H. R. 5009—725 
‘‘(H) Materials and manufacturing. 
‘‘(I) Any other technology or research field the Director 
determines relevant to meet evolving national security 
threats in technology sectors.’’. 
(b) DURATION OF TEMPORARY DETAILS.—Subsection (e) of sec-
tion 5306 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 
2020 (50 U.S.C. 3334) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘3 years’’ and inserting 
‘‘5 years’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘3 years’’ and inserting 
‘‘5 years’’. 
(c) TREATMENT OF PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEES.—Subsection (g) 
of such section is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting 
a semicolon; 
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end 
and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(7) shall not have access to any trade secrets or proprietary 
information which is of commercial value or competitive advan-
tage to the private-sector organization from which such 
employee is detailed.’’. 
(d) ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.—Such section is 
amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (i) as subsection (j); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (h) the following: 
‘‘(i) ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A private-sector organization that tempo-
rarily details a member of its workforce to an element of the 
intelligence community or that accepts the temporary detail 
of a member of the intelligence community shall not be consid-
ered to have an organizational conflict of interest with the 
element of the intelligence community solely because of partici-
pation in the program established under this section. 
‘‘(2) IDENTIFICATION
OF
CONFLICTS
OF
INTEREST.—If the 
identification of an organizational conflict of interest arises 
based on the particular facts surrounding an individual’s 
participation in the program established under this section 
and the nature of any contract, then the heads of intelligence 
community elements shall implement a system to avoid, neu-
tralize, or mitigate any such organizational conflicts of 
interest.’’. 
(e) ANNUAL REPORTS.— 
(1) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
and 
(C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for 2 
more years, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress an annual report 
on—
H. R. 5009—726 
(A) the implementation of the policies, processes, and 
procedures developed pursuant to subsection (a) of such 
section 5306 (50 U.S.C. 3334) and the administration of 
such section; 
(B) how the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community are using or plan to use the authorities provided 
under such section; and 
(C) recommendations for legislative or administrative 
action to increase use of the authorities provided under 
such section. 
SEC. 6507. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON HOSTILE FOREIGN CYBER ACTORS. 
It is the sense of Congress that foreign ransomware organiza-
tions, and foreign affiliates associated with them, constitute hostile 
foreign cyber actors, that covered nations abet and benefit from 
the activities of these actors, and that such actors should be treated 
as hostile foreign cyber actors by the United States. Such actors 
include the following: 
(1) DarkSide. 
(2) Conti. 
(3) REvil. 
(4) BlackCat, also known as ‘‘ALPHV’’. 
(5) LockBit. 
(6) Rhysida, also known as ‘‘Vice Society’’. 
(7) Royal. 
(8) Phobos, also known as ‘‘Eight’’ and also known as 
‘‘Joanta’’. 
(9) C10p. 
(10) Hackers associated with the SamSam ransomware 
campaigns. 
(11) Play. 
(12) BianLian. 
(13) Killnet. 
(14) Akira. 
(15) Ragnar Locker, also known as ‘‘Dark Angels’’. 
(16) Blacksuit. 
(17) INC. 
(18) Black Basta. 
SEC. 6508. DEEMING RANSOMWARE THREATS TO CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE AS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term ‘‘critical infra-
structure’’ has the meaning given such term in subsection (e)
H. R. 5009—727 
of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 
5195c(e)). 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT RANSOMWARE THREATS TO CRIT-
ICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRI-
ORITY.—It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National 
Intelligence should deem ransomware threats to critical infrastruc-
ture a national intelligence priority as part of the National Intel-
ligence Priorities Framework. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall, in consultation with the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report on the implications of the ransomware 
threat to United States national security. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
shall address the following: 
(A) Identification of individuals, groups, and entities 
who pose the most significant threat, including attribution 
to individual ransomware attacks whenever possible. 
(B) Locations from which individuals, groups, and enti-
ties conduct ransomware attacks. 
(C) 
The 
infrastructure, 
tactics, 
and 
techniques 
ransomware actors commonly use. 
(D) Any relationships between the individuals, groups, 
and entities that conduct ransomware attacks and their 
governments or countries of origin that could impede the 
ability to counter ransomware threats. 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 6509. ENHANCING PUBLIC-PRIVATE SHARING ON MANIPULATIVE 
ADVERSARY 
PRACTICES 
IN 
CRITICAL 
MINERAL 
PROJECTS. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall, in consultation with the heads of such Federal agen-
cies as the Director considers appropriate, develop a strategy to 
improve the sharing between the Federal Government and private 
entities of information and intelligence to mitigate the threat that 
foreign adversary illicit activities and tactics pose to United States 
persons in foreign jurisdictions on projects relating to energy 
generation and storage, including with respect to critical minerals 
inputs. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by subsection (a) shall 
cover— 
(1) how best to assemble and transmit information to 
United States persons— 
(A) to protect against foreign adversary illicit tactics 
and activities relating to critical mineral projects abroad, 
including foreign adversary efforts to undermine such 
United States projects abroad; 
(B) to mitigate the risk that foreign adversary govern-
ment involvement in the ownership and control of entities 
engaging in deceptive or illicit activities targeting critical
H. R. 5009—728 
mineral supply chains pose to the interests of the United 
States; and 
(C) to inform on economic espionage and other threats 
from foreign adversaries to the rights of owners of intellec-
tual property, including owners of patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and trade secrets, and other sensitive informa-
tion, with respect to such property; and 
(2) how best to receive information from United States 
persons on threats to United States interests in the critical 
mineral supply chains, resources, mines, and products, or other 
suspicious malicious activity. 
(c) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the date 
on which the Director completes developing the strategy pursu-
ant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the appro-
priate committees of Congress, or provide such committees 
a briefing on, a plan for implementing the strategy, which 
shall include a description of risks, benefits, opportunities, and 
drawbacks. 
TITLE 
LXVI—SECURITY 
CLEARANCES 
AND 
INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENTS 
Subtitle A—Security Clearances and 
Controlled Access Program Improvements 
SEC. 6601. SECURITY CLEARANCES HELD BY CERTAIN FORMER 
EMPLOYEES OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
(a) ISSUANCE OF GUIDELINES AND INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRED.— 
Section 803(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3162a(c)) is amended— 
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting 
a semicolon; 
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end 
and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(5) issue guidelines and instructions to the heads of Fed-
eral agencies to ensure that any individual who was appointed 
by the President to a position in an element of the intelligence 
community but is no longer employed by the Federal Govern-
ment shall maintain a security clearance only in accordance 
with Executive Order 12968 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating 
to access to classified information), or successor order.’’.