road Initiative to show the full spec-
trum of negative costs on participant countries. The report 
shall— 
(1) show the long-term financial costs of such 
participation; 
(2) describe China’s use of One Belt, One Road 
to enrich Chinese State Owned Enterprises; 
(3) provide examples of China’s imposition of 
political cost on participating countries; and 
(4) contain any additional information deter-
mined necessary to dissuade future participation 
with China’s debt trap and coercive infrastructure 
program. 
SEC. 30219M. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE STA-
TUS OF CHINA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the People’s Republic of China is a fully in-
dustrialized nation and no longer a developing na-
tion; and
1236 
(2) any international agreement that provides 
or accords China a favorable status or treatment as 
a ‘‘developing nation’’ should be updated to reflect 
the status of China. 
SEC. 30219N. REPORT ON PROVIDING ACCESS TO UNCEN-
SORED MEDIA IN CHINA. 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to 
Congress a classified report on what is needed to provide 
access to free and uncensored media in the Chinese mar-
ket. 
SEC. 30219O. REPORT ON OPEN RADIO ACCESS NETWORKS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Com-
merce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
port on the national security implications of open radio 
access networks (Open RAN or O-RAN) that— 
(1) provides information on the United States 
Government’s international engagement to support 
United States leadership in Open RAN, including 
the Department of State’s diplomatic efforts to en-
sure United States leadership in international stand-
ard setting bodies for Open RAN;
1237 
(2) 
describes 
the 
involvement 
of 
China 
headquartered companies in Open RAN standards 
setting bodies such as the O-RAN Alliance; 
(3) reviews the national security risks posed by 
the presence of entities included on the Bureau of 
Industry and Security’s ‘‘Entity List’’ in the O-RAN 
Alliance; 
(4) determines whether entities that do business 
in the United States can participate in the O-Ran 
Alliance under existing sanctions and export control 
laws; 
(5) analyzes whether United States national se-
curity is affected by the limited number of tele-
communications equipment vendors, and examines 
whether the advent and deployment of Open RAN 
would expand the number of equipment and service 
providers; 
(6) outlines how the United States can work 
with allies, partners, and other countries to ensure 
that Open RAN maintains the highest security and 
privacy standards; and 
(7) identifies steps the United States can take 
to assert leadership in Open RAN.
1238 
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(4) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate. 
Subtitle B—International Security 
Matters 
SEC. 30221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS. 
In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 
Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
1239 
SEC. 30222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE 
INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
priated for each of fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 
2026 for the Department of State, out of amounts author-
ized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for 
assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.) (relating 
to international military education and training assist-
ance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region 
in accordance with this subtitle. Funds may be disbursed 
only after vetting of individuals proposed to be trained, 
consistent with sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d). 
(b) LIMITATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by subsection (a) may be 
used to provide assistance to any foreign security 
force units if the Secretary of State determines that 
such forces have engaged in patterns of torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, 
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduc-
tion and clandestine detention of those persons, au-
thorized by high-ranking officials or other flagrant
1240 
denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of 
person, authorized by high-ranking officials pursuant 
to section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304). 
(2) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case- 
by-case basis and for periods not to exceed 180 
days, waive the prohibition in paragraph (1) if the 
President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees not later than 15 days before such waiv-
er is to take effect that the waiver is vital to the na-
tional security interests of the United States or its 
partners and allies. 
SEC. 30223. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to— 
(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United 
States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for 
achieving United States political and military objec-
tives in the region; 
(2) exercise freedom of operations in the inter-
national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific 
maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-
perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-
gion; 
(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the 
Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber
1241 
presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, 
long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabili-
ties, and diversified and resilient basing and rota-
tional presence, including support for pre-positioning 
strategies; 
(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and 
partnerships of the United States to build capacity 
and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, 
modernize communications architecture, address 
anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase 
joint exercises and security cooperation efforts; 
(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the 
United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-
cific region, including longstanding United States 
policy regarding— 
(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-
operation and Security between the United 
States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-
ary 19, 1960; 
(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty between the United States and the Re-
public of Korea, signed at Washington October 
1, 1953; 
(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Trea-
ty between the United States and the Republic
1242 
of the Philippines, signed at Washington Au-
gust 30, 1951, including that, as the South 
China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed at-
tack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public ves-
sels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
defense obligations under Article IV of our mu-
tual defense treaty; 
(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-
land, United States Security Treaty, done at 
San Francisco September 1, 1951; and 
(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-
gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 
1962; 
(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies 
in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral se-
curity and defense cooperation with other regional 
partners; 
(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the 
United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with 
partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle 
of freedom of operations in international waters and 
airspace in accordance with established principles 
and practices of international law;
1243 
(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ‘‘Six As-
surances’’ provided by the United States to Taiwan 
in July 1982 as the foundations for United States- 
Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest extent 
possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations 
of the United States and Taiwan, including coopera-
tion to support the development of capable, ready, 
and modern forces necessary for the defense of Tai-
wan; 
(9) enhance security partnerships with India, 
across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the 
Indo-Pacific; 
(10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the 
PRC against United States and allies’ interests, es-
pecially along the First Island Chain and in the 
Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the 
United States can and is willing to deny them the 
ability to achieve their objectives, including by— 
(A) consistently demonstrating the political 
will of the United States to deepening existing 
treaty alliances and growing new partnerships 
as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-
tegic advantage to the PRC’s growing military 
capabilities and reach;
1244 
(B) maintaining a system of forward-de-
ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the 
most visible sign of United States resolve and 
commitment to the region, and as platforms to 
ensure United States operational readiness and 
advance interoperability with allies and part-
ners; 
(C) adopting a more dispersed force pos-
ture throughout the region, particularly the 
Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access 
for United States mobile and relocatable 
launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and 
hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region; 
(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike 
networks to United States and allied forces, in-
cluding ground-launched cruise missiles, under-
sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air 
and missile defense in the First Island Chain 
and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter 
and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and 
to maximize the United States ability to oper-
ate; 
(E) strengthening extended deterrence to 
ensure that escalation against key United
1245 
States interests would be costly, risky, and self- 
defeating; and 
(F) collaborating with allies and partners 
to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-
ing the burdens of mutual defense, including 
through the acquisition and fielding of advanced 
capabilities and training that will better enable 
them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and 
(11) maintain the capacity of the United States 
to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, 
reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts 
of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself 
and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-
tacks against them. 
