IV 
109TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. CON. RES. 341 
Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international nuclear 
nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts to report 
Iran to the United Nations Security Council. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FEBRUARY 15, 2006 
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. HYDE, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. ACKERMAN, 
Mr. MACK, Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia, Ms. HARRIS, Mr. WILSON 
of South Carolina, Mr. PENCE, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. MCCAUL 
of Texas, Mr. ISSA, Mr. POE, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. BERMAN, 
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY, Mr. TANCREDO, Mr. CROWLEY, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, 
Mr. SCHIFF, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. MCCOTTER, Mr. CARDOZA, Mr. KING of 
New York, Mr. MARIO DIAZ-BALART of Florida, and Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ- 
BALART of Florida) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 
was referred to the Committee on International Relations 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its inter-
national nuclear nonproliferation obligations and express-
ing support for efforts to report Iran to the United 
Nations Security Council. 
Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty’’), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Ar-
ticle II of the Treaty, ‘‘not to receive the transfer from
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any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons 
or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any as-
sistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices’’; 
Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 
19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Safeguards 
Agreement’’), which requires Iran to report the importa-
tion and use of nuclear material, to declare nuclear facili-
ties, and to accept safeguards on nuclear materials and 
activities to ensure that such materials and activities are 
not diverted to any military purpose and are used for 
peaceful purposes and activities; 
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) re-
ported in November 2003 that Iran had been developing 
an undeclared nuclear enrichment program for 18 years 
and had covertly imported nuclear material and equip-
ment, carried out over 110 unreported experiments to 
produce uranium metal, separated plutonium, and con-
cealed many other aspects of its nuclear facilities and ac-
tivities; 
Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director Gen-
eral of the IAEA on November 10, 2003, of its decision 
to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, 
and stated that the suspension would cover all activities 
at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all
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feed material for enrichment, and the importation of any 
enrichment-related items; 
Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the 
Government of Iran specified the scope of suspension of 
its enrichment and reprocessing activities, which the 
IAEA was invited to verify, including the suspension of 
the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with or 
without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
Plant at Natanz, the suspension of further introduction 
of nuclear material into any centrifuges, the suspension 
of the installation of new centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel 
Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges at 
the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent 
practicable, the withdrawal of nuclear material from any 
centrifuge enrichment facility; 
Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran in-
formed the IAEA of its decision to expand the scope and 
clarify the nature of its decision to suspend to the fur-
thest extent possible the assembly and testing of cen-
trifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge com-
ponents, including those related to existing contracts, in-
formed the IAEA that any components that are manufac-
tured under existing contracts that cannot be suspended 
will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited the 
IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the 
suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities 
in Iran; 
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolution of March 
13, 2004, which was adopted unanimously, noted with 
‘‘serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in 
October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final 
picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme
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considered essential by the Board’s November 2003 reso-
lution’’, and also noted that the IAEA has discovered 
that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge associ-
ated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two 
mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment pro-
gram, and designs for hot cells to handle highly radio-
active materials; 
Whereas the same resolution also noted ‘‘with equal concern 
that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the de-
velopment of its enrichment technology to its current ex-
tent, and that a number of other questions remain unre-
solved’’; 
Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany entered into an agree-
ment with Iran on Iran’s nuclear program (commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘‘Paris Agreement’’), securing a formal 
commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily 
suspend uranium enrichment operations in exchange for 
discussions on economic, technological, political, and se-
curity issues; 
Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organi-
zation announced it has mastered the technique of using 
biotechnology to extract purer uranium, adding that this 
method ‘‘substantially decreases the cost . . . in the proc-
ess that leads to the production of yellowcake’’, which is 
a part of the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle; 
Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires 
the IAEA Board of Governors to report the noncompli-
ance of any member of the IAEA with its IAEA safe-
guards obligations to all members and to the Security 
Council and General Assembly of the United Nations;
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Whereas Article III.B–4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies 
that ‘‘if in connection with the activities of the Agency 
there should arise questions that are within the com-
petence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify 
the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’’; 
Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors adopted a resolution finding that Iran’s many fail-
ures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the 
Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the 
context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and 
that matters concerning Iran’s nuclear program have 
given rise to questions that are within the competence of 
the Security Council as the organ bearing the primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security; 
Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, 
in an October 26, 2005, speech, his hope for ‘‘a world 
without America’’ and his desire ‘‘to wipe Israel off the 
map’’ and has subsequently denied the existence of the 
Holocaust; 
Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran an-
nounced that it planned to restart its nuclear research ef-
forts; 
Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence 
of IAEA inspectors, began to remove IAEA seals from 
the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran; 
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ‘‘[i]t is 
obvious that if Iran cannot be brought to live up to its 
international obligations, in fact, the IAEA Statute would
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indicate that Iran would have to be referred to the U.N. 
Security Council’’; 
Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ‘‘The Iranian gov-
ernment and nation has no fear of the Western ballyhoo 
and will continue its nuclear programs with decisiveness 
and wisdom.’’; 
Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of 
Britain, France, and Germany in calling for a meeting of 
the IAEA Board of Governors to discuss Iran’s non-
compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations; 
Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of 
the IAEA Board of Governors relayed an ‘‘absence of 
confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively 
for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of con-
cealment of Iran’s nuclear activities, the nature of those 
activities and other issues arising from the Agency’s 
verification of declarations made by Iran since September 
2002’’; 
Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed ‘‘serious 
concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify 
some important issues relating to Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme, including the fact that Iran has in its posses-
sion a document on the production of uranium metal 
hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this 
process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon 
components’’; 
Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors 
reported Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards 
obligations to the Security Council;
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Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional 
steps confirming its unwillingness to comply with its nu-
clear nonproliferation obligations; and 
Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of ter-
rorism for over two decades and the Department of State 
has declared in its most recent Country Reports on Ter-
rorism that Iran ‘‘remained the most active state sponsor 
of terrorism’’: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
concurring), That Congress— 
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms 
the many breaches and failures of the Government 
of Iran to comply faithfully with its nuclear non-
proliferation obligations, including its obligations 
under the Agreement Between Iran and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 
of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the 
Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vi-
enna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the 
‘‘Safeguards Agreement’’), as reported by the Direc-
tor General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board of Gov-
ernors since 2003; 
(2) commends the efforts of the Governments of 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek 
a meaningful and credible suspension of Iran’s 
enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities and 
to find a diplomatic means to address the non-com-
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pliance of the Government of Iran with its obliga-
tions, requirements, and commitments related to nu-
clear nonproliferation; 
(3) calls on all members of the United Nations 
Security Council, in particular the Russian Federa-
tion and the People’s Republic of China, to expedi-
tiously consider and take action in response to the 
report of Iran’s noncompliance in fulfillment of the 
mandate of the Security Council to respond to and 
deal with situations bearing on the maintenance of 
international peace and security; 
(4) declares that Iran, through its many 
breaches for almost 20 years of its obligations under 
the Safeguards Agreement, has forfeited the right to 
develop any aspect of a nuclear fuel cycle, especially 
with uranium conversion and enrichment and pluto-
nium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facili-
ties; 
(5) calls on all responsible members of the 
international community to impose economic sanc-
tions designed to deny Iran the ability to develop nu-
clear weapons; and
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(6) urges the President to keep Congress fully 
and currently informed concerning Iran’s violation of 
its international nuclear nonproliferation obligations. 
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