(1) RUSSIA IS NOT A RELIABLE PARTNER.—(A) 
Unless Space Shuttle operations are extended be-
yond 2010, the United States will be heavily reliant 
on Russia to supply crew and possibly cargo trans-
port services to the International Space Station dur-
ing the gap period of 2010 through 2015. There will 
be no other way to fly our astronauts into space dur-
ing this period. 
(B) The United States should not increase its 
reliance on Russia to transport American astronauts 
into space, given the increasingly divergent views 
and posturing from Russia. Russia opposes the 
United States plan to base an antimissile radar sys-
tem in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles 
in Poland to deal with the threat posed by the Ira-
nian nuclear weapons and missile programs. Russia 
also suspended its participation in the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, one of the most sig-
nificant arms control agreements of the Cold War 
years. Additionally, Russia continues to arm some of 
America’s most hostile adversaries, Iran and Ven-
ezuela. Despite United States objections, Russia sold 
billions of dollars worth of weapons to the regime of 
Hugo Chavez in 2006. Such meddling is a possible 
violation of the Monroe Doctrine and a throwback to 
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the Cold War era. Even more troublesome is the 
Russian history of weapons trading with Iran. Rus-
sia has supplied advanced conventional arms tech-
nology, missile technology, and nuclear technologies 
to this very anti-American regime. 
(2) RUSSIA HAS ABUSED PAST NASA COOPERA-
TION AGREEMENTS.—(A) In the late 1990s, Russia 
fell short in fulfilling its commitment to the Inter-
national Space Station. 
(B) The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (in this Act referred to as ‘‘NASA’’) 
was forced to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars 
to enable the Russians to complete the critical Space 
Station service module Zvezda, without which the 
International Space Station could not operate. 
(C) Russia delayed completion of the Zvezda 
service module for several years. Under the Inter-
national Space Station agreement, the Russian gov-
ernment had committed to fund as well as build the 
Zvezda service module. Subsequent transfers from 
the United States, in order to complete the module, 
reflect serious Russian mismanagement in the field 
of space. 
(D) In 2000, while Russia was failing to meet 
its commitment to the International Space Station, 
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Russia was diverting financial and human resources 
away from fulfilling its International Space Station 
commitments in order to keep the Russian’s Mir 
Space Station aloft. 
(E) Russia’s past shortcomings in fulfilling 
commitments to its international space partners 
should serve as a warning to the United States as 
we consider increased reliance on Russian space 
services in the future. It is not prudent for the 
United States to depend on Russia for access to 
space given our past experience with this relation-
ship. 
(3) AMERICAN SPACE SCIENCE SHOULD NOT BE 
DEPENDENT
ON
RUSSIAN
SUPPORT.—(A) 
The 
United States has already invested billions of dollars 
in the International Space Station program since its 
inception. 
(B) There is much research of great value being 
conducted in space, and on the International Space 
Station, that may yield tremendous gains. Research 
being conducted on the International Space Station 
may help scientists back on Earth develop medicines 
to treat diseases and help us better understand the 
Earth’s climate. Many scientists believe that the 
microgravity environment of space will enable the 
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development of new drugs, vaccines, and other thera-
pies. Equipment on the International Space Station 
will monitor stratospheric gases, and investigate 
ozone chemistry. 
(4) THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE ASSURED 
ACCESS TO SPACE.—(A) To ensure that the United 
States realizes the dividends from the considerable 
investment we have made in the International Space 
Station, we need to ensure continued access to space 
for our astronauts. However, NASA’s plan for trans-
port of crew to and from the International Space 
Station fails to provide necessary redundancies to 
provide assured access to space. 
(B) NASA anticipates that the Russian Soyuz 
spacecraft will be the only vehicle for astronaut crew 
rotation to the International Space Station after 
2010. From 2011 until the planned operation of 
Orion in 2015, NASA likely has no other option for 
transporting American astronauts to space other 
than on Russian vehicles. 
(C) NASA has conceded that without the Space 
Shuttle, it will be unable to transport the Alpha 
Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the International 
Space Station. Scientists involved in the development 
of the AMS acknowledge that it will enhance sci-
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entific discoveries. While the AMS has cost over 
$1,500,000,000 to develop and build, NASA has 
stated that the remaining Space Shuttle manifest 
does not allow for transport of the AMS and that it 
will not be an option to retrofit another launch vehi-
cle in order to fly it into space. Only by extending 
Space Shuttle operations beyond 2010 will NASA be 
able to transport the AMS to the International 
Space Station. As long as the AMS meets all re-
quired standards to verify its validity and justify its 
transport on the Space Shuttle, NASA should fulfill 
its obligation to the Department of Energy and our 
international partners. 
(D) In addition, the Japanese Centrifuge Ac-
commodation Module, which can only fly to the 
International Space Station on the Space Shuttle, 
will also be unable to reach the Space Station absent 
extending Space Shuttle operations. 
(5) A BETTER APPROACH.—(A) Due to NASA’s 
lack of a backup plan for reliance on the Russians 
for transport of American astronauts to space, the 
United States needs a better approach. The best ap-
proach is the Space Shuttle, a proven, domestic 
source of space transport for assured access to 
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space, including the International Space Station, for 
crew and cargo transport. 
(B) With 2 Shuttle missions per year during 
the human spaceflight program flight gap between 
Shuttle and Orion, currently scheduled from 2010 
through 2015, we can replace our need to rely on 
the Russians for crew rotation for the International 
Space Station. 
(C) Savings from replacing Russian transport 
services to the International Space Station with the 
Space Shuttle would pay for a portion of the costs 
for flying 2 Space Shuttle missions per year. 
(D) Only by closing the gap between 2010 and 
2015, or until the Orion is operational, will our Na-
tion be able to keep our Nation’s highly skilled and 
critically important spaceworkers and engineers 
gainfully employed, and mitigate the loss of critical 
skills. 
(E) By extending Space Shuttle operations, 
NASA may realize considerable savings by no longer 
having to pay retention bonuses to critical space 
workers. But retention bonuses would not be the 
only added costs associated with the end of Space 
Shuttle operations when critical skilled workers leave 
NASA or its contractors. Recruitment incentives for 
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new workers and contract cost increases could also 
be incurred by NASA since the majority of the Ken-
nedy Space Center’s workforce are contractors. 
(F) The success of the Constellation program 
will depend on having the most skilled and experi-
enced workforce possible. The workforce gap, as cur-
rently envisioned by NASA, will jeopardize this. 
NASA has acknowledged that thousands of critical 
space workers will lose their jobs in the transition 
from the Space Shuttle to the Constellation pro-
gram. Continued operation of the Space Shuttle, but 
on a reduced flight requirement, while also inte-
grating these workers into the Orion program, is the 
best way to retain many of these critical workers 
and skill sets. 
(G) An August 2007 study by the Government 
Accountability Office, ‘‘NASA Progress Made on 
Strategic Human Capital Management, but Future 
Program Challenges Remain,’’ stated that ‘‘the 
agency as a whole faces challenges in recruiting and 
retaining highly experienced senior-level engineers in 
certain specialties. NASA’s principal workforce chal-
lenge will be faced in the transition to the next gen-
eration of human space flight systems.’’. 
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(H) This Act authorizes for NASA additional 
funding under section 4 to fully restore the appro-
priation shortfalls in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 
compared to the funds that were authorized for 
NASA. An additional $1,000,000,000 is authorized 
in section 4(b) to reimburse NASA for the costs in-
curred by NASA from the Space Shuttle return-to- 
flight efforts following the Space Shuttle Columbia 
disaster. 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON USE OF RUSSIAN SPACE SERV-
ICES. 
NASA shall not rely solely on the Russian govern-
ment for astronaut transport or cargo resupply services. 
This prohibition does not apply to the current Soyuz emer-
gency escape services for astronauts on the International 
Space Station. 
SEC. 4. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR NASA. 
(a) ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2007 SHORTFALL.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated to NASA $1,648,000,000, 41.6 percent of which 
shall be for Exploration Systems, and 28.7 percent of 
which shall be available for Space Operations. 
(b) COLUMBIA RETURN-TO-FLIGHT.—There are au-
thorized to be appropriated to NASA $1,000,000,000 for 
emergency funding to reimburse for Columbia return-to- 
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flight costs, of which the Exploration Systems and Space 
Operations Accounts shall receive funding at the rate pro-
portional to the amounts used to pay the costs associated 
with the Space Shuttle return-to-flight efforts. 
(c) ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 
2008 SHORTFALL.—There are authorized to be appro-
priated to NASA $1,064,000,000, 41.7 percent of which 
shall be for Exploration Systems. 
(d) PRESERVATION OF FUNDING FOR PROGRAMS.— 
NASA shall not take any funding from its Exploration 
Systems account or the Constellation program in order to 
fund the continued operation of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram as required in this Act. 
SEC. 5. EXTENDING SPACE SHUTTLE OPERATIONS. 
(a) USE
OF SPACE SHUTTLE
FOR ACCESS
TO 
SPACE.—NASA shall fly at least 2 Space Shuttle missions 
per year for crew transport, instead of Russian crew and 
cargo services, for the period of 2010 through 2015, or 
until Orion is operational. There are authorized to be ap-
propriated to NASA such sums as may be necessary, in 
addition to amounts otherwise authorized, to carry out 
this subsection, including for the production of more exter-
nal tanks as may be needed. 
(b) INSUFFICIENT FUNDING.—Except as provided 
under subsection (c), the requirements of this Act shall 
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have effect only to the extent that sufficient funding is 
appropriated, as authorized under subsection (a). Suffi-
cient funding is defined as funds required to fully or par-
tially comply with the requirements of this Act. 
(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—NASA shall report to 
Congress not later than 90 days after the date of enact-
ment of this Act on the specific costs and actions needed 
to extend the operation of the Space Shuttle in accordance 
with this Act. 
(d) OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCIES.—As soon as pos-
sible, but no later than March 31, 2011, NASA shall in-
vestigate areas of reduced operations and enhanced cost 
savings and implement those that do not impinge the safe 
operation of the Space Shuttle program, including the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The possible retirement of one Space Shut-
tle orbiter, leaving 2 to remain operational, in a 
manner that ensures the safe operation of the Space 
Shuttle program. 
(2) Significantly reducing changes to the design 
of the Space Shuttle orbiters, in a manner that en-
sures the safe operation of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram. This shall include changes to the Space Shut-
tle software systems. 
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