(2) The United States maintains a force of ap-
proximately 25,000 military personnel in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf region.
(3) The United States has many allies and
friends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.
(4) The policies of the current regime in Iran,
including the export of terrorism and the pursuit of
regional military hegemony, are inimical to the inter-
ests of the United States and its allies and friends.
(5) Iran has been aggressively pursuing ballistic
missile technology. According to a statement by the
Vice President in August 1997, ‘‘It is obvious that
there is a vigorous effort by Iran to obtain the tech-
nologies that it needs to build a ballistic missile and
to build nuclear weapons.’’
(6) The President, in Executive Order 12938,
issued on November 14, 1994 and reaffirmed in No-
vember 1995 and November 1996, declared a state
of emergency, finding that ‘‘the proliferation of nu-
clear, biological, and chemical weapons and of the
means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an un-
usual and extraordinary threat to the national secu-
rity, foreign policy and economy of the United
States . . .’’
(7) Iran may achieve theater ballistic missile
capabilities capable of striking United States forces,
allies, and friends in the Middle East and Persian
Gulf regions within one to two years. Department of
Defense officials report that Iran is acquiring missile
systems and technology from abroad and is develop-
ing two ballistic missile systems. The Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Near Eastern Affairs recently
testified that Iran could complete development of its
Shahab–3 missile in 12 to 18 months. This threat
will grow over time as Iranian missile production ca-
pability matures and missile ranges increase.
(8) The United States intelligence community
confirms that Iran is achieving the capability de-
scribed in paragraph (7) with substantial assistance
from other nations, including Russia. The Central
Intelligence Agency concluded that ‘‘Russia supplied
a variety of ballistic missile-related goods to foreign
countries . . . especially Iran.’’
(9) Currently deployed missile defenses have
been designed to meet shorter range, slower missile
threats and are not adequate to meet the threat
posed by Iranian ballistic missiles. The United
States and its allies will be vulnerable to Iranian
missiles after they become operational and until im-
proved United States and allied missile defenses are
deployed.
(10) Current theater missile defense plans of
the Department of Defense are inadequate to meet
the state of emergency declared by the President.
The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC–3) and Navy
Area Defense missile defense systems have limited
capability against longer-range ballistic missiles. The
more capable Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system and Navy Theater-Wide system
are not scheduled to be deployed until well after the
time by which it is expected that the Iranian missile
threat will have matured.
(11) It is a matter of the highest national inter-
est to minimize the vulnerability of United States
forces, allies, and friends to this threat.
SEC. 3. PURPOSE OF ACT.
In light of the findings in section 2, an immediate
national response to the emerging Iranian missile threat,
consistent with the Presidential declaration of national
emergency, is required and is in the highest national inter-
est of the United States.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATION OF EXTENT OF RUSSIAN CO-
OPERATION WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE AC-
TIVITIES OF IRAN.
(a) COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH RUSSIA.—(1)
There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for co-
operative activities with Russia for determining and fur-
nishing to the United States information on—
(A) the extent and technical specifics of co-
operation and assistance by Russia in the develop-
ment by Iran of a ballistic missile capability; and
(B) the technical nature of the Iranian missile
threat.
(2) The amount appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization in paragraph (1) may not be obligated until the
President certifies to Congress that the United States and
Russia have reached a satisfactory memorandum of under-
standing concerning the information to be released by
Russia described in paragraph (1) and the mechanism by
which that information will be transferred from Russia to
the United States.
(b) LIMITATION ON FISCAL YEAR 1998 COOPERA-
TIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECTS.—(1) The
amount described in paragraph (2) may not be obligated
until the President determines, and certifies to Congress,
that the Russian government is providing full cooperation
to the United States and its allies in determining the in-
formation described in subsection (a)(1). Such a certifi-
cation shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the
date of such a determination. The President shall include
with the certification a description of the basis for the
President’s determination.
(2) The amount referred to in paragraph (1) is the
amount of $3,000,000 appropriated for fiscal year 1998
for Russian cooperative ballistic missile defense projects
as part of the amount provided for that fiscal year for
missile defense programs of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization
SEC. 
5. 
DEPARTMENT 
OF 
DEFENSE 
MEASURES 
TO
COUNTER IRAN BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT.
(a) ACCELERATION OF NAVY THEATER-WIDE MIS-
SILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.—(1) The amount for the Navy
Theater-Wide missile defense system described in para-
graph (2) is hereby authorized and may be used to acceler-
ate the development of that system through additional
testing and risk reduction.
(2) The amount referred to in paragraph (1) is the
amount of $65,000,000 appropriated for the Navy Thea-
ter-Wide missile defense system for fiscal year 1998 in the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998, that is
in excess of the amount authorized to be appropriated for
that system for fiscal year 1998 in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.
(b) OTHER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE MEAS-
URES.—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for
defense-wide research, development, test, and evaluation
$215,000,000, to be available as follows:
(1) $20,000,000 for the Joint Composite
Tracking Network to improve battle management
and interoperability.
(2) $15,000,000 for theater battle management,
command, control, and communications (BM/C3) to
validate the interoperability of the Army’s Theater
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ground-based
radar and to accelerate the final phases of develop-
ment leading to operational upgrade of the Aegis
Spy–1 radar.
(3) $5,000,000 for enhancement of integration
activities associated with the capabilities for a rein-
forced theater missile defense family of system archi-
tectures oriented toward the threat in the Middle
East and Persian Gulf region.
(4) $35,000,000 for two Cobra Gemini radars
to improve tracking and target discrimination.
(5) $15,000,000 to accelerate the remote
launch capability for the Patriot Advanced Capabil-
ity (PAC–3) missile defense system, including use of
an existing prototype Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) ground-based radar, to enlarge
the area defended by that system.
(6) $25,000,000 to be available for production
enhancements for the PAC–3 system to accelerate
operational deployment of PAC–3 systems.
(7) $100,000,000 to be available for additional
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) User
Operational Evaluation System (UOES) missiles, to
provide greater capability to defend against longer-
range Iranian ballistic missiles under development.
(c) ADDITIONAL MEASURES.—There is authorized to
be appropriated for military construction for the Air Force
$5,000,000 to be available for hangars and support facili-
ties on Diego Garcia.
(d) LIMITATION.—Funds appropriated pursuant to
the authorization in subsection (b)(7) may be obligated
only after a successful THAAD intercept.
SEC. 6. ISRAELI ARROW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.
(a) ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES SUPPORT.—There
is hereby authorized to be appropriated for defense-wide
research, development, test, and evaluation $110,000,000
to be available for support of the Israeli Arrow tactical
ballistic missile defense system, of which—
(1) $20,000,000 is for production enhance-
ments to accelerate deployment; and
(2) $90,000,000 is for additional missiles in
order to provide for greater territorial coverage.
(b) CONGRESSIONAL INTENT CONCERNING ARROW
SYSTEM.—The authorization of appropriations for sup-
port of the Israeli Arrow missile defense system under
subsection (a) is a one-time authorization for the purpose
of protecting a United States ally in imminent peril.
SEC. 7. IMPLEMENTATION REPORT TO CONGRESS; FUND-
ING FLEXIBILITY.
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to Congress a report on the Iranian ballistic
missile threat in the Middle East and Persian Gulf re-
gions. The report shall include a description of—
(1) the Secretary’s plans for implementation of
this Act, including the Secretary’s plan for use of
funds appropriated pursuant to the authorizations of
appropriations in this Act; and
(2) such additional steps as the Secretary con-
siders appropriate to meet the Iranian ballistic mis-
sile threat, including an assessment of the funding
implications of each of those additional steps.
(b) FUNDING FLEXIBILITY.—(1) If the Secretary of
Defense intends to propose in the report under this section
measures for the purpose of countering the ballistic missile
threat posed by Iran that vary from the theater ballistic
missile defense measures authorized in sections 5(b) and
6 and the Secretary intends to propose (within the total
amount authorized to be appropriated by those sections),
authorizations that vary from the amounts authorized in
those sections, the Secretary shall consult with the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and Committee
on National Security of the House of Representatives con-
cerning such proposals before the report is submitted.
(2) Alternative measures, and funding for those
measures, described in paragraph (1) that are proposed
by the Secretary in the report to enhance the performance
or accelerate the development or deployment of theater
missile defenses for the purpose of countering the ballistic
missile threat posed by Iran shall be considered to be au-
thorized by law for purposes of section 114(a) of title 10,
United States Code.
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