IB 
Union Calendar No. 449 
110TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 2631 
[Report No. 110–708, Part I] 
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop 
nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of nu-
clear material. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JUNE 7, 2007 
Mr. SCHIFF (for himself, Mr. LANGEVIN, Mr. ISRAEL, Mr. SHAYS, and Mr. 
THORNBERRY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Homeland Security, and in addition to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speak-
er, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the ju-
risdiction of the committee concerned 
JUNE 11, 2008 
Additional sponsor: Mr. MCCAUL of Texas 
JUNE 11, 2008 
Reported from the Committee on Homeland Security with amendments 
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 
JUNE 11, 2008 
Committee on Foreign Affairs discharged; committed to the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June 7, 2007] 
A BILL 
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Secu-
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rity to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit 
attribution of the source of nuclear material. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics and 
Attribution Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 
American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 
of the most serious threats to the national security of 
the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu-
tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance. 
Because of the destructive power of the weapon, there 
could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive 
material in the bomb itself. 
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 
both existing techniques and those under development, 
it may be possible to identify the source and pathway 
of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto-
nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate-
rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 
forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post- 
detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 
and the challenges are compounded by the pressures 
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and time constraints of performing forensics after a 
nuclear or radiological attack. 
(3) A robust and well-known capability to iden-
tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in-
tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter 
prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of 
effective attribution could compel improved security 
at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit-
ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate-
rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 
necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam-
ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 
samples, and compare samples against known signa-
tures of nuclear and radiological material. 
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 
detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so 
the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost im-
portance. Over the past several decades, the ability of 
the United States to gather atmospheric samples— 
often the preferred method of sample acquisition has 
diminished. This ability must be restored and modern 
techniques that could complement or replace existing 
techniques should be pursued. 
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(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 
a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ-
ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 
traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 
a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro-
vide the most useful tools for analysis and character-
ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
programs and radiochemists in United States Na-
tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 
declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 
pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is 
a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and 
credible nuclear forensics program. 
(5) Once samples have been acquired and charac-
terized, it is necessary to compare the results against 
samples of known material from reactors, weapons, 
and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca-
demic, commercial, and other facilities containing 
such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
samples are available to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and 
some countries maintain internal sample databases. 
Access to samples in many countries is limited by na-
tional security concerns. 
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(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
necessary to have the capability to positively identify 
the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po-
tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 
must be aware of that capability. International co-
operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 
sources of nuclear or radiological material. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE-
MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should— 
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter-
national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 
under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral 
agreements, an international framework for deter-
mining the source of any confiscated nuclear or radi-
ological material or weapon, as well as the source of 
any detonated weapon and the nuclear or radiological 
material used in such a weapon; 
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu-
clear or radiological materials and samples of con-
trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent 
required by the agreements entered into under para-
graph (1); and 
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(3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex-
change and dissemination of sensitive information 
needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det-
onation. 
SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC-
TION OFFICE. 
(a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by 
Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ 
after the semicolon; 
(B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as 
paragraph (14); and 
(C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 
of the Secretary and in coordination with the heads 
of appropriate departments and agencies, methods 
and capabilities to support the attribution of nuclear 
or radiological material to its source when such mate-
rial is intercepted by the United States, foreign gov-
ernments, or international bodies or is dispersed in 
the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or ra-
diological explosion; 
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‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De-
tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 
Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 
planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im-
provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 
forensics activities to ensure an enduring national 
technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 
the collective response of the United States to nuclear 
terrorism or other nuclear attacks; 
‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex-
pertise Development Program which— 
‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintain-
ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway 
from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in 
nuclear and geochemical science specialties di-
rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in-
cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear 
physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, 
and analytical chemistry; and 
‘‘(B) shall— 
‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 
study student scholarships, with a duration 
of up to four years per student, which shall 
include, whenever possible, at least one sum-
mer internship at a national laboratory or 
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appropriate Federal agency in the field of 
technical nuclear forensics during the course 
of the student’s undergraduate career; 
‘‘(ii) make available for graduate study 
student fellowships, with a duration of up 
to five years per student, which— 
‘‘(I) shall include, whenever pos-
sible, at least two summer internships 
at a national laboratory or appro-
priate Federal agency in the field of 
technical nuclear forensics during the 
course of the student’s graduate career; 
and 
‘‘(II) shall require each recipient 
to commit to serve for two years in a 
post-doctoral position in a technical 
nuclear forensics-related specialty at a 
national laboratory or appropriate 
Federal agency after graduation; 
‘‘(iii) 
make 
available 
to 
faculty 
awards, with a duration of three to five 
years each, to ensure faculty and their grad-
uate students a sustained funding stream; 
and 
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‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 
reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 
programs, while encouraging the participa-
tion of undergraduate students, graduate 
students, and university faculty from his-
torically Black colleges and universities, 
Hispanic-serving institutions, and Tribal 
Colleges and Universities; 
‘‘(13) provide an annual report to Congress on 
the activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11), 
and (12); and’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVER-
SITY.—The term ‘historically Black college or univer-
sity’ has the meaning given the term ‘part B institu-
tion’ in section 322(2) of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)). 
‘‘(2) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term 
‘Hispanic-serving institution’ has the meaning given 
that term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a). 
‘‘(3) TRIBAL
COLLEGE
OR
UNIVERSITY.—The 
term ‘Tribal College or University’ has the meaning 
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