H. R. 1119—315
agreement in principle on a number of far-reaching agreements,
including START I, II, and III, a revision in the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty, and a series of other agreements
(such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical
Weapons Convention), designed to further reduce bilateral
threats and limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion.
(3) These far-reaching agreements were based on the under-
standing between the United States and Russia that there
would be a good faith effort on both sides to comply with
the letter and spirit of the agreements.
(4) Reports indicate that Russia has been pursuing
construction of a massive underground facility of unknown
purpose at Yamantau Mountain and the city of Mezhgorye
(formerly the settlements of Beloretsk–15 and Beloretsk–16)
that is designed to survive a nuclear war and appears to exceed
reasonable defense requirements.
(5) The Yamantau Mountain project does not appear to
be consistent with the lowering of strategic threats, openness,
and cooperation that is the basis of the post-Cold War strategic
partnership between the United States and Russia.
(6) The United States has allowed senior Russian military
and government officials to have access to key strategic facilities
of the United States by providing tours of the North American
Air Defense (NORAD) command at Cheyenne Mountain and
the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) head-
quarters in Omaha, Nebraska, among other sites, and by
providing extensive briefings on the operations of those facili-
ties.
(b) SENSE
OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that
the Russian government—
(1) should provide to the United States Government a
written explanation with sufficient detail (including drawings
and diagrams) of the purpose and operational concept of the
completed and planned facilities at Yamantau Mountain to
support a high confidence judgment by the United States that
the design of the Yamantau facility is consistent with official
Russian government explanations; and
(2) should allow a United States delegation, to include
officials of the executive branch and Members of Congress,
to have access to the Yamantau Mountain project and buildings
and facilities surrounding the project.
SEC. 1228. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO UNITED STATES
NATIONAL SECURITY.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Cuba has maintained a hostile policy in its relations
with the United States for over 35 years.
(2) The United States, as a sovereign nation, must be
able to respond to any Cuban provocation and defend the people
and territory of the United States against any attack.
(3) In 1994, the Government of Cuba callously encouraged
a massive exodus of Cubans, by boat and raft, toward the
United States during which countless numbers of those Cubans
lost their lives on the high seas.
(4) The humanitarian response of the United States to
rescue, shelter, and provide emergency care to those Cubans,
H. R. 1119—316
together with the actions taken to absorb some 30,000 of those
Cubans into the United States, required significant efforts and
the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for the costs
incurred by the United States and State and local governments
in connection with those efforts.
(5) On February 24, 1996, Cuban MiG aircraft attacked
and destroyed, in international airspace, two unarmed civilian
aircraft flying from the United States, and the four persons
in those unarmed civilian aircraft were killed.
(6) Since that attack, the Cuban government has issued
no apology for the attack, nor has it indicated any intention
to conform its conduct to international law that is applicable
to civilian aircraft operating in international airspace.
(b) REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall
carry out a comprehensive review and assessment of—
(1) Cuban military capabilities; and
(2) the threats to the national security of the United States
that may be posed by Cuba, including—
(A) such unconventional threats as (i) encouragement
of massive and dangerous migration, and (ii) attacks on
citizens and residents of the United States while they
are engaged in peaceful protest in international waters
or airspace;
(B) the potential for development and delivery of chemi-
cal or biological weapons; and
(C) the potential for internal strife in Cuba that could
involve citizens or residents of the United States or the
Armed Forces of the United States.
(c) REPORT.—Not later than March 31, 1998, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of
the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House
of Representatives a report on the review and assessment. The
report shall include the following:
(1) The Secretary’s assessment of the capabilities and
threats referred to in subsection (b), including each of the
threats described in paragraph (2) of that subsection.
(2) A discussion of the results of the review and assessment,
including an assessment of the contingency plans developed
by the Secretary to counter any threat posed by Cuba to the
United States.
(d) CONSULTATION ON REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT.—In performing
the review and assessment and in preparing the report, the Sec-
retary of Defense shall consult with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the commander of the United States Southern
Command, and the heads of other appropriate departments and
agencies of the United States.
SEC. 1229. REPORT ON HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT.
(a) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than March 31, 1998, the Presi-
dent shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of
Representatives a report on the Helsinki Joint Statement on future
reductions in nuclear forces. The report shall address the United
States approach (including verification implications) to implement-
ing the Helsinki Joint Statement, in particular, as that Statement
relates to the following:
(1) Lower aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads.
H. R. 1119—317
(2) Measures relating to the transparency of strategic
nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic
nuclear warheads.
(3) Deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
(4) Measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched
cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems.
(5) Issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.
(b) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘‘Hel-
sinki Joint Statement’’ means the agreements between the Presi-
dent of the United States and the President of the Russian Federa-
tion as contained in the Joint Statement on Parameters on Future
Reductions in Nuclear Forces issued at Helsinki in March 1997.
SEC. 1230. COMMENDATION OF MEXICO ON FREE AND FAIR ELEC-
TIONS.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On July 6, 1997, elections were conducted in Mexico
in order to fill 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 32
seats in the 128 seat Senate, the office of the Mayor of Mexico
City, and local elections in a number of Mexican States.
(2) For the first time, the federal elections were organized
by the Federal Electoral Institute, an autonomous and
independent organization established under the Mexican Con-
stitution.
(3) More than 52,000,000 Mexican citizens registered to
vote.
(4) Eight political parties registered to participate in those
elections, including the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),
the National Action Party (PAN), and the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD).
(5) Since 1993, Mexican citizens have had the exclusive
right to participate as observers in activities related to the
preparation and the conduct of elections.
(6) Since 1994, Mexican law has permitted international
observers to be a part of the election process.
(7) With 84 percent of the ballots counted, PRI candidates
received 38 percent of the vote for seats in the Chamber of
Deputies, while PRD and PAN candidates received 52 percent
of the combined vote.
(8) PRD candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas Solorzano has
become the first elected Mayor of Mexico City, a post previously
appointed by the President.
(9) PAN members will now serve as governors in seven
of Mexico’s 31 States.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the recent elections in Mexico were conducted in a
free, fair, and impartial manner;
(2) the will of the Mexican people, as expressed through
the ballot box, has been respected by President Ernesto Zedillo
and officials throughout his administration; and
(3) President Zedillo, the Mexican Government, the Federal
Electoral Institute of Mexico, the political parties and can-
didates, and most importantly the citizens of Mexico should
all be congratulated for their support and participation in these
very historic elections.
SEC. 1231. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CAMBODIA.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
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(1) During the 1970s and 1980s, Cambodia was wracked
by political conflict, war, and violence, including genocide per-
petrated by the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.
(2) The 1991 Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Politi-
cal Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict set the stage for a
process of political accommodation and national reconciliation
among Cambodia’s warring parties.
(3) The international community engaged in a massive
effort involving more than $2,000,000,000 to ensure peace,
democracy, and prosperity in Cambodia following the Paris
Accords.
(4) The Cambodian people clearly demonstrated their sup-
port for democracy when 90 percent of eligible Cambodian
voters participated in United Nations-sponsored elections in
1993.
(5) Since the 1993 elections, Cambodia has made economic
progress, as shown by the recent decision of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to extend membership
in the Association to Cambodia.
(6) Tensions within the ruling Cambodian coalition have
erupted into violence.
(7) In March 1997, 19 Cambodians were killed and more
than 100 were wounded in a grenade attack on political dem-
onstrators supportive of the Funcinpec and the Khmer Nation
Party.
(8) During June 1997, fighting erupted in Phnom Penh
between forces loyal to First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh
and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen.
(9) On July 5, 1997, Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
deposed the First Prime Minister in a violent coup d’e´tat.
(10) Forces loyal to Hun Sen have executed former Interior
Minister Ho Sok and approximately 40 other political opponents
loyal to Prince Ranariddh.
(11) Democracy and stability in Cambodia are threatened
by the continued use of violence and other extralegal means
to resolve political tensions.
(12) In response to the July 1997 coup in Cambodia referred
to in paragraph (9)—
(A) the President has suspended all direct assistance
to the Cambodian Government; and
(B) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has decided to delay indefinitely admission of
Cambodia to membership in the Association.
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the parties in Cambodia should immediately cease the
use of violence;
(2) the United States should take all necessary steps to
ensure the safety of United States citizens in Cambodia;
(3) the United States should call an emergency meeting
of the United Nations Security Council to consider all options
to restore peace and democratic governance in Cambodia;
(4) the United States and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations should work together to take immediate steps
to restore democracy and the rule of law in Cambodia;
(5) United States assistance to the Government of Cam-
bodia should remain suspended until violence ends, the demo-
cratically elected Government is restored to power, and the