IV 
110TH CONGRESS 
2D SESSION 
H. RES. 1345 
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, of high crimes 
and misdemeanors. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 15, 2008 
Mr. KUCINICH submitted the following resolution 
JULY 15, 2008 
By motion of the House, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 
RESOLUTION 
Impeaching George W. Bush, President of the United States, 
of high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Resolved, That President George W. Bush be im-
peached for high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the 
following Article of Impeachment be exhibited to the 
United States Senate: 
An Article of Impeachment exhibited by the House 
of Representatives of the United States of America in the 
name of itself and the people of the United States of 
America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment 
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against President George W. Bush for high crimes and 
misdemeanors. 
ARTICLE
ONE—DECEIVING
CONGRESS
WITH
FAB-
RICATED THREATS OF IRAQ WMDS TO FRAUDU-
LENTLY OBTAIN SUPPORT FOR AN AUTHORIZATION 
OF THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ 
In his conduct while President of the United States, 
George W. Bush, in violation of his constitutional oath to 
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United 
States, and to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in 
violation of his constitutional duty under article II, section 
3 of the Constitution ‘‘to take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed,’’ deceived Congress with fabricated threats 
of Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction to fraudulently ob-
tain support for an authorization for the use of force 
against Iraq and used that fraudulently obtained author-
ization, then acting in his capacity under article II, section 
2 of the Constitution as Commander in Chief, to commit 
U.S. troops to combat in Iraq. 
To gain congressional support for the passage of the 
Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States 
Armed Forces Against Iraq, the President made the fol-
lowing material representations to the Congress in S.J. 
Res. 45: 
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1. That Iraq was ‘‘continuing to possess and 
develop a significant chemical and biological weapons 
capability. . . .’’ 
2. That Iraq was ‘‘actively seeking a nuclear 
weapons capability. . . .’’ 
3. That Iraq was ‘‘continuing to threaten the 
national security interests of the United States and 
international peace and security.’’ 
4. That Iraq has demonstrated a ‘‘willingness 
to attack, the United States. . . .’’ 
5. That ‘‘members of al Qaeda, an organization 
bearing responsibility for attacks on the United 
States, its citizens and interests, including the at-
tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are 
known to be in Iraq. . . .’’ 
6. The ‘‘attacks on the United States of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the 
threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass de-
struction 
to 
international 
terrorist 
organiza-
tions. . . .’’ 
7. That Iraq ‘‘will either employ those weapons 
to launch a surprise attack against the United 
States or its Armed Forces or provide them to inter-
national terrorists who would do so. . . .’’ 
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8. That an ‘‘extreme magnitude of harm that 
would result to the United States and its citizens 
from such an attack. . . .’’ 
9. That the aforementioned threats ‘‘justify ac-
tion by the United States to defend itself. . . .’’ 
10. The enactment clause of section 2 of S.J. 
Res. 45, the Authorization of the Use of the United 
States Armed Forces authorizes the President to 
‘‘defend the national security interests of the United 
States against the threat posed by Iraq. . . .’’ 
Each consequential representation made by the Presi-
dent to the Congress in S.J. Res. 45 in subsequent 
iterations and the final version was unsupported by evi-
dence which was in the control of the White House. 
To wit: 
1. Iraq was not ‘‘continuing to possess and de-
velop a significant chemical and biological weapons 
capability. . . .’’ 
‘‘A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical 
warfare agents, precursors, munitions and pro-
duction equipment were destroyed between 
1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert 
Storm and United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable infor-
mation on whether Iraq is producing and stock-
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piling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 
will establish its chemical warfare agent produc-
tion facilities.’’ 
The source of this information is the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, a report called, 
‘‘Iraq—Key WMD Facilities—An Operational 
Support Study,’’ September 2002. 
‘‘Statements by the President and Vice 
President prior to the October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq’s chemical 
weapons production capability and activities did 
not reflect the intelligence community’s uncer-
tainties as to whether such production was on-
going.’’ 
