I 
117TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. R. 8560 
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a 
report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the national 
will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 28, 2022 
Mr. CROW (for himself and Mr. MEIJER) introduced the following bill; which 
was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
A BILL 
To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit 
to Congress a report relating to analyses of the military 
will to fight and the national will to fight with respect 
to the Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Will to Fight Act of 
2022’’. 
SEC. 2. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
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(1) According to a study by the RAND corpora-
tion, ‘‘will to fight’’ is poorly analyzed and the least 
understood aspect of war. 
(2) In testimony before the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intel-
ligence officials of the United States indicated that 
although the intelligence community accurately an-
ticipated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the intel-
ligence community did not accurately assess the will 
of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a Rus-
sian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would 
succeed in averting a rapid Russian military occupa-
tion of Kyiv. 
(3) According to the RAND corporation, the in-
telligence community estimated that the Afghan gov-
ernment’s forces could hold out against the Taliban 
for as long as 2 years if all ground forces of the 
United States were withdrawn. This estimate was 
revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence com-
munity view that Afghanistan’s military collapse 
could come in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the 
Afghan government fell within days after the ground 
forces of the United States were withdrawn. 
(4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of 
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the Iraqi Security Forces in 2014 appeared to take 
the policymakers of the United States by surprise. 
(5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had 
important implications for policy decisions of the 
United States toward Russia and Afghanistan, and 
suggest a need for further examination of how the 
intelligence community assesses a foreign military’s 
will to fight. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
telligence, acting through the National Intelligence Coun-
cil, and in coordination with the heads of the elements of 
the intelligence community that the Director determines 
appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report examining the extent to which anal-
yses of the military will to fight and the national will to 
fight informed the all-source analyses of the intelligence 
community regarding how the armed forces and Govern-
ments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform 
at key junctures. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (b) 
shall include the following: 
(1) The methodology of the intelligence commu-
nity for measuring the military will to fight and the 
national will to fight of a foreign country. 
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(2) The extent to which analysts of the intel-
ligence community applied such methodology when 
assessing the military will to fight and the national 
will to fight of— 
(A) Afghanistan following the April 2021 
announcement of the full withdrawal of the 
United States Armed Forces; 
(B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence 
and advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria; and 
(C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial 
phase of the invasion and march toward Kyiv 
by Russia in February 2022. 
(3) The extent to which— 
(A) the assessments described in para-
graph (2) depended on the observations of per-
sonnel of the United States Armed Forces who 
had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and Ukrainian 
armed forces; and 
(B) such observations reflected any stand-
ardized, objective methodology. 
(4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the mili-
tary will to fight and the national will to fight may 
have affected the capacity of the intelligence commu-
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nity to provide ‘‘early warning’’ about the collapse of 
government forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
(5) The extent to which ‘‘red teaming’’ was 
used to test the assessments described in paragraph 
(2). 
(6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of 
intelligence analysts were highlighted in final written 
products presented to senior policymakers of the 
United States. 
(7) The extent to which analysts and super-
visors adhered to the policies, procedures, directives, 
and best practices of the intelligence community. 
(8) Recommendations for analyses by the intel-
ligence community going forward to incorporate les-
sons learned and enhance the quality of future ana-
lytical products to more accurately reflect the mili-
tary will to fight and the national will to fight and 
improve the capacity of the intelligence community 
to accurately predict the success or failure of the 
armed forces of a foreign country. 
(d) ANNEX.—In submitting the report under sub-
section (b) to the congressional intelligence committees, 
the Director shall also include an accompanying annex, 
which shall be classified, providing an inventory of the fol-
lowing: 
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(1) Collection gaps and challenges that may 
have affected the analysis of the collapse of govern-
ment forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
(2) Actions that the Director of National Intel-
ligence has taken to mitigate such gaps and chal-
lenges. 
(e) FORM.—The report under subsection (b) may be 
submitted in classified form, but if so submitted, shall in-
clude an unclassified summary of key findings, consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. 
(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the following: 
(A) The congressional intelligence commit-
tees (as such term is defined in section 3 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3003)). 
(B) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives. 
(C) The Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate. 
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(2) INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—The term 
‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 
that term in section 3 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 
(3) MILITARY
WILL
TO
FIGHT.—The term 
‘‘military will to fight’’ means, with respect to the 
military of a country, the disposition and decision to 
fight, act, or persevere as needed. 
(4) NATIONAL WILL TO FIGHT.—The term ‘‘na-
tional will to fight’’ means, with respect to the gov-
ernment of a country, the resolve to conduct sus-
tained military and other operations for an objective 
even when the expectation of success decreases or 
the need for significant political, economic, and mili-
tary sacrifices increases. 
Æ 
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