IV 
110TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 626 
Censuring the President and the Attorney General. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
AUGUST 4, 2007 
Mr. HINCHEY (for himself, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. CAPUANO, Mr. COHEN, Mr. 
DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. HALL of 
New York, Mr. HONDA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KUCINICH, Ms. LEE, Mrs. 
MALONEY of New York, Mr. MORAN of Virginia, Mr. PASTOR, Ms. 
SCHAKOWSKY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, and Mr. ROTHMAN) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
on the Judiciary 
RESOLUTION 
Censuring the President and the Attorney General. 
Resolved, 
SECTION 1. BASIS FOR CENSURE. 
(a) NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY WIRETAPPING.— 
The House of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), 
and in so doing provided the executive branch with 
clear authority to wiretap suspected terrorists inside 
the United States. 
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(2) Section 201 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978 states that it and the criminal 
wiretap law are the ‘‘exclusive means by which elec-
tronic surveillance’’ may be conducted by the United 
States Government, and section 109 of that Act 
makes it a crime to wiretap individuals without com-
plying with this statutory authority. 
(3) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 both permits the Government to initiate wire-
tapping immediately in emergencies as long as the 
Government obtains approval from the court estab-
lished under section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) within 
72 hours of initiating the wiretap, and authorizes 
wiretaps without a court order otherwise required by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for 
the first 15 days following a declaration of war by 
Congress. 
(4) The Authorization for Use of Military Force 
that became law on September 18, 2001 (Public 
Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note), did not grant 
the President the power to authorize wiretaps of 
Americans within the United States without obtain-
ing the court orders required by the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
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(5) The President’s inherent constitutional au-
thority does not give him the power to violate the ex-
plicit statutory prohibition on warrantless wiretaps 
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
(6) George W. Bush, President of the United 
States, authorized the National Security Agency to 
wiretap Americans within the United States without 
obtaining the court orders required by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for more than 
5 years. 
(7) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Attorney General of 
the United States and as Counsel to the President, 
reviewed and defended the legality of the President’s 
authorization of wiretaps by the National Security 
Agency of Americans within the United States with-
out the court orders required by the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
(8) President George W. Bush repeatedly mis-
led the public prior to the public disclosure of the 
National Security Agency warrantless surveillance 
program by indicating his Administration was rely-
ing on court orders to wiretap suspected terrorists 
inside the United States. 
(9) Alberto R. Gonzales misled Congress in 
January 2005 during the hearing on his nomination 
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to be Attorney General of the United States by indi-
cating that a question about whether the President 
has the authority to authorize warrantless wiretaps 
in violation of statutory prohibitions presented a 
‘‘hypothetical situation,’’ even though he was fully 
aware that a warrantless wiretapping program had 
been ongoing for several years. 
(10) In statements about the supposed need for 
the National Security Agency warrantless surveil-
lance program after the public disclosure of the pro-
gram, President George W. Bush falsely implied 
that the program was necessary because the execu-
tive branch did not otherwise have authority to wire-
tap suspected terrorists inside the United States. 
(11) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, de-
spite his admitted awareness that congressional crit-
ics of the program support wiretapping terrorists in 
accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, attempted to create the opposite 
impression by making public statements such as 
‘‘[s]ome people will argue that nothing could justify 
the Government being able to intercept conversations 
like the ones the Program targets’’. 
(12) President George W. Bush inaccurately 
stated in his January 31, 2006, State of the Union 
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address that ‘‘[p]revious Presidents have used the 
same constitutional authority I have, and federal 
courts have approved the use of that authority.’’, 
even though the Administration has failed to identify 
a single instance since the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act of 1978 became law in which another 
President has authorized wiretaps inside the United 
States without complying with the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and no Federal 
court has evaluated whether the President has the 
inherent authority to authorize wiretaps inside the 
United States without complying with the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. 
(13) At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing 
on February 6, 2006, Attorney General Alberto R. 
Gonzales defended the President’s misleading state-
ments in the January 31, 2006, State of the Union 
address. 
(14) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales has 
misled Congress and the American people repeatedly 
by stating that there was no serious disagreement 
among Government officials ‘‘about’’ or ‘‘relate[d] 
to’’ the National Security Agency program con-
firmed by the President. 
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(15) According to testimony from former Dep-
uty Attorney General James Comey, Alberto R. 
Gonzales, while serving as Counsel to the President, 
participated in a visit to then-Attorney General John 
Ashcroft in the intensive care unit of the hospital in 
an attempt to convince Mr. Ashcroft to overturn the 
decision by Mr. Comey, then serving as Acting At-
torney General due to Mr. Ashcroft’s illness, not to 
certify the legality of a classified intelligence pro-
gram, in what Mr. Comey described as ‘‘an effort to 
take advantage of a very sick man’’. 
(b) DETAINEE AND TORTURE POLICY.—The House 
of Representatives finds the following: 
(1) The United States is a party to the Conven-
tion Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
(2) Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions requires that detainees in armed conflicts other 
than those between nations ‘‘shall in all cir-
cumstances be treated humanely,’’ and the Third 
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War provides additional protections for detainees 
who qualify as ‘‘prisoners of war’’. 
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(3) United States law criminalizes any ‘‘act spe-
cifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering’’ under sections 2340 and 2340A 
of title 18, United States Code, and the War Crimes 
Act (18 U.S.C. 2441) and recognizes the gravity of 
such offenses by further providing for civil liability 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act. 
(4) In a draft memorandum dated January 25, 
2002, Alberto R. Gonzales, in his capacity as Coun-
sel to the President, argued that the protections of 
the Third Geneva Convention should not be afforded 
to Taliban and al Qaeda detainees, and described 
provisions of the Convention as ‘‘quaint’’ and ‘‘obso-
lete’’. 
(5) The January 25, 2002, memorandum by 
then-Counsel to the President Alberto R. Gonzales 
cited ‘‘reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal 
prosecution’’ as a ‘‘positive’’ consequence of dis-
avowing the Geneva Conventions’ applicability, as-
serting that such a disavowal ‘‘would provide a solid 
defense to any future prosecution’’ in the event a 
prosecutor brought charges under the domestic War 
Crimes Act. 
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(6) Secretary of State Colin Powell responded 
in a January 26, 2002, memorandum that such an 
attempt to evade the Geneva Conventions would ‘‘re-
verse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in 
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine 
the protections of the rule of law for our troops’’. 
(7) Despite the warnings of the Secretary of 
State and in contravention of the language of the 
Third Geneva Convention, President George W. 
Bush announced on February 7, 2002, that— 
(A) he did not consider the Convention to 
apply to al Qaeda fighters; and 
(B) Taliban detainees would not be enti-
tled to ‘‘prisoner of war’’ status under the Con-
vention, despite the fact that Article 5 of the 
Convention and United States Army regulations 
expressly require such determinations to be 
made by a ‘‘competent tribunal’’. 
(8) The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, confirmed that Common Article 3 of the Gene-
va Conventions applies to Taliban forces and al 
Qaeda forces, and characterized a central legal 
premise by which the President sought to avoid the 
obligations of international law as ‘‘erroneous’’. 
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(9) Alberto R. Gonzales, acting as Counsel to 
the President, solicited and accepted the August 1, 
2002, Office of Legal Counsel memorandum entitled 
‘‘Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A’’, which took the untenable 
position that ‘‘mere infliction of pain’’ is not ‘‘tor-
ture’’ unless ‘‘the victim . . . experiences intense pain 
or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the 
pain that would be associated with serious physical 
injury so severe that death, organ failure, or perma-
nent damage resulting in a loss of significant body 
function will likely result.’’. 
(10) According to the ‘‘Review of Department 
of Defense Detention Operations and Detainee In-
terrogation Techniques’’ (the ‘‘Church Report’’), 
issued on March 7, 2005, then-Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, authorized 
the use on Guantanamo Bay detainees of harsh in-
terrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field 
Manual, including stress positions, hooding, the use 
of military dogs to exploit phobias, prolonged isola-
tion, sensory deprivation, and forcing Muslim men to 
shave their beards. 
(11) According to the ‘‘Article 15–6 Investiga-
tion of CJSOTF–AP [Combined Joint Special Oper-
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ations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula] and 5th SF 
[Special Forces] Group Detention Operation (For-
mica Report)’’ and Department of Defense docu-
ments released under the Freedom of Information 
Act, Guantanamo Bay detainees were chained to the 
floor, subjected to loud music, fed only bread and 
water, and kept for some period of time in cells 
measuring 4 feet by 4 feet by 20 inches. 
(12) The March 2004 investigative report of 
Major General Antonio Taguba documented ‘‘sadis-
tic, blatant and wanton criminal abuses’’ against de-
tainees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility, includ-
ing sexual and physical abuse, the threat of torture, 
the forcing of detainees to perform degrading acts 
designed to assault their religious identity, and the 
use of dogs to frighten detainees. 
