I 
116TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 2529 
To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating to the expiration 
of the New START Treaty, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MAY 7, 2019 
Mr. ENGEL (for himself and Mr. MCCAUL) introduced the following bill; which 
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a 
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
A BILL 
To require certain reports and briefings to Congress relating 
to the expiration of the New START Treaty, and for 
other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Richard G. Lugar and 
Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nu-
clear Forces’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
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(1) Since the end of World War II, the United 
States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 
deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 
against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 
Russian Federation. 
(2) The United States nuclear arsenal must re-
main, safe, secure, and reliable such that it can ef-
fectively ensure the security of the United States 
and its allies. 
(3) Along with its nuclear deterrent, the United 
States has pursued a number of arms control, disar-
mament, and nonproliferation agreements with the 
Soviet Union and Russia to ensure strategic stability 
and the protection of the United States homeland, 
such as— 
(A) the Interim Agreement Between the 
United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 
with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms, signed on May 26, 1972 (com-
monly referred to as SALT I); and 
(B) the Treaty Between the United States 
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
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signed on July 31, 1991 (commonly referred to 
as START I). 
(4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the United States continues to rely on a com-
bination of nuclear deterrence and strategic arms 
control to help protect the United States from nu-
clear attack. 
(5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and 
the Russia signed the Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to 
as ‘‘New Start Treaty’’). 
(6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated 
December 2, 2010, former Secretaries of State 
Henry A. Kissinger, George P. Shultz, James A. 
Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin L. 
Powell urged the Senate to ratify the Treaty, stating 
that it was in ‘‘the national interest to ratify’’. 
(7) During the ratification process, the Treaty 
garnered bipartisan support, and the United States 
Senate approved the Treaty on December 22, 2010, 
by a 71–26 vote. 
(8) The Treaty entered into force on February 
5, 2011, placing numerical limits on United States 
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and Russian strategic systems, including interconti-
nental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic 
missiles, and heavy bombers, as well as warheads. 
(9) On February 5, 2018, the Treaty’s central 
limits on strategic arms took effect. 
(10) Through the Treaty’s verification regime, 
which includes short-notice, on-site inspections at 
military bases and facilities, the United States is 
able to verify the data provided by Russia regarding 
its strategic nuclear arsenal. The verification regime 
provides both countries insight into each other’s 
strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and fa-
cilities, as well as data exchanges to track the status 
and makeup of nuclear weapons systems. 
(11) During a February 26, 2019, hearing on 
nuclear deterrence requirements of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Commander of the 
United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
General John Hyten voiced his support for the Trea-
ty, saying he was ‘‘a big supporter of the New 
START agreement’’ and stating, ‘‘The New START 
treaty’’ provides ‘‘insights into the Russians capa-
bilities. Those are hugely beneficial to me.’’. 
(12) During a March 2017 hearing on nuclear 
deterrence requirements of the House Armed Serv-
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ices Committee, Air Force General Paul Selva, the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also en-
dorsed the New START Treaty, saying the Treaty 
is ‘‘a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us 
some degree of predictability on what our potential 
adversaries look like’’. 
(13) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the 
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deter-
rence and Nuclear Integration, asserted that the 
New START Treaty was of ‘‘huge value’’ to United 
States security. 
(14) During a September 2018 hearing before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for Policy David Trachtenberg 
stated that ‘‘the transparency and verification re-
quirements of the New START Treaty are a ben-
efit’’ to the security of the United States and, in re-
sponse to a question regarding missile defense, as-
serted that the Treaty had ‘‘no’’ effect on limiting 
United States missile defense capabilities. 
(15) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic 
Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services 
Committee, Retired Air Force General and former 
commander of United States Strategic Command 
Robert Kehler stated, ‘‘I think that we have gotten 
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tremendous benefit out of those kinds of agreements 
with the Russians over the years, provided that the 
Russians comply,’’ regarding the importance of the 
New START Treaty. 
(16) The Department of State confirmed in 
February 2018 that Russia had met the Treaty’s 
central limits on strategic arms and stated that ‘‘im-
plementation of the New START Treaty enhances 
the safety and security of the United States’’. 
(17) The Nuclear Posture Review states that 
arms control agreements can ‘‘foster transparency, 
understanding, and predictability in adversary rela-
tions, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 
and miscalculation’’. 
(18) The New START Treaty strengthens 
United States nuclear security and strategic stability 
by reducing the number of strategic systems in Rus-
sia’s nuclear arsenal and provides the United States 
with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary 
to confidently verify Russian compliance with the 
Treaty. 
