163 
of human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
nents. 
(b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of 
State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean to— 
(1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 
liberties posed by technologies and services described 
in subsection (a); and 
(2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate 
such risks. 
(c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global 
Media, who may work through the Open Technology 
Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Inter-
net Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, 
shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censor-
ship technology and services to journalists in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability 
to safely access or share digital news and information. 
(d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall 
work through nongovernmental organizations to— 
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(1) support and promote programs that support 
internet freedom and the free flow of information 
online in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
(2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
able access to internet in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; 
(3) provide integrated support to civil society 
for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, 
and applied research programs in Latin America 
and the Caribbean; 
(4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 
Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 
techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 
and prevent government overreach in the digital 
sphere; 
(5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 
their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 
news reports covering governance and human rights 
topics; 
(6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 
improve transparency and accountability in govern-
ment and the private sector; 
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(7) provide training on investigative reporting 
of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business 
and commercial practices; 
(8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 
strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities 
described in paragraph (7); and 
(9) identify local resources to support the pre-
ponderance of activities that would be carried out 
under this subsection. 
SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTER-
NATIVE TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIA-
TIVE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily 
reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-
mately 90 percent of their energy production. 
(2) The level of dependence is even higher in-
cluding— 
(A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 
percent of its electricity; 
(B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 
percent of its electricity; 
(C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil 
for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and 
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(D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 
percent of its electricity. 
(3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has 
had a detrimental effect on economic development, 
growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean. 
(4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-
bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal devel-
opment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate 
change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously 
damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source 
of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural 
beauty. 
(5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-
tricity— 
(A) has serious health impacts in the form 
of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-
ments; and 
(B) can also exacerbate climate change. 
(6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-
able to sea level rise and stronger storms. 
(7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of 
the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpet-
uated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, 
which— 
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(A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; 
and 
(B) supplies some countries with up to 40 
percent of their energy production needs. 
(8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and 
political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-
ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the 
Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional 
power. 
Only 
Cuba 
still 
receives 
preferential 
Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, 
while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-
encing a destabilized flow of oil. 
(9) 
China 
has 
spent 
more 
than 
$244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide 
since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Although the majority 
of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has 
also been the largest investor in clean energy glob-
ally for almost a decade. 
(10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib-
bean will need $12,000,000,000 in power invest-
ments through 2035. 
(11) Renewable energy technology costs have 
decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a 
more viable economic alternative for energy produc-
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tion. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent 
since 2008, causing significant market growth, and 
according to data released by the International Re-
newable Energy Agency, 1⁄3 of global power capacity 
is based in renewable energy. 
(12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund 
estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-
cent of the total primary energy consumed in the 
Caribbean subregion. 
(13) According to the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean 
could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 
and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 
2050 if the region’s energy and transport sectors 
reach net zero emissions. 
(14) The Caribbean has an abundance of on-
shore and offshore resources needed for renewable 
energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some 
hydropower production capacity. 
(15) The United States Government is deeply 
engaged in providing technical and policy assistance 
to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues 
through— 
(A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of 
the Americas; 
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(B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and 
(C) bilateral assistance programs. 
(16) On February 19, 2014, at the North 
American Leaders’ Summit, President Barack 
Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, 
and President Enrique Pen˜a Nieto of Mexico re-
affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reli-
able, and increasingly renewable power to the Carib-
bean, while opening wider markets for clean energy 
and green technology. 
(17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack 
Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security 
Initiative, which would partner with individual coun-
tries— 
(A) to transform its energy sector; 
(B) to work to increase access to finance, 
good governance, and diversification; and 
(C) to maximize the impact of existing 
donor effects. 
(18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States- 
Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the 
energy security task force formally launched the 
Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strat-
egy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage re-
gional coordination and action on energy security 
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and agreed to expand the regional market and trans-
mission system. 
(19) The United States has an important op-
portunity— 
(A) to deepen this engagement; 
(B) to work as a partner with Caribbean 
countries on a more regional and coordinated 
basis; 
(C) to help ease the region’s dependence 
on imported oil; and 
(D) to promote affordable alternative 
sources of energy. 
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Carib-
bean countries’’ means countries in the Caribbean 
region, but does not including Cuba or Venezuela. 
