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106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. J. RES. 48
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the court-martial conviction
of the late Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay, III, and calling upon
the President to award a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew
of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APRIL 28, 1999
Mr. SCARBOROUGH (for himself, Ms. CARSON, Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island,
Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut, Mr. MALONEY of Connecticut, Mrs.
EMERSON, Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. FARR of California,
Mr. FROST, Mrs. MINK of Hawaii, Mrs. THURMAN, Mr. PEASE, Mr.
KLECZKA, Mr. SNYDER, Mr. NEY, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. BOYD, Mr.
THOMPSON of Mississippi, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr.
GEJDENSON, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. STUMP, Mr. GARY
MILLER of California, Mrs. MEEK of Florida, Mr. UNDERWOOD, Mr.
EHLERS, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. METCALF,
Mr. BARRETT of Nebraska, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr.
CALLAHAN, Mr. REGULA, Mr. COOK, Mr. FOSSELLA, Ms. EDDIE BER-
NICE JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. MCINNIS, Mr. JOHN, Mr. UDALL of New
Mexico, and Ms. RIVERS) introduced the following joint resolution; which
was referred to the Committee on Armed Services
JOINT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the court-
martial conviction of the late Rear Admiral Charles But-
ler McVay, III, and calling upon the President to award
a Presidential Unit Citation to the final crew of the
U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
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Whereas shortly after midnight on the night of July 30,
1945, during the closing days of World War II, the
United States Navy heavy cruiser U.S.S. INDIANAP-
OLIS (CA–35) was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese
submarine;
Whereas of the 1,196 crew members, only 316 survived the
attack and subsequent five-day ordeal adrift at sea, the
rest dying from battle wounds, drowning, shark attacks,
exposure, or lack of food and water, making the sinking
of the INDIANAPOLIS the worst sea disaster in United
States naval history;
Whereas following the rescue of the surviving crew members,
the commanding officer of the INDIANAPOLIS, Captain
Charles Butler McVay III, who survived the sinking and
the ordeal at sea, was charged with ‘‘suffering a vessel
to be hazarded through negligence’’ and was convicted by
a court-martial of that charge, notwithstanding a great
many extenuating circumstances, some of which were not
presented at the court-martial trial;
Whereas Captain McVay had an excellent record throughout
his naval career before the sinking of the INDIANAP-
OLIS, beginning with his graduation from the United
States Naval Academy in 1919 and including an excellent
combat record that included participation in the landings
in North Africa and award of the Silver Star for courage
under fire earned during the Solomon Islands campaign;
Whereas after assuming command of the INDIANAPOLIS
on November 18, 1944, Captain McVay led the ship dur-
ing her participation in the assaults on Iwo Jima and
Okinawa;
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Whereas during the latter assault, the INDIANAPOLIS suf-
fered a damaging kamikaze attack which penetrated the
ship’s hull, but the ship was made seaworthy and skill-
fully returned by Captain McVay and her crew to San
Francisco for repairs;
Whereas following completion of those repairs, the INDIAN-
APOLIS was given the mission of transporting to the is-
land of Tinian vital parts of the atomic bomb which was
dropped on Hiroshima, a mission which was completed
successfully on July 26, 1945, at a record average speed
of 29 knots;
Whereas following the accomplishment of that mission, the
INDIANAPOLIS sailed from Tinian to Guam and from
there embarked for Leyte Gulf in the Philippines to join
training with the fleet assembling for the final assault on
the Japanese mainland;
Whereas as the INDIANAPOLIS began its trip across the
Philippine Sea on July 28, 1945, the war was virtually
over in that area of the south Pacific, with hostilities
having moved 1,000 miles to the north, the Japanese
navy’s surface fleet was nonexistent, and United States
naval intelligence reported only four operational Japanese
submarines in the entire Pacific theater of war, all of
which resulted in the state of alert among shore-based
personnel routing and tracking the INDIANAPOLIS
across the Philippine Sea being affected accordingly;
Whereas before departure from Guam Captain McVay re-
quested a destroyer escort because his ship was not
equipped with antisubmarine detection devices, but, de-
spite the fact that no capital ship such as the INDIAN-
APOLIS had made the transit between Guam and the
Philippines without escort during World War II, that re-
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quest was denied, and a 1996 report by the Navy’s Judge
Advocate General’s office concedes that ‘‘Captain McVay
and the routing officer did not discuss the availability of
an 
escort 
after 
the 
operations 
officer 
for
COMMARIANNAS confirmed that an escort was not
necessary’’;
Whereas although Captain McVay was informed of ‘‘sub-
marine sightings’’ in the Philippine Sea, such sightings
were commonplace, and none of those reported to Cap-
tain McVay had been confirmed, and at the same time
there was a failure to inform him that a submarine with-
in range of his path had sunk the U.S.S. UNDERHILL
four days before his departure from Guam;
Whereas United States military intelligence activities,
through a code-breaking system called ULTRA, had
learned that the Japanese submarine I–58 was operating
in the Philippine Sea area, but Captain McVay was not
told of this intelligence, which remained classified as Top
Secret until the early 1990’s, and this intelligence (and
the fact that it was withheld from Captain McVay when
he sailed from Guam) was not brought to light at his
court-martial;
Whereas the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk by this same sub-
marine;
Whereas the commander of that submarine, Mochitsura
Hashimoto, testified at the court-martial that once he
had detected the ship, he would have been able to make
a successful torpedo attack whether or not the ship was
zigzagging;
Whereas with visibility severely limited by a heavy overcast
at approximately 11 p.m. on the night of July 29, 1945,
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Captain McVay gave the order to cease zigzagging and
retired to his cabin and shortly after midnight the INDI-
ANAPOLIS was struck by two torpedoes and sunk with-
in 12 minutes;
Whereas the formal charge upon which Captain McVay was
convicted for ‘‘suffering a vessel to be hazarded through
negligence’’ contained the phrase ‘‘in good visibility’’ in
reference to the weather conditions on that night, which
is contrary to the recollection of all survivors, who recall
that the visibility was very poor;
Whereas after the INDIANAPOLIS was sunk, various Navy
shore offices compounded the previous errors which had
led to the ship being placed in jeopardy by failing to re-
port the ship’s overdue arrival, thus leaving the approxi-
mately 950 members of the crew who survived the sink-
ing of the ship adrift for four days and five nights until
by chance the survivors were spotted by a routine air pa-
trol;
Whereas a court of inquiry to investigate the sinking was
convened in Guam on August 13, 1945, just two weeks
after the sinking and nine days after the survivors were
rescued (a date so soon after the sinking that Captain
William Hillbert, the Navy judge advocate for the in-
quiry, admitted that the inquiry was so rushed that they
were ‘‘. . . starting the proceedings without having
available all the necessary data’’) and recommended that
Captain McVay be issued a Letter of Reprimand and
that he be court-martialed;
Whereas the headquarters staff of CINCPAC (commanded by
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz) disagreed with the rec-
ommendation of the court of inquiry, stating that in not
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maintaining a zigzag course Captain McVay at worst was
guilty only of an error in judgment and not gross neg-
ligence and concluded that the rule requiring zigzagging
would not have applied in any event since Captain
McVay’s orders gave him discretion on that matter and
took precedence over all other orders (a point that was
never made by Captain McVay’s attorney during the
court-martial);
Whereas the Department of the Navy delayed the announce-
ment of the sinking of the INDIANAPOLIS for almost
two weeks to coincide with the announcement of the sur-
render of Japan, thus diverting attention from the mag-
nitude of the disaster and lessening its public impact,
and then, despite opposition by Admiral Nimitz and Ad-
miral Raymond Spruance (for whom the INDIANAP-
OLIS had served as flagship), it brought court-martial
charges against Captain McVay in a rare instance when
a commanding officer’s recommendations are con-
travened;
Whereas Captain McVay thus became the first United States
Navy commanding officer brought to trial for losing his
ship in combat during World War II, despite the fact
that over 700 ships were lost during World War II, in-
cluding some under questionable circumstances;
Whereas Captain McVay was convicted on February 23,
1946, on the charge of ‘‘suffering a vessel to be hazarded
through negligence’’, thus permanently damaging his ca-
reer as a naval officer, although when Admiral Nimitz
was advanced to the position of Chief of Naval Oper-
ations later that same year, he remitted Captain McVay’s
sentence and restored him to active duty;
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Whereas following his court-martial conviction, Captain
McVay remained on active duty until retiring in 1949
upon completion of 30 years of active naval service, with
a final promotion, in accordance with then-applicable law,
to the grade of rear admiral, effective upon the date of
his retirement;
Whereas Rear Admiral Charles Butler McVay III (retired),
died on November 6, 1968, without having been exoner-
ated from responsibility for the loss of his ship and the
lives of 880 members of her crew;
Whereas the survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS still living
have remained steadfast in their support of the exonera-
tion of Captain McVay;
Whereas in 1993, Congress, in section 1165 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public
Law 103–160; 107 Stat. 1765; 16 U.S.C. 431 note), rec-
ognized the memorial to the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS
(CA–35) in Indianapolis, Indiana, as the national memo-
rial to that historic warship and to her final crew; and
Whereas in 1994, Congress, in section 1052 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public
Law 103–337; 108 Stat. 2844), stating that it was act-
ing on behalf of the grateful people of the United
States—
(1) recognized the invaluable contributions of the
U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS to the ending of World War II;
and
(2) on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of her
tragic sinking, and the dedication of the national memo-
rial in Indianapolis on July 30, 1995, commended that
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ship and her crew for selfless and heroic service to the
United States: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE
COURT-MARTIAL CONVICTION OF CHARLES
BUTLER MCVAY, III.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the court-martial charges against then-Cap-
tain Charles Butler McVay III, United States Navy,
arising from the sinking of the U.S.S. INDIANAP-
OLIS (CA–35) on July 30, 1945, while under his
command were not morally sustainable;
(2) Captain McVay’s conviction was a mis-
carriage of justice that led to his unjust humiliation
and damage to his naval career; and
(3) the American people should now recognize
Captain McVay’s lack of culpability for the tragic
loss of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS and the lives of
the men who died as a result of her sinking.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL
UNIT CITATION FOR FINAL CREW OF THE
U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
gress that the President should award a Presidential Unit
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Citation to the final crew of the U.S.S. INDIANAPOLIS
(CA–35) in recognition of the courage and fortitude dis-
played by the members of that crew in the face of tremen-
dous hardship and adversity after their ship was torpedoed
and sunk on July 30, 1945.
(b) WAIVER OF TIME LIMITATION.—A citation de-
scribed in subsection (a) may be awarded without regard
to any provision of law or regulation prescribing a time
limitation that is otherwise applicable with respect to rec-
ommendation for, or the award of, such a citation.
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