187
North Korea to engage in a dialogue with such Gov-
ernment, and the continued conduct of provocative,
offensive oriented military exercises.
(5) The nuclear threat posed by North Korea is
just one of a number of security concerns of the
United States arising out of the policies of North
Korea.
SEC. 2642. CLARIFICATION OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERA-
TION 
OBLIGATIONS 
OF 
NORTH 
KOREA
UNDER THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.
It is the sense of the Congress that in discussions
or negotiations with the Government of North Korea pur-
suant to the implementation of the United States-Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea Agreed Framework en-
tered into on October 21, 1994, the President should up-
hold the following minimum conditions relating to nuclear
nonproliferation:
(1) All spent fuel from the graphite-moderated
nuclear reactors and related facilities of North
Korea should be removed from the territory of North
Korea as is consistent with the Agreed Framework.
(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency
should have the freedom to conduct any and all in-
spections that it deems necessary to fully account for
the stocks of plutonium and other nuclear materials
188
in North Korea, including special inspections of sus-
pected nuclear waste sites, before any nuclear com-
ponents controlled by the Nuclear Supplier Group
Guidelines are delivered for a light water reactor for
North Korea.
(3) The dismantlement of all declared graphite-
based nuclear reactors and related facilities in North
Korea, including reprocessing units, should be com-
pleted in accordance with the Agreed Framework
and in a manner that effectively bars in perpetuity
any reactivation of such reactors and facilities.
(4) The United States should suspend actions
described in the Agreed Framework if North Korea
reloads its existing 5 megawatt nuclear reactor or
resumes construction of nuclear facilities other than
those permitted to be built under the Agreed Frame-
work.
SEC. 2643. ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA UNDER THE
AGREED FRAMEWORK.
It is further the sense of the Congress that the Re-
public of Korea should play the central role in the project
to provide light water reactors to North Korea under the
Agreed Framework.
189
SEC. 2644. FURTHER STEPS TO PROMOTE UNITED STATES
SECURITY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS WITH
RESPECT TO NORTH KOREA.
It is further the sense of the Congress that, after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President should
not take further steps toward upgrading diplomatic rela-
tions with North Korea beyond opening liaison offices or
relaxing trade and investment barriers imposed against
North Korea without—
(1) action by the Government of North Korea
to engage in a North-South dialogue with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Korea to facilitate
progress toward:
(A) holding a North Korea-South Korea
Summit;
(B) resuming North-South joint military
discussions regarding steps to reduce tensions
between North and South Korea;
(C) expanding trade relations between
North and South Korea;
(D) promoting freedom of travel between
North and South Korea by citizens of both
North and South Korea;
(E) cooperating in science and technology,
education, the arts, health, sports, the environ-
190
ment, publishing, journalism, and other fields of
mutual interest;
(F) establishing postal and telecommuni-
cations services between North and South
Korea; and
(G) reconnecting railroads and roadways
between North and South Korea;
(2) significant progress toward implementation
of the North-South Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; and
(3) progress toward the achievement of several
long-standing United States policy objectives regard-
ing North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, includ-
ing—
(A) reducing the number of military forces
of North Korea along the Demilitarized Zone
and relocating such military forces away from
the Demilitarized Zone;
(B) prohibiting any movement by North
Korea toward the deployment of an intermedi-
ate range ballistic missile system; and
(C) prohibiting the export by North Korea
of missiles and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion, including related technology and compo-
nents.
191
SEC. 2645. RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO NORTH
KOREA AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA EN-
ERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION.
(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 1 of part III of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
‘‘SEC. 620G. ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA AND THE KO-
REAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION.
‘‘No assistance may be provided under this Act or
any other provision of law to North Korea or the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization unless—
‘‘(1) such assistance is provided in accordance
with all requirements, limitations, and procedures
otherwise applicable to the provision of such assist-
ance for such purposes; and
‘‘(2) the President—
‘‘(A) notifies the congressional committees
specified in section 634A(a) of this Act prior to
the obligation of such assistance in accordance
with 
the 
procedures 
applicable 
to
reprogramming notifications under that section,
irrespective of the amount of the proposed obli-
gation of such assistance; and
‘‘(B) determines and reports to such com-
mittees that the provision of such assistance is
192
vital to the national interests of the United
States.’’.
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 620G of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as added by subsection (a), ap-
plies with respect to assistance provided to North Korea
or the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organiza-
tion on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
CHAPTER 3—BURMA
SEC. 2651. UNITED STATES POLICY CONCERNING THE DIC-
TATORSHIP IN BURMA.
(a) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the President should take steps to encour-
age the United Nations Security Council to—
(1) impose an international arms embargo on
Burma;
(2) affirm support for human rights and the
protection of all Karen, Karenni, and other minori-
ties in Burma;
(3) condemn Burmese officials responsible for
crimes against humanity;
(4) take steps to encourage multilateral assist-
ance programs for refugees from Burma in Thailand
and India; and
(5) reduce United Nations activities in Burma,
including UNDP (United Nations Development Pro-
193
gram), UNICEF (United Nations Childrens Fund),
UNFPA (United Nations Family Planning Agency),
World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO), and UNIDCP (United
Nations International Drug Control Program) activi-
ties.
(b) REDUCTION IN DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE.—It is
the sense of the Congress that the President should reduce
the diplomatic presence of the United States in Burma
by reducing the total number of the members of the For-
eign Service stationed in Burma on the date of enactment
of this Act.
CHAPTER 4—TORTURE
SEC. 2661. DEFINITIONS.
(a) TORTURE.—As used in this chapter, the term
‘‘torture’’ means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from the person or
a third person information or a confession, punishing the
person for an act the person or a third person has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing the person or a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by, at the instigation of, or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
194
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to
lawful sanctions.
(b) SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING.—As
used in this chapter, the term ‘‘substantial grounds for
believing’’ means substantial evidence.
(c) IN DANGER
OF BEING SUBJECTED
TO TOR-
TURE.—As used in this chapter, the term ‘‘in danger of
being subjected to torture’’ means circumstances in which
a reasonable person would fear subjection to torture.
(d) INVOLUNTARILY RETURN.—As used in this chap-
ter, the term ‘‘involuntarily return’’ means to take action
by which it is reasonably foreseeable that a person will
be required to return to a country against the person’s
will, regardless of whether such return is induced by phys-
ical force and regardless of whether the person is phys-
ically present in the United States.
SEC. 2662. UNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE
INVOLUNTARY RETURN OF PERSONS SUB-
JECTED TO TORTURE.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act
are authorized to be available to expel, extradite, or other-
wise involuntarily return a person to a country in which
there are substantial grounds for believing the person
195
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, or to
support, promote, or assist such involuntary return.
TITLE XXVII—CONGRESSIONAL
STATEMENTS
SEC. 2701. INTER-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS.
Taking into consideration the long-term commitment
by the United States to the affairs of this Hemisphere and
the need to build further upon the linkages between the
United States and its neighbors, the Secretary of State,
in allocating the level of resources for international organi-
zations, should pay particular attention to funding levels
of the Inter-American organizations.
SEC. 2702. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) The sovereign and independent state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was formally recognized by the
United States of America on April 7, 1992.
(2) The sovereign and independent state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted as a full partici-
pating State of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe on April 30, 1992.
196
(3) The sovereign and independent state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted as a Member
state of the United Nations on May 22, 1992.
(4) The United States has declared its deter-
mination to respect and put into practice the Dec-
laration on Principles Guiding Relations between
Participating States contained in the Final Act of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope.
(5) Each of the principles has been violated
during the course of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent
in sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of
force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of
States; peaceful settlement of disputes; noninterven-
tion in internal affairs; respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of
thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal rights
and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among
States; and fulfillment in good faith of obligations
under international law.
