H. R. 7776—1206 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation deter-
mines that the pilot program required by subsection (b)(1) 
is operational, the Director’’; 
(B) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘within the United 
States’’; and 
(C) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘by the intelligence 
community’’ and inserting ‘‘deployed by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’’. 
SEC. 6810. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND 
RESEARCH 
ASSESSMENT 
OF 
ANOMALOUS 
HEALTH 
INCIDENTS. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this 
section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Intelligence and Research shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress an assessment of the findings relating 
to the events that have been collectively labeled as ‘‘anomalous 
health incidents’’. 
(c) CONTENTS.—The assessment submitted under subsection 
(b) shall include the following: 
(1) Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information 
on the causation of anomalous health incidents. 
(2) Any diplomatic reporting or other relevant information 
on any person or entity who may be responsible for such 
incidents. 
(3) Detailed plans, including metrics, timelines, and meas-
urable goals, for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to 
understand anomalous health incidents and share findings with 
other elements of the intelligence community. 
SEC. 6811. REPEAL AND MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING AND 
BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS. 
(a) REPORTS ON SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA IN THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION.— 
Section 1107A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3237a) is repealed. 
(b) ANNUAL UPDATE TO REPORT ON FOREIGN WEAPONIZATION 
OF DEEPFAKES AND DEEPFAKE TECHNOLOGY.—Section 5709 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (50 U.S.C. 
3369a) is amended— 
(1) by striking subsection (d); and 
(2) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d). 
(c) 
INFORMATION
SHARING
PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT 
REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is 
amended— 
(A) by striking subsection (h); and
H. R. 7776—1207 
(B) by redesignating subsections (i) through (l) as sub-
sections (h) through (k), respectively. 
(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 210(b) of the Home-
land Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124g(b)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘section 1016(i) of the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(i))’’ and inserting 
‘‘section 1016(h) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485(h))’’. 
(d) PERIODIC REPORTS
ON ACTIVITIES
OF PRIVACY OFFICERS 
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICERS.—Section 1062(f)(1) of the Intel-
ligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 
2000ee–1(f)(1)) is amended, in the matter preceding subparagraph 
(A), by striking ‘‘semiannually’’ and inserting ‘‘annually’’. 
(e) BRIEFING ON HIZBALLAH’S ASSETS AND ACTIVITIES RELATED 
TO FUNDRAISING, FINANCING, AND MONEY LAUNDERING WORLD- 
WIDE.—Section 204(b) of the Hizballah International Financing 
Prevention Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–102; 129 Stat. 2212) is 
amended by striking ‘‘every 180 days’’ and inserting ‘‘annually’’. 
(f) INSPECTORS GENERAL REPORTS ON CLASSIFICATION.—Section 
6721(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 2231) is amended by striking 
‘‘per year in each of the three’’ and inserting ‘‘every two years 
in each of the six’’. 
(g) REPORT ON EFFORTS OF STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM, 
OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES, OR ENTITIES TO ILLICITLY ACQUIRE 
SATELLITES AND RELATED ITEMS.—Section 1261(e)(1) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112– 
239; 126 Stat. 2019) is amended by striking ‘‘annually’’ and inserting 
‘‘once every two years’’. 
(h) REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE PROGRAM ON USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN EFFORTS 
TO SANCTION FOREIGN OPIOID TRAFFICKERS.—Section 7231(c) of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (21 
U.S.C. 2331(c)) is amended— 
(1) in the subsection heading, by inserting ‘‘AND BRIEFINGS’’ 
after ‘‘REPORTS’’; and 
(2) in paragraph (1)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘(1) QUARTERLY
REPORTS
ON
PRO-
GRAM.—Not later than’’ and inserting the following: 
‘‘(1) REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON PROGRAM.— 
‘‘(A) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than’’; 
(B) in subparagraph (A), as designated by subpara-
graph (A) of this paragraph— 
(i) by striking ‘‘every 90 days’’ and inserting 
‘‘annually’’; 
(ii) by striking ‘‘90-day period’’ and inserting 
‘‘year’’; and 
(iii) by striking ‘‘under this paragraph’’ and 
inserting ‘‘under this subparagraph’’; and 
(C) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(B) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFINGS.—On a semiannual basis, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy shall jointly 
brief the appropriate congressional committees and leader-
ship on the status and accomplishments of the program 
required by subsection (a).’’.
