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support the leadership of the Government of Rus-
sia, including President Vladimir Putin. 
(2) SCOPE OF REPORTS.—The first report under 
subsection (a) shall include comprehensive informa-
tion on the matters described in paragraph (1). Any 
succeeding report under subsection (a) may consist of 
an update or supplement to the preceding report 
under that subsection. 
(d) COORDINATION.—In preparing each report, up-
date, or supplement under this section, the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate as follows: 
(1) In preparing the assessment and descriptions 
required by subparagraphs (A) through (D) of sub-
section (c)(1), the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall coordinate with the head of the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the 
Treasury and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
(2) In preparing the description and assessment 
required by subparagraph (E) of such subsection, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall co-
ordinate with the head of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury. 
(e) FORM.—
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(1) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), 
each report under subsection (b) shall include an un-
classified executive summary, and may include a 
classified annex. 
(2) UNCLASSIFIED FORM OF CERTAIN INFORMA-
TION.—The information described in subsection 
(c)(1)(D) in each report under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form. 
SEC. 
9508. 
REPORT 
ON 
BIOSECURITY 
RISK 
AND 
DISINFORMATION BY THE CHINESE COM-
MUNIST PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs of the Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com-
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† HR 6395 EAS 
mittee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on 
Homeland Security of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(2) 
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE.—The 
term 
‘‘critical infrastructure’’ has the meaning given such 
term in section 1016(e) of the Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate commit-
tees of Congress a report identifying whether and how offi-
cials of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China may have sought— 
(1) to suppress information about— 
(A) the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in 
Wuhan; 
(B) the spread of the virus through China; 
and 
(C) the transmission of the virus to other 
countries; 
(2) to spread disinformation relating to the pan-
demic; or
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(3) to exploit the pandemic to advance their na-
tional security interests. 
(c) ASSESSMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(b) shall include assessments of reported actions and the ef-
fect of those actions on efforts to contain the novel 
coronavirus pandemic, including each of the following: 
(1) The origins of the novel coronavirus out-
break, the time and location of initial infections, and 
the mode and speed of early viral spread. 
(2) Actions taken by the Government of China to 
suppress, conceal, or misinform the people of China 
and those of other countries about the novel 
coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan. 
(3) The effect of disinformation or the failure of 
the Government of China to fully disclose details of 
the outbreak on response efforts of local governments 
in China and other countries. 
(4) Diplomatic, political, economic, intelligence, 
or other pressure on other countries and international 
organizations to conceal information about the spread 
of the novel coronavirus and the response of the Gov-
ernment of China to the contagion, as well as to in-
fluence or coerce early responses to the pandemic by 
other countries.
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(5) Efforts by officials of the Government of 
China to deny access to health experts and inter-
national health organizations to afflicted individuals 
in Wuhan, pertinent areas of the city, or laboratories 
of interest in China, including the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology. 
(6) Efforts by the Government of China, or those 
acting at its direction or with its assistance, to con-
duct cyber operations against international, national, 
or private health organizations conducting research 
relating to the novel coronavirus or operating in re-
sponse to the pandemic. 
(7) Efforts to control, restrict, or manipulate rel-
evant segments of global supply chains, particularly 
in the sale, trade, or provision of relevant medicines, 
medical supplies, or medical equipment as a result of 
the pandemic. 
(8) Efforts to advance the economic, intelligence, 
national security, and political objectives of the Gov-
ernment of China by exploiting vulnerabilities of for-
eign governments, economies, and companies under fi-
nancial duress as a result of the pandemic or to accel-
erate economic espionage and intellectual property 
theft.
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(9) Efforts to exploit the disruption of the phar-
maceutical and telecommunications industries as well 
as other industries tied to critical infrastructure and 
bilateral trade between China and the United States 
and between China and allies and partners of the 
United States in order to advance the economic and 
political objectives of the Government of China fol-
lowing the pandemic. 
(d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 9509. REPORT ON EFFECT OF LIFTING OF UNITED NA-
TIONS ARMS EMBARGO ON ISLAMIC REPUB-
LIC OF IRAN. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF 
CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate com-
mittees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives.
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SEC. 9510. REPORT ON IRANIAN ACTIVITIES RELATING TO 
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF 
CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate com-
mittees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate; and 
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
(b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate commit-
tees of Congress a report assessing— 
(1) any relevant activities potentially relating to 
nuclear weapons research and development by the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran; and 
(2) any relevant efforts to afford or deny inter-
national access in accordance with international non-
proliferation agreements. 
(c) ASSESSMENTS.—The report required by subsection 
(b) shall include assessments, for the period beginning on 
January 1, 2018, and ending on the date of the submittal 
of the report, of the following:
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(1) Activities to research, develop, or enrich ura-
nium or reprocess plutonium with the intent or capa-
bility of creating weapons-grade nuclear material. 
(2) Research, development, testing, or design ac-
tivities that could contribute to or inform construc-
tion of a device intended to initiate or capable of ini-
tiating a nuclear explosion. 
(3) Efforts to receive, transmit, store, destroy, re-
locate, archive, or otherwise preserve research, proc-
esses, products, or enabling materials relevant or re-
lating to any efforts assessed under paragraph (1) or 
(2). 
(4) Efforts to afford or deny international access, 
in accordance with international nonproliferation 
agreements, to locations, individuals, and materials 
relating to activities described in paragraph (1), (2), 
or (3). 
(d) FORM.—The report required under subsection (b) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include 
a classified annex. 
SEC. 9511. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THIRD OPTION FOUN-
DATION. 
It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) the work of the Third Option Foundation to 
heal, help, and honor members of the special oper-
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ations community of the Central Intelligence Agency 
and their families is invaluable; and 
(2) the Director of the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy should work closely with the Third Option Foun-
dation in implementing section 19A of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b), as 
added by section 6412 of the Damon Paul Nelson and 
Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 (Public 
Law 116–92). 
Attest: 
Secretary.