H. Res. 568 
In the House of Representatives, U. S., 
May 17, 2012. 
Whereas since at least the late 1980s, Iran has engaged in 
a sustained and well-documented pattern of illicit and de-
ceptive activities to acquire a nuclear capability; 
Whereas the United Nations Security Council has adopted 
multiple resolutions since 2006 demanding the full and 
sustained suspension of all uranium enrichment-related 
and reprocessing activities by the Iranian Government 
and its full cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) on all outstanding issues related 
to its nuclear activities, particularly those concerning the 
possible military dimensions of its nuclear program; 
Whereas Iran remains in violation of all of the aforemen-
tioned United Nations Security Council resolutions; 
Whereas, on November 8, 2011, the IAEA issued an exten-
sive report that— 
(1) documents ‘‘serious concerns regarding possible 
military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’; 
(2) states that ‘‘Iran has carried out activities rel-
evant to the development of a nuclear device’’; and 
(3) states that the efforts described in paragraphs 
(1) and (2) may be ongoing;
•HRES 568 EH 
Whereas as of November 2008, Iran had produced, according 
to the IAEA— 
(1) approximately 630 kilograms of uranium-235 en-
riched to 3.5 percent; and 
(2) no uranium-235 enriched to 20 percent; 
Whereas as of November 2011, Iran had produced, according 
to the IAEA— 
(1) nearly 5,000 kilograms of uranium-235 enriched 
to 3.5 percent; and 
(2) 79.7 kilograms of uranium-235 enriched to 20 
percent; 
Whereas, on January 9, 2011, IAEA inspectors confirmed 
that the Iranian Government had begun enrichment ac-
tivities at the Fordow site, including possibly enrichment 
of uranium-235 to 20 percent; 
Whereas Iran has repeatedly refused requests by IAEA in-
spectors to visit its Parchin military facility, a suspected 
site of Iranian activities related to testing of a nuclear 
weapon; 
Whereas if Iran were successful in acquiring a nuclear weap-
on capability, it would likely spur other countries in the 
region to consider developing their own nuclear weapons 
capabilities; 
Whereas, on December 6, 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia stated that if international efforts to pre-
vent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons fail, ‘‘we must, 
as a duty to our country and people, look into all options 
we are given, including obtaining these weapons our-
selves’’;
•HRES 568 EH 
(A) the full and sustained suspension of all 
uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activi-
ties; 
(B) complete cooperation with the IAEA on all 
outstanding questions related to Iran’s nuclear ac-
tivities, including— 
(i) the implementation of the Additional 
Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons; and 
(ii) the verified end of Iran’s ballistic mis-
sile programs; and 
(C) a permanent agreement that verifiably 
assures that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely 
peaceful; 
(3) expresses support for the universal rights and 
democratic aspirations of the Iranian people; 
(4) affirms that it is a vital national interest of the 
United States to prevent the Government of Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability; 
(5) strongly supports United States policy to pre-
vent the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability; 
(6) rejects any policy that would rely on efforts to 
contain a nuclear weapons-capable Iran; and
•HRES 568 EH 
(7) 
urges 
the 
President 
to 
reaffirm 
the 
unacceptability of an Iran with nuclear-weapons capa-
bility and opposition to any policy that would rely on 
containment as an option in response to the Iranian nu-
clear threat. 
Attest: 
Clerk.