SEC. 30224. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO- 
PACIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO-
PRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME 
SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-
REACH ACTIVITIES. 
(a) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.—In 
addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section 
23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (re-
lating to foreign military financing assistance), there is 
authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022
1246 
through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific 
region in accordance with this section— 
(1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 
(2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; 
(3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; 
(4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and 
(5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026. 
(b) SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-
TIATIVE.—There is authorized to be appropriated 
$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
for the Department of State for International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support 
of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initia-
tive. 
(c) DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 
$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, 
which shall be used— 
(1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with 
the United States’ interpretation of international law 
relating to freedom of the seas; and
1247 
(2) to work with allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific region to better align respective inter-
pretations of international law relating to freedom of 
the seas, including on the matters of operations by 
military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent 
passage through territorial seas, and transits 
through international straits. 
(d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION
AND PURPOSE.— 
Using amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance for the pur-
pose of increasing maritime security and domain aware-
ness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region— 
(1) to provide assistance to national military or 
other security forces of such countries that have 
maritime security missions among their functional 
responsibilities; 
(2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and 
headquarters level organizations for such forces; and 
(3) to provide assistance and training to other 
relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related 
ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that 
manage and oversee maritime activities and policy 
that the Secretary of State may so designate.
1248 
(e) DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance pro-
vided by the Secretary of State under subsection (g) shall 
be known as the ‘‘Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
tive’’ (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Initiative’’). 
(f) PROGRAM
OBJECTIVES.—Assistance provided 
through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-
lowing objectives: 
(1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of 
international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region 
that are critical to ensuring the security and free 
flow of commerce and to achieving United States na-
tional security objectives. 
(2) Improving maritime domain awareness in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion. 
(4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activi-
ties and other forms of maritime trafficking activity 
in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-
tions that have been determined to be a security 
threat to the United States. 
(5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a 
country or regional organization to respond to 
emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo- 
Pacific region.
1249 
(6) Strengthening United States alliances and 
partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (a) (relating to foreign mili-
tary financing assistance), there is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State for the 
Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative and other 
related regional programs exactly— 
(A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 
(B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; 
(C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024; 
(D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; 
and 
(E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The ‘‘Indo-Pa-
cific Maritime Security Initiative’’ and funds author-
ized for the Initiative shall include existing regional 
programs carried out by the Department of State re-
lated to maritime security, including the Southeast 
Asia Maritime Security Initiative. 
(h) ELIGIBILITY
AND
PRIORITIES
FOR
ASSIST-
ANCE.—
1250 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 
use the following considerations when selecting 
which countries in the Indo-Pacific region should re-
ceive assistance pursuant to the Initiative: 
(A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-
try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-
pabilities of that country according to the objec-
tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-
tion that includes that country, to conduct— 
(i) maritime intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance; 
(ii) littoral and port security; 
(iii) Coast Guard operations; 
(iv) command and control; and 
(v) management and oversight of mar-
itime activities. 
(B) Priority shall be placed on assistance 
to enhance the maritime security capabilities of 
the military or security forces of countries in 
the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime mis-
sions and the government agencies responsible 
for such forces. 
(2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.— 
(A) AUTHORIZED
ELEMENTS
OF
ASSIST-
ANCE.—Assistance provided under paragraph
1251 
(1)(A) may include the provision of equipment, 
training, and small-scale military construction. 
(B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE 
AND TRAINING.—Assistance and training pro-
vided under subparagraph (A) shall include ele-
ments that promote— 
(i) the observance of and respect for 
human rights; and 
(ii) respect for legitimate civilian au-
thority within the country to which the as-
sistance is provided. 
SEC. 30225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT 
PILOT PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fis-
cal years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot pro-
gram for foreign military financing (FMF) compacts. 
(b) ASSISTANCE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is 
authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration 
of two years, with an assessment for any additional 
or permanent programming, to provide assistance 
under this section for each country that enters into 
an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States 
pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and
1252 
programs that advance the progress of the country 
in achieving lasting security and civilian-military 
governance through respect for human rights, good 
governance (including transparency and free and 
fair elections), and cooperation with United States 
and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, 
and counter-crime efforts and programs. 
(2) FORM OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under 
this subsection may be provided in the form of 
grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-in-
terest loans to the government of an eligible country 
described in subsection (c). 
(c) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a can-
didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-
ance for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 if— 
(A) the country is classified as a lower 
middle income country in the then-most recent 
edition of the World Development Report for 
Reconstruction and Development published by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and has an income greater than 
the historical ceiling for International Develop-
ment Association eligibility for the fiscal year 
involved; and
1253 
(B) the Secretary of State determines that 
the country is committed to seeking just and 
democratic governance, including with a dem-
onstrated commitment to— 
(i) the promotion of political plu-
ralism, equality, and the rule of law; 
(ii) respect for human and civil rights; 
(iii) protection of private property 
rights; 
(iv) transparency and accountability 
of government; 
(v) anti-corruption; and 
(vi) the institution of effective civilian 
control, professionalization, and respect for 
human rights by and the accountability of 
the armed forces. 
(2) 
IDENTIFICATION
OF
ELIGIBLE
COUN-
TRIES.—Not later than 90 days prior to the date on 
which the Secretary of State determines eligible 
countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Sec-
retary— 
(A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report that 
contains a list of all eligible countries identified
1254 
that have met the requirements under para-
graph (1) for the fiscal year; and 
(B) shall consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees on the extent to which 
such countries meet the criteria described in 
paragraph (1). 
(d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.— 
(1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may 
provide assistance for an eligible country only if the 
country enters into an agreement with the United 
States, to be known as an ‘‘FMF Challenge Com-
pact’’ (in this subsection referred to as a ‘‘Com-
pact’’) that establishes a multi-year plan for achiev-
ing shared security objectives in furtherance of the 
purposes of this title. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact 
shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for de-
termining eligibility, and be designed to significantly 
advance the performance of those commitments dur-
ing the period of the Compact. 
(3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take 
into account the national strategy of the eligible 
country and shall include— 
(A) the specific objectives that the country 
and the United States expect to achieve during
1255 
the term of the Compact, including both how 
the foreign military financing under the Com-
pact will advance shared security interests and 
advance partner capacity building efforts as 
well as to advance national efforts towards just 
and democratic governance; 
(B) the responsibilities of the country and 
the United States in the achievement of such 
objectives; 
(C) regular benchmarks to measure, where 
appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-
jectives; and 
(D) the strategy of the eligible country to 
sustain progress made toward achieving such 
objectives after expiration of the Compact. 