H. R. 7776—1208 
SEC. 
6812. 
INCREASED 
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED 
ENGINEERING, 
RESEARCH, 
AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
CAPABILITIES 
OF 
MINORITY INSTITUTIONS. 
(a) PLAN.— 
(1) REQUIREMENT.—The Director of National Intelligence 
shall develop a plan to promote intelligence-related engineering, 
research, and development activities at covered institutions 
for the purpose of contributing toward the research necessary 
to achieve the intelligence advantage of the United States. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The plan under paragraph (1) shall include 
the following: 
(A) An assessment of opportunities to support 
engineering, research, and development at covered institu-
tions in computer sciences, including artificial intelligence, 
quantum computing, and machine learning, and synthetic 
biology and an assessment of opportunities to support the 
associated workforce and physical research infrastructure 
of such institutions. 
(B) An assessment of opportunities to enhance the 
ability of covered institutions— 
(i) 
to 
participate 
in 
intelligence-related 
engineering, research, and development activities; and 
(ii) to effectively compete for intelligence-related 
engineering, research and development contracts in 
support of the most urgent research requirements of 
the intelligence community. 
(C) An assessment of the activities and investments 
the Director determines necessary— 
(i) to expand opportunities for covered institutions 
to partner with other research organizations and edu-
cational institutions that the intelligence community 
frequently partners with to conduct research; and 
(ii) to increase participation of covered institutions 
in intelligence-related engineering, research, and 
development activities. 
(D) Recommendations identifying actions that may be 
taken by the Director, Congress, covered institutions, and 
other organizations to increase participation of such institu-
tions in intelligence-related engineering, research, and 
development activities and contracts. 
(E) Specific goals, incentives, and metrics to increase 
and measure the capacity of covered institutions to address 
the engineering, research, and development needs of the 
intelligence community. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—In developing the plan under para-
graph (1), the Director shall consult with covered institutions 
and other departments or agencies of the United States Govern-
ment or private sector organizations that the Director deter-
mines appropriate. 
(4) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the congres-
sional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives, and make publicly available 
on the internet website of the Director, a report containing 
the plan under paragraph (1).
H. R. 7776—1209 
(b) ACTIVITIES
TO
SUPPORT
RESEARCH
AND
ENGINEERING 
CAPACITY.—Subject to the availability of appropriations for such 
purpose, the Director may establish a program to award contracts, 
grants, or other agreements, on a competitive basis, and to perform 
other appropriate activities, for any of the following purposes: 
(1) Developing the capability, including the workforce and 
the research infrastructure, for covered institutions to more 
effectively 
compete 
for 
intelligence-related 
engineering, 
research, and development activities and contracts. 
(2) Any other purposes the Director determines appropriate 
to enhance the capabilities of covered institutions to carry 
out intelligence-related engineering, research, and development 
activities and contracts. 
(c) INCREASED PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN IARPA AND COVERED 
INSTITUTIONS.—The Director shall establish goals and incentives 
to encourage the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity 
to— 
(1) partner with covered institutions to advance the 
research and development needs of the intelligence community 
through partnerships and collaborations with the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity; and 
(2) if the Director determines appropriate, foster the 
establishment of similar relationships between such institutions 
and other organizations that have partnerships with the Intel-
ligence Advanced Research Projects Activity. 
(d) COVERED INSTITUTION DEFINED.—In this section, the term 
‘‘covered institution’’ means the following: 
(1) A part B institution (as defined in section 322 of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061)). 
