I 
118TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 1425 
To require any convention, agreement, or other international instrument on 
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached by the World 
Health Assembly to be subject to Senate ratification. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
MARCH 7, 2023 
Mr. TIFFANY (for himself, Mr. BIGGS, Mrs. BOEBERT, Mr. FITZGERALD, Mr. 
GOODEN of Texas, Mr. GOSAR, Mrs. HARSHBARGER, Mrs. HOUCHIN, 
Mrs. MILLER of Illinois, Mr. NEHLS, Mr. ROY, Mr. SELF, Mr. SESSIONS, 
Mr. STEIL, and Ms. TENNEY) introduced the following bill; which was re-
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
A BILL 
To require any convention, agreement, or other international 
instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness, and 
response reached by the World Health Assembly to be 
subject to Senate ratification. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘No WHO Pandemic 
Preparedness Treaty Without Senate Approval Act’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
(1) On May 18, 2020, President Donald Trump 
sent a letter to World Health Organization (referred 
to in this Act as ‘‘WHO’’) Director-General Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus (referred to in this Act as the 
‘‘Director-General’’), announcing that— 
(A) United States contributions to WHO 
would be halted due its mismanagement of the 
COVID–19 outbreak and its lack of independ-
ence from the People’s Republic of China; and 
(B) the United States would withdraw 
from WHO if it did not commit to substantive 
improvements within 30 days. 
(2) President Trump’s May 18 letter cited nu-
merous instances of WHO mismanagement of the 
COVID–19 pandemic, including— 
(A) unjustified delays informing member 
states about a potentially serious disease out-
break in Wuhan, China; and 
(B) repeated grossly inaccurate or mis-
leading claims about the transmissibility of the 
virus and about the Government of China’s 
handling of the outbreak. 
(3) On June 30, 2020, Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo formally notified the United Nations of the 
United States decision to withdraw from WHO, 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
which would have taken effect on July 6, 2021, 
under the terms of a joint resolution adopted by 
Congress on June 14, 1948 (Public Law 80–643; 62 
Stat. 441). 
(4) A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 
April and May 2020 indicated that 51 percent of 
Americans felt that WHO had done a poor or fair 
job in managing the COVID–19 pandemic. 
(5) On January 20, 2021, President Joseph 
Biden sent United Nations Director-General Anto´nio 
Guterres a letter retracting the United States notice 
of withdrawal from WHO. 
(6) On December 1, 2021, at the second special 
session of the World Health Assembly (referred to in 
this Act as the ‘‘WHA’’) decided— 
(A) to establish an intergovernmental ne-
gotiating body (referred to in this section as the 
‘‘INB’’) to draft and negotiate a WHO conven-
tion (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Conven-
tion’’), agreement, or other international instru-
ment on pandemic prevention, preparedness, 
and response, with a view to adoption under Ar-
ticle 19 or any other provision of the WHO 
Constitution; and 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
(B) that the INB shall submit a progress 
report to the Seventy-sixth WHA and a working 
draft of the convention for consideration by the 
Seventy-seventh WHA, which is scheduled to 
take place beginning on March 18, 2024. 
(7) On February 24, March 14 and 15, and 
June 6 through 8 and 15 through 17, 2022, the 
INB held its inaugural meeting at which the Direc-
tor-General proposed the following 5 themes to guide 
the INB’s work in drafting the Convention: 
(A) Building national, regional, and global 
capacities based on a whole-of-government and 
whole-of-society approach. 
(B) Establishing global access and benefit 
sharing for all pathogens, and determining a 
global policy for the equitable production and 
distribution of countermeasures. 
(C) Establishing robust systems and tools 
for pandemic preparedness and response. 
(D) Establishing a long-term plan for sus-
tainable financing to ensure support for global 
health threat management and response sys-
tems. 
(E) Empowering WHO to fulfill its man-
date as the directing and coordinating authority 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
on international health work, including for pan-
demic preparedness and response. 
(8) On July 18 through 22, 2022, the INB held 
its second meeting at which it agreed that the Con-
vention would be adopted under Article 19 of the 
WHO Constitution and legally binding on the par-
ties. 
(9) On December 5 through 7, 2022, the INB 
held its third meeting at which it accepted a concep-
tual zero draft of the Convention and agreed to pre-
pare a zero draft for consideration at the INB’s next 
meeting. 
(10) In early January 2023, an initial draft of 
the Convention was sent to WHO member states in 
advance of its formal introduction at the fourth 
meeting of the INB, which is scheduled for February 
27 through March 3, 2023. The draft includes broad 
and binding provisions, including rules governing 
parties’ access to pathogen genomic sequences and 
how the products or benefits of such access are to 
be distributed. 
(11) Section 723.3 of title 11 of the Depart-
ment of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that 
when ‘‘determining whether any international agree-
ment should be brought into force as a treaty or as 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
an international agreement other than a treaty, the 
utmost care is to be exercised to avoid any invasion 
or compromise of the constitutional powers of the 
President, the Senate, and the Congress as a whole’’ 
and includes the following criteria to be considered 
when determining whether an international agree-
ment should take the form of a treaty or an execu-
tive agreement: 
(A) ‘‘The extent to which the agreement 
involves commitments or risks affecting the na-
tion as a whole’’. 
(B) ‘‘Whether the agreement is intended to 
affect state laws’’. 
(C) ‘‘Whether the agreement can be given 
effect without the enactment of subsequent leg-
islation by the Congress’’. 
(D) ‘‘Past U.S. practice as to similar 
agreements’’. 
(E) ‘‘The preference of the Congress as to 
a particular type of agreement’’. 
(F) ‘‘The degree of formality desired for 
an agreement’’. 
(G) ‘‘The proposed duration of the agree-
ment, the need for prompt conclusion of an 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
agreement, and the desirability of concluding a 
routine or short-term agreement’’. 
(H) ‘‘The general international practice as 
to similar agreements’’. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) a significant segment of the American pub-
lic is deeply skeptical of the World Health Organiza-
tion, its leadership, and its independence from the 
pernicious political influence of certain member 
states, including the People’s Republic of China; 
(2) Congress strongly prefers that any agree-
ment related to pandemic prevention, preparedness, 
and response adopted by the World Health Assembly 
pursuant to the work of the INB be considered a 
treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, with two-thirds of Senators concurring; 
(3) the scope of the agreement which the INB 
has been tasked with drafting, as outlined by the Di-
rector-General, is so broad that any application of 
the factors referred to in section 2(11) will weigh 
strongly in favor of it being considered a treaty; and 
(4) given the level of public distrust, any rel-
evant new agreement by the World Health Assembly 
which cannot garner the two-thirds vote needed for 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
Senate ratification should not be agreed to or imple-
mented by the United States. 
SEC. 4. ANY WORLD HEALTH AGENCY CONVENTION OR 
AGREEMENT OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL IN-
STRUMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTER-
NATIONAL NEGOTIATING BODY’S FINAL RE-
PORT DEEMED TO BE A TREATY SUBJECT TO 
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any con-
vention, agreement, or other international instrument on 
pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response reached 
by the World Health Assembly pursuant to the rec-
ommendations, report, or work of the International Nego-
tiating Body established by the second special session of 
the World Health Assembly is deemed to be a treaty that 
is subject to the requirements of article II, section 2, 
clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, which 
requires the advice and consent of the Senate, with two- 
thirds of Senators concurring. 
Æ 
VerDate Sep 11 2014 
03:04 Mar 21, 2023
Jkt 039200
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6301
E:\BILLS\H1425.IH
H1425
kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS