tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 
with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 
the extent possible, all countries that possess 
nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 
(C) An agreement by each country to 
adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap-
ons. 
(D) An agreement on a proactive United 
Nations Security Council resolution that ex-
pands access by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 
of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 
with its obligations under the NPT. 
(E) An agreement to refrain from config-
uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 
nuclear posture allowing a country to launch a 
ballistic missile attack in response to detection 
by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a sus-
pected incoming ballistic missile. 
(F) An agreement not to target or inter-
fere in the nuclear command, control, and com-
munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 
infrastructure of another country through a 
cyberattack. 
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(G) An agreement on transparency meas-
ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 
cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are 
mounted on ballistic missiles. 
(H) An agreement to provide a baseline 
and continuous exchanges detailing the aggre-
gate number of active nuclear weapons and as-
sociated systems possessed by each country. 
(4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 
in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 
governing the consensus rule on negotiation of a 
verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another 
international body or fora, such as a meeting of the 
P5. Successful conclusion of such a treaty would 
verifiably prevent any country’s production of highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear 
weapons. 
(5) The United States should convene a series 
of high level summits on nuclear disarmament mod-
eled on the Nuclear Security Summits process, 
which saw the elimination of the equivalent of 3,000 
nuclear weapons. 
(6) The President should seek ratification by 
the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 
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covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 
action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 
entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 
by the United States will provide critical momentum, 
will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 
to investigate allegations that any country that is a 
party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 
any yield. 
(7) The President should make the accession of 
North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 
agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 
of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 
is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 
nuclear explosive test since 1998. 
(8) The United States should— 
(A) refrain from developing any new de-
signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe-
cially designs that could add a level of technical 
uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 
thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 
testing in order to test that new design; and 
(B) seek reciprocal commitments from 
other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 
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SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 
TEST EXPLOSIONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 
be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 
2021 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap-
propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 
before fiscal year 2021 and available for obligation as of 
the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated 
or expended to conduct or make preparations for any ex-
plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until 
such time as— 
(1) the President submits to Congress an ad-
dendum to the report required by section 4205 of 
the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) 
that details any change to the condition of the 
United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the 
report submitted under that section in the preceding 
year; and 
(2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution 
of Congress that approves the test. 
(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (a) does 
not limit nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are 
consistent with the zero-yield standard and other require-
ments under law. 
Æ 
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