•HRES 577 IH 
Whereas absent congressional action, section 702 authorities 
will sunset at the end of the year; 
Whereas the Intelligence Community has not been forthright 
about its use of section 702 authorities over the 15 years 
that section 702 has been authorized; 
Whereas both Houses of Congress have repeatedly sought to 
exercise their constitutional, article I authority to conduct 
oversight of executive branch use of section 702 authori-
ties, and the Department of Justice, including the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has repeatedly and 
over multiple Congresses, failed to produce lawfully re-
quested documents and witnesses to both Houses of Con-
gress; 
Whereas what information Congress has related to section 
702 authorities is often obtained from news reports, 
whistleblower materials, and even when produced is often 
heavily redacted; 
Whereas what data Congress have on section 702 practice are 
often incomplete, in part due to the Department of Jus-
tice itself failing for 21 months to comply with the plain 
language of section 112 of the FISA Amendments Reau-
thorization Act of 2017, mandating that the agency keep 
a count of its section 702 queries of United States person 
data, until two Federal courts held that they were re-
quired to do so; 
Whereas this Congress is aware of multiple abuses of the sec-
tion 702 data collection process through released court 
decisions and aggregated data, which in itself is an ade-
quate basis to sunset the program; 
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•HRES 577 IH 
Whereas the National Security Agency acquires more than 
250,000,000 internet communications every year pursu-
ant to section 702; 
Whereas the FBI itself has conducted 702 queries with cal-
lous disregard of the privacy rights of Americans, as evi-
denced by a redacted Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC) opinion of April 21, 2022, including— 
(1) by conducting queries using 6,800 Social Secu-
rity numbers; 
(2) by running a batch query in June 2020 of 
unminimized FISA information using identifiers of 133 
individuals arrested ‘‘in connection with civil unrest and 
protests between approximately May 30, and June 18, 
2020’’ without ‘‘any specific potential connections to ter-
rorist related activity’’ known to those who conducted the 
queries; 
(3) by conducting a batch query for over 19,000 do-
nors to a congressional campaign; 
(4) by ‘‘regularly’’ querying queried unminimized 
FISA information using identifiers of individuals listed in 
local police homicide reports, including victims, family 
members, witnesses, and suspects with no evidence of 
criminal activity; 
(5) by conducting batch queries consisting of 23,132 
separate queries, using presumed United States-person 
query 
terms, 
and 
running 
said 
queries 
against 
unminimized section 702 information, although the FBI 
analyst conducting the queries had no indications of for-
eign influence related to the query terms used; and 
(6) by conducting ‘‘in excess’’ of 278,000 noncompli-
ant queries of raw FISA-acquired information; 
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•HRES 577 IH 
Whereas that FISC court opinion concluded that ‘‘[a]cross 
the FBI, the government has reported queries of raw 
FISA-acquired information as ‘a part of routine baseline 
checks in order to determine whether there was any in-
formation regarding the subject [of the query] in FBI 
holdings,’ without a specific factual basis to believe the 
query was reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence 
information or evidence of a crime.’’; 
Whereas current oversight work of the 118th Congress does 
evidence that this pattern of abuses, in particular by the 
FBI, are not incidental, but rather a pattern of behavior 
warranting the sunset of section 702; 
Whereas even FISC Judge James E. Boasberg in a 2018 rul-
ing observed that a ‘‘large number of [702] queries 
evidence[ed] a misunderstanding of the querying stand-
ard—or indifference toward it’’; 
Whereas numerous American intelligence, law enforcement, 
academic, and civil liberties groups have expressed sus-
tained concern over the law and practice of section 702 
collection; 
Whereas there is no indication that traditional FISA author-
izations, requiring a warrant, are not up to the task of 
protecting American national security while also pro-
tecting American civil liberties; 
Whereas traditional FISA authorities are more protective of 
American civil liberties, including— 
(1) by requiring close involvement of article III 
judges; 
(2) by requiring approval both of the Attorney Gen-
eral and a judge; 
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•HRES 577 IH 
(3) by requiring an attestation that ordinary meth-
ods of information collection would not work, prior to 
having a warrant approved; and 
(4) by having time limits on surveillance; and 
Whereas no government component has ever provided evi-
dence that section 702 has produced better outcomes 
than traditional FISA: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that the authorities under section 702 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 should be 
allowed to expire at the end of this calendar year. 
Æ 
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