627 
(A) Increased United States presence in 
Europe through additional permanently sta-
tioned forces. 
(B) Continued United States presence in 
Europe through additional rotational forces. 
(C) Increased United States prepositioned 
military equipment to include logistics enablers 
and a division headquarters. 
(D) Sufficient and necessary infrastructure 
additions and improvements throughout the Eu-
ropean theater. 
(E) Increased investment and priority to 
counter unconventional methods of warfare, in-
cluding sufficient cyber warfare resources, in-
formation operations resources, and intelligence 
resources. 
(F) Effective security cooperation re-
sources and opportunities with partners and al-
lies, including NATO member countries. 
SEC. 1234. MODIFICATION AND EXTENSION OF UKRAINE SE-
CURITY ASSISTANCE INITIATIVE. 
Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 
1068), as amended by section 1237 of the National De-
628 
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 
114–328; 130 Stat. 2494), is further amended— 
(1) in subsection (c)— 
(A) 
in 
paragraph 
(1), 
by 
striking 
‘‘$175,000,000 of the funds available for fiscal 
year 2017 pursuant to subsection (f)(2)’’ and 
inserting ‘‘$75,000,000 of the funds available 
for fiscal year 2018 pursuant to subsection 
(f)(3)’’; and 
(B) in paragraph (3)— 
(i) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2017’’ and 
inserting ‘‘fiscal year 2018’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘$100,000,000’’ and 
inserting ‘‘$50,000,000’’; 
(2) in subsection (f), by adding at the end the 
following: 
‘‘(3) For fiscal year 2018, $150,000,000.’’; and 
(3) in subsection (h), by striking ‘‘December 
31, 2018’’ and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2019’’. 
SEC. 1235. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS RELAT-
ING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPEN 
SKIES TREATY. 
(a) LIMITATION ON CONDUCT OF FLIGHTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise
629 
made available for any fiscal year after fiscal year 
2017 for the Department of Defense for operation 
and maintenance, Defense-wide, or operation and 
maintenance, Air Force, may be obligated or ex-
pended to conduct any flight during such fiscal year 
for purposes of implementing the Open Skies Treaty 
until the date that is seven days after the date on 
which the President submits to the appropriate con-
gressional committees a plan described in paragraph 
(2) with respect to such fiscal year. 
(2) PLAN DESCRIBED.—The plan described in 
this paragraph is a plan developed by the Secretary 
of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of 
State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and the Director of National Intelligence, that con-
tains a description of the objectives for all planned 
flights described in paragraph (1) during such fiscal 
year. 
(3) UPDATE.—To the extent necessary and ap-
propriate, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National 
Intelligence, may update the plan described in para-
graph (2) with respect to a fiscal year and submit
630 
the updated plan to the appropriate congressional 
committees. 
(4) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appro-
priate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the congressional defense committees; 
and 
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence 
and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives. 
(5) SUNSET.—The requirements of this sub-
section shall terminate on the date that is five years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
(b) PROHIBITION
ON
ACTIVITIES
TO
MODIFY 
UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT.—None of the funds author-
ized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2018 for research, development, 
test, and evaluation, Air Force, for arms control imple-
mentation (PE 0305145F) or procurement, Air Force, for 
digital visual imaging system (BA–05, Line Item #1900) 
may be obligated or expended to carry out any activities 
to modify any United States aircraft for purposes of im-
plementing the Open Skies Treaty.
631 
(c) OPEN SKIES TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘Open Skies Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open 
Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into 
force January 1, 2002. 
SEC. 1236. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF NU-
CLEAR CAPABILITIES OF NATO. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Warsaw Summit Communique, issued 
on July 9, 2016, by the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (in this section referred to as ‘‘NATO’’) 
clearly defines the need for, and the importance of, 
the nuclear mission of NATO. 
(2) The Warsaw Summit Communique states— 
(A) with respect to the nuclear deterrence 
capability of NATO, ‘‘As a means to prevent 
conflict and war, credible deterrence and 
defence is essential. Therefore, deterrence and 
defence, based on an appropriate mix of nu-
clear, conventional, and missile defence capabili-
ties, remains a core element of our overall strat-
egy. . . The fundamental purpose of NATO’s 
nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent 
coercion, and deter aggression. Nuclear weap-
ons are unique. Any employment of nuclear 
weapons against NATO would fundamentally
632 
alter the nature of a conflict. The cir-
cumstances in which NATO might have to use 
nuclear weapons are extremely remote’’; 
(B) with respect to the nature of the nu-
clear deterrence posture of NATO, ‘‘NATO 
must continue to adapt its strategy in line with 
trends in the security environment–including 
with respect to capabilities and other measures 
required–to ensure that NATO’s overall deter-
rence and defence posture is capable of address-
ing potential adversaries’ doctrine and capabili-
ties, and that it remains credible, flexible, resil-
ient, and adaptable.’’; and 
(C) with respect to the importance of con-
tributions to the nuclear deterrence mission 
from across the NATO alliance, ‘‘The strategic 
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the 
United States, are the supreme guarantee of 
the security of the Allies. The independent stra-
tegic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and 
France have a deterrent role of their own and 
contribute to the overall security of the Alli-
ance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision- 
making contribute to deterrence by compli-
cating the calculations of potential adversaries.
633 
NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies, 
in part, on United States’ nuclear weapons for-
ward-deployed in Europe and on capabilities 
and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. 
These Allies will ensure that all components of 
NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, 
and effective. That requires sustained leader-
ship focus and institutional excellence for the 
nuclear deterrence mission and planning guid-
ance aligned with 21st century requirements. 
The Alliance will ensure the broadest possible 
participation of Allies concerned in their agreed 
nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.’’. 
(3) Secretary of Defense James Mattis, in re-
sponse to the advance policy questions for his Senate 
confirmation hearing on January 12, 2017, stated 
that— 
(A) ‘‘NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture 
relies in part on U.S. nuclear weapons forward- 
deployed in Europe and on capabilities and in-
frastructure provided by NATO allies. These 
capabilities include dual-capable aircraft that 
contribute to current burden-sharing arrange-
ments within NATO. In general, we must take 
care to maintain this particular capability, and
634 
to modernize it appropriately and in a timely 
fashion.’’; and 
(B) the role of the nuclear weapons of the 
United States is ‘‘to deter nuclear war and to 
serve as last resort weapons of self-defense. In 
this sense, U.S. nuclear weapons are funda-
mental to our nation’s security and have his-
torically provided a deterrent against aggression 
and security assurance to U.S. allies. A robust, 
flexible, and survivable U.S. nuclear arsenal un-
derpins the U.S. ability to deploy conventional 
forces worldwide.’’. 