(2) CARIBBEAN
GOVERNMENTS.—The term 
‘‘Caribbean governments’’ means the national gov-
ernments of the Caribbean countries. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 
United States to help Caribbean countries— 
(1) achieve greater energy security and improve 
domestic energy resource mobilization; 
(2) lower their dependence on imported fuels; 
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(3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, 
other petroleum products, and coal for the genera-
tion of electricity; 
(4) increase production of renewable energy; 
and 
(5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of 
their national determined contributions to the Paris 
Agreement. 
(d) STRATEGY.— 
(1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis-
trator of USAID, shall submit a multi-year strategy 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives that describes how the De-
partment of State will promote regional cooperation 
with Caribbean countries— 
(A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, 
grow domestic clean energy production in the 
region, strengthen regional energy security, and 
lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions; 
(B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 
transportation sector; 
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(C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 
conservation, and investment in alternatives to 
imported fuels; 
(D) to improve grid reliability and mod-
ernize electricity transmission networks; 
(E) to advance deployment of innovative 
solutions to expand community and individuals’ 
access to electricity; 
(F) to help reform energy markets to en-
courage good regulatory governance and to pro-
mote a climate of private sector investment; and 
(G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 
from the energy and transportation sector. 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 
subsection (a) shall include— 
(A) a thorough review and inventory of 
United States Government activities that are 
being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in 
coordination with multilateral institutions— 
(i) to promote energy and climate se-
curity in the Caribbean region; and 
(ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on 
oil for electricity generation; 
(B) opportunities for marshaling regional 
cooperation— 
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(i) to overcome market barriers result-
ing from the small size of Caribbean en-
ergy markets; 
(ii) to address the high transportation 
and infrastructure costs faced by Carib-
bean countries; 
(iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-
tion between governments, multilateral in-
stitutions, multilateral banks, and private 
investors; and 
(iv) to expand regional financing op-
portunities to allow for lower cost energy 
entrepreneurship; 
(C) measures to ensure that each Carib-
bean government has— 
(i) an independent utility regulator or 
equivalent; 
(ii) affordable access by third party 
investors to its electrical grid with minimal 
regulatory interference; 
(iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
ergy conservation; 
(iv) programs to address technical and 
nontechnical issues; 
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(v) a plan to eliminate major market 
distortions; 
(vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and 
(vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean 
energy solutions; and 
(D) recommendations for how United 
States policy, technical, and economic assist-
ance can be used in the Caribbean region— 
(i) to advance renewable energy devel-
opment and the incorporation of renewable 
technologies into existing energy grids and 
the development and deployment of micro- 
grids where appropriate and feasible to 
boost energy security and reliability, par-
ticularly to underserved communities; 
(ii) to increase the generation of clean 
energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 
the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 
generation units in Caribbean countries; 
(iii) to create regional financing op-
portunities to allow for lower cost energy 
entrepreneurship; 
(iv) to deploy transaction advisors in 
the region to help attract private invest-
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ment and break down any market or regu-
latory barriers; and 
(v) to establish a mechanism for each 
host government to have access to inde-
pendent legal advice— 
(I) to speed the development of 
energy-related contracts; and 
(II) to better protect the inter-
ests of Caribbean governments and 
citizens. 
(3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy 
under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall 
work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult 
with— 
(A) the Secretary of the Interior; 
(B) the Secretary of Commerce; 
(C) the Secretary of the Treasury; 
(D) the Board of Directors of the Export- 
Import Bank of the United States; 
(E) the Board of Directors of the Develop-
ment Finance Corporation; 
(F) the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development; 
(G) the Caribbean governments; 
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(H) 
the 
Inter-American 
Development 
Bank; 
(I) the World Bank Group; and 
(J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 
Corporation. 
SEC. 250. U.S.-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The United States shares with the Carib-
bean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, 
which affects the lives and the economies of our citi-
zens. 
(2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La 
Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devas-
tation caused by the many natural disasters the Car-
ibbean confronts each year and the region’s vulner-
ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the 
largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts 
of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes 
Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across 
the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According 
to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide 
to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds 
(324) have been in the Caribbean. 
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(3) This region is seven times more likely to ex-
perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, 
when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times 
more damage. 
(4) Extreme weather events and other environ-
mental impacts will only worsen over the coming 
years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas-
ing economic shocks on these countries, driving ir-
regular migration. 
(5) While the United States has considerable 
expertise and capacity in assisting countries with 
disaster response, there remains a need for stronger 
partnerships that build regional resilience through 
efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting peo-
ple and speeding recovery. 
(6) The People’s Republic of China has dra-
matically increased its engagement in the Caribbean 
in the past five years, including offering loans and 
grants related to disaster response and resilience 
and sought to acquire property rights in the Carib-
bean that would be detrimental to United States na-
tional security interests. 
(7) In 2019, the United States launched a new 
U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co-
operation and investment to strengthen our disaster 
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resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ-
ing— 
(A) to streamline early warning response 
networks and formalize communication chan-
nels; 
(B) to enhance, encourage, and work col-
laboratively on further developing aviation dis-
aster resilience plans and partnerships; 
(C) to prioritize regional technical ex-
change in energy planning, risk reduction, and 
resilience; 
(D) to increase communications network 
interoperability between Caribbean partners and 
the United States; 
(E) to utilize storm surge mapping data 
and share real-time information in preparation 
for potential damage resulting from tropical cy-
clones and tsunamis; 
(F) to use meteorological services to 
strengthen and deepen physical and commu-
nications infrastructure, data collection net-
works, and human and technical capacity 
throughout the region, as well as interactions 
with the public; 
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(G) to understand that while the use of 
international and military and civil defense as-
sets in disaster response may only be considered 
as a last resort, when local, national, and inter-
national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, 
civil-military coordination should occur, in sup-
port of the affected nation; 
(H) to develop a framework that would 
govern the deployment of international military 
and civil defense assets in disaster response 
when local, national, and international civilian 
capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the 
affected nation; 
(I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur-
ing rapid disaster response and recovery, in-
cluding waiving or expediting diplomatic clear-
ances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, 
streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, 
and ensuring that the first responders have the 
ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other 
countries; 
(J) to promote the integration and coordi-
nation of regional response mechanisms in the 
Caribbean, including through the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the 
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Regional Security System, United States Gov-
ernment Agencies, and allies in ways that facili-
tate more effective and efficient planning, miti-
gation, response, and resilience to natural disas-
ters; 
(K) to share best practices in improved 
building codes with national disaster organiza-
tions, including building better programs, at re-
gional, national and community levels; and 
(L) to promote community-based disaster 
preparedness and mitigation activities, particu-
larly in underserved communities, with the aim 
of increasing broad public participation and re-
silience. 
(b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to 
help Caribbean countries— 
(1) increase their resilience and adapt to nat-
ural disasters and the impacts of severe weather 
events and a changing environment; 
(2) partner with United States Federal, State, 
and local agencies and engage in technical coopera-
tion, dialogue, and assistance activities; 
(3) harmonize standards and practices related 
to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased in-
vestment and integration; 
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(4) increase investment from United States 
companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, 
adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts; 
(5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef-
forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and 
international partners complement each other; and 
(6) further assist with the efforts listed under 
subsection (a)(7) above. 
(c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
in coordination with other departments and agencies shall 
submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how 
the Department of State will achieve the policy described 
in subsection (b) above. 
(d) APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be 
appropriated for U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership 
activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement 
the following: 
(1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022. 
(2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023. 
(3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and there-
after. 
(e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.— 
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(1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal 
year, at least five percent of all programming fund-
ing allocation must support and be directed toward 
reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effective-
ness. 
(2) The Department of State will ensure that at 
least 20 percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Car-
ibbean Resilience Partnership directly support the 
training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and 
exchange of expertise on resilience between United 
States Federal, State, and local officials and their 
Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should 
also support as appropriate increased academic, civil 
society, media, and private sector engagement in the 
fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga-
tion. 
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELA-
TIONSHIPS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States, European Union, and 
European countries are close partners, sharing val-
ues grounded in democracy, human rights, trans-
parency, and the rules-based international order es-
tablished after World War II; 
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(2) without a common approach by the United 
States, European Union, and European countries on 
connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
port for democracy and human rights, the People’s 
Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
nomic, political, and security leverage in Europe; 
(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment 
of assistance to European countries following the 
COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach 
to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep eco-
nomic ties to the People’s Republic of China; 
(4) as European states seek to recover from the 
economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United 
States must stand in partnership with Europe to 
support our collective economic recovery, reinforce 
our collective national security, and defend shared 
values; 
(5) the United States, European Union, and 
European countries should coordinate on joint strat-
egies to diversify reliance on supply chains away 
from the People’s Republic of China, especially in 
the medical and pharmaceutical sectors; 
(6) the United States, European Union, and 
European countries should leverage their respective 
economic innovation capabilities to support the glob-
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al economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession 
and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of 
the People’s Republic of China; 
(7) the United States, United Kingdom, and 
European Union should accelerate efforts to de-esca-
late their trade disputes, including negotiating a 
United States-European Union trade agreement that 
benefits workers and the broader economy in both 
the United States and European Union; 
(8) the United States, European Union, and 
Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address 
economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic 
of China; 
(9) the United States, European Union, and 
countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to 
counter PRC disinformation, influence operations, 
and propaganda efforts; 
(10) the United States and European nations 
share serious concerns with the repressions being 
supported and executed by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, and should continue im-
plementing measures to address the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in 
Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build 
joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the ex-
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port of China’s authoritarian governance model to 
countries around the world; 
(11) the United States and European nations 
should remain united in their shared values against 
attempts by the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China at the United Nations and other multi-
lateral organizations to promote efforts that erode 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the 
‘‘community of a shared future for mankind’’ and 
‘‘democratization of international relations’’; 
(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
structure investments around the world, particularly 
in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
structure, could threaten democracy across Europe 
and the national security of key countries; 
(13) as appropriate, the United States should 
share intelligence with European allies and partners 
on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China 
with respect to 5G expansion in Europe; 
(14) the European Union’s Investment Screen-
ing Regulation, which came into force in October 
2020, is a welcome development, and member states 
should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their 
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countries through their own national investment 
screening measures; 
(15) the President should actively engage the 
European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
port Control Reform Act regulations and to better 
harmonize United States and European Union poli-
cies with respect to export controls; 
(16) the President should strongly advocate for 
the listing of more items and technologies to restrict 
dual use exports controlled at the National Security 
and above level to the People’s Republic of China 
under the Wassenaar Arrangement; 
(17) the United States should explore the value 
of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating 
Committee 
for 
Multilateral 
Export 
Controls 
(CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United 
States and European Union export control policies 
with respect to limiting exports of sensitive tech-
nologies to the People’s Republic of China; and 
(18) the United States should work with coun-
terparts in Europe to— 
(A) evaluate United States and European 
overreliance on goods originating in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, including in the med-
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ical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop 
joint strategies to diversify supply chains; 
(B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID– 
19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pres-
sure developing countries by offering relevant 
United States and European expertise and as-
sistance; and 
(C) leverage the United States and Euro-
pean private sectors to advance the post- 
COVID–19 economic recovery. 
SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-
OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief 
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the 
United States will enhance cooperation with the European 
Union, NATO, and European partner countries with re-
spect to the People’s Republic of China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required by subsection 
(a) shall do the following: 
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(1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De-
partment of State official that leads United States 
efforts to cooperate with the European Union, 
NATO, and European partner countries to advance 
a shared approach with respect to the People’s Re-
public of China. 
(2) Identify key policy points of convergence 
and divergence between the United States and Euro-
pean partners with respect to the People’s Republic 
of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco-
nomic practices. 
(3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests 
with European counterparts on— 
(A) economic challenges with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(B) democracy and human rights chal-
lenges with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China; 
(C) technology issues with respect to the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; and 
(E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 
respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
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established by the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
(4) Describe the coordination mechanisms 
among key regional and functional bureaus within 
the Department of State and Department of Defense 
tasked with engaging with European partners on the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of 
the briefing and future plans to work with European 
partners to counter the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian 
governance model around the world. 
(6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the 
date of the briefing and future plans to support Eu-
ropean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 
to Huawei’s 5G technology. 
(7) Detail how United States public diplomacy 
tools, including the Global Engagement Center of 
the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with 
counterpart entities within the European Union to 
counter Chinese propaganda. 
(8) Describe the staffing and budget resources 
the Department of State dedicates to engagement 
between the United States and the European Union 
on the People’s Republic of China and provide an 
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assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the 
strategy. 
(9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts 
to exert influence across multilateral fora, including 
at the World Health Organization. 
(c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall 
be classified. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there-
after for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with 
the appropriate congressional committees regarding the 
development and implementation of the elements described 
in subsection (b). 
SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON 
PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 
transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among 
the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, 
and the European Development Finance Institutions 
(called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on 
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development 
and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-
nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to 
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the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), including by integrating efforts such as— 
(1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
necting Europe and Asia; 
(2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas 
Initiative Fund; 
(3) the Blue Dot Network among the United 
States, Japan, and Australia; and 
(4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 
leveraged 
$65,000,000,000 
for 
infrastructure 
projects and emphasizes transparency standards. 
(b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to 
enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 
Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for 
Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
oping countries. 
SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-
TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN 
CHINA AND RUSSIA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 
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Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination 
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro-
priate committees of Congress on cooperation be-
tween the People’s Republic of China and the Is-
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lamic Republic of Iran and between the People’s Re-
public of China and the Russian Federation. 
(2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under 
paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 
(A) An identification of major areas of dip-
lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
tion— 
(i) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 
and 
(ii) between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Russian Federation. 
(B) An assessment of the effect of the 
COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation. 
(C) An assessment of the effect that 
United States compliance with the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in 
January 14, 2016, and United States with-
drawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had 
on the cooperation described in subparagraph 
(A)(i). 
(D) An assessment of the effect on the co-
operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that 
would be had by the United States reentering 
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compliance with the JCPOA or a successor 
agreement and the effect of the United States 
not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 
reaching a successor agreement. 
(3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex. 
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES 
AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
propriate Federal departments and agencies should share 
the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) 
with important allies and partners of the United States, 
as appropriate. 
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 
SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL 
ASIA. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the United States should continue to stand 
with friends and partners, while also working to es-
tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as 
they contend with efforts by the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China to interfere in their re-
spective political systems and encroach upon their 
sovereign territory; and 
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(2) the United States should reaffirm its com-
mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic 
Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral 
defense consultations and collaboration with India 
commensurate with its status as a major defense 
partner. 
SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for 
how the United States will engage with the countries of 
South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 
mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
section (a) shall include the following elements: 
(1) A detailed description of the security and 
economic challenges that the People’s Republic of 
China poses to the countries of South and Central 
Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-
tral Asian countries that border the People’s Repub-
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lic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports, 
transportation infrastructure, and energy projects 
across the region. 
(2) A detailed description of United States ef-
forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in 
infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
tral Asia. 
(3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia 
on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts 
to interfere in their political systems and economies. 
(4) A detailed description of United States dip-
lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by 
PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector. 
(5) A detailed description of United States dip-
lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan 
with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Re-
public of China, including investments by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt 
and Road Initiative. 
(6) In close consultation with the Government 
of India, identification of areas where the United 
States Government can provide diplomatic and other 
support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address 
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economic and security challenges posed by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in the region. 
(7) A description of the coordination mecha-
nisms among key regional and functional bureaus 
within the Department of State and Department of 
Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of 
South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
People’s Republic of China. 
(8) A description of the efforts being made by 
Federal departments and agencies, including the De-
partment of State, the United States Agency for 
International Development, the Department of Com-
merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and 
commerce links that will help those nations diversify 
their trade away from the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(9) A detailed description of United States dip-
lomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, 
and any other countries with significant populations 
of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse-
cution in the People’s Republic of China to press 
those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi-
norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect 
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198 
ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese gov-
ernment authorities, and protect the right to the 
freedoms of assembly and expression. 
(c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) 
shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 
made available to the public, but may include a classified 
annex as necessary. 
(d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than 
annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State 
shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of For-
eign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives regarding the development and implementation of the 
strategy required under subsection (a). 
SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor-
tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United 
States has political, economic, and security interests. 
(2) The United States has an interest in work-
ing with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including 
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India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional gov-
ernance, economic connectivity, and security chal-
lenges including threats to freedom of navigation. 
(b) STATEMENT
OF POLICY.—As a part of the 
United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be 
the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement 
with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including 
with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such 
countries to— 
(1) promote United States political engagement 
with such region, including through active participa-
tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip-
lomatic relations with United States partners in 
such region; 
(2) 
enhance 
United 
States 
economic 
connectivity and commercial exchange with such re-
gion; 
(3) defend freedom of navigation in such region 
from security challenges, including related to piracy; 
(4) support the ability of governments and or-
ganizations in such region to respond to natural dis-
asters; 
(5) support and facilitate the role of regional al-
lies and partners as net providers of security to such 
region and as partners to the United States in ad-
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dressing security challenges in such region, including 
through assistance to such allies and partners to 
build capacity in maritime security and maritime do-
main awareness; 
(6) continue to build the United States-India 
relationship in order to regularize security coopera-
tion through the negotiation of agreements con-
cerning access, communication, and navigation, in-
cluding through foundational agreements; and 
(7) promote cooperation with United States al-
lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus-
tralia, and major defense partners, including India, 
and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and 
France, to support a rules-based order in such re-
gion. 
(c) STRATEGY.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a multi-year strategy for United States en-
gagement to support United States interests in the 
Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall— 
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201 
(A) define United States political, eco-
nomic, and security interests in the Indian 
Ocean region; 
(B) outline challenges to the interests of 
the United States in such region; 
(C) outline efforts to improve cooperation 
between the United States and members of the 
Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, 
through coordination in diplomacy and develop-
ment priorities, joint military exercises and op-
erations, and other activities that promote 
United States political, economic, and security 
interests; 
(D) outline efforts to support economic 
connectivity in such region, including through 
the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra-
structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa 
Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand 
and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pa-
cific, including with the countries of Southeast 
Asia, that maintain high standards of invest-
ment and support for civil society and people- 
to-people connectivity; 
(E) describe how the United States can en-
gage with regional intergovernmental organiza-
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202 
tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association, to promote United States po-
litical, economic, and security interests in such 
region; 
(F) review the United States diplomatic 
posture in such region, including an assessment 
of United States diplomatic engagement in 
countries without a permanent United States 
embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assess-
ment of ways to improve the cooperation with 
the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros; 
(G) review United States diplomatic agree-
ments with countries in such region that facili-
tate United States military operations in such 
region, including bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, and describe efforts to expand 
United States cooperation with such countries 
through the negotiation of additional agree-
ments; and 
(H) include a security assistance strategy 
for such region that outlines priorities, objec-
tives, and actions for United States security as-
sistance efforts to governments of countries in 
such region to promote United States political, 
economic, and security interests in such region. 
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(2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under 
paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any 
other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific. 
(3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later 
than one year after the submission of the strategy 
required under paragraph (1) and one year there-
after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-
propriate congressional committees a report on 
progress made toward implementing such strategy. 
(d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECU-
RITY REVIEW COMMISSION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 
1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 
7002(c)(2)) is amended— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘, including in the Indian 
Ocean region’’ after ‘‘deployments of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China military’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following new 
sentence: ‘‘In this subparagraph, the term ‘In-
dian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in-
cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, 
and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian 
Ocean.’’. 
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(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 
by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the 
enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the 
first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd 
D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) 
that is submitted after such date. 
(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate. 
(2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term ‘‘Indian 
Ocean region’’ means the Indian Ocean, including 
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the lit-
toral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean. 
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PART IV—AFRICA 
SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE-
CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives. 
(b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director 
of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and 
impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, eco-
nomic, sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, 
and its impact on United States strategic interests, includ-
ing— 
(1) the amount and impact of direct invest-
ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans 
deals, and other preferential trading arrangements; 
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(2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enter-
prises in Africa; 
(3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China; 
(4) the involvement of PRC private security, 
technology and media companies in Africa; 
(5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to 
African countries; 
(6) the scope of Chinese investment in and con-
trol of African energy resources and minerals critical 
for emerging and foundational technologies; 
(7) an analysis on the linkages between Bei-
jing’s aid and assistance to African countries and 
African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals 
in international fora; 
(8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in 
counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-
tractive resources and wildlife products, between Af-
rica and China; 
(9) the methods and techniques that the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China uses to exert undue influence 
on African governments and facilitate corrupt activ-
ity in Africa, including through the CCP’s party-to- 
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party training program, and to influence African 
multilateral organizations; and 
(10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
educational activities undertaken by the PRC and 
CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa. 
SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES IN AFRICA. 
(a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit-
tees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
Finance of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 
(b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 
General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-
ministrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting 
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