H. R. 3616—245
to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
SEC. 1305. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION PREVENTION ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA.
No fiscal year 1999 Cooperative Threat Reduction funds may
be obligated or expended for biological weapons proliferation preven-
tion activities in Russia until 15 days after the date on which
the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a
report on—
(1) whether Cooperative Threat Reduction funds provided
for cooperative research activities at biological research
institutes in Russia have been used—
(A) to support activities to develop new strains of
anthrax; or
(B) for any purpose inconsistent with the objectives
of providing such funds; and
(2) the new strains of anthrax alleged to have been devel-
oped at a biological research institute in Russia and any efforts
by the United States to examine such strains.
SEC. 1306. COOPERATIVE COUNTER PROLIFERATION PROGRAM.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in section 1302 (other than the amounts authorized to be appro-
priated in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of that section) and subject
to the limitations in that section and subsection (b), the Secretary
of Defense may provide a country of the former Soviet Union with
emergency assistance for removing or obtaining from that country—
(1) weapons of mass destruction; or
(2) materials, equipment, or technology related to the
development or delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
(b) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—(1) The Secretary may not pro-
vide assistance under subsection (a) until 15 days after the date
that the Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees
a certification in writing that the weapons, materials, equipment,
or technology described in that subsection meet each of the following
requirements:
(A) The weapons, materials, equipment, or technology are
at risk of being sold or otherwise transferred to a restricted
foreign state or entity.
(B) The transfer of the weapons, materials, equipment,
or technology would pose a significant near-term threat to
the national security interests of the United States or would
significantly advance a foreign country’s weapon program that
threatens the national security interests of the United States.
(C) Other options for securing or otherwise preventing the
transfer of the weapons, materials, equipment, or technology
have been considered and rejected as ineffective or inadequate.
(2) The 15-day notice requirement in paragraph (1) may be
waived if the Secretary determines that compliance with the
requirement would compromise the national security interests of
the United States. In such case, the Secretary shall promptly notify
the congressional defense committees of the circumstances regard-
ing such determination in advance of providing assistance under
subsection (a) and shall submit the certification required not later
than 30 days after providing such assistance.
H. R. 3616—246
(c) CONTENT OF CERTIFICATIONS.—Each certification required
under subsection (b) shall contain information on the following
with respect to the assistance being provided:
(1) The specific assistance provided and the purposes for
which the assistance is being provided.
(2) The sources of funds for the assistance.
(3) Whether any assistance is being provided by any other
Federal department or agency.
(4) The options considered and rejected for preventing the
transfer of the weapons, materials, equipment, or technology,
as described in subsection (b)(1)(C).
(5) Whether funding was requested by the Secretary from
other Federal departments or agencies.
(6) Any additional information that the Secretary deter-
mines is relevant to the assistance being provided.
(d) ADDITIONAL SOURCES
OF FUNDING.—The Secretary may
request assistance and accept funds from other Federal departments
or agencies in carrying out this section.
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1) The term ‘‘restricted foreign state or entity’’, with
respect to weapons, materials, equipment, or technology covered
by a certification or notification of the Secretary of Defense
under subsection (b), means—
(A) any foreign country the government of which has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terror-
ism, as determined by the Secretary of State under section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2371); or
(B) any foreign state or entity that the Secretary of
Defense determines would constitute a military threat to
the United States, its allies, or interests, if that foreign
state or entity were to possess the weapons, materials,
equipment, or technology.
(2) The term ‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’ has the mean-
ing given that term in section 1403(1) of the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public
Law 104–201; 50 U.S.C. 2302(1)).
SEC. 1307. REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT SUMMARY OF AMOUNTS
REQUESTED BY PROJECT CATEGORY.
(a) SUMMARY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall sub-
mit to Congress as part of the Secretary’s annual budget request
to Congress—
(1) a descriptive summary, with respect to the appropria-
tions requested for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs
for the fiscal year after the fiscal year in which the summary
is submitted, of the amounts requested for each project category
under each Cooperative Threat Reduction program element;
and
(2) a descriptive summary, with respect to appropriations
for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs for the fiscal year
in which the list is submitted and the previous fiscal year,
of the amounts obligated or expended, or planned to be obligated
or expended, for each project category under each Cooperative
Threat Reduction program element.