(6) Principle II of the Final Act commits the
participating States to ‘‘refrain from any manifesta-
tion of force for the purpose of inducing another
197
participating State to renounce the full exercise of
its sovereign rights’’.
(7) Principle III of the Final Act commits the
participating States to ‘‘refrain from any demand
for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all
of the territory of any participating State’’.
(8) Principle IV of the Final Act commits the
participating States to ‘‘respect the territorial integ-
rity of each of the participating States’’ and ‘‘refrain
from any action inconsistent with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations
against the territorial integrity, political independ-
ence or the unity of any participating State’’.
(9) The Charter of Paris for a New Europe
commits the participating States ‘‘to cooperate in
defending democratic institutions against activities
which violate the independence, sovereign equality,
or territorial integrity of the participating States’’.
(10) The Helsinki Document 1992 reaffirms
‘‘the validity of the guiding principles and common
values of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of
Paris, embodying responsibilities of States towards
each other and of governments towards their own
people’’ which serve as the ‘‘collective conscience of
our community’’.
198
(11) The Charter of the United Nations calls
upon Member states to respect the territorial integ-
rity and political independence of any state in keep-
ing with the Purposes of the United Nations.
(12) The sovereign and independent state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina has been and continues to be
subjected to armed aggression Bosnian Serb forces,
Croatian Serb forces, and others in violation of
Final Act and the Charter.
(13) Unchecked armed aggression and genocide
threatens the lives of innocent civilians as well as the
very existence of the sovereign and independent state
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the United States should refuse to recognize
the incorporation of any of the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into the territory of any neighboring state or
the creation of any new state or states within the borders
of Bosnia-Herzegovina resulting from the threat or use of
force, coercion, or any other means inconsistent with inter-
national law.
SEC. 2703. THE LAOGAI SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PRISONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
199
(1) The Chinese gulag, known as the Laogai,
was created as a primary means of political repres-
sion and control when the Communists assumed
power in China in 1949.
(2) The Laogai has caused millions of people to
suffer grave human rights abuses over the past 46
years, including countless deaths.
(3) The Laogai continues to be used to incar-
cerate unknown numbers of ordinary citizens for po-
litical reasons, including workers, students, intellec-
tuals, religious believers, and Tibetans.
(4) So-called ‘‘thought reform’’ is a standard
practice of Laogai officials, and reports of torture
are routinely received by human rights organizations
from Laogai prisoners and survivors.
(5) Negotiations about unfettered access to
Laogai prisoners between the Chinese Government
and the International Red Cross have ceased.
(6) The Laogai is in reality a huge system of
forced labor camps in which political and penal
criminals are slave laborers producing an array of
products for export throughout the world, including
the United States.
(7) The Chinese Government continues to main-
tain, as part of its official propaganda and in defi-
200
ance of significant evidence to the contrary gathered
by many human rights organizations, that the
Laogai is a prison system like any other in the
world.
(8) Testimony delivered before the Subcommit-
tee on International Operations and Human Rights
of the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives has documented human
rights abuses in the Laogai which continue to this
day.
(9) The American people have repeatedly ex-
pressed their abhorrence of forced labor camps sys-
tems, whether they be operated by the Nazis, Soviet
Communists, or any other political ideology.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the President should—
(1) publicly condemn the continued existence of
the Laogai, and call upon the Government of the
People’s Republic of China to dismantle it, and re-
lease all of its political prisoners; and
(2) instruct the appropriate diplomatic rep-
resentatives of the United States to cause a resolu-
tion condemning the Laogai to be put before the
United Nations Human Rights Commission and
work for its passage.
201
SEC. 2704. CONCERNING THE USE OF FUNDS TO FURTHER
NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM.
It is the sense of the Congress that none of the funds
authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available
by this Act may be obligated or expended to further nor-
malize diplomatic relations between the United States and
Vietnam, until Vietnam—
(1) releases all of its political and religious pris-
oners;
(2) accounts for American POWs and MIAs
from the Vietnam War;
(3) holds democratic elections; and
(4) institutes policies which protect human
rights.
SEC. 2705. DECLARATION OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNIT-
ED STATES GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS
POLICY TOWARD CHINA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following
findings:
(1) According to the 1994 State Department
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices there
continue to be ‘‘widespread and well-documented
human rights abuses in China, in violation of inter-
nationally accepted norms . . . (including) arbitrary
and lengthy incommunicado detention, torture, and
mistreatment of prisoners. The regime continued se-
202
vere restrictions on freedoms of speech, press assem-
bly and association, and tightened controls on the
exercise of these rights during 1994. Serious human
rights abuses persisted in Tibet and other areas pop-
ulated by ethnic minorities’’.
(2) The President, in announcing his decision
on Most Favored Nation trading status for China in
May 1994 stated that, ‘‘China continues to commit
very serious human rights abuses. Even as we en-
gage the Chinese on military, political, and economic
issues, we intend to stay engaged with those in
China who suffer from human rights abuses. The
United States must remain a champion of their lib-
erties’’.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that the President should take the following ac-
tions:
(1) Decline the invitation to visit China until
and unless there is dramatic overall progress on
human rights in China and Tibet and communicate
to the Government of China that such a visit cannot
take place without such progress. Indications of
overall progress would include the release of hun-
dreds of political, religious, and labor activists; an
agreement to allow unhindered confidential access to
203
prisoners by international humanitarian agencies;
enactment of major legal reforms such as an end to
all restrictions on the exercise of freedom of religion,
revocation of the 1993 state security law, and the
abolition of all so-called ‘‘counter-revolutionary’’
crimes; an end to forced abortion, forced steriliza-
tion, and the provision by government facilities of
human fetal remains for consumption as food; and
a decision to allow unrestricted access to Tibet by
foreign media and international human rights mon-
itors.
(2) Seek to develop an agreement on a multilat-
eral strategy to promote human rights in China with
other members of the G–7, beginning with the meet-
ing of the G–7 industrial partners scheduled for
June 1995 in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Such an agree-
ment should include efforts to encourage greater co-
operation by the Government of China with the
human rights rapporteurs and working groups of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, as well
as bilateral and multilateral initiatives to secure the
unconditional release of imprisoned peaceful pro-de-
mocracy advocates such as Wei Jingsheng.
(3) Instruct the United States delegates to the
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women
204
in September 1995 to vigorously and publicly sup-
port nongovernmental organizations that may be
subjected to harassment or to restrictions or limita-
tions on their activities, access to the media, or to
channels of communication during the conference by
the Government of China and to protest publicly and
privately any actions by the Government of China
aimed at punishing or repressing Chinese citizens
who seek to peacefully express their views or com-
municate with foreign citizens or media during or
following the United Nations Conference.
(4) Extend an invitation to the Dalai Lama to
visit Washington, District of Columbia, in 1995.
(c) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS
POLICY TOWARD CHINA.—It shall be the policy of the
United States Government to continue to promote inter-
nationally recognized human rights and worker rights in
China and Tibet. The President shall submit the following
reports on the formulation and implementation of United
States human rights policy toward China and the results
of that policy to the International Relations Committee of
the House of Representatives :
(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of en-
actment of this Act, the President shall report on
the status of the ‘‘new United States Human Rights
205
Policy for China’’ announced by the President on
May 26, 1994, including an assessment of the imple-
mentation and effectiveness of the policy in bringing
about human rights improvements in China and
Tibet, with reference to the following specific initia-
tives announced on that date:
(A) High-level dialogue on human rights.
(B) Voluntary principles in the area of
human rights for United States businesses op-
erating in China.
(C) Increased contact with and support for
groups and individuals in China promoting law
reform and human rights.
(D) Increased exchanges to support human
rights law reform in China.
(E) The practice of all United States offi-
cials who visit China to meet with the broadest
possible spectrum of Chinese citizens.
(F) Increased efforts to press United
States views on human rights in China at the
United Nations, the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, and other international or-
ganizations.
(G) A plan of international actions to ad-
dress Tibet’s human rights problems and to
206
promote substantive discussions between the
Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government.
(H) Efforts to use the 1995 United Na-
tions Women’s Conference in Beijing to expand
freedoms of speech, association, and assembly,
as well as the rights of women, in China.
(I) An information strategy for promoting
human rights by expanding Chinese and Ti-
betan language broadcasts on the Voice of
America and establishing Radio Free Asia.
(J) Encouraging the Chinese Government
to permit international human rights groups to
operate in and visit China.
The report required by this paragraph shall also as-
sess the progress, if any, of the People’s Republic of
China toward ending forced abortion, forced steri-
lization, and other coercive population control prac-
tices.
(2) Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall report on
the status of Chinese Government compliance with
United States laws prohibiting the importation into
the United States of forced labor products, including
(but not limited to) a complete assessment and re-
port on the implementation of the Memorandum of
207
Understanding signed by the United States and
China in 1992. The report shall include (but not be
limited to) the following:
(A) All efforts made by the United States
Customs Service from 1992 until the date of
the report to investigate forced labor exports
and to conduct unannounced unrestricted in-
spections of suspected forced labor sites in
China, and the extent to which Chinese authori-
ties cooperated with such investigations.
(B) Recommendations of what further
steps might be taken to enhance United States
effectiveness in prohibiting forced labor exports
to the United States from China.
SEC. 2706. CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS VOL-
UNTARY FUND FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President,
acting through the United States Permanent Representa-
tive to the United Nations, should—
(1) request the United Nations Voluntary Fund
for Victims of Torture—
(A) to find new ways to support and pro-
tect treatment centers that are carrying out re-
habilitative services for victims of torture; and
208
(B) to encourage the development of new
such centers;
(2) use the voice and vote of the United States
to support the work of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture and the Committee Against Torture estab-
lished under the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment; and
(3) use the voice and vote of the United States
to establish a country rapporteur or similar proce-
dural mechanism to investigate human rights viola-
tions in a country if either the Special Rapporteur
or the Committee Against Torture indicates that a
systematic practice of torture is prevalent in that
country.
SEC. 2707. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT FOR
REFORM OF WAR POWERS RESOLUTION.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President
should transmit to the Congress recommendations for re-
form of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et
seq.) in order to permit the Congress and the President
to more effectively fulfill their constitutional responsibil-
ities with respect to the deployment of United States
Armed Forces abroad.
209
SEC. 2708. CONFLICT IN KASHMIR.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
reiterates the need for all parties to the conflict in Kash-
mir to enter into negotiations and resolve the conflict
peacefully. The Congress urges the executive branch to
work with all parties to facilitate a peaceful negotiated set-
tlement of the Kashmir conflict.
SEC. 2709. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE FORMER
YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC 
OF 
MACEDONIA
(FYROM).
It is the sense of the Congress that the Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) should be eligible
for all United States foreign assistance programs, includ-
ing programs of the Export-Import Bank and the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation, if the government
continues to respect the rights of all ethnic minorities.
SEC. 2710. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO INDO-
NESIA.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the United States should continue to urge
progress in promotion and protection of internation-
ally recognized human rights by the Government of
Indonesia;
(2) in its bilateral relations with the Govern-
ment of Indonesia, the United States should place a
high priority on public and private efforts to urge
210
the Government of Indonesia to take specific steps
to remove restrictions of freedom of expression and
association, to allow freedom of the press, to allow
freedom of religion, to end arbitrary arrests and tor-
ture and ill-treatment, to cease official attacks on
nongovernmental organizations, to end the wide-
spread denial of worker rights, and to hold members
of the military accountable for human rights abuses;
(3) with respect to the situation in East Timor,
the United States should call on the Government of
Indonesia to make public the complete findings of
the investigations into the killings of unarmed civil-
ians in Liquica on January 12, 1995, including the
reports of the Army Council of Military Honor and
the findings of the National Human Rights Commis-
sion, and that those responsible for the killings be
identified and brought to justice;
(4) the United States should continue to press
the Government of Indonesia to fully comply with
the 1994 and 1995 recommendations of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission regarding the
need for a full accounting of the Dili incident of No-
vember 1991;
(5) the United States should urge the Govern-
ment of Indonesia to allow independent human
212
SEC. 2712. POLICY TOWARD IRAN.
(a) IRAN’S ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.—
The Congress makes the following findings with respect
to Iran’s acts of international terrorism:
(1) As cited by the Department of State, the
Government of Iran was the greatest supporter of
state terrorism in 1992, supporting over 20 terrorist
acts, including the bombing of the Israeli Embassy
in Buenos Aires that killed 29 people.
(2) As cited by the Department of State, the
Government of Iran is a sponsor of radical religious
groups that have used terrorism as a tool. These in-
clude such groups as Hezballah, HAMAS, the Turk-
ish Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP–
GC).
(3) As cited by the Department of State, the
Government of Iran has resorted to international
terrorism as a means of obtaining political gain.
These actions have included not only the assassina-
tion of former Prime Minister Bakhitiar, but the
death sentence imposed on Salman Rushdie, and the
assassination of the leader of the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Party of Iran.
(4) As cited by the Department of State and
the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Ter-
213
rorism, the Government of Iran has long been a pro-
ponent of terrorist actions against the United
States, beginning with the takeover of the United
States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Iranian support
of extremist groups has led to the following attacks
upon the United States as well:
(A) The car bomb attack on the United
States Embassy in Beirut killing 49 in 1983 by
the Hezballah.
(B) The car bomb attack on the United
States Marine Barracks in Beirut killing 241 in
1983 by the Hezballah.
(C) The assassination of American Univer-
sity President in 1984 by the Hezballah.
(D) The kidnapping of all American hos-
tages in Lebanon from 1984–86 by the
Hezballah.
(5) The Government of Iran provides several
hundred million dollars annually in financial and
logistical support to organizations that use terrorism
and violence as a tool to undermine the Middle East
peace process.
(6) The Government of Iran provides financial,
political, and logistical support and safe haven to
214
groups that seek the violent overthrow of secular
governments in the Middle East and North Africa.
(b) IRAN’S PROGRAM TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS
OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MEANS BY WHICH TO DE-
LIVER THEM.—The Congress makes the following findings
with respect to Iran’s program to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and the means by which to deliver them—
(1) the Government of Iran has intensified its
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and
the means by which to deliver them;
(2) given Iran’s petroleum reserves, the desire
of the Government of Iran to obtain gas centrifuge
equipment and light water nuclear power reactors
clearly demonstrates what had already been appar-
ent, that Iran seeks to develop its nuclear weapons
capability; and
(3) Iran has been relentless in its attempt to
acquire the missiles needed to deliver nuclear and
chemical weapons.
(c) IRAN’S VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—The
Congress makes the following findings with respect to
Iran’s violations of human rights:
(1) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
cial Representative on Human Rights, Amnesty
International, and the United States Department of
215
State, the Government of Iran has conducted assas-
sinations outside of Iran, such as that of former
Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhitiar for which the
Government of France issued arrest warrants for
several Iranian governmental officials.
(2) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
cial Representative on Human Rights and by Am-
nesty International, the Government of Iran has
conducted revolutionary trials which do not meet
internationally recognized standards of fairness or
justice. These trials have included such violations as
a lack of procedural safeguards, trial times of 5 min-
utes or less, limited access to defense counsel, forced
confessions, and summary executions.
(3) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
cial Representative on Human Rights, the Govern-
ment of Iran systematically represses its Baha’i
population. Persecutions of this small religious com-
munity include assassinations, arbitrary arrests,
electoral prohibitions, and denial of applications for
documents such as passports.
(4) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
cial Representative on Human Rights, the Govern-
ment of Iran suppresses opposition to its govern-
ment. Political organizations such as the Freedom
216
Movement are banned from parliamentary elections,
have their telephones tapped and their mail opened,
and are systematically harassed and intimidated.
(5) As cited by the 1991 United Nations Spe-
cial Representative on Human Rights and Amnesty
International, the Government of Iran has failed to
recognize the importance of international human
rights. This includes suppression of Iranian human
rights movements such as the Freedom Movement,
lack of cooperation with international human rights
organizations such as the International Red Cross,
and an overall apathy toward human rights in gen-
eral. This lack of concern prompted the Special Rep-
resentative to state in his report that Iran had made
‘‘no appreciable progress towards improved compli-
ance with human rights in accordance with the cur-
rent international instruments’’.
(6) As cited by Amnesty International, the Gov-
ernment of Iran continues to torture its political
prisoners. Torture methods include burns, arbitrary
blows, severe beatings, and positions inducing pain.
(d) UNITED STATES POLICY AND RESPONSE.—The
Congress makes the following findings with respect to
United States policy and response to Iran:
217
(1) The actions by the Government of Iran
identified in subsections (a), (b), and (c) threaten
the national security and offend the democratic val-
ues of the United States and many other nations in
the Middle East and elsewhere.
(2) In response to this record of violent, desta-
bilizing, and antidemocratic conduct, it has been the
policy of the United States to seek to isolate the
Government of Iran diplomatically and economically,
thereby making the continuation of such conduct in-
creasingly costly.
(3) The policies the United States has pursued
in an effort to pressure the Government of Iran dip-
lomatically and economically have included refusing
to conduct normal diplomatic relations with Iran;
barring the importation of Iranian oil and other
products into the United States; prohibiting the ex-
port or reexport to Iran of weapons or of goods or
technology with potential military uses; voting
against all loans to Iran by international financial
institutions; and, most recently, imposing a total
economic embargo on Iran.
(4) To further increase the cost to the Govern-
ment of Iran of its objectionable conduct the United
States has urged other countries with economic ties
218
to Iran to take equivalent steps to isolate Iran eco-
nomically and diplomatically.
(e) CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.—The Congress
makes the following declarations:
(1) The imposition of an economic embargo on
Iran by President Clinton was an important and
necessary measure to increase economic and political
pressure on Iran.
(2) The President should, as a matter of the
highest priority, intensify efforts to persuade Iran’s
leading trade partners and creditors to join with the
United States in ceasing all trade with Iran and
ending any rescheduling or other relaxation of debts
owed to them.
(3) The President should take whatever steps
are appropriate to dissuade those who are aiding
Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons and the
means by which to deliver them from continuing
such assistance.
(4) The United States should convene a special
summit of the world’s leading heads of state to ad-
dress the issue of international terrorism and the
means for improving the efforts to combat inter-
national terrorism.
219
(5) The Secretary of State should promptly
take steps to strengthen each of the existing multi-
lateral nonproliferation regimes to make them more
effective in counteracting rogue regimes such as
Iran.
(6) The President should make the development
of a multilateral economic embargo on Iran a top
priority on the agenda at the meeting of the G—7
industrial partners scheduled for June 1995 in Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia.
SEC. 2713. CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds the following:
(1) Russian troops advanced into Chechnya on
December 10, 1994, and were met with strong re-
sistance from Chechen rebels who have now moved
to the Caucasus mountains where they are engaging
in what even the most optimistic Russian military
officers predict will be a drawn-out guerrilla war.
(2) The cost of the Chechen battle is estimated
to cost the Government of Russia at least
$2,000,000,000 and could exacerbate the budget
deficit of the Government of Russia.
(3) The United States has approved over
$2,400,000,000 in loan guarantees through the Ex-
220
port-Import Bank of the United States and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
(4) The United States has provided Russia with
significant direct assistance to promote a free mar-
ket economy, support democracy, meet humanitarian
needs, and dismantle nuclear weapons.
(b) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—The Congress de-
clares the following:
(1) United States investment in Russia has
been significant in promoting democracy and sta-
bilizing the economy of Russia and this progress
could be imperiled by Russia’s continued war in
Chechnya.
(2) The inability to negotiate an end to this cri-
sis and the resulting economic implications could ad-
versely affect the ability of Russia to fulfill its com-
mitments to the International Monetary Fund, the
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
(3) In further contacts with President Yeltsin,
it is imperative that President Clinton repeat his call
for an immediate end to the war in Chechnya.
221
SEC. 2714. UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FOURTH
WORLD 
CONFERENCE 
ON 
WOMEN 
IN
BEIJING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States
delegation to the Fourth World Conference on Women
should include at least one representative of a United
States-based nongovernmental organization representing
Tibetan women.
SEC. 2715. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—
(1) female genital mutilation is a violation of
women’s basic human rights;
(2) female genital mutilation constitutes a
major health risk to women, with lifelong physical
and psychological consequences; and
(3) female genital mutilation should not be con-
doned by any government.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the
Congress that—
(1) the President should seek to end the prac-
tice of female genital mutilation worldwide through
the active cooperation and participation of govern-
ments in countries where female genital mutilation
takes place; and
(2) steps to end the practice of female genital
mutilation should include—
222
(A) encouraging nations to establish clear
policies against female genital mutilation and
enforcing existing laws which prohibit it;
(B) assisting nations in creating culturally
appropriate outreach programs that include
education and counseling about the dangers of
female genital mutilation for women and men of
all ages; and
(C) ensuring that all appropriate programs
in which the United States participates include
a component pertaining to female genital muti-
lation, so as to ensure consistency across the
spectrum of health and child related programs
conducted in any country in which female geni-
tal mutilation is known to be a problem.
SEC. 2716. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING SYRIAN
OCCUPATION OF LEBANON.
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the Government of Syria should comply
with the Taif Agreement and withdraw all of its
troops from Lebanon;
(2) the United States should use its contacts at
the highest level of the Syrian Government to en-
courage the Government of Syria to withdraw all of
its troops from Lebanon within a timeframe to be
223
negotiated between the Syrian and Lebanese Gov-
ernments; and
(3) the Secretary of State should inform the
Congress as to the actions the United States has
taken to encourage withdrawal of all Syrian troops
from Lebanon.
DIVISION C—FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE.
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Foreign Aid Re-
duction Act of 1995’’.
SEC. 3002. DECLARATION OF POLICY.
The Congress declares the following:
(1) United States leadership overseas must be
maintained to support our vital national security,
economic, and humanitarian interests.
(2) As part of this leadership, United States
foreign assistance programs are essential to support
these national interests.
(3) However, United States foreign assistance
programs can be responsibly reduced while maintain-
ing United States leadership overseas.
400
$2,346,378,000 for fiscal year 1996 and $2,238,478,000
for fiscal year 1997.’’.
(c) DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR AFRICA.—Notwith-
standing paragraph (2) of section 3221(a) of this Act,
there are authorized to be appropriated $649,214,000 for
fiscal year 1996 and $634,214,000 for fiscal year 1997
to carry out chapter 10 of part I of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2293 et seq.).
TITLE 
XLV—UNITED 
STATES
EDUCATIONAL 
AND 
CUL-
TURAL 
EXCHANGE 
PRO-
GRAMS
SEC. 4501. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) FULBRIGHT ACADEMIC EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—
Notwithstanding section 2106(3)(A), there are authorized
to be appropriated for ‘‘Fulbright Academic Exchange
Programs’’, $112,484,200 for the fiscal year 1996 and
$88,680,800 for the fiscal year 1997.
(b) OTHER
PROGRAMS.—Notwithstanding section
2106(3)(F), there are authorized to be appropriated for
401
‘‘Other Programs’’, $77,265,800 for the fiscal year 1996
and $57,341,400 for the fiscal year 1997.
Passed the House of Representatives June 8, 1995.
Attest:
Clerk.