SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Countering the PRC 
Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023’’. 
SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUN-
TERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND. 
(a) COUNTERING
THE
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF 
CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 
appropriated $325,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
2023 through 2027 for the Countering the People’s 
Republic of China Malign Influence Fund to counter 
the malign influence of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China and entities acting on their behalf globally. 
(2) AVAILABILITY; AMOUNTS IN ADDITION TO 
OTHER AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under para-
graph (1)— 
(A) are authorized to remain available 
until expended; and 
(B) shall be in addition to amounts other-
wise authorized to be appropriated for the pur-
poses described in paragraph (1). 
(b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of 
funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap-
propriations under subsection (a) or otherwise made avail-
able for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) shall 
be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with 
section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of— 
(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
PROVAL.— 
(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State 
shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
partment of State to provide policy guidance, coordi-
nation, and approval for the obligation of funds ap-
propriated pursuant to the authorization of appro-
priations under subsection (a). 
(2) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development shall designate an existing senior offi-
cial of the United States Agency for International 
Development to assist and consult with the senior 
official of the Department of State designated pur-
suant to paragraph (1).
(3) DUTIES.—The senior official of the Depart-
ment of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
shall be responsible for— 
(A) on an annual basis, the identification 
of specific strategic priorities for using funds 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of 
appropriations under subsection (a), such as ge-
ographic areas of focus or functional categories 
of programming that funds are to be con-
centrated within, consistent with the national 
interests of the United States and the purposes 
of this section; 
(B) the coordination and approval of all 
programming conducted using such funds, 
based on an assessment that such programming 
directly counters the malign influence of the 
Chinese Communist Party or the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China, including 
specific activities or policies advanced by the 
Chinese Communist Party or the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China and entities 
acting on their behalf globally, pursuant to the 
strategic objectives of the United States, as es-
tablished in the 2017 National Security Strat-
egy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and
other relevant national and regional strategies 
as appropriate; 
(C) ensuring that all programming ap-
proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party or 
the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China described in subsection (d) and adheres 
to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); 
and 
(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 
evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
ming conducted using such funds to ensure that 
it advances United States interests and de-
grades the ability of the Chinese Communist 
Party or the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China, to advance activities that align 
with subsection (d) of this section. 
(4) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior 
official of the Department of State designated pur-
suant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and 
approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), 
seek— 
(A) to conduct appropriate interagency 
consultation; and
(B) to ensure, to the maximum extent 
practicable, that all approved programming 
functions in concert with other Federal activi-
ties to counter the malign influence of the Chi-
nese Communist Party or the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China. 
(d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term 
‘‘malign influence’’, with respect to the Chinese Com-
munist Party or the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China, shall be construed to include acts conducted by 
the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, or entities acting on their be-
half that— 
(1) undermine a free and open international 
order; 
(2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist 
Party’s or the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized 
by coercion and dependency; 
(3) undermine the national security or sov-
ereignty of the United States or other countries; or 
(4) undermine the economic security of the 
United States or other countries, including by pro-
moting corruption and advancing coercive economic 
practices. 
(e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-
tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds 
appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
tions under subsection (a) shall include efforts— 
(1) to promote transparency and accountability, 
and reduce corruption, including in governance 
structures targeted by the malign influence of the 
Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China; 
(2) to support civil society and independent 
media to raise awareness of and increase trans-
parency regarding the negative impact of activities 
related to the Belt and Road Initiative, associated 
initiatives, other economic initiatives with strategic 
or political purposes, and coercive economic prac-
tices; 
(3) to counter transnational criminal networks 
that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of 
the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China; 
(4) to encourage economic development struc-
tures that help protect against predatory lending 
schemes, including support for market-based alter-