The source of this information is the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence, a report 
entitled ‘‘Report on Whether Public Statements 
Regarding Iraq By U.S. Government Officials 
Were Substantiated By Intelligence Informa-
tion.’’ June 5, 2008. 
‘‘In April and early May 2003, military 
forces found mobile trailers in Iraq. Although 
intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the 
trailers, administration officials repeatedly as-
serted that they were mobile biological weapons 
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laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice 
President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Sec-
retary Powell, and National Security Advisor 
Rice made 34 misleading statements about the 
trailers in 27 separate public appearances. 
Shortly after the mobile trailers were found, the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense In-
telligence Agency issued an unclassified white 
paper evaluating the trailers. The white paper 
was released without coordination with other 
members of the intelligence community, how-
ever. It was later disclosed that engineers from 
the Defense Intelligence Agency who examined 
the trailers concluded that they were most likely 
used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather 
balloons. A former senior intelligence official re-
ported that ‘only one of 15 intelligence analysts 
assembled from three agencies to discuss the 
issue in June endorsed the white paper conclu-
sion.’ ’’ 
The source of this information is the 
House Committee on Government Reform, mi-
nority staff, ‘‘Iraq on the Record: Bush Admin-
istration’s Public Statements about Chemical 
and Biological Weapons.’’ March 16, 2004. 
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Former chief of CIA covert operations in 
Europe, Tyler Drumheller, has said that the 
CIA had credible sources discounting weapons 
of mass destruction claims, including the pri-
mary source of biological weapons claims, an in-
formant 
who 
the 
Germans 
code-named 
‘‘Curveball’’ whom the Germans had informed 
the Bush administration was a likely fabricator 
of information including that concerning the 
Niger yellowcake forgery. Two other former 
CIA officers confirmed Drumheller’s account to 
Sidney Blumenthal who reported the story at 
Salon.com on September 6, 2007, which in fact 
is the media source of this information. 
‘‘In practical terms, with the destruction of 
the al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambi-
tion to obtain advanced biological weapons 
quickly. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) found no 
direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans 
for a new biological weapons program or was 
conducting biological weapons-specific work for 
military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, 
despite evidence of continuing interest in nu-
clear and chemical weapons, there appears to be 
a complete absence of discussion or even inter-
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est in biological weapons at the Presidential 
level. In spite of exhaustive investigation, the 
Iraq Survey Group found no evidence that Iraq 
possessed, or was developing, biological weapon 
agent production systems mounted on road ve-
hicles or railway wagons. The Iraq Survey 
Group harbors severe doubts about the source’s 
credibility in regards to the breakout program.’’ 
That’s a direct quote from the ‘‘Comprehensive 
Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of 
Central Intelligence on Iraq’s WMD,’’ com-
monly known as the Duelfer report by Charles 
Duelfer. 
‘‘While a small number of old, abandoned 
chemical munitions have been discovered, the 
Iraq Survey Group judges that Iraq unilaterally 
destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons 
stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indica-
tions that Baghdad resumed production of 
chemical munitions thereafter, a policy the Iraq 
Survey Group attributes to Baghdad’s desire to 
see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or 
its fear of force against it should WMD be dis-
covered.’’ 
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The source of this information, the ‘‘Com-
prehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 
Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s 
WMD,’’ Charles Duelfer. 
2. Iraq was not ‘‘actively seeking a nuclear 
weapons capability.’’ 
The key finding of the Iraq Survey 
Group’s report to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence found that ‘‘Iraq’s ability to reconstitute 
a nuclear weapons program progressively de-
cayed after that date. Saddam Husayn (sic) 
ended the nuclear program in 1991 following 
the Gulf War. Iraq Survey Group found no evi-
dence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the 
program.’’ 
The source of this information, the ‘‘Com-
prehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the 
Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq’s 
WMD,’’ Charles Duelfer. 
Claims that Iraq was purchasing uranium 
from Niger were not supported by the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search in the National Intelligence Estimate of 
October 2002. 
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The CIA had warned the British Govern-
ment not to claim Iraq was purchasing uranium 
from Niger prior to the British statement that 
was later cited by President Bush, this accord-
ing to George Tenet of the Central Intelligence 
Agency on July 11, 2003. 
Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in 
a ‘‘Statement to the United Nations Security 
Council on The Status of Nuclear Inspections 
in Iraq: An Update’’ on March 7, 2003, said as 
follows: 
‘‘One, there is no indication of resumed 
nuclear activities in those buildings that were 
identified through the use of satellite imagery 
as being reconstructed or newly erected since 
1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related pro-
hibited activities at any inspected sites. Second, 
there is no indication that Iraq has attempted 
to import uranium since 1990. Three, there is 
no indication that Iraq has attempted to import 
aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrich-
ment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a 
plan, it would have been—it would have en-
countered practical difficulties in manufacturing 
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centrifuges out of the aluminum tubes in ques-
tion. Fourthly, although we are still reviewing 
issues related to magnets and magnet produc-
tion, there is no indication to date that Iraq im-
ported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrich-
ment program. As I stated above, the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) will nat-
urally continue to further scrutinize and inves-
tigate all of the above issues.’’ 
3. Iraq was not ‘‘continuing to threaten the na-
tional security interests of the United States.’’ 
‘‘Let me be clear: analysts differed on sev-
eral important aspects of [Iraq’s biological, 
chemical, and nuclear] programs and those de-
bates were spelled out in the Estimate. They 
never said there was an ‘imminent’ threat.’’ 
George Tenet, who was Director of the 
CIA, said this in Prepared Remarks for Deliv-
ery at Georgetown University on February 5, 
2004. 
‘‘We have been able to keep weapons from 
going into Iraq. We have been able to keep the 
sanctions in place to the extent that items that 
might support weapons of mass destruction 
have had some controls on them. It’s been quite 
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a success for 10 years.’’ The source of this 
statement, Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in 
an interview with Face the Nation, February 
11, 2001. 
On July 23, 2002, a communication from 
the Private Secretary to Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, ‘‘Memo to British Ambassador David 
Manning’’ reads as follows: ‘‘British Secret In-
telligence Service Chief Sir Richard Billing 
Dearlove reported on his recent talks in Wash-
ington. There was a perceptible shift in atti-
tude. Military action was now seen as inevi-
table. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through 
military action, justified by the conjunction of 
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and 
facts were being fixed around the policy. The 
NSC had no patience with the U.N. route and 
no enthusiasm for publishing material on the 
Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discus-
sion in Washington of the aftermath after mili-
tary action. The Foreign Secretary said he 
would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. 
It seemed clear that Bush had made up his 
mind to take military action, even if the timing 
was not yet decided. But the case was thin. 
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Saddam Hussein was not threatening his neigh-
bors, and his WMD capability was less than 
that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should 
work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to 
allow back in the U.N. weapons inspectors. This 
would also help with the legal justification for 
the use of force.’’ 
4. Iraq did not have the ‘‘willingness to attack, 
the United States.’’ 
‘‘The fact of the matter is that both bas-
kets, the U.N. basket and what we and other 
allies have been doing in the region, have suc-
ceeded in containing Saddam Hussein and his 
ambitions. His forces are about one-third their 
original size. They really don’t possess the ca-
pability to attack their neighbors the way they 
did 10 years ago.’’ The source of this quote, 
Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in a transcript 
of remarks made to German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer in February 2001. 
The October 2002 National Intelligence 
Estimate concluded that ‘‘Baghdad for now ap-
pears to be drawing a line short of conducting 
terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical 
or biological weapons against the United States, 
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fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement 
would provide Washington a stronger case for 
making war.’’ 
5. Iraq had no connection with the attacks of 
9/11 or with al Qaeda’s role in 9/11. 
‘‘The report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence documents significant in-
stances in which the administration went be-
yond what the intelligence community knew or 
believed in making public claims, most notably 
on the false assertion that Iraq and al Qaeda 
had an operational partnership and joint in-
volvement in carrying out the attacks of Sep-
tember 11.’’ This is a quote from Senator John 
D. Rockefeller, IV, the chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence entitled ‘‘Ad-
ditional Views of Chairman John D. Rocke-
feller, IV’’ on page 90. 
Continuing from Senator Rockefeller: 
‘‘The President and his advisors undertook 
a relentless public campaign in the aftermath of 
the attacks to use the war against al Qaeda as 
a justification for overthrowing Saddam Hus-
sein. Representing to the American people that 
the two had an operational partnership and 
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posed a single, indistinguishable threat was fun-
damentally misleading and led the Nation to 
war on false premises.’’ Senator Rockefeller. 
Richard Clarke, a National Security Advi-
sor, in a memo of September 18, 2001, titled 
‘‘Survey of Intelligence Information on Any 
Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks’’ 
found no ‘‘compelling case’’ that Iraq had either 
planned or perpetrated the attacks, and that 
there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam 
cooperating with bin Laden on unconventional 
weapons. 
On September 17, 2003, President Bush 
said: ‘‘No, we’ve got no evidence that Saddam 
Hussein was involved with September 11. What 
the Vice President said was is that he (Sad-
dam) has been involved with al Qaeda.’’ 
On June 16, 2004, a staff report from the 
9/11 Commission stated: ‘‘There have been re-
ports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda 
also occurred after bin Laden had returned to 
Afghanistan in 1996, but they do not appear to 
have resulted in a collaborative relationship. 
Two senior bin Laden associates have ada-
mantly denied that any ties existed between al 
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Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence 
that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks 
against the United States.’’ 
‘‘Intelligence provided by former Undersec-
retary of Defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress 
the White House case for invading Iraq in-
cluded ‘reporting of dubious quality or reli-
ability’ that supported the political views of sen-
ior administration officials rather than the con-
clusions of the intelligence community, this ac-
cording to a report by the Pentagon Inspector 
General. 
‘‘Feith’s office ‘was predisposed to finding 
a significant relationship between Iraq and al 
Qaeda,’ according to portions of the report re-
leased by Senator Carl Levin. The Inspector 
General described Feith’s activities as ‘an alter-
native intelligence assessment process.’ ’’ The 
source of this information is a report in the 
Washington Post dated February 9, 2007, page 
A–1, an article by Walter Pincus and Jeffrey 
Smith entitled ‘‘Official’s Key Report on Iraq is 
Faulted, ‘Dubious’ Intelligence Fueled Push for 
War.’’ 
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6. Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruc-
tion to transfer to anyone. 
Iraq possessed no weapons of mass de-
struction to transfer. Furthermore, available in-
telligence information found that the Iraq re-
gime would probably only transfer weapons of 
mass destruction to terrorist organizations if 
under threat of attack by the United States. 
According to information in the October 
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on 
Iraq that was available to the administration at 
the time that they were seeking congressional 
support for the authorization of use of force 
against Iraq, the Iraq regime would probably 
only transfer weapons to a terrorist organiza-
tion if ‘‘sufficiently desperate’’ because it feared 
that ‘‘an attack that threatened the survival of 
the regime were imminent or unavoidable.’’ 
‘‘The Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) prob-
ably has been directed to conduct clandestine 
attacks against the United States and Allied in-
terests in the Middle East in the event the 
United States takes action against Iraq. The 
IIS probably would be the primary means by 
which Iraq would attempt to conduct any chem-
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regime were imminent or unavoidable.’’ That, 
again, from the October 2002 National Intel-
ligence Estimate on Iraq. 
‘‘The Iraqi Intelligence Service probably 
has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks 
against U.S. and Allied interests in the Middle 
East in the event the United States takes ac-
tion against Iraq. The Iraq Intelligence Service 
probably would be the primary means by which 
Iraq would attempt to conduct any chemical or 
biological weapons attacks on the U.S. home-
land, although we have no specific intelligence 
information that Saddam’s regime has directed 
attacks against U.S. territory.’’ 
As reported in the Washington Post on 
March 1, 2003, in 1995, Saddam Hussein’s 
son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, had informed U.S. 
and British intelligence officers that ‘‘all weap-
ons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear— 
were destroyed.’’ That from the Washington 
Post, March 1, 2003, page A15, an article enti-
tled ‘‘Iraqi Defector Claimed Arms Were De-
stroyed By 1995,’’ by Colum Lynch. 
The Defense Intelligence Agency, in a re-
port called ‘‘Iraq—Key WMD Facilities—An 
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Operational Report Study’’ in September 2002, 
said this: 
‘‘A substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical 
warfare agents, precursors, munitions and pro-
duction equipment were destroyed between 
1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert 
Storm and United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) actions. There is no reliable infor-
mation on whether Iraq is producing and stock-
piling chemical weapons or whether Iraq has or 
will establish its chemical warfare agent produc-
tion facilities.’’ 
8. There was not a real risk of an ‘‘extreme 
magnitude of harm that would result to the United 
States and its citizens from such an attack’’ because 
Iraq had no capability of attacking the United 
States. 
Here’s what Colin Powell said at the time: 
‘‘Containment has been a successful policy, and 
I think we should make sure that we continue 
it until such time as Saddam Hussein comes 
into compliance with the agreements he made 
at the end of the Gulf War.’’ Speaking of Iraq, 
Secretary of State Powell said, ‘‘Iraq is not 
threatening America.’’ 
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9. The aforementioned evidence did not ‘‘justify 
the use of force by the United States to defend 
itself’’ because Iraq did not have weapons of mass 
destruction, or have the intention or capability of 
using nonexistent WMDs against the United States. 
10. Since there was no threat posed by Iraq to 
the United States, the enactment clause of the Sen-
ate 
Joint 
Resolution 
was 
predicated 
on 
misstatements to Congress. 
Congress relied on the information provided to it by 
the President of the United States. Congress provided the 
President with the authorization to use military force that 
he requested. As a consequence of the fraudulent represen-
tations made to Congress, the United States Armed 
Forces, under the direction of George Bush as Com-
mander in Chief, pursuant to section 3 of the Authoriza-
tion for the Use of Force which President Bush requested, 
invaded Iraq and occupies it to this day, at the cost of 
4,116 lives of servicemen and -women, injuries to over 
30,000 of our troops, the deaths of over 1 million innocent 
Iraqi civilians, the destruction of Iraq, and a long-term 
cost of over $3 trillion. 
President Bush’s misrepresentations to Congress to 
induce passage of a use of force resolution is subversive 
of the constitutional system of checks and balances, de-
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structive of Congress’s sole prerogative to declare war 
under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and is there-
fore a High Crime. An even greater offense by the Presi-
dent of the United States occurs in his capacity as Com-
mander in Chief, because he knowingly placed the men 
and women of the United States Armed Forces in harm’s 
way, jeopardizing their lives and their families’ future, for 
reasons that to this date have not been established in fact. 
In all of these actions and decisions, President 
George W. Bush has acted in a manner contrary to his 
trust as President and Commander in Chief, and subver-
sive of constitutional government, to the prejudice of the 
cause of law and justice and to the manifest injury of the 
people of the United States and of those members of the 
Armed Forces who put their lives on the line pursuant 
to the falsehoods of the President. 
Wherefore, President George W. Bush, by such con-
duct, is guilty of an impeachable offense warranting re-
moval from office. 
Æ 
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