(e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-
PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before 
commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible 
country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the ap-
propriate congressional committees with respect to the 
proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objec-
tives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of 
the Compact. 
(f) ASSESSMENT
OF PILOT PROGRAM
AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the con-
1256 
clusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall 
provide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees with respect to the pilot program, including an assess-
ment of the success and utility of the pilot program estab-
lished under this subsection in meeting United States ob-
jectives and a recommendation with respect to whether to 
continue a further foreign military financing compact pro-
gram on a pilot or permanent basis. 
SEC. 30226. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREE-
DOM OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO- 
PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEA-
TURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions 
or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation 
operations in international airspace by military or ci-
vilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to desta-
bilize the Indo-Pacific region; 
(2) urges the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China to refrain from implementing the de-
clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification 
Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
1257 
provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
gion; 
(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court 
of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 
both parties and that the People’s Republic of Chi-
na’s claims to offshore resources across most of the 
South China Sea are unlawful; and 
(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China 
for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as 
a state party to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States to— 
(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
ing with respect to the mutual defense treaties with 
Indo-Pacific allies; 
(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 
freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace 
above it, that are available to all countries, and op-
pose the militarization of new and reclaimed land 
features in the South China Sea; 
(3) continue certain policies with respect to the 
PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically—
1258 
(A) that PRC claims in the South China 
Sea, including to offshore resources across most 
of the South China Sea, are unlawful; 
(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 
maritime claim vis-a`-vis the Philippines in areas 
that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found 
to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 
(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived 
from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; 
and 
(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 
or maritime claim to James Shoal; 
(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
destabilizing activities, including environmentally 
harmful and provocative land reclamation; 
(5) ensure that disputes are managed without 
intimidation, coercion, or force; 
(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 
claims in accordance with international law; 
(7) uphold the principle that territorial and 
maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
torial seas, must derive from land features and oth-
erwise comport with international law;
1259 
(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
tions covering disputed areas in the South China 
Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the 
region; 
(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if 
that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
east Asian claimant countries and does not serve as 
a vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to ad-
vance its unlawful maritime claims; 
(10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), 
is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
tween the United States Armed Forces and the 
forces of other countries, including the People’s Re-
public of China; 
(11) support the development of regional insti-
tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting 
Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
national law;
1260 
(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 
with other countries in the region for maritime do-
main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
forts by the United States Government to explore 
the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
nisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the 
South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries 
that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing 
behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities; 
(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 
any other country from exercising its sovereign 
rights to the resources of the exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims 
to those areas in the South China Sea that have no 
support in international law; and 
(14) assure the continuity of operations by the 
United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 
when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 
allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over-
flight and other lawful uses of the sea. 
SEC. 30227. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF 
INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
1261 
(1) the Secretary of State should expand and 
strengthen existing measures under the United 
States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide 
capabilities to allies and partners consistent with 
agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, 
missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
United States strategic imperatives; 
(2) the United States should design for export 
to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in 
the region, including long-range precision fires, air 
and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional 
hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
connaissance capabilities, and command and control 
systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and 
international commitments; 
(3) the United States should pursue, to the 
maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology 
security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems 
described in paragraph (2); 
(4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense, should—
1262 
(A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
tingency requirements and avoid the need for 
accessing United States stocks in wartime; and 
(B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ 
capacity to produce such munitions; and 
(5) it is in the United States interest to not au-
thorize arms transfers or security cooperation to 
governments that demonstrate patterns of gross vio-
lations of human rights if such arms or security co-
operation could be used to commit or support such 
violations. 
(b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
1263 
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report that describes United States pri-
orities for building more capable security partners in 
the Indo-Pacific region. 
(2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 
required under paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) provide a priority list of defense and 
military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 
partners must possess for the United States to 
be able to achieve its military objectives in the 
Indo-Pacific region; 
(B) identify, from the list referred to in 
subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
provided, or can only be provided, by the 
United States; 
(C) identify— 
(i) actions required to expedite field-
ing the capabilities identified in subpara-
graph (B); and 
(ii) steps needed to fully account for 
and a plan to integrate all means of 
United States foreign military sales, direct 
commercial sales, security assistance, and 
all applicable authorities of the Depart-
1264 
ment of State and the Department of De-
fense; 
(D) assess the requirements for United 
States security assistance, including Inter-
national Military Education and Training, in 
the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means 
to deliver critical partner capability require-
ments identified in subparagraph (B); 
(E) assess the resources necessary to meet 
the requirements for United States security as-
sistance, and identify resource gaps; 
(F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
requirements for United States security assist-
ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative 
and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
cific partner countries; 
(G) identify limitations on the ability of 
the United States to provide such capabilities, 
including capabilities identified under subpara-
graph (B), because of existing United States 
treaty obligations, United States policies, in-
cluding sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 
2378d), or other regulations;
1265 
(H) recommend improvements to the proc-
ess for developing requirements for United 
States partner capabilities; and 
(I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
ommendations for infrastructure and posture, 
based on any ongoing mutual dialogues. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under this 
subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a 
classified annex. 
SEC. 30228. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE 
THREAT 
POSED 
BY 
THE 
CHINESE 
COM-
MUNIST PARTY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY ORGANIZATION. 
It is the policy of the United States to— 
(1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like- 
minded partners, in particular with the European 
Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen 
resilience, maintain a technological edge, and ad-
dress the challenges to the rules-based international 
order posed by the Chinese Communist Party; 
(2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to 
monitor and defend against any activity of the Chi-
nese Communist Party that could impact collective 
defense, military readiness, or resilience in the Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe’s Area of Respon-
1266 
sibility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key 
sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the 
European Union; 
(3) push for NATO allies to establish a consult-
ative body to bring together such allies, and other 
institutions and partners as relevant, to exchange in-
formation, share experiences, and discuss all aspects 
of such allies’ security interests with respect to the 
Chinese Communist Party; and 
(4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share 
the burden that comes with collective security in an 
increasingly complex security environment by reach-
ing by 2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Sum-
mit to spend two percent of GDP on defense spend-
ing and 20 percent of annual defense spending on 
major new equipment. 
