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spector General under paragraphs (1) through 
(3) shall not extend to the following: 
‘‘(i) Military operations or activities 
(including security assistance or coopera-
tion), unless such operations or activities 
are funded using a Fund or account speci-
fied in subsection (n)(1). 
‘‘(ii) Contracts for personal security. 
‘‘(B) ASSIGNMENT OF DUTIES AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES FOR SUCH MATTERS.—Duties and re-
sponsibilities of inspectors general with respect to 
operations and activities and contracts specified 
in subparagraph (A) shall be discharged by the 
lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s 
Sentinel designated pursuant to section 8L(d) of 
the Inspector General Act of 1978.’’. 
(f) RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION OF EFFORTS 
VESTED IN LEAD IG FOR OPERATION FREEDOM’S SEN-
TINEL.—Such section is further amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (g) through (o) 
as subsections (h) through (p), respectively; and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following 
new subsection (g): 
‘‘(g) COORDINATION
AND DECONFLICTION
OF EF-
FORTS.—
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‘‘(1) 
COORDINATION
AND
DECONFLICTION 
THROUGH LEAD IG FOR OPERATION FREEDOM’S SEN-
TINEL.—The lead Inspector General for Operation 
Freedom’s Sentinel designated pursuant to section 
8L(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 shall exer-
cise all duties, responsibilities, and authorities for the 
coordination and deconfliction of inspector general 
activities in or in regard to Afghanistan. 
‘‘(2) COORDINATION
IN
DISCHARGE.—In car-
rying out duties, responsibilities, and authorities 
under paragraph (1), the lead Inspector General re-
ferred to in that paragraph shall coordinate with, re-
ceive the cooperation of, and be responsible for 
deconfliction among, the following: 
‘‘(A) Each Inspector General specified in 
section 8L(c) of the Inspector General Act of 
1978 who is not the lead Inspector General for 
Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. 
‘‘(B) The Inspector General under this sec-
tion.’’. 
(g) ASSISTANCE FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES.—Sub-
section (i) of such section, as redesignated by subsection 
(f)(1) of this section, is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (5)(A), by inserting ‘‘per-
taining to the exercise by the Inspector General of du-
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ties, responsibilities, or authorities specified in sub-
section (f)’’ after ‘‘information and assistance’’; and 
(2) by striking paragraph (6). 
(h) REPORTS.—Subsection (j) of such section, as redes-
ignated by subsection (f)(1) of this section, is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1)— 
(A) by striking the matter preceding sub-
paragraph (A) and inserting the following new 
matter: 
‘‘(1) SEMI-ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 30 
days after the end of the second quarter of each fiscal 
year, and not later than 30 days after the end of the 
fourth quarter of each fiscal year, the Inspector Gen-
eral shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report setting forth a summary, for the 
two fiscal year quarters ending before the date on 
which such report is required to be submitted, of the 
activities of the Inspector General and the activities 
under programs and operations funded with amounts 
appropriated or otherwise made available for the re-
construction of Afghanistan. Each report shall in-
clude, for the period covered by such report, the fol-
lowing:’’; 
(B) by striking subparagraph (A) and in-
serting the following new subparagraph (A):
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‘‘(A) A detailed statement of all obligations 
and expenditures of amounts appropriated or 
otherwise made available for the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan.’’; 
(C) in subparagraph (B), by inserting 
‘‘projects and programs funded by amounts ap-
propriated or otherwise made available’’ after 
‘‘costs incurred to date for’’; and 
(D) in subparagraphs (C) and (D), by 
striking ‘‘funded by any department or agency of 
the United States Government’’ each place it ap-
pears and inserting ‘‘funded by amounts appro-
priated or otherwise made available for the re-
construction of Afghanistan’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘that involves 
the use’’ and all that follows and inserting ‘‘that is 
funded by amounts appropriated or otherwise made 
available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.’’. 
(i) REPORT COORDINATION.—Subsection (k) of such 
section, as redesignated by subsection (f)(1) of this section, 
is amended— 
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ‘‘BY 
INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR OPERATION FREEDOM’S 
SENTINEL’’ after ‘‘REPORT COORDINATION’’;
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(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘and the Sec-
retary of Defense’’ and inserting ‘‘, the Secretary of 
Defense, and the lead Inspector General for Operation 
Freedom’s Sentinel designated pursuant to section 
8L(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978’’; and 
(3) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘or the Sec-
retary of Defense’’ each place it appears and inserting 
‘‘, the Secretary of Defense, or the lead Inspector Gen-
eral referred to in paragraph (1)’’. 
(j) FUNDS
SUBJECT
TO
OVERSIGHT
RESPONSI-
BILITY.—Paragraph (1) of subsection (n) of such section, 
as redesignated by subsection (f)(1) of this section, is 
amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(1) AMOUNTS
APPROPRIATED
OR
OTHERWISE 
MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AF-
GHANISTAN.—The term ‘amounts appropriated or 
otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Af-
ghanistan’ means amounts appropriated or otherwise 
made available for any fiscal year for the reconstruc-
tion of Afghanistan under either of the following: 
‘‘(A) The Economic Support Fund. 
‘‘(B) The International Narcotics Control 
and Law Enforcement account. 
‘‘(C) The Commanders Emergency Response 
Program Fund.
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‘‘(D) The NATO Afghanistan National 
Army Trust Fund. 
‘‘(E) The Drug Interdiction and Counter 
Drug Activities Fund. 
‘‘(F) The Afghanistan Security Forces 
Fund.’’. 
(k) TERMINATION.—Subsection (p) of such section, as 
redesignated by subsection (f)(1) of this section, is amend-
ed— 
(1) by striking paragraph (2); and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new para-
graphs. 
‘‘(2) ASSUMPTION
OF
DUTIES, RESPONSIBIL-
ITIES, AND AUTHORITIES IN TERMINATION.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Effective as of the date 
provided for in subparagraph (B), the duties, re-
sponsibilities, and authorities of the Inspector 
General under this section shall be discharged by 
the lead Inspector General for Operation Free-
dom’s Sentinel designated pursuant to subsection 
(d) of section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 
1978. 
‘‘(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The effective date 
provided for in this subparagraph shall be such 
date after the date of the termination of the Of-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
fice of the Special Inspector General for Afghani-
stan Reconstruction pursuant to paragraph (1) 
as the Chair of the Council of Inspectors General 
on Integrity and Efficiency under subsection (a) 
of section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 
1978 shall specify, which date may not be more 
than 180 days after the date of such termination. 
‘‘(3) FINAL REPORT.—The final report of the In-
spector General under this section shall consist of the 
semi-annual report required by subsection (j)(1) for 
the last two fiscal year quarters ending before the date 
of the termination of the Office of the Special Inspec-
tor General for Afghanistan Reconstruction pursuant 
to paragraph (1).’’. 
(l) CONFORMING AND TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), 
such section is further amended as follows: 
(A) In subsection (a)(2)(A), by inserting a 
comma after ‘‘economy’’. 
(B) Subsection (a)(3) is amended to read as 
such subsection read as of the day before the date 
of the enactment of this Act. 
(C) Paragraph (4) of subsection (a) is re-
pealed.
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(D) In subsection (f)(1)(E), by striking 
‘‘fund’’ and inserting ‘‘funds’’. 
(E) In subsections (l) and (m), as redesig-
nated by subsection (f)(1) of this section— 
(i) by striking ‘‘subsection (i)’’ each 
place it appears and inserting ‘‘subsection 
(j)’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘subsection (j)(2)’’ each 
place it appears and inserting ‘‘subsection 
(k)(2)’’. 
(2) EFFECTIVE DATES.—The amendments made 
by subparagraphs (A), (D) and (E) of paragraph (1) 
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 
Act. The amendment made by subparagraphs (B) and 
(C) of that paragraph shall take effect on the effective 
date provided for in section 1229(p)(2)(B) of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008, as redesignated by subsection (f)(1) and amend-
ed by subsection (k). 
(m) CONFORMING AMENDMENT TO OTHER LAW.—Sec-
tion 842(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181; 122 Stat. 234; 10 
U.S.C. 2302 note) is amended— 
(1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ before ‘‘The Special In-
spector General for Iraq Reconstruction’’; and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(2) by adding at the end the following new para-
graph: 
‘‘(2) Upon the assumption by the lead Inspector Gen-
eral for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel designated pursuant 
to section 8L(d) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. app. 8L(d)) of duties, responsibilities, and authori-
ties under section 1229 of this Act, as provided for in sub-
section (p)(2) of such section 1229, the requirement in para-
graph (1) to perform audits as required by subsection (a) 
with respect to Afghanistan shall be discharged by such lead 
Inspector General.’’. 
TITLE 
XVI—STRATEGIC 
PRO-
GRAMS, CYBER, AND INTEL-
LIGENCE MATTERS 
Subtitle A—Space Activities 
SEC. 1601. RESILIENT AND SURVIVABLE POSITIONING, 
NAVIGATION, AND TIMING CAPABILITIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than two years after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, consistent with the 
timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs state-
ments, the Secretary of Defense shall— 
(1) prioritize and rank order the mission ele-
ments, platforms, and weapons systems most critical 
for the operational plans of the combatant commands;
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(2) mature, test, and produce for such prioritized 
mission elements sufficient equipment— 
(A) to generate resilient and survivable al-
ternative positioning, navigation, and timing 
signals; and 
(B) to process resilient survivable data pro-
vided by signals of opportunity and on-board 
sensor systems; and 
(3) integrate and deploy such equipment into the 
prioritized operational systems, platforms, and weap-
ons systems. 
(b) PLAN.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
plan to commence carrying out subsection (a) in fis-
cal year 2021. 
(2) 
REPROGRAMMING
AND
BUDGET
PRO-
POSALS.—The plan submitted under paragraph (1) 
may include any reprogramming or supplemental 
budget request the Secretary considers necessary to 
carry out subsection (a). 
(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out this section, the 
Secretary shall consult with the National Security Council, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of
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† HR 6395 EAS 
Transportation, and the head of any other relevant Federal 
department or agency to enable civilian and commercial 
adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and 
survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing 
capabilities to complement the global positioning system. 
SEC. 1602. DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS FOR NATIONAL SECU-
RITY SPACE LAUNCH PROVIDERS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Air Force shall 
establish a program to develop technologies and systems to 
enhance phase three National Security Space Launch re-
quirements and enable further advances in launch capa-
bility associated with the insertion of national security 
payloads into relevant classes of orbits. 
(b) DURATION.—The duration of a project to develop 
technologies and systems selected under the program shall 
be not more than three years. 
(c) PROGRAM EXPENSE CEILING.—The total amount 
expended under the program shall not exceed $250,000,000. 
(d) SUNSET.—The program established under this sec-
tion shall terminate on October 1, 2027. 
SEC. 1603. TIMELINE FOR NONRECURRING DESIGN VALIDA-
TION FOR RESPONSIVE SPACE LAUNCH. 
Not later than 540 days after the date on which the 
Secretary of the Air Force selects two National Security 
Space Launch providers in accordance with the phase two
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† HR 6395 EAS 
acquisition strategy for the National Security Space 
Launch program, the Secretary of Defense shall complete 
the nonrecurring design validation of previously flown 
launch hardware for National Security Space Launch pro-
viders that offer such hardware for use in the phase two 
acquisition strategy or other national security space mis-
sions. 
SEC. 1604. TACTICALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE LAUNCH OPER-
ATIONS. 
The Secretary of the Air Force shall implement a 
tactically responsive space launch program— 
(1) to provide long-term continuity for tactically 
responsive space launch operations across the future- 
years defense program submitted to Congress under 
section 221 of title 10, United States Code; 
(2) to accelerate the development of— 
(A) responsive launch concepts of oper-
ations; 
(B) tactics; 
(C) training; and 
(D) procedures; 
(3) to develop appropriate processes for tactically 
responsive space launch, including— 
(A) mission assurance processes; and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) command and control, tracking, telem-
etry, and communications; and 
(4) to identify basing capabilities necessary to 
enable tactically responsive space launch, including 
mobile launch range infrastructure. 
SEC. 1605. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REES-
TABLISHMENT OF SPACE COMMAND. 
(a) CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING INTEGRATED TAC-
TICAL WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT MISSION OF 
THE AIR FORCE.—Section 1666(a) of National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 
113 Stat. 2617) is amended by striking ‘‘Strategic Com-
mand’’ and inserting ‘‘Space Command’’. 
(b) COUNCIL ON OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING ENTER-
PRISE.—Section 2279b of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) in subsection (b)— 
(A) by redesignating paragraphs (7), (8), 
(9), and (10) as paragraphs (8), (9), (10), and 
(11), respectively; and 
(B) by inserting after paragraph (6) the fol-
lowing new paragraph (7): 
‘‘(7) The Commander of the United States Space 
Command.’’; and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(2) in subsection (f), by striking ‘‘Strategic Com-
mand’’ each place it appears and inserting ‘‘Space 
Command’’. 
(c) JOINT INTERAGENCY COMBINED SPACE OPER-
ATIONS CENTER.—Section 605(e) of the Intelligence Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 115–31; 131 
Stat. 832) is amended— 
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ‘‘JOINT 
INTERAGENCY COMBINED SPACE OPERATIONS CEN-
TER’’ and inserting ‘‘NATIONAL SPACE DEFENSE 
CENTER’’; and 
(2) by striking ‘‘Strategic Command’’ each place 
it appears and inserting ‘‘Space Command’’; and 
(3) by striking ‘‘Joint Interagency Combined 
Space Operations Center’’ each place it appears and 
inserting ‘‘National Space Defense Center’’. 
(d) NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SATELLITE REPORT-
ING POLICY.—Section 2278(a) of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended by striking ‘‘Strategic Command’’ and 
inserting ‘‘Space Command’’. 
(e) SPACE-BASED INFRARED SYSTEM AND ADVANCED 
EXTREMELY
HIGH
FREQUENCY
PROGRAM.—Section 
1612(a)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
2017 (Public Law 114–328; 130 Stat. 2590) is amended
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† HR 6395 EAS 
by striking ‘‘Strategic Command’’ and inserting ‘‘Space 
Command’’. 
SEC. 1606. SPACE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY DEVELOPMENT 
REQUIREMENTS AND TRANSFER TO SPACE 
FORCE. 
(a) DEVELOPMENT.—The Director of the Space Devel-
opment Agency shall lead— 
(1) the development and demonstration of a re-
silient military space-based sensing, tracking, and 
data transport architecture that primarily uses a pro-
liferated low-Earth orbit; and 
(2) the integration of next-generation space ca-
pabilities, and sensor and tracking components (in-
cluding a hypersonic and ballistic missile-tracking 
space sensor payload), into such architecture to ad-
dress the requirements and needs of the Armed Forces 
and combatant commands for such capabilities. 
(b) ORGANIZATION.—On October 1, 2022, or earlier if 
directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Space Development 
Agency shall be transferred from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense to the United States Space Force and shall main-
tain the same organizational reporting requirements and 
acquisition authorities as the Space Rapid Capability Of-
fice.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1607. SPACE LAUNCH RATE ASSESSMENT. 
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and biennially thereafter for the following five- 
year period, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees an assessment that in-
cludes— 
(1) the total number of space launches for all na-
tional security and Federal civil agency entities con-
ducted in the United States during the preceding two- 
year period; and 
(2) the number of space launches by the same 
sponsors projected to occur during the following three- 
year period, including— 
(A) the number of launches, disaggregated 
by class of launch vehicle; and 
(B) the number of payloads, disaggregated 
by orbital destination. 
SEC. 1608. REPORT ON IMPACT OF ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
FOR 
THE 
NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
SPACE 
LAUNCH PROGRAM ON EMERGING FOREIGN 
SPACE LAUNCH PROVIDERS. 
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to 
Congress a report on the impact of the acquisition strategy 
for the National Security Space Launch program on the 
potential for foreign countries, including the People’s Re-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
public of China, to enter the global commercial space launch 
market. 
SEC. 1609. LEVERAGING COMMERCIAL SATELLITE REMOTE 
SENSING. 
(a) IN
GENERAL.—In acquiring geospatial-intel-
ligence, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office and the Di-
rector of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, shall 
leverage, to the maximum extent practicable, the capabili-
ties of United States industry, including through the use 
of commercial geospatial-intelligence services and acquisi-
tion of commercial satellite imagery. 
(b) OBTAINING FUTURE GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE 
DATA.—The Director of the National Reconnaissance Of-
fice, as part of an analysis of alternatives for the future 
acquisition of space systems for geospatial-intelligence, 
shall— 
(1) consider whether there is a suitable, cost-ef-
fective, commercial capability available that can meet 
any or all of the geospatial-intelligence requirements 
of the Department and the intelligence community; 
(2) if a suitable, cost-effective, commercial capa-
bility is available as described in paragraph (1), de-
termine whether it is in the national interest to de-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
velop a governmental space system for geospatial in-
telligence; and 
(3) include, as part of the established acquisition 
reporting requirements to the appropriate committees 
of Congress, any determination made under para-
graphs (1) and (2). 
(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con-
gress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate; and 
(C) the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence of the House of Representatives. 
(2) The term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the 
meaning given such term in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
Subtitle B—Cyberspace-Related 
Matters 
SEC. 1611. MODIFICATION OF POSITION OF PRINCIPAL 
CYBER ADVISOR. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 932 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 
(Public Law 113–66; 10 U.S.C. 2224 note) is amended to 
read as follows:
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(c) PRINCIPAL CYBER ADVISOR.— 
‘‘(1) DESIGNATION.—The Secretary shall des-
ignate a Principal Cyber Advisor from among those 
civilian officials of the Department of Defense who 
have been appointed to the positions in which they 
serve by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. 
‘‘(2) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Principal Cyber 
Advisor shall be responsible for the following: 
‘‘(A) Acting as the principal advisor to the 
Secretary on military cyber forces and activities. 
‘‘(B) Overall integration of Cyber Oper-
ations Forces activities relating to cyberspace op-
erations, including associated policy and oper-
ational considerations, resources, personnel, tech-
nology development and transition, and acquisi-
tion. 
‘‘(C) Assessing and overseeing the imple-
mentation of the cyber strategy of the Depart-
ment and execution of the cyber posture review 
of the Department on behalf of the Secretary. 
‘‘(D) Coordinating activities pursuant to 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection (c)(3) 
with the Principal Information Operations Advi-
sor, the Chief Information Officer of the Depart-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
ment, and other officials as determined by the 
Secretary of Defense, to ensure the integration of 
activities in support of cyber, information, and 
electromagnetic spectrum operations. 
‘‘(E) Such other matters relating to the of-
fensive military cyber forces of the Department 
as the Secretary shall specify for the purposes of 
this subsection. 
‘‘(3) CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAM.—Consistent with 
section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 10 U.S.C. 
111 note), the Principal Cyber Advisor shall— 
‘‘(A) integrate the cyber expertise and per-
spectives of appropriate organizations within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, 
military departments, the Defense Agencies and 
Field Activities, and combatant commands, by 
establishing and maintaining a full-time cross- 
functional team of subject matter experts from 
those organizations; and 
‘‘(B) select team members, and designate a 
team leader, from among those personnel nomi-
nated by the heads of such organizations.’’. 
(b) DESIGNATION OF DEPUTY PRINCIPAL CYBER ADVI-
SOR.—Section 905(a)(1) of the National Defense Authoriza-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) is 
amended by striking ‘‘Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy’’ and inserting ‘‘Secretary of Defense’’. 