(2) An institution of higher education (as defined in section 
101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965(20 U.S.C. 1001)) 
not covered by paragraph (1) at which not less than 50 percent 
of the total student enrollment consists of students from ethnic 
groups that are underrepresented in the fields of science and 
engineering, as determined by the Director of National Intel-
ligence. 
SEC. 6813. REPORTS ON PERSONNEL VETTING PROCESSES AND 
PROGRESS UNDER TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0 INITIATIVE. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) AUTHORIZED ADJUDICATIVE AGENCY; AUTHORIZED INVES-
TIGATIVE AGENCY; PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION; PERI-
ODIC
REINVESTIGATION.—The terms ‘‘authorized adjudicative 
agency’’, ‘‘authorized investigative agency’’, ‘‘personnel security 
investigation’’, and ‘‘periodic reinvestigation’’ have the meanings 
given those terms in section 3001(a) of the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(a)). 
(2) CONTINUOUS VETTING; COUNCIL; SECURITY EXECUTIVE 
AGENT.—The terms ‘‘continuous vetting’’, ‘‘Council’’, and ‘‘Secu-
rity Executive Agent’’ have the meanings given those terms 
in section 6601 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 
2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352). 
(b) REPORTS.—Not later than September 30, 2023, and annually 
thereafter until September 30, 2027, the Security Executive Agent, 
in coordination with the Chair and other Principals of the Council,
H. R. 7776—1210 
shall submit to Congress a report on the personnel vetting processes 
of the United States Government. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—Each report under subsection (b) shall include, 
with respect to the preceding fiscal year, the following: 
(1) An analysis of the timeliness, costs, and other related 
information for the initiations, investigations (including initial 
investigations and any required periodic reinvestigations), and 
adjudications for personnel vetting purposes. Such analysis 
shall include the following: 
(A) The average periods of time taken (from the date 
of an agency’s receipt of a completed security clearance 
application to the date of the ultimate disposition and 
notification to the subject and the employer of the subject) 
by each authorized investigative agency and authorized 
adjudicative agency, to the greatest extent practicable, to 
initiate investigations, conduct investigations, and adju-
dicate security clearances, as compared with established 
timeliness objectives. 
(B) The number of initial investigations and periodic 
reinvestigations initiated and adjudicated by each author-
ized investigative agency and authorized adjudicative 
agency, to the extent practicable. 
(C) The number of initial investigations and periodic 
reinvestigations carried over to the fiscal year covered by 
the report from a prior fiscal year by each authorized 
investigative agency and authorized adjudicative agency, 
to the greatest extent practicable. 
(D) The number of initial investigations and periodic 
reinvestigations that resulted in a denial or revocation 
of a security clearance by each authorized adjudicative 
agency. 
(E) The costs to the executive branch relating to per-
sonnel security clearance initiations, investigations, adju-
dications, revocations, and continuous vetting with respect 
to such clearances. 
(F) A discussion of any impediments, including with 
respect to resources, personnel, or authorities, to the timely 
processing of personnel security clearances. 
(G) The number of individuals who hold a personnel 
security clearance and are enrolled in a program of contin-
uous vetting with respect to such clearance, and the num-
bers and types of adverse actions taken by each authorized 
adjudicative agency as a result of such continuous vetting. 
(H) The number of personnel security clearances 
awaiting or under investigation (including initial investiga-
tion and periodic reinvestigation) by the Director of the 
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and each 
authorized investigative agency. 
(I) Such other information as the Security Executive 
Agent may determine appropriate, including any rec-
ommendations to improve the effectiveness, timeliness, and 
efficiency of personnel security clearance initiations, inves-
tigations, and adjudications. 
(2) An analysis of the status of the implementation of 
the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative sponsored by the Council, 
including the following:
H. R. 7776—1212 
(B) the implementation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 
initiative; 
(C) the transfer and reciprocal recognition of deter-
minations relating to personnel vetting between and among 
departments and agencies; and 
(D) the completeness and provision of data from ele-
ments of the intelligence community, pursuant to para-
graphs (1), (2), and (3) of this subsection. 
SEC. 6814. REPORTS RELATING TO PROGRAMS OF RECORD OF 
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) 
The 
comprehensive 
identification 
of 
National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency programs and activities, to 
include significant, enduring programs determined by the 
Agency to be ‘‘programs of record’’, is a critical element for 
enabling budget auditability and oversight by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of Management 
and Budget, and the congressional intelligence committees. 
(2) In order to improve how the National Geospatial-Intel-
ligence Agency justifies and oversees resources in support of 
core missions and authorities, the Agency has committed to 
establish a deliberate acquisition structure, modeled after 
Department of Defense best practices, with programs and activi-
ties aligned under a Program Executive Office structure. 
(3) Establishing an effective Program Executive Office 
structure at the National Geospatial-intelligence Agency will 
ensure clearly articulated acquisition efforts that have defined 
requirements and program scope with traceability from 
capabilities to deliverables to Programs of Record to budget 
materials. 
(b) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 
(1) REPORTS TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES 
AND DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEES OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIA-
TIONS
COMMITTEES.—Not later than February 1, 2023, the 
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, con-
sistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
reports on the programs and activities of the Agency. Such 
reports shall include, at a minimum, the following: 
(A) An identification of any definition for the term 
‘‘program of record’’ used by the Agency during the period 
beginning October 1, 2017, and ending on the date of 
the submission of the report. 
(B) A detailed description of each current program 
and activity of the Agency, including each current program 
of record of the Agency. 
(C) A detailed explanation of how funding and other 
information relating to each such program of record or 
other program or activity may be located within the budget 
justification materials submitted to Congress. 
(D) An in-process review of the program element office 
planning and implementation efforts.
H. R. 7776—1213 
(E) Identification of limitations and additional support 
required by the Agency to implement program element 
offices and related changes to financial management sys-
tems. 
(2) REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DEFENSE 
COMMITTEES.— 
(A) 
DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate 
congressional committees’’ means— 
(i) the congressional intelligence committees; and 
(ii) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate; and 
(iii) the Committee on Armed Services and Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives. 
(B) REPORT
REQUIRED.—Not later than February 1, 
2023, the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods, shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the programs and 
activities of the Agency that are funded in full or in part 
under the Military Intelligence Program. Such report shall 
include, at a minimum, the following: 
(i) An identification of any definition for the term 
‘‘program of record’’ used by the Agency during the 
period beginning October 1, 2017 and ending on the 
date of the submission of the report. 
(ii) A detailed description of each current program 
and activity of the Agency funded in full or in part 
under the Military Intelligence Program, including 
each current program of record of the Agency funded 
in full or in part under the Military Intelligence Pro-
gram. 
(iii) A detailed explanation of how funding and 
other information relating to each such program of 
record or other program or activity funded in full or 
in part under the Military Intelligence Program may 
be located within the budget justification materials 
submitted to Congress. 
(3) FORM.—Each report under this subsection may be sub-
mitted in classified form. 
SEC. 6815. PLAN REGARDING SOCIAL MEDIA DATA AND THREAT ANAL-
YSIS CENTER. 
(a) DEFINITION
OF
APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
tees’’ has the meaning given that term in section 5323(h) of the 
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 
3369(h)). 
(b) PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to operationalize 
the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis Center in accordance 
with section 5323 of the Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young
H. R. 7776—1214 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, 
and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3369). 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The plan under subsection (b) shall include 
a description of how the Social Media Data and Threat Analysis 
Center shall— 
(1) coordinate with social media companies, independent 
organizations and researchers, and other public-facing internet- 
based platforms to determine— 
(A) what categories of data and metadata are useful 
indicators of internet-based foreign malign influence activi-
ties; and 
(B) how such data and metadata may be shared effec-
tively with the Center and with independent organizations 
and researchers while protecting the privacy and civil lib-
erties of United States users of social media platforms 
and other public-facing internet-based platforms; and 
(2) develop criteria under which social media companies 
and other public-facing internet-based platforms share indica-
tors of internet-based foreign malign influence activities with 
the Center and independent organizations and researchers, 
including a description of— 
(A) the timeliness and consistency of such sharing of 
indicators; 
(B) the categories of indicators to be shared; and 
(C) the protection, in consultation with the head of 
the Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency 
as may be appropriate, of privacy, civil liberties, and con-
stitutionally protected activities of users of social media 
platforms and other public-facing internet-based platforms. 
SEC. 6816. REPORT ON USE OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA 
INFORMATION IN PERSONNEL VETTING DETERMINA-
TIONS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS OF CONTINUOUS VETTING, COUNCIL, AND SECU-
RITY EXECUTIVE AGENT.—In this section, the terms ‘‘continuous 
vetting’’, ‘‘Council’’, and ‘‘Security Executive Agent’’ have the 
meanings given those terms in section 6601 of the Damon Paul 
Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (50 U.S.C. 3352). 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with other heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community that the Director determines appropriate, and in con-
sultation with the other principal members of the Council, shall 
submit to Congress a report regarding the current and planned 
use of publicly available social media information in the personnel 
vetting and security clearance processes. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (b) shall include 
the following: 
(1) A description of how departments and agencies of the 
United States Government have implemented Security Execu-
tive Agent Directive 5 titled ‘‘Collection, Use, and Retention 
of Publicly Available Social Media Information in Personnel 
Security Background Investigations and Adjudications’’, and 
relevant agency implementing guidance, including Department 
of Defense Instruction 1325.06 titled ‘‘Handling Protest,
H. R. 7776—1215 
Extremist, and Criminal Gang Activities among Members of 
the Armed Forces’’. 
(2) A description of how the use of publicly available social 
media in personnel vetting determinations and security clear-
ance investigations and adjudications is, or will be, captured 
in the National Background Investigation Services system and 
other information technology systems used in the personnel 
vetting process. 
(3) A description of how publicly available social media 
information is used, and will be used, in continuous vetting 
and security clearances processes and insider threat programs. 
(4) A description of any privacy or civil liberties concerns 
with the use of publicly available social media information 
in personnel vetting or security clearance determinations, 
including a discussion of the risks, benefits, and drawbacks 
of allowing for the voluntary provision of, or voluntary access 
to, nonpublicly available social media information in the regular 
course of personnel vetting and security clearance processes. 
(5) A discussion of the extent to which officials and entities 
of the United States Government responsible for privacy and 
civil liberties matters, including the Chief of the Office of Civil 
Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence and the civil liberties officers 
of departments and agencies of the United States Government, 
are involved in the development and operation of programs 
to use social media information in personnel vetting and secu-
rity clearance processes. 
(6) A discussion of any impediments, constraints, risks, 
or drawbacks relating to the use of publicly available social 
media information in personnel vetting and security clearance 
processes, including— 
(A) challenges associated with implementation of Secu-
rity Executive Agent Directive 5, Department of Defense 
Instruction 1325.06, and other relevant guidance; 
(B) the resources required, including with respect to 
personnel, funding, and information systems, to gather, 
assess, and make use of such information; and 
(C) an analysis of the costs and benefits of the use 
of publicly available social media information. 
(7) An implementation plan for the future use of publicly 
available social media information, based on relevant findings 
under paragraphs (1) through (6). 
SEC. 6817. REPORT ON STRENGTHENING WORKFORCE DIVERSITY 
PLANNING AND OVERSIGHT. 
(a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report 
discussing steps to enhance the strategic planning for, measure 
the progress of, and assess barriers to workforce diversity in the 
intelligence community. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The report under subsection (a) shall include 
the following: