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complete and detailed descriptions and estimates of the amounts
provided in that budget for the costs of NATO enlargement.
SEC. 1224. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ENLARGEMENT OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met
on July 8 and 9, 1997, in Madrid, Spain, and issued invitations
to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin accession
talks to join NATO.
(2) Congress has expressed its support for the process
of NATO enlargement by approving the NATO Enlargement
Facilitation Act of 1996 (title VI of the matter enacted in
section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104–208; 22 U.S.C.
1928 note).
(3) The United States has supported the position that the
process of enlarging NATO will continue after the first round
of invitations in July 1997.
(4) Romania and Slovenia are to be commended for their
progress toward political and economic reform and appear to
be striving to meet the guidelines for prospective membership
in NATO.
(5) In furthering the purpose and objective of NATO in
promoting stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area,
NATO should invite Romania and Slovenia to accession negotia-
tions to become NATO members as expeditiously as possible
upon the satisfaction of all relevant membership criteria and
consistent with NATO security objectives.
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that
North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be commended—
(1) for having committed to review the process of enlarging
the Organization in 1999; and
(2) for singling out the positive developments toward
democracy and rule of law in Romania and Slovenia.
SEC. 1225. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO LEVEL OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC REGION.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
(1) The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is a matter
of vital national interest affecting the well-being of all Ameri-
cans.
(2) The nations of the Pacific Rim collectively represent
the United States largest trading partner and are expected
to account for almost one-third of the world’s economic activity
by the start of the next century.
(3) The increased reliance by the United States on trade
and Middle East oil sources has reinforced United States secu-
rity interests in the Southeast Asia shipping lanes through
the South China Sea and the key straits of Malacca, Sunda,
Lombok, and Makassar.
(4) The South China Sea is an important area for United
States Navy ships passing from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf.
(5) Maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea is an important interest of the United States.
(6) The threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, the emerging nationalism amidst long-standing ethnic
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and national rivalries, and the unresolved territorial disputes
combine to create a political landscape of potential instability
and conflict in this region that could jeopardize the interests
of the United States and the safety of United States nationals.
(7) A critical component of the East Asia strategy of the
United States is maintaining forward deployed forces in Asia
to ensure broad regional stability, to help to deter aggression,
to lessen the pressure for arms races, and to contribute to
the political and economic advances of the region from which
the United States benefits.
(8) The forward presence of the United States in Northeast
Asia enables the United States to respond to regional contin-
gencies, to protect sea lines of communication, to sustain influ-
ence, and to support operations as distant as operations in
the Persian Gulf.
(9) The military forces of the United States serve to prevent
the political or economic control of the Asia-Pacific region by
a rival, hostile power or coalition of such powers, thus prevent-
ing any such group from obtaining control over the vast
resources, enormous wealth, and advanced technology of the
region.
(10) Allies of the United States in the region can base
their defense planning on a reliable American security commit-
ment, a reduction of which could stimulate an arms buildup
in the region.
(11) The Joint Announcement of the United States-Japan
Security Consultative Committee of December 1996, acknowl-
edged that ‘‘the forward presence of U.S. forces continues to
be an essential element for pursuing our common security
objectives’’.
(12) The United States and Japan signed the United States-
Japan Security Declaration in April 1996, in which the United
States reaffirmed its commitment to maintain this level of
100,000 United States military personnel in the region.
(13) The United States military presence is recognized by
the nations of the region as serving stability and enabling
United States engagement.
(14) The nations of East Asia and the Pacific consider
the commitment of the forces of the United States to be so
vital to their future that they scrutinize actions of the United
States for any sign of weakened commitment to the security
of the region.
(15) The reduction of forward-based military forces could
negatively affect the ability of the United States to contribute
to the maintenance of peace and stability of the Asia and
Pacific region.
(16) Recognizing that while the United States must con-
sider the overall capabilities of its forces in its decisions to
deploy troops, nevertheless any reduction in the number of
forward-based troops may reduce the perception of American
capability and commitment in the region that cannot be com-
pletely offset by modernization of the remaining forces.
(17) During time of crisis, deployment of forces to East
Asia, even though such forces were previously removed from
the area, might be deemed to be an act of provocation that
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could be used as a pretext by a hostile power for armed aggres-
sion within the region, and the existence of that possibility
might hinder such a deployment.
(18) Proposals to reduce the forward presence of the United
States in the East Asia region or subordinate security interests
to United States domestic budgetary concerns can erode the
perception of the commitment of the United States to its alli-
ances and interests in the region.
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that
the United States should maintain at least approximately 100,000
United States military personnel in the East Asia and Pacific region
until such time as there is a peaceful and permanent resolution
to the major security and political conflicts in the region.
SEC. 1226. REPORT ON FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND
STRATEGY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) REPORT.—The Secretary of Defense shall prepare a report,
in both classified and unclassified form, on the pattern of military
modernization of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall
address the probable course of military-technological development
in the People’s Liberation Army and the development of Chinese
security strategy and military strategy, and of military organiza-
tions and operational concepts, through 2015.
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall include analy-
ses and forecasts of the following:
(1) The goals of Chinese security strategy and military
strategy.
(2) Trends in Chinese strategy regarding the political goals
of the People’s Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region
and its political and military presence in other regions of the
world, including Central Asia, Southwest Asia, Europe, and
Latin America.
(3) Developments in Chinese military doctrine, focusing
on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit an emerging Revolution
in Military Affairs or to conduct preemptive strikes.
(4) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to enhance
its capabilities in the area of nuclear weapons development.
(5) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to develop
long-range air-to-air or air defense missiles that would provide
the capability to target special support aircraft such as Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, Joint Surveil-
lance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, or
other command and control, intelligence, airborne early warn-
ing, or electronic warfare aircraft.
(6) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to develop
a capability to conduct ‘‘information warfare’’ at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of war.
(7) Development by the People’s Republic of China of
capabilities in the area of electronic warfare.
(8) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to develop
a capability to establish control of space or to deny access
and use of military and commercial space systems in times
of crisis or war, including programs to place weapons in space
or to develop earth-based weapons capable of attacking space-
based systems.
(9) Trends that would lead the People’s Republic of China
toward the development of advanced intelligence, surveillance,
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and reconnaissance capabilities, including gaining access to
commercial or third-party systems with military significance.
(10) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to develop
highly accurate and stealthy ballistic and cruise missiles,
including sea-launched cruise missiles, particularly in numbers
sufficient to conduct attacks capable of overwhelming projected
defense capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
(11) Development by the People’s Republic of China of
command and control networks, particularly those capable of
battle management of long-range precision strikes.
(12) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China in the area
of telecommunications, including common channel signaling
and synchronous digital hierarchy technologies.
(13) Development by People’s Republic of China of advanced
aerospace technologies with military applications (including gas
turbine ‘‘hot section’’ technologies).
(14) Programs of the People’s Republic of China involving
unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly those with extended
ranges or loitering times or potential strike capabilities.
(15) Exploitation by the People’s Republic of China for
military purposes of the Global Positioning System or other
similar systems (including commercial land surveillance sat-
ellites), with such analysis and forecasts focusing particularly
on indications of an attempt to increase the accuracy of weapons
or situational awareness of operating forces.
(16) Development by the People’s Republic of China of
capabilities for denial of sea control, including such systems
as advanced sea mines, improved submarine capabilities, or
land-based sea-denial systems.
(17) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to develop
its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
(18) Continued development by the People’s Republic of
China of follow-on forces, particularly forces capable of rapid
air or amphibious assault.
(19) Efforts by the People’s Republic of China to enhance
its capabilities in such additional areas of strategic concern
as the Secretary identifies.
(c) ANALYSIS
OF IMPLICATIONS
OF SALES
OF PRODUCTS
AND
TECHNOLOGIES TO ENTITIES IN CHINA.—The report under subsection
(a) shall include, with respect to each area for analyses and forecasts
specified in subsection (b)—
(1) an assessment of the military effects of sales of United
States and foreign products and technologies to entities in
the People’s Republic of China; and
(2) the potential threat of developments related to such
effects to United States strategic interests.
(d) SUBMISSION
OF REPORT.—The report shall be submitted
to Congress not later than March 15, 1998.
SEC. 1227. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEED FOR RUSSIAN OPENNESS
ON THE YAMANTAU MOUNTAIN PROJECT.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds as follows:
(1) The United States and Russia have been working since
the end of the Cold War to achieve a strategic relationship
based on cooperation and openness between the two nations.
(2) This effort to establish a new strategic relationship
between the two nations has resulted in the conclusion or