SEC. 30229. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA–SUPPORTED INSTITU-
TIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate to 
United States institutions and places of study a list identi-
fying the research, engineering, and scientific institutions 
that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or fund-
ed by, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
1267 
(b) FORM.—The list published and disseminated 
under subsection (a) shall be unclassified and publicly ac-
cessible, but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 30229A. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO 
THE PHILIPPINES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized to be appro-
priated or otherwise made available by this Act are author-
ized to be made available to provide assistance for the 
Philippine National Police, including assistance in the 
form of equipment or training, until the Secretary of State 
certifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate that the Government of the Philippines 
has— 
(1) investigated and successfully prosecuted 
members of the Philippine National Police who have 
violated human rights, ensured that police personnel 
cooperated with judicial authorities in such cases, 
and affirmed that such violations have ceased; 
(2) established that the Philippine National Po-
lice effectively protects the rights of trade unionists, 
journalists, human rights defenders, critics of the 
government, faith and religious leaders, and other 
civil society activists to operate without interference;
1268 
(3) taken effective steps to guarantee a judicial 
system that is capable of investigating, prosecuting, 
and bringing to justice members of the police and 
military who have committed human rights abuses; 
and 
(4) fully complied with domestic and United 
States audits and investigations regarding the im-
proper use of prior security assistance. 
(b) WAIVER.—The President may, on a case-by-case 
basis and for periods not to exceed 180 days each, waive 
the prohibition under subsection (a) if the President cer-
tifies to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate not later than 15 days before such 
waiver is to take effect that such waiver is vital to the 
national security interests of the United States or its part-
ners and allies. 
SEC. 30229B. PRIORITIZATION AND PROTECTION OF INTER-
NATIONAL RESEARCH. 
(a) LIST OF ALLIED COUNTRIES.—The Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Director of the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, the National Security 
Council, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Na-
tional Science Foundation, and the heads of other relevant 
agencies, shall create a list of allied countries with which
1269 
joint international research and cooperation would ad-
vance United States national interests and advance sci-
entific knowledge in key technology focus areas. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY PROCEDURES.— 
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the individ-
uals and entities listed in subsection (a), shall collaborate 
with similar entities in the countries appearing on the list 
created pursuant to subsection (a) to develop, coordinate, 
and agree to general security policies and procedures for 
governmental, academic, and private sector research, to 
prevent sensitive research from being disclosed to adver-
saries. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the individuals and entities listed in sub-
section (a), and allied countries appearing on the list cre-
ated pursuant to subsection (a), shall submit a report to 
Congress that identifies the most promising international 
research ventures that leverage resources and advance re-
search in key technology focus areas. 
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies 
to Bolster American Power 
SEC. 30231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 
Congress finds the following:
1270 
(1) Every UN member state is legally required 
to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure 
that these missions are properly resourced, and as-
sessment rates are renegotiated every three years by 
the UN General Assembly. 
(2) While the United States is the largest single 
financial contributor to the UN system, the current 
model is beneficial because it requires all UN mem-
ber states, no matter how big or small, to help 
shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets 
at specified levels. 
(3) Failing to meet our financial commitments 
to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised 
our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable 
partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu-
tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in 
ways that run counter to United States interests and 
values. 
(4) The People’s Republic of China is now the 
second largest financial contributor to UN peace-
keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of 
just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent 
today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to 
UN missions, providing more personnel than the
1271 
other four permanent members of the Security 
Council combined. 
(5) With greater engagement comes greater in-
fluence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their 
expanded clout to push back against the human 
rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence 
aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United 
States funding shortfalls as a pretext. 
(6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to 
fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur-
rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 
specialized agencies, while the United States occu-
pies only one. 
(7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elec-
tions for the heads of UN specialized agencies and 
five for major UN funds and programs. With the ex-
ception of the World Food Programme, none are 
currently led by Americans. 
(8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen-
eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter-
national Organizations did not have a standard oper-
ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em-
ployment of American Citizens in the UN system, 
and their recommendation to the department to es-
tablish one remains open.
1272 
SEC. 30232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTI-
LATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 
It is the policy of the United States that— 
(1) the Permanent Representative of the United 
States to the United Nations serves as a standing 
member of the cabinet; 
(2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations 
be paid in full in a timely fashion; 
(3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities 
under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, 
and subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regula-
tions (relating to detail and transfer of Federal em-
ployees to international organizations), to detail or 
transfer employees to relevant international organi-
zations; 
(4) the Secretary of State should assist the De-
partment of State and other Federal agencies in car-
rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent; 
(5) the Secretary of State should support quali-
fied American candidates in their bid to win election 
to United Nations-related leadership positions; and 
(6) the Secretary of State should support the 
placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored 
by the United States in United Nations-affiliated 
agencies.
1273 
SEC. 30233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA-
TIONS. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu-
reau of International Organization Affairs an Office of 
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel. 
(b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection 
(a) of this section shall be responsible for— 
(1) promoting United States leadership and 
participation in the United Nations system, with a 
focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are 
exercising increased influence in and determining the 
agenda of the United Nations system; 
(2) establishing and implementing a standard 
operating procedure for the promotion and efficient 
tracking of United States citizen employment at the 
United Nations and other international organiza-
tions that includes Mission Geneva; 
(3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations 
jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens 
and other qualified nationals to promote for such po-
sitions; 
(4) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, 
and developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of 
like-minded countries are assembled to ensure lead-
1274 
ership races are not won by countries that do not 
share United States interests; 
(5) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
ment of United States citizens in the United Nations 
Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and 
(6) increasing the number of qualified United 
States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
tions. 
SEC. 30234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS. 
(a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER 
POSITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the 
number of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored 
by the United States within the United Nations system. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each 
year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate 
congressional committees information regarding the 
amount of funding each bureau has designated during the 
immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional 
Officer positions in the United Nations system and the 
number of such positions that exist as of the end of the 
prior fiscal year.
1275 
SEC. 30235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 
other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, 
shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on how many Federal employees are 
currently detailed or transferred to an international orga-
nization during the immediately preceding 1-year period 
and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal em-
ployees so detailed or transferred. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) The number of Federal employees detailed 
or transferred to an international organization under 
section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub-
part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relat-
ing to the detail and transfer of Federal employees 
to international organizations), including— 
(A) an identification of the Federal agency 
from which such employees were detailed or 
transferred; and 
(B) an identification of the international 
organizations to and from which such employ-
ees have been so detailed or transferred.
