I 
116TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 2707 
To limit funding for any extension of the New START Treaty or any suc-
cessor agreement unless the agreement includes the People’s Republic 
of China and covers all strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of 
the Russian Federation. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 14, 2019 
Ms. CHENEY (for herself, Mr. BANKS, Mr. WALTZ, Mr. DESJARLAIS, Mr. 
LAMBORN, and Mr. TURNER) introduced the following bill; which was re-
ferred to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by 
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To limit funding for any extension of the New START 
Treaty or any successor agreement unless the agreement 
includes the People’s Republic of China and covers all 
strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces of the Russian 
Federation. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘New START Treaty 
Improvement Act of 2019’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States and the Russian Federa-
tion signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Trea-
ty (the ‘‘New START Treaty’’) on April 8, 2010. 
(2) The United States Senate advised and con-
sented to the the treaty on December 22, 2010, by 
a vote of 71-26. 
(3) The Senate resolution advising and con-
senting to the ratification of the New START Trea-
ty states that ‘‘prior to the entry into force of the 
New START Treaty, the President shall certify to 
the Senate that. . .the United States will seek to 
initiate. . .not later than one year after the entry 
into force of the New START Treaty, negotiations 
with the Russian Federation on an agreement to ad-
dress the disparity between the non-strategic (tac-
tical) nuclear weapons stockpiles of the Russian 
Federation and of the United States’’. 
(4) The New START Treaty is due to expire in 
February 2021. 
(5) The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states— 
(A) ‘‘While the United States has contin-
ued to reduce the number and salience of nu-
clear weapons, others, including Russia and 
China, have moved in the opposite direction. 
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Russia has expanded and improved its strategic 
and non-strategic nuclear forces. China’s mili-
tary modernization has resulted in an expanded 
nuclear force, with little to no transparency into 
its intentions.’’; 
(B) ‘‘Russia is developing and deploying 
new nuclear warheads and launchers. These ef-
forts include multiple upgrades for every leg of 
the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, 
sea-based missiles, and landbased missiles. Rus-
sia is also developing at least two new inter-
continental range systems, a hypersonic glide 
vehicle, and a new intercontinental, nuclear- 
armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous 
torpedo.’’; 
(C) ‘‘[Russia] is also building a large, di-
verse, and modern set of non-strategic systems 
that are dual-capable. . .These theater- and 
tactical-range systems are not accountable 
under the New START Treaty’’; 
(D) ‘‘China continues to increase the num-
ber, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear 
forces.’’; and 
(E) ‘‘China has developed a new road-mo-
bile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile 
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(ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its 
DF5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced 
ballistic missile submarine armed with new sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It 
has also announced development of a new nu-
clear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a 
nuclear triad.’’. 
(6) On April 4, 2019, President Donald J. 
Trump stated, ‘‘Between Russia and China and us, 
we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars 
worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridicu-
lous. . .and I would say that China will come along, 
and I would say Russia will come along. It doesn’t 
really make sense that we’re doing this.’’. 
(7) In testimony before the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the Senate on April 10, 2019, Sec-
retary of State Mike Pompeo stated, in response to 
a question about extending the New START treaty, 
that ‘‘we need to make sure that we’ve got all of the 
parties that are relevant as a component of this as 
well’’. 
(8) On March 16, 2019, National Security Ad-
visor John Bolton stated, ‘‘China is building up its 
nuclear capacity now. It’s. . .one reason why if 
we’re going to have another arms control negotia-
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tion, for example, with the Russians, it may make 
sense to include China in that discussion as well’’. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) arms control is beneficial for both United 
States national security and international stability, 
but the United States should not enter arms control 
agreements that impose unilateral restrictions on the 
United States Armed Forces and fail to properly ac-
count for the nuclear arsenals of all near-peer com-
petitors in the international system; and 
(2) any New START Treaty extension or suc-
cessor agreement must be a trilateral arrangement 
among the United States, the Russian Federation, 
and the People’s Republic of China. 
SEC. 4. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS. 
No funds shall be expended to implement a New 
START Treaty extension or any successor agreement un-
less the New START Treaty or such successor agree-
ment— 
(1) includes and is signed by the People’s Re-
public of China; and 
(2) covers all strategic and non-strategic nu-
clear forces held by the Russian Federation, includ-
ing— 
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(A) the RS–28 Sarmat (SS–X–30) inter-
continental ballistic missile system; 
(B) the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC–X–9) 
nuclear-powered cruise missile system; 
(C) the KH–47M2 Kinzhal air-launched 
hypersonic missile system; 
(D) the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide 
vehicle system; and 
(E) the Status–6 (Kanyon) unmanned un-
dersea vehicle. 
Æ 
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