H. R. 133—1200 
promote development and education relating to science, tech-
nology, engineering, the arts, or mathematics. 
‘‘(3) STATE.—The term ‘State’ means each of the several 
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
and any other territory or possession of the United States. 
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENTS.—The Director shall, on a continuing 
basis— 
‘‘(1) identify actions that the Director may take to improve 
education in the scientific, technology, engineering, arts, and 
mathematics (known as ‘STEAM’) skills necessary to meet the 
long-term national security needs of the United States for per-
sonnel proficient in such skills; and 
‘‘(2) establish and conduct programs to carry out such 
actions. 
‘‘(c) AUTHORITIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director, in support of educational 
programs in science, technology, engineering, the arts, and 
mathematics, may— 
‘‘(A) award grants to eligible entities; 
‘‘(B) provide cash awards and other items to eligible 
entities; 
‘‘(C) accept voluntary services from eligible entities; 
‘‘(D) support national competition judging, other edu-
cational event activities, and associated award ceremonies 
in connection with such educational programs; and 
‘‘(E) enter into one or more education partnership 
agreements with educational institutions in the United 
States for the purpose of encouraging and enhancing study 
in science, technology, engineering, the arts, and mathe-
matics disciplines at all levels of education. 
‘‘(2) EDUCATION PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS.— 
‘‘(A) NATURE OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED.—Under an edu-
cation partnership agreement entered into with an edu-
cational institution under paragraph (1)(E), the Director 
may provide assistance to the educational institution by— 
‘‘(i) loaning equipment to the educational institu-
tion for any purpose and duration in support of such 
agreement that the Director considers appropriate; 
‘‘(ii) making personnel available to teach science 
courses or to assist in the development of science 
courses and materials for the educational institution; 
‘‘(iii) providing sabbatical opportunities for faculty 
and internship opportunities for students; 
‘‘(iv) involving faculty and students of the edu-
cational institution in Agency projects, including 
research and technology transfer or transition projects; 
‘‘(v) cooperating with the educational institution 
in developing a program under which students may 
be given academic credit for work on Agency projects, 
including research and technology transfer for transi-
tion projects; and 
‘‘(vi) providing academic and career advice and 
assistance to students of the educational institution. 
‘‘(B) PRIORITIES.—In entering into education partner-
ship agreements under paragraph (1)(E), the Director shall
H. R. 133—1201 
prioritize entering into education partnership agreements 
with the following: 
‘‘(i) Historically Black colleges and universities and 
other minority-serving institutions, as described in sec-
tion 371(a) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 
U.S.C. 1067q(a)). 
‘‘(ii) Educational institutions serving women, mem-
bers of minority groups, and other groups of individuals 
who traditionally are involved in the science, tech-
nology, engineering, arts, and mathematics professions 
in disproportionately low numbers. 
‘‘(d) DESIGNATION OF ADVISOR.—The Director shall designate 
one or more individuals within the Agency to advise and assist 
the Director regarding matters relating to science, technology, 
engineering, the arts, and mathematics education and training.’’. 
SEC. 502. SEEDLING INVESTMENT IN NEXT-GENERATION MICROELEC-
TRONICS IN SUPPORT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 
(1) developing faster, more energy efficient, and more resil-
ient computing is important to the future of the national secu-
rity of the United States and the leadership by the United 
States in artificial intelligence; and 
(2) multidisciplinary teams co-designing microelectronics 
for artificial intelligence will lead to unprecedented capabilities 
that will help ensure that the United States maintains its 
superiority in this worldwide competition for economic and 
national security. 
(b) AWARDS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Director 
of National Intelligence, acting through the Director of the Intel-
ligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, shall award contracts 
or grants, or enter into transactions other than contracts, to encour-
age microelectronics research. 
(c) USE
OF FUNDS.—The Director shall award contracts or 
grants to, or enter into transactions other than contracts with, 
entities under subsection (b) to carry out any of the following: 
(1) Advanced engineering and applied research into novel 
computing models, materials, devices, architectures, or algo-
rithms to enable the advancement of artificial intelligence and 
machine learning. 
(2) Research efforts to— 
(A) overcome challenges with engineering and applied 
research of microelectronics, including with respect to the 
physical limits on transistors, electrical interconnects, and 
memory elements; or 
(B) promote long-term advancements in computing 
technologies, including by fostering a unified and multi-
disciplinary approach encompassing research and develop-
ment into algorithm design, computing architectures, 
microelectronic devices and circuits, and the chemistry and 
physics of new materials. 
(3) Any other activity the Director determines would pro-
mote the development of microelectronics research. 
(d) AWARD AMOUNTS.—In awarding contracts or grants, or 
entering into transactions other than contracts, under subsection 
(b), the Director may award not more than a total of $15,000,000.
H. R. 133—1202 
TITLE VI—REPORTS AND OTHER 
MATTERS 
SEC. 601. REPORT ON ATTEMPTS BY FOREIGN ADVERSARIES TO BUILD 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CYBERSECURITY EQUIP-
MENT AND SERVICES FOR, OR TO PROVIDE SUCH EQUIP-
MENT AND SERVICES TO, CERTAIN ALLIES OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services and the Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
(2) FIVE EYES COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘Five Eyes country’’ 
means any of the following: 
(A) Australia. 
(B) Canada. 
(C) New Zealand. 
(D) The United Kingdom. 
(E) The United States. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall jointly submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on attempts 
by foreign adversaries to build telecommunications and cybersecu-
rity equipment and services for, or to provide such equipment 
and services to, Five Eyes countries. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(1) An assessment of United States intelligence sharing 
and intelligence and military force posture in any Five Eyes 
country that currently uses or intends to use telecommuni-
cations or cybersecurity equipment or services provided by a 
foreign adversary of the United States, including China and 
Russia. 
(2) A description and assessment of mitigation of any poten-
tial compromises or risks for any circumstance described in 
paragraph (1). 
(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 602. REPORT ON THREATS POSED BY USE BY FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS AND ENTITIES OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE 
CYBER INTRUSION AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY. 
(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the 
Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
of Representatives a report on the threats posed by the use by
H. R. 133—1203 
foreign governments and entities of commercially available cyber 
intrusion and other surveillance technology. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) Matters relating to threats described in subsection (a) 
as they pertain to the following: 
(A) The threat posed to United States persons and 
persons inside the United States. 
(B) The threat posed to United States personnel over-
seas. 
(C) The threat posed to employees of the Federal 
Government, including through both official and personal 
accounts and devices. 
(2) A description of which foreign governments and entities 
pose the greatest threats from the use of technology described 
in subsection (a) and the nature of those threats. 
(3) An assessment of the source of the commercially avail-
able cyber intrusion and other surveillance technology that 
poses the threats described in subsection (a), including whether 
such technology is made by United States companies or compa-
nies in the United States or by foreign companies. 
(4) An assessment of actions taken, as of the date of the 
enactment of this Act, by the Federal Government and foreign 
governments to limit the export of technology described in 
subsection (a) from the United States or foreign countries to 
foreign governments and entities in ways that pose the threats 
described in such subsection. 