(4) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis 
Scaparrotti, Commander of the United States Euro-
pean Command and the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, testified to the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives that 
‘‘NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a 
vital component of our deterrence. Our moderniza-
tion efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, 
credible, and safe nuclear capability.’’. 
(5) The Russian Federation is currently under-
going significant modernization and recapitalization 
of all three legs of its nuclear triad, continues to 
field and modernize a large variety of non-strategic
635 
nuclear weapons, and is developing and deploying 
new and unique nuclear capabilities. 
(6) Russia remains in violation of the INF 
Treaty due to the development, testing, and, most 
recently, the operational deployment of ground- 
launched cruise missiles in violation of the INF 
Treaty. 
(7) On March 28, 2017, General Paul Selva, 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, de-
scribed the security consequences of the deployment 
of such INF Treaty-violating missiles, testifying to 
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives that ‘‘our assessment of the impact 
is that it more threatens NATO and infrastructure 
within the European continent than any other...area 
of the world that we have national interests in or al-
liance interests in.’’. 
(8) On March 28, 2017, General Curtis 
Scaparrotti, in testimony before the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives, re-
sponded to a question asking if Russia intends to re-
turn to compliance with the INF Treaty by stating, 
‘‘I don’t have any indication that they will at this 
time.’’.
636 
(9) Rhetoric from Russian officials has dem-
onstrated that Moscow has sought to leverage its nu-
clear arsenal to threaten and intimidate neighboring 
countries, including members of NATO, as was the 
case when the Russian Ambassador to Denmark 
stated, ‘‘Danish warships will be targets for Russian 
nuclear missiles’’ in response to Denmark’s potential 
cooperation in the NATO missile defense system. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the nuclear and conventional deterrence ca-
pabilities of NATO are of critical importance to the 
security of the United States and of the NATO alli-
ance, and must continue to adapt to the changed se-
curity environment in Europe; 
(2) the ability of the United States to forward- 
deploy dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons, 
and of select members of NATO to participate in the 
nuclear deterrence mission of NATO by hosting for-
ward-deployed nuclear weapons of the United States 
or operating dual-capable aircraft, is central to the 
credibility of the nuclear deterrence and defense pos-
ture of NATO; 
(3) the strategic forces of the United States, 
the independent nuclear forces of the United King-
637 
dom and the French Republic, and the dual-capable 
aircraft operated by the United States and other 
members of NATO constitute foundational elements 
of the nuclear deterrence and defense posture of 
NATO; 
(4) NATO should modernize its nuclear-related 
infrastructure to ensure the highest-level of safety 
and security; 
(5) effective deterrence requires NATO to con-
duct nuclear planning and exercises aligned with 
21st century requirements and modernize nuclear-re-
lated capabilities and infrastructure, including dual- 
capable aircraft, command and control networks, 
and facilities; and 
(6) to ensure the continued credibility of the de-
terrence and defense posture of NATO, the planned 
completion of F–35A aircraft development and test-
ing, as well as the delivery of such aircraft to mem-
bers of NATO, must not be delayed. 
(c) INF TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ means the Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the 
‘‘Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’’,
638 
signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into 
force June 1, 1988. 
SEC. 1237. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR GEOR-
GIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Georgia is a valued friend of the United 
States and has repeatedly demonstrated its commit-
ment to advancing the mutual interests of both 
countries, including the deployment of Georgian 
forces as part of the NATO-led International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the 
Multi-National Force in Iraq. 
(2) The European Deterrence Initiative builds 
the partnership capacity of Georgia so it can work 
more closely with the United States and NATO, as 
well as provide for its own defense. 
(3) In addition to the European Deterrence Ini-
tiative, Georgia’s participation in the NATO initia-
tive Partnership for Peace is paramount to inter-
operability with the United States and NATO, and 
establishing a more peaceful environment in the re-
gion. 
(4) Despite the losses suffered, as a NATO 
partner of ISAF, Georgia is engaged in the Resolute
639 
Support Mission in Afghanistan with the second 
largest contingent on the ground. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) reaffirms United States support for Geor-
gia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its 
internationally-recognized borders, and does not rec-
ognize the independence of the Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia regions currently occupied by the Russian 
Federation; and 
(2) supports continued cooperation between the 
United States and Georgia and the efforts of the 
Government of Georgia to provide for the defense of 
its people and sovereign territory. 
SEC. 1238. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT FOR ESTO-
NIA, LATVIA, AND LITHUANIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania are highly valued allies of the United 
States, and they have repeatedly demonstrated their 
commitment to advancing our mutual interests as 
well as those of the NATO Alliance. 
(2) Operation Atlantic Resolve is a series of ex-
ercises and coordinating efforts demonstrating the 
United States’ commitment to its European partners 
and allies, including the Baltic States of Estonia,
640 
Latvia, and Lithuania, with the shared goal of peace 
and stability in the region. Operation Atlantic Re-
solve strengthens communication and understanding, 
and is an important effort to deter Russian aggres-
sion in the region. 
(3) Through Operation Atlantic Resolve, the 
European Deterrence Initiative undertakes exercises, 
training, and rotational presence necessary to reas-
sure and integrate our allies, including the Baltic 
States, into a common defense framework. 
(4) All three Baltic States contributed to the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
in Afghanistan, sending disproportionate numbers of 
troops and operating with few caveats. The Baltic 
States continue to engage in Operation Resolute 
Support in Afghanistan. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 
(1) reaffirms its support for the principle of col-
lective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty for our NATO allies, including Estonia, Lat-
via, and Lithuania; 
(2) supports the sovereignty, independence, ter-
ritorial integrity, and inviolability of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania as well as their internationally recog-
nized borders, and expresses concerns over increas-
641 
ingly aggressive military maneuvering by the Rus-
sian Federation near their borders and airspace; 
(3) expresses concern over and condemns sub-
versive and destabilizing activities by the Russian 
Federation within the Baltic States; and 
(4) encourages the Administration to further 
enhance defense cooperation efforts with Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania and supports the efforts of 
their Governments to provide for the defense of their 
people and sovereign territory. 
SEC. 1239. REPORT ON DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN 
SERBIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees and the 
Committees on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives a report on the defense and security relationship be-
tween Serbia and the Russian Federation. 
(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
quired under subsection (a) shall include the following: 
(1) A list of Russian weapons systems and 
other military hardware and technology valued at
642 
$1,000,000 or more that have been provided to Ser-
bia since 2012. 
(2) A description of the participation by Ser-
bian armed forces in Russian military training or ex-
ercises since 2012. 
(3) A list of any defense and security coopera-
tion agreements between Serbia and Russia entered 
into since 2012. 
(4) An assessment of how the countries bor-
dering Serbia assess the risk the Serbian armed 
forces pose to their national security. 
(5) An assessment of intelligence cooperation 
between Serbia and Russia. 
(6) An assessment of defense and security co-
operation between Serbia and the United States. 
(7) An assessment of how military relations be-
tween Serbia and Russia affect United States de-
fense and security cooperation with Serbia and co-
operation between Serbia and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 
(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex.
643 
SEC. 1240. PLAN TO RESPOND IN CASE OF RUSSIAN NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW START TREATY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
mit to the congressional defense committees, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
a report— 
(1) describing the options available in response 
to a failure by Russia to achieve the reductions re-
quired by the New START Treaty before February 
5, 2018; and 
(2) including the assessment of the Secretary of 
Defense whether such a failure would constitute a 
material breach of the New START Treaty, pro-
viding grounds for the United States to withdraw 
from the treaty. 
(b) OPTIONS
DESCRIBED.—The report required 
under subsection (a) shall specifically describe options to 
respond to such a failure relating to the following: 
(1) Economic sanctions. 
(2) Diplomacy. 
(3) Additional deployment of ballistic or cruise 
missile defense capabilities, or other United States 
capabilities that would offset any potential Russian 
military advantage from such a failure.
644 
(4) Redeployment of United States nuclear 
forces beyond the levels required by the New 
START Treaty, and the associated costs and im-
pacts on United States operations. 
(5) Legal countermeasures available under 
other treaties between the United States and Russia, 
including under the Treaty on Open Skies, done at 
Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into force 
January 1, 2002. 
(c) NEW START TREATY.—In this section, the term 
‘‘New START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, 
and entered into force February 5, 2011. 
Subtitle 
E—Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
Preservation Act of 2017 
SEC. 1241. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 
2017’’. 
SEC. 1242. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings:
645 
(1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of 
State reports entitled, ‘‘Adherence to and Compli-
ance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Dis-
armament Agreements and Commitments’’, all stat-
ed that the United States has determined that ‘‘the 
Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations 
under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or 
flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) 
with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or 
to possess or produce launchers of such missiles’’. 
(2) The 2016 report also noted that ‘‘the cruise 
missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty 
definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a 
range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as 
such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of 
the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are 
prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty’’. 
(3) Potential consistency and compliance con-
cerns regarding the INF Treaty noncompliant 
GLCM have existed since 2008, were not officially 
raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, and 
were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) until January 2014.
646 
(4) The United States Government is aware of 
other consistency and compliance concerns regarding 
Russia actions vis-a`-vis its INF Treaty obligations. 
(5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, 
including the President, the Secretary of State, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have 
raised Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty 
to their counterparts, but no progress has been 
made in bringing the Russian Federation back into 
compliance with the INF Treaty. 
(6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe, correctly stated, 
‘‘A weapon capability that violates the INF, that is 
introduced into the greater European land mass, is 
absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with . . . 
It can’t go unanswered.’’. 
(7) The Department of Defense in its Sep-
tember 2013 report, Report on Conventional Prompt 
Global Strike Options if Exempt from the Restric-
tions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that 
it has multiple validated military requirement gaps 
due to the prohibitions imposed on the United States 
as a result of its compliance with the INF Treaty.
647 
(8) It is not in the national security interests 
of the United States to be unilaterally legally prohib-
ited from developing dual-capable ground-launched 
cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 
kilometers, while Russia makes advances in devel-
oping and fielding this class of weapon systems, and 
such unilateral limitation cannot be allowed to con-
tinue indefinitely. 
(9) Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., Commander of 
the United States Pacific Command, testified before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 27, 
2017, that ‘‘[W]e’re in a multi-polar world where we 
have a lot of countries who are developing these 
weapons, including China, that I worry about. And 
I worry about their DF-21 and DF-26 missile pro-
grams, their anti-carrier ballistic missile programs, 
if you will. INF doesn’t address missiles launched 
from ships or airplanes, but it focuses on those land- 
based systems. I think there’s goodness in the INF 
treaty, anything you can do to limit nuclear weapons 
writ-large is generally good. But the aspects of the 
INF Treaty that limit our ability to counter Chinese 
and other countries’ land-based missiles, I think, is 
problematic.’’.
648 
(10) A material breach of the INF Treaty by 
the Russian Federation affords the United States 
the right to invoke legal countermeasures which in-
clude suspension of the treaty in whole or in part. 
(11) Article XV of the INF Treaty provides 
that ‘‘Each Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related 
to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized 
its supreme interests.’’. 
SEC. 1243. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUS-
SIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY. 
(a) STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is 
the policy of the United States as follows: 
(1) The actions undertaken by the Russian 
Federation in violation of the INF Treaty constitute 
a material breach of the treaty. 
(2) In light of the Russian Federation’s mate-
rial breach of the INF Treaty, the United States is 
legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF 
Treaty in whole or in part for so long as the Russian 
Federation continues to be in material breach. 
(3) For so long as the Russian Federation re-
mains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the 
United States should take actions to encourage the
649 
Russian Federation return to compliance, including 
by— 
(A) providing additional funds for the ca-
pabilities identified in section 1243(d) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 
1062); and 
(B) seeking additional missile defense as-
sets in the European theater to protect United 
States and NATO forces from ground-launched 
missile systems of the Russian Federation that 
are in noncompliance with the INF Treaty. 
(b) AUTHORIZATION
OF ADDITIONAL APPROPRIA-
TIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the funds authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2018 for 
research, development, test, and evaluation, as speci-
fied in the funding table in division D, $50,000,000 
shall be made available for— 
(A) the development of active defenses to 
counter ground-launched missile systems with 
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; 
(B) counterforce capabilities to prevent at-
tacks from these missiles; and
650 
(C) countervailing strike capabilities to en-
hance the capabilities of the United States iden-
tified in section 1243(d) of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 
(Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1062). 
(2) DEVELOPMENT.—Of the amount authorized 
to be appropriated by paragraph (1), $25,000,000 is 
authorized to be appropriated for activities under-
taken to carry out section 1244(a), including with 
respect to research and development activities. 
SEC. 
1244. 
DEVELOPMENT 
OF 
INF 
RANGE 
GROUND- 
LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROGRAM OF RECORD.— 
The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program of 
record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground- 
launched cruise missile system with a range of between 
500 to 5,500 kilometers. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
tives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate a report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify 
existing and planned missile systems, including the toma-
hawk land attack cruise missile, the standard missile-3,
651 
the standard missile-6, and Army tactical missile system 
missiles for ground launch with a range of between 500 
and 5,500 kilometers in order to provide any of the capa-
bilities identified in section 1243(d) of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 
114–92; 129 Stat. 1062). 
SEC. 1245. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RELATED TO RUS-
SIAN FEDERATION DEVELOPMENT OF NON-
COMPLIANT SYSTEMS AND UNITED STATES 
ACTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL BREACH OF 
INF TREATY BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares 
that because of the Russian Federation’s violations of the 
INF Treaty, including the flight-test, production, and pos-
session of prohibited systems, its actions have defeated the 
object and purpose of the INF Treaty, and thus constitute 
a material breach of the INF Treaty. 
(b) NOTIFICTION BY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL IN-
TELLIGENCE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National In-
telligence shall notify the appropriate congressional 
committees of any development, deployment, or test 
of a system by the Russian Federation that the Di-
rector determines is inconsistent with the INF Trea-
ty.
652 
(2) DEADLINE.—A notification under this sub-
section shall be made not later than 15 days after 
the date on which the Director makes the determina-
tion under this subsection with respect to which the 
notification is required. 
(c) REPORT
BY PRESIDENT.—Not later than 15 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains a determination of the 
President of whether the Russian Federation has flight- 
tested, produced, or is in possession of a ground-launched 
cruise missile or ground-launched ballistic missile with a 
range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers during each 
of the three consecutive 120-day periods beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(d) UNITED STATES ACTIONS.—If the determination 
of the President contained in the report required to be 
submitted under subsection (c) is that the Russian Fed-
eration has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of 
any missile described in subsection (c) during each of the 
periods described in subsection (c), the prohibitions set 
forth in Article VI of the INF Treaty shall no longer be 
binding on the United States as a matter of United States 
law.
653 
SEC. 1246. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO EX-
TEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW 
START TREATY. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2018 for the De-
partment of Defense may be obligated or expended to ex-
tend the implementation of the New START Treaty un-
less the President certifies to the appropriate congres-
sional committees that the Russian Federation has 
verifiably eliminated all missiles that are in violation of 
or may be inconsistent with the INF Treaty. 
SEC. 1247. REVIEW OF RS–26 BALLISTIC MISSILE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall conduct a review of the RS– 
26 ballistic missile of the Russian Federation. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the re-
view conducted under subsection (a). The report shall in-
clude—
654 
(1) a determination whether the RS–26 ballistic 
missile is covered under the New START Treaty or 
would be a violation of the INF Treaty because Rus-
sia has flight-tested such missile to ranges covered 
by the INF Treaty in more than one warhead con-
figuration; and 
(2) if the President determines that the RS–26 
ballistic missile is covered under the New START 
Treaty, a determination whether the Russian Fed-
eration— 
(A) has agreed through the Bilateral Con-
sultative Commission that such a system is lim-
ited under the New START Treaty central lim-
its; and 
(B) has agreed to an exhibition of such a 
system. 
(c) EFFECT OF DETERMINATION.—If the President, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence, deter-
mines that the RS–26 ballistic missile is covered under 
the New START Treaty and that the Russian Federation 
has not taken the steps described under subsection (b)(2), 
the United States Government shall consider for purposes 
of all policies and decisions that the RS–26 ballistic mis-
655 
sile of the Russian Federation is a violation of the INF 
Treaty. 
SEC. 1248. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives. 
(2) INF TREATY.—The term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ 
means the Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington De-
cember 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 
1988. 
(3) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The term 
‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given the
656 
term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 
(4) NEW
START
TREATY.—The term ‘‘New 
START Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federa-
tion on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at 
Prague April 8, 2010, and entered into force Feb-
ruary 5, 2011. 
(5) OPEN
SKIES
TREATY.—The term ‘‘Open 
Skies Treaty’’ means the Treaty on Open Skies, 
done at Helsinki March 24, 1992, and entered into 
force January 1, 2002. 
Subtitle 
F—Fostering 
Unity 
Against Russian Aggression Act 
of 2017 
SEC. 1251. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Fostering Unity 
Against Russian Aggression Act of 2017’’. 
SEC. 1252. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander 
of the United States European Command, testified 
before the House Armed Services Committee on 
March 27, 2017, that ‘‘Today we face the most dy-
657 
namic European security environment in history.’’ 
and that ‘‘Russia’s malign actions are supported by 
its diplomatic, information, economic, and military 
initiatives.’’. 
(2) The Russian Federation has shifted to a 
military doctrine that envisions using nuclear weap-
ons in an attempt to end a failing regional conven-
tional conflict. On June 25, 2015, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Robert Work and then-Vice-Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld 
testified before the House Armed Services Com-
mittee that ‘‘Russian military doctrine includes what 
some have called an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strat-
egy—a strategy that purportedly seeks to deescalate 
a conventional conflict through coercive threats, in-
cluding limited nuclear use. We think that this label 
is dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they 
can control escalation through the use of nuclear 
weapons is literally playing with fire. Escalation is 
escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate es-
calation.’’. 
(3) General Scaparrotti noted in his March 27, 
2017, testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee that ‘‘Moscow’s provocative rhetoric and
658 
nuclear threats increase the likelihood of misunder-
standing and miscalculation.’’. 
(4) The Russian Federation continues to con-
duct ongoing influence campaigns aimed at under-
mining democracies around the world. According to 
an assessment by the intelligence community, ‘‘Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 
campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 
election’’, which included the use of the Russian 
military intelligence organization. The intelligence 
community also assessed that Russia would apply 
lessons learned to future influence efforts worldwide, 
including against United States allies and their elec-
tion systems. 
(5) The Russian Federation continues its ag-
gression on its periphery. In 2008, the Russian Fed-
eration fomented conflict in Georgia. Further, the 
Russian Federation is directing combined Russian- 
Separatist units in eastern Ukraine, actively inciting 
violence and prolonging the most significant conflict 
in Europe. 
(6) The investment of over $5 billion in the Eu-
ropean Reassurance Initiative (ERI), now the Euro-
pean Deterrence Initiative (EDI), has proven suc-
cessful in significantly enhancing the ability of
659 
United States forces, NATO allies, and regional 
partners to deter Russian aggression. EDI has not 
only assured our European allies and partners but 
supported essential investments in NATO’s military 
capacity, interoperability, and agility. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the risks of miscalculation in a crisis are ex-
acerbated by the Russian Federation’s shift to a 
military doctrine of ‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’, low-
ering the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weap-
ons and thereby increasing the risk of using nuclear 
weapons, potentially escalating in to a massive nu-
clear exchange; 
(2) subversive and destabilizing activities by the 
Russian Federation targeting NATO allies and part-
ners causes concern and should be condemned; 
(3) European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in-
vestments are long-term and, as such, Congress ex-
pects future budgets to reflect United States com-
mitment by planning for funding in the base budget, 
and further EDI should build on United States pres-
ence by increasing the United States permanent 
force posture; and
660 
(4) credible deterrence requires steadfast co-
operation and joint action with NATO allies and 
partners and other United States allies and partners 
in Europe. 