1276 
(2) A list of international organizations to and 
from which the United States previously detailed or 
transferred Federal employees. 
Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to 
Bolster American Power 
SEC. 30241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION 
WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE 
WORLD. 
It is the policy of the United States— 
(1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships 
with like-minded countries around the globe; and 
(2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
partners— 
(A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and military challenges posed by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC); 
(B) to deter the PRC from pursuing mili-
tary aggression; 
(C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
national law; 
(D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
economic development while countering efforts 
by the Government of the PRC to leverage 
predatory economic practices as a means of po-
1277 
litical and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific 
region and beyond; 
(E) to promote the values of democracy 
and human rights, including through efforts to 
end the repression by the PRC of political dis-
sidents, Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, 
Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic 
minorities; 
(F) to respond to the crackdown by the 
PRC, in contravention of the commitments 
made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on 
the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong 
Kong; and 
(G) to counter the PRC Government’s ef-
forts to spread disinformation in the PRC and 
countering their disbursement of vaccines in ex-
change for exploitative concessions in low- to 
middle-income 
countries 
while 
maintaining 
United States engagement with and support for 
multilateral vaccine procurement and equitable 
distribution and beyond with respect to its re-
sponse to COVID–19.
1278 
SEC. 30241A. REPORT ON INDIGENOUS ENGAGEMENT. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Interior 
and in consultation with other relevant Federal depart-
ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a report on international indigenous 
engagement. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(a) shall include the following: 
(1) a description of existing programs and ef-
forts by the United States Government that promote 
international engagement with indigenous peoples by 
Native Americans and Native American communities 
as well as Native American representation and par-
ticipation in international organizations dedicated to 
indigenous communities; 
(2) a description of existing programs and ef-
forts by other countries, especially United States al-
lies and partners, to promote international diplo-
matic representation, educational and cultural ex-
change, and other people-to-people engagements 
among their indigenous peoples; 
(3) a strategy for enhancing and promoting 
greater Native American participation and represen-
tation in United States diplomatic engagement in
1279 
international organizations and international edu-
cational and cultural exchange programs operated by 
the United States Government, including the estab-
lishment of an Office of Indigenous Affairs headed 
by a presidentially appointed Special Envoy for In-
digenous Affairs; and 
(4) steps that the Secretary of State shall take 
to enhance cooperation and relationship with Native 
Americans in accordance with the Federal trust re-
sponsibility and to promote best practices among the 
staff of the Department of State for engagement 
with Native Americans. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Natural Resources of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Indian Affairs of the 
Senate. 
(2) NATIVE
AMERICAN.—The term ‘‘Native 
American’’ includes—
1280 
(A) American Indian as defined in section 
4 of the Indian Self-Determination and Edu-
cation Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 5304); 
(B) Alaska Native, within the meaning 
provided for the term ‘‘Native’’ in section 3(b) 
of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 
23 U.S.C. 1602(b)); and 
(C) Native Hawaiian as defined in para-
graph (9) of section 801 of the Native Amer-
ican Housing Assistance and Self-Determina-
tion Act (25 U.S.C. 4221(9)). 
PART 1—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
SEC. 30242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 
STATES-CANADA RELATIONS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States and Canada have a 
unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
tensive personal connections, deep economic ties, 
mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to 
uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules 
based international order established after World 
War II; 
(2) the United States and Canada can better 
address the People’s Republic of China’s economic, 
political, and security influence through closer co-
1281 
operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew-
ardship, transparent practices in public procurement 
and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 
connectivity issues, commercial relations, bilateral 
legal matters, and support for democracy, good gov-
ernance, and human rights; 
(3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the 
United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
tiatives to address border management, commercial 
relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with 
respect to the People’s Republic of China, and 
transnational challenges, including pandemics, en-
ergy security, and environmental stewardship; 
(4) the United States and Canada should en-
hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, 
influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
ganda efforts; 
(5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
cations technology, extraction of natural resources, 
and port infrastructure, pose national security risks 
for the United States and Canada; 
(6) the United States should share, as appro-
priate, intelligence gathered regarding— 
(A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and
1282 
(B) the PRC government’s intentions with 
respect to 5G expansion; 
(7) the United States and Canada should con-
tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada 
Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development 
Collaboration; and 
(8) the United States and Canada should 
prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in 
the Arctic, including by modernizing the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
sensor architecture to provide effective warning and 
tracking of threats by peer competitors, including 
long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to 
the Northern Hemisphere. 
SEC. 30243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA’S AR-
BITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITI-
ZENS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive 
treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and 
Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is 
deeply concerning;
1283 
(2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
national leadership by— 
(A) upholding the rule of law and com-
plying with its international legal obligations, 
including obligations pursuant to the Extra-
dition Treaty Between the United States of 
America and Canada, signed at Washington 
December 3, 1971; and 
(B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, 
which has been endorsed by 57 countries and 
the European Union, and reaffirms well-estab-
lished prohibitions under international human 
rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage 
in country-to-country relations; and 
(3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for 
due 
process 
for 
Canadian 
national 
Robert 
Schellenberg. 
SEC. 30244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
CANADA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
1284 
mit to the appropriate congressional committees, and the 
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and 
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, a 
strategy that describes how the United States will enhance 
cooperation with the Government of Canada in managing 
relations with the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall— 
(1) identify key policy points of convergence 
and divergence between the United States and Can-
ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
lic of China in the areas of technology, economic 
practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and 
critical minerals, and illicit narcotics; 
(2) include a description of United States devel-
opment and coordination efforts with Canadian 
counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the 
United States and Canada with respect to— 
(A) managing economic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China;
1285 
(B) democracy and human rights in the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(C) technology issues involving the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(D) defense issues involving the People’s 
Republic of China; and 
(E) international law enforcement and 
transnational organized crime issues; 
(3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 
work with Canada to counter the People’s Republic 
of China’s projection of an authoritarian governing 
model around the world; 
(4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 
to Huawei’s 5G technology; 
(5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
tion— 
(A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
dian priorities for responsible stewardship in 
the Arctic Region; and 
(B) to counter the People’s Republic of 
China’s efforts to project political, economic, 
and military influence into the Arctic Region; 
and
1286 
(6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
ada to track and counter the People’s Republic of 
China’s attempts to exert influence across the multi-
lateral system. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex, if necessary. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act and not less fre-
quently than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate con-
gressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
regarding the development and implementation of the 
strategy required under this section. 
SEC. 30245. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) United States engagement with the leaders 
of the Western Hemisphere is critical to addressing 
the region’s shared challenges and opportunities; 
(2) Congress encourages cooperation and fur-
ther engagement specifically in policy areas on mi-
gration, climate, and economic development, under-
scoring the China-Community of Latin American
1287 
and Caribbean States Forum Joint Action Plan 
(2022–2024) and other initiatives that signal Chi-
na’s growing influence and cooperation in the region; 
and 
(3) Congress encourages the development of an 
annual summit that convenes leaders of the Western 
Hemisphere on issues relating to root causes of mi-
gration, including the climate crisis, poverty, secu-
rity, and other contributing factors to instability. 
SEC. 30246. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-
PETITIVENESS, 
GOVERNANCE, 
HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 
of the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID), the Attorney General, the United States 
Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of 
the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Finance and the Committee
1288 
on Appropriations of the Senate a multi-year strategy for 
increasing United States economic competitiveness and 
promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule 
of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, par-
ticularly in the areas of— 
(1) investment; 
(2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable develop-
ment, including for indigenous and African-descend-
ant communities; 
(3) commercial relations; 
(4) anti-corruption activities; and 
(5) infrastructure projects. 
(b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required 
under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to— 
(1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries to advance the 
sustainable and inclusive development of equitable 
economies, including for indigenous and African-de-
scendant communities; 
(2) facilitate a more open, transparent, and 
competitive environment for United States busi-
nesses in the region; 
(3) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
view long term financial sustainability and security
1289 
implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
tors or services, including transportation, commu-
nications, natural resources, and energy; 
(4) establish competitive, transparent, and in-
clusive infrastructure project selection and procure-
ment processes that promote transparency, supplier 
diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, 
adherence to robust global standards, and the em-
ployment of a diverse local workforce and manage-
ment; 
(5) strengthen national, regional, and local legal 
structures critical to robust democratic governance, 
fair competition, combatting corruption, and ending 
impunity; and 
(6) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi-
table access to the internet and digital infrastructure 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
(c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annu-
ally thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-
retary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the 
United States International Development Finance Cor-
poration, shall brief the congressional committees specified
1290 
in subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this sec-
tion, including examples of successes and challenges. 
SEC. 30247. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate; 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate; 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate; 
(4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives; 
(5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence of the House of Representatives; and 
(6) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State, in coordination with the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intel-
1291 
ligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a report that assesses the nature, intent, and 
impact on United States strategic interests of Chi-
nese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the de-
cisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral or-
ganizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, in-
cluding the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Organization of American States, and the 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
(2) DEFENSE
SECTOR.—The report required 
under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of 
the nature, intent, and impact on United States 
strategic interests of Chinese military activity in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 
education and training programs, weapons sales, and 
space-related activities in the military or civilian 
spheres, such as— 
(A) the satellite and space control station 
the People’s Republic of China constructed in 
Argentina; and 
(B) defense and security cooperation car-
ried out by the People’s Republic of China in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, including 
sales of surveillance and monitoring technology
1292 
to governments in the region such as Venezuela, 
Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the poten-
tial use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 
intelligence services. 
(3) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form 
and include classified annexes. 
SEC. 30248. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the 
International Military Education and Training Program 
for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026. 
(b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding 
in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such pro-
grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent 
choice for international military education and training for 
Latin American and Caribbean partners. 
(c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred 
to in subsection (a) shall— 
(1) provide training and capacity-building op-
portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
rity services;
1293 
(2) provide practical skills and frameworks 
for— 
(A) improving the functioning and organi-
zation of security services in Latin America and 
the Caribbean; 
(B) creating a better understanding of the 
United States and its values; and 
(C) using technology for maximum effi-
ciency and organization; 
(3) promote and ensure that security services in 
Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian 
authority and operate in compliance with inter-
national norms, standards, and rules of engagement, 
including a respect for human rights, and full com-
pliance with requirements under section 620M of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; 
commonly referred to as the ‘‘Leahy law’’); and 
(4) receive funds only after vetting of individ-
uals proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 
502B and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d). 
(d) REPORT ON IMET ACTIVITIES.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall provide a report to the House
1294 
and Senate Appropriations Committees, House and 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, and House Foreign Affairs 
Committee a report on the use of the International 
Military Education and Training Program (IMET) 
in the countries of Latin America since 2012, in-
cluding relating to the following: 
(A) The number of security units trained 
in each country. 
(B) Which security service units, by coun-
try and unit, received IMET education and 
training despite credible allegations of corrup-
tion, impeding democratic processes, or involve-
ment in drug trafficking prior to IMET pro-
gram. 
(C) Which security service units, by coun-
try and unit, received IMET education and 
training, and subsequently had credible allega-
tions of corruption, impeding democratic proc-
esses, or involvement in drug trafficking. 
(D) Which security service units, by coun-
try and unit, were involved in violations of 
human rights subsequent to their involvement 
in IMET programs.
1295 
(2) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex if necessary. 
SEC. 30249. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 
ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-
NOLOGIES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China is exporting its model for internal security 
and state control of society through advanced tech-
nology and artificial intelligence; and 
(2) the inclusion of communication networks 
and communications supply chains with equipment 
and services from companies with close ties to or 
that are susceptible to pressure from governments or 
security services without reliable legal checks on gov-
ernmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ 
private information, increased censorship, violations 
of human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
nents. 
(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of 
State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
1296 
ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean to— 
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 
liberties posed by technologies and services described 
in subsection (a); and 
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate 
such risks. 
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global 
Media, who may work through the Open Technology Fund 
of the Agency, and the Secretary of State, working 
through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor’s Internet Freedom and Business and Human 
Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to pro-
vide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance 
their ability to safely access or share digital news and in-
formation. 
(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall 
work through nongovernmental organizations to— 
(1) support and promote programs that support 
internet freedom and the free flow of information 
online in Latin America and the Caribbean;
1297 
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
able access to internet in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; 
(3) provide integrated support to civil society 
for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, 
and applied research programs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean; 
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 
Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 
techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 
and prevent government overreach in the digital 
sphere; 
(5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 
their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 
news reports covering governance and human rights 
topics; 
(6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 
improve transparency and accountability in govern-
ment and the private sector; 
(7) provide training on investigative reporting 
of incidents of corruption and unfair business and 
commercial practices;
1298 
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 
strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents 
and practices described in paragraph (7); 
(9) identify local resources to support the pre-
ponderance of activities that would be carried out 
under this subsection; and 
(10) support and promote programs that sup-
port independent judicial sectors, anti-corruption ef-
forts, rule of law activities, and good governance. 
