•HRES 1365 IH 
place, and manner of elections for Members of the House 
of Representatives; 
Whereas article I, section 4 also conveys to Congress the au-
thority to make or alter regulations with respect to the 
manner that States must follow in carrying out congres-
sional redistricting after an apportionment of Members of 
the House of Representatives; 
Whereas redistricting is conducted in each State by either the 
State legislature or a commission, and normally occurs 
every 10 years following the regular Census; 
Whereas in the early 1960s, when many State legislative and 
congressional districts were grossly mal-apportioned, the 
Supreme Court imposed a standard of ‘‘one person, one 
vote’’ on nearly all districting, requiring that equal or 
nearly equal numbers of people receive equal numbers of 
representatives; 
Whereas gerrymandering is used both by partisans seeking to 
gain additional seats and by incumbents of all parties 
seeking to shore up their districts and minimize the risk 
of electoral defeat, and has several adverse effects on the 
democratic process, including a decline in the number of 
competitive seats throughout the nation, reducing ac-
countability and threatening to further the ideological po-
larization of our elected officials by enabling the election 
of partisans who need not appeal to moderate voters, as 
well as a reduction in voter interest and turnout in non-
competitive districts; 
Whereas technical advancement has allowed for the precise 
drawing of Congressional districts for the purpose of par-
tisan advantage or incumbent retention; 
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•HRES 1365 IH 
Whereas it is important to reduce the partisan pressures than 
are inherent in the redistricting process when conducted 
by State legislatures; 
Whereas transparency and public participation are crucial 
components in an accountable redistricting process; 
Whereas numerous good government organizations and advo-
cates have recommended the use of independent commis-
sions for the redistricting process to draw fair and com-
petitive Congressional districts, which would decrease 
partisanship and increase accountability; 
Whereas 12 States presently conduct their redistricting ef-
forts by some form of independent commission; 
Whereas conducting redistricting once each decade, following 
the census, with a strict time line for completion and ap-
propriate flexibility to accommodate the occasional need 
for technical corrections due to late-discovered data er-
rors or other rare exogenous events, encourages stability 
in the political system and the accountability of rep-
resentatives to constituencies established for a 10-year 
period, while multiple or mid-cycle redistricting worsens 
the retributive aspects of politics and carries the potential 
for increased partisan bias; 
Whereas almost half of the states already have some provi-
sion in law to limit redistricting to once after each cen-
sus; 
Whereas under the ‘‘one person, one vote’’ requirement of the 
United States Constitution, any jurisdiction electing dis-
trict-based representatives effectively must redistrict after 
each decennial census; 
Whereas the legitimacy of democratic institutions rests large-
ly on transparency and participation, and mistrust of in-
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•HRES 1365 IH 
stitutions and government structures can taint subse-
quent political outcomes; 
Whereas limiting redistricting to once immediately after each 
decennial census limits any possibility of partisan oppor-
tunism after the post-census redistricting unless a court 
finds that the post-census plan is itself invalid, and en-
sures the stability of the electoral process and the demo-
cratic process; 
Whereas limiting redistricting to once after every decennial 
census thus makes sense especially when partisan gain is 
a threat, and could help constrain partisan opportunism 
in cases where political actors redistrict; and 
Whereas the use of an independent commission would vest 
power in a body composed of qualified individuals com-
petent to apply the preferred redistricting standards ob-
jectively and would be particularly well-suited to follow 
the procedural principles of transparency, effective, and 
diverse public participation and accountability: Now, 
therefore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that— 
(1) an independent redistricting commission is 
the best vehicle for ensuring that Congressional re-
districting conducted by a State is done in a manner 
that respects the principles of transparency, effective 
and diverse public participation, and accountability, 
so long as the redistricting is conducted in accord-
ance with a plan developed by such a commission 
using criteria and procedures that will discourage 
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•HRES 1365 IH 
gerrymandering and promote competition, to the ex-
tent that such criteria and procedures are consistent 
with the applicable requirements of the Constitution 
of the United States and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq.); and 
(2) a State should not be redistricted until after 
the next apportionment of Representatives, unless a 
court requires the State to conduct such subsequent 
redistricting to comply with the Constitution or to 
enforce the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 
1973 et seq.). 
Æ 
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