SEC. 1253. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUS-
SIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of De-
fense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and in 
consultation with each of the Secretaries of the military 
departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the com-
manders of each of the regional and functional combatant 
commands, shall develop and implement a comprehensive 
strategy to counter threats by the Russian Federation. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the strategy 
required by subsection (a). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by this 
subsection shall include the following elements: 
(A) An evaluation of strategic objectives 
and motivations of the Russian Federation. 
(B) A detailed description of Russian 
threats to the national security of the United
661 
States, including threats that may pose chal-
lenges below the threshold of armed conflict. 
(C) A discussion of how the strategy com-
plements the National Defense Strategy and 
the National Military Strategy. 
(D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and 
means inherent to the strategy. 
(E) A discussion of the strategy’s objec-
tives with respect to deterrence, escalation con-
trol, and conflict resolution. 
(F) A description of the military activities 
across geographic regions and military func-
tions and domains that are inherent to the 
strategy. 
(G) A description of the posture, forward 
presence, and readiness requirements inherent 
to the strategy. 
(H) A description of the roles of the 
United States Armed Forces in implementing 
the strategy, including— 
(i) the role of United States nuclear 
capabilities; 
(ii) the role of United States space ca-
pabilities;
662 
(iii) the role of United States cyber 
capabilities; 
(iv) the role of United States conven-
tional ground forces; 
(v) the role of United States naval 
forces; 
(vi) the role of United States air 
forces; and 
(vii) the role of United States special 
operations forces. 
(I) An assessment of the force require-
ments needed to implement and sustain the 
strategy. 
(J) A description of the logistical require-
ments needed to implement and sustain the 
strategy. 
(K) An assessment of the technological re-
search and development requirements needed to 
implement and sustain the strategy. 
(L) An assessment of the training and ex-
ercise requirements needed to implement and 
sustain the strategy. 
(M) An assessment of the budgetary re-
source requirements needed to implement and
663 
sustain the strategy through December 31, 
2030. 
(N) A discussion of how the strategy pro-
vides a framework for future planning and in-
vestments in regional defense initiatives, includ-
ing the European Deterrence Initiative. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
SEC. 1254. STRATEGY TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL PRECI-
SION STRIKE WEAPON STOCKPILES IN THE 
UNITED 
STATES 
EUROPEAN 
COMMAND’S 
AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
(a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall de-
velop and implement a strategy to increase conven-
tional precision strike weapon stockpiles in the 
United States European Command’s areas of re-
sponsibility. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by this 
subsection shall include necessary increases in the 
quantities of such stockpiles that the Secretary de-
termines will enhance deterrence and warfighting ca-
664 
pability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
forces. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the strategy required by subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
SEC. 1255. PLAN TO COUNTER THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES 
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. 
(a) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall develop and implement a plan to counter the 
military capabilities of the Russian Federation. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by this 
subsection shall include the following: 
(A) Accelerating programs to improve the 
capability of United States military forces to 
operate in a Global Positioning System (GPS)- 
denied or GPS-degraded environment. 
(B) Accelerating programs of the Depart-
ment of the Army to counter Russian un-
665 
manned aircraft systems, electronic warfare, 
and long-range precision strike capabilities. 
(C) Countering unconventional capabilities 
and hybrid threats from the Russian Federa-
tion. 
(D) Any other elements that the Secretary 
determines to be appropriate. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the plan required by subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
section shall be submitted in unclassified form but 
may contain a classified annex. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that concerns persist over the growing sophistication 
of unconventional and hybrid state-sponsored threats by 
the Russian Federation as demonstrated through its ad-
vancement and integration of conventional warfare, eco-
nomic warfare, cyber and information operations, intel-
ligence operations, and other activities to undermine 
United States national security objectives.
666 
SEC. 1256. PLAN TO INCREASE CYBER AND INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS, DETERRENCE, AND DEFENSE. 
(a) PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
retary of State shall jointly develop a plan to— 
(1) increase inclusion of regional cyber planning 
within larger United States joint planning exercises 
in the European region; 
(2) enhance joint, regional, and combined infor-
mation operations and strategic communication 
strategies to counter Russian Federation informa-
tion warfare, malign influence, and propaganda ac-
tivities; and 
(3) identify potential areas of cybersecurity col-
laboration and partnership capabilities with NATO 
and other European allies and partners of the 
United States. 
(b) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense 
shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 
a briefing on the plan required under subsection (a). 
SEC. 1257. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING MARITIME 
CAPABILITIES. 
Congress notes the 2016 Force Structure Assessment 
(FSA) that increased the requirement for fast attack sub-
marine (SSN) from 48 to 66 and supports an acquisition
667 
plan that enhances maritime capabilities that address this 
requirement. 
SEC. 1258. PLAN TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISCALCULA-
TION 
AND 
UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
THAT COULD PRECIPITATE A NUCLEAR WAR. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) the Russian Federation has adopted a dan-
gerous nuclear doctrine that includes a strategy of 
‘‘escalate to de-escalate’’, which could lower the 
threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons in a 
regional conflict; and 
(2) such nuclear doctrine exacerbates the risks 
of miscalculation and unintended consequences that 
could precipitate a nuclear war. 
(b) PLAN REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Com-
mander of the United States Strategic Command, 
and the Commander of the United States European 
Command, shall submit to the congressional defense 
committees a plan that includes options to reduce 
the risk of miscalculation and unintended con-
sequences that could precipitate a nuclear war.
670 
ering contingencies ranging from grey zone to 
high-end near-peer conflict; and 
(5) the United States should continue to engage 
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by strengthening alli-
ances and partnerships, supporting regional institu-
tions and bodies such as the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), building cooperative 
security arrangements, addressing shared challenges, 
and reinforcing the role of international law, includ-
ing respect for human rights. 
SEC. 1262. REPORT ON STRATEGY TO PRIORITIZE UNITED 
STATES DEFENSE INTERESTS IN THE INDO- 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. 
(a) REQUIRED REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Secretary of State, shall submit to the congressional de-
fense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives a report that contains a strategy 
to prioritize United States defense interests in the Indo- 
Asia-Pacific region. The strategy shall address the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The security challenges, including threats, 
emanating from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.
671 
(2) The primary objectives and priorities in the 
Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including— 
(A) the military missions necessary to ad-
dress threats on the Korean Peninsula; 
(B) the role of the Department of Defense 
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region regarding secu-
rity challenges posed by China; 
(C) the primary objectives and priorities 
for combating terrorism in the Indo-Asia-Pa-
cific region; 
(3) Department of Defense plans, force posture, 
capabilities, and resources to address any gaps. 
(4) The roles of allies, partners, and other 
countries in achieving United States defense objec-
tives and priorities. 
(5) Actions the Department of Defense could 
take, in cooperation with other Federal departments 
or agencies, to advance United Sates national secu-
rity interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. 
(6) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense 
determines to be appropriate. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
a classified annex.
672 
(c) 
ANNUAL
BUDGET.—The 
President, 
acting 
through the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, shall ensure that the annual budget submitted to 
Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States 
Code, clearly highlights programs and projects that are 
being funded in the annual budget of the United States 
Government that relate to the strategy referred to in sub-
section (a). 
(d) REPEAL.—Section 1251 of the Carl Levin and 
Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 
Stat. 3570) is hereby repealed. 
SEC. 1263. ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCE POS-
TURE AND BASING NEEDS IN THE INDO-ASIA- 
PACIFIC REGION. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense 
shall conduct an assessment of United States force 
posture and basing needs in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 
region. 
(2) 
ELEMENTS.—The 
assessment 
required 
under paragraph (1) shall include the following: 
(A) A review of military requirements 
based on operation and contingency plans, sce-
narios, capabilities of potential adversaries, and
673 
any assessed gaps or shortfalls of the Armed 
Forces. 
(B) A review of current United States mili-
tary force posture and deployment plans of the 
United States Pacific Command. 
(C) An analysis of potential future realign-
ments of United States forces in the region, in-
cluding options for strengthening United States 
presence, access, readiness, training, exercises, 
logistics, and pre-positioning. 
(D) A discussion of any factors that may 
influence the United States posture. 
(E) Any recommended changes to the 
United States posture in the region. 
(F) Any other matters the Secretary of 
Defense determines to be appropriate. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than March 1, 
2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report that in-
cludes the assessment required under subsection (a). 
(2) FORM.—The report required under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may contain a classified annex.
674 
SEC. 1264. EXTENDED DETERRENCE COMMITMENT TO THE 
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review re-
affirmed the commitment of the United States to ex-
tended deterrence and continued protection of the 
treaty allies of the United States under the United 
States nuclear umbrella. 
(2) The United States-Republic of Korea Deter-
rence Strategy Committee and the United States- 
Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue provide valu-
able communication channels for ensuring the com-
mitment of the United States to the policy of ex-
tended nuclear deterrence and allow for bilateral dis-
cussions on how United States capabilities can be le-
veraged to credibly deter, and if necessary, defeat, 
North Korean nuclear weapons, weapons of mass de-
struction, and missile threats and aggression. 
(3) Statements by officials of the United States 
have consistently emphasized the United States com-
mitment to providing extended deterrence and de-
fense across the full spectrum of military capabili-
ties, including nuclear capabilities. 
(4) On September 9, 2016, President Obama 
responded to a North Korean nuclear test by issuing 
the following statement, ‘‘I restated to President
675 
Park and Prime Minister Abe the unshakable U.S. 
commitment to take necessary steps to defend our 
allies in the region, including through our deploy-
ment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) battery to the ROK, and the commitment 
to extended deterrence, guaranteed by the full spec-
trum of U.S. defense capabilities.’’. 
(5) On October 14, 2016, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, ‘‘re-
affirmed the ironclad commitment of the U.S. to de-
fend both the ROK and Japan and provide extended 
deterrence guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. 
military capabilities, including conventional, nuclear, 
and missile defense capabilities’’. 
(6) On October 19, 2016, Secretary of Defense 
Ashton Carter, stated, ‘‘the U.S. commitment to the 
defense of South Korea is unwavering. This includes 
our commitment to provide extended deterrence, 
guaranteed by the full spectrum of U.S. defense ca-
pabilities. Make no mistake: Any attack on America 
or our allies will not only be defeated, but any use 
of nuclear weapons will be met with an over-
whelming and effective response.’’. 
(7) On October 19, 2016, Secretary of State 
John Kerry, during a joint press conference with the
676 
South Korean Foreign Minister, confirmed the 
United States would ‘‘defend South Korea through 
a robust combined defense posture and through ex-
tended deterrence, including the US nuclear um-
brella, conventional strike and missile defense capa-
bilities.’’. 
(8) On February 3, 2017, Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis, during a visit to South Korea, stated, 
‘‘America’s commitments to defending our allies and 
to upholding our extended deterrence guarantees re-
main ironclad: Any attack on the United States, or 
our allies, will be defeated, and any use of nuclear 
weapons would be met with a response that would 
be effective and overwhelming.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the defense of the Republic of Korea and 
Japan must remain a top priority for the adminis-
tration; 
(2) the United States maintains an unwavering 
and steadfast commitment to the policy of extended 
deterrence, especially with respect to South Korea 
and Japan; 
(3) bilateral extended deterrence dialogues and 
discussions with South Korea and Japan are of
677 
great value to the United States and its partners 
and must remain a central component of these rela-
tionships; 
(4) the United States must sustain and mod-
ernize current United States nuclear capabilities to 
ensure the extended deterrence commitments of the 
United States remain credible and executable; and 
(5) the timely development, production, and de-
ployment of modern nuclear-capable aircraft are fun-
damental to ensure that the United States remains 
able to meet extended deterrence requirements in the 
Asia-Pacific region far into the future. 
(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
tion may be construed to alter the shared goal of the 
United 
States, 
South 
Korea, 
and 
Japan 
for 
a 
denuclearized Korean Peninsula or to change the United 
States nuclear posture in the Asia-Pacific region. 
SEC. 1265. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO MEET 
UNITED STATES FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION 
WITH PALAU. 
There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 
2018 $123,900,000 to the Secretary of the Interior, to 
remain available until expended, for use in meeting the 
financial obligations of the Government of the United
678 
States under the Agreement between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Palau under section 432 of the Compact of 
Free Association with Palau (48 U.S.C. 1931 note; Public 
Law 99–658). 