(19) The New START Treaty does not restrict 
United States nuclear modernization programs or 
limit United States missile defense efforts. 
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(20) If the New START Treaty is not extended 
or replaced before it expires in 2021, the United 
States runs the risk of having no legally binding, 
verifiable limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal 
for the first time since 1972. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
should seek to extend the New START Treaty from its 
initial termination date in February 2021 to February 
2026, as provided for under Article XIV of the Treaty, 
unless the President determines and informs the appro-
priate congressional committees that— 
(1) Russia is in material breach of the Treaty; 
or 
(2) the United States and Russia have entered 
into a new arms control agreement to replace the 
Treaty that provides equal or greater constraints, 
transparency, and verification measures with regard 
to Russia’s nuclear forces. 
SEC. 4. REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS TO CONGRESS. 
(a) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.—Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees an intel-
ligence assessment based on all sources of the national se-
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curity and intelligence implications of the expiration of the 
New START Treaty without the United States and Rus-
sia having entered into a new arms control agreement to 
replace the Treaty that provides equal or greater con-
straints, transparency, and verification measures with re-
gard to Russia’s nuclear forces. The assessment shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a clas-
sified annex, and shall include the following elements: 
(1) A description of the size and posture of 
Russia’s nuclear forces and strategic delivery vehi-
cles, as well as predicted force levels through Feb-
ruary 2026 under each of the following potential sce-
narios: 
(A) The Treaty expires in February 2021 
without such a replacement agreement. 
(B) The Treaty is extended until February 
2026. 
(2) An assessment of how strategic stability 
would be impacted if the Treaty is not extended or 
such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 
(3) An assessment of the impact on United 
States allies if the limitations on Russia’s nuclear 
forces are dissolved if the Treaty is not extended or 
such a replacement agreement is not concluded. 
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(4) A description of the intelligence collection 
benefits of the Treaty. 
(5) An assessment of how the United States in-
telligence community’s confidence in its assessments 
of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal and future nu-
clear force levels would be impacted if the Treaty is 
not extended or such a replacement agreement is not 
concluded. 
(6) An assessment of what specific capabilities 
the United States intelligence community would have 
to develop, deploy, or realign to ensure no loss of 
collection capability occurs if the Treaty is not ex-
tended or such a replacement agreement is not con-
cluded. 
(b) SECRETARY OF STATE.— 
(1) RELATING TO NATO, NATO MEMBER COUN-
TRIES, AND OTHER UNITED STATES ALLIES.—Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report, 
which shall be in an unclassified form, but may con-
tain a classified annex, and provide a briefing to the 
appropriate congressional committees that includes 
an assessment of the likely reactions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO mem-
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ber countries, and other United States allies to a 
United States decision not to extend the New 
START Treaty or enter into a new arms control 
agreement with Russia to replace the Treaty that 
provides equal or greater constraints, transparency, 
and verification measures with regard to Russia’s 
nuclear forces. 
(2) RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS.—Not later 
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and every 180 days thereafter until the New 
START Treaty is extended or expires, the Secretary 
of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De-
fense, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 
congressional committees that includes the following 
elements: 
(A) A description of any discussions with 
Russia on the Treaty or a similar agreement on 
the reduction and limitation of strategic offen-
sive arms at the Assistant Secretary, Ambassa-
dorial level or higher. 
(B) The dates, locations, discussion topics, 
agenda, outcomes, and Russian interlocutors in-
volved in those discussions. 
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(C) An identification of the United States 
Government departments and agencies involved 
in the discussions. 
(D) The types of systems, both nuclear 
and nonnuclear, discussed by either side in such 
discussions. 
(E) Whether an offer of extension of the 
Treaty, of any length of time, has been offered 
by either side. 
SEC. 5. PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION IN EVENT OF EXPI-
RATION OF NEW START TREATY. 
If the New START Treaty is allowed to expire before 
the United States and Russia enter into a new arms con-
trol agreement to replace the Treaty that provides equal 
or greater constraints, transparency, and verification 
measures with regard to Russia’s nuclear forces, not later 
than 30 days after such expiration the President shall sub-
mit to the appropriate congressional committees— 
(1) a justification for why the New START 
Treaty was allowed to expire; and 
(2) a certification that extending the Treaty 
was not in the national security interest of the 
United States. 
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
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(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se-
lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. 
(2) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The term 
‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 
that term in section 3 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
(3) NEW START TREATY; TREATY.—The terms 
‘‘New START Treaty’’ and ‘‘Treaty’’ mean the 
Treaty between the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, signed on April 8, 2010, and entered into 
force on February 5, 2011. 
Æ 
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