(5) Matters relating to how the Federal Government, Con-
gress, and foreign governments can most effectively mitigate 
the threats described in subsection (a), including matters 
relating to the following: 
(A) Working with the technology and telecommuni-
cations industry to identify and improve the security of 
consumer software and hardware used by United States 
persons and persons inside the United States that is tar-
geted by commercial cyber intrusion and surveillance soft-
ware. 
(B) Export controls. 
(C) Diplomatic pressure. 
(D) Trade agreements. 
(c) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 603. REPORTS ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CYBERSPACE 
SOLARIUM COMMISSION. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In this section, 
the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Select Committee 
on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Homeland Secu-
rity, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and
H. R. 133—1204 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an agency described 
in subsection (c) shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report on the recommendations included in the report 
issued by the Cyberspace Solarium Commission under section 
1652(k) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232). 
(c) AGENCIES DESCRIBED.—The agencies described in this sub-
section are the following: 
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
(2) The Department of Homeland Security. 
(3) The Department of Energy. 
(4) The Department of Commerce. 
(5) The Department of Defense. 
(d) CONTENTS.—Each report submitted under subsection (b) 
by the head of an agency described in subsection (c) shall include 
the following: 
(1) An evaluation of the recommendations in the report 
described in subsection (b) that the agency identifies as per-
taining directly to the agency. 
(2) A description of the actions taken, or the actions that 
the head of the agency may consider taking, to implement 
any of the recommendations (including a comprehensive esti-
mate of requirements for appropriations to take such actions). 
SEC. 604. ASSESSMENT OF CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY TRENDS RELATING 
TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MICROCHIPS, AND SEMI-
CONDUCTORS AND RELATED SUPPLY CHAINS. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall complete a detailed assessment of critical technology 
trends relating to artificial intelligence, microchips, and semiconduc-
tors and related supply chains. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The assessment required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) EXPORT CONTROLS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—An assessment of efforts by partner 
countries to enact and implement export controls and other 
technology transfer measures with respect to artificial intel-
ligence, microchips, advanced manufacturing equipment, 
and other artificial intelligence enabled technologies critical 
to United States supply chains. 
(B) IDENTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERA-
TION.—The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall iden-
tify opportunities for further cooperation with international 
partners on a multilateral and bilateral basis to strengthen 
export control regimes and address technology transfer 
threats. 
(2) SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAINS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—An assessment of global semicon-
ductor supply chains, including areas to reduce United 
States vulnerabilities and maximize points of leverage. 
(B) ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL EFFECTS.—The assessment 
under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the
H. R. 133—1205 
potential effects of significant geopolitical shifts, including 
those related to Taiwan. 
(C) IDENTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIVERSIFICA-
TION.—The assessment under subparagraph (A) shall also 
identify opportunities for diversification of United States 
supply chains, including an assessment of cost, challenges, 
and opportunities to diversify manufacturing capabilities 
on a multinational basis. 
(3) COMPUTING POWER.—An assessment of trends relating 
to computing power and the effect of such trends on global 
artificial intelligence development and implementation, in con-
sultation with the Director of the Intelligence Advanced 
Research Projects Activity, the Director of the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Director of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, including for-
ward-looking assessments of how computing resources may 
affect United States national security, innovation, and 
implementation relating to artificial intelligence. 
(c) REPORT.— 
(1) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CON-
GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 
of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to 
the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings 
of the Director with respect to the assessment completed under 
subsection (a). 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under paragraph (2) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 605. COMBATING CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND STRENGTHENING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
PROTECTIONS. 
(a) UPDATES TO ANNUAL REPORTS ON INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
AND CAMPAIGNS IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTY.—Section 1107(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3237(b)) is amended— 
(1) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and 
(2) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following: 
‘‘(8) An identification of influence activities and operations 
employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United 
States science and technology sectors, specifically employees 
of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and 
students in the science and technology sector in the United 
States.’’.
H. R. 133—1206 
(b) PLAN FOR FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TO INCREASE 
PUBLIC AWARENESS AND DETECTION OF INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES BY 
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.— 
(1) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a plan to increase public awareness of influence 
activities by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
Director shall consult with the following: 
(A) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy. 
(B) Such other stakeholders outside the intelligence 
community, including professional associations, institutions 
of higher education, businesses, and civil rights and multi-
cultural organizations, as the Director determines relevant. 
(c) RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION
TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIPS
AND BUILD TRUST WITH 
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, in consultation with the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for the Civil Rights Division and the Chief Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Officer of the Department of Justice, shall 
develop recommendations to strengthen relationships with 
communities targeted by influence activities of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China and build trust with such 
communities through local and regional grassroots outreach. 
(2) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit 
to Congress the recommendations developed under paragraph 
(1). 
(d) TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.—The National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3001 et seq.) is amended— 
(1) in section 1107 (50 U.S.C. 3237)— 
(A) in the section heading, by striking ‘‘communist
party 
of china’’ and inserting ‘‘chinese communist party’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘Communist Party of China’’ both places 
it appears and inserting ‘‘Chinese Communist Party’’; and 
(2) in the table of contents before section 2 (50 U.S.C. 
3002), by striking the item relating to section 1107 and 
inserting the following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 1107. Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United 
States by the Chinese Communist Party.’’. 
SEC. 606. ANNUAL REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OFFI-
CIALS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives.
H. R. 133—1207 
(b) ANNUAL REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 
2025, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
on the corruption and corrupt activities of senior officials of 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
(2) ELEMENTS.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—Each report under paragraph (1) 
shall include the following: 
(i) A description of the wealth of, and corruption 
and corrupt activities among, senior officials of the 
Chinese Communist Party. 
(ii) A description of any recent actions of the offi-
cials described in clause (i) that could be considered 
a violation, or potential violation, of United States 
law. 
(iii) A description and assessment of targeted 
financial measures, including potential targets for des-
ignation of the officials described in clause (i) for the 
corruption and corrupt activities described in that 
clause and for the actions described in clause (ii). 
(B) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report under para-
graph (1) shall include comprehensive information on the 
matters described in subparagraph (A). Any succeeding 
report under paragraph (1) may consist of an update or 
supplement to the preceding report under that subsection. 
(3) COORDINATION.—In preparing each report, update, or 
supplement under this subsection, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows: 
(A) In preparing the description required by clause 
(i) of paragraph (2)(A), the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. 
(B) In preparing the descriptions required by clauses 
(ii) and (iii) of such paragraph, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head of the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
the Treasury. 
(4) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) shall include 
an unclassified executive summary, and may include a classified 
annex. 
(c) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should undertake every effort and pursue every 
opportunity to expose the corruption and illicit practices of senior 
officials of the Chinese Communist Party, including President Xi 
Jinping. 
SEC. 607. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN AND OTHER 
EASTERN EUROPEAN OLIGARCHS. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means—
H. R. 133—1208 
(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
the Committee on Finance, the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 100 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 
and the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of Russian 
and other Eastern European oligarchs. 
(c) ELEMENTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each report under subsection (b) shall 
include the following: 
(A) A description of corruption and corrupt activities 
among Russian and other Eastern European oligarchs who 
support the Government of the Russian Federation, 
including estimates of the total assets of such oligarchs. 
(B) An assessment of the impact of the corruption 
and corrupt activities described pursuant to subparagraph 
(A) on the economy and citizens of Russia. 
(C) A description of any connections to, or support 
of, organized crime, drug smuggling, or human trafficking 
by an oligarch covered by subparagraph (A). 
(D) A description of any information that reveals 
corruption and corrupt activities in Russia among oligarchs 
covered by subparagraph (A). 
(E) A description and assessment of potential sanctions 
actions that could be imposed upon oligarchs covered by 
subparagraph (A) who support the leadership of the 
Government of Russia, including President Vladimir Putin. 
(2) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report under subsection 
(a) shall include comprehensive information on the matters 
described in paragraph (1). Any succeeding report under sub-
section (a) may consist of an update or supplement to the 
preceding report under that subsection. 
(d) COORDINATION.—In preparing each report, update, or 
supplement under this section, the Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency shall coordinate as follows: 
(1) In preparing the assessment and descriptions required 
by subparagraphs (A) through (D) of subsection (c)(1), the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate 
with the head of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of 
the Department of the Treasury and the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 
(2) In preparing the description and assessment required 
by subparagraph (E) of such subsection, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate with the head 
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department 
of the Treasury. 
(e) FORM.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), each report 
under subsection (b) shall include an unclassified executive 
summary, and may include a classified annex.
H. R. 133—1209 
(2) UNCLASSIFIED
FORM
OF
CERTAIN
INFORMATION.—The 
information described in subsection (c)(1)(D) in each report 
under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 
SEC. 608. REPORT ON BIOSECURITY RISK AND DISINFORMATION BY 
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
COMMITTEES
OF
CONGRESS.—The term 
‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, and the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 
of Representatives. 
(2) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.—The term ‘‘critical infra-
structure’’ has the meaning given such term in section 1016(e) 
of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
identifying whether and how officials of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China may 
have sought— 
(1) to suppress information about— 
(A) the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan; 
(B) the spread of the virus through China; and 
(C) the transmission of the virus to other countries; 
(2) to spread disinformation relating to the pandemic; or 
(3) to exploit the pandemic to advance their national secu-
rity interests. 
(c) ASSESSMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 
include assessments of reported actions and the effect of those 
actions on efforts to contain the novel coronavirus pandemic, 
including each of the following: 
(1) The origins of the novel coronavirus outbreak, the time 
and location of initial infections, and the mode and speed of 
early viral spread. 
(2) Actions taken by the Government of China to suppress, 
conceal, or misinform the people of China and those of other 
countries about the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. 
(3) The effect of disinformation or the failure of the Govern-
ment of China to fully disclose details of the outbreak on 
response efforts of local governments in China and other coun-
tries. 
(4) Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, or other 
pressure on other countries and international organizations 
to conceal information about the spread of the novel coronavirus 
and the response of the Government of China to the contagion,
H. R. 133—1210 
as well as to influence or coerce early responses to the pandemic 
by other countries. 
(5) Efforts by officials of the Government of China to deny 
access to health experts and international health organizations 
to afflicted individuals in Wuhan, pertinent areas of the city, 
or laboratories of interest in China, including the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology. 
(6) Efforts by the Government of China, or those acting 
at its direction or with its assistance, to conduct cyber oper-
ations against international, national, or private health 
organizations conducting research relating to the novel 
coronavirus or operating in response to the pandemic. 
(7) Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate relevant seg-
ments of global supply chains, particularly in the sale, trade, 
or provision of relevant medicines, medical supplies, or medical 
equipment as a result of the pandemic. 
(8) Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, national 
security, and political objectives of the Government of China 
by exploiting vulnerabilities of foreign governments, economies, 
and companies under financial duress as a result of the pan-
demic or to accelerate economic espionage and intellectual prop-
erty theft. 
(9) Efforts to exploit the disruption of the pharmaceutical 
and telecommunications industries as well as other industries 
tied to critical infrastructure and bilateral trade between China 
and the United States and between China and allies and part-
ners of the United States in order to advance the economic 
and political objectives of the Government of China following 
the pandemic. 
(d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 609. REPORT ON EFFECT OF LIFTING OF UNITED NATIONS ARMS 
EMBARGO ON ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate; and 
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency, in consultation with such heads of other elements of the 
intelligence community as the Director considers appropriate, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on— 
(1) the plans of the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran to acquire military arms if the ban on arms transfers 
to or from such government under United Nations Security 
Council resolutions are lifted; and 
(2) the effect such arms acquisitions may have on regional 
security and stability. 
(c) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall 
include assessments relating to plans of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire additional weapons, the intention
H. R. 133—1211 
of other countries to provide such weapons, and the effect such 
acquisition and provision would have on regional stability, including 
with respect to each of the following: 
(1) The type and quantity of weapon systems under consid-
eration for acquisition. 
(2) The countries of origin of such systems. 
(3) Likely reactions of other countries in the region to 
such acquisition, including the potential for proliferation by 
other countries in response. 
(4) The threat that such acquisition could present to inter-
national commerce and energy supplies in the region, and the 
potential implications for the national security of the United 
States. 
(5) The threat that such acquisition could present to the 
Armed Forces of the United States, of countries allied with 
the United States, and of countries partnered with the United 
States stationed in or deployed in the region. 
(6) The potential that such acquisition could be used to 
deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. 
(7) The potential for the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran to proliferate weapons acquired in the absence 
of an arms embargo to regional groups, including Shi’a militia 
groups backed by such government. 
(d) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex. 
SEC. 610. REPORT ON IRANIAN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate; and 
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
assessing— 
(1) any relevant activities potentially relating to nuclear 
weapons research and development by the Islamic Republic 
of Iran; and 
(2) any relevant efforts to afford or deny international 
access in accordance with international nonproliferation agree-
ments. 
(c) ASSESSMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 
include assessments, for the period beginning on January 1, 2018, 
and ending on the date of the submittal of the report, of the 
following: 
(1) Activities to research, develop, or enrich uranium or 
reprocess plutonium with the intent or capability of creating 
weapons-grade nuclear material.
H. R. 133—1212 
(2) Research, development, testing, or design activities that 
could contribute to or inform construction of a device intended 
to initiate or capable of initiating a nuclear explosion. 
(3) Efforts to receive, transmit, store, destroy, relocate, 
archive, or otherwise preserve research, processes, products, 
or enabling materials relevant or relating to any efforts 
assessed under paragraph (1) or (2). 
(4) Efforts to afford or deny international access, in accord-
ance with international nonproliferation agreements, to loca-
tions, individuals, and materials relating to activities described 
in paragraph (1), (2), or (3). 
(d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 611. ANNUAL REPORTS ON SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION. 
(a) FINDING.—Congress finds that the National People’s Con-
gress of the People’s Republic of China promulgated the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on June 30, 2020. 
(b) REPORTS.—Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.), is amended by inserting after section 
1107 the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 1107A. ANNUAL REPORTS ON SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION. 
‘‘(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
‘‘(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 
‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— 
‘‘(A) the congressional intelligence committees; 
‘‘(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate; and 
‘‘(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. 
‘‘(2) CHINESE SECURITY SERVICES.—The term ‘Chinese secu-
rity services’ means— 
‘‘(A) the security services of the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, including the Ministry of State 
Security and the Ministry of Public Security; and 
‘‘(B) any known front organizations or aliases associ-
ated with such security services, including officers associ-
ated with the national security division of the Hong Kong 
Police Force and other officers of the Hong Kong Police 
Force selected by the Committee for Safeguarding National 
Security to work on matters relating to national security. 
‘‘(b) REQUIREMENT.—On an annual basis through 2047, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the presence and activities 
of Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region. 
‘‘(c) CONTENTS.—Each report under subsection (b) shall include, 
with respect to the year covered by the report, the following: 
‘‘(1) Identification of the approximate number of personnel 
affiliated with Chinese security services operating within the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, including a break-
down of such personnel by the specific security service and
H. R. 133—1213 
the division of the security service, and (to the extent possible) 
an identification of any such personnel associated with the 
national security division of the Hong Kong Police Force. 
‘‘(2) A description of the command and control structures 
of such security services, including information regarding the 
extent to which such security services are controlled by the 
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
or the Government of the People’s Republic of China. 
‘‘(3) A description of the working relationship and coordina-
tion mechanisms of the Chinese security services with the 
police force of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
‘‘(4) A description of the activities conducted by Chinese 
security services operating within the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, including— 
‘‘(A) information regarding the extent to which such 
security services, and officers associated with the national 
security division of the Hong Kong Police Force, are 
engaged in frontline policing, serving in advisory and 
assistance roles, or both; 
‘‘(B) an assessment of the likelihood of such security 
services conducting renditions of individuals from the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region to China and a listing 
of every known individual subject to such rendition during 
the year covered by the report; and 
‘‘(C) an assessment of how such activities conducted 
by Chinese security services contribute to self-censorship 
and corruption within the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region. 
‘‘(5) A discussion of the doctrine and tactics employed by 
Chinese security services operating within the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region, including an overview of the extent 
to which such security services employ surveillance, detection, 
and control methods, including ‘high-tech’ policing models and 
‘preventative policing tactics’, that are consistent with the rise 
of digital authoritarianism, and used in a manner similar to 
methods used in the Xinjiang region of China. 
‘‘(6) An overview of the funding for Chinese security serv-
ices operating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, including an assessment of the extent to which funding 
is drawn locally from the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government or from the Government of China. 
‘‘(7) A discussion of the various surveillance technologies 
used by security services operating within the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region, including— 
‘‘(A) a list of the key companies that provide such 
technologies; and 
‘‘(B) an assessment of the degree to which such tech-
nologies can be accessed by Chinese security services oper-
ating within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
‘‘(d) COORDINATION.—In carrying out subsection (b), the Director 
shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and any other relevant 
head of an element of the intelligence community.
H. R. 133—1214 
‘‘(e) FORM.—Each report submitted to the appropriate congres-
sional committees under subsection (b) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.’’. 
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents in the first 
section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 1107 the following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 1107A. Annual reports on security services of the People’s Republic of China 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.’’. 
SEC. 612. RESEARCH PARTNERSHIP ON ACTIVITIES OF PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) RESEARCH PARTNERSHIP.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency shall seek to enter into a part-
nership with an academic or non-profit research institution 
to— 
(A) carry out joint unclassified geospatial intelligence 
analyses of the activities of the People’s Republic of China 
that pose risks to the national security interests of the 
United States; and 
(B) make available on a publicly available internet 
website 
unclassified 
geospatial 
intelligence 
products 
relating to such analyses. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The Director shall ensure that the activi-
ties of China analyzed under paragraph (1)(A) include the fol-
lowing: 
(A) Any notable developments relating to the global 
activities of the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the People’s Liberation 
Army Air Force, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, 
the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, and 
the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Coast Guard 
Corps. 
(B) Infrastructure projects associated with the ‘‘One 
Belt, One Road’’ Initiative. 
(C) Maritime land reclamation activities conducted by 
China in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean region, 
and the broader maritime commons. 
(D) Matters relevant to global public health and climate 
security, including— 
(i) indications and warnings of disease outbreaks 
with pandemic potential; 
(ii) the activities of China likely contributing to 
climate change; and 
(iii) 
any 
environmental 
degradation 
directly 
resulting from the practices of China. 
(3) CONSORTIUM.—In carrying out paragraph (1), the 
Director may enter into a partnership with— 
(A) one research institution; or 
(B) a consortium of research institutions if the Director 
determines that the inclusion of multiple institutions will 
result in more effective research conducted pursuant to 
this section or improve the outcomes of such research.
H. R. 133—1216 
SEC. 613. REPORT ON THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND PERSONAL PROTEC-
TIVE EQUIPMENT REGULATORY PRACTICES OF THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on— 
(1) the pharmaceutical and personal protective equipment 
regulatory practices of the People’s Republic of China; and 
(2) the effects of such practices on the national security 
of the United States. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following: 
(1) An assessment of the quantity of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients produced annually within China. 
(2) An estimate of the percentage of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients produced globally that originate in China. 
(3) A description of the National Medical Products Adminis-
tration of China, including with respect to— 
(A) the roles and responsibilities of the Administration; 
(B) the organizational structure of the Administration; 
and 
(C) any affiliated institutions of the National Medical 
Products Administration. 
(4) An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical 
Products Administration to effectively develop safety standards, 
efficacy standards, and any other relevant standards concerning 
the production of active pharmaceutical ingredients and 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
(5) An assessment of the capacity of the National Medical 
Products Administration to enforce standards on the production 
and distribution of active pharmaceutical ingredients and 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
(6) An overview of qualitative disparities between active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs approved 
by the National Medical Products Administration and similar 
drugs subject to regulatory oversight and approval in the mar-
kets of the member states of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
(7) An assessment of the qualitative disparities between 
the standards and enforcement practices of the National Med-
ical Products Administration on the production and distribution 
of active pharmaceutical ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs 
and the good manufacturing practice guidelines issued by the 
International Council for Harmonization of Technical Require-
ments for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use. 
(8) An assessment of the susceptibility of the National 
Medical Products Administration, the subordinate organizations 
of the National Medical Products Administration, and other 
associated personnel to engage in corrupt practices, particularly 
practices that relate to assessing the safety of pharmaceutical 
ingredients and other pharmaceutical drugs within the 
authority of the National Medical Products Administration. 
(9) An assessment of the national security risks associated 
with the reliance by the United States on pharmaceutical 
ingredients and pharmaceutical drugs originating in China, 
including an assessment of how and whether China could lever-
age its production of certain pharmaceutical ingredients as
H. R. 133—1217 
a means to coerce the United States or the partners and allies 
of the United States. 
(10) An assessment of the percentage of personal protective 
equipment produced globally that originates in China. 
(11) An assessment of the national security risks associated 
with any reliance by the United States on personal protective 
equipment originating in China, including an assessment of 
how and whether China could leverage its production of per-
sonal protective equipment as a means to coerce the United 
States or the partners and allies of the United States. 
(c) COORDINATION.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Director 
shall coordinate with the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director 
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and any other relevant head of an 
element of the intelligence community as well as the Commissioner 
of the Food and Drug Administration. 
(d) FORM.—The report submitted to the appropriate congres-
sional committees under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 
(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In 
this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ 
means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; 
and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Finance of the Senate. 
SEC. 614. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON SITUATION IN 
AFGHANISTAN. 
(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce a National 
Intelligence Estimate on the situation in Afghanistan. 
(b) MATTERS.—The National Intelligence Estimate produced 
under subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the prospects 
of a durable intra-Afghan settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan 
that leads to— 
(1) a permanent ceasefire and sustained reduction in 
violence; 
(2) a verifiable break between the Taliban and al-Qaeda; 
(3) verifiable cooperation by the Taliban in efforts against 
al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Khorasan, 
and associated international terrorists the intelligence commu-
nity determines are active in Afghanistan and pose a threat 
to the United States homeland or United States interests 
abroad; and 
(4) sustainment of the social and human rights progress 
achieved by Afghan women and girls since 2001. 
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than February 1, 2021, the 
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees the National Intelligence Estimate produced under sub-
section (a), including all intelligence reporting underlying the 
Estimate.
H. R. 133—1218 
(2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If before February 1, 
2021, the Director determines that the National Intelligence 
Estimate produced under subsection (a) cannot be submitted 
by such date, the Director shall (before such date)— 
(A) submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a report setting forth the reasons why the National Intel-
ligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such date and 
an estimated date for the submission of the National Intel-
ligence Estimate; and 
(B) testify before the congressional intelligence commit-
tees on the issues that will be covered by the National 
Intelligence Estimate. 
(3) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate shall be 
submitted under paragraph (1) in classified form. 
(d) PUBLIC VERSION.—Consistent with the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods, at the same time as the Director 
submits to the congressional intelligence committees the National 
Intelligence Estimate under subsection (c), the Director shall make 
publicly available on the internet website of the Director an 
unclassified version of the key findings of the National Intelligence 
Estimate. 
SEC. 615. ASSESSMENT REGARDING TENSIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA 
AND AZERBAIJAN. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
a written assessment regarding tensions between the governments 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, including with respect to the status 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Such assessment shall include 
each of the following: 
(1) An identification of the strategic interests of the United 
States and its partners in the Armenia-Azerbaijan region. 
(2) A description of all significant uses of force in and 
around the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the border between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan during calendar year 2020, including 
a description of each significant use of force and an assessment 
of who initiated the use of such force. 
(3) An assessment of the effect of United States military 
assistance to Azerbaijan and Armenia on the regional balance 
of power and the likelihood of further use of military force. 
(4) An assessment of the likelihood of any further uses 
of force or potentially destabilizing activities in the region in 
the near- to medium-term. 
(b) FORM
OF ASSESSMENT.—The assessment required under 
this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 616. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THIRD OPTION FOUNDATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) the work of the Third Option Foundation to heal, help, 
and honor members of the special operations community of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and their families is invaluable; 
and 
(2) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should 
work closely with the Third Option Foundation in implementing 
section 19A of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
(50 U.S.C. 3519b), as added by section 6412 of the Damon
H. R. 133—1219 
Paul 
Nelson 
and 
Matthew 
Young 
Pollard 
Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public 
Law 116–92). 
SEC. 617. ANNUAL REPORTS ON WORLDWIDE THREATS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
108A the following new section: 
‘‘SEC. 108B. ANNUAL REPORTS ON WORLDWIDE THREATS. 
‘‘(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’ means— 
‘‘(1) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
‘‘(2) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. 
‘‘(b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than the first Monday in 
February 2021, and each year thereafter, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of the elements of 
the intelligence community, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report containing an assessment of the intel-
ligence community with respect to worldwide threats to the national 
security of the United States. 
‘‘(c) FORM.—Each report under subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex only for 
the protection of intelligence sources and methods relating to the 
matters contained in the report. 
‘‘(d) HEARINGS.— 
‘‘(1) OPEN
HEARINGS.—Upon request by the appropriate 
congressional committees, the Director (and any other head 
of an element of the intelligence community determined appro-
priate by the committees in consultation with the Director) 
shall testify before such committees in an open setting 
regarding a report under subsection (b). 
‘‘(2) CLOSED HEARINGS.—Any information that may not be 
disclosed during an open hearing under paragraph (1) in order 
to protect intelligence sources and methods may instead be 
discussed in a closed hearing that immediately follows such 
open hearing.’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the begin-
ning of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating 
to section 108A the following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 108B. Annual reports on world-wide threats.’’. 
SEC. 618. ANNUAL REPORT ON CLIMATE SECURITY ADVISORY 
COUNCIL. 
Section 120 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3060), as amended by section 405, is further amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new sub-
section (d): 
‘‘(d) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than January 31, 2021, and 
not less frequently than annually thereafter, the chair of the Council 
shall submit, on behalf of the Council, to the congressional intel-
ligence committees a report describing the activities of the Council 
as described in subsection (c) during the year preceding the year 
during which the report is submitted.’’.
H. R. 133—1220 
SEC. 619. IMPROVEMENTS TO FUNDING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY EDU-
CATION PROGRAM. 
(a) FUNDING FOR SCHOLARSHIP, FELLOWSHIP, AND GRANT PRO-
GRAMS.—Section 810 of the David L. Boren National Security Edu-
cation Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1910) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘for each fiscal year, begin-
ning with fiscal year 2005,’’ and inserting ‘‘for each of fiscal 
years 2005 through 2021’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘‘(d) FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING WITH FISCAL YEAR 2022.—In 
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary 
under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal 
year 2022, $8,000,000, to carry out the scholarship, fellowship, 
and grant programs under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), respec-
tively, of section 802(a)(1).’’. 
(b) FUNDING FOR NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE INITIATIVE.— 
Section 811 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1911) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘ $10,000,000’’ and 
inserting ‘‘ $16,000,000’’; and 
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ‘‘for each fiscal year, begin-
ning with fiscal year 2005,’’ and inserting ‘‘for each of fiscal 
years 2005 through 2021’’. 
(c) FUNDING
FOR
SCHOLARSHIP
PROGRAM
FOR
ADVANCED 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE STUDIES.—Section 812 of the David L. Boren 
National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1912) is 
amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘for each fiscal year, begin-
ning with fiscal year 2005,’’ and inserting ‘‘for each of fiscal 
years 2005 through 2021’’; 
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); 
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new sub-
section (b): 
‘‘(b) FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING WITH FISCAL YEAR 2022.—In 
addition to amounts that may be made available to the Secretary 
under the Fund for a fiscal year, there is authorized to be appro-
priated to the Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal 
year 2022, $2,000,000, to carry out the scholarship programs for 
English language studies by certain heritage community citizens 
under section 802(a)(1)(E).’’; and 
(4) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by striking ‘‘sub-
section (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘this section’’. 
SEC. 620. REPORT ON BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT PRIVACY, CIVIL 
LIBERTIES, AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF CHINESE AMERICANS. 
(a) REPORT.—Section 5712 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Mat-
thew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2171) is— 
(1) transferred to title XI of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3231 et seq.); 
(2) inserted after section 1109 of such title, as added by 
section 308; 
(3) redesignated as section 1110; and 
(4) amended— 
(A) in the heading, by striking ‘‘and
civil
liberties’’ and 
inserting ‘‘, civil liberties, and civil rights’’; and 
(B) in subsection (b)—
H. R. 133—1221 
(i) in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by 
striking ‘‘Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act,’’ and inserting ‘‘On an 
annual basis,’’; and 
(ii) by striking ‘‘and civil liberties’’, each place it 
appears and inserting ‘‘, civil liberties, and civil rights’’. 
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of contents at the begin-
ning of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 1109, as added by section 308, 
the following new item: 
‘‘Sec. 1110. Report on best practices to protect privacy, civil liberties, and civil 
rights of Chinese Americans.’’. 
SEC. 621. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THREAT OF GLOBAL 
PANDEMIC DISEASE. 
(a) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence, 
acting through the National Intelligence Council, shall produce 
a National Intelligence Estimate on the threat of global pan-
demic disease, including with respect to the following: 
(A) An assessment of the possible courses of the 
COVID–19 pandemic during the 18 months following the 
date of the Estimate, including— 
(i) the projected spread of COVID–19 outside the 
United States and the likelihood of subsequent major 
outbreaks; 
(ii) the capacity of countries and international 
organizations to combat the further spread of COVID– 
19, including risks and opportunities for further global 
cooperation; and 
(iii) the risks to the national security and health 
security of the United States if COVID–19 is not con-
tained abroad. 
(B) An assessment of the global public health system 
and the responses of the system to the COVID–19 pan-
demic, including— 
(i) prospects for an effective global disease surveil-
lance and response system, opportunities to advance 
the development of such a system, and signposts for 
evaluating whether or not an effective system has been 
developed before a disease outbreak occurs; and 
(ii) an assessment of global health system capacity. 
(C) An assessment of— 
(i) the humanitarian and economic implications 
of the COVID–19 pandemic; and 
(ii) the consequences of the COVID–19 pandemic 
with respect to political stability, armed conflict, 
democratization, and the global leadership by the 
United States of the post-World War II international 
system. 
(D) An assessment of— 
(i) likely threats by global pandemic diseases 
during the 10-year period following the date of the 
Estimate; 
(ii) global readiness to avert a future global pan-
demic;
H. R. 133—1222 
(iii) challenges and opportunities for the policy 
of the United States to advance global pandemic 
preparedness; and 
(iv) the potential role of non-state and state-backed 
global influence activities or disinformation campaigns 
involving 
COVID–19 
or 
future 
potential 
global 
pandemics. 
(E) Any other matters the Director determines appro-
priate. 
(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit 
to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate the National Intelligence Esti-
mate produced under paragraph (1), including all intel-
ligence reporting underlying the Estimate. 
(B) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMISSION.—If before the end 
of the 90-day period specified in subparagraph (A) the 
Director determines that the National Intelligence Esti-
mate under paragraph (1) cannot be submitted by the 
end of that period, the Director shall (before the end of 
that period)— 
(i) submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report 
setting forth— 
(I) the reasons why the National Intelligence 
Estimate cannot be submitted by the end of that 
period; and 
(II) an estimated date for the submission of 
the National Intelligence Estimate; and 
(ii) testify before such committees on the issues 
that will be covered by the National Intelligence Esti-
mate. 
(C) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate shall 
be submitted under subparagraph (A) in classified form. 
(3) PUBLIC
VERSION.—Consistent with the protection of 
intelligence sources and methods, at the same time as the 
Director submits to the congressional intelligence committees 
the National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (2), the 
Director shall make publicly available on the internet website 
of the Director, an unclassified version of the National Intel-
ligence Estimate. 
(4) 
CONSULTATION.—The 
Director 
shall 
prepare 
the 
National Intelligence Estimate under paragraph (1) in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
the Secretary of State, and any other head of an element 
of the Federal Government the Director of National Intelligence 
determines appropriate. 
(b) FUTURE PANDEMIC PLAN.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall make publicly 
available on the internet website of the President a report 
containing a whole-of-government plan for an effective response
H. R. 133—1223 
to subsequent major outbreaks of the COVID–19 pandemic 
and for other future global pandemic diseases. 
(2) MATTERS
INCLUDED.—The plan under paragraph (1) 
shall address how to improve the following: 
(A) Pandemic planning. 
(B) Homeland preparedness. 
(C) International disease surveillance. 
(D) Diagnostic testing. 
(E) Contact tracing. 
(F) The role of the Federal Government with respect 
to the regulation, acquisition, and disbursement, of medical 
supplies and other public health resources necessary to 
respond to COVID–19 or other diseases with pandemic 
potential (including diagnostic testing equipment, bio-
medical equipment, drugs and medicines, and hygiene 
equipment). 
(G) The procurement and distribution of personal 
protective equipment. 
(H) Early domestic response to future global pandemic 
diseases in the United States. 
(c) GLOBAL STRATEGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President, in coordination with 
the Director of National Intelligence, shall make publicly available 
on the internet website of the President a report containing a 
global strategy for mobilizing international institutions to combat 
the COVID–19 pandemic. 
SEC. 622. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEFINGS ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF EMERGING INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASE AND PANDEMICS. 
Section 6722(b)(2) of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–98) is amended— 
(1) in the paragraph heading, by striking ‘‘QUINQUENNIAL’’ 
and inserting ‘‘ANNUAL’’; 
(2) by striking ‘‘beginning on the date that is 5 years 
after the date on which the Director submits the report under 
paragraph (1), and every 5 years thereafter’’ and inserting 
‘‘not later than January 31, 2021, and annually thereafter’’; 
and 
(3) by inserting ‘‘required under paragraph (1)’’ before the 
period at the end. 
SEC. 623. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE. 
(a) STUDY.—The Director of National Intelligence shall seek 
to enter into an agreement with a federally funded research and 
development center or a nongovernmental entity to conduct a com-
prehensive study on the future of the collection, processing, exploi-
tation, analysis, dissemination, and evaluation of open-source intel-
ligence by the intelligence community. The Director shall select 
such entity in consultation with the congressional intelligence 
committees. 
(b) MATTERS INCLUDED.—The study under subsection (a) shall 
include the following: 
(1) Recommendations with respect to the governance of 
open-source intelligence within the intelligence community, 
including regarding—
H. R. 133—1224 
(A) whether such governance of open-source intel-
ligence should be assigned to a functional manager or 
an executive agent, or use another governance structure; 
(B) which official of the intelligence community should 
serve as such a functional manager, executive agent, or 
the leader of such other governance structure, and what 
authorities the official should have in serving in such role; 
(C) which official of the intelligence community should 
be responsible for conducting oversight by the executive 
branch for open-source intelligence; 
(D) which elements of the intelligence community 
should retain capabilities to collect, process, exploit, and 
disseminate open-source intelligence; 
(E) how to effectively integrate such collection capabili-
ties among the elements of the intelligence community; 
and 
(F) whether to establish a new agency as an element 
of the intelligence community dedicated to open-source 
intelligence or to establish a fusion center to co-locate open- 
source intelligence capabilities of the elements of the intel-
ligence community, including a discussion of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each such approach. 
(2) Recommendations regarding the requirements processes 
for open-source intelligence, including with respect to— 
(A) the utility (or disutility) of a unified collection 
management process for open-source intelligence for all 
of the intelligence community; 
(B) what such a process might look like; 
(C) ways to integrate an open-source requirements 
process into all-source collection management; and 
(D) ways that automation might be leveraged to facili-
tate open-source requirements and collection management. 
(3) An assessment of the value of rejuvenating a career 
service for a professional cadre of the intelligence community 
that focuses on collecting and disseminating open-source intel-
ligence and recommendations for such a rejuvenation. 
(4) Recommendations regarding the need to adjust any 
legal and policy frameworks (including any applicable guide-
lines of the Attorney General) that would facilitate the collec-
tion, retention, and dissemination of open-source intelligence 
while balancing customer needs with the privacy interests of 
United States persons. 
(5) An assessment of methods to use open-source intel-
ligence to support the operations of the intelligence community, 
including recommendations on when and how open-source intel-
ligence should support such operations. 
(6) With respect to the data management of open-source 
intelligence, recommendations on proposed data ingestion tools, 
scraping capabilities, and other tools and capabilities to collect, 
process, exploit, and analyze the volume of open-source intel-
ligence, including recommendations on how the intelligence 
community can increase the speed and security with which 
the intelligence community adopts open-source technology and 
unclassified commercial products. 
(7) Any other matters the Director or the entity selected 
to conduct the study determines appropriate.
H. R. 133—1225 
(c) COOPERATION.—The Director shall make available to the 
entity selected to conduct the study under subsection (a) the nec-
essary information and materials to conduct the study, including 
with respect to— 
(1) accessing secure workspaces; 
(2) accessing directives and policy guidance of the intel-
ligence community and other policy documents regarding the 
governance and execution of open-source intelligence; 
(3) reviewing technological systems used to conduct open- 
source intelligence collection; 
(4) interviewing senior personnel of the intelligence commu-
nity, including such personnel with responsibility for the open- 
source intelligence mission of the intelligence community; and 
(5) ensuring that each head of an element of the intelligence 
community provides the cooperation described in this sub-
section. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—The entity selected to conduct the study 
under subsection (a) shall consult with the congressional intelligence 
committees before beginning to conduct such study. 
(e) REPORT.—Not later than 270 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing the study under sub-
section (a), without change. The report shall be unclassified, but 
may include a classified annex. 
SEC. 624. SURVEY ON OPEN SOURCE ENTERPRISE. 
(a) SURVEY.—The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
(as the open source functional manager for the intelligence commu-
nity), in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence 
and any other head of an element of the intelligence community 
that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency determines 
appropriate, shall conduct a survey to measure the satisfaction 
of customers of open-source intelligence with the Open Source 
Enterprise of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
(b) PURPOSE.—The Director shall ensure that the survey under 
subsection (a)— 
(1) evaluates which types of open-source intelligence sup-
ports the missions of the customers of such intelligence, regard-
less of whether the customers are elements of the intelligence 
community and regardless of whether the customers are 
receiving such intelligence from the Open Source Enterprise; 
(2) evaluates how responsive the Open Source Enterprise 
is to the missions of the elements of the intelligence community 
and the other customers of the Open Source Enterprise; 
(3) enables the Open Source Enterprise to set strategic 
priorities; and 
(4) enables Congress to better oversee the strategic direc-
tion of the Open Source Enterprise and to provide support 
to the collection and analysis of open-source intelligence. 
(c) CONTENTS.— 
(1) ASSESSMENT.—The survey under subsection (a) shall 
include qualitative and quantitative questions designed to 
assess the following: 
(A) The value of support provided by the Open Source 
Enterprise to the mission of the customer taking the 
survey.
H. R. 133—1226 
(B) The accessibility of the products of the Open Source 
Enterprise. 
(C) The frequency that such products are used in 
accomplishing the mission of the customer. 
(D) The responsiveness of the Open Source Enterprise 
to tasking requests. 
(E) Areas in which the Open Source Enterprise could 
improve. 
(F) The in-house open-source intelligence capabilities 
of the customer taking the survey, including— 
(i) a description of such capabilities; 
(ii) how such capabilities are tailored to the mis-
sion of the customer; 
(iii) when such capabilities were established; and 
(iv) whether and to what extent the customer 
coordinates with the Open Source Enterprise regarding 
such capabilities. 
(2) SURVEY ANSWERS.—A customer who receives the survey 
under subsection (a) shall make all reasonable efforts to respond 
fully and frankly to the survey. 
(d) DESIGN METHODOLOGY.—In carrying out subsection (a), the 
Director of Central Intelligence shall seek advice regarding design 
methodology for customer satisfaction surveys from— 
(1) experts in survey design of the Central Intelligence 
Agency and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 
and 
(2) senior executives of the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research of the Department of State who conduct a survey 
similar to the survey under subsection (a). 
(e) REPORT.— 
(1) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
on which the survey is completed under subsection (a), the 
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees a report on the strategic direction of the Open Source 
Enterprise based on the results of the survey, including expla-
nations of how the Open Source Enterprise will— 
(A) build off the successes of the Open Source Enter-
prise; and 
(B) fill gaps in the collection, production, analysis, or 
dissemination of open-source intelligence. 
(2) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) shall be sub-
mitted in classified form. 
(3) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the date on 
which the Director submits to the congressional intelligence 
committees the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall 
provide to such committees a briefing on the strategic direction 
of the Open Source Enterprise. 
SEC. 625. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON REPORT ON MURDER OF JAMAL 
KHASHOGGI. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) There is a strong bipartisan conviction, shared widely 
throughout the legislative and executive branches of the United 
States Government and elsewhere, that ensuring full account-
ability for the brutal murder on October 2, 2018, of Jamal 
Khashoggi, a former Washington Post columnist and resident
H. R. 133—1227 
of the United States, is in the public interest and also the 
national interest of the United States. 
(2) Section 5714 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew 
Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
2018, 2019, and 2020 (division E of Public Law 116–92; 133 
Stat. 2173) required the Director of National Intelligence to 
submit to Congress a written report in ‘‘unclassified form’’ 
that includes ‘‘identification of those who carried out, partici-
pated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible 
for the death of Jamal Khashoggi.’’. 
(3) Section 1277 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1701) 
likewise obligated the Director to submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate a written report on the assessment of the intel-
ligence community regarding Mr. Khashoggi’s brutal murder. 
(4) Such section 1277 specifically called, among other 
things, for a determination and presentation of evidence with 
respect to the advance knowledge and role of any current 
or former official of the Government of Saudi Arabia or any 
current or former senior Saudi political figure over the 
directing, ordering, or tampering of evidence in relation to 
Mr. Khashoggi’s murder. 
(5) Such section 1277 also required the Director to submit 
a list of foreign persons whom the Director has high confidence 
were responsible for, complicit in, or otherwise knowingly and 
materially assisted the murder, or impeded its impartial inves-
tigation, or who ordered or otherwise directed an act or acts 
contributing to or causing the murder. 
(6) Contrary to the unambiguous and lawful command 
of Congress under such sections 5714 and 1277, the Director 
did not produce any unclassified report as required by either 
such section, and instead, on February 20, 2020, the Director 
submitted to such committees a classified report, which the 
Director referred to as an ‘‘annex’’. 
(7) The evident belief of the Director that no unclassified 
information can be produced in accordance with the directives 
of Congress is dubious, in light of the extensive body of credible, 
unclassified reporting available regarding the murder of Mr. 
Khashoggi, and the roles and culpability of officials at the 
highest levels of the Government of Saudi Arabia. 
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that 
the Director of National Intelligence should reasonably have been 
able to produce an unclassified report pursuant to section 5714 
of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 and section 
1277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020 that did not alter or obscure, in any way, the intelligence 
community’s core determinations, its presentation of evidence, or 
identification of relevant persons, as required, without putting 
sources and methods at risk.
H. R. 133—1228 
DIVISION 
X—SUPPORTING 
FOSTER 
YOUTH AND FAMILIES THROUGH THE 
PANDEMIC 
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Supporting Foster Youth 
and Families through the Pandemic Act’’. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) COVID–19 PUBLIC
HEALTH
EMERGENCY.—The term 
‘‘COVID–19 public health emergency’’ means the public health 
emergency declared by the Secretary pursuant to section 319 
of the Public Health Service Act, entitled ‘‘Determination that 
a Public Health Emergency Exists Nationwide as the Result 
of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus’’. 
(2) COVID–19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PERIOD.—The 
term ‘‘COVID–19 public health emergency period’’ means the 
period beginning on April 1, 2020 and ending with September 
30, 2021. 
(3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services. 
SEC. 3. CONTINUED SAFE OPERATION OF CHILD WELFARE PROGRAMS 
AND SUPPORT FOR OLDER FOSTER YOUTH. 
(a) FUNDING INCREASES.— 
(1) INCREASE IN SUPPORT FOR CHAFEE PROGRAMS.—Out of 
any money in the Treasury of the United States not otherwise 
appropriated, there are appropriated $400,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2021, to carry out section 477 of the Social Security 
Act, in addition to any amounts otherwise made available for 
such purpose. 
(2) EDUCATION AND TRAINING VOUCHERS.—Of the amount 
made available by reason of paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
not less than $50,000,000 shall be reserved for the provision 
of vouchers pursuant to section 477(h)(2) of the Social Security 
Act. 
(3) APPLICABILITY OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ADDITIONAL 
FUNDS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 477(g)(2) of the Social Secu-
rity Act shall apply with respect to the amount made 
available by reason of paragraph (1) of this subsection 
as if the amount were included in the amount specified 
in section 477(h) of such Act. 
(B) RESERVATION OF FUNDS.— 
(i) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount to which section 
477(g)(2) of the Social Security Act applies by reason 
of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the Secretary 
shall reserve not less than $500,000 to provide tech-
nical assistance to a State implementing or seeking 
to implement a driving and transportation program 
for foster youth. 
(ii) PROVIDER
QUALIFICATIONS.—The Secretary 
shall ensure that the entity providing the assistance 
has demonstrated the capacity to—
H. R. 133—1229 
(I) successfully administer activities in 1 or 
more States to provide driver’s licenses to youth 
who are in foster care under the responsibility 
of the State; and 
(II) increase the number of such foster youth 
who obtain a driver’s license. 
(4) INAPPLICABILITY OF STATE MATCHING REQUIREMENT TO 
ADDITIONAL FUNDS.—In making payments under subsections 
(a)(4) and (e)(1) of section 474 of the Social Security Act from 
the additional funds made available as a result of paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of this subsection, the percentages specified in 
subsections (a)(4)(A)(i) and (e)(1) of such section are, respec-
tively, deemed to be 100 percent. 
(5) MAXIMUM AWARD AMOUNT.—The dollar amount specified 
in section 477(i)(4)(B) of the Social Security Act through the 
end of fiscal year 2022 is deemed to be $12,000. 
(6) INAPPLICABILITY
OF
NYTD
PENALTY
TO
ADDITIONAL 
FUNDS.—In calculating any penalty under section 477(e)(2) of 
the Social Security Act with respect to the National Youth 
in Transition Database (NYTD) for April 1, 2020, through the 
end of fiscal year 2022, none of the additional funds made 
available by reason of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection 
shall be considered to be part of an allotment to a State under 
section 477(c) of such Act. 
(b) MAXIMUM AGE LIMITATION
ON ELIGIBILITY
FOR ASSIST-
ANCE.—During fiscal years 2020 and 2021, a child may be eligible 
for services and assistance under section 477 of the Social Security 
Act until the child attains 27 years of age, notwithstanding any 
contrary certification made under such section. 
(c) SPECIAL RULE.—With respect to funds made available by 
reason of subsection (a) that are used during the COVID–19 public 
health emergency period to support activities due to the COVID– 
19 pandemic, the Secretary may not require any State to provide 
proof of a direct connection to the pandemic if doing so would 
be administratively burdensome or would otherwise delay or impede 
the ability of the State to serve foster youth. 
(d) PROGRAMMATIC
FLEXIBILITIES.—During the COVID–19 
public health emergency period: 
(1) SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE EDU-
CATION AND TRAINING VOUCHER PROGRAM.—The Secretary shall 
allow a State to waive the applicability of the requirement 
in section 477(i)(3) of the Social Security Act that a youth 
must be enrolled in a postsecondary education or training pro-
gram or making satisfactory progress toward completion of 
that program if a youth is unable to do so due to the COVID– 
19 public health emergency. 
(2) AUTHORITY TO USE VOUCHERS TO MAINTAIN TRAINING 
AND POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION.—A voucher provided under 
a State educational and training voucher program under section 
477(i) of the Social Security Act may be used for maintaining 
training and postsecondary education, including less than full- 
time matriculation costs or other expenses that are not part 
of the cost of attendance but would help support youth in 
remaining enrolled as described in paragraph (1) of this sub-
section. 
(3) AUTHORITY TO WAIVE LIMITATIONS ON PERCENTAGE OF 
FUNDS
USED
FOR
HOUSING
ASSISTANCE
AND
ELIGIBILITY
FOR