H. R. 2670—905 
criminal matters has not yet been adjudicated, unless the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis has obtained the consent 
of the interviewee following consultation with counsel; 
(B) with respect to either the Overt Human Intelligence 
Collection Program or the Open Source Intelligence Collec-
tion Program, any collection targeting journalists in the 
performance of their journalistic functions; and 
(C) with respect to the Overt Human Intelligence 
Collection Program, an interview for intelligence collection 
purposes with a United States person where the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis lacks a reasonable belief based 
on facts and circumstances that the United States person 
may possess significant foreign intelligence (as defined in 
section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3003)). 
(3) OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.— 
The term ‘‘Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program’’ 
means the program established by the Under Secretary of 
Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis pursuant to 
Policy Instruction 907 of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 
issued on June 29, 2016, or any successor program. 
(4) OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.— 
The term ‘‘Open Source Collection Intelligence Program’’ means 
the program established by the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence and Analysis for the purpose of col-
lecting intelligence and information for potential production 
and reporting in the form of Open Source Information Reports 
as reflected in Policy Instruction 900 of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, issued on January 13, 2015, or any successor 
program. 
(5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United States per-
son’’ means— 
(A) a United States citizen; 
(B) an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to be a permanent resident alien; 
(C) an unincorporated association substantially com-
posed of United States citizens or permanent resident 
aliens; or 
(D) a corporation incorporated in the United States, 
except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign 
government or governments. 
(6) UNITED STATES PERSON INFORMATION (USPI).—The term 
‘‘United States person information’’— 
(A) means information that is reasonably likely to iden-
tify 1 or more specific United States persons; and 
(B) may be either a single item of information or 
information that, when combined with other available 
information, is reasonably likely to identify one or more 
specific United States persons. 
(b) PROHIBITION
ON AVAILABILITY
OF FUNDS
FOR COVERED 
ACTIVITIES OF OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM 
AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.—None of 
the funds authorized to be appropriated by this division may be 
made available to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security to conduct a covered activity. 
(c) LIMITATION ON PERSONNEL.—None of the funds authorized 
to be appropriated by this division may be used by the Office
H. R. 2670—906 
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity to increase, above the staffing level in effect on the day before 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the number of personnel 
assigned to the Open Source Intelligence Division who work exclu-
sively or predominantly on domestic terrorism issues. 
(d) INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
ASSESSMENT
OF OVERT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PRO-
GRAM AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAM.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Inspector General of the Intel-
ligence Community shall conduct an assessment of the Overt 
Human Intelligence Collection Program and the Open Source 
Intelligence Collection Program. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The assessment under paragraph (1) shall 
include findings and, as the Inspector General considers appro-
priate, recommendations on the following: 
(A) Whether the Overt Human Intelligence Collection 
Program and the Open Source Intelligence Collection Pro-
gram are legally authorized, and if so, an identification 
of the legal authorities. 
(B) Whether, and to what extent, such programs have 
provided valuable insights on national intelligence prior-
ities and intelligence priorities of the Department of Home-
land Security, citing specific examples of such insights 
at the appropriate classification level. 
(C) Whether there is sufficient training provided to, 
and sufficient oversight provided of, personnel of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland 
Security who conduct intelligence collection under such 
programs. 
(D) Whether the responsibilities and requirements for 
such programs set forth in the relevant policy instructions, 
intelligence oversight guidelines, and other governing docu-
ments or standard operating procedures of the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, particularly as they relate to 
the obligation to safeguard the privacy, civil liberties, and 
civil rights of United States persons, are adequate, appro-
priate, and consistently adhered to by such personnel. 
(E) Whether such programs raise or have raised legal, 
ethical, or operational concerns, including concerns relating 
to the actual or potential violation of any applicable policies 
or procedures for protecting the constitutional or statutory 
rights of United States persons. 
(F) Whether other Federal agencies, such as the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, conduct similar programs and, 
if so, a comparison of any similarities and differences 
between the respective programs. 
(G) With respect to non-analytic intelligence reports 
produced by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis derived 
in whole or in part from such programs, whether such 
reports appropriately minimize United States person 
information and use press reporting in an appropriate 
manner. 
(H) With respect to the Open Source Intelligence 
Collection Program, whether such program is effective at 
identifying threats directed against the United States, 
including true threats, incitement to violence, and malign 
cyber activity.
H. R. 2670—907 
(I) Whether there have been any identified instances 
in which State, local, territorial, or Tribal government agen-
cies have used, or sought to use, the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis as an instrument to introduce political or 
politicized information into the national intelligence collec-
tion and reporting stream. 
(J) Any other matter the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community determines appropriate. 
(3) BRIEFING.—Not later than 120 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intel-
ligence Community shall provide to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a briefing on the preliminary findings and 
recommendations of the Inspector General with respect to the 
assessment under paragraph (1). 
(4) REPORT.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community shall submit to the appro-
priate congressional committees a report containing the 
findings and recommendations of the Inspector General 
with respect to the assessment under paragraph (1). 
(B) FORM.—The report submitted pursuant to subpara-
graph (A) shall be submitted under that subparagraph 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(5) QUARTERLY BRIEFINGS.—The Under Secretary of Home-
land Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall, not less than 
once per quarter, provide to the appropriate congressional 
committees a briefing on the intelligence collection activities 
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. These briefings shall 
include— 
(A) a description of any new activities, initiatives, or 
efforts undertaken pursuant to the Overt Human Intel-
ligence Collection Program or the Open Source Intelligence 
Collection Program; 
(B) a description of any new policies, procedures, or 
guidance concerning the Overt Human Intelligence Collec-
tion Program or the Open Source Intelligence Collection 
Program; 
(C) a description of any compliance-related inquiries, 
investigations, reviews, checks, or audits initiated con-
cerning the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program 
or the Open Source Intelligence Collection Program, as 
well as an update on the outcome or status of any pre-
existing inquiries, investigations, reviews, checks, or audits 
concerning these programs; 
(D) a comparison of the volume of intelligence and 
information collected on United States persons by the Office 
and used in finished intelligence products produced by 
the Office with the volume of intelligence or information 
on United States persons that is— 
(i) collected by State, local, and Tribal territory 
governments, the private sector, and other components 
of the Department of Homeland Security; 
(ii) provided directly or indirectly to the Office; 
and 
(iii) used in finished intelligence products produced 
by the Office; and
H. R. 2670—908 
(E) information on the reports and products issued 
by the Overt Human Intelligence Collection Program and 
the Open Source Intelligence Collection Program for the 
quarter covered by the briefing, which shall reflect— 
(i) the number of reports and products issued by 
each program; 
(ii) the number of reports and products issued 
by type or format of the report or product; 
(iii) the number of reports and products based 
on information provided by representatives of Federal, 
foreign or international, State, local, Tribal, territorial, 
or private sector entities, respectively, and, for each 
of these subcategories, the number of reports or prod-
ucts based on information provided by known or pre-
sumed United States persons; 
(iv) the number of reports and products based on 
information provided by individuals in administrative 
custody and, within that number, the number of 
reports or products based on information provided by 
known or presumed United States persons; 
(v) the number of reports and products based on 
information provided by confidential informants and, 
within that number, the number of reports or products 
based on information provided by known or presumed 
United States persons; 
(vi) the number of reports and products supporting 
different national or departmental missions and, for 
each of these subcategories, the number of reports 
or products based on information provided by known 
or presumed United States persons; and 
(vii) the number of reports and products identifying 
United States persons. 
(e) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.— 
(1) EFFECT ON OTHER INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.—Nothing 
in this section shall be construed as limiting or superseding 
the authority of any official within the Department of Homeland 
Security to conduct legal, privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties 
oversight of the intelligence activities of the Office of Intel-
ligence and Analysis. 
(2) SHARING AND RECEIVING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.— 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to 
limit the authority of, personnel of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis from sharing intelligence information with, or 
receiving information from— 
(A) foreign, State, local, Tribal, or territorial govern-
ments (or any agency or subdivision thereof); 
(B) the private sector; or 
(C) other elements of the Federal government, 
including the components of the Department of Homeland 
Security. 
SEC. 7325. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITY OF FENTANYL IN 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIES FRAMEWORK. 
It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, 
including precursor chemicals and manufacturing equipment associ-
ated with illicit fentanyl production and organizations that traffic 
or finance the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, originating from the
H. R. 2670—909 
People’s Republic of China and Mexico should be among the highest 
priorities in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
SEC. 7326. REPORTS ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES CAUSED BY CERTAIN 
OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. 
(a) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 2 years, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congres-
sional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives, and, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, the Foreign Relations Committee of the 
Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Rep-
resentatives, a report on civilian casualties caused by covered oper-
ations. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (a) shall include, 
for the year covered by the report, each of the following: 
(1) A list identifying each covered operation during that 
year that has resulted in civilian casualties that the Director 
of National Intelligence has confirmed. 
(2) An identification of the total number of civilian casual-
ties resulting from covered operations during that year that 
the Director of National Intelligence has confirmed. 
(3) For each covered operation identified in the list under 
paragraph (1), an identification of the following: 
(A) The date on which, and the location where, the 
covered operation occurred. 
(B) The element of the foreign government that con-
ducted the covered operation. 
(C) The individual or entity against which the covered 
operation was directed. 
(D) Any other circumstances or facts that the Director 
of National Intelligence determines relevant. 
(c) FORM.—Each report required under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted shall include an 
unclassified executive summary. 
(d) COVERED OPERATION DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘covered operation’’ means an operation— 
(1) conducted by a foreign government; 
(2) involving the use of force; and 
(3) in which intelligence shared by an element of the intel-
ligence community plays a significant role. 
SEC. 7327. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING REQUIRE-
MENTS. 
(a) MODIFICATION OF FREQUENCY OF WHISTLEBLOWER NOTIFICA-
TIONS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.— 
Section 5334(a) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, 
and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended 
by striking ‘‘in near real time’’ and inserting ‘‘monthly’’. 
(b) REPEAL
OF
REQUIREMENT
FOR
INSPECTORS
GENERAL 
REVIEWS OF ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAMS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 11001 of title 5, United States 
Code, is amended— 
(A) by striking subsection (d); and 
(B) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d).
H. R. 2670—910 
(2) TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS.—Subsection (d) of section 
11001 of such title, as redesignated by paragraph (1)(B), is 
amended— 
(A) in paragraph (3), by adding ‘‘and’’ after the semi-
colon at the end; and 
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting 
a period. 
(c) REPEAL OF CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR 
DEGREE-GRANTING AUTHORITY
OF
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
UNIVERSITY.—Section 1032(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3225a(c)) is repealed. 
(d) REPEAL
OF REQUIREMENT
FOR DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE
TO
UPDATE
LIST
IDENTIFYING
ONLINE
VIOLENT 
EXTREMIST CONTENT.—Section 403(b) of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (50 U.S.C. 3368(b)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘or more frequently as needed’’ and inserting ‘‘until the 
date of the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2024’’. 
(e) REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON ILLICIT 
FINANCING OF ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.— 
Section 5722(d) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, 
and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2176) is amended— 
(1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘REPORTS’’ and inserting 
‘‘REPORT’’; 
(2) in the heading of paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘INITIAL 
REPORT’’ and inserting ‘‘IN GENERAL’’; 
(3) by striking paragraph (2) and redesignating paragraph 
(3) as paragraph (2); and 
(4) in paragraph (2), as so redesignated, by striking ‘‘Each 
report’’ and inserting ‘‘The report’’. 
Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency 
SEC. 7331. CHANGE TO PENALTIES AND INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF 
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT 
ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTALLATIONS. 
Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sentence, by striking 
‘‘those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States Code’’ 
and inserting ‘‘the maximum penalty authorized for a Class B 
misdemeanor under section 3559 of title 18, United States Code’’. 
SEC. 7332. MODIFICATIONS TO PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES OF THE 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3503) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘sections’’ and all that 
follows through ‘‘session)’’ and inserting ‘‘sections 3201, 3203, 
3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through 3306, 3321 through 3323, 3801 
through 3808, 3069, 3134, 3841, and 4752 of title 10, United 
States Code’’ and 
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘in paragraphs’’ and all 
that follows through ‘‘1947’’ and inserting ‘‘in sections 3201 
through 3204 of title 10, United States Code, shall not be 
delegable. Each determination or decision required by sections
H. R. 2670—911 
3201 through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of title 10, 
United States Code’’. 
SEC. 7333. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY QUARTERLY EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT SUM-
MARIES. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; and 
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and 
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the last day 
of the first full fiscal quarter beginning after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act and not later than 30 days after the last day 
of each fiscal quarter thereafter until the last fiscal quarter of 
fiscal year 2027, the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a summary of the engagement of employees of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency with the Inspector General during that quarter. 
(c) CONTENTS.—Each summary submitted pursuant to sub-
section (b) shall include each of the following for the quarter covered 
by the summary: 
(1) The total number of reports filed with the Inspector 
General by employees of the Agency. 
(2) An identification of the nature of the allegation made 
in each such report, such as— 
(A) fraud, waste, and abuse; 
(B) harassment or other personnel issues; 
(C) questionable intelligence activities; or 
(D) threats to health and safety. 
(3) For each such report— 
(A) whether an investigation was initiated because of 
the report; 
(B) for any such investigation, whether the status of 
the investigation is initiated, in progress, or complete; and 
(C) for any completed investigation, whether the allega-
tion made in the report was found to be substantiated 
or unsubstantiated, and whether any recommendations or 
criminal referrals were made as a result. 
(4) A copy of any audit, assessment, inspection, or other 
final report completed by the Inspector General during the 
quarter covered by the summary. 
SEC. 7334. BENJAMIN TALLMADGE INSTITUTE AS PRIMARY CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ENTITY FOR EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall maintain the Benjamin Tallmadge Institute as the 
primary entity within the Central Intelligence Agency for education 
and training related to all aspects of counterintelligence. 
(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR.—The Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall— 
(1) ensure the Institute is fully and properly organized 
and has the resources necessary to provide counterintelligence
H. R. 2670—912 
education and training for all career fields within the Agency, 
including specialized certifications for Agency counterintel-
ligence personnel; 
(2) develop appropriate certification courses that are 
designed to educate, train, and certify Agency personnel in— 
(A) counterintelligence threats, insider threats, and 
other counterintelligence processes and issues; 
(B) the conduct and support of counterintelligence 
inquiries and investigations; 
(C) relevant skills necessary for coordination with Fed-
eral law enforcement; and 
(D) any other skills as the Director determines nec-
essary; 
(3) identify and designate specific positions for which an 
individual shall be required to have a certification described 
in paragraph (2) prior to filling such a position; and 
(4) develop necessary infrastructure and capacity to support 
the availability of courses under subsection (c) to increase 
participation by personnel from other components of the intel-
ligence community in the courses offered by the Institute. 
(c) TRAINING AND FAMILIARIZATION COURSES.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Institute shall— 
(A) develop training and familiarization courses at dif-
ferent classification levels, including courses at an unclassi-
fied level; and 
(B) offer instruction in the courses developed under 
subparagraph (A) or make training curricula available to 
other intelligence community components, as appropriate, 
to support outreach efforts. 
(2) AVAILABILITY
OF
COURSES.—The training and famil-
iarization courses developed under paragraph (1) shall be made 
available to any of the following that have a need and appro-
priate clearance, as determined by the Director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center in consultation with 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, for a general 
education on counterintelligence threats, briefings on specific 
topics, or other training related to counterintelligence: 
(A) Federal departments and agencies that are not 
elements of the intelligence community. 
(B) State, local, and Tribal governments. 
(C) Private sector entities. 
(D) Such other personnel and entities as appropriate. 
(d) BASELINE CERTIFICATION COURSE.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Institute shall develop, in coordina-
tion with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and implement a baseline 
certification course for all counterintelligence career profes-
sionals that aligns the minimum certification requirements of 
the course and the Defense Counterintelligence Agent Course 
of the Joint Counterintelligence Training Activity. 
(2) AVAILABILITY
OF
COURSE.—The baseline certification 
course developed under paragraph (1) shall be made available, 
on a space-available basis, to all intelligence community profes-
sionals and appropriate personnel with appropriate security 
clearance from any other agency, committee, commission, office, 
or other establishment in the executive, legislative, or judicial 
branch of the Federal Government.
H. R. 2670—913 
SEC. 7335. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESS-
MENT OF SINALOA CARTEL AND JALISCO CARTEL. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, in consultation with the heads of the other elements of 
the intelligence community that the Director determines appro-
priate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
an intelligence assessment on the transnational criminal organiza-
tions known as the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The intelligence assessment under subsection 
(a) shall include, with respect to each transnational criminal 
organization specified in such subsection, a description of the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The key leaders, organizational structure, subgroups, 
presence in the states within Mexico, and cross-border illicit 
drug smuggling routes of the transnational criminal organiza-
tion. 
(2) The practices used by the transnational criminal 
organization to import the chemicals used to make synthetic 
drugs, to produce such drugs, and to smuggle such drugs across 
the border into the United States. 
(3) The main suppliers and the main brokers that supply 
the transnational criminal organization with precursor chemi-
cals and equipment used in the production of synthetic drugs. 
(4) The manner in which the transnational criminal 
organization is tailoring the fentanyl products of such organiza-
tion to attract a wider variety of United States consumers, 
including unwitting users. 
(5) The degree to which the transnational criminal 
organization is using human and technical operations to under-
mine counternarcotics efforts by United States and Mexican 
security services. 
(6) An estimate of the annual revenue received by the 
transnational criminal organization from the sale of illicit 
drugs, disaggregated by drug type. 
(7) Any other information the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency determines relevant. 
(c) FORM.—The intelligence assessment under subsection (a) 
may be submitted in classified form. 
(d) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
Homeland Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
SEC. 7336. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESS-
MENT 
WITH 
RESPECT 
TO 
EFFORTS 
BY 
PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO INCREASE INFLUENCE IN 
MIDDLE EAST. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence