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Iraq and the United States Ambassador to Iraq shall
jointly submit to Congress a report describing and as-
sessing in detail the current progress being made by
the Government of Iraq in meeting the benchmarks set
forth in paragraph (1)(A).
SEC. 1316. INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILI-
TIES OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES. (a) FINDINGS.—
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The responsibility for Iraq’s internal security
and halting sectarian violence must rest primarily
with the Government of Iraq, relying on the Iraqi Se-
curity Forces (ISF).
(2) In quarterly reports to Congress, and in tes-
timony before a number of congressional committees,
the Department of Defense reported progress towards
training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces; how-
ever, the subsequent performance of the Iraqi Security
Forces has been uneven and occasionally appeared in-
consistent with those reports.
(3) On November 15, 2005, President Bush said,
‘‘The plan [is] that we will train Iraqi troops to be
able to take the fight to the enemy. And as I have con-
sistently said, as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand
down’’.
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(4) On January 10, 2007, the President an-
nounced a new strategy, which consists of three basic
elements: diplomatic, economic, and military; the cen-
tral component of the military element being an aug-
mentation of the present level of the U.S. military
forces with more than 20,000 additional U.S. mili-
tary troops to Iraq to ‘‘work alongside Iraqi units
and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will
have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and
secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local
population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces
left behind are capable of providing the security that
Baghdad needs’’.
(5) The President said on January 10, 2007,
that ‘‘I’ve made it clear to the Prime Minister and
Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not
open-ended’’ so as to dispel the contrary impression
that exists.
(6) The latest National Intelligence Estimate
(NIE) on Iraq, entitled ‘‘Prospects for Iraq’s Sta-
bility: A Challenging Road Ahead,’’ released in Janu-
ary 2007, found: ‘‘If strengthened Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and sup-
ported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of
violence and establish more effective security for
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Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an oppor-
tunity to begin the process of political compromise
necessary for longer term stability, political progress,
and economic recovery’’.
(7) The NIE also stated that ‘‘[d]espite real im-
provements, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)—par-
ticularly the Iraqi police—will be hard pressed in the
next 12–18 months to execute significantly increased
security responsibilities’’.
(8) The current and prospective readiness of the
ISF is critical to (A) the long term stability of Iraq,
(B) the force protection of U.S. forces conducting com-
bined operations with the ISF; and (C) the scale of
U.S. forces deployed to Iraq.
(b) INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated
or otherwise made available for the Department of
Defense, $750,000 is provided to commission an inde-
pendent, private-sector entity, which operates as a
501(c)(3) with recognized credentials and expertise in
military affairs, to prepare an independent report as-
sessing the following:
(A) The readiness of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) to assume responsibility for main-
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taining the territorial integrity of Iraq, denying
international terrorists a safe haven, and bring-
ing greater security to Iraq’s 18 provinces in the
next 12–18 months, and bringing an end to sec-
tarian violence to achieve national reconcili-
ation.
(B) The training; equipping; command,
control and intelligence capabilities; and logis-
tics capacity of the ISF.
(C) The likelihood that, given the ISF’s
record of preparedness to date, following years of
training and equipping by US forces, the contin-
ued support of US troops will contribute to the
readiness of the ISF to fulfill the missions out-
lined in subparagraph (A).
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after pas-
sage of this Act, the designated private sector entity
shall provide an unclassified report, with a classified
annex, containing its findings, to the House and Sen-
ate Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations,
Foreign Relations, and Intelligence.
SEC. 1317. (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs (referred to
in this section as the ‘‘Secretary’’) may convey to the State
of Texas, without consideration, all right, title, and interest
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of the United States in and to the parcel of real property
comprising the location of the Marlin, Texas, Department
of Veterans Affairs Medical Center.
(2) The property conveyed under paragraph (1) shall
be used by the State of Texas for the purposes of a prison.
(b) In carrying out the conveyance under subsection
(a), the Secretary—
(1) shall not be required to comply with, and
shall not be held liable under, any Federal law (in-
cluding a regulation) relating to the environment or
historic preservation; but
(2) may, at the discretion of the Secretary, con-
duct environmental cleanup on the parcel to be con-
veyed, at a cost not to exceed $500,000, using
amounts made available for environmental cleanup of
sites under the jurisdiction of the Secretary.
SEC. 1318. REDEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
IN IRAQ. Of the amount appropriated or otherwise made
available by this chapter under the heading ‘‘IRAQ FREE-
DOM FUND’’, up to $100,000,000 may be obligated and ex-
pended for purposes of the Task Force to Improve Business
and Stability Operations in Iraq.
SEC. 1319. ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR PROCUREMENT,
MARINE CORPS, FOR ACCELERATION OF PROCUREMENT OF
ADDITIONAL 2,500 MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED