114 
precludes the renewal or continuation of the certifi-
cation. 
‘‘(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a 
certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, 
the United States may not contribute to the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Ref-
ugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor 
entity an annual amount— 
‘‘(A) greater than the highest annual con-
tribution to UNRWA made by a member coun-
try of the League of Arab States; 
‘‘(B) that, as a proportion of the total 
UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion of the 
total budget for the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the 
United States; or 
‘‘(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total 
budget of UNRWA.’’. 
SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) the President and the Secretary of State 
should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour-
age other responsible nations to withhold contribu-
tions to UNRWA, to any successor or related entity, 
or to the regular budget of the United Nations for 
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the support of UNRWA or a successor entity 
(through staff positions provided by the United Na-
tions Secretariat, or otherwise) until UNRWA has 
met the conditions listed in subparagraphs (A) 
through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of 
this Act); 
(2) citizens of recognized states should be re-
moved from UNRWA’s jurisdiction; 
(3) UNRWA’s definition of a ‘‘Palestine ref-
ugee’’ should be changed to that used for a refugee 
by the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees; and 
(4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Pales-
tinian refugees, responsibility for those refugees 
should be fully transferred to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL 
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives 
of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribu-
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tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that as-
sistance provided by it or at its request or under its 
supervision or control is not used in such a way as 
to further any military purpose.’’. 
(2) The United States, via assessed contribu-
tions, is the largest financial contributor to the reg-
ular budget of the IAEA. 
(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 
called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 
primarily through voluntary contributions by mem-
ber states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to 
provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for 
peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 
(4) The United States is the largest financial 
contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 
Fund. 
(5) A March 2009 report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither 
[the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to sys-
tematically limit TC assistance to countries the 
United States has designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even 
though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 
sanctions.’’. 
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(6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 
[Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 
$55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 
2007.’’. These four countries have received contin-
ued assistance since 2007. 
(7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera-
tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 
provided to certain countries and because nuclear 
equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual- 
use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 
also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel-
opment.’’. 
(8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 
State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 
projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 
nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 
(9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro-
liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 
Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 
States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be-
cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 
TC project information during the proposal develop-
ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 
documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 
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118 
proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in 
U.S. policies and IAEA procedures [including moni-
toring proliferation risks] related to TC program fel-
lowships.’’. 
(10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi-
cials told us that the [technical cooperation pro-
gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 
basis of their status as United States—designated 
state sponsors of terrorism or other political consid-
erations’’ and that, according to the Deputy Director 
General for the Technical Cooperation Program, 
‘‘there are no good countries and there are no bad 
countries’’ with respect to provision of technical co-
operation by the IAEA. 
(11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 
the limited information available on TC projects and 
the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 
expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 
can assert with complete confidence that TC assist-
ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc-
tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 
terrorism’’. 
(12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 
not share [the State Department’s confidence in 
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119 
IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 
from contributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga-
nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 
for the United States proportionate share for pro-
grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, inter alia. 
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ-
ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 
funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 
being made available for programs and projects of 
the IAEA in Cuba. 
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 
the United States to withhold a proportionate share 
of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard-
ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 
Pi Nuclear Research Center. 
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con-
sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 
share of future annual contributions to the [tech-
nical cooperation fund] that is proportionate to the 
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amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 
designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 
is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 
foster a more consistent United States policy toward 
such nations’’. 
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 
the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 
water-related projects and its enrichment of ura-
nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 
(2010). 
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 
provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 
shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 
other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 
that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 
that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear 
activities . . .’’. 
(19) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 
2011, that the Government of Iran now has approxi-
mately 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is 
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running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its 
stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilo-
grams, considered sufficient for further enrichment 
into enough high-enriched uranium for more than 
one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran has also 
reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms 
of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U–235. 
(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘out-
standing issues related to possible military dimen-
sions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 
(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the 
[IAEA] remains concerned about the possible exist-
ence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear 
related activities involving military-related organiza-
tions, including activities related to the development 
of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’. 
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 
not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 
prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible as-
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surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma-
terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 
IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans-
parency measure, access to additional locations re-
lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 
research and development on uranium enrichment, 
and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 
the Security Council.’’. 
(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 
of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con-
nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 
about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 
progress on these issues.’’. 
(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolu-
tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 
September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 
2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 
and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 
and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 
NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 
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IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 
of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 
(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran 
recently denied access to its enrichment site at 
Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 
request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 
surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 
Natanz. 
(26) In April of 2008, United States Govern-
ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build-
ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as-
sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 
a North Korean model capable of producing pluto-
nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 
from becoming operational before an Israeli air 
strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 
2007. 
(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay-
den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 
Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 
or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 
(28) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 
2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 
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