IV
106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. CON. RES. 164
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should adhere to
a consistent policy with respect to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostile situations.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JULY 27, 1999
Mr. HAYES submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred
to the Committee on International Relations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress that the President
should adhere to a consistent policy with respect to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostile
situations.
Whereas since President Clinton took office in 1993, United
States Armed Forces have been introduced 19 times into
hostile situations;
Whereas members of the United States Armed Forces volun-
tarily, and without condition, carry out the orders of the
President, their Commander-in-Chief;
Whereas American idealism and its imperative for democracy
and freedom around the world does not, in all cases, par-
allel the national interests of the United States;
•HCON 164 IH
Whereas in 1992 President Clinton called for a peacekeeping
mission into Somalia, deploying approximately 25,800
members of the United States Armed Forces, and this
mission ultimately cost 29 American lives and concluded
with the withdrawal of such Armed Forces in the midst
of civil unrest and political instability;
Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a humanitarian
mission into Rwanda, deploying approximately 3,600
members of the United States Armed Forces, that con-
cluded with the withdrawal of such Armed Forces in the
midst of civil unrest and political instability;
Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a mission into
Haiti to restore constitutional order, deploying approxi-
mately 21,000 members of the United States Armed
Forces, and this mission ultimately cost one American
life and concluded with the withdrawal of such Armed
Forces in the midst of civil unrest and political insta-
bility;
Whereas in 1994 President Clinton called for a mission into
Bosnia-Herzegovina to suppress Serbian aggression and
to eventually ensure implementation of the conditions
outlined under a negotiated peace settlement, deploying
approximately 16,500 members of the United States
Armed Forces, which has resulted in the partition of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (thus achieving a goal of the Ser-
bians), and which has yet to conclude and will require a
long-term United States military presence;
Whereas in 1998 President Clinton called for a mission in-
volving air strikes against Iraq to reinstate inspections of
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and
degrade Saddam Hussein’s ability to produce weapons of
mass destruction, using 650 strike and strike support
•HCON 164 IH
sorties and expending over 400 cruise missiles, that con-
cluded with the termination of UNSCOM inspections, has
emboldened Saddam Hussein, and has strengthened his
stranglehold on the Iraqi people;
Whereas the frequency, and, at times, seemingly cavalier use
of the United States Armed Forces calls into question the
Clinton Administration’s policy of military engagement;
and
Whereas during the Reagan Administration, the deployment
of United States Armed Forces into hostile situations ad-
hered to the ‘‘Weinberger Doctrine’’, the philosophy of
then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, which
stated clear and consistent objectives prior to the intro-
duction of United States Armed Forces into hostile situa-
tions: Now therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate
concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the
President should, with respect to the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situa-
tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances—
(1) adhere to the ‘‘Weinberger Doctrine’’, the
philosophy of former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger, which states—
(A) such introduction of Armed Forces
should take place only if the vital national in-
terests of the United States are in jeopardy;
•HCON 164 IH
(B) the commitment to introduce the
Armed Forces should be framed around clearly
defined political and military objectives;
(C) prior to such introduction of Armed
Forces, there should exist a reasonable assur-
ance that the President will have the support of
the people of the United States and their elect-
ed representative in Congress for such introduc-
tion;
(D) such introduction of Armed Forces
should be a last resort;
(E) such introduction of Armed Forces
should be done wholeheartedly and in a manner
by which the Armed Forces have an over-
whelming superiority so that a swift victory is
virtually certain; and
(F) the President should continually reas-
sess and, if necessary, readjust the commitment
to introduce the Armed Forces if conditions and
objectives invariably change after such introduc-
tion; and
(2) in addition to adhering to the requirements
of the ‘‘Weinberger Doctrine’’ under paragraph (1),
should, after the mission of the Armed Forces has
been defined and the Armed Forces have been intro-
•HCON 164 IH
duced, allow senior general officers of the Armed
Forces to carry out the mission in an unhindered
manner.
Æ