SEC. 1612. FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER HUNT FORWARD OPER-
ATIONS. 
(a) FRAMEWORK REQUIRED.—Not later than Feb-
ruary 1, 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall develop a 
standard, comprehensive framework to enhance the consist-
ency, execution, and effectiveness of cyber hunt forward op-
erations. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The framework developed pursuant 
to subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) Identification of the selection criteria for pro-
posed hunt forward operations, including specifica-
tion of necessary thresholds for the justification of op-
erations and thresholds for partner cooperation. 
(2) The roles and responsibilities of the following 
organizations in the support of the planning and exe-
cution of hunt forward operations: 
(A) United States Cyber Command. 
(B) Service cyber components. 
(C) The Office of the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Policy. 
(D) Geographic combatant commands.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(E) Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning 
Elements and Joint Cyber Centers. 
(F) Embassies and consulates of the United 
States. 
(3) Pre-deployment planning guidelines to maxi-
mize the operational success of each unique operation, 
including guidance that takes into account the highly 
variable nature of the following aspects at the tactical 
level: 
(A) Team composition, including necessary 
skillsets, recommended training, and guidelines 
on team size and structure. 
(B) Relevant factors to determine mission 
duration in a country of interest. 
(C) Agreements with partner countries re-
quired pre-deployment. 
(D) Criteria for potential follow-on oper-
ations. 
(E) Equipment and infrastructure required 
to support the missions. 
(4) Metrics to measure the effectiveness of each 
operation, including means to evaluate the value of 
discovered malware and infrastructure, the effect on 
the adversary, and the potential for future engage-
ments with the partner country.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(5) Roles and responsibilities for United States 
Cyber Command and the National Security Agency 
in the analysis of relevant mission data. 
(6) Such other matters as the Secretary deter-
mines relevant. 
(c) BRIEFING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2021, 
the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representa-
tives a briefing on the framework developed pursuant 
to subsection (a). 
(2) CONTENTS.—The briefing required by para-
graph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) An overview of the framework developed 
in subsection (a). 
(B) An explanation of the tradeoffs associ-
ated with the use of Department of Defense re-
sources for hunt forward missions in the context 
of competing priorities. 
(C) Such recommendations as the Secretary 
may have for legislative action to improve the ef-
fectiveness of hunt forward missions.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1613. MODIFICATION OF SCOPE OF NOTIFICATION RE-
QUIREMENTS 
FOR 
SENSITIVE 
MILITARY 
CYBER OPERATIONS. 
Subsection (c) of section 395 of title 10, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(c) SENSITIVE MILITARY CYBER OPERATION DE-
FINED.—(1) In this section, the term ‘sensitive military 
cyber operation’ means an action described in paragraph 
(2) that— 
‘‘(A) is carried out by the armed forces of the 
United States; 
‘‘(B) is intended to achieve a cyber effect against 
a foreign terrorist organization or a country, includ-
ing its armed forces and the proxy forces of that coun-
try located elsewhere — 
‘‘(i) with which the armed forces of the 
United States are not involved in hostilities (as 
that term is used in section 4 of the War Powers 
Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1543)); or 
‘‘(ii) with respect to which the involvement 
of the armed forces of the United States in hos-
tilities has not been acknowledged publicly by the 
United States; and 
‘‘(C)(i) is determined to— 
‘‘(I) have a medium or high collateral effects 
estimate;
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(II) have a medium or high intelligence 
gain or loss; 
‘‘(III) have a medium or high probability of 
political retaliation, as determined by the polit-
ical military assessment contained within the as-
sociated concept of operations; 
‘‘(IV) have a medium or high probability of 
detection when detection is not intended; or 
‘‘(V) result in medium or high collateral ef-
fects; or 
‘‘(ii) is a matter the Secretary determines to be 
appropriate. 
‘‘(2) The actions described in this paragraph are the 
following: 
‘‘(A) An offensive cyber operation. 
‘‘(B) A defensive cyber operation.’’. 
SEC. 1614. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR QUAR-
TERLY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER OP-
ERATIONS BRIEFINGS FOR CONGRESS. 
Section 484 of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
by striking subsections (a) and (b) and inserting the fol-
lowing new subsections: 
‘‘(a) BRIEFINGS REQUIRED.—The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, the Commander of United States Cyber 
Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
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† HR 6395 EAS 
or designees from each of their offices, shall provide to the 
congressional defense committees quarterly briefings on all 
offensive and significant defensive military operations in 
cyberspace, including clandestine cyber activities, carried 
out by the Department of Defense during the immediately 
preceding quarter. 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—Each briefing under subsection (a) 
shall include, with respect to the military operations in 
cyberspace described in such subsection, the following: 
‘‘(1) An update, set forth separately for each ap-
plicable geographic and functional command, that de-
scribes the operations carried out in the area of oper-
ations of that command or by that command. 
‘‘(2) An update, set forth for each applicable geo-
graphic and functional command, that describes de-
fensive cyber operations executed to protect or defend 
forces, networks, and equipment in the area of oper-
ations of that command. 
‘‘(3) An update on relevant authorities and legal 
issues applicable to operations, including any presi-
dential directives and delegations of authority re-
ceived since the last quarterly update. 
‘‘(4) An overview of critical operational chal-
lenges posed by major adversaries or encountered in
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operational activities conducted since the last quar-
terly update. 
‘‘(5) An overview of the readiness of the Cyber 
Mission Forces to perform assigned missions that— 
‘‘(A) addresses all of the abilities of such 
Forces to conduct cyberspace operations based on 
capability and capacity of personnel, equipment, 
training, and equipment condition— 
‘‘(i) using both quantitative and quali-
tative metrics; and 
‘‘(ii) in a way that is common to all 
military departments; and 
‘‘(B) is consistent with readiness reporting 
pursuant to section 482 of this title. 
‘‘(6) Any other matters that the briefers deter-
mine to be appropriate. 
‘‘(c) DOCUMENTS.—Each briefing under subsection (a) 
shall include a classified placemat, summarizing the ele-
ments specified in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) of sub-
section (b), and an unclassified memorandum, summa-
rizing the briefing’s contents.’’.
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SEC. 1615. RATIONALIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF PAR-
ALLEL 
CYBERSECURITY 
ARCHITECTURES 
AND OPERATIONS. 
(a) REVIEW REQUIRED.—The Commander of United 
States Cyber Command, with support from the Chief Infor-
mation Officer of the Department of Defense, the Chief Data 
Officer of the Department, the Principal Cyber Advisor, the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director 
of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, shall conduct 
a review of the Cybersecurity Service Provider and Cyber 
Mission Force enterprises. 
(b) 
ASSESSMENT
AND
IDENTIFICATION
OF 
REDUNDANCIES AND GAPS.—The review required by sub-
section (a) shall assess and identify— 
(1) the optimal way to integrate the Joint Cyber 
Warfighting Architecture and the Cybersecurity Serv-
ice Provider architectures, associated tools and capa-
bilities, and associated concepts of operations; 
(2) redundancies and gaps in network sensor de-
ployment and data collection and analysis for the— 
(A) Big Data Platform; 
(B) Joint Regional Security Stacks; and 
(C) Security Information and Event Man-
agement capabilities;
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(3) where integration, collaboration, and inter-
operability are not occurring that would improve out-
comes; 
(4) baseline training, capabilities, competencies, 
operational responsibilities, and joint concepts of op-
erations for the Joint Force Headquarters for the De-
partment of Defense Information Network, Cybersecu-
rity Service Providers, and Cyber Protection Teams; 
(5) the roles and responsibilities of the Principal 
Cyber Advisor, Chief Information Officer, and the 
Commander of United States Cyber Command in es-
tablishing and overseeing the baselines assessed and 
identified under paragraph (4); 
(6) the optimal command structure for the mili-
tary services’ and combatant commands’ cybersecurity 
service providers and cyber protection teams; 
(7) the responsibilities of network owners and cy-
bersecurity service providers in mapping, configuring, 
instrumenting, and deploying sensors on networks to 
best support response of cyber protection teams when 
assigned to defend unfamiliar networks; and 
(8) operational concepts and engineering changes 
to enhance remote access and operations of cyber pro-
tection teams on networks through tools and capabili-
ties of the Cybersecurity Service Providers.
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(c) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDG-
ET.—The Chief Information Officer, the Chief Data Officer, 
the Commander of United States Cyber Command, and the 
Principal Cyber Advisor shall jointly develop recommenda-
tions for the Secretary of Defense in preparation of the 
budget justification materials to be submitted to Congress 
in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for 
fiscal year 2023 (as submitted with the budget of the Presi-
dent for such fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code). 
(d) PROGRESS BRIEFING.—Not later than March 31, 
2021, the Chief Information Officer, the Chief Data Officer, 
the Commander of United States Cyber Command, and the 
Principal Cyber Advisor shall jointly provide a briefing to 
the congressional defense committees on the progress made 
in carrying out this section. 
SEC. 1616. MODIFICATION OF ACQUISITION AUTHORITY OF 
COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES CYBER COM-
MAND. 
Section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 10 U.S.C. 2224 
note) is amended— 
(1) by striking subsections (e) and (i); and 
(2) by redesignating subsections (f) through (h) 
as subsections (e) through (g), respectively.
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SEC. 1617. ASSESSMENT OF CYBER OPERATIONAL PLAN-
NING AND DECONFLICTION POLICIES AND 
PROCESSES. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than November 1, 2021, 
the Principal Cyber Advisor of the Department of Defense 
and the Commander of United States Cyber Command shall 
jointly, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
and Security, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, conduct and complete an assessment on the oper-
ational planning and deconfliction policies and processes 
that govern cyber operations of the Department of Defense. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by sub-
section (a) shall include evaluations as to whether— 
(1) the joint targeting cycle and relevant oper-
ational and targeting databases are suitable for the 
conduct of timely and well-coordinated cyber oper-
ations; 
(2) each of the policies and processes in effect to 
facilitate 
technical, 
operational, 
and 
capability 
deconfliction are appropriate for the conduct of timely 
and effective cyber operations; 
(3) intelligence gain-loss decisions made by 
Cyber Command are sufficiently well-informed and 
made in timely fashion;
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(4) relevant intelligence data and products are 
consistently available and distributed to relevant 
planning and operational elements in Cyber Com-
mand; 
(5) collection operations and priorities meet the 
operational requirements of Cyber Command; and 
(6) authorities relevant to intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance and operational prepara-
tion of the environment are delegated to the appro-
priate level. 
(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than February 1, 2022, the 
Principal Cyber Advisor and the Commander of United 
States Cyber Command shall provide to the Committee on 
Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives a briefing on the 
findings of the assessment completed under subsection (a), 
including discussion of planned policy and process changes, 
if any, relevant to cyber operations. 
SEC. 1618. PILOT PROGRAM ON CYBERSECURITY CAPA-
BILITY METRICS. 
(a) PILOT PROGRAM REQUIRED.—The Secretary of 
Defense, acting through the Chief Information Officer of the 
Department of Defense and the Commander of United 
States Cyber Command, shall conduct a pilot program to 
assess the feasibility and advisability of developing and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
using speed-based metrics to measure the performance and 
effectiveness of security operations centers and cyber secu-
rity service providers in the Department of Defense. 
(b) REQUIREMENTS.— 
(1) DEVELOPMENT OF METRICS.—(A) Not later 
than July 1, 2021, the Chief Information Officer and 
the Commander shall jointly develop metrics described 
in subsection (a) to carry out the pilot program 
under such subsection. 
(B) The Chief Information Officer and the Com-
mander shall ensure that the metrics developed under 
subparagraph (A) are commensurate with the rep-
resentative timelines of nation-state and non-nation- 
state actors when gaining access to, and compro-
mising, Department networks. 
(2) USE OF METRICS.—(A) Not later than De-
cember 1, 2021, the Secretary shall, in carrying out 
the pilot program required by subsection (a), begin 
using the metrics developed under paragraph (1) of 
this subsection to assess select security operations cen-
ters and cyber security service providers, which the 
Secretary shall select specifically for purposes of the 
pilot program, for a period of not less than four 
months.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) In carrying out the pilot program under 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall evaluate the effec-
tiveness of operators, capabilities available to opera-
tors, and operators’ tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures. 
(c) AUTHORITIES.—In carrying out the pilot program 
under subsection (a), the Secretary may— 
(1) assess select security operations centers and 
cyber security service providers— 
(A) over the course of their mission per-
formance; or 
(B) in the testing and accreditation of cy-
bersecurity products and services on test net-
works designated pursuant to section 1658 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92); and 
(2) assess select elements’ use of security orches-
tration and response technologies, modern endpoint 
security 
technologies, 
Big 
Data 
Platform 
instantiations, and technologies relevant to zero trust 
architectures. 
(d) BRIEFING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2022, 
the Secretary shall brief the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed
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† HR 6395 EAS 
Services of the House of Representatives on the find-
ings of the Secretary with respect to the pilot pro-
gram required by subsection (a). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The briefing provided under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) The pilot metrics developed under sub-
section (b)(1). 
(B) The findings of the Secretary with re-
spect to the assessments carried out under sub-
section (b)(2). 
(C) An analysis of the utility of speed-based 
metrics in assessing security operations centers 
and cyber security service providers. 
(D) An analysis of the utility of the exten-
sion of the pilot metrics to or speed-based assess-
ment of the Cyber Mission Forces. 
(E) An assessment of the technical and pro-
cedural measures that would be necessary to meet 
the speed-based metrics developed and applied in 
the pilot program.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1619. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECT OF INCONSISTENT TIM-
ING AND USE OF NETWORK ADDRESS TRANS-
LATION IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NET-
WORKS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2021, the 
Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense 
shall conduct comprehensive assessments as follows: 
(1) TIMING VARIABILITY IN DEPARTMENT NET-
WORKS.—The Chief Information Officer shall charac-
terize— 
(A) timing variability across Department 
information technology and operational tech-
nology networks, appliances, devices, applica-
tions, and sensors that generate time-stamped 
data and metadata used for cybersecurity pur-
poses; 
(B) how timing variability affects current, 
planned, and potential capabilities for detecting 
network intrusions that rely on correlating 
events and the sequence of events; and 
(C) how to harmonize standard of timing 
across Department networks. 
(2) USE OF NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION.— 
The Chief Information Officer shall characterize— 
(A) why and how the Department is using 
Network Address Translation (NAT) and mul-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
tiple layers and nesting of Network Address 
Translation; 
(B) how using Network Address Translation 
affects the ability to link malicious communica-
tions detected at various network tiers to specific 
endpoints or hosts to enable prompt additional 
investigations, quarantine decisions, and remedi-
ation activities; and 
(C) what steps and associated cost and 
schedule are necessary to eliminate the use of 
Network Address Translation or to otherwise 
provide transparency to network defenders, in-
cluding options to accelerate the transition from 
Internet Protocol version 4 to Internet Protocol 
version 6. 
(b) RECOMMENDATION.—The Chief Information Offi-
cer and the Principal Cyber Advisor shall submit to the 
Secretary of Defense a recommendation to address the as-
sessments conducted under subsection (a), including wheth-
er and how to revise the cyber strategy of the Department. 
(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than April 1, 2021, the Chief 
Information Officer shall brief the congressional defense 
committees on the findings of the Chief Information Officer 
with respect to the assessments conducted under subsection
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(a) and the recommendation submitted under subsection 
(b). 
SEC. 1620. MATTERS CONCERNING THE COLLEGE OF INFOR-
MATION AND CYBERSPACE AT NATIONAL DE-
FENSE UNIVERSITY. 
(a) PROHIBITION.—The Secretary of Defense may not 
eliminate, divest, downsize, or reorganize the College of In-
formation and Cyberspace of the National Defense Univer-
sity, or seek to reduce the number of students educated at 
the College, until 30 days after the date on which the con-
gressional defense committees receive the report required by 
subsection (c). 
(b) ASSESSMENT, DETERMINATION, AND REVIEW.— 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in consultation 
with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, the Principal Cyber Advisor, the Principal In-
formation Operations Advisor of the Department of Defense, 
the Chief Information Officer of the Department, the Chief 
Financial Officer of the Department, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of United States 
Cyber Command, shall— 
(1) assess requirements for joint professional 
military education and civilian leader education in 
the information environment and cyberspace domain
1052 
† HR 6395 EAS 
to support the Department and other national secu-
rity institutions of the Federal Government; 
(2) determine whether the importance, challenges, 
and complexity of the modern information environ-
ment and cyberspace domain warrant— 
(A) a college at the National Defense Uni-
versity, or a college independent of the National 
Defense University whose leadership is respon-
sible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
and 
(B) the provision of resources, services, and 
capacity at levels that are the same as, or de-
creased or enhanced in comparison to, those re-
sources, services, and capacity in place at the 
College of Information and Cyberspace on Janu-
ary 1, 2019; 
(3) review the plan proposed by the National De-
fense University for eliminating the College of Infor-
mation and Cyberspace and reducing and restruc-
turing the information and cyberspace faculty, course 
offerings, joint professional military education and 
degree and certificate programs, and other services 
provided by the College; and 
(4) assess the changes made to the College of In-
formation and Cyberspace since January 1, 2019,
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† HR 6395 EAS 
and the actions necessary to reverse those changes, in-
cluding relocating the College and its associated budg-
et, faculty, staff, students, and facilities outside of the 
National Defense University. 
(c) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than February 1, 
2021, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report on— 
(1) the findings of the Secretary with respect to 
the assessments, determination, and review conducted 
under subsection (b); and 
(2) such recommendations as the Secretary may 
have for higher education in the information environ-
ment and cyberspace domain. 
SEC. 1621. MODIFICATION OF MISSION OF CYBER COMMAND 
AND ASSIGNMENT OF CYBER OPERATIONS 
FORCES. 
Section 167b of title 10, United States Code, is amend-
ed— 
(1) in subsection (a)— 
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ 
before ‘‘With the advice’’; 
(B) in paragraph (1), as designated by sub-
paragraph (A), by striking the second sentence; 
and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph: 
‘‘(2) The principal mission of the cyber command is 
to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyber planning and 
operations to defend and advance national interests in col-
laboration with domestic and international partners.’’; and 
(2) by amending subsection (b) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(b) ASSIGNMENT OF FORCES.—(1) Active and reserve 
cyber forces of the armed forces shall be assigned to the cyber 
command through the Global Force Management Process, 
as approved by the Secretary of Defense. 
‘‘(2) Cyber forces not assigned to cyber command re-
main assigned to combatant commands or service-re-
tained.’’. 
SEC. 1622. INTEGRATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
USER ACTIVITY MONITORING AND CYBERSE-
CURITY. 
(a) INTEGRATION OF PLANS, CAPABILITIES, AND SYS-
TEMS.—The Secretary of Defense shall integrate the plans, 
capabilities, and systems for user activity monitoring, and 
the plans, capabilities, and systems for endpoint cybersecu-
rity and the collection of metadata on network activity for 
cybersecurity to enable mutual support and information 
sharing.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(b) REQUIREMENTS.—In carrying out subsection (a), 
the Secretary shall— 
(1) consider using the Big Data Platform in-
stances that host cybersecurity metadata for storage 
and analysis of all user activity monitoring data col-
lected across the Department of Defense Information 
Network at all security classification levels; 
(2) develop policies and procedures governing ac-
cess to user activity monitoring data or data derived 
from user activity monitoring by cybersecurity opera-
tors; and 
(3) develop processes and capabilities for using 
metadata on host and network activity for user activ-
ity monitoring in support of the insider threat mis-
sion. 
(c) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING.—Not later than Octo-
ber 1, 2021, the Secretary shall provide a briefing to the 
congressional defense committees on actions taken to carry 
out this section. 
SEC. 1623. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CYBERSECURITY 
SENSOR ARCHITECTURE PLAN. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than February 1, 
2021, the Principal Cyber Advisor of the Department of De-
fense, in consultation with the Chief Information Officer of 
the Department, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
tion and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, and the Commander of United 
States Cyber Command, shall develop a comprehensive plan 
for the deployment of commercial-off-the-shelf solutions on 
supplier networks to monitor the public-facing Internet at-
tack surface in the defense industrial base. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
(1) Definition of an architecture, concept of op-
erations, and governance structure that— 
(A) will allow for the instrumentation and 
collection of cybersecurity data on the public-fac-
ing Internet attack surfaces of defense industrial 
base contractors in a manner that is compatible 
with the Department’s existing or future capa-
bilities for analysis, and instrumentation and 
collection, as appropriate, of cybersecurity data 
within the Department of Defense Information 
Network; 
(B) includes the expected scale, schedule, 
and guiding principles of deployment; 
(C) is consistent with the defense industrial 
base cybersecurity policies and programs of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
Sustainment and the Chief Information Officer; 
and 
(D) includes an acquisition strategy for sen-
sor capabilities that optimizes required capa-
bility, scalability, cost, and intelligence and cy-
bersecurity requirements. 
(2) Roles and responsibilities of the persons re-
ferred to in subsection (a) in implementing and exe-
cuting the plan. 
(c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the plan required 
by subsection (a), the Principal Cyber Advisor shall ensure 
that extensive consultation with representative companies 
of the defense industrial base occurs so as to ensure that 
prospective participants in the defense industrial base un-
derstand and agree that emerging solutions are acceptable, 
practical, and effective. 
(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than March 1, 2021, the 
Principal Cyber Advisor shall provide a briefing to the 
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives 
on the plan developed pursuant to subsection (a).
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† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1624. EXTENSION OF CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMMIS-
SION TO TRACK AND ASSESS IMPLEMENTA-
TION. 
Section 1652 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115– 
232), as amended by section 1639 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116– 
92), is further amended— 
(1) in subsection (b)(1)(B)— 
(A) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘under clauses 
(iv) through (vii) of subparagraph (A)’’ and in-
serting ‘‘under clauses (v) through (viii) of sub-
paragraph (A)’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following new 
clause: 
‘‘(iv) Effective on the date of the enactment 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021, the composition of the Com-
mission shall not include clauses (i) through (iv) 
of subparagraph (A).’’; 
(2) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ‘‘Seven 
members shall’’ and inserting ‘‘Seven members, dur-
ing the period beginning on the date of the establish-
ment of the Commission and ending on the day before 
the date of the enactment of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, and six mem-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
bers, during the period beginning on the date of the 
enactment of such Act and ending on the date of the 
termination of the Commission, shall’’; 
(3) in subsection (i)(1)(B)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘Members of the Commis-
sion who’’ inserting ‘‘(i) During the period be-
ginning on the date of the establishment of the 
Commission and ending on the day before the 
date of the enactment of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, members 
of the Commission who’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following new 
clause: 
‘‘(ii) During the period beginning on the date of 
the enactment of such Act and ending on the date of 
the termination of the Commission, members of the 
Commission who are Members of Congress shall re-
ceive no additional pay by reason of their service on 
the Commission.’’; and 
(4) in subsection (k)(2)— 
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘120 
day period’’ and inserting ‘‘16 month period 
with no further extensions permitted’’; 
(B) by amending subparagraph (B) to read 
as follows:
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(B) The Commission may use the 16 month pe-
riod referred to in subparagraph (A) for the purposes 
of— 
‘‘(i) collecting and assessing comments and 
feedback from the Federal departments and agen-
cies, as well as published reviews, on the analysis 
and recommendations contained in the final re-
port under paragraph (1); 
‘‘(ii) collecting and assessing any develop-
ments in cybersecurity that may affect the rec-
ommendations in such report; 
‘‘(iii) reviewing the implementation of the 
recommendations contained in such report; and 
‘‘(iv) revising or amending recommenda-
tions based on the assessments and reviews con-
ducted under clauses (i) through (iii); 
‘‘(C) During the 16 month period referred to in 
subparagraph (A), the Commission shall— 
‘‘(i) provide, in such manner and format as 
the Commission considers appropriate, an an-
nual update on such report and any revisions or 
amendments reached by the Commission under 
subparagraph (B)(iv) to— 
‘‘(I) the Committee on Armed Services, 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; 
‘‘(II) the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, and the Committee on Homeland 
Security of the House of Representatives; 
‘‘(III) the Director of National Intel-
ligence; 
‘‘(IV) the Secretary of Defense; and 
‘‘(V) the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity; and 
‘‘(ii) conclude its activities, including pro-
viding testimony to Congress concerning the 
final report under paragraph (1) and dissemi-
nating such report.’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
‘‘(D) In the event that the Commission is ex-
tended, and the effective date of the extension comes 
after the time set for the Commission’s termination, 
the Commission shall be deemed reconstituted with the 
same members and powers that existed at the time of 
termination of the Commission, except that—
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(i) a member of the Commission shall only 
serve if the member’s position continues to be au-
thorized under subsection (b); 
‘‘(ii) no compensation or entitlements relat-
ing to a person’s status with the Commission 
shall be due for the period between the termi-
nation and reconstitution of the Commission; 
‘‘(iii) nothing in this paragraph shall be 
deemed as requiring the extension or reemploy-
ment of any staff member or contractor working 
for the Commission; 
‘‘(iv) the staff of the commission— 
‘‘(I) shall be selected by the co-chairs of 
the Commission in accordance with sub-
section (h)(1); 
‘‘(II) shall be comprised of not more 
than four individuals, including a staff di-
rector; 
‘‘(III) shall be resourced in accordance 
with subsection (g)(4)(A); and 
‘‘(IV) with the approval of the co- 
chairs, may be provided by contract with a 
nongovernmental organization; 
‘‘(v) any unexpended funds made available 
for the use of the Commission shall continue to
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† HR 6395 EAS 
be available for use for the life of the Commis-
sion, as well as any additional funds appro-
priated to the Department of Defense that are 
made available to the Commission, provided that 
the total such funds does not exceed $1,000,000 
from the reconstitution of the Commission to the 
completion of the Commission; and 
‘‘(vi) the requirement for an annual assess-
ment of the final report in subsection (l) shall be 
in effect until the termination of the Commis-
sion.’’. 
SEC. 1625. REVIEW OF REGULATIONS AND PROMULGATION 
OF 
GUIDANCE 
RELATING 
TO 
NATIONAL 
GUARD RESPONSES TO CYBER ATTACKS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than December 31, 2021, 
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, shall— 
(1) review and, if the Secretary determines nec-
essary, update regulations promulgated under section 
903 of title 32, United States Code, to clarify when 
and under what conditions the participation of the 
National Guard in a response to a cyber attack quali-
fies as a homeland defense activity that would be 
compensated for by the Secretary of Defense under 
section 902 of such title; and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(2) promulgate guidance on how units of the Na-
tional Guard shall collaborate with the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation through multi-agency task 
forces, information-sharing groups, incident response 
planning and exercises, State fusion centers, and 
other relevant forums and activities. 
(b) ANNEX OF NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE 
PLAN.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Defense, shall develop an annex to the National Cyber 
Incident Response Plan that details those regulations and 
guidance reviewed, updated, and promulgated under para-
graphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a). 
SEC. 1626. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO THE QUADREN-
NIAL CYBER POSTURE REVIEW. 
Section 1644(c) of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91), as amended 
by section 1635 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92), is further 
amended— 
(1) by amending paragraph (1) to read as fol-
lows:
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‘‘(1) The assessment and definition of the role of 
cyber forces in the national defense and military 
strategies of the United States.’’; 
(2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(2) Review of the following: 
‘‘(A) The role of cyber operations in combat-
ant commander warfighting plans. 
‘‘(B) The ability of combatant commanders 
to respond to adversary cyber attacks. 
‘‘(C) The cyber capacity-building programs 
of the Department.’’; 
(3) by amending paragraph (3) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(3) A review of the law, policies, and authori-
ties relating to, and necessary for, the United States 
to maintain a safe, reliable, and credible cyber pos-
ture for defending against and responding to cyber 
attacks and for deterrence in cyberspace, including 
the following: 
‘‘(A) An assessment of the need for further 
delegation of cyber-related authorities, including 
those germane to information warfare, to the 
Commander of United States Cyber Command.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(B) An evaluation of the adequacy of mis-
sion authorities for all cyber-related military 
components, defense agencies, directorates, cen-
ters, and commands.’’; 
(4) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘A declara-
tory’’ and inserting ‘‘A review of the need for or for 
updates to a declaratory’’; 
(5) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘Proposed’’ 
and inserting ‘‘A review of’’; 
(6) by amending paragraph (6) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(6) A review of a strategy to deter, degrade, or 
defeat malicious cyber activity targeting the United 
States (which may include activities, capability devel-
opment, and operations other than cyber activities, 
cyber capability development, and cyber operations), 
including— 
‘‘(A) a review and assessment of various ap-
proaches to competition and deterrence in cyber-
space, determined in consultation with experts 
from Government, academia, and industry; 
‘‘(B) a comparison of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approaches identified pursuant 
to subparagraph (A) relative to the threat of each 
other; and
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‘‘(C) an assessment as to how the cyber 
strategy will inform country-specific campaign 
plans focused on key leadership of Russia, 
China, Iran, North Korea, and any other coun-
try the Secretary considers appropriate.’’; 
(7) by striking paragraph (8) and inserting the 
following new paragraph (8): 
‘‘(8) A comprehensive force structure assessment 
of the Cyber Operations Forces of the Department for 
the posture review period, including the following: 
‘‘(A) A determination of the appropriate 
size and composition of the Cyber Mission Forces 
to accomplish the mission requirements of the 
Department. 
‘‘(B) An assessment of the Cyber Mission 
Forces’ personnel, capabilities, equipment, fund-
ing, operational concepts, and ability to execute 
cyber operations in a timely fashion. 
‘‘(C) An assessment of the personnel, capa-
bilities, equipment, funding, and operational 
concepts of Cybersecurity Service Providers and 
other elements of the Cyber Operations Forces.’’; 
(8) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (11) 
as subsections (12) through (15), respectively; and
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(9) by inserting after paragraph (8), the fol-
lowing new paragraphs: 
‘‘(9) An assessment of whether the Cyber Mission 
Force has the appropriate level of interoperability, in-
tegration, and interdependence with special oper-
ations and conventional forces. 
‘‘(10) An evaluation of the adequacy of mission 
authorities for the Joint Force Provider and Joint 
Force Trainer responsibilities of United States Cyber 
Command, including the adequacy of the units des-
ignated as Cyber Operations Forces to support such 
responsibilities. 
‘‘(11) An assessment of the missions and 
resourcing of the combat support agencies in support 
of cyber missions of the Department.’’. 
SEC. 1627. REPORT ON ENABLING UNITED STATES CYBER 
COMMAND RESOURCE ALLOCATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than January 15, 2021, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report detailing the actions the Sec-
retary will undertake to implement clauses (ii) and (iii) 
of section 167b(d)(2) of title 10, United States Code, includ-
ing actions to ensure that the Commander of United States 
Cyber Command has enhanced authority, direction, and 
control of the Cyber Operations Forces and the equipment
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budget that enables Cyber Operations Forces’ operations 
and readiness, beginning with the budget to be submitted 
to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 
31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2024, and the budget 
justification materials for the Department of Defense to be 
submitted to Congress in support of such budget. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall address the following items: 
(1) The procedures by which the Principal Cyber 
Advisor (PCA) will exercise authority, direction, and 
oversight over the Commander of United States Cyber 
Command, with respect to Cyber Operations Forces- 
peculiar equipment and resources. 
(2) The procedures by which the Commander of 
United States Cyber Command will— 
(A) prepare and submit to the Secretary 
program recommendations and budget proposals 
for Cyber Operations Forces and for other forces 
assigned to the Cyber Command; and 
(B) exercise authority, direction, and con-
trol over the expenditure of funds for— 
(i) forces assigned to United States 
Cyber Command; and 
(ii) Cyber Operations Forces assigned 
to other unified combatant commands.
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(3) Recommendations for actions to enable the 
Commander of United States Cyber Command to exe-
cute the budget and acquisition responsibilities of the 
Commander in excess of currently imposed limits on 
the Cyber Operations Procurement Fund, including 
potential increases in personnel to support the Com-
mander. 
(4) The procedures by which the Secretary will 
categorize and track funding obligated or expended for 
Cyber Operations Forces-peculiar equipment and ca-
pabilities. 
(5) The methodology and criteria by which the 
Secretary will characterize equipment as being Cyber 
Operations Forces-peculiar. 
SEC. 1628. EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR ESTABLISHING A 
CYBER RESERVE FORCE. 
(a) EVALUATION REQUIRED.—Not later than Decem-
ber 31, 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct an eval-
uation of options for establishing a cyber reserve force. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The evaluation conducted under sub-
section (a) shall include assessment of the following: 
(1) The capabilities and deficiencies in military 
and civilian personnel with needed cybersecurity ex-
pertise, and the quantity of personnel with such ex-
pertise, within the Department.
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(2) The potential for a uniformed, civilian, or 
mixed cyber reserve force to remedy shortfalls in ex-
pertise and capacity. 
(3) The ability of the Department to attract the 
personnel with the desired expertise to either a uni-
formed or civilian cyber reserve force. 
(4) The number of personnel, the level of funding, 
and the composition of a cyber reserve force that 
would be required to meet the needs of the Depart-
ment. 
(5) Alternative models for establishing a cyber 
reserve force, including the following: 
(A) A traditional uniformed military re-
serve component. 
(B) A nontraditional uniformed military 
reserve component, with respect to drilling and 
other requirements such as grooming and phys-
ical fitness. 
(C) Nontraditional civilian cyber reserve 
options. 
(6) The impact a uniformed military cyber re-
serve would have on active duty and existing reserve 
forces, including the following: 
(A) Recruiting. 
(B) Promotion.
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(C) Retention. 
(7) The effect a civilian cyber reserve would have 
on active duty and existing reserve forces, and the 
private sector. 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 2022, the 
Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on the evaluation conducted under subsection 
(a). 
SEC. 1629. ENSURING CYBER RESILIENCY OF NUCLEAR 
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. 
(a) PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM FIRST ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF 
CYBER RESILIENCY OF NUCLEAR COMMAND AND CONTROL 
SYSTEM.—Not later than October 1, 2021, the Secretary of 
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
a comprehensive plan, including a schedule and resourcing 
plan, for the implementation of the findings and rec-
ommendations included in the first report submitted under 
section 499(c)(3) of title 10, United States Code. 
(b) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS AND OVERSIGHT MECH-
ANISM FOR CYBER DEFENSE OF NUCLEAR COMMAND AND 
CONTROL SYSTEM.—Not later than October 1, 2021, the 
Secretary shall develop and establish—
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(1) a concept of operations for defending the nu-
clear command and control system against cyber at-
tacks, including specification of the— 
(A) roles and responsibilities of relevant en-
tities within the Office of the Secretary, the mili-
tary services, combatant commands, the Defense 
Agencies, and the Department of Defense Field 
Activities; and 
(B) cybersecurity capabilities to be acquired 
and employed and operational tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures, including cyber protec-
tion team and sensor deployment strategies, to be 
used 
to 
monitor, 
defend, 
and 
mitigate 
vulnerabilities in nuclear command and control 
systems; and 
(2) an oversight mechanism or governance model 
for overseeing the implementation of the concept of 
operations developed and established under paragraph 
(1), related development, systems engineering, and ac-
quisition activities and programs, and the plan re-
quired by subsection (a), including specification of 
the— 
(A) roles and responsibilities of relevant en-
tities within the Office of the Secretary, the mili-
tary services, combatant commands, the Defense
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Agencies, and the Department of Defense Field 
Activities in overseeing the defense of the nuclear 
command and control system against cyber at-
tacks; 
(B) responsibilities and authorities of the 
Strategic Cybersecurity Program in overseeing 
and, as appropriate, executing— 
(i) vulnerability assessments; and 
(ii) development, systems engineering, 
and acquisition activities; and 
(C) processes for coordination of activities, 
policies, and programs relating to the cybersecu-
rity and defense of the nuclear command and 
control system. 
SEC. 1630. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS RELATING 
TO THE STRATEGIC CYBERSECURITY PRO-
GRAM AND THE EVALUATION OF CYBER 
VULNERABILITIES OF MAJOR WEAPON SYS-
TEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 
(a) EVALUATION
OF CYBER VULNERABILITIES
OF 
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DE-
FENSE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1647 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Pub-
lic Law 114–92), as amended by section 1633 of the
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020 (Public Law 116–92), is further amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(i) ESTABLISHING REQUIREMENTS FOR PERIODICITY 
OF VULNERABILITY REVIEWS.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall establish policies and requirements for each major 
weapon system, and the priority critical infrastructure es-
sential to the proper functioning of major weapon systems 
in broader mission areas, to be re-assessed for cyber 
vulnerabilities, taking into account upgrades or other modi-
fications to systems and changes in the threat. 
‘‘(j) IDENTIFICATION OF SENIOR OFFICIAL.—Each sec-
retary of a military department shall identify a senior offi-
cial who shall be responsible for ensuring that cyber vulner-
ability assessments and mitigations for weapon systems and 
critical infrastructure are planned, funded, and carried 
out.’’. 
(2) TECHNICAL CORRECTION.—Such section 1647 
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2016 is further amended— 
(A) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub-
section (h); and 
(B) by redesignating the second subsection 
(f), as added by section 1633 of the National De-
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fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, as 
subsection (g). 
(b) STRATEGIC CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM.—Section 
1640 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 2224 note), is 
amended by striking subsections (a) through (e) and insert-
ing the following new subsections: 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than August 1, 2021, the 
Secretary of Defense shall, acting through the Director of 
the National Security Agency and in coordination with the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a pro-
gram to be known as the ‘Strategic Cybersecurity Program’ 
(in this section referred to as the ‘Program’). 
‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Program shall be com-
prised of personnel assigned to the Program by the 
Secretary from among personnel, including regular 
and reserve members of the Armed Forces, civilian 
employees of the Department of Defense (including the 
Defense intelligence agencies), and personnel of the re-
search laboratories of the Department of Defense and 
the Department of Energy, who have particular ex-
pertise in the areas of responsibility described in sub-
section (c).
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‘‘(2) DEPARTMENT
OF
ENERGY
PERSONNEL.— 
Any personnel assigned to the Program from among 
personnel of the Department of Energy shall be so as-
signed with the concurrence of the Secretary of En-
ergy. 
‘‘(3) PROGRAM MANAGER.—The Secretary of De-
fense shall designate a manager for the Program (in 
this section referred to as the ‘Program manager’). 
‘‘(c) RESPONSIBILITIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Program manager and 
the personnel assigned to the Program shall improve 
the end-to-end cybersecurity of all of the systems, crit-
ical infrastructure, kill chains, and processes that 
make up the following military missions of the De-
partment of Defense: 
‘‘(A) Nuclear deterrence and strike. 
