SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. 
(a) FIRST PRINCIPAL FINDING.—Ending the war in 
Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even 
greater importance for United States national security, 
the safety of members of the United States Armed Forces 
currently serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and 
the Middle East. 
(b) SECOND PRINCIPAL FINDING.— 
(1) 
OPEN-ENDED
COMMITMENT
IS 
UNSUSTAINABLE.—An open-ended United States in-
volvement in Iraq is not in the interest of United 
States national security, and United States military 
forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely 
over-strained. 
(2) SUPPORTING FACTS.— 
(A) Currently, 40 percent of all United 
States Army equipment is in Iraq. 
(B) There is no Army unit currently in the 
United States in a state of readiness that would 
permit the unit to deploy anywhere another 
contingency might occur in the world. 
(c) THIRD PRINCIPAL FINDING.— 
(1) LENGTHY REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS.—Re-
deployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process. 
(2) SUPPORTING FACTS.— 
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(A) Redeploying approximately 160,000 
troops and 50,000 civilian contractors from 
Iraq and closing bases are logistically chal-
lenging, especially during conflict. 
(B) The critical consideration is the clo-
sure or turnover of the sixty-five Forward Oper-
ating Bases held by the United States Armed 
Forces in Iraq. 
(C) It takes on average 100 days to close 
just one Forward Operating Base, and any de-
cision regarding the number of Forward Oper-
ating Bases to close at one time depends on 
surrounding strife and the fact that receiving 
facilities in Kuwait to prepare military vehicles 
for shipment to the United States or elsewhere 
can handle only 2 to 21⁄2 brigade combat teams 
at a time and there are currently 40 brigade 
combat teams or their equivalent in Iraq. 
(D) Redeployment is the most vulnerable 
of military operations, particularly in this case 
because redeployment will rely on a single road, 
leading from Iraq to Kuwait. 
(E) For comparison purposes, the removal 
of 6,300 members of the Armed Forces from 
Somalia in 1993 took six months and actually 
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required the deployment of another 19,000 
troops to protect their withdrawal. 
(F) In view of the logistical challenges, it 
will take at least a year, more likely 15 to 20 
months to complete redeployment of United 
States forces from Iraq. 
SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY. 
(a) FIRST DECLARATION OF POLICY.— 
(1) NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SE-
CURITY PLAN.—Congress declares that it is critical 
that a comprehensive security plan is developed for 
Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a 
deliberate redeployment of United States forces from 
Iraq. 
(2) SUPPORTING DETAILS.— 
(A) A comprehensive security plan is nec-
essary for both the safety of United States 
forces in Iraq and the overall national security 
of the United States. 
(B) Redeployment would allow large num-
bers of members of the United States Armed 
Forces to return to the United States, while 
some forces could be deployed to areas, such as 
Afghanistan, where terrorists pose a threat to 
the national security of the United States or 
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could remain at existing bases in Kuwait, Bah-
rain, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar and 
on aircraft carrier and amphibious groups, to 
protect United States interests in the region. 
(b) SECOND DECLARATION OF POLICY.— 
(1) IRAQI ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY.— 
Congress declares that a planned end to United 
States involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi 
leaders to assume responsibility for the security and 
governance of their country while providing Iran and 
Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise 
caused by the redeployment of United States forces. 
(2) SUPPORTING DETAILS.— 
(A) The United States intelligence commu-
nity has found that Iran and Syria, currently 
involved destructively in the fighting in Iraq 
want stability in Iraq following redeployment, 
and can play a constructive role in improving 
security and stability in Iraq. 
(B) Because the redeployment of United 
States may take up to 20 months, there is an 
opportunity for a strategic approach to work 
diplomatically for political accommodation in 
Iraq with Iran and Syria (as well as Saudi Ara-
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bia and other countries in the region) during 
that timeframe. 
(c) THIRD DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress de-
clares that while a ‘‘date certain’’ deadline for the rede-
ployment of United States forces could force Iraqi leaders 
to assume responsibility and provide Iran and Syria the 
incentive to prevent violence that could result from the re-
deployment, a ‘‘goal’’ for the redeployment’s end instead 
of a ‘‘date certain’’ is a necessary compromise in order 
to ensure a strategic approach for United States security 
and create a greater level of Iraqi stability in the after-
math of the redeployment. 
SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) REDEPLOYMENT REQUIRED.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—Redeployment of United 
States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom shall begin within three 
months after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
Within six months after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, troop levels shall be at least 15,000 
below the pre-surge level of 130,000 troops. 
(2) GOAL.—Except as provided in subsection 
(b), not later than twenty months after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the goal is that all United 
States Armed Forces serving in Iraq as part of Op-
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