would be very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Terror-
ists could attack or steal the waste as it travels on 
our roads, highways, railways, or waterways, as it 
is stored or moved at intermodal storage facilities 
or storage depots, or at the proposed repository 
itself. 
(16) The United States Government, in at-
tempting to implement the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1982, has not sufficiently addressed the threat of 
terrorist attacks. 
(17) The Department of Energy has failed to 
address the Yucca Mountain Project’s vulnerability 
to terrorism and sabotage, intrusions, trespassing, 
vandalism, arson, and bomb-related incidents, as ex-
pressed by the State of Nevada and independent re-
searchers throughout the country. As a result, the 
Department of Energy has failed to discuss or pro-
vide any plan for prevention and response to ter-
rorist attacks directed at Yucca Mountain. 
(18) The Department of Energy’s current 
methodology for assessing risks seriously underesti-
mates those associated with sabotage and terrorism 
against radioactive shipments, waste stored at inter-
modal storage facilities or storage depots, and at 
Yucca Mountain itself.
(19) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the 
agency in charge of protecting public health and 
safety and the environment from the harmful effects 
of nuclear waste, has not revised its rules regarding 
the transportation of nuclear waste since the early 
1970s. The antiquated rules do not address modern-
day threats and weapons, nor the increased risk 
posed by today’s most violent and maniacal terror-
ists. 
SEC. 3. YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT VULNERABILITY AND 
DEFENSE PLAN. 
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate 
the development and implementation of an interagency 
plan, in conjunction with appropriate Federal, State, and 
local agencies and with public input, to prepare for and 
defend against Federal crimes of terrorism targeting any 
aspect of the Yucca Mountain Project. The interagency 
plan shall—
(1) include a comprehensive analysis of the 
safety and vulnerability to Federal crimes of ter-
rorism of the Yucca Mountain Project; 
(2) address attacks against—
(A) rail, truck, and barge shipments of nu-
clear waste;
(B) facilities, equipment, infrastructure, 
and vehicles used for such shipments of nuclear 
waste; 
(C) personnel working for the Yucca 
Mountain Project; 
(D) all intermediary, staging, transfer, 
intermodal, and temporary storage facilities 
used for shipping nuclear waste to the Yucca 
Mountain repository; 
(E) Yucca Mountain repository facilities, 
vehicles, and equipment; 
(F) all water and power systems used by 
the Yucca Mountain Project; and 
(G) nuclear waste containers for transpor-
tation, transfer, or storage; 
(3) give special emphasis to addressing—
(A) the use of nuclear waste as a radio-
logical weapon; 
(B) the use of high-energy explosives, anti-
tank missiles, armor-piercing technologies, and 
other sophisticated technologies; and 
(C) sabotage or theft of high-level nuclear 
waste;
(4) include a comprehensive strategy for de-
fending the Yucca Mountain Project against all Fed-
eral crimes of terrorism, which shall address—
(A) vulnerabilities analyzed under para-
graph (1); 
(B) the defense of the Yucca Mountain 
Project against air and ground assaults, truck 
bombs, attacks using sophisticated armor-pierc-
ing technologies, suicide attacks, and other po-
tential military-style attacks; 
(C) credible worst-case assumptions about 
the timing and location of potential attacks; 
(D) the effects of weather conditions dur-
ing and after attacks; 
(E) the use of expanded no-fly zones, and 
the development of policy regarding infractions 
of a no-fly zone, over key areas involved in the 
Yucca Mountain Project, with emphasis paid to 
whether the size of the no-fly zone is sufficient 
to protect against an airborne attack, ways of 
defending against this type of attack, and 
whether there is ample time for our national de-
fense to defend against an infraction of the no-
fly zone;
(F) the use of background and security 
checks of all personnel related to the transport 
of nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain; 
(G) developing a uniform Federal standard 
for the use of deadly force to protect all aspects 
of the Yucca Mountain Project; and 
(H) specific rules of engagement for a po-
tential airborne attack; and 
(5) include an analysis of the economic, public 
health, and environmental costs and impacts of im-
plementing the interagency plan. 
SEC. 4. YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT TERRORISM CON-
SEQUENCE 
ASSESSMENT 
AND 
RESPONSE 
PLAN. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency, in co-
ordination with appropriate Federal, State, and local 
agencies, shall coordinate the development and implemen-
tation of a comprehensive interagency plan to ensure that 
Federal, State, and local government response plans and 
programs can respond adequately to the consequences of 
Federal crimes of terrorism directed against any stage of 
the Yucca Mountain Project. The plan shall include—
(1) necessary preresponse preparations and 
evacuation plans for Federal, State, and local gov-
ernments;
(2) procedures for notifying State and local 
emergency response units when nuclear waste is 
transported through their local area; 
(3) an analysis and a comprehensive set of pro-
cedures to address the impacts of Federal crimes of 
terrorism that result in a release of radioactive ma-
terials including—
(A) immediate and long-term public health 
effects; 
(B) environmental impacts, broadly de-
fined; 
(C) direct socioeconomic impacts, including 
cleanup and disposal costs and opportunity 
costs, to affected individuals and businesses; 
and 
(D) indirect socioeconomic impacts, includ-
ing economic losses resulting from perceptions 
of risk and stigma effects; and 
(4) a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the 
economic, public health, and environmental effects of 
implementing the plan, including analysis of the re-
percussions and costs from a wide range of types of 
Federal crimes of terrorism.