‘‘(B) Select long-range conventional strike 
missions germane to the warfighting plans of 
United States European Command and United 
States Indo-Pacific Command. 
‘‘(C) Offensive cyber operations. 
‘‘(D) Homeland missile defense. 
‘‘(2) 
ASSESSING
AND
REMEDIATING 
VULNERABILITIES IN MISSION EXECUTION.—In car-
rying out the activities described in paragraph (1),
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the Program manager shall conduct end-to-end vul-
nerability assessments and undertake or oversee reme-
diation of identified vulnerabilities in the systems 
and processes on which the successful execution of the 
missions delineated in paragraph (1) depend. 
‘‘(3) ACQUISITION AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
REVIEW.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the Pro-
gram manager shall conduct appropriate reviews of 
acquisition and systems engineering plans for pro-
posed systems and infrastructure. The review of an 
acquisition plan for any proposed system or infra-
structure shall be carried out before Milestone B ap-
proval for such system or infrastructure. 
‘‘(d) INTEGRATION WITH OTHER EFFORTS.—The Sec-
retary shall ensure that the Program builds upon, and does 
not duplicate, other efforts of the Department of Defense re-
lating to cybersecurity, including the following: 
‘‘(1) The evaluation of cyber vulnerabilities of 
major weapon systems of the Department of Defense 
required under section 1647 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 
114–92). 
‘‘(2) The evaluation of cyber vulnerabilities of 
Department of Defense critical infrastructure required 
under section 1650 of the National Defense Authoriza-
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tion Act for Fiscal year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 
10 U.S.C. 2224 note). 
‘‘(3) The activities of the cyber protection teams 
of the Department of Defense. 
‘‘(e) MISSION DEFINITION.—The Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff shall coordinate with the Director of 
the National Security Agency and the commanders of the 
unified combatant commands to define the elements of the 
missions that will be included in the Program, and shall 
be responsible for updating those definitions as necessary. 
‘‘(f) BRIEFING.—Not later than December 1, 2021, the 
Secretary of Defense shall provide a briefing to the congres-
sional defense committees on the establishment of the Pro-
gram, and the plans, funding, and staffing of the Pro-
gram.’’. 
SEC. 1631. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE PARTICIPATION IN 
A CYBERSECURITY THREAT INTELLIGENCE 
SHARING PROGRAM. 
(a) DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE THREAT INTEL-
LIGENCE PROGRAM.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense shall 
establish a threat intelligence sharing program to 
share threat intelligence with, and obtain threat intel-
ligence from, the defense industrial base.
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(2) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—At a minimum, 
the Secretary shall ensure that the program estab-
lished pursuant to paragraph (1) includes the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Cybersecurity incident reporting re-
quirements applicable to the defense industrial 
base that— 
(i) extend beyond mandatory incident 
reporting requirements in effect on the day 
before the date of the enactment of this Act; 
(ii) set specific timeframes for all cat-
egories of incident reporting; 
(iii) establishes a single clearinghouse 
for all mandatory incident reporting to the 
Department of Defense, including incidents 
involving covered unclassified information, 
and classified information; and 
(iv) provide that, unless authorized or 
required by another provision of law or the 
element of the defense industrial base mak-
ing the report consents, nonpublic informa-
tion of which the Department becomes 
aware only because of a report provided 
pursuant to the program shall be dissemi-
nated and used only for a cybersecurity
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purpose, as defined in section 102 of the Cy-
bersecurity Information Sharing Act of 
2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501). 
(B) A mechanism for developing a shared 
and real-time picture of the threat environment. 
(C) Joint, collaborative, and co-located ana-
lytics. 
(D) Investments in technology and capabili-
ties to support automated detection and analysis 
across the defense industrial base. 
(E) Coordinated intelligence tipping, shar-
ing, and deconfliction, as necessary, with rel-
evant government agencies with similar intel-
ligence sharing programs. 
(b) THREAT INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM PARTICIPA-
TION.— 
(1) PROCUREMENT.—The Secretary either may 
require or shall encourage and provide incentive for 
companies to participate in the threat intelligence 
sharing program required by subsection (a). 
(2) IMPLEMENTATION.—In implementing para-
graph (1), the Secretary shall— 
(A) create tiers of requirements for partici-
pation within the program based on—
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(i) the role of and relative threats re-
lated to entities within the defense indus-
trial base; and 
(ii) Cybersecurity Maturity Model Cer-
tification level; and 
(B) prioritize available funding and tech-
nical support to assist affected businesses, insti-
tutions, and organizations as is reasonably nec-
essary for those affected entities to commence 
participation in the threat intelligence sharing 
program and to meet any applicable program re-
quirements. 
(c) EXISTING INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAMS.— 
The Secretary may utilize an existing Department informa-
tion sharing program to satisfy the requirement in sub-
section (a) if— 
(1) the existing program includes, or is modified 
to include, two-way sharing of threat information 
that is specifically relevant to the defense industrial 
base; and 
(2) such a program is coordinated with other 
government agencies with existing intelligence sharing 
programs where overlap occurs. 
(d) REGULATIONS.—
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(1) RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY.—Not later than 
December 15, 2021, the Secretary shall promulgate 
such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry 
out this section. 
(2) CYBERSECURITY MATURITY MODEL CERTIFI-
CATION
PROGRAM
HARMONIZATION.—The Secretary 
shall ensure that any intelligence sharing require-
ments set forth in the rules and regulations promul-
gated pursuant to paragraph (1) consider an entity’s 
maturity and role within the defense industrial base, 
consistent with the maturity certification levels estab-
lished in the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certifi-
cation program of the Department. 
(e) COMMUNITY CONSENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the program estab-
lished pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary either 
may require through contractual mechanisms or shall 
encourage entities in the defense industrial base to 
consent to queries of foreign intelligence collection 
databases related to the entities, provided that intel-
ligence information provided to companies is handled 
in a manner that protects sources and methods. 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to require that the ele-
ments of the intelligence community conduct queries
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on defense industrial base companies to detect cyberse-
curity threats to such companies or to require that in-
formation resulting from such queries be provided to 
such companies. 
(f) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 
2022, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a report that includes a description of— 
(1) mandatory requirements levied on defense in-
dustrial base entities regarding cyber incidents; 
(2) Department procedures for ensuring the con-
fidentiality and security of data provided by such en-
tities to the Department on either a voluntary or 
mandatory basis; and 
(3) any other matters regarding the program es-
tablished under subsection (a) the Secretary considers 
significant. 
(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘defense industrial base’’ means the 
Department of Defense, Federal Government, and pri-
vate sector worldwide industrial complex with capa-
bilities to perform research and development, design, 
produce, and maintain military weapon systems, sub-
systems, components, or parts to satisfy military re-
quirements.
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(2) The term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the 
meaning given such term in section 3 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
(3) The term ‘‘threat intelligence’’ means cyberse-
curity information collected and shared amongst the 
defense industrial base. 
SEC. 1632. ASSESSMENT ON DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CY-
BERSECURITY THREAT HUNTING. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than Decem-
ber 1, 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall complete an as-
sessment of— 
(1) the adequacy of the threat hunting elements 
of the compliance-based Cybersecurity Maturity Model 
Certification program of the Department of Defense; 
and 
(2) the need for continuous threat hunting oper-
ations on defense industrial base networks conducted 
by the Department of Defense, prime contractors, or 
third-party cybersecurity vendors. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment completed under sec-
tion (a) shall include evaluation of the following: 
(1) The adequacy of the requirements at each 
level of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certifi-
cation, including requirements germane to continuous
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monitoring, discovery, and investigation of anoma-
lous activity indicative of a cybersecurity incident. 
(2) The need for the establishment of a contin-
uous threat-hunting operational model, as a supple-
ment to the cyber hygiene requirements of the Cyber-
security Maturity Model Certification, in which net-
work activity is comprehensively and continuously 
monitored for signs of compromise. 
(3) Whether the continuous threat-hunting oper-
ations described in paragraph (2) should be conducted 
by— 
(A) United States Cyber Command; 
(B) a component of the Department of De-
fense other than United States Cyber Command; 
(C) qualified prime contractors or sub-
contractors; 
(D) accredited third-party cybersecurity 
vendors; or 
(E) a combination of the entities specified 
in subparagraphs (A) through (D). 
(4) Criteria for the prime contractors and sub-
contractors that should be subject to continuous 
threat-hunting operations as described in paragraph 
(2).
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(c) BRIEFING.—Not later than February 1, 2022, the 
Secretary of Defense shall provide a briefing to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on— 
(1) the findings of the Secretary with respect to 
the assessment completed under subsection (a); and 
(2) such implementation plans as the Secretary 
may have arising out of the findings described in 
paragraph (1). 
SEC. 1633. ASSESSING RISK TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF 
QUANTUM COMPUTING. 
(a) 
COMPREHENSIVE
ASSESSMENT
AND
REC-
OMMENDATIONS REQUIRED.—Not later than December 31, 
2022, the Secretary of Defense shall— 
(1) complete a comprehensive assessment of the 
current and potential threats and risks posed by 
quantum computing technologies to critical national 
security systems, including— 
(A) identification and prioritization of crit-
ical national security systems at risk; 
(B) assessment of the standards of the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology for 
quantum resistant cryptography and their appli-
cability to cryptographic requirements of the De-
partment of Defense;
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(C) feasibility of alternative quantum re-
sistant algorithms and features; and 
(D) funding shortfalls in public and private 
developmental efforts relating to quantum resist-
ant cryptography; and 
(2) develop recommendations for research, devel-
opment, 
and 
acquisition 
activities, 
including 
resourcing schedules, for securing the national secu-
rity systems identified in paragraph (1)(A) against 
quantum computing code-breaking capabilities. 
(b) BRIEFING.—Not later than February 1, 2023, the 
Secretary shall brief the congressional defense committees 
on the assessment completed under paragraph (1) of sub-
section (a) and the recommendations developed under para-
graph (2) of such subsection. 
SEC. 1634. APPLICABILITY OF REORIENTATION OF BIG 
DATA PLATFORM PROGRAM TO DEPARTMENT 
OF NAVY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1651 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 
116–92) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection: 
‘‘(e) APPLICABILITY.—The requirements of this section 
shall apply in full to the Department of the Navy, including 
the Sharkcage and associated programs.’’.
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(b) BRIEFING.—Not later than January 1, 2021, the 
Secretary of the Navy, the program manager of the Unified 
Platform program, the Chief Information Officer, and the 
Principal Cyber Advisor shall jointly brief the congressional 
defense committees on the compliance of the Department of 
the Navy with the requirements of such section, as amended 
by paragraph (1). 
SEC. 1635. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ACCESS AND IN-
FORMATION RELATING TO CYBER ATTACKS 
ON 
OPERATIONALLY 
CRITICAL 
CONTRAC-
TORS OF THE ARMED FORCES. 
Section 391(c) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) by amending paragraph (3) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(3) ARMED FORCES ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS 
TO EQUIPMENT AND INFORMATION BY MEMBERS OF 
THE
ARMED
FORCES.—The procedures established 
pursuant to subsection (a) shall— 
‘‘(A) include mechanisms for a member of 
the armed forces— 
‘‘(i) if requested by an operationally 
critical contractor, to assist the contractor 
in detecting and mitigating penetrations; or
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† HR 6395 EAS 
‘‘(ii) at the request of the Secretary of 
Defense or the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard, to obtain access to equipment or in-
formation of an operationally critical con-
tractor necessary to conduct a forensic anal-
ysis, in addition to any analysis conducted 
by the contractor; and 
‘‘(B) provide that an operationally critical 
contractor is only required to provide access to 
equipment or information as described in sub-
paragraph (A) to determine whether— 
‘‘(i) information created by or for the 
armed forces in connection with any pro-
gram of the armed forces was successfully 
exfiltrated from or compromised on a net-
work or information system of such con-
tractor and, if so, what information was 
exfiltrated or compromised; or 
‘‘(ii) the ability of the contractor to 
provide operationally critical support has 
been affected and, if so, how and to what ex-
tent it has been affected.’’; 
(2) in paragraph (4), by inserting ‘‘, so as to 
minimize delays in or any curtailing of the cyber re-
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sponse or defensive actions of the Department or the 
Coast Guard’’ after ‘‘specific person’’; and 
(3) in paragraph (5)(C), by inserting ‘‘or coun-
terintelligence activities’’ after ‘‘investigations’’. 
SEC. 1636. REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW OF AND LIMITA-
TIONS ON THE JOINT REGIONAL SECURITY 
STACKS ACTIVITY. 
(a) BASELINE REVIEW.—Not later than October 1, 
2021, the Secretary of Defense shall undertake a baseline 
review of the Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS) to de-
termine whether the activity— 
(1) should proceed as a program of record, with 
modifications as specified in section (b), for exclu-
sively the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Network 
(NIPRNET) or for such network and the Secret Inter-
net Protocol Network (SIPRNET); or 
(2) should be phased out across the Department 
of Defense with each of the Joint Regional Security 
Stacks replaced through the institution of cost-effective 
and capable networking and cybersecurity tech-
nologies, architectures, and operational concepts with-
in five years of the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(b) PLAN TO TRANSITION TO PROGRAM OF RECORD.— 
If the Secretary determines under subsection (a) that the 
Joint Regional Security Stacks activity should proceed, not
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later than October 1, 2021, the Secretary shall develop a 
plan to transition such activity to a program of record, gov-
erned by standard Department of Defense acquisition pro-
gram requirements and practices, including the following: 
(1) Baseline operational requirements docu-
mentation. 
(2) An acquisition strategy and baseline. 
(3) A program office and responsible program 
manager, under the oversight of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the 
Chief Information Officer of the Department of De-
fense, responsible for pertinent doctrine, organization, 
training, materiel, leadership and education, per-
sonnel, facilities and policy matters, and the develop-
ment of effective tactics, techniques, and procedures; 
(4) manning and training requirements docu-
mentation; and 
(5) operational test planning. 
(c) LIMITATIONS.— 
(1) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—None of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may 
be used to field Joint Regional Security Stacks on the 
Secret Internet Protocol Network in fiscal year 2021. 
(2) LIMITATION
ON
OPERATIONAL
DEPLOY-
MENT.—The Secretary may not conduct an oper-
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ational deployment of Joint Regional Security Stacks 
to the Secret Internet Protocol Network in fiscal year 
2021. 
(d) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Not later than Decem-
ber 1, 2021, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees— 
(1) the findings of the Secretary with respect to 
the baseline review conducted under subsection (a); 
(2) the plan developed under subsection (b), if 
any; and 
(3) a proposal for the replacement of Joint Re-
gional Security Stacks, if the Secretary determines 
under subsection (a) that it should be replaced. 
SEC. 1637. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF ESTABLISH-
MENT OF A NATIONAL CYBER DIRECTOR. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than December 1, 2020, 
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, shall seek to enter into an agreement 
with an independent organization with relevant expertise 
in cyber policy and governmental organization to conduct 
and complete an assessment of the feasibility and advis-
ability of establishing a National Cyber Director. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required under sub-
section (a) shall include a review of and development of rec-
ommendations germane to the following, including the de-
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velopment of proposed legislative text for the establishment 
of a National Cyber Director: 
(1) The authorities necessary to bring capabili-
ties and capacities together across the interagency, all 
levels of government, and the private sector. 
(2) A definition of the roles of the National 
Cyber Director in planning, preparing, and directing 
integrated cyber operations in response to a major 
cyber attack on the United States, including intel-
ligence operations, law enforcement actions, cyber ef-
fects operations, defensive operations, and incident re-
sponse operations. 
(3) The authorities necessary to align resources 
to cyber priorities. 
(4) The structure of the office of the National 
Cyber Director and position within government. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2021, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress a report on— 
(A) the findings of the independent organi-
zation with respect to the assessment carried out 
under subsection (a); and 
(B) the recommendations developed as part 
of such assessment under subsection (b).
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(2) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in a publicly releasable 
and unclassified format, but may include a classified 
annex. 
(d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
Representatives. 
SEC. 1638. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO USE OPER-
ATION 
AND 
MAINTENANCE 
FUNDS 
FOR 
CYBER OPERATIONS-PECULIAR CAPABILITY 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1640 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 
116–92) is amended— 
(1) by redsignating subsections (b) and (c) as 
subsections (c) and (d), respectively; 
(2) in subsection (a)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘The Secretary of Defense’’ 
and inserting ‘‘Subject to subsection (b), the
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Commander of the United States Cyber Com-
mand’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘per service’’ and inserting 
‘‘per use’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘through 2022’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘through 2025’’; and 
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(b) LIMITATION.—(1) Each fiscal year, the Secre-
taries of the military departments concerned may each obli-
gate and expend under subsection (a) not more than 
$20,000,000. 
‘‘(2) Each fiscal year, the Commander of the United 
States Cyber Command may obligate and expend under 
subsection (a) not more than $6,000,000.’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Subsection (c) of such 
section is amended by striking ‘‘through 2022’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘through 2025’’. 
SEC. 1639. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR 
COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES CYBER COM-
MAND AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR OF-
FENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS. 
(a) PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR COM-
MANDER OF UNITED STATES CYBER COMMAND TO ATTRACT 
EXPERTS IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING.—Section 1599h
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of title 10, United States Code, as amended by section 212 
of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 
(Public Law 116–92)), is further amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the 
following: 
‘‘(7) UNITED
STATES
CYBER
COMMAND.—The 
Commander of United States Cyber Command may 
carry out a program of personnel management au-
thority provided in subsection (b) in order to facili-
tate the recruitment of eminent experts in computer 
science, data science, engineering, mathematics, and 
computer network exploitation within the head-
quarters of United States Cyber Command and the 
Cyber National Mission Force.’’; and 
(2) in subsection (b)(1)— 
(A) in subparagraph (E), by striking ‘‘; 
and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) in subparagraph (F), by striking the 
semicolon and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
‘‘(G) in the case of United States Cyber 
Command, appoint computer scientists, data sci-
entists, engineers, mathematicians, and computer 
network exploitation specialists to a total of not
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more than 10 scientific and engineering posi-
tions in the Command;’’. 
(b) PROGRAM
TO DEVELOP ACCESSES, DISCOVER 
VULNERABILITIES, AND ENGINEER CYBER TOOLS AND DE-
VELOP TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR OF-
FENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Pursuant to the authority 
provided under section 1599h(a)(7) of such title, as 
added by subsection (a), the Commander of United 
States Cyber Command shall establish a program or 
augment an existing program within the Command 
to develop accesses, discover vulnerabilities, and engi-
neer cyber tools and develop tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for the use of these assets and capabilities 
in offensive cyber operations. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The program or augmented 
program required by paragraph (1) shall— 
(A) develop accesses, tools, vulnerabilities, 
and tactics, techniques, and procedures fit for 
Department of Defense military operations in 
cyberspace, such as reliability, meeting short de-
velopment and operational timelines, low cost, 
and expendability;
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(B) aim to decrease the reliance of Cyber 
Command on accesses, tools, and expertise pro-
vided by the intelligence community; 
(C) be designed to provide technical and 
operational expertise on par with that of pro-
grams of the intelligence community; 
(D) enable the Commander to attract and 
retain expertise resident in the private sector 
and other technologically elite government orga-
nizations; and 
(E) coordinate development activities with, 
and, as appropriate, facilitate transition of ca-
pabilities from, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, the Strategic Capabilities Of-
fice, and components within the intelligence com-
munity. 
(3) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
DEFINED.—In 
this subsection, the term ‘‘intelligence community’’ 
has the meaning given such term in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
SEC. 1640. IMPLEMENTATION OF INFORMATION OPER-
ATIONS MATTERS. 
Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
year 2021 by section 301 for operation and maintenance 
and available for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
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the travel of persons as specified in the table in section 
4301— 
(1) not more than 25 percent shall be available 
until the date on which the report required by sub-
section (h)(1) of section 1631 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 
116–92) is submitted to the Committee on Armed 
Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed 
Services House of Representatives; and 
(2) not more than 75 percent shall be available 
until the date on which the strategy and posture re-
view required by subsection (g) of such section is sub-
mitted to such committees. 
SEC. 1641. REPORT ON CYBER INSTITUTES PROGRAM. 
Section 1640 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115– 
232; 132 Stat. 2310; 10 U.S.C. 2200 note) is amended by 
adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(g) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than Sep-
tember 30, 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives a report on the effectiveness of the 
Cyber Institutes and on opportunities to expand the Cyber 
Institutes to additional select institutions of higher learning 
that have a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program.’’.
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SEC. 1642. ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL MANUFACTURERS IN 
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CHAIN 
ON MATTERS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of appro-
priations, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology, may award financial assistance to a Center for the 
purpose of providing cybersecurity services to small manu-
facturers. 
(b) CRITERIA.—The Secretary, in consultation with 
the Director, shall establish and publish on the grants.gov 
website, or successor website, criteria for selecting recipients 
for financial assistance under this section. 
(c) USE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE.—Financial as-
sistance under this section— 
(1) shall be used by a Center to provide small 
manufacturers with cybersecurity services relating 
to— 
(A) compliance with the cybersecurity re-
quirements of the Department of Defense Supple-
ment to the Federal Acquisition Regulation, in-
cluding awareness, assessment, evaluation, prep-
aration, and implementation of cybersecurity 
services; and
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(B) achieving compliance with the Cyberse-
curity Maturity Model Certification framework 
of the Department of Defense; and 
(2) may be used by a Center to employ trained 
personnel to deliver cybersecurity services to small 
manufacturers. 
(d) BIENNIAL REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than once 
every two years, the Secretary shall submit to the con-
gressional defense committees, the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, 
and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 
of the House of Representatives a biennial report on 
financial assistance awarded under this section. 
(2) CONTENTS.—To the extent practicable, each 
report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include 
the following with respect to the years covered by the 
report: 
(A) The number of small manufacturing 
companies assisted. 
(B) A description of the cybersecurity serv-
ices provided. 
(C) A description of the cybersecurity mat-
ters addressed.
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(D) An analysis of the operational effective-
ness and cost-effectiveness of the cybersecurity 
services provided. 
(e) TERMINATION.—The authority of the Secretary to 
award of financial assistance under this section shall termi-
nate on the date that is five years after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘Center’’ has the meaning given 
such term in section 25(a) of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology Act (15 U.S.C. 
278k(a)). 
(2) The term ‘‘small manufacturer’’ has the 
meaning given that term in section 1644(g) of the 
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232; 10 U.S.C. 
2224 note). 
SEC. 1643. STUDY ON CYBEREXPLOITATION OF MEMBERS 
OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR FAMI-
LIES. 
(a) STUDY REQUIRED.—Not later than 150 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense shall complete a study on the cyberexploitation of the 
personal information and accounts of members of the 
Armed Forces and their families.
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(b) ELEMENTS.—The study required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following: 
(1) An intelligence assessment of the threat cur-
rently posed by foreign government and non-state 
actor cyberexploitation of members of the Armed 
Forces and their families, including generalized as-
sessments as to whether cyberexploitation of members 
of the Armed Forces and their families is a substan-
tial threat as compared to other means of information 
warfare and as to whether cyberexploitation of mem-
bers of the Armed Forces and their families is an in-
creasing threat. 
(2) Case-study analysis of three known occur-
rences of attempted cyberexploitation against mem-
bers of the Armed Forces and their families, including 
assessments of the vulnerability and the ultimate con-
sequences of the attempted cyberexploitation. 
(3) A description of the actions taken by the De-
partment of Defense to educate members of the Armed 
Forces and their families, including particularly vul-
nerable subpopulations, about any actions that can be 
taken to reduce these threats. 
(4) An intelligence assessment of the threat posed 
by foreign government and non-state actor creation 
and use of deep fakes featuring members of the Armed
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Forces or their families, including generalized assess-
ments of the maturity of the technology used in the 
creation of deep fakes and as to how deep fakes have 
been used or might be used to conduct information 
warfare. 
(5) Development of recommendations for policy 
changes to reduce the vulnerability of members of the 
Armed Forces and their families to cyberexploitation, 
including recommendations for legislative or adminis-
trative action. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall submit to 
the congressional defense committees a report on the 
findings of the Secretary with respect to the study re-
quired by subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term ‘‘cyberexploitation’’ means the use 
of digital means to knowingly access, or conspire to 
access, without authorization, an individual’s per-
sonal information to be employed (or to be used) with 
malicious intent.
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(2) The term ‘‘deep fake’’ means the digital in-
sertion of a person’s likeness into or digital alteration 
of a person’s likeness in visual media, such as photo-
graphs and videos, without the person’s permission 
and with malicious intent. 
Subtitle C—Nuclear Forces 
SEC. 1651. MODIFICATION TO RESPONSIBILITIES OF NU-
CLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL. 
Section 179(d) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended— 
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (9) through (12) 
as paragraphs (10) through (13), respectively; and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the fol-
lowing new paragraph (9): 
‘‘(9) Reviewing proposed capabilities, and estab-
lishing and validating performance requirements (as 
defined in section 181(h) of this title), for nuclear 
warhead programs.’’. 
SEC. 1652. RESPONSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUN-
CIL IN PREPARATION OF NATIONAL NUCLEAR 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET. 
Paragraph (11) of section 179(d) of title 10, United 
States Code, as redesignated by section 1651, is further 
amended to read as follows:
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‘‘(11) As part of the planning, programming, 
budgeting, and execution process of the National Nu-
clear Security Administration— 
‘‘(A) providing guidance with respect to the 
development of the annual budget proposals of 
the Administration under section 3255 of the 
National Nuclear Security Administration Act; 
‘‘(B) reviewing the adequacy of such pro-
posals under section 4717 of the Atomic Energy 
Defense Act; and 
‘‘(C) preparing, coordinating, and approv-
ing such proposals, including before such pro-
posals are submitted to— 
‘‘(i) the Secretary of Energy; 
‘‘(ii) the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget; 
‘‘(iii) the President; or 
‘‘(iv) Congress (as submitted with the 
budget of the President under section 
1105(a) of title 31).’’. 
SEC. 1653. MODIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE REVIEW OF ANNUAL RE-
PORTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTERPRISE. 
Section 492a(c) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended—
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(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘review each 
report’’ and inserting ‘‘periodically review reports 
submitted’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘not later’’ 
and all that follows through ‘‘submitted,’’. 
SEC. 1654. PROHIBITION ON REDUCTION OF THE INTER-
CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
(a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsection 
(b), none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
Act for fiscal year 2021 for the Department of Defense may 
be obligated or expended for the following, and the Depart-
ment may not otherwise take any action to do the following: 
(1) Reduce, or prepare to reduce, the responsive-
ness or alert level of the intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles of the United States. 
(2) Reduce, or prepare to reduce, the quantity of 
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
United States to a number less than 400. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition in subsection (a) 
shall not apply to any of the following activities: 
(1) The maintenance or sustainment of inter-
continental ballistic missiles. 
(2) Ensuring the safety, security, or reliability of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
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SEC. 1655. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON NUCLEAR COOPERA-
TION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
It is the sense of the Senate that— 
(1) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) continues to play an essential role in the na-
tional security of the United States and the inde-
pendent nuclear deterrents of other NATO members, 
such as the United Kingdom, have helped underwrite 
peace and security; 
(2) the nuclear programs of the United States 
and the United Kingdom have enjoyed significant col-
laborative benefits as a result of the cooperative rela-
tionship formalized in the Agreement for Cooperation 
on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense 
Purposes, signed at Washington July 3, 1958, and en-
tered into force August 4, 1958 (9 UST 1028), be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom 
(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Mutual Defense Agree-
ment’’); 
(3) the unique partnership between the United 
States and the United Kingdom has enhanced sov-
ereign military and scientific capabilities, strength-
ened bilateral ties, and shared costs, particularly on 
such programs as the Trident II D–5 weapons system
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and the common missile compartment for the future 
Dreadnought and Columbia classes of submarines; 
(4) additionally, the extension of the nuclear de-
terrence commitments of the United Kingdom to 
members of the NATO alliance strengthens collective 
security while reducing the burden placed on United 
States nuclear forces to deter potential adversaries 
and assure allies of the United States and the United 
Kingdom; 
(5) as the international security environment de-
teriorates and potential adversaries expand and en-
hance their nuclear forces, the extended deterrence 
commitments of the United Kingdom play an increas-
ingly important role in supporting the security inter-
ests of the United States and allies of the United 
States and the United Kingdom; 
(6) it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to support the United Kingdom with 
respect to the decision of the Government of the 
United Kingdom to maintain its nuclear deterrent 
until global security conditions warrant its elimi-
nation; 
(7) as the United States must modernize its 
aging nuclear forces to ensure its ability to continue 
to field a nuclear deterrent that is safe, secure, and
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effective, the United Kingdom faces a similar chal-
lenge; 
(8) bilateral cooperation on the parallel develop-
ment of the W93/Mk7 warhead of the United States 
and the replacement warhead of the United Kingdom, 
as well as associated components, will allow the 
United States and the United Kingdom to responsibly 
address challenges within their legacy nuclear forces 
in a cost-effective manner that— 
(A) preserves independent, sovereign control; 
(B) is consistent with each country’s obliga-
tions under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, Lon-
don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) 
(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty’’); and 
(C) supports nonproliferation objectives; 
and 
(9) continued cooperation between the nuclear 
programs of United States and the United Kingdom, 
including through the W93/Mk7 program, is essential 
to ensuring that the NATO alliance continues to be 
supported by credible nuclear forces capable of pre-
serving peace, preventing coercion, and deterring ag-
gression.
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Subtitle D—Missile Defense 
Programs 
SEC. 1661. IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM AND ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE 
DEFENSE PROGRAM CO-DEVELOPMENT AND 
CO-PRODUCTION. 
(a) IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE 
SYSTEM.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 
2021 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the 
Missile 
Defense 
Agency, 
not 
more 
than 
$73,000,000 may be provided to the Government of 
Israel to procure components for the Iron Dome short- 
range rocket defense system through co-production of 
such components in the United States by industry of 
the United States. 
(2) CONDITIONS.— 
(A) 
AGREEMENT.—Funds 
described 
in 
paragraph (1) for the Iron Dome short-range 
rocket defense program shall be available subject 
to the terms and conditions in the Agreement Be-
tween the Department of Defense of the United 
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of 
the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome De-
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fense System Procurement, signed on March 5, 
2014, as amended to include co-production for 
Tamir interceptors. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 
days prior to the initial obligation of funds de-
scribed in paragraph (1), the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees— 
(i) a certification that the amended bi-
lateral international agreement specified in 
subparagraph (A) is being implemented as 
provided in such agreement; 
(ii) an assessment detailing any risks 
relating to the implementation of such 
agreement; and 
(iii) for system improvements resulting 
in modified Iron Dome components and 
Tamir interceptor sub-components, a certifi-
cation that the Government of Israel has 
demonstrated successful completion of Pro-
duction Readiness Reviews, including the 
validation 
of 
production 
lines, 
the 
verification of component conformance, and 
the verification of performance to specifica-
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tion as defined in the Iron Dome Defense 
System Procurement Agreement, as further 
amended. 
(b) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, DAVID’S
SLING
WEAPON
SYSTEM
CO-PRODUC-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (3), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2021 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $50,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel to pro-
cure the David’s Sling Weapon System, including for 
co-production of parts and components in the United 
States by United States industry. 
(2) AGREEMENT.—Provision of funds specified 
in paragraph (1) shall be subject to the terms and 
conditions in the bilateral co-production agreement, 
including— 
(A) a one-for-one cash match is made by 
Israel or in another matching amount that oth-
erwise meets best efforts (as mutually agreed to 
by the United States and Israel); and 
(B) co-production of parts, components, and 
all-up rounds (if appropriate) in the United 
States by United States industry for the David’s
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Sling Weapon System is not less than 50 per-
cent. 
(3) 
CERTIFICATION
AND
ASSESSMENT.—The 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Sustainment shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees— 
(A) a certification that the Government of 
Israel has demonstrated the successful completion 
of the knowledge points, technical milestones, and 
production readiness reviews required by the re-
search, development, and technology agreement 
and the bilateral co-production agreement for the 
David’s Sling Weapon System; and 
(B) an assessment detailing any risks relat-
ing to the implementation of such agreement. 
(c) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PRO-
GRAM, ARROW 3 UPPER TIER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM CO- 
PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2021 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available for 
the Missile Defense Agency not more than $77,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel for the 
Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program, including
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for co-production of parts and components in the 
United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a certifi-
cation that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has dem-
onstrated the successful completion of the knowl-
edge points, technical milestones, and production 
readiness reviews required by the research, devel-
opment, and technology agreement for the Arrow 
3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be 
provided on the basis of a one-for-one cash match 
made by Israel or in another matching amount 
that otherwise meets best efforts (as mutually 
agreed to by the United States and Israel); 
(C) the United States has entered into a bi-
lateral international agreement with Israel that 
establishes, with respect to the use of such 
funds— 
(i) in accordance with subparagraph 
(D), the terms of co-production of parts and 
components on the basis of the greatest 
practicable co-production of parts, compo-
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nents, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) 
by United States industry and minimizes 
nonrecurring engineering and facilitization 
expenses to the costs needed for co-produc-
tion; 
(ii) complete transparency on the re-
quirement of Israel for the number of inter-
ceptors and batteries that will be procured, 
including with respect to the procurement 
plans, acquisition strategy, and funding 
profiles of Israel; 
(iii) technical milestones for co-produc-
tion of parts and components and procure-
ment; 
(iv) a joint affordability working 
group to consider cost reduction initiatives; 
and 
(v) joint approval processes for third- 
party sales; and 
(D) the level of co-production described in 
subparagraph (C)(i) for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program is not less than 50 percent. 
(d) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) and paragraph (2) of subsection (c), the Under 
Secretary may submit—
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(1) one certification covering both the David’s 
Sling Weapon System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier 
Interceptor Program; or 
(2) separate certifications for each respective sys-
tem. 
(e) TIMING.—The Under Secretary shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees the certification and as-
sessment under subsection (b)(3) and the certification under 
subsection (c)(2) no later than 30 days before the funds 
specified in paragraph (1) of subsections (b) and (c) for 
the respective system covered by the certification are pro-
vided to the Government of Israel. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees’’ means the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees. 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1662. ACCELERATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF 
HYPERSONIC 
AND 
BALLISTIC 
TRACKING 
SPACE SENSOR PAYLOAD. 
(a) PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
FOR DEVELOPMENT 
AND DEPLOYMENT OF HYPERSONIC AND BALLISTIC TRACK-
ING SPACE SENSOR PAYLOAD.—
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
shall— 
(A) assign the Director of the Missile De-
fense Agency with the principal responsibility 
for the development and deployment of a 
hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor 
payload through the end of fiscal year 2022; and 
(B) submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees certification of such assignment. 
(2) TRANSITION.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees— 
(A) a determination regarding whether re-
sponsibility for a hypersonic and ballistic track-
ing space sensor payload should be transitioned 
to the United States Space Force at the end of 
fiscal year 2022 or later; and 
(B) if the Secretary so determines, a plan 
for transition of primary responsibility that 
minimizes disruption to the program and pro-
vides for sufficient funding as described in sub-
section (b)(1).
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(b) 
CERTIFICATION
REGARDING
FUNDING
OF 
HYPERSONIC AND BALLISTIC TRACKING SPACE SENSOR 
PROGRAM.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—At the same time that the 
President submits to Congress pursuant to section 
1105 of title 31, United States Code, the annual budg-
et request of the President for fiscal year 2022, the 
Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and the Di-
rector for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 
shall jointly submit to the congressional defense com-
mittees a certification as to whether the hypersonic 
and ballistic tracking space sensor program is suffi-
ciently funded in the future-years defense program. 
(2) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 
2021 under the Operations and Maintenance, De-
fense-Wide, account for the Office of Secretary of De-
fense travel of persons assigned to the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engi-
neering, not more than 50 percent of such funds may 
be obligated or expended until the certification re-
quired by paragraph (1) is submitted under such 
paragraph.
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(c) DEPLOYMENT DEADLINE.—Section 1683(a) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 
(Public Law 115–91; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—’’ and insert-
ing the following: 
‘‘(a) DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND DEPLOYMENT.— 
‘‘(1) DEVELOPMENT.—’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new para-
graphs: 
‘‘(2) TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT.—The Director 
shall begin on-orbit testing of a hypersonic and bal-
listic tracking space sensor no later than December 
31, 2022, with full operational deployment as soon as 
technically feasible thereafter. 
‘‘(3) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Defense may 
waive the deadline for testing specified in paragraph 
(2) if the Secretary submits to the congressional de-
fense committees a report containing— 
‘‘(A) the explanation why the Secretary 
cannot meet such deadline; 
‘‘(B) the technical risks and estimated cost 
of accelerating the program to attempt to meet 
such deadline;
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‘‘(C) an assessment of threat systems that 
could not be detected or tracked persistently due 
to waiving such deadline; and 
‘‘(D) a plan, including a timeline, for be-
ginning the required testing.’’. 
(d) ASSESSMENT AND REPORT.—Not later than 120 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chair 
of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council established 
under section 181 of title 10, United States Code, shall— 
(1) complete an assessment on whether all efforts 
being made by the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air Force, 
and the Space Development Agency relating to space- 
based sensing and tracking capabilities for missile de-
fense are aligned with the requirements of United 
States Strategic Command, United States Northern 
Command, United States European Command, and 
United States Indo-Pacific Command for missile 
tracking and missile warning that have been vali-
dated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; 
and 
(2) submit to the congressional defense commit-
tees a report on the findings of the Chair with respect 
to the assessment conducted under paragraph (1).
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SEC. 1663. EXTENSION OF PROHIBITION RELATING TO MIS-
SILE DEFENSE INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS. 
Section 130h(e) of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ‘‘January 1, 2021’’ and inserting 
‘‘January 1, 2026’’. 
SEC. 1664. REPORT ON AND LIMITATION ON EXPENDITURE 
OF FUNDS FOR LAYERED HOMELAND MISSILE 
DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 2021, 
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall sub-
mit to the congressional defense committees a report 
on the proposal for a layered homeland missile de-
fense system included in the budget justification mate-
rials submitted to Congress in support of the budget 
for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2021 (as 
submitted with the budget of the President for such 
year under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States 
Code). 
(2) ELEMENTS REQUIRED.—The report required 
by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A description of the approved require-
ments for a layered homeland missile defense 
system, based on an assessment by the intel-
ligence community of threats to be addressed at 
the time of deployment of such a system.
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(B) An assessment of how such requirements 
addressed by a layered homeland missile defense 
system relate to those addressed by the existing 
ground-based midcourse defense system, includ-
ing deployed ground-based interceptors and 
planned upgrades to such ground-based intercep-
tors. 
(C) An analysis of interceptor solutions to 
meet such requirements, to include land-based 
Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block IIA inter-
ceptor systems and the Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense (THAAD) system, with the number 
of locations required for deployment and the pro-
duction numbers of interceptors and related sen-
sors. 
(D) A site-specific fielding plan that in-
cludes possible locations, the number and type of 
interceptors and radars in each location, and 
any associated environmental or permitting con-
siderations, including an assessment of the loca-
tions evaluated pursuant to section 227(b) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2013 (126 Stat. 1679; Public Law 112– 
239) for inclusion in the layered homeland mis-
sile defense system.
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(E) Relevant policy considerations for de-
ployment of such systems for defense against 
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the conti-
nental United States. 
(F) A cost estimate and schedule for options 
involving a land-based Standard Missile 3 Block 
IIA interceptor system and the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense system, including required 
environmental assessments. 
(G) A feasibility assessment of the necessary 
modifications to the Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense system to address such require-
ments. 
(H) An assessment of the industrial base ca-
pacity to support additional production of either 
a land-based Standard Missile 3 Block IIA inter-
ceptor system or the Terminal High Altitude 
Area Defense system. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—In preparing the report re-
quired by paragraph (1), the Director shall consult 
with the following: 
(A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Pol-
icy. 
(B) The Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
quisition and Sustainment.
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SEC. 1665. EXTENSION OF REQUIREMENT FOR COMP-
TROLLER GENERAL REVIEW AND ASSESS-
MENT OF MISSILE DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
PROGRAMS. 
Section 232(a) of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112–81) is amend-
ed— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘through 
2020’’ and inserting ‘‘through 2025’’; 
(2) in paragraph (2)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘through 2021’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘through 2026’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘year. Each’’ and all that 
follows through ‘‘appropriate.’’ and insert the fol-
lowing: ‘‘, which shall include such findings and 
recommendations as the Comptroller General 
considers appropriate.’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(3) REVIEW
OF
EMERGING
ISSUES.—In car-
rying out this subsection, as the Comptroller General 
determines is warranted, the Comptroller General 
shall review emerging issues and, in consultation with 
the congressional defense committees, brief such com-
mittees or submit to such committees a report on the
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† HR 6395 EAS 
findings of the Comptroller General with respect to 
such review.’’. 
SEC. 1666. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTING 
STRUCTURE OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY. 
Section 205 of title 10, United States Code, is amended 
to read as follows: 
‘‘§ 205. Missile Defense Agency 
‘‘The Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall be 
appointed for a six-year term.’’. 
SEC. 1667. GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE INTERIM 
CAPABILITY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that— 
(1) the nuclear and ballistic missile threats from 
rogue nations are increasing; and 
(2) the Department of Defense should fully assess 
development of an interim ground-based missile de-
fense capability while also pursuing the development 
of a next generation interceptor capability. 
(b) INTERIM GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR.— 
(1) DEVELOPMENT.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense, acting through the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency and in coordination with the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
Sustainment, the Commander of the United States 
Northern Command, and the Commander of the 
United States Strategic Command, shall commence 
carrying out a program to develop an interim 
ground-based interceptor capability that will— 
(A) use sound acquisition practices; 
(B) address the majority of current and 
near- to mid-term projected ballistic missile 
threats to the United States homeland from 
rogue nations; 
(C) at minimum, meet the proposed capa-
bilities of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program; 
(D) leverage existing kill vehicle and booster 
technology; and 
(E) appropriately balance interceptor per-
formance with schedule of delivery. 
(2) DEPLOYMENT.—The Secretary of Defense, 
acting through the Director of the Missile Defense 
Agency and in coordination with the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Com-
mander of the United States Northern Command, and 
the Commander of the United States Strategic Com-
mand, shall— 
(A) conduct rigorous flight testing of the in-
terim ground-based interceptor; and
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) deliver 20 new ground-based intercep-
tors by 2026. 
(3) WAIVER AUTHORITY.—(A) The Secretary of 
Defense may waive the requirements under para-
graphs (1) and (2) if the Secretary certifies to the 
congressional defense committees that— 
(i) the technology development is not tech-
nically feasible; 
(ii) the interim capability development is 
not in the national security interest of the 
United States; or 
(iii) the next generation interceptor for the 
ground-based midcourse defense system can de-
liver capability before the program otherwise re-
quired by this subsection. 
(B) If the Secretary chooses to waive the require-
ments under paragraphs (1) and (2), the Secretary 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees 
along with the certification required by subparagraph 
(A) of this paragraph— 
(i) an explanation of the rationale for the 
decision; 
(ii) an estimate of projected rogue nation 
threats to the United States homeland that will 
not be defended against until the fielding of the
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† HR 6395 EAS 
next generation interceptor for the ground-based 
midcourse defense system; and 
(iii) an updated schedule for development 
and deployment of the next generation inter-
ceptor. 
(C) The Secretary may not delegate the certifi-
cation described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) unless 
the Secretary is recused, in which case the Secretary 
may delegate such certification to the Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense. 
(c) CAPABILITIES AND CRITERIA.—The Director shall 
ensure that the interim ground-based interceptor developed 
under subsection (c)(1) meets, at a minimum, the following 
capabilities and criteria: 
(1) Vehicle-to-vehicle communications, as appli-
cable. 
(2) Vehicle-to-ground communications. 
(3) Kill assessment capability. 
(4) The ability to counter advanced counter 
measures, decoys, and penetration aids. 
(5) Producibility and manufacturability. 
(6) Use of technology involving high technology 
readiness levels. 
(7) Options to integrate the new kill vehicle onto 
other missile defense interceptor vehicles other than
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† HR 6395 EAS 
the ground-based interceptors of the ground-based 
midcourse defense system. 
(8) Sound acquisition processes. 
(d) REPORT
ON FUNDING PROFILE.—The Director 
shall include with the budget justification materials sub-
mitted to Congress in support of the budget of the Depart-
ment of Defense for fiscal year 2022 (as submitted with the 
budget of the President under section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code) a report on the funding profile nec-
essary for the interim ground-based interceptor program to 
meet the objectives under subsection (c). 
TITLE XVII—HONG KONG 
AUTONOMY ACT 
SEC. 1701. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Hong Kong Autonomy 
Act’’. 
SEC. 1702. DEFINITIONS. 
In this title: 
(1) ALIEN; NATIONAL; NATIONAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES.—The terms ‘‘alien’’, ‘‘national’’, and ‘‘na-
tional of the United States’’ have the meanings given 
those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
AND LEADERSHIP.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres-
sional committees and leadership’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, 
the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
majority leader and the minority leader of the 
Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Financial Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Homeland 
Security, the Committee on the Judiciary, the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and 
the Speaker and the minority leader of the House 
of Representatives. 
(3) BASIC LAW.—The term ‘‘Basic Law’’ means 
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region of the People’s Republic of China. 
(4) CHINA.—The term ‘‘China’’ means the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
(5) ENTITY.—The term ‘‘entity’’ means a part-
nership, joint venture, association, corporation, orga-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
nization, network, group, or subgroup, or any other 
form of business collaboration. 
(6) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term ‘‘finan-
cial institution’’ means a financial institution speci-
fied in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States 
Code. 
(7) HONG
KONG.—The term ‘‘Hong Kong’’ 
means the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
(8) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint Dec-
laration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 
done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. 
(9) KNOWINGLY.—The term ‘‘knowingly’’, with 
respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means 
that a person has actual knowledge of the conduct, the 
circumstance, or the result. 
(10) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an in-
dividual or entity. 
(11) 
UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The 
term 
‘‘United States person’’ means— 
(A) any citizen or national of the United 
States;
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) any alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence in the United States; 
(C) any entity organized under the laws of 
the United States or any jurisdiction within the 
United States (including a foreign branch of 
such an entity); or 
(D) any person located in the United 
States. 
SEC. 1703. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law 
clarify certain obligations and promises that the Gov-
ernment of China has made with respect to the future 
of Hong Kong. 
(2) The obligations of the Government of China 
under the Joint Declaration were codified in a le-
gally-binding treaty, signed by the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land and registered with the United Nations. 
(3) The obligations of the Government of China 
under the Basic Law originate from the Joint Dec-
laration, were passed into the domestic law of China 
by the National People’s Congress, and are widely 
considered by citizens of Hong Kong as part of the de 
facto legal constitution of Hong Kong.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(4) Foremost among the obligations of the Gov-
ernment of China to Hong Kong is the promise that, 
pursuant to Paragraph 3b of the Joint Declaration, 
‘‘the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will 
enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign 
and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of 
the Central People’s Government’’. 
(5) The obligation specified in Paragraph 3b of 
the Joint Declaration is referenced, reinforced, and 
extrapolated on in several portions of the Basic Law, 
including Articles 2, 12, 13, 14, and 22. 
(6) Article 22 of the Basic Law establishes that 
‘‘No department of the Central People’s Government 
and no province, autonomous region, or municipality 
directly under the Central Government may interfere 
in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region administers on its own in accordance 
with this Law.’’. 
(7) The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law 
make clear that additional obligations shall be under-
taken by China to ensure the ‘‘high degree of auton-
omy’’ of Hong Kong. 
(8) Paragraph 3c of the Joint Declaration states, 
as reinforced by Articles 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 22 of 
the Basic Law, that Hong Kong ‘‘will be vested with
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† HR 6395 EAS 
executive, legislative and independent judicial power, 
including that of final adjudication’’. 
(9) On multiple occasions, the Government of 
China has undertaken actions that have contravened 
the letter or intent of the obligation described in para-
graph (8) of this section, including the following: 
(A) In 1999, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress overruled a decision 
by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal on the 
right of abode. 
(B) On multiple occasions, the Government 
of Hong Kong, at the advice of the Government 
of China, is suspected to have not allowed per-
sons entry into Hong Kong allegedly because of 
their support for democracy and human rights 
in Hong Kong and China. 
(C) The Liaison Office of China in Hong 
Kong has, despite restrictions on interference in 
the affairs of Hong Kong as detailed in Article 
22 of the Basic Law— 
(i) openly expressed support for can-
didates in Hong Kong for Chief Executive 
and Legislative Council; 
(ii) expressed views on various policies 
for the Government of Hong Kong and other
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† HR 6395 EAS 
internal matters relating to Hong Kong; 
and 
(iii) on April 17, 2020, asserted that 
both the Liaison Office of China in Hong 
Kong and the Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office of the State Council ‘‘have the 
right to exercise supervision . . . on affairs 
regarding Hong Kong and the mainland, in 
order to ensure correct implementation of 
the Basic Law’’. 
(D) The National People’s Congress has 
passed laws requiring Hong Kong to pass laws 
banning disrespectful treatment of the national 
flag and national anthem of China. 
(E) The State Council of China released a 
white paper on June 10, 2014, that stressed the 
‘‘comprehensive jurisdiction’’ of the Government 
of China over Hong Kong and indicated that 
Hong Kong must be governed by ‘‘patriots’’. 
(F) The Government of China has directed 
operatives to kidnap and bring to the mainland, 
or is otherwise responsible for the kidnapping of, 
residents of Hong Kong, including businessman 
Xiao Jianhua and bookseller Gui Minhai.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(G) The Government of Hong Kong, acting 
with the support of the Government of China, in-
troduced an extradition bill that would have per-
mitted the Government of China to request and 
enforce extradition requests for any individual 
present in Hong Kong, regardless of the legality 
of the request or the degree to which it com-
promised the judicial independence of Hong 
Kong. 
(H) The spokesman for the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People’s Congress said, 
‘‘Whether Hong Kong’s laws are consistent with 
the Basic Law can only be judged and decided 
by the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee. No other authority has the right to 
make judgments and decisions.’’. 
(10) Paragraph 3e of the Joint Declaration 
states, as reinforced by Article 5 of the Basic Law, 
that the ‘‘current social and economic systems in 
Hong Kong will remain unchanged, as so will the 
life-style.’’. 
(11) On multiple occasions, the Government of 
China has undertaken actions that have contravened 
the letter or intent of the obligation described in para-
graph (10) of this section, including the following:
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(A) In 2002, the Government of China pres-
sured the Government of Hong Kong to introduce 
‘‘patriotic’’ curriculum in primary and sec-
ondary schools. 
(B) The governments of China and Hong 
Kong proposed the prohibition of discussion of 
Hong Kong independence and self-determination 
in primary and secondary schools, which in-
fringes on freedom of speech. 
(C) The Government of Hong Kong man-
dated that Mandarin, and not the native lan-
guage of Cantonese, be the language of instruc-
tion in Hong Kong schools. 
(D) The governments of China and Hong 
Kong agreed to a daily quota of mainland immi-
grants to Hong Kong, which is widely believed 
by citizens of Hong Kong to be part of an effort 
to ‘‘mainlandize’’ Hong Kong. 
(12) Paragraph 3e of the Joint Declaration 
states, as reinforced by Articles 4, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
31, 32 33, 34, and 39 of the Basic Law, that the 
‘‘rights and freedoms, including those of person, of 
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of 
travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of
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† HR 6395 EAS 
choice of occupation, of academic research and of reli-
gious belief will be ensured by law’’ in Hong Kong. 
(13) On multiple occasions, the Government of 
China has undertaken actions that have contravened 
the letter or intent of the obligation described in para-
graph (12) of this section, including the following: 
(A) On February 26, 2003, the Government 
of Hong Kong introduced a national security bill 
that would have placed restrictions on freedom of 
speech and other protected rights. 
(B) The Liaison Office of China in Hong 
Kong has pressured businesses in Hong Kong not 
to advertise in newspapers and magazines crit-
ical of the governments of China and Hong 
Kong. 
(C) The Hong Kong Police Force selectively 
blocked demonstrations and protests expressing 
opposition to the governments of China and 
Hong Kong or the policies of those governments. 
(D) The Government of Hong Kong refused 
to renew work visa for a foreign journalist, alleg-
edly for hosting a speaker from the banned Hong 
Kong National Party. 
(E) The Justice Department of Hong Kong 
selectively prosecuted cases against leaders of the
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† HR 6395 EAS 
Umbrella Movement, while failing to prosecute 
police officers accused of using excessive force 
during the protests in 2014. 
(F) On April 18, 2020, the Hong Kong Po-
lice Force arrested 14 high-profile democracy ac-
tivists and campaigners for their role in orga-
nizing a protest march that took place on August 
18, 2019, in which almost 2,000,000 people ral-
lied against a proposed extradition bill. 
(14) Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law assert 
that the selection of Chief Executive and all members 
of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong should be by 
‘‘universal suffrage.’’. 
(15) On multiple occasions, the Government of 
China has undertaken actions that have contravened 
the letter or intent of the obligation described in para-
graph (14) of this section, including the following: 
(A) In 2004, the National People’s Congress 
created new, antidemocratic procedures restrict-
ing the adoption of universal suffrage for the 
election of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong. 
(B) The decision by the National People’s 
Congress on December 29, 2007, which ruled out 
universal suffrage in 2012 elections and set re-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
strictions on when and if universal suffrage will 
be implemented. 
(C) The decision by the National People’s 
Congress on August 31, 2014, which placed lim-
its on the nomination process for the Chief Exec-
utive of Hong Kong as a condition for adoption 
of universal suffrage. 
(D) On November 7, 2016, the National 
People’s Congress interpreted Article 104 of the 
Basic Law in such a way to disqualify 6 elected 
members of the Legislative Council. 
(E) In 2018, the Government of Hong Kong 
banned the Hong Kong National Party and 
blocked the candidacy of pro-democracy can-
didates. 
(16) The ways in which the Government of 
China, at times with the support of a subservient 
Government of Hong Kong, has acted in contraven-
tion of its obligations under the Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law, as set forth in this section, are 
deeply concerning to the people of Hong Kong, the 
United States, and members of the international com-
munity who support the autonomy of Hong Kong. 
SEC. 1704. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING HONG KONG. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
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† HR 6395 EAS 
(1) the United States continues to uphold the 
principles and policy established in the United 
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 
5701 et seq.) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76; 22 
U.S.C. 5701 note), which remain consistent with Chi-
na’s obligations under the Joint Declaration and cer-
tain promulgated objectives under the Basic Law, in-
cluding that— 
(A) as set forth in section 101(1) of the 
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 
U.S.C. 5711(1)), ‘‘The United States should play 
an active role, before, on, and after July 1, 1997, 
in maintaining Hong Kong’s confidence and 
prosperity, Hong Kong’s role as an international 
financial center, and the mutually beneficial ties 
between the people of the United States and the 
people of Hong Kong.’’; and 
(B) as set forth in section 2(5) of the United 
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 
5701(5)), ‘‘Support for democratization is a fun-
damental principle of United States foreign pol-
icy. As such, it naturally applies to United 
States policy toward Hong Kong. This will re-
main equally true after June 30, 1997.’’;
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† HR 6395 EAS 
certain economic penalties on entities, so as to permit 
a clear path for the removal of economic penalties if 
the sanctioned behavior is reversed and verified by the 
Secretary of State; 
(5) relevant Federal agencies should establish a 
multilateral sanctions regime with respect to foreign 
persons involved in the contravention of the obliga-
tions of China under the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law; and 
(6) in addition to the penalties on foreign per-
sons, and financial institutions transacting with 
those foreign persons, for the contravention of the obli-
gations of China under the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law, the United States should take steps, in a 
time of crisis, to assist permanent residents of Hong 
Kong who are persecuted or fear persecution as a re-
sult of the contravention by China of its obligations 
under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law to be-
come eligible to obtain lawful entry into the United 
States.
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† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1705. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN-
VOLVED IN THE EROSION OF THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF CHINA UNDER THE JOINT DEC-
LARATION OR THE BASIC LAW AND FOREIGN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCT 
SIGNIFICANT TRANSACTIONS WITH THOSE 
PERSONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, if the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, deter-
mines that a foreign person is materially contributing to, 
has materially contributed to, or attempts to materially 
contribute to the failure of the Government of China to meet 
its obligations under the Joint Declaration or the Basic 
Law, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees and leadership a report that in-
cludes— 
(1) an identification of the foreign person; and 
(2) a clear explanation for why the foreign per-
son was identified and a description of the activity 
that resulted in the identification. 
(b) IDENTIFYING
FOREIGN
FINANCIAL
INSTITU-
TIONS.—Not earlier than 30 days and not later than 60 
days after the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees and leadership the report under 
subsection (a), the Secretary of the Treasury, in consulta-
1148 
† HR 6395 EAS 
tion with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees and leadership a report 
that identifies any foreign financial institution that know-
ingly conducts a significant transaction with a foreign per-
son identified in the report under subsection (a). 
(c) EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.— 
(1) INTELLIGENCE.—The Secretary of State shall 
not disclose the identity of a person in a report sub-
mitted under subsection (a) or (b), or an update 
under subsection (e), if the Director of National Intel-
ligence determines that such disclosure could com-
promise an intelligence operation, activity, source, or 
method of the United States. 
(2) LAW ENFORCEMENT.—The Secretary of State 
shall not disclose the identity of a person in a report 
submitted under subsection (a) or (b), or an update 
under subsection (e), if the Attorney General, in co-
ordination, as appropriate, with the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the head of any 
other appropriate Federal law enforcement agency, 
and the Secretary of the Treasury, determines that 
such disclosure could reasonably be expected— 
(A) to compromise the identity of a con-
fidential source, including a State, local, or for-
eign agency or authority or any private institu-
1149 
† HR 6395 EAS 
tion that furnished information on a confidential 
basis; 
(B) to jeopardize the integrity or success of 
an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecu-
tion; 
(C) to endanger the life or physical safety 
of any person; or 
(D) to cause substantial harm to physical 
property. 
(3) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—If the Director of 
National Intelligence makes a determination under 
paragraph (1) or the Attorney General makes a deter-
mination under paragraph (2), the Director or the 
Attorney General, as the case may be, shall notify the 
appropriate congressional committees and leadership 
of the determination and the reasons for the deter-
mination. 
(d) EXCLUSION OR REMOVAL OF FOREIGN PERSONS 
AND FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 
(1) FOREIGN PERSONS.—The President may ex-
clude a foreign person from the report under sub-
section (a), or an update under subsection (e), or re-
move a foreign person from the report or update prior 
to the imposition of sanctions under section 1706(a) 
if the material contribution (as described in sub-
1150 
† HR 6395 EAS 
section (g)) that merited inclusion in that report or 
update— 
(A) does not have a significant and lasting 
negative effect that contravenes the obligations of 
China under the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law; 
(B) is not likely to be repeated in the fu-
ture; and 
(C) has been reversed or otherwise mitigated 
through positive countermeasures taken by that 
foreign person. 
(2) FOREIGN
FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS.—The 
President may exclude a foreign financial institution 
from the report under subsection (b), or an update 
under subsection (e), or remove a foreign financial in-
stitution from the report or update prior to the impo-
sition of sanctions under section 1707(a) if the sig-
nificant transaction or significant transactions of the 
foreign financial institution that merited inclusion in 
that report or update— 
(A) does not have a significant and lasting 
negative effect that contravenes the obligations of 
China under the Joint Declaration and the 
Basic Law;
1151 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) is not likely to be repeated in the fu-
ture; and 
(C) has been reversed or otherwise mitigated 
through positive countermeasures taken by that 
foreign financial institution. 
(3) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—If the President 
makes a determination under paragraph (1) or (2) to 
exclude or remove a foreign person or foreign finan-
cial institution from a report under subsection (a) or 
(b), as the case may be, the President shall notify the 
appropriate congressional committees and leadership 
of the determination and the reasons for the deter-
mination. 
(e) UPDATE OF REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted under 
subsections (a) and (b) shall be updated in an ongo-
ing manner and, to the extent practicable, updated 
reports shall be resubmitted with the annual report 
under section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong 
Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731). 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to terminate the require-
ment to update the reports under subsections (a) and 
(b) upon the termination of the requirement to submit 
the annual report under section 301 of the United
1152 
† HR 6395 EAS 
States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 
5731). 
(f) FORM OF REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each report under subsection 
(a) or (b) (including updates under subsection (e)) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and made 
available to the public. 
(2) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The explanations and 
descriptions included in the report under subsection 
(a)(2) (including updates under subsection (e)) may 
be expanded on in a classified annex. 
(g) MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS RELATED TO OBLIGA-
TIONS OF CHINA DESCRIBED.—For purposes of this section, 
a foreign person materially contributes to the failure of the 
Government of China to meet its obligations under the Joint 
Declaration or the Basic Law if the person— 
(1) took action that resulted in the inability of 
the people of Hong Kong— 
(A) to enjoy freedom of assembly, speech, 
press, or independent rule of law; or 
(B) to participate in democratic outcomes; 
or 
(2) otherwise took action that reduces the high 
degree of autonomy of Hong Kong.
1153 
† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1706. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PER-
SONS THAT CONTRAVENE THE OBLIGATIONS 
OF CHINA UNDER THE JOINT DECLARATION 
OR THE BASIC LAW. 
(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—On and after the date on 
which a foreign person is included in the report 
under section 1705(a) or an update to that report 
under section 1705(e), the President may impose 
sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to 
that foreign person. 
(2) MANDATORY SANCTIONS.—Not later than one 
year after the date on which a foreign person is in-
cluded in the report under section 1705(a) or an up-
date to that report under section 1705(e), the Presi-
dent shall impose sanctions described in subsection (b) 
with respect to that foreign person. 
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described 
in this subsection with respect to a foreign person are the 
following: 
(1) PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS.—The President 
may, pursuant to such regulations as the President 
may prescribe, prohibit any person from— 
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, 
transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or ex-
porting any property that is subject to the juris-
1154 
† HR 6395 EAS 
diction of the United States and with respect to 
which the foreign person has any interest; 
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to such property; 
or 
(C) conducting any transaction involving 
such property. 
(2) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND 
REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION.— 
In the case of a foreign person who is an individual, 
the President may direct the Secretary of State to 
deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity to exclude from the United States, the foreign 
person, subject to regulatory exceptions to permit the 
United States to comply with the Agreement regard-
ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at 
Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and 
the United States, or other applicable international 
obligations.
1155 
† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1707. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT CONDUCT SIGNIFI-
CANT TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN PER-
SONS THAT CONTRAVENE THE OBLIGATIONS 
OF CHINA UNDER THE JOINT DECLARATION 
OR THE BASIC LAW. 
(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 
(1) INITIAL SANCTIONS.—Not later than one year 
after the date on which a foreign financial institution 
is included in the report under section 1705(b) or an 
update to that report under section 1705(e), the Presi-
dent shall impose not fewer than 5 of the sanctions 
described in subsection (b) with respect to that foreign 
financial institution. 
(2) EXPANDED SANCTIONS.—Not later than two 
years after the date on which a foreign financial in-
stitution is included in the report under section 
1705(b) or an update to that report under section 
1705(e), the President shall impose each of the sanc-
tions described in subsection (b). 
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions described 
in this subsection with respect to a foreign financial institu-
tion are the following: 
(1) LOANS FROM UNITED STATES FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS.—The United States Government may 
prohibit any United States financial institution from
1156 
† HR 6395 EAS 
making loans or providing credits to the foreign fi-
nancial institution. 
(2) PROHIBITION ON DESIGNATION AS PRIMARY 
DEALER.—Neither the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York may designate, or permit the continuation 
of any prior designation of, the foreign financial in-
stitution as a primary dealer in United States Gov-
ernment debt instruments. 
(3) PROHIBITION ON SERVICE AS A REPOSITORY 
OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS.—The foreign financial insti-
tution may not serve as agent of the United States 
Government or serve as repository for United States 
Government funds. 
(4) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The President may, 
pursuant to such regulations as the President may 
prescribe, prohibit any transactions in foreign ex-
change that are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States and involve the foreign financial insti-
tution. 
(5) BANKING
TRANSACTIONS.—The President 
may, pursuant to such regulations as the President 
may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or 
payments between financial institutions or by, 
through, or to any financial institution, to the extent
1157 
† HR 6395 EAS 
that such transfers or payments are subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States and involve the foreign 
financial institution. 
(6) PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS.—The President 
may, pursuant to such regulations as the President 
may prescribe, prohibit any person from— 
(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, 
transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or ex-
porting any property that is subject to the juris-
diction of the United States and with respect to 
which the foreign financial institution has any 
interest; 
(B) dealing in or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to such property; 
or 
(C) conducting any transaction involving 
such property. 
(7) RESTRICTION ON EXPORTS, REEXPORTS, AND 
TRANSFERS.—The President, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Commerce, may restrict or prohibit ex-
ports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of com-
modities, software, and technology subject to the juris-
diction of the United States directly or indirectly to 
the foreign financial institution.
1158 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(8) BAN ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT.— 
The President may, pursuant to such regulations or 
guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit 
any United States person from investing in or pur-
chasing significant amounts of equity or debt instru-
ments of the foreign financial institution. 
(9) EXCLUSION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS.—The 
President may direct the Secretary of State, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, to exclude from the 
United States any alien that is determined to be a 
corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with 
a controlling interest in, the foreign financial institu-
tion, subject to regulatory exceptions to permit the 
United States to comply with the Agreement regard-
ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at 
Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 
November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and 
the United States, or other applicable international 
obligations. 
(10) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFI-
CERS.—The President may impose on the principal 
executive officer or officers of the foreign financial in-
stitution, or on individuals performing similar func-
tions and with similar authorities as such officer or
1159 
† HR 6395 EAS 
officers, any of the sanctions described in paragraphs 
(1) through (8) that are applicable. 
(c) TIMING OF SANCTIONS.—The President may im-
pose sanctions required under subsection (a) with respect 
to a financial institution included in the report under sec-
tion 1705(b) or an update to that report under section 
1705(e) beginning on the day on which the financial insti-
tution is included in that report or update. 
SEC. 1708. WAIVER, TERMINATION, EXCEPTIONS, AND CON-
GRESSIONAL REVIEW PROCESS. 
(a) NATIONAL SECURITY WAIVER.—Unless a dis-
approval resolution is enacted under subsection (d), the 
President may waive the application of sanctions under sec-
tion 1706 or 1707 with respect to a foreign person or foreign 
financial institution if the President— 
(1) determines that the waiver is in the national 
security interest of the United States; and 
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional 
committees and leadership a report on the determina-
tion and the reasons for the determination. 
(b) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AND REMOVAL FROM 
REPORT.—Unless a disapproval resolution is enacted under 
subsection (d), the President may terminate the application 
of sanctions under section 1706 or 1707 with respect to a 
foreign person or foreign financial institution and remove
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† HR 6395 EAS 
the foreign person from the report required under section 
1705(a) or the foreign financial institution from the report 
required under section 1705(b), as the case may be, if the 
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
the Treasury, determines that the actions taken by the for-
eign person or foreign financial institution that led to the 
imposition of sanctions— 
(1) do not have a significant and lasting nega-
tive effect that contravenes the obligations of China 
under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law; 
(2) are not likely to be repeated in the future; 
and 
(3) have been reversed or otherwise mitigated 
through positive countermeasures taken by that for-
eign person or foreign financial institution. 
(c) TERMINATION OF ACT.— 
(1) REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than July 1, 
2046, the President, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
and the heads of such other Federal agencies as 
the President considers appropriate, shall submit 
to Congress a report evaluating the implementa-
tion of this title and sanctions imposed pursuant 
to this title.
1161 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) ELEMENTS.—The President shall in-
clude in the report submitted under subpara-
graph (A) an assessment of whether this title and 
the sanctions imposed pursuant to this title 
should be terminated. 
(2) TERMINATION.—This title and the sanctions 
imposed pursuant to this title shall remain in effect 
unless a termination resolution is enacted under sub-
section (e) after July 1, 2047. 
(d) CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.— 
(1) RESOLUTIONS.— 
(A) DISAPPROVAL
RESOLUTION.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘disapproval resolution’’ means 
only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
gress— 
(i) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A 
joint resolution disapproving the waiver or 
termination of sanctions with respect to a 
foreign person that contravenes the obliga-
tions of China with respect to Hong Kong 
or a foreign financial institution that con-
ducts a significant transaction with that 
person.’’; and 
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
clause of which is the following: ‘‘Congress
1162 
† HR 6395 EAS 
disapproves of the action under section 1708 
of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act relating to 
the application of sanctions imposed with 
respect to a foreign person that contravenes 
the obligations of China with respect to 
Hong Kong, or a foreign financial institu-
tion that conducts a significant transaction 
with that person, on lllllll re-
lating to llllllll.’’, with the 
first blank space being filled with the ap-
propriate date and the second blank space 
being filled with a short description of the 
proposed action. 
(B) TERMINATION
RESOLUTION.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘termination resolution’’ means 
only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
gress— 
(i) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A 
joint resolution terminating sanctions with 
respect to foreign persons that contravene 
the obligations of China with respect to 
Hong Kong and foreign financial institu-
tions that conduct significant transactions 
with those persons.’’; and
1163 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
clause of which is the following: ‘‘The Hong 
Kong Autonomy Act and any sanctions im-
posed pursuant to that Act shall terminate 
on llll.’’, with the blank space being 
filled with the termination date. 
(C) COVERED
RESOLUTION.—In this sub-
section, the term ‘‘covered resolution’’ means a 
disapproval resolution or a termination resolu-
tion. 
(2) INTRODUCTION.—A covered resolution may 
be introduced— 
(A) in the House of Representatives, by the 
majority leader or the minority leader; and 
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader 
(or the majority leader’s designee) or the minor-
ity leader (or the minority leader’s designee). 
(3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of Rep-
resentatives to which a covered resolution has been re-
ferred has not reported the resolution within 10 cal-
endar days after the date of referral, that committee 
shall be discharged from further consideration of the 
resolution. 
(4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.—
1164 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.— 
(i) DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTION.—A dis-
approval resolution introduced in the Sen-
ate shall be— 
(I) referred to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
if the resolution relates to an action 
that is not intended to significantly 
alter United States foreign policy with 
regard to China; and 
(II) referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations if the resolution re-
lates to an action that is intended to 
significantly alter United States for-
eign policy with regard to China. 
(ii) 
TERMINATION
RESOLUTION.—A 
termination resolution introduced in the 
Senate shall be referred to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and 
the Committee on Foreign Relations. 
(B) REPORTING
AND
DISCHARGE.—If a 
committee to which a covered resolution was re-
ferred has not reported the resolution within 10 
calendar days after the date of referral of the res-
olution, that committee shall be discharged from
1165 
† HR 6395 EAS 
further consideration of the resolution and the 
resolution shall be placed on the appropriate cal-
endar. 
(C) PROCEEDING TO CONSIDERATION.—Not-
withstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules 
of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations, as 
the case may be, reports a covered resolution to 
the Senate or has been discharged from consider-
ation of such a resolution (even though a pre-
vious motion to the same effect has been dis-
agreed to) to move to proceed to the consider-
ation of the resolution, and all points of order 
against the resolution (and against consideration 
of the resolution) are waived. The motion to pro-
ceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject 
to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider 
the vote by which the motion is agreed to or dis-
agreed to shall not be in order. 
(D) RULINGS
OF
THE
CHAIR
ON
PROCE-
DURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair 
relating to the application of the rules of the 
Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure re-
1166 
† HR 6395 EAS 
lating to a covered resolution shall be decided 
without debate. 
(E) CONSIDERATION OF VETO MESSAGES.— 
Debate in the Senate of any veto message with 
respect to a covered resolution, including all de-
batable motions and appeals in connection with 
the resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be 
equally divided between, and controlled by, the 
majority leader and the minority leader or their 
designees. 
(5) RULES RELATING TO SENATE AND HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES.— 
(A) TREATMENT OF SENATE RESOLUTION IN 
HOUSE.—In the House of Representatives, the 
following procedures shall apply to a covered res-
olution received from the Senate (unless the 
House has already passed a resolution relating 
to the same proposed action): 
(i) The resolution shall be referred to 
the appropriate committees. 
(ii) If a committee to which a resolu-
tion has been referred has not reported the 
resolution within 2 calendar days after the 
date of referral, that committee shall be dis-
1167 
† HR 6395 EAS 
charged from further consideration of the 
resolution. 
(iii) Beginning on the third legislative 
day after each committee to which a resolu-
tion has been referred reports the resolution 
to the House or has been discharged from 
further consideration thereof, it shall be in 
order to move to proceed to consider the res-
olution in the House. All points of order 
against the motion are waived. Such a mo-
tion shall not be in order after the House 
has disposed of a motion to proceed on the 
resolution. The previous question shall be 
considered as ordered on the motion to its 
adoption without intervening motion. The 
motion shall not be debatable. A motion to 
reconsider the vote by which the motion is 
disposed of shall not be in order. 
(iv) The resolution shall be considered 
as read. All points of order against the reso-
lution and against its consideration are 
waived. The previous question shall be con-
sidered as ordered on the resolution to final 
passage without intervening motion except 
2 hours of debate equally divided and con-
1168 
† HR 6395 EAS 
trolled by the sponsor of the resolution (or 
a designee) and an opponent. A motion to 
reconsider the vote on passage of the resolu-
tion shall not be in order. 
(B) TREATMENT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION IN 
SENATE.— 
(i) RECEIVED
BEFORE
PASSAGE
OF 
SENATE
RESOLUTION.—If, before the pas-
sage by the Senate of a covered resolution, 
the Senate receives an identical resolution 
from the House of Representatives, the fol-
lowing procedures shall apply: 
(I) That resolution shall not be re-
ferred to a committee. 
(II) With respect to that resolu-
tion— 
(aa) the procedure in the 
Senate shall be the same as if no 
resolution had been received from 
the House of Representatives; but 
(bb) the vote on passage shall 
be on the resolution from the 
House of Representatives. 
(ii) RECEIVED
AFTER
PASSAGE
OF 
SENATE RESOLUTION.—If, following passage
1169 
† HR 6395 EAS 
of a covered resolution in the Senate, the 
Senate receives an identical resolution from 
the House of Representatives, that resolution 
shall be placed on the appropriate Senate 
calendar. 
(iii) NO
SENATE
COMPANION.—If a 
covered resolution is received from the 
House of Representatives, and no com-
panion resolution has been introduced in 
the Senate, the Senate procedures under this 
subsection shall apply to the resolution from 
the House of Representatives. 
(C) APPLICATION
TO
REVENUE
MEAS-
URES.—The provisions of this paragraph shall 
not apply in the House of Representatives to a 
covered resolution that is a revenue measure. 
(6) RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND 
SENATE.—This subsection is enacted by Congress— 
(A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power 
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the 
rules of each House, respectively, and supersedes 
other rules only to the extent that it is incon-
sistent with such rules; and
1170 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(B) with full recognition of the constitu-
tional right of either House to change the rules 
(so far as relating to the procedure of that 
House) at any time, in the same manner, and 
to the same extent as in the case of any other 
rule of that House. 
SEC. 1709. IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES. 
(a) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exercise 
all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1702 and 1704) to the extent necessary to carry out this 
title. 
(b) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, attempts to 
violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of section 
1706 or 1707 or any regulation, license, or order issued to 
carry out that section shall be subject to the penalties set 
forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an un-
lawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. 
SEC. 1710. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. 
Nothing in this title shall be construed as an author-
ization of military force against China.
1171 
† HR 6395 EAS 
SEC. 1711. EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF 
GOODS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and requirements 
to impose sanctions under this title shall not include the 
authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the impor-
tation of goods. 
(b) GOOD DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘good’’ 
means any article, natural or manmade substance, mate-
rial, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection 
and test equipment, and excluding technical data. 
DIVISION 
B—MILITARY 
CON-
STRUCTION 
AUTHORIZA-
TIONS 
SEC. 2001. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Military Construc-
tion Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021’’. 
SEC. 
2002. 
EXPIRATION 
OF 
AUTHORIZATIONS 
AND 
AMOUNTS REQUIRED TO BE SPECIFIED BY 
LAW. 
(a) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS AFTER FIVE 
YEARS.—Except as provided in subsection (b), all author-
izations contained in titles XXI through XXVII for military 
construction projects, land acquisition, family housing 
projects and facilities, and contributions to the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization Security Investment Program
1172 
† HR 6395 EAS 
(and authorizations of appropriations therefor) shall expire 
on the later of— 
(1) October 1, 2025; or 
(2) the date of the enactment of an Act author-
izing funds for military construction for fiscal year 
2026. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to au-
thorizations for military construction projects, land acqui-
sition, family housing projects and facilities, and contribu-
tions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security 
Investment Program (and authorizations of appropriations 
therefor), for which appropriated funds have been obligated 
before the later of— 
(1) October 1, 2025; or 
(2) the date of the enactment of an Act author-
izing funds for fiscal year 2026 for military construc-
tion projects, land acquisition, family housing 
projects and facilities, or contributions to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Security Investment 
Program. 
SEC. 2003. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
Titles XXI through XXVII and title XXIX shall take 
effect on the later of— 
(1) October 1, 2020; or 
(2) the date of the enactment of this Act.
1173 
† HR 6395 EAS 
TITLE XXI—ARMY MILITARY 
CONSTRUCTION 
SEC. 2101. AUTHORIZED ARMY CONSTRUCTION AND LAND 
ACQUISITION PROJECTS. 
(a) INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
in section 2103(a) and available for military construction 
projects inside the United States as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Army may ac-
quire real property and carry out military construction 
projects for the installations or locations inside the United 
States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following table: 
Army: Inside the United States 
State 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Alaska .........................
Fort Wainwright ...............................................
$114,000,000 
Arizona ......................
Yuma Proving Ground .....................................
$14,000,000 
California ..................
Military Ocean Terminal Concord ..................
$46,000,000 
Colorado .....................
Fort Carson ........................................................
$28,000,000 
Georgia .......................
Fort Gillem ........................................................
$71,000,000 
Fort Gordon .......................................................
$80,000,000 
Hawaii .......................
Aliamanu Military Reservation .......................
$71,000,000 
Schofield Barracks .............................................
$39,000,000 
Wheeler Army Airfield ......................................
$89,000,000 
Louisiana ...................
Fort Polk ............................................................
$25,000,000 
Oklahoma ...................
McAlester AAP ...................................................
$35,000,000 
South Carolina ..........
Fort Jackson ......................................................
$7,000,000 
Virginia .....................
Humphreys Engineer Center ............................
$51,000,000 
(b) OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
tions in section 2103(a) and available for military con-
struction projects outside the United States as specified in 
the funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Army 
may acquire real property and carry out military construc-
1174 
† HR 6395 EAS 
tion projects for the installation outside the United States, 
and in the amount, set forth in the following table: 
Army: Outside the United States 
State 
Installation 
Amount 
Italy ...........................
Casmera Renato Dal Din .................................
$10,200,000 
SEC. 2102. FAMILY HOUSING. 
(a) 
CONSTRUCTION
AND
ACQUISITION.—Using 
amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap-
propriations in section 2103(a) and available for military 
family housing functions as specified in the funding table 
in section 4601, the Secretary of the Army may construct 
or acquire family housing units (including land acquisition 
and supporting facilities) at the installations or locations, 
in the number of units, and in the amounts set forth in 
the following table: 
Army: Family Housing 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Units 
Amount 
Italy ................
Vicenza .......................................
Family Housing 
New Construc-
tion ...................
$84,100,000 
Kwajalein .......
Kwajalein Atoll .........................
Family Housing 
Replacement 
Construction ....
$32,000,000 
(b) PLANNING AND DESIGN.—Using amounts appro-
priated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in 
section 2103(a) and available for military family housing 
functions as specified in the funding table in section 4601, 
the Secretary of the Army may carry out architectural and 
engineering services and construction design activities with
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respect to the construction or improvement of family hous-
ing units in an amount not to exceed $3,300,000. 
SEC. 2103. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, ARMY. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Funds are 
hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years begin-
ning after September 30, 2020, for military construction, 
land acquisition, and military family housing functions of 
the Department of the Army as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601. 
(b) LIMITATION ON TOTAL COST OF CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS.—Notwithstanding the cost variations author-
ized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and 
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost 
of all projects carried out under section 2101 of this Act 
may not exceed the total amount authorized to be appro-
priated under subsection (a), as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601. 
SEC. 2104. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 PROJECT AT CAMP WALK-
ER, KOREA. 
In the case of the authorization contained in the table 
in section 2102(a) of the Military Construction Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (division B of Public Law 
114–92; 129 Stat. 1146) for Camp Walker, Korea, the Sec-
retary of the Army may construct an elevated walkway be-
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tween two existing parking garages to connect children’s 
playgrounds using amounts available for Family Housing 
New Construction, as specified in the funding table in sec-
tion 4601 of such Act (129 Stat. 1290). 
TITLE XXII—NAVY MILITARY 
CONSTRUCTION 
SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZED NAVY CONSTRUCTION AND LAND 
ACQUISITION PROJECTS. 
(a) INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
in section 2204(a) and available for military construction 
projects inside the United States as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Navy may ac-
quire real property and carry out military construction 
projects for the installations or locations inside the United 
States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following table: 
Navy: Inside the United States 
State 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
California .................
Camp Pendleton .................................................
$115,530,000 
Lemoore ...............................................................
$187,220,000 
Point Mugu .........................................................
$26,700,000 
Port Hueneme .....................................................
$43,500,000 
San Diego ...........................................................
$128,500,000 
Seal Beach ..........................................................
$46,800,000 
Twentynine Palms .............................................
$76,500,000 
Hawaii ......................
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam ....................
$114,900,000 
Maine ........................
Kittery .................................................................
$715,000,000 
NCTAMS LANT Detachment Cutler ................
$26,100,000 
Nevada ......................
Fallon ..................................................................
$29,040,000 
North Carolina .........
Cherry Point .......................................................
$51,900,000 
Virginia ....................
Norfolk .................................................................
$39,800,000 
(b) OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
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tions in section 2204(a) and available for military con-
struction projects outside the United States as specified in 
the funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Navy 
may acquire real property and carry out military construc-
tion projects for the installations or locations outside the 
United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following 
table: 
Navy: Outside the United States 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Bahrain Island ............
SW Asia .............................................................
$68,340,000 
El Salvador .................
Comalapa ...........................................................
$28,000,000 
Greece ...........................
Souda Bay .........................................................
$50,180,000 
Guam ............................
Andersen Air Force Base ..................................
$21,280,000 
Joint Region Marianas .....................................
$546,550,000 
Spain ............................
Rota ....................................................................
$60,110,000 
SEC. 2202. FAMILY HOUSING. 
Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2204(a) and available 
for military family housing functions as specified in the 
funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Navy 
may carry out architectural and engineering services and 
construction design activities with respect to the construc-
tion or improvement of family housing units in an amount 
not to exceed $5,854,000. 
SEC. 2203. IMPROVEMENTS TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING 
UNITS. 
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, 
and using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2204(a) and available
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in section 2304(a) and available for military construction 
projects inside the United States as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Air Force may 
acquire real property and carry out military construction 
projects for the installations or locations inside the United 
States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following table: 
Air Force: Inside the United States 
State 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Colorado .................................
United States Air Force Academy ..
$49,000,000 
New Jersey .............................
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst 
$22,000,000 
South Dakota .........................
Ellsworth Air Force Base .................
$96,000,000 
Texas .......................................
Joint Base San Antonio ...................
$19,500,000 
Utah ........................................
Hill Air Force Base ..........................
$132,000,000 
Virginia ..................................
Joint Base Langley-Eustis ...............
$19,500,000 
(b) OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
tions in section 2304(a) and available for military con-
struction projects outside the United States as specified in 
the funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Air 
Force may acquire real property and carry out military 
construction projects for the installations or locations out-
side the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in 
the following table: 
Air Force: Outside the United States 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Guam ......................................
Andersen Air Force Base .................
$56,000,000 
Qatar ......................................
Al Udeid ............................................
$26,000,000 
SEC. 2302. FAMILY HOUSING. 
Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2304(a) and available
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for military family housing functions as specified in the 
funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Air Force 
may carry out architectural and engineering services and 
construction design activities with respect to the construc-
tion or improvement of family housing units in an amount 
not to exceed $2,969,000. 
SEC. 2303. IMPROVEMENTS TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING 
UNITS. 
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, 
and using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2304(a) and available 
for military family housing functions as specified in the 
funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of the Air Force 
may improve existing military family housing units in an 
amount not to exceed $94,245,000. 
SEC. 2304. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, AIR 
FORCE. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Funds are 
hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years begin-
ning after September 30, 2020, for military construction, 
land acquisition, and military family housing functions of 
the Department of the Air Force, as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601. 
(b) LIMITATION ON TOTAL COST OF CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS.—Notwithstanding the cost variations author-
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ized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and 
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost 
of all projects carried out under section 2301 of this Act 
may not exceed the total amount authorized to be appro-
priated under subsection (a), as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601. 
SEC. 2305. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
FISCAL YEAR 2018 PROJECT AT ROYAL AIR 
FORCE LAKENHEATH. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—In the case of the authorization 
contained in the table in section 2301(b) of the Military 
Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (divi-
sion B of Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1826) for Royal 
Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom, the Secretary of 
the Air Force may construct a 2,700 square meter consoli-
dated corrosion control and wash rack facility at such loca-
tion. 
(b) INCREASE OF AMOUNT.—The table in section 4601 
of such Act is amended in the item relating to a Consoli-
dated Corrosion Control Facility at Royal Air Force 
Lakenheath, United Kingdom, by striking ‘‘20,000,000’’ 
and inserting ‘‘55,300,000’’.
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SEC. 2306. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2019 PROJECTS. 
(a) EIELSON AIR FORCE BASE, ALASKA.—In the case 
of the authorization contained in the table in section 
2301(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2019 (division B of Public Law 115–232; 132 
Stat. 2246) for Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, the Sec-
retary of the Air Force may construct a 426 square meter 
non-contained (outdoor) range with covered and heated fir-
ing line for construction of an F–35 CATM Range, as speci-
fied in the funding table in section 4601 of such Act (132 
Stat. 2404). 
(b) BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of the authoriza-
tion contained in the table in section 2301(a) of the 
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019 (division B of Public Law 115–232; 132 
Stat. 2246) for Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, 
the Secretary of the Air Force may construct an en-
trance road and gate complex consistent with the 
Unified Facilities Criteria relating to entry control 
facilities and the construction guidelines for the Air 
Force, in the amount of $48,000,000. 
(2) 
DETAILS
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—In 
con-
structing the entrance road and gate complex under 
paragraph (1), the Secretary of the Air Force may
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construct a 190 square meter visitor control center, a 
44 square meter gate house, a 124 square meter pri-
vately owned vehicle inspection facility, a 338 square 
meter truck inspection facility, and a 45 square meter 
gatehouse. 
(3) CONSTRUCTION IN FLOOD PLAIN.—Construc-
tion under paragraph (1) may be conducted in a 
flood plain and appropriate mitigation measures 
shall be included in the project. 
(c) ROYAL AIR FORCE LAKENHEATH, UNITED KING-
DOM.—In the case of the authorization contained in the 
table in section 2301(b) of the Military Construction Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (division B of Public 
Law 115–232; 132 Stat. 2247) for Royal Air Force 
Lakenheath, United Kingdom, the Secretary of the Air 
Force may construct a 1,206 square meter maintenance fa-
cility for construction of an F–35A ADAL Conventional 
Munitions MX, as specified in the funding table in section 
4601 of such Act (132 Stat. 2400). 
(d) FORCE PROTECTION AND SAFETY.—The table in 
section 4601 of the Military Construction Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019 (division B of Public Law 115–232; 
132 Stat. 2406) is amended in the item relating to Force 
Protection and Safety, Air Force, Unspecified Worldwide 
Locations, by striking ‘‘35,000’’ and inserting ‘‘50,000’’.
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SEC. 2307. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2020 FAMILY HOUSING 
PROJECTS. 
(a) CONSTRUCTION AND ACQUISITION.—Section 2302 
of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘Using amounts’’ and inserting 
‘‘(a) PLANNING AND DESIGN.—Using amounts’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section: 
‘‘(b) 
CONSTRUCTION
AND
ACQUISITION.—Using 
amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap-
propriations in section 2304(a), the Secretary of the Air 
Force may construct or acquire family housing units (in-
cluding land, acquisition, and supporting facilities) at the 
installation, in the number of units, and in the amounts 
set forth in the following table: 
‘‘Air Force: Family Housing 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Purpose 
Amount 
Germany ..........
Spangdahlem Air Base ......
76 Units ................
$53,584,000’’. 
(b) FUNDING.—Section 2303 of the Military Construc-
tion Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 
116–92) is amended by striking ‘‘$53,584,000’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘$46,638,000’’.
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SEC. 2308. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT 
CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 2020 PROJECTS. 
(a) TYNDALL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA.—In the case 
of the authorization contained in the table in section 
2912(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (division B of Public Law 116–92) for 
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, the Secretary of the Air 
Force may construct— 
(1) not more than 4,770 square meters of aircraft 
support equipment storage for construction of an 
Auxiliary Ground Equipment Facility, as specified 
in the funding table in section 4603 of such Act; 
(2) not more than 18,770 square meters of vis-
iting quarters for construction of Dorm Complex 
Phase 1, as specified in such funding table; 
(3) 2,127 square meters of squadron operations 
and 2,875 square meters of aircraft maintenance unit 
for construction of Ops/Aircraft Maintenance Unit/ 
Hangar #2, as specified in such funding table; 
(4) 2,127 square meters of squadron operations 
and 2,875 square meters of aircraft maintenance unit 
for construction of Ops/Aircraft Maintenance Unit/ 
Hangar #3, as specified in such funding table; 
(5) not more than 3,420 square meters of head-
quarters for construction of an Operations Group/
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Maintenance Group HQ, as specified in such funding 
table; 
(6) not more than 930 square meters of equip-
ment storage for construction of a Security Forces 
Mobility Storage Facility, as specified in such fund-
ing table; 
(7) not more than 7,000 meters of storm water 
piping, box culverts, underground detention, and 
grading for surface detention for construction of Site 
Development, Utilities & Demo Phase 2, as specified 
in such funding table; and 
(8) not more than 12,471 meters of visiting 
quarters for construction of Lodging Facilities Phase 
1, as specified in such funding table. 
(b) OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA.—In the 
case of the authorization contained in the table in section 
2912(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (division B of Public Law 116–92) for 
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, the Secretary of the Air 
Force may construct— 
(1) seven 2.5-megawatt diesel engine generators, 
seven 
diesel 
exhaust 
fluid 
systems, 
15-kilovolt 
switchgear, two import/export inter-ties, five import- 
only inter-ties, and 800 square meters of switchgear 
facility for construction of an Emergency Power
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Microgrid, as specified in the funding table in section 
4603 of such Act; 
(2) 2,536 square meters of warehouse for con-
struction of a Logistics Readiness Squadron Campus, 
as specified in such funding table; 
(3) 4,218 square meters of operations center and 
1,343 square meters of military working dog kennel 
for construction of a Security Campus, as specified in 
such funding table; 
(4) 445 square meters of petroleum operations 
center, 268 square meters of de-icing liquid storage, 
and 173 square meters of warehouse for construction 
of a Flightline Hangars Campus, as specified in such 
funding table; and 
(5) 240 square meters of recreation complex and 
270 square meters of storage for construction of a 
Lake Campus, as specified in such funding table. 
(c) JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, VIRGINIA.—In the 
case of the authorization contained in the table in section 
2912(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2020 (division B of Public Law 116–92) for 
Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, the Secretary of the 
Air Force may construct up to 6,720 square meters of dor-
mitory for construction of a Dormitory, as specified in the 
funding table in section 4603 of such Act.
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TITLE 
XXIV—DEFENSE 
AGEN-
CIES 
MILITARY 
CONSTRUC-
TION 
SEC. 2401. AUTHORIZED DEFENSE AGENCIES CONSTRUC-
TION AND LAND ACQUISITION PROJECTS. 
(a) INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
in section 2403(a) and available for military construction 
projects inside the United States as specified in the funding 
table in section 4601, the Secretary of Defense may acquire 
real property and carry out military construction projects 
for the installations or locations inside the United States, 
and in the amounts, set forth in the following table: 
Defense Agencies: Inside the United States 
State 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Alabama .....................
Anniston Army Depot ........................................
$18,000,000 
Alaska .........................
Fort Greely ..........................................................
$48,000,000 
Arizona .......................
Fort Huachuca ....................................................
$33,728,000 
Yuma ...................................................................
$49,500,000 
California ...................
Beale Air Force Base ..........................................
$22,800,000 
Colorado ......................
Fort Carson .........................................................
$15,600,000 
CONUS Unspecified ..
CONUS Unspecified ...........................................
$14,400,000 
Florida ........................
Hurlburt Field ....................................................
$83,120,000 
Kentucky .....................
Fort Knox ............................................................
$69,310,000 
New Mexico ...............
Kirtland Air Force Base ....................................
$46,600,000 
North Carolina ...........
Fort Bragg ..........................................................
$113,800,000 
Ohio .............................
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ......................
$23,500,000 
Texas ...........................
Fort Hood ............................................................
$32,700,000 
Virginia ......................
Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort 
Story ................................................................
$112,500,000 
Washington .................
Joint Base Lewis-McChord ................................
$21,800,000 
Manchester ...........................................................
$82,000,000 
(b) OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
tions in section 2403(a) and available for military con-
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struction projects outside the United States as specified in 
the funding table in section 4601, the Secretary of Defense 
may acquire real property and carry out military construc-
tion projects for the installation or location outside the 
United States, and in the amount, set forth in the following 
table: 
Defense Agencies: Outside the United States 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Japan ....................
Def Fuel Support Point Tsurumi .....................
$49,500,000 
SEC. 2402. AUTHORIZED ENERGY RESILIENCE AND CON-
SERVATION 
INVESTMENT 
PROGRAM 
PROJECTS. 
(a) INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts ap-
propriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations 
in section 2403(a) and available for energy conservation 
projects as specified in the funding table in section 4601, 
the Secretary of Defense may carry out energy conservation 
projects under chapter 173 of title 10, United States Code, 
for the installations or locations inside the United States, 
and in the amounts, set forth in the following table: 
ERCIP Projects: Inside the United States 
State 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Alabama .....................
Fort Rucker .........................................................
$24,000,000 
Arkansas .....................
Fort Smith Air National Guard Base ..............
$2,600,000 
District of Columbia ..
Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling ............................
$35,933,000 
Georgia .......................
Fort Benning ......................................................
$17,000,000 
Mississippi ..................
MTA Camp Shelby .............................................
$30,000,000 
North Carolina ...........
Fort Bragg ..........................................................
$6,100,000 
Ohio .............................
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base ......................
$35,000,000 
Tennessee ....................
Memphis International Airport ........................
$4,780,000
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(b) OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.—Using amounts 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
tions in section 2403(a) and available for energy conserva-
tion projects as specified in the funding table in section 
4601, the Secretary of Defense may carry out energy con-
servation projects under chapter 173 of title 10, United 
States Code, for the installations or locations outside the 
United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following 
table: 
ERCIP Projects: Outside the United States 
Country 
Installation or Location 
Amount 
Unspecified World-
wide ...................
Unspecified Worldwide Locations .....................
$142,500,000 
SEC. 2403. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, DEFENSE 
AGENCIES. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Funds are 
hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years begin-
ning after September 30, 2020, for military construction, 
land acquisition, and military family housing functions of 
the Department of Defense (other than the military depart-
ments), as specified in the funding table in section 4601. 
(b) LIMITATION ON TOTAL COST OF CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS.—Notwithstanding the cost variations author-
ized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and 
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost 
of all projects carried out under section 2401 of this Act