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plosively formed penetrators], mortars, rockets, as
well as intelligence, sniper, and kidnapping oper-
ations.’’
(13) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that Iraqi extremists receive between
$750,000 and $3,000,000 every month from Iranian
sources.
(14) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that ‘‘[o]ur intelligence reveals that
senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity’’
and that it would be ‘‘hard to imagine’’ that Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, is
unaware of it.
(15) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated, ‘‘There does not seem to be any follow-
through on the commitments that Iran has made to
work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing secu-
rity issues here in Iraq.’’
(16) On February 11, 2007, the United States
military held a briefing in Baghdad at which its rep-
resentatives stated that at least 170 members of the
United States Armed Forces have been killed, and at
least 620 wounded, by weapons tied to Iran.
(17) On January 20, 2007, a sophisticated at-
tack was launched by insurgents at the Karbala Pro-
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vincial Joint Coordination Center in Iraq, resulting
in the murder of five American soldiers, four of whom
were first abducted.
(18) On April 26, 2007, General Petraeus stated
that the so-called Qazali network was responsible for
the attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordina-
tion Center and that ‘‘there’s no question that the
Qazali network is directly connected to the Iranian
Qods force [and has] received money, training, arms,
ammunition, and at some points in time even advice
and assistance and direction’’.
(19) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated that the United States Armed Forces
possesses documentary evidence that the Qods Force
had developed detailed information on the United
States position at the Karbala Provincial Joint Co-
ordination Center ‘‘regarding our soldiers’ activities,
shift changes, and defenses, and this information was
shared with the attackers’’.
(20) On July 2, 2007, Brigadier General
Bergner stated of the January 20 Karbala attackers,
‘‘[They] could not have conducted this complex oper-
ation without the support and direction of the Qods
Force.’’
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(21) On May 28, 2007, the United States Am-
bassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, met in Baghdad with
representatives of the government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran to express United States concern about
Iranian anti-coalition activity in Iraq;
(22) Section 1213(a) of the fiscal year 2007 John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act (Public
Law 109–364) required that the intelligence commu-
nity produce an updated National Intelligence Esti-
mate (NIE) on Iran.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
that—
(1) the murder of members of the United States
Armed Forces by a foreign government or its agents
is an intolerable and unacceptable act against the
United States by the foreign government in question;
and
(2) the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran must take immediate action to end any train-
ing, arming, equipping, funding, advising, and any
other forms of support that it or its agents are pro-
viding, and have provided, to Iraqi militias and in-
surgents, who are contributing to the destabilization
of Iraq and are responsible for the murder of members
of the United States Armed Forces.
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(3) It is imperative for the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the Federal government to have accu-
rate intelligence on Iran and therefore the intelligence
community should produce the NIE on Iran without
further delay;
(4) Congress supports United States diplomacy
with the representatives of the government of Islamic
Republic of Iran in order to stop any actions by the
Iranian government or its agents against United
States service members in Iraq;
(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 60
days thereafter, the Commander, Multi-National
Forces Iraq and the United States Ambassador to
Iraq in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence shall jointly submit to Congress a report
describing and assessing in detail—
(A) any external support or direction pro-
vided to anti-coalition forces by the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran or its agents;
(B) the strategy and ambitions in Iraq of
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran;
and
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(C) any counter-strategy or efforts by the
United States Government to counter the activi-
ties of agents of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in Iraq.
(2) FORM.—Each report required under para-
graph (1) shall be in unclassified form to the extent
practical consistent with the need to protect national
security, but may contain a classified annex.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to au-
thorize or otherwise speak to the use of Armed Forces
against Iran.
SEC. 1536. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON THE CONSEQUENCES
OF A FAILED STATE IN IRAQ.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following find-
ings:
(1) A failed state in Iraq would become a safe
haven for Islamic radicals, including al Qaeda and
Hezbollah, who are determined to attack the United
States and United States allies.
(2) The Iraq Study Group report found that ‘‘[a]
chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of op-
erations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or
even globally’’.
(3) The Iraq Study Group noted that ‘‘Al Qaeda
will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq