(F) M–11 missiles and components to
Pakistan.
(2) The Department of State has failed to de-
termine whether most such transfers violate provi-
sions of relevant United States and Executive orders
relating to the proliferation of sensitive equipment
and technology, including the Arms Export Control
Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994, the Export Administration Act of 1979, the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and the Iran-Iraq
Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, and Executive
Order 12938.
(3) Where the Department of State has made
such determinations, it has imposed the least oner-
ous form of sanction, which significantly weakens
the intended deterrent effect of the sanctions pro-
vided for in such laws.
(4) The Clinton Administration decided not to
impose sanctions on the People’s Republic of China
for its transfer of C–802 anti-ship cruise missiles to
Iran, finding that the transfer was not ‘‘destabiliz-
ing’’.
(5) That finding is contrary to the judgment of
the commander of the United States Fifth Fleet, ele-
ments of which are frequently deployed in and
around the Persian Gulf.
(6) Despite the fact that officials of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China were responsible for the sale
to Pakistan of specialized ring magnets, which are
used to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons,
the Clinton Administration did not impose sanctions
on either the People’s Republic of China or Pakistan
for such sale, even though sanctions are required for
such sale under law.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that—
(1) the transfers of equipment and technology
by the People’s Republic of China described in sub-
section (a)(1) pose a threat to the national security
interests of the United States;
(2) the failure of the Clinton Administration to
initiate a formal process to determine whether to im-
pose sanctions for such transfers under United
States laws intended to halt the proliferation of sen-
sitive equipment and technology contributes to the
threat posed to the national security interests of the
United States by the proliferation of such equipment
and technology; and
(3) the President should immediately initiate
the procedures necessary to determine whether sanc-
tions should be imposed under United States law for
such transfers.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date
of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form,
setting forth—
(1) the date, if any, of the commencement and
of the conclusion of each formal process conducted
by the Department of State to determine whether to
impose sanctions for each transfer described in sub-
section (a)(1);
(2) the facts providing the basis for each deter-
mination not to impose sanctions on the Government
of the People’s Republic of China, or entities within
or having a relationship with that government, for
each transfer, and the legal analysis supporting such
determination; and
(3) a schedule for initiating a formal process
described in paragraph (1) for each transfer not yet
addressed by such formal process and an expla-
nation for the failure to commence such formal proc-
ess with respect to such transfer before the date of
the report.
Æ