H. R. 2810—496 
and deploy, and the lifecycle costs to operate and sustain, 
the sensor architecture; 
(2) an assessment of the maturity of critical technologies 
necessary to make operational such sensor architecture, and 
recommendations for any research and development activities 
to rapidly mature such technologies; 
(3) an assessment of what capabilities such sensor architec-
ture can contribute that other sensor architectures do not con-
tribute; 
(4) how the Director will leverage the use of national tech-
nical means, commercially available space and terrestrial 
capabilities, hosted payloads, small satellites, and other 
capabilities to carry out subsection (a); and 
(5) any other matters the Director determines appropriate. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1684. IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE SYSTEM AND 
ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM CO- 
DEVELOPMENT AND CO-PRODUCTION. 
(a) IRON DOME SHORT-RANGE ROCKET DEFENSE SYSTEM.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Of the funds authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for 
fiscal year 2018 for procurement, Defense-wide, and available 
for the Missile Defense Agency, not more than $92,000,000 
may be provided to the Government of Israel to procure Tamir 
interceptors for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense 
system through co-production of such interceptors in the United 
States by industry of the United States. 
(2) CONDITIONS.— 
(A) AGREEMENT.—Funds described in paragraph (1) 
for the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense program shall 
be available subject to the terms and conditions in the 
Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the 
United States of America and the Ministry of Defense 
of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System 
Procurement, signed on March 5, 2014, as amended to 
include co-production for Tamir interceptors. In negotia-
tions by the Missile Defense Agency and the Missile 
Defense Organization of the Government of Israel 
regarding such production, the goal of the United States 
is to maximize opportunities for co-production of the Tamir 
interceptors described in paragraph (1) in the United States 
by industry of the United States. 
(B) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days prior to 
the initial obligation of funds described in paragraph (1), 
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees— 
(i) a certification that the amended bilateral inter-
national agreement specified in subparagraph (A) is
H. R. 2810—497 
being implemented as provided in such agreement; 
and 
(ii) an assessment detailing any risks relating to 
the implementation of such agreement. 
(b) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, DAVID’S 
SLING WEAPON SYSTEM CO-PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for procure-
ment, Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense 
Agency not more than $120,000,000 may be provided to the 
Government of Israel to procure the David’s Sling Weapon 
System, including for co-production of parts and components 
in the United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—The Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Sustainment shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has demonstrated the 
successful completion of the knowledge points, technical 
milestones, and production readiness reviews required by 
the research, development, and technology agreement and 
the bilateral co-production agreement for the David’s Sling 
Weapon System; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be provided 
on the basis of a one-for-one cash match made by Israel 
or in another matching amount that otherwise meets best 
efforts (as mutually agreed to by the United States and 
Israel); and 
(C) the level of co-production of parts, components, 
and all-up rounds (if appropriate) in the United States 
by United States industry for the David’s Sling Weapon 
System is not less than 50 percent. 
(c) ISRAELI COOPERATIVE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM, ARROW 
3 UPPER TIER INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM CO-PRODUCTION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2018 for procure-
ment, Defense-wide, and available for the Missile Defense 
Agency not more than $120,000,000 may be provided to the 
Government of Israel for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor 
Program, including for co-production of parts and components 
in the United States by United States industry. 
(2) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided by paragraph (3), 
the 
Under 
Secretary 
of 
Defense 
for 
Acquisition 
and 
Sustainment shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a certification that— 
(A) the Government of Israel has demonstrated the 
successful completion of the knowledge points, technical 
milestones, and production readiness reviews required by 
the research, development, and technology agreements for 
the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Development Program; 
(B) funds specified in paragraph (1) will be provided 
on the basis of a one-for-one cash match made by Israel 
or in another matching amount that otherwise meets best 
efforts (as mutually agreed to by the United States and 
Israel); 
(C) the United States has entered into a bilateral inter-
national agreement with Israel that establishes, with 
respect to the use of such funds—
H. R. 2810—498 
(i) in accordance with subparagraph (D), the terms 
of co-production of parts and components on the basis 
of the greatest practicable co-production of parts, 
components, and all-up rounds (if appropriate) by 
United States industry and minimizes nonrecurring 
engineering and facilitization expenses to the costs 
needed for co-production; 
(ii) complete transparency on the requirement of 
Israel for the number of interceptors and batteries 
that will be procured, including with respect to the 
procurement plans, acquisition strategy, and funding 
profiles of Israel; 
(iii) technical milestones for co-production of parts 
and components and procurement; 
(iv) a joint affordability working group to consider 
cost reduction initiatives; and 
(v) joint approval processes for third-party sales; 
and 
(D) the level of co-production described in subpara-
graph (C)(i) for the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Pro-
gram is not less than 50 percent. 
(3) WAIVER.—The Under Secretary may waive the certifi-
cation required by paragraph (2) if the Under Secretary certifies 
to the appropriate congressional committees that the Under 
Secretary has received sufficient data from the Government 
of Israel to demonstrate— 
(A) the funds specified in paragraph (1) are provided 
to Israel solely for funding the procurement of long-lead 
components and critical hardware in accordance with a 
production plan, including a funding profile detailing Israeli 
contributions for production, including long-lead produc-
tion, of the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; 
(B) such long-lead components have successfully com-
pleted knowledge points, technical milestones, and produc-
tion readiness reviews; and 
(C) the long-lead procurement will be conducted in 
a manner that maximizes co-production in the United 
States without incurring nonrecurring engineering activity 
or cost other than such activity or cost required for sup-
pliers of the United States to start or restart production 
in the United States. 
(d) NUMBER.—In carrying out paragraph (2) of subsection (b) 
and paragraph (2) of subsection (c), the Under Secretary may 
submit— 
(1) one certification covering both the David’s Sling Weapon 
System and the Arrow 3 Upper Tier Interceptor Program; or 
(2) separate certifications for each respective system. 
(e) TIMING.—The Under Secretary shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees the certifications under paragraph (2) 
of subsection (b) and paragraph (2) of subsection (c) by not later 
than 60 days before the funds specified in paragraph (1) of sub-
sections (b) and (c) for the respective system covered by the certifi-
cation are provided to the Government of Israel. 
(f) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means 
the following: 
(1) The congressional defense committees.
H. R. 2810—499 
(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 1685. BOOST PHASE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that, 
if consistent with the direction or recommendations of the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Review that commenced in 2017— 
(1) the Secretary of Defense should rapidly develop and 
demonstrate a boost phase intercept capability for missile 
defense as soon as practicable; 
(2) existing technologies should be adapted to demonstrate 
this capability; 
(3) the concept of operation for this demonstration should 
be developed in cooperation with the United States Pacific 
Command to address emerging threats and heightened tensions 
in the Asia-Pacific region; and 
(4) the Secretary should prioritize funding allocations for 
the development of boost phase intercept capabilities and 
coordinate these efforts with the Missile Defense Agency as 
the Agency develops a space-based missile defense sensor layer. 
(b) INITIAL
OPERATIONAL
DEPLOYMENT.—The Secretary of 
Defense shall ensure that an effective interim kinetic or directed 
energy boost phase ballistic missile defense capability is available 
for initial operational deployment as soon as practicable. 
(c) PLAN.—Together with the budget of the President submitted 
to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, 
for fiscal year 2019, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a plan to achieve the requirement 
in subsection (b). Such plan shall include— 
(1) the budget requirements; 
(2) a robust test schedule; and 
(3) a plan to develop an enduring boost phase ballistic 
missile defense capability, including cost and test schedule. 
SEC. 1686. GROUND-BASED INTERCEPTOR CAPABILITY, CAPACITY, AND 
RELIABILITY. 
(a) INCREASE IN CAPACITY AND CONTINUED ADVANCEMENT.— 
The Secretary of Defense may— 
(1) subject to the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
for national missile defense, increase the number of the ground- 
based interceptors of the United States by up to 28, if consistent 
with the direction or recommendations of the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review that commenced in 2017; 
(2) develop a plan to further increase such number to 
the currently available missile field capacity of 104 and to 
plan for any future capacity at any site that may be identified 
by such Ballistic Missile Defense Review; and 
(3) continue to rapidly advance missile defense technologies 
to improve the capability and reliability of the ground-based 
midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense 
system. 
