489 
(4) All three Baltic States contributed to the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in 
Afghanistan, sending disproportionate numbers of 
troops and operating with few caveats. The Baltic 
States continue to engage in Operation Resolute Sup-
port in Afghanistan. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) reaffirms its support for the principle of col-
lective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Trea-
ty for our NATO allies, including Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania; 
(2) supports the sovereignty, independence, terri-
torial integrity, and inviolability of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania as well as their internationally recog-
nized borders, and expresses concerns over increas-
ingly aggressive military maneuvering by the Russian 
Federation near their borders and airspace; 
(3) expresses concern over and condemns subver-
sive and destabilizing activities by the Russian Fed-
eration within the Baltic States; and 
(4) encourages the Administration to further en-
hance defense cooperation efforts with Estonia, Lat-
via, and Lithuania and supports the efforts of their 
Governments to provide for the defense of their people 
and sovereign territory. 
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Subtitle E—Intermediate-Range Nu-
clear Forces (INF) Treaty Preser-
vation Act of 2017 
SEC. 1241. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017’’. 
SEC. 1242. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of 
State reports entitled, ‘‘Adherence to and Compliance 
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disar-
mament Agreements and Commitments’’, all stated 
that the United States has determined that ‘‘the Rus-
sian Federation is in violation of its obligations 
under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or 
flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) 
with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or 
to possess or produce launchers of such missiles’’. 
(2) The 2016 report also noted that ‘‘the cruise 
missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty def-
inition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a 
range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, 
all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type 
used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited 
under the provisions of the INF Treaty’’. 
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(3) Potential consistency and compliance con-
cerns regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM 
have existed since 2008, were not officially raised 
with the Russian Federation until 2013, and were not 
briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) until January 2014. 
(4) The United States Government is aware of 
other consistency and compliance concerns regarding 
Russia actions vis-a`-vis its INF Treaty obligations. 
(5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, in-
cluding the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have raised 
Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty to their 
counterparts, but no progress has been made in bring-
ing the Russian Federation back into compliance 
with the INF Treaty. 
(6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe, correctly stated, ‘‘A 
weapon capability that violates the INF, that is in-
troduced into the greater European land mass, is ab-
solutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . It 
can’t go unanswered.’’. 
(7) The Department of Defense in its September 
2013 report, Report on Conventional Prompt Global 
Strike Options if Exempt from the Restrictions of the 
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, stated that it has multiple vali-
dated military requirement gaps due to the prohibi-
tions imposed on the United States as a result of its 
compliance with the INF Treaty. 
(8) It is not in the national security interests of 
the United States to be unilaterally legally prohibited 
from developing dual-capable ground-launched cruise 
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilo-
meters, while Russia makes advances in developing 
and fielding this class of weapon systems, and such 
unilateral limitation cannot be allowed to continue 
indefinitely. 
(9) Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of 
the United States Pacific Command, testified before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 27, 
2017, that ‘‘[W]e’re in a multi-polar world where we 
have a lot of countries who are developing these weap-
ons, including China, that I worry about. And I 
worry about their DF-21 and DF-26 missile pro-
grams, their anti-carrier ballistic missile programs, if 
you will. INF doesn’t address missiles launched from 
ships or airplanes, but it focuses on those land-based 
systems. I think there’s goodness in the INF treaty, 
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anything you can do to limit nuclear weapons writ- 
large is generally good. But the aspects of the INF 
Treaty that limit our ability to counter Chinese and 
other countries’ land-based missiles, I think, is prob-
lematic.’’. 
(10) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the 
Russian Federation affords the United States the 
right to invoke legal countermeasures which include 
suspension of the treaty in whole or in part. 
(11) Article XV of the INF Treaty provides that 
‘‘Each Party shall, in exercising its national sov-
ereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty 
if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its su-
preme interests.’’. 
SEC. 1243. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUS-
SIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY. 
(a) STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is the 
policy of the United States as follows: 
(1) The actions undertaken by the Russian Fed-
eration in violation of the INF Treaty constitute a 
material breach of the treaty. 
(2) In light of the Russian Federation’s material 
breach of the INF Treaty, the United States is legally 
entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty 
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in whole or in part for so long as the Russian Federa-
tion continues to be in material breach. 
(3) For so long as the Russian Federation re-
mains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the 
United States should take actions to encourage the 
Russian Federation return to compliance, including 
by— 
(A) providing additional funds for the ca-
pabilities identified in section 1243(d) of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1062); and 
(B) seeking additional missile defense assets 
in the European theater to protect United States 
and NATO forces from ground-launched missile 
systems of the Russian Federation that are in 
noncompliance with the INF Treaty. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF
ADDITIONAL
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2018 for re-
search, development, test, and evaluation, as specified 
in the funding table in division D, $50,000,000 shall 
be made available for— 
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(A) the development of active defenses to 
counter ground-launched missile systems with 
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; 
(B) counterforce capabilities to prevent at-
tacks from these missiles; and 
(C) countervailing strike capabilities to en-
hance the capabilities of the United States iden-
tified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public 
Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1062). 
(2) DEVELOPMENT.—Of the amount authorized 
to be appropriated by paragraph (1), $25,000,000 is 
authorized to be appropriated for activities under-
taken to carry out section 1244(a), including with re-
spect to research and development activities. 
SEC. 
1244. 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF 
INF 
RANGE 
GROUND- 
LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM OF RECORD.— 
The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program of record 
to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched 
cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 
kilometers. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees, the Com-
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mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify exist-
ing and planned missile systems, including the tomahawk 
land attack cruise missile, the standard missile-3, the stand-
ard missile-6, and Army tactical missile system missiles for 
ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilo-
meters in order to provide any of the capabilities identified 
in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 
1062). 
SEC. 1245. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RELATED TO RUS-
SIAN FEDERATION DEVELOPMENT OF NON-
COMPLIANT SYSTEMS AND UNITED STATES 
ACTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL BREACH OF 
INF TREATY BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares that 
because of the Russian Federation’s violations of the INF 
Treaty, including the flight-test, production, and possession 
of prohibited systems, its actions have defeated the object 
and purpose of the INF Treaty, and thus constitute a mate-
rial breach of the INF Treaty. 
(b) NOTIFICTION BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE.— 
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(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National In-
telligence shall notify the appropriate congressional 
committees of any development, deployment, or test of 
a system by the Russian Federation that the Director 
determines is inconsistent with the INF Treaty. 
(2) DEADLINE.—A notification under this sub-
section shall be made not later than 15 days after the 
date on which the Director makes the determination 
under this subsection with respect to which the notifi-
cation is required. 
(c) REPORT
BY PRESIDENT.—Not later than 15 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees a report that contains a determination of the President 
of whether the Russian Federation has flight-tested, pro-
duced, or is in possession of a ground-launched cruise mis-
sile or ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of be-
tween 500 and 5,500 kilometers during each of the three 
consecutive 120-day periods beginning on the date of the 
enactment of this Act. 
(d) UNITED STATES ACTIONS.—If the determination 
of the President contained in the report required to be sub-
mitted under subsection (c) is that the Russian Federation 
has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of any missile 
described in subsection (c) during each of the periods de-
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scribed in subsection (c), the prohibitions set forth in Article 
VI of the INF Treaty shall no longer be binding on the 
United States as a matter of United States law. 
SEC. 1246. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EX-
TEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW 
START TREATY. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or oth-
erwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the Depart-
ment of Defense may be obligated or expended to extend the 
implementation of the New START Treaty unless the Presi-
dent certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
that the Russian Federation has verifiably eliminated all 
missiles that are in violation of or may be inconsistent with 
the INF Treaty. 
SEC. 1247. REVIEW OF RS–26 BALLISTIC MISSILE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, shall conduct a review of the RS–26 bal-
listic missile of the Russian Federation. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appro-
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