(b) DESCRIPTION
OF PURPOSE
AND INTENT.—The descriptive
summary required under subsection (a) shall include a narrative
H. R. 3616—247
description of each program and project category under each
Cooperative Threat Reduction program element that explains the
purpose and intent of the funds requested.
SEC. 1308. REPORT ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN RUSSIA.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than March 1, 1999, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a
report, in classified and unclassified forms, containing—
(1) an assessment of the extent of compliance by Russia
with international agreements relating to the control of
biological weapons; and
(2) a detailed evaluation of the potential political and mili-
tary costs and benefits of collaborative biological pathogen
research efforts by the United States and Russia.
(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) An evaluation of the extent of the control and oversight
by the Government of Russia over the military and civilian-
military biological warfare programs formerly controlled or
overseen by states of the former Soviet Union.
(2) The extent and scope of continued biological warfare
research, development, testing, and production in Russia,
including the sites where such activity is occurring and the
types of activity being conducted.
(3) An assessment of compliance by Russia with the terms
of the Biological Weapons Convention.
(4) An identification and assessment of the measures taken
by Russia to comply with the obligations assumed under the
Joint Statement on Biological Weapons, agreed to by the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14,
1992.
(5) A description of the extent to which Russia has per-
mitted individuals from the United States or other countries
to visit military and nonmilitary biological research, develop-
ment, testing, and production sites in order to resolve ambigu-
ities regarding activities at such sites.
(6) A description of the information provided by Russia
about its biological weapons dismantlement efforts to date.
(7) An assessment of the accuracy and comprehensiveness
of declarations by Russia regarding its biological weapons
activities.
(8) An identification of collaborative biological research
projects carried out by the United States and Russia for which
Cooperative Threat Reduction funds have been used.
(9) An evaluation of the political and military utility of
prior, existing, and prospective cooperative biological pathogen
research programs carried out between the United States and
Russia, and an assessment of the impact of such programs
on increasing Russian military transparency with respect to
biological weapons activities.
(10) An assessment of the political and military utility
of the long-term collaborative program advocated by the
National Academy of Sciences in its October 27, 1997 report,
‘‘Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Blueprint for U.S.-Rus-
sian Cooperation’’.
H. R. 3616—248
SEC. 1309. REPORT ON INDIVIDUALS WITH EXPERTISE IN FORMER
SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 31, 1999, the Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy,
and any other appropriate officials, shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a report on the number of individuals in the
former Soviet Union who have significant expertise in the research,
development, production, testing, and operational employment of
ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The report shall
contain the following:
(1) A listing of the specific expertise of the individuals,
by category and discipline.
(2) An assessment of which categories of expertise would
pose the greatest risks to the security of the United States
if that expertise were transferred to potentially hostile states.
(3) An estimate, by category, of the number of the individ-
uals in paragraph (1) who are fully or partly employed at
the time the report is submitted by the military-industrial
complex of the former Soviet Union, the number of such individ-
uals who are fully employed at the time the report is submitted
by commercial ventures outside the military-industrial complex
of the former Soviet Union, and the number of such individuals
who are unemployed and underemployed at the time the report
is submitted.
(4) An identification of the nature, scope, and cost of activi-
ties conducted by the United States and other countries to
assist in the employment in nonproliferation and nonmilitary-
related endeavors and enterprises of individuals involved in
the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union, and which
categories of individuals are being targeted in these efforts.
(5) An assessment of whether the activities identified under
paragraph (4) should be reduced, maintained, or expanded.
TITLE XIV—DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS
FOR DEFENSE AGAINST WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
Sec. 1401. Short title.
Sec. 1402. Domestic preparedness for response to threats of terrorist use of weapons
of mass destruction.
Sec. 1403. Report on domestic emergency preparedness.
Sec. 1404. Threat and risk assessments.
Sec. 1405. Advisory panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction.
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction Act of 1998’’.
SEC. 1402. DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE TO THREATS
OF TERRORIST USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUC-
TION.
(a) ENHANCED RESPONSE CAPABILITY.—In light of the continu-
ing potential for terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against
the United States and the need to develop a more fully coordinated
response to that threat on the part of Federal, State, and local
agencies, the President shall act to increase the effectiveness at