(b) DEPLOYMENT.—Not later than December 31, 2021, the Sec-
retary of Defense may— 
(1) execute any requisite construction to ensure that Missile 
Field 1 or Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, or alternative 
missile fields at Fort Greely which may be identified pursuant
H. R. 2810—500 
to subsection (a), are capable of supporting and sustaining 
additional ground-based interceptors; and 
(2) deploy up to 20 additional ground-based interceptors 
to a missile field at Fort Greely as soon as technically feasible. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If consistent with the direction or rec-
ommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that 
commenced in 2017, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees, not later 
than 90 days after the date on which the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review is published, a report on options to increase 
the capability, capacity, and reliability of the ground-based 
midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense 
system and the infrastructure requirements for increasing the 
number of ground-based interceptors in currently feasible loca-
tions across the United States. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall 
include the following: 
(A) An identification of potential sites in the United 
States, whether existing or new on the East Coast or in 
the Midwest, for the deployment of 104 ground-based inter-
ceptors. 
(B) A cost-benefit analysis of each such site, including 
with respect to tactical, operational, and cost-to-construct 
considerations. 
(C) A description of any completed and outstanding 
environmental assessments or impact statements for each 
such site. 
(D) A description of the additional infrastructure and 
components needed to further outfit missile fields at Fort 
Greely before emplacing additional ground-based intercep-
tors configured with the redesigned kill vehicle, including 
with respect to ground excavation, silos, utilities, and sup-
port equipment. 
(E) A cost estimate of such infrastructure and compo-
nents. 
(F) An estimated schedule for completing such 
construction as may be required for such infrastructure 
and components. 
(G) An identification of any environmental assessments 
or impact studies that would need to be conducted to 
expand such missile fields at Fort Greely beyond current 
capacity. 
(H) A determination of the appropriate fleet mix of 
ground-based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters to maxi-
mize overall system effectiveness and increase its capacity 
and capability, including the costs and benefits of continued 
inclusion of capability enhancement II block 1 interceptors 
after the fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle. 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.
H. R. 2810—501 
SEC. 1687. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR GROUND- 
BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF THE BAL-
LISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM. 
Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the ground-based 
midcourse defense element of the ballistic missile defense system, 
$50,000,000 may not be obligated or expended until the date on 
which the Director of the Missile Defense Agency submits to the 
congressional defense committees a written certification that the 
risk of mission failure of ground-based midcourse interceptor 
enhanced kill vehicles due to foreign object debris has been mini-
mized. 
SEC. 1688. PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE INTERCEPT LAYER. 
(a) DEVELOPMENT.—If consistent with the direction or rec-
ommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that com-
menced in 2017, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall 
develop a space-based ballistic missile intercept layer to the ballistic 
missile defense system that is— 
(1) regionally focused; 
(2) capable of providing boost-phase defense; and 
(3) achieves an operational capability at the earliest prac-
ticable date. 
(b) SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE INTERCEPT LAYER PLAN.— 
If the Director carries out subsection (a), not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to carry 
out subsection (a) during the 10-year period following the date 
of the plan. Such plan shall include the following: 
(1) A concept definition phase consisting of multiple 
awarded contracts to identify feasible solutions consistent with 
architectural principles, performance goals, and price points 
established by the Director, such as contracts relating to— 
(A) refined requirements; 
(B) conceptual designs; 
(C) technology readiness assessments; 
(D) critical technical and operational issues; 
(E) cost, schedule, performance estimates; and 
(F) risk reduction plans. 
(2) A technology risk reduction phase consisting of up to 
three competitively awarded contracts focused on maturing, 
integrating, and characterizing key technologies, algorithms, 
components, and subsystems, such as contracts relating to— 
(A) refined concepts and designs; 
(B) engineering trade studies; 
(C) medium-to-high fidelity digital representations of 
the space-based ballistic missile intercept weapon system; 
and 
(D) a proposed integration and test sequence that could 
potentially lead to a live-fire boost phase intercept during 
fiscal year 2022, if the technology has reached sufficient 
maturity and is economically viable. 
(3) During the technology risk reduction phase, contractors 
will define proposed demonstrations to a preliminary design 
review level prior to a technology development phase down- 
select.
H. R. 2810—502 
(4) A technology development phase consisting of two 
competitively awarded contracts to mature the preferred space- 
based ballistic missile intercept weapon system concepts and 
to potentially conduct a live-fire boost phase intercept fly-off 
during fiscal year 2022, if the technology has reached sufficient 
maturity and is economically viable, with brassboard hardware 
and prototype software on a path to the operational goal. 
(5) A concurrent space-based ballistic missile intercept 
weapon system fire control test bed activity that incrementally 
incorporates modeling and simulation elements, real-world 
data, hardware, algorithms, and systems to evaluate with 
increasing confidence the performance of evolving designs and 
concepts of such weapon system from target detection to inter-
cept. 
(6) Any other matters the Director determines appropriate. 
(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF SPACE TEST BED.—In carrying out sub-
section (a), the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall estab-
lish a space test bed to— 
(1) conduct research and development regarding options 
for a space-based defensive layer, including with respect to 
space-based interceptors and directed energy platforms; and 
(2) identify the most cost-efficient and promising techno-
logical solutions to implementing such layer. 
(d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional defense committees; and 
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives. 
SEC. 1689. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE STATE OF THE MISSILE 
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Secretary of Defense should use the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review that commenced in 2017 to consider accel-
erating the development of technologies that will increase the 
capacity, capability, and reliability of the ground-based mid-
course defense element of the ballistic missile defense system; 
(2) upon completion of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 
the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should, to the extent 
practicable and with sound acquisition practices, accelerate the 
development, testing, and fielding of such capabilities as they 
are prioritized in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, with 
respect to the redesigned kill vehicle, the multi-object kill 
vehicle, the C3 booster, a space-based sensor layer, boost phase 
sensor and kill technologies, and additional ground-based inter-
ceptors; and 
(3) in order to achieve these objectives, and to avoid post- 
production and post-deployment problems, it is essential for 
the Department of Defense and the Missile Defense Agency 
to follow a ‘‘fly before you buy’’ approach to adequately test 
and assess the elements of the ballistic missile defense system 
before final production decisions or operational deployment. 
SEC. 1690. SENSE OF CONGRESS AND REPORT ON GROUND-BASED MID-
COURSE DEFENSE TESTING. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
H. R. 2810—503 
(1) at a minimum, the Missile Defense Agency should con-
tinue to flight test the ground-based midcourse defense element 
at least once each fiscal year; 
(2) the Department of Defense should allocate increased 
funding to homeland missile defense testing to ensure that 
the defenses of the United States continue to evolve faster 
than the threats against which they are postured to defend, 
while pursuing a sound acquisition practice; 
(3) in order to rapidly innovate, develop, and field new 
technologies, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should 
continue to focus testing campaigns on delivering increased 
capabilities to the Armed Forces as quickly as possible; and 
(4) the Director should seek to establish a more prudent 
balance between risk mitigation and the more rapid testing 
pace needed to quickly develop and deliver new capabilities 
to the Armed Forces. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—If consistent with the direction or rec-
ommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that 
commenced in 2017, not later than 90 days after the date 
on which the Review is published, the Director of the Missile 
Defense Agency shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a revised missile defense testing campaign plan 
that accelerates the development and deployment of new missile 
defense technologies. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report under paragraph (1) shall 
include the following: 
(A) A detailed analysis of the acceleration of each of 
following programs: 
(i) Redesigned kill vehicle. 
(ii) Multi-object kill vehicle. 
(iii) Configuration-3 Booster. 
(iv) Such additional technologies as the Director 
considers appropriate. 
(B) A new deployment timeline for each of the pro-
grams listed in subparagraph (A) or a detailed description 
of why the current timeline for deployment technologies 
under those programs is most suitable. 
(C) An identification of any funding or policy restric-
tions that would slow down the deployment of the tech-
nologies under the programs listed in subparagraph (A). 
(D) A risk assessment of the potential cost-overruns 
and deployment delays that may be encountered in the 
expedited development process of the capabilities under 
paragraph (1). 
(c) REPORT ON FUNDING PROFILE.—The Director shall include 
with the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in 
support of the budget of the Department of Defense for fiscal 
year 2019 (as submitted with the budget of the President under 
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code) a report on the 
funding profile necessary for the new testing campaign plan 
required by subsection (b)(1).
H. R. 2810—504 
Subtitle F—Other Matters 
SEC. 1691. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED 
STATES FROM ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE ATTACKS AND 
SIMILAR EVENTS. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby established a commission 
to be known as the ‘‘Commission to Assess the Threat to the 
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attacks and Similar 
Events’’ (hereafter in this section referred to as the ‘‘Commission’’). 
The purpose of the Commission is to assess and make recommenda-
tions with respect to the threat to the United States from electro-
magnetic pulse attacks and similar events. 
(b) COMPOSITION.— 
(1) MEMBERSHIP.—The Commission shall be composed of 
12 members appointed as follows: 
(A) Three members appointed by the chair of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. 
(B) Three members appointed by the ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives. 
(C) Three members appointed by the chair of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate. 
(D) Three members appointed by the ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 
(2) CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR.— 
(A) CHAIR.—The chair of the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives and the chair 
of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate shall 
jointly designate one member of the Commission to serve 
as chair of the Commission. 
(B) VICE CHAIR.—The ranking minority member of the 
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representa-
tives and the ranking minority member of the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate shall jointly designate 
one member of the Commission to serve as vice chair 
of the Commission. 
(3) SECURITY
CLEARANCE
REQUIRED.—Each individual 
appointed as a member of the Commission shall possess (or 
have recently possessed before the date of such appointment) 
the appropriate security clearance necessary to carry out the 
duties of the Commission. 
(4) QUALIFICATION.—Members of the Commission shall be 
appointed from among private United States citizens with 
knowledge and expertise in the scientific, technical, and defense 
aspects of electromagnetic pulse threats, geomagnetic disturb-
ances, and related vulnerabilities. 
(5) PERIOD OF APPOINTMENT; VACANCIES.—Members shall 
be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in 
the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the 
original appointment. 
(c) DUTIES.— 
(1) REVIEW
AND
ASSESSMENT.—The Commission shall 
review and assess— 
(A) the nature, magnitude, and likelihood of potential 
electromagnetic pulse (hereafter in section referred to as 
‘‘EMP’’) attacks and similar events, including geomagnetic
H. R. 2810—505 
disturbances, both manmade and natural, that could be 
directed at or affect the United States within the next 
20 years; 
(B) the vulnerability of United States military and 
civilian systems to EMP attacks and similar events, 
including with respect to emergency preparedness and 
immediate response; 
(C) the capability of the United States to repair and 
recover from damage inflicted on United States military 
and civilian systems by EMP attacks and similar events; 
and 
(D) the feasibility and cost of hardening critical mili-
tary and civilian systems against EMP attack and similar 
events. 
(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.—The Commission shall recommend 
any actions it believes should be taken by the United States 
to better prepare, prevent, mitigate, or recover military and 
civilian systems with respect to EMP attacks and similar 
events. 
(d) COOPERATION FROM GOVERNMENT.— 
(1) COOPERATION.—In carrying out its duties, the Commis-
sion shall receive the full and timely cooperation of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, and the pertinent heads of any other Fed-
eral agency in providing the Commission with analysis, 
briefings, and other information necessary for the fulfillment 
of its responsibilities. 
(2) LIAISON.—Each Secretary specified in paragraph (1) 
shall designate at least one officer or employee of the respective 
department of the Secretary to serve as a liaison officer between 
the Department and the Commission. 
(e) REPORT.— 
(1) FINAL REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 2019, the 
Commission shall submit to the President, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives, and the Committee on Armed Services 
of the Senate a report on the findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations of the Commission. 
(B) FORM OF REPORT.—The report submitted to Con-
gress under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(2) VIEWS
OF
THE
SECRETARY.—Not later than 90 days 
after the submittal of the report under paragraph (1), the 
Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate a report that contains the 
views of the Secretary with respect to the findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations of the Commission and any actions the 
Secretary intends to take as a result. 
(3) INTERIM BRIEFING.—Not later than October 1, 2018, 
the Commission shall provide to the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate a briefing on the status 
of the activities of the Commission, including a discussion of 
any interim recommendations.
H. R. 2810—506 
(f) FUNDING.—Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
by this Act for the Department of Defense, $3,000,000 is available 
to fund the activities of the Commission, as specified in the funding 
tables in division D. 
(g) APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.—The 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall apply to 
the Commission. 
(h) TERMINATION.—The Commission shall terminate on October 
1, 2019. 
(i) REPEAL.—Title XIV of Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106–398) is 
repealed. 
SEC. 1692. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN FACILITIES AND ASSETS FROM 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT. 
Section 130i of title 10, United States Code, is amended to 
read as follows: 
‘‘§ 130i Protection of certain facilities and assets from 
unmanned aircraft 
‘‘(a) AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding section 46502 of title 49, 
or any provision of title 18, the Secretary of Defense may take, 
and may authorize members of the armed forces and officers and 
civilian employees of the Department of Defense with assigned 
duties that include safety, security, or protection of personnel, facili-
ties, or assets, to take, such actions described in subsection (b)(1) 
that are necessary to mitigate the threat (as defined by the Sec-
retary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Transpor-
tation) that an unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft 
poses to the safety or security of a covered facility or asset. 
‘‘(b) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.—(1) The actions described in this 
paragraph are the following: 
‘‘(A) Detect, identify, monitor, and track the unmanned 
aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, 
including by means of intercept or other access of a wire 
communication, an oral communication, or an electronic 
communication used to control the unmanned aircraft system 
or unmanned aircraft. 
‘‘(B) Warn the operator of the unmanned aircraft system 
or unmanned aircraft, including by passive or active, and direct 
or indirect physical, electronic, radio, and electromagnetic 
means. 
‘‘(C) Disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or 
unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by dis-
abling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft 
by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, 
oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the 
unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. 
‘‘(D) Seize or exercise control of the unmanned aircraft 
system or unmanned aircraft. 
‘‘(E) Seize or otherwise confiscate the unmanned aircraft 
system or unmanned aircraft. 
‘‘(F) Use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy 
the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft. 
‘‘(2) The Secretary of Defense shall develop the actions described 
in paragraph (1) in coordination with the Secretary of Transpor-
tation.
H. R. 2810—507 
‘‘(c) FORFEITURE.—Any unmanned aircraft system or unmanned 
aircraft described in subsection (a) that is seized by the Secretary 
of Defense is subject to forfeiture to the United States. 
‘‘(d) REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE.—(1) The Secretary of Defense 
and the Secretary of Transportation may prescribe regulations and 
shall issue guidance in the respective areas of each Secretary to 
carry out this section. 
‘‘(2)(A) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transpor-
tation shall coordinate in the development of guidance under para-
graph (1). 
‘‘(B) The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate with the Sec-
retary of Transportation and the Administrator of the Federal Avia-
tion Administration before issuing any guidance or otherwise imple-
menting this section if such guidance or implementation might 
affect aviation safety, civilian aviation and aerospace operations, 
aircraft airworthiness, or the use of airspace. 
‘‘(e) PRIVACY PROTECTION.—The regulations prescribed or guid-
ance issued under subsection (d) shall ensure that— 
‘‘(1) the interception or acquisition of, or access to, commu-
nications to or from an unmanned aircraft system under this 
section is conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth 
amendment to the Constitution and applicable provisions of 
Federal law; 
‘‘(2) communications to or from an unmanned aircraft 
system are intercepted, acquired, or accessed only to the extent 
necessary to support a function of the Department of Defense; 
‘‘(3) records of such communications are not maintained 
for more than 180 days unless the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that maintenance of such records— 
‘‘(A) is necessary to support one or more functions 
of the Department of Defense; or 
‘‘(B) is required for a longer period to support a civilian 
law enforcement agency or by any other applicable law 
or regulation; and 
‘‘(4) such communications are not disclosed outside the 
Department of Defense unless the disclosure— 
‘‘(A) would fulfill a function of the Department of 
Defense; 
‘‘(B) would support a civilian law enforcement agency 
or the enforcement activities of a regulatory agency of 
the Federal Government in connection with a criminal 
or civil investigation of, or any regulatory action with 
regard to, an action described in subsection (b)(1); or 
‘‘(C) is otherwise required by law or regulation. 
‘‘(f) BUDGET.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Con-
gress, as a part of the defense budget materials for each fiscal 
year after fiscal year 2018, a consolidated funding display that 
identifies the funding source for the actions described in subsection 
(b)(1) within the Department of Defense. The funding display shall 
be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. 
‘‘(g) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFINGS.—(1) On a semiannual basis during 
the five-year period beginning March 1, 2018, the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, shall jointly provide 
a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees on the activi-
ties carried out pursuant to this section. Such briefings shall 
include—
H. R. 2810—508 
‘‘(A) policies, programs, and procedures to mitigate or elimi-
nate impacts of such activities to the National Airspace System; 
‘‘(B) a description of instances where actions described in 
subsection (b)(1) have been taken; 
‘‘(C) how the Secretaries have informed the public as to 
the possible use of authorities under this section; and 
‘‘(D) how the Secretaries have engaged with Federal, State, 
and local law enforcement agencies to implement and use such 
authorities. 
‘‘(2) Each briefing under paragraph (1) shall be in unclassified 
form, but may be accompanied by an additional classified briefing. 
‘‘(h) RULE
OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section may 
be construed to— 
‘‘(1) vest in the Secretary of Defense any authority of the 
Secretary of Transportation or the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration under title 49; and 
‘‘(2) vest in the Secretary of Transportation or the Adminis-
trator of the Federal Aviation Administration any authority 
of the Secretary of Defense under this title. 
‘‘(i) PARTIAL TERMINATION.—(1) Except as provided by para-
graph (2), the authority to carry out this section with respect 
to the covered facilities or assets specified in clauses (iv) through 
(viii) of subsection (j)(3) shall terminate on December 31, 2020. 
‘‘(2) The President may extend by 180 days the termination 
date specified in paragraph (1) if before November 15, 2020, the 
President certifies to Congress that such extension is in the national 
security interests of the United States. 
‘‘(j) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ 
means— 
‘‘(A) the congressional defense committees; 
‘‘(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation of the Senate; and 
‘‘(C) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
‘‘(2) The term ‘budget’, with respect to a fiscal year, means 
the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress 
by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31. 
‘‘(3) The term ‘covered facility or asset’ means any facility 
or asset that— 
‘‘(A) is identified by the Secretary of Defense, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of Transportation with respect 
to potentially impacted airspace, through a risk-based 
assessment for purposes of this section; 
‘‘(B) is located in the United States (including the 
territories and possessions of the United States); and 
‘‘(C) directly relates to the missions of the Department 
of Defense pertaining to— 
‘‘(i) nuclear deterrence, including with respect to 
nuclear command and control, integrated tactical 
warning and attack assessment, and continuity of 
government; 
‘‘(ii) missile defense; 
‘‘(iii) national security space;
H. R. 2810—509 
‘‘(iv) assistance in protecting the President or the 
Vice President (or other officer immediately next in 
order of succession to the office of the President) pursu-
ant to the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 
1976 (18 U.S.C. 3056 note); 
‘‘(v) air defense of the United States, including 
air sovereignty, ground-based air defense, and the 
National Capital Region integrated air defense system; 
‘‘(vi) combat support agencies (as defined in para-
graphs (1) through (4) of section 193(f) of this title); 
‘‘(vii) special operations activities specified in para-
graphs (1) through (9) of section 167(k) of this title; 
‘‘(viii) 
production, 
storage, 
transportation, 
or 
decommissioning of high-yield explosive munitions, by 
the Department; or 
‘‘(ix) a Major Range and Test Facility Base (as 
defined in section 196(i) of this title). 
‘‘(4) The term ‘defense budget materials’, with respect to 
a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by 
the Secretary of Defense in support of the budget for that 
fiscal year. 
‘‘(5) The terms ‘electronic communication’, ‘intercept’, ‘oral 
communication’, and ‘wire communication’ have the meanings 
given those terms in section 2510 of title 18. 
‘‘(6) The terms ‘unmanned aircraft’ and ‘unmanned aircraft 
system’ have the meanings given those terms in section 331 
of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Public 
Law 112–95; 49 U.S.C. 40101 note).’’. 
SEC. 1693. CONVENTIONAL PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE WEAPONS 
SYSTEM. 
(a) EARLY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY.—The Secretary of Defense, 
in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
shall plan to reach early operational capability for the conventional 
prompt strike weapon system by not later than September 30, 
2022. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commander 
of the United States European Command, the Commander of the 
United States Pacific Command, and the Commander of the United 
States Strategic Command, shall submit to the congressional 
defense committees a report on the conventional prompt global 
strike weapons system with respect to— 
(1) the required level of resources that is consistent with 
the level of priority assigned to the associated capability gap; 
(2) the estimated period for the delivery of a medium- 
range early operational capability, the required level of 
resources necessary to field a medium-range conventional 
prompt global strike weapon within the United States 
(including the territories and possessions of the United States), 
or a similar sea-based system, and a detailed plan consistent 
with the urgency of the associated capability gap across mul-
tiple platforms; 
(3) the joint performance requirements that— 
(A) ensure interoperability, where appropriate, between 
and among joint military capabilities; and