SEC. 1266. SENSE OF CONGRESS REAFFIRMING SECURITY 
COMMITMENTS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF 
JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA AND TRILATERAL 
COOPERATION 
BETWEEN 
THE 
UNITED 
STATES, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States values its alliances with 
the Governments of Japan and the Republic of 
Korea, based on shared values of democracy, the 
rule of law, free and open markets, and respect for 
human rights; 
(2) the United States reaffirms its commitment 
to these alliances with Japan and South Korea, 
which are critical for the preservation of peace and 
stability in the Asia-Pacific region and throughout 
the world; 
(3) the United States recognizes the substantial 
financial commitments of Japan and South Korea to 
the maintenance of United States forces in these
679 
countries, making them among the most significant 
burden-sharing partners of the United States; 
(4) the United States reaffirms its commitment 
to Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between the United States of America 
and Japan, which applies to the Japanese-adminis-
tered Senkaku Islands; 
(5) the United States supports continued imple-
mentation and expansion of defense cooperation with 
Japan in accordance with the 2015 U.S.-Japan De-
fense 
Guidelines 
and 
additional 
measures 
to 
strengthen this defense cooperation, including by ex-
panding foreign military sales, establishing new co-
operative technology development programs, increas-
ing military exercises, or other actions as appro-
priate; 
(6) the United States and South Korea share 
deep concerns that the nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs of North Korea and its repeated provo-
cations pose great threats to peace and stability on 
the Korean Peninsula, and the United States recog-
nizes that South Korea has made important commit-
ments to the bilateral security alliance, including by 
hosting a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system;
680 
(7) the United States and South Korea should 
continue further defense cooperation, by enhancing 
mutual security based on the Mutual Defense Treaty 
between the United States and the Republic of 
Korea and investing in capabilities critical to the 
combined defense; 
(8) the United States welcomes greater security 
cooperation with, and among, Japan and South 
Korea to promote mutual interests and address 
shared concerns, including the bilateral military in-
telligence-sharing pact between Japan and South 
Korea, signed on November 23, 2016, and the tri-
lateral intelligence sharing agreement between the 
United States, Japan, and South Korea, signed on 
December 29, 2015; and 
(9) recognizing that North Korea poses a threat 
to the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and 
that the security of the three countries is inter-
twined, the United States welcomes and encourages 
deeper trilateral defense cooperation, including 
through expanded exercises, training, and informa-
tion sharing that strengthens integration. 
SEC. 1267. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGA-
TION OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. 
It is the sense of Congress that—
681 
(1) the United States has a national interest in 
maintaining freedom of navigation, respect for inter-
national law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the 
South China Sea; 
(2) the United States should condemn any as-
sertion that limits the right to freedom of navigation 
and overflight; and 
(3) the United States should keep to a regular 
and routine schedule for freedom of navigation oper-
ations in the sea and air. 
SEC. 1268. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON STRENGTHENING THE 
DEFENSE OF TAIWAN. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96– 
8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) codified the basis for 
commercial, cultural, and other relations between 
the United States and Taiwan, and the Six Assur-
ances are an important aspect in guiding bilateral 
relations; 
(2) Section 3(a) of that Act states that ‘‘the 
United States will make available to Taiwan such 
defense articles and defense services in such quan-
tity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to main-
tain a sufficient self-defense capability’’;
683 
resiliency and ability to respond to and recover 
from natural disasters; and 
(B) recognize Taiwan’s already valuable 
military contributions to such efforts. 
SEC. 1269. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ASSOCIATION OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. 
(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that 2017 is the 50th 
anniversary of the formation of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), which includes Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, 
Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and Cambodia. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States supports the development 
of regional institutions and bodies, including the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Min-
isters Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the 
expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase re-
gional cooperation and ensure that disputes are 
managed without intimidation, coercion, or force; 
(2) the United States recognizes ASEAN ef-
forts to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in 
the region, including the steps taken to highlight the 
importance of peaceful dispute resolution and the
684 
need for adherence to international rules and stand-
ards. 
(3) United States defense engagement with 
ASEAN and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
Plus should continue to be forums to discuss shared 
challenges in the maritime domain and the need for 
greater information sharing among ASEAN nations; 
and 
(4) the United States welcomes continued work 
with ASEAN and other regional partners to estab-
lish more reliable and routine crisis communication 
mechanisms. 
SEC. 1270. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REAFFIRMING THE IM-
PORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES-AUS-
TRALIA DEFENSE ALLIANCE. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States values its alliance with 
the Government of Australia, and the shared values 
and interests between both countries are essential to 
promoting peace, security, stability, and economic 
prosperity in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; 
(2) the annual rotations of United States Ma-
rine Corps forces to Darwin, Australia and enhanced 
rotations of United States Air Force aircraft to Aus-
685 
tralia pave the way for even closer defense and secu-
rity cooperation; 
(3) the Treaty Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of 
Australia Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, 
done at Sydney, September 5, 2007, should continue 
to facilitate industry collaboration and innovation to 
meet shared security challenges and reinforce mili-
tary ties; 
(4) as described by Australian Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull, North Korea is ‘‘a threat to the 
peace of the region’’ and the United States and Aus-
tralia should continue to cooperate to defend against 
the threat of North Korea’s nuclear and missile ca-
pabilities; and 
(5) the United States and Australia also should 
continue to address the threat of terrorism and 
strengthen information sharing. 
SEC. 1270A. RESTRICTION ON FUNDING FOR THE PRE-
PARATORY 
COMMISSION 
FOR 
THE 
COM-
PREHENSIVE 
NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN 
TREATY 
ORGANIZATION. 
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress declares that 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2310 (Sep-
tember 23, 2016) does not obligate the United States nor
686 
does it impose an obligation on the United States to re-
frain from actions that would run counter to the object 
and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty. 
(b) RESTRICTION ON FUNDING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—No United States funds may 
be made available to the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Or-
ganization. 
(2) EXCEPTION.—The restriction under para-
graph (1) shall not apply with respect to the avail-
ability of United States funds for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty 
Organization’s 
Inter-
national Monitoring System. 
SEC. 1270B. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NORTH KOREA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
also known as North Korea, continues to develop a 
ballistic and nuclear weapons development program 
that poses a grave threat to the United States, 
United States allies the Republic of Korea, Japan, 
and Australia, and to regional and global security. 
(2) North Korea continues to escalate the pace 
and number of its ballistic missile launches, and to 
date has conducted five nuclear tests.
687 
(3) On July 4, 2017, North Korea conducted 
the first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile 
(ICBM) it claims is capable of reaching United 
States territory, which, if reliable and effective, con-
stitutes a new threat to America’s security. 
(4) On June 3, 2017, Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis stated, during remarks at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue, that ‘‘the current North Korea 
program signals a clear intent to acquire nuclear 
armed ballistic missiles, including those of inter-
continental range that pose direct and immediate 
threats to our allies, our partners and all the world’’. 
(5) On April 27, 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, 
Jr., Commander of the United States Pacific Com-
mand, testified that ‘‘North Korea continues to dis-
regard United Nations sanctions by developing, and 
threatening to use intercontinental ballistic missiles 
and nuclear weapons that will threaten the U.S. 
Homeland.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that— 
(1) the United States should act to counter 
North Korea’s continued development and testing of 
nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles;
688 
(2) the development of a functional and oper-
ational North Korean nuclear and intercontinental 
ballistic missile program constitutes a threat to the 
security of the United States and to our allies and 
partners in the region; 
(3) the defense of the United States and our al-
lies against North Korean aggression remains a top 
priority, and the United States maintains an unwav-
ering and steadfast commitment to the policy of ex-
tended deterrence, especially with respect to South 
Korea and Japan; 
(4) the United States supports the deployment 
of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) system in South Korea to counter North 
Korea’s missile threat and the deployment of bal-
listic missile defense systems to allies in the Indo- 
Asia-Pacific region to protect from the growing 
threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and bal-
listic missile programs; 
(5) the United States should encourage further 
multilateral security cooperation and dialogue among 
South Korea, Japan, and Australia to address the 
North Korea threat; 
(6) the United States calls upon the People’s 
Republic of China to use its leverage to pressure
689 
North Korea to cease its provocative behavior and 
abandon and dismantle its nuclear and ballistic mis-
sile programs, and comply with all relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions; 
(7) the United States should fully enforce all 
existing sanctions on North Korea and undertake a 
comprehensive diplomatic effort to urge allies and 
other countries to fully enforce, and build upon, ex-
isting international sanctions; and 
(8) the United States should retain diplomatic, 
economic, and military options to defend against and 
pressure North Korea to abandon its illicit weapons 
program. 
SEC. 1270C. STRATEGY TO FURTHER UNITED STATES-INDIA 
DEFENSE COOPERATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of De-
fense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 
develop a strategy for advancing defense cooperation be-
tween the United States and India. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy shall address the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Common security challenges. 
(2) The role of United States partners and al-
lies in the United States-India defense relationship.
690 
(3) The role of the Defense Technology and 
Trade Initiative. 
(4) How to advance the Communications Inter-
operability and Security Memorandum of Agreement 
and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement 
for Geospatial Cooperation. 
(5) Any other matters the Secretary of Defense 
or the Secretary of State determines to be appro-
priate. 
SEC. 1270D. PLAN TO ENHANCE THE EXTENDED DETER-
RENCE AND ASSURANCE CAPABILITIES OF 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION. 
(a) FINDING.—Congress recognizes that North Ko-
rea’s first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic 
missile (ICBM) constitutes a grave and imminent threat 
to United States security and to the security of United 
States allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. 
(b) PLAN.—Not later than 30 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Commander of the United States 
Pacific Command and the Commander of the United 
States Strategic Command, shall submit to the congres-
sional defense committees a plan to enhance the extended
691 
deterrence and assurance capabilities of the United States 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
(c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Such plan shall in-
clude consideration of actions that will enhance United 
States security by strengthening deterrence of North Ko-
rean aggression and providing increased assurance to 
United States allies in the Asia-Pacific region, including 
the following: 
(1) Increased visible presence of key United 
States military assets, such as missile defenses, long- 
range strike assets, and intermediate-range strike 
assets to the region. 
(2) Increased military cooperation, exercises, 
and integration of defenses with allies in the region. 
(3) Development and deployment of ground- 
based intermediate-range missiles, whether by allies 
or by the United States, if the United States were 
no longer bound by the limitations of the INF Trea-
ty. 
(4) Increased foreign military sales to allies in 
the region. 
(5) Planning for, exercising, or deploying dual- 
capable aircraft to the region. 
(6) Any necessary modifications to the United 
States nuclear force posture, including re-deploy-
692 
ment of submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles 
to the region. 
(7) Such other actions the Secretary considers 
appropriate to strengthen extended deterrence and 
assurance in the region. 
(d) FORM.—Such plan shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may contain a classified annex. 
(e) INF TREATY DEFINED.—In this section, the 
term ‘‘INF Treaty’’ means the Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington De-
cember 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988. 
SEC. 1270E. REPORT ON NAVAL PORT OF CALL EXCHANGES 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than September 
1, 2018, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the ap-
propriate committees of Congress a report on the fol-
lowing: 
(1) An assessment of the feasibility and advis-
ability regarding ports of call by the United States 
Navy at ports on the island of Taiwan. 
(2) An assessment of the feasibility and advis-
ability of the United States to receiving ports of call
693 
by the Republic of China navy in Hawaii, Guam, 
and other appropriate locations. 
(b) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
SEC. 1270F. ASSESSMENT ON UNITED STATES DEFENSE IM-
PLICATIONS OF CHINA’S EXPANDING GLOBAL 
ACCESS. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall assess 
the foreign military and non-military activities of the 
People’s Republic of China which could affect the re-
gional and global national security and defense in-
terests of the United States. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by 
paragraph (1) shall evaluate the following:
694 
(A) China’s use of military and non-mili-
tary means in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and 
globally, including tourism, media, influence 
campaigns, investment projects, infrastructure, 
and access to foreign ports and military bases, 
and whether such means could affect United 
States national security or defense interests, in-
cluding operational access. 
(B) The implications, if any, of such 
means for the military force posture, access, 
training, and logistics of both the United States 
and China. 
(C) The United States strategy and policy 
for mitigating any harmful effects resulting 
from such means. 
(D) The resources required to implement 
such strategy and policy, and the mitigation 
plan to address any gaps in capabilities or re-
sources necessary for such implementation. 
(E) Measures to bolster the roles of allies, 
partners, and other countries to implement such 
strategy and policy. 
(F) Any other matters the Secretary of 
Defense or the Secretary of State determines to 
be appropriate.
721 
Summit and reaffirmed at the 2016 Warsaw 
Summit; 
(H) continue to build on efforts to identify 
and address, through consensus, the security 
threats facing the alliance, such as by enhanc-
ing counterterrorism activities; 
(I) continue to bolster deterrence efforts 
and promote the Enhanced Forward Presence 
in Eastern Europe; 
(J) as decided at the 2016 Warsaw Sum-
mit, use the new rotational deployments of four 
multinational combat battalions in Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to promote sta-
bility in that region as well as to deter Russian 
aggression; and 
(K) invest in infrastructure projects nec-
essary to guarantee free and efficient movement 
throughout the territories of NATO members; 
and 
(2) the United States should commit to main-
taining a robust military presence in Europe as a 
means of promoting allied interoperability, providing 
visible assurance to NATO allies, and deterring Rus-
sian aggression in the region.
767 
utive part of the Department of the Air Force a Space 
Corps. The function of the Space Corps shall be to assist 
the Secretary of the Air Force in carrying out the duties 
described in subsection (c). 
‘‘(b) COMPOSITION.—The Space Corps shall be com-
posed of the following: 
‘‘(1) The Chief of Staff of the Space Corps. 
‘‘(2) Such other offices and officials as may be 
established by law or as the Secretary of the Air 
Force, in consultation with the Chief of Staff of the 
Space Corps, may establish or designate. 
‘‘(c) DUTIES.—Except as otherwise specifically pre-
scribed by law, the Space Corps shall be organized in such 
manner, and the members of the Space Corps shall per-
form, such duties and have such titles, as the Secretary 
may prescribe. Such duties shall include— 
‘‘(1) protecting the interests of the United 
States in space; 
‘‘(2) deterring aggression in, from, and through 
space; 
‘‘(3) providing combat-ready space forces that 
enable the commanders of the combatant commands 
to fight and win wars; 
‘‘(4) organizing, training, and equipping space 
forces; and