Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Resolution of the Ethi-
opia–Eritrea Border Dispute Act of 2004’’.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) ALGIERS AGREEMENTS.—The term ‘‘Algiers
Agreements’’ means the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment.
(2) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(3) CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT.—
The term ‘‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’’
means the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
signed on June 18, 2000, in Algiers, Algeria, by the
Government of Ethiopia and the Government of Eri-
trea that established a temporary demilitarized secu-
rity zone within Eritrea to be enforced by the United
Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eri-
trea (UNMEE).
(4) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT.—The
term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’’ means the
agreement signed on December 12, 2000, in Algiers,
Algeria, by the Government of Ethiopia and the
Government of Eritrea, under the auspices of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), that provided
for an end to military hostilities between the two
countries, assurances by the countries to refrain
from the threat or use of force against each other,
and established a neutral Boundary Commission to
delimit and demarcate the border between the two
countries.
(5) ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘eco-
nomic assistance’’ means—
(A) assistance under chapter 1 of part I of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
development assistance); and
(B) assistance under chapter 4 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating
to economic support fund assistance).
(6) MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANS-
FERS.—The term ‘‘military assistance and arms
transfers’’ means—
(A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating
to military assistance), including the transfer of
excess defense articles under section 516 of that
Act;
(B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating
to international military education and training
or ‘‘IMET’’), including military education and
training for civilian personnel under section 541
of that Act (commonly referred to as ‘‘Ex-
panded IMET’’); and
(C) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military
Financing’’ Program under section 23 of the
Arms Export Control Act and the transfer of
defense articles, defense services, design and
construction services, or any other defense-re-
lated training under that Act.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On May 6, 1998, a conflict erupted between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the world’s poorest
countries.
(2) The two-year war claimed 100,000 lives,
displaced more than 1,000,000 people, cost Ethiopia
more than $2,900,000,000, and caused a 62 percent
decline in food production in Eritrea.
(3) Millions of dollars were diverted from much
needed development projects into military activities
and weapons procurements at a time when severe
drought threatened a famine in both Ethiopia and
Eritrea, as bad as the famine in 1984 in those coun-
tries, putting more than 13,000,000 lives at risk.
(4) On June 18, 2000, Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethi-
opia and President Isaias Afewerki of the State of
Eritrea signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agree-
ment in Algiers, Algeria. On December 12, 2000,
the two countries also signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in Algiers under the auspices of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the
presence of United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan and President Abdel-Aziz Boutheflika of Al-
geria.
(5) Article 4.2 of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree
that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of
five members shall be established with a mandate to
delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border [be-
tween the two countries] based on pertinent colonial
treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable inter-
national law.’’.
(6) Article 4.15 of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree
that the delimitation and demarcation determina-
tions of the Commission shall be final and binding.
Each party shall respect the border so determined,
as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the
other party.’’.
(7)(A) The President of the United Nations Se-
curity Council, on behalf of the Security Council,
confirmed the Security Council’s endorsement of the
terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements,
with special reference to the neutral Boundary Com-
mission described in Article 4.2 of the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement and its mandate.
(B) In addition, the Security Council reaffirmed
its support for the Algiers Agreements in United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1312 (July 31,
2000), 1320 (September 15, 2000), 1344 (March
15, 2001), 1369 (September 14, 2001), 1398
(March 15, 2002), 1430 (August 14, 2002), 1434
(September 6, 2002), 1466 (March 14, 2003), 1507
(September 12, 2003), 1531 (March 12, 2004), and
1560 (September 14, 2004).
(8) On April 13, 2002, the neutral Boundary
Commission announced its ‘‘Delimitation Decision’’,
reiterating that both parties had agreed that it
would be ‘‘final and binding’’.
(9) Following the decision of the Boundary
Commission that the heavily disputed town of
Badme would be zoned to the Eritrean side of the
new border, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin of
Ethiopia announced on April 15, 2003, that ‘‘[n]o-
one expects the [G]overnment of Ethiopia to accept
these mistakes committed by the Commission’’. Fur-
ther, the Ethiopian Ministry of Information released
a statement accusing the Boundary Commission of
an ‘‘unfair tendency’’ in implementing the border
ruling and ‘‘misinterpreting’’ the Algiers Agree-
ments.
(10) In his March 6, 2003, ‘‘Progress Report’’
to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary
General Kofi Annan reported that Prime Minister
Zenawi of Ethiopia had expressed to his Special
Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, that ‘‘if
its concerns were not properly addressed Ethiopia
might eventually reject the demarcation-related deci-
sions of the Commission’’.
(11) On September 19, 2003, Prime Minister
Zenawi wrote to United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan and stated: ‘‘As the Commission’s deci-