(13) According to Department of Defense docu-
ments released under the Freedom of Information 
Act, the United States Armed Forces held certain 
Iraqis as ‘‘ghost detainees,’’ who were ‘‘not ac-
counted for’’ and were hidden from the observation 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). 
(14) Military autopsy reports and death certifi-
cates released pursuant to the Freedom of Informa-
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tion Act revealed that at least 39 deaths, and prob-
ably more, have occurred among detainees in United 
States custody overseas, approximately half of which 
were homicides and 7 of which appear to have been 
caused by ‘‘strangulation,’’ ‘‘asphyxiation’’ or fatal 
‘‘blunt force injuries’’. 
(15) On September 6, 2006, President George 
W. Bush stated that he had authorized the incom-
municado detention of certain suspected terrorist 
leaders and operatives at secret sites outside the 
United States under a ‘‘separate program’’ operated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency. 
(16) President George W. Bush has authorized 
the indefinite detention, without charge or trial, of 
more than 700 individuals at Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base on the ground that they are ‘‘enemy 
combatants’’ and therefore may be held until the 
cessation of hostilities under the laws of war. 
(17) Department of Justice lawyers, rep-
resenting President George W. Bush and the De-
partment of Defense in a Federal lawsuit brought on 
behalf of Guantanamo detainees, took the unprece-
dented position that the term ‘‘enemy combatant’’ 
could in theory justify the indefinite detention of a 
‘‘little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to 
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what she thinks is [a] charity that helps orphans in 
Afghanistan but is really a front to finance al-Qaeda 
activities’’ and ‘‘a person who teaches English to the 
son of an al Qaeda member’’. 
(18) After the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush rejected the claim that 
an alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ could be detained in-
definitely without any meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the designation, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense issued an order on July 7, 2004, creating 
‘‘Combatant Status Review Tribunals’’ (CSRTs) for 
the stated purpose of ‘‘review[ing] the detainee’s sta-
tus as an enemy combatant’’. 
(19) Such Order— 
(A) did not allow detainees to be rep-
resented by counsel in Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal proceedings, but instead specified 
that a ‘‘military officer’’ would be assigned to 
‘‘assist[ ]’’ each detainee and required such 
military officers to inform the detainees that ‘‘I 
am neither a lawyer nor your advocate,’’ and 
that ‘‘[n]one of the information you provide me 
shall be held in confidence’’; 
(B) allowed the detainee to be excluded 
from attendance during review proceedings in-
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volving ‘‘testimony or other matters that would 
compromise national security if held in the 
presence of the detainee’’; 
(C) allowed the decision-maker to rely on 
hearsay evidence and specified that ‘‘[t]he Tri-
bunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such 
as would apply in a court of law’’; and 
(D) specified that ‘‘there shall be a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the Government’s 
evidence’’. 
(20) The Government has relied on the above 
procedures to deprive individuals of their liberty for 
an indefinite period of time without a meaningful 
opportunity to confront and rebut the evidence on 
which that detention is predicated. 
(21) President George W. Bush and the De-
partment of Defense designated at least 2 United 
States citizens as ‘‘enemy combatants,’’ claimed the 
right to detain them indefinitely on United States 
soil without charge and without access to counsel, 
and argued that allowing meaningful judicial review 
of their detention would be ‘‘constitutionally intoler-
able’’. 
(22) The Supreme Court established in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld that meaningful review by a neutral de-
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cisionmaker of the detention of United States citi-
zens is constitutionally required, that ‘‘the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of a citizen’s liberty . . . is very 
real,’’ and that the Constitution mandates that a 
United States citizen be given a fair opportunity to 
rebut the Government’s ‘‘enemy combatant’’ des-
ignation. 
(23) The administration, having consistently 
claimed that according United States citizens des-
ignated as ‘‘enemy combatants’’ the due process pro-
tections accorded to criminal defendants in civilian 
courts would jeopardize national security interests of 
the utmost importance, elected to pursue criminal 
charges against alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ Jose 
Padilla in a civilian court after holding him in mili-
tary custody for 3 years. 
(24) The administration, having contended that 
alleged ‘‘enemy combatant’’ and United States cit-
izen Yaser Esam Hamdi was so dangerous that 
merely allowing him to meet with counsel ‘‘jeopard-
izes compelling national security interests’’ because 
he might ‘‘pass concealed messages through unwit-
ting intermediaries,’’ released Mr. Hamdi from cus-
tody after 3 years and allowed him to return to 
Saudi Arabia. 
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(25) President George W. Bush issued ‘‘Mili-
tary Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treat-
ment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism,’’ which authorized the creation 
of military tribunals to try suspected al Qaeda mem-
bers and other international terrorist suspects for 
violations of the law of war. 
(26) Alberto R. Gonzales, as Counsel to the 
President, in a November 30, 2001, newspaper edi-
torial, 
defended 
these 
military 
tribunals 
and 
misleadingly represented that they would have ade-
quate procedural safeguards, by stating: ‘‘Everyone 
tried before a military commission will know the 
charges against him, be represented by qualified 
counsel and be allowed to present a defense.’’. 
(27) The military tribunals’ procedural rules as 
outlined in Military Commission Order No. 1, issued 
on March 21, 2002, and as subsequently amended— 
(A) permitted the accused and his civilian 
counsel to be excluded from any part of the 
proceeding that the presiding officer decided to 
close, and never learn what was presented dur-
ing that portion of the proceeding; 
(B) permitted the introduction of any evi-
dence that the presiding officer determined 
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would have probative value to a reasonable per-
son, thereby permitting the admission of hear-
say and evidence obtained through undue coer-
cion; and 
(C) restricted appellate review of the com-
missions to a panel appointed by the Secretary 
of Defense, followed by review by the Secretary 
of Defense and a final decision by the Presi-
dent, with no provision for direct appeal to the 
Federal courts for review by civilian judges. 
(28) Nearly 5 years after the military order was 
signed, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
struck down the military commissions as unlawful, 
finding that— 
(A) the military commissions as con-
stituted were not expressly authorized by any 
congressional act, including the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force, the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), and the Detainee 
Treatment Act; 
(B) the military commission procedures 
violated the UCMJ, which mandates that rules 
governing military commissions be as similar to 
those governing courts-martial ‘‘as practicable,’’ 
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and which affords the accused the right to be 
present; 
(C) the military commission procedures 
violated Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions, which is part of the ‘‘law of war’’ 
under UCMJ Article 21 and requires trial in ‘‘a 
regularly constituted court affording all the ju-
dicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples’’. 
(29) President George W. Bush sought to pre-
vent the Guantanamo detainees from obtaining judi-
cial review of their indefinite confinement by claim-
ing that the writ of habeas corpus was categorically 
unavailable to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay. 
(30) The Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush 
squarely rejected this claim, holding that the legal 
precedent on which the President relied ‘‘plainly 
does not preclude the exercise of [statutory habeas] 
jurisdiction’’ over the detainees’ claims, and that the 
general presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of a statute, cited by the President, ‘‘certainly 
has no application’’ with respect to detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay where the United States exercises 
‘‘complete jurisdiction and control’’. 
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(c) UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FIRINGS AND EXEC-
UTIVE PRIVILEGE.—The House of Representatives finds 
the following: 
(1) At least 9 United States Attorneys were 
told in 2006 that they must step down under the au-
thority of President George W. Bush, who had the 
final decision-making power in terminating the em-
ployment of United States Attorneys. 
(2) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and 
subordinates under his supervision repeatedly misled 
Congress and attempted to block legitimate congres-
sional oversight efforts concerning the firing of at 
least nine United States Attorneys. 
(3) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales re-
peatedly obscured the true scope of the firings, origi-
nally declining to cite a specific number of individ-
uals fired in his testimony on January 18, 2007, ac-
knowledging only seven in his USA Today op-ed 
published on March 6, 2007, acknowledging eight 
firings in his testimony on April 19, 2007, tacitly 
conceding there had been nine individuals fired in 
his testimony on May 10, 2007, and testifying on 
July 24, 2007, that ‘‘there may have been others’’ 
but he did not know the exact number. 
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(4) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales ini-
tially characterized the firings as ‘‘an overblown per-
sonnel matter,’’ claiming that the United States At-
torneys had lost his confidence and were fired for 
‘‘performance reasons’’ when many of those same in-
dividuals had received only the highest performance 
reviews prior to their dismissal. 
(5) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testi-
fied before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he 
would ‘‘never, ever make a change in a United 
States attorney for political reasons,’’ but in later 
testimony on April 19, 2007, and July 24, 2007, ad-
mitted that he does not know who selected each indi-
vidual United States Attorney for firing or why they 
were included on the list of United States Attorneys 
to be fired. 
(6) Prior to their selection for firing, both 
former New Mexico United States Attorney David 
Iglesias and former Washington United States At-
torney John McKay received inappropriate phone 
calls from Members of Congress or their staffs re-
garding ongoing, politically sensitive investigations 
and the White House received complaints about the 
manner in which they were conducting those inves-
tigations. 
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(7) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales testi-
fied before the Senate on January 18, 2007, that he 
would not fire a United States Attorney ‘‘if it would 
in any way jeopardize an ongoing serious investiga-
tion,’’ but later testified, as did his subordinates, 
that concerns about whether ongoing investigations 
would be jeopardized were not explored prior to the 
firings and were specifically ignored when some fired 
United States Attorneys asked for a delay in their 
departure dates to allow them to wrap up ongoing 
investigations. 
(8) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales pub-
licly stated on March 13, 2007, that he was ‘‘not in-
volved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any 
discussions about what was going on’’ regarding the 
process leading up to the firing of the United States 
Attorneys, but later testimony from his subordinates 
and documents released by the Department of Jus-
tice indicate that the Attorney General was, in fact, 
regularly briefed on the process and did receive at 
least one memo in November 2005 regarding the 
planned firings. 
(9) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales pub-
licly stated on May 15, 2007, that Deputy Attorney 
General Paul McNulty’s participation in the firing of 
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the United States Attorneys was of central impor-
tance to the validity of the process and to the Attor-
ney General’s decision to fire the specific individuals, 
but he had previously testified on April 19, 2007, 
that he did not discuss the process with Mr. McNul-
ty prior to firing the United States Attorneys, and 
that ‘‘looking back . . . I would have had the deputy 
attorney general more involved, directly involved’’. 
(10) Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales tes-
tified on May 10, 2007, that, after the start of the 
congressional investigation into the firings, he had 
refrained from discussing the firings with anyone in-
volved because he did not want to interfere with the 
ongoing investigations, but former White House Li-
aison for the Department of Justice, Monica Good-
ling, testified on May 23, 2007, that the Attorney 
General spoke with her in late March of 2007 and 
‘‘laid out . . . his general recollection . . . of some of 
the process regarding the replacement of the United 
States Attorneys.’’ 
(11) Former White House Liaison for the De-
partment of Justice, Monica Goodling, also testified 
on May 23, 2007, that she did not respond to what 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said about his 
recollection because ‘‘I did not know if it was appro-
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•HRES 626 IH 
priate for us to both be discussing our recollections 
of what had happened, and I just thought maybe we 
shouldn’t have that conversation.’’ 
(12) President George W. Bush has consistently 
stonewalled congressional attempts at oversight by 
refusing to turn over White House documents relat-
ing to the firing of at least 9 United States Attor-
neys and refusing to allow current or former White 
House officials to testify before Congress on this 
matter, based on an excessively broad and legally in-
sufficient assertion of executive privilege. 
(13) President George W. Bush has asserted 
executive privilege in refusing even to turn over cor-
respondence between non-Executive Branch officials 
and White House officials concerning the firings of 
at least 9 United States Attorneys, even though such 
communications could not reasonably be classified as 
falling within the privilege. 
(14) President George W. Bush has directed at 
least two staff members, former and current, to ig-
nore congressional subpoenas altogether, ordering 
former Counsel to the President Harriet Miers and 
current Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser to 
the President Karl Rove not to appear at Congres-
sional oversight hearings based on the assertion that 
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immediate presidential advisors are ‘‘immune from 
compelled Congressional testimony about matters 
that arose during [their] tenure,’’ rather than simply 
instructing them to refrain from answering questions 
that might be covered by a proper assertion of exec-
utive privilege. 
(15) President George W. Bush has refused to 
work to find a compromise with Congress or other-
wise accommodate legitimate congressional oversight 
efforts, disregarding the proper relationship between 
the executive and legislative branches and dem-
onstrating a belief that he and his Administration 
are above oversight and the rule of law. 
(d) MISLEADING STATEMENTS ON THE USA PA-
TRIOT ACT.—The House of Representatives finds the fol-
lowing: 
(1) President George W. Bush made misleading 
claims during the course of the Administration’s 
2005 campaign to reauthorize the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001, by suggesting that Federal officials did 
not have access to the same tools to investigate ter-
rorism as they did to investigate other crimes. 
(2) In 2005 the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion transmitted to Attorney General Alberto R. 
Gonzales multiple reports of violations of law in con-
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