or emerging biotechnology sectors or are identified 
as high-risk countries in the Threat Assessment re-
quired under section 301. 
(2) TOPICS.—Topics to be discussed under 
paragraph (1) shall include— 
(A) multilateral initiatives intended to pro-
mote safe and secure biotechnology; 
(B) norms and safeguards necessary to 
prevent the misuse of biotechnology; 
(C) multilateral initiatives intended to 
counter the threat of biological terrorism; and 
(D) other topics on international biosecu-
rity that the Secretary of State considers to be 
relevant. 
Subtitle B—Global Pathogen 
Surveillance 
SEC. 321. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Global Pathogen 
Surveillance Act of 2010’’. 
SEC. 322. FINDINGS; PURPOSE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The frequency of the occurrence of biologi-
cal events that could threaten the national security 
of the United States has increased and is likely in-
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creasing. The threat to the United States from such 
events includes threats from diseases that infect hu-
mans, animals, or plants regardless of whether such 
diseases are introduced naturally, accidentally, or in-
tentionally. 
(2) Bioterrorism poses a grave national security 
threat to the United States. The insidious nature of 
a bioterrorist attack, the likelihood that the recogni-
tion of such an attack would be delayed, and the 
underpreparedness of the domestic public health in-
frastructure to respond to such an attack could re-
sult in catastrophic consequences following a biologi-
cal weapons attack against the United States. 
(3) The ability to recognize that a country or 
organization is carrying out a covert biological weap-
ons program is dependent on a number of indica-
tions and warnings. A critical component of this rec-
ognition is the timely detection of sentinel events 
such as community-level outbreaks that could be the 
earliest indication of an emerging bioterrorist pro-
gram in a foreign country. Early detection of such 
events may enable earlier counterproliferation inter-
vention. 
(4) A contagious pathogen engineered as a bio-
logical weapon and developed, tested, produced, or 
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released in a foreign country could quickly spread to 
the United States. Considering the realities of inter-
national travel, trade, and migration patterns, a 
dangerous pathogen appearing naturally, acciden-
tally, or intentionally anywhere in the world can 
spread to the United States in a matter of days, be-
fore any effective quarantine or isolation measures 
could be implemented. 
(5) To combat bioterrorism effectively and en-
sure that the United States is fully prepared to pre-
vent, recognize, and contain a biological weapons at-
tack or emerging infectious disease, measures to 
strengthen the domestic public health infrastructure 
and improve domestic event detection, surveillance, 
and response, while absolutely essential, are not suf-
ficient. 
(6) The United States should enhance coopera-
tion with the World Health Organization, regional 
international health organizations, and individual 
countries, including data sharing with appropriate 
agencies and departments of the United States, to 
help detect and quickly contain infectious disease 
outbreaks or a bioterrorism agent before such a dis-
ease or agent is spread. 
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