SEC. 30250. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTER-
NATIVE TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily 
reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-
mately 90 percent of their energy production. 
(2) The level of dependence is even higher in-
cluding— 
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 
percent of its electricity; 
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 
percent of its electricity; 
(C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil 
for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
1299 
(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 
percent of its electricity. 
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has 
had a detrimental effect on economic development, 
growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean. 
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-
bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal devel-
opment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate 
change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously 
damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source 
of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural 
beauty. 
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-
tricity— 
(A) has serious health impacts in the form 
of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-
ments; and 
(B) can also exacerbate climate change. 
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-
able to sea level rise and stronger storms. 
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of 
the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpet-
uated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, 
which—
1300 
(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; 
and 
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 
percent of their energy production needs. 
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and 
political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-
ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the 
Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional 
power. 
Only 
Cuba 
still 
receives 
preferential 
Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, 
while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-
encing a destabilized flow of oil. 
(9) 
China 
has 
spent 
more 
than 
$244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide 
since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Although the majority 
of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has 
also been the largest investor in clean energy glob-
ally for almost a decade. 
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib-
bean will need $12,000,000,000 in power invest-
ments through 2035. 
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have 
decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a 
more viable economic alternative for energy produc-
1301 
tion. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent 
since 2008, causing significant market growth, and 
according to data released by the International Re-
newable Energy Agency, 1⁄3 of global power capacity 
is based in renewable energy. 
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund 
estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-
cent of the total primary energy consumed in the 
Caribbean subregion. 
(13) According to the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean 
could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 
and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 
2050 if the region’s energy and transport sectors 
reach net zero emissions. 
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of on-
shore and offshore resources needed for renewable 
energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some 
hydropower production capacity. 
(15) The United States Government is deeply 
engaged in providing technical and policy assistance 
to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues 
through— 
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of 
the Americas;
1302 
(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and 
(C) bilateral assistance programs. 
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North 
American Leaders’ Summit, President Barack 
Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, 
and President Enrique Pen˜a Nieto of Mexico re-
affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reli-
able, and increasingly renewable power to the Carib-
bean, while opening wider markets for clean energy 
and green technology. 
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack 
Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security 
Initiative, which would partner with individual coun-
tries— 
(A) to transform its energy sector; 
(B) to work to increase access to finance, 
good governance, and diversification; and 
(C) to maximize the impact of existing 
donor effects. 
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States- 
Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the 
energy security task force formally launched the 
Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strat-
egy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage re-
gional coordination and action on energy security
1303 
and agreed to expand the regional market and trans-
mission system. 
(19) The United States has an important op-
portunity— 
(A) to deepen this engagement; 
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean 
countries on a more regional and coordinated 
basis; 
(C) to help ease the region’s dependence 
on imported oil; and 
(D) to promote affordable alternative 
sources of energy. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Carib-
bean countries’’ means countries in the Caribbean 
region, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela. 
(2) CARIBBEAN
GOVERNMENTS.—The term 
‘‘Caribbean governments’’ means the national gov-
ernments of the Caribbean countries. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to help Caribbean countries— 
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve 
domestic energy resource mobilization; 
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
1304 
(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, 
other petroleum products, and coal for the genera-
tion of electricity; 
(4) increase production of renewable energy; 
and 
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of 
their national determined contributions to the Paris 
Agreement. 
(d) STRATEGY.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a multi-year strat-
egy that describes how the Department of State will 
promote regional cooperation with Caribbean coun-
tries— 
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, 
grow domestic clean energy production in the 
region, strengthen regional energy security, and 
lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions; 
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 
transportation sector;
1305 
(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 
conservation, and investment in alternatives to 
imported fuels; 
(D) to improve grid reliability and mod-
ernize electricity transmission networks; 
(E) to advance deployment of innovative 
solutions to expand community and individuals’ 
access to electricity; 
(F) to help reform energy markets to en-
courage good regulatory governance and to pro-
mote a climate of private sector investment; and 
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
from the energy and transportation sector. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 
subsection (a) shall include— 
(A) a thorough review and inventory of 
United States Government activities that are 
being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in 
coordination with multilateral institutions— 
(i) to promote energy and climate se-
curity in the Caribbean region; and 
(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on 
oil for electricity generation; 
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional 
cooperation—
1306 
(i) to overcome market barriers result-
ing from the small size of Caribbean en-
ergy markets; 
(ii) to address the high transportation 
and infrastructure costs faced by Carib-
bean countries; 
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-
tion between governments, multilateral in-
stitutions, multilateral banks, and private 
investors; and 
(iv) to expand regional financing op-
portunities to allow for lower cost energy 
entrepreneurship; 
(C) measures to ensure that each Carib-
bean government has— 
(i) an independent utility regulator or 
equivalent; 
(ii) affordable access by third party 
investors to its electrical grid with minimal 
regulatory interference; 
(iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
ergy conservation; 
(iv) programs to address technical and 
nontechnical issues;
1307 
(v) a plan to eliminate major market 
distortions; and 
(vi) other taxes on clean energy solu-
tions; and 
(D) recommendations for how United 
States policy, technical, and economic assist-
ance can be used in the Caribbean region— 
(i) to advance renewable energy devel-
opment and the incorporation of renewable 
technologies into existing energy grids and 
the development and deployment of micro- 
grids where appropriate and feasible to 
boost energy security and reliability, par-
ticularly to underserved communities; 
(ii) to increase the generation of clean 
energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 
the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 
generation units in Caribbean countries; 
(iii) to create regional financing op-
portunities to allow for lower cost energy 
entrepreneurship; 
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in 
the region to help attract private invest-
ment and break down any market or regu-
latory barriers; and
1308 
(v) to establish a mechanism for each 
host government to have access to inde-
pendent legal advice— 
(I) to speed the development of 
energy-related contracts; and 
(II) to better protect the inter-
ests of Caribbean governments and 
citizens. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy 
under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall 
work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult 
with— 
(A) the Secretary of the Interior; 
(B) the Secretary of Commerce; 
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury; 
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States; 
(E) the Board of Directors of the Develop-
ment Finance Corporation; 
(F) the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development; 
(G) the Caribbean governments; 
(H) 
the 
Inter-American 
Development 
Bank; 
(I) the World Bank Group; and
1309 
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 
Corporation. 
SEC. 30251. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PART-
NERSHIP. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The United States shares with the Carib-
bean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, 
which affects the lives and the economies of our citi-
zens. 
(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La 
Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devas-
tation caused by the many natural disasters the Car-
ibbean confronts each year and the region’s vulner-
ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the 
largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts 
of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes 
Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across 
the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According 
to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide 
to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds 
(324) have been in the Caribbean. 
(3) This region is seven times more likely to ex-
perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And,
1310 
when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times 
more damage. 
(4) Extreme weather events and other environ-
mental impacts will only worsen over the coming 
years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas-
ing economic shocks on these countries, driving ir-
regular migration. 
(5) While the United States has considerable 
expertise and capacity in assisting countries with 
disaster response, there remains a need for stronger 
partnerships that build regional resilience through 
efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting peo-
ple and speeding recovery. 
(6) The People’s Republic of China has dra-
matically increased its engagement in the Caribbean 
in the past five years, including offering loans and 
grants related to disaster response and resilience 
and sought to acquire property rights in the Carib-
bean that would be detrimental to United States na-
tional security interests. 
(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new 
U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co-
operation and investment to strengthen our disaster 
resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ-
ing—
1311 
(A) to streamline early warning response 
networks and formalize communication chan-
nels; 
(B) to enhance, encourage, and work col-
laboratively on further developing aviation dis-
aster resilience plans and partnerships; 
(C) to prioritize regional technical ex-
change in energy planning, risk reduction, and 
resilience; 
(D) to increase communications network 
interoperability between Caribbean partners and 
the United States; 
(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data 
and share real-time information in preparation 
for potential damage resulting from tropical cy-
clones and tsunamis; 
(F) to use meteorological services to 
strengthen and deepen physical and commu-
nications infrastructure, data collection net-
works, and human and technical capacity 
throughout the region, as well as interactions 
with the public; 
(G) to understand that while the use of 
international and military and civil defense as-
sets in disaster response may only be considered
1312 
as a last resort, when local, national, and inter-
national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, 
civil-military coordination should occur, in sup-
port of the affected nation; 
(H) to develop a framework that would 
govern the deployment of international military 
and civil defense assets in disaster response 
when local, national, and international civilian 
capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the 
affected nation; 
(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur-
ing rapid disaster response and recovery, in-
cluding waiving or expediting diplomatic clear-
ances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, 
streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, 
and ensuring that the first responders have the 
ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other 
countries; 
(J) to promote the integration and coordi-
nation of regional response mechanisms in the 
Caribbean, including through the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the 
Regional Security System, United States Gov-
ernment Agencies, and allies in ways that facili-
tate more effective and efficient planning, miti-
1313 
gation, response, and resilience to natural disas-
ters; 
(K) to share best practices in improved 
building codes with national disaster organiza-
tions, including building better programs, at re-
gional, national and community levels; and 
(L) to promote community-based disaster 
preparedness and mitigation activities, particu-
larly in underserved communities, with the aim 
of increasing broad public participation and re-
silience. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to 
help Caribbean countries— 
(1) increase their resilience and adapt to nat-
ural disasters and the impacts of severe weather 
events and a changing environment; 
(2) partner with United States Federal, State, 
and local agencies and engage in technical coopera-
tion, dialogue, and assistance activities; 
(3) harmonize standards and practices related 
to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased in-
vestment and integration; 
(4) increase investment from United States 
companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, 
adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;
1314 
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef-
forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and 
international partners complement each other; and 
(6) further assist with the efforts described in 
subsection (a)(7). 
(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the heads of other Federal depart-
ments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a multi-year strategy that describes 
how the Department of State will achieve the policies de-
scribed in subsection (b). 
(d) AUTHORIZATION
OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 
are authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, 
technical assistance, and engagement under this section 
the following: 
(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022. 
(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023. 
(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each 
fiscal year thereafter. 
(e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized 
to be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to sub-
section (d), at least five percent of all programming 
funding allocation shall support and be directed to-
1315 
ward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effec-
tiveness. 
(2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The 
Department of State shall ensure that at least 20 
percent of amounts authorized to be appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (d) directly support the 
training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and 
exchange of expertise on resilience between United 
States Federal, State, and local officials and their 
Caribbean government counterparts. Such amounts 
should also support, as appropriate, increased aca-
demic, civil society, media, and private sector en-
gagement in the fields of resilience-building, adapta-
tion, and mitigation. 
SEC. 30252. COUNTERING CHINA’S EDUCATIONAL AND CUL-
TURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) According to a report by the National En-
dowment for Democracy, China has spent the equiv-
alent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion 
and perceptions around the world through thousands 
of people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, 
educational programs, and the development of media 
enterprises and information initiatives with global 
reach.
1316 
(2) Educational and exchange programs are a 
core element of United States public diplomacy, ele-
vating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide. 
(3) These programs provide students with ac-
cess to international knowledge, an opportunity to 
learn foreign languages, and a unique environment 
for developing cultural understanding, all of which 
are valuable skills in today’s global economy. 
(4) 90 percent of ECA’s appropriation is spent 
in the United States or invested directly in American 
citizens or American organizations. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) China’s efforts to mold public opinion and 
influence educational institutions undermine United 
States’ influence in Latin America and the Carib-
bean and threaten democratic institutions and prac-
tices in the region; 
(2) the United States Government should ex-
pand current educational and cultural exchange pro-
grams in Latin America and the Caribbean, which 
are cost-effective and strengthen people-to-people di-
plomacy, to promote national security and foreign 
policy interests of the United States; and
1317 
(3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cul-
tural, and educational skills that advance United 
States economic competitiveness, strengthen alli-
ances, and support democracies worldwide. 
(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Edu-
cational and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the 
Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic 
Growth, Education, and Environment at the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall devise 
a strategy— 
(1) to evaluate and expand existing programs 
and, as necessary, design and implement new edu-
cational, professional, and cultural exchanges and 
other programs to— 
(A) create and sustain mutual under-
standing with other countries necessary to ad-
vance United States foreign policy goals by cul-
tivating people-to-people ties among current and 
future global leaders that build enduring net-
works and personal relationships; and 
(B) promote United States national secu-
rity interests and values, including through the 
expansion of exchange visitor programs such as