(1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 
combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul-
timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 
of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 
resulting in— 
(A) the termination of hostilities or at 
least the attempted fait accompli; or 
(B) the neutralization of the ability of the 
People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 
accompli against Taiwan. 
(2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 
refers to the strategy of the People’s Republic of 
China for invading and seizing control of Taiwan be-
fore the United States Armed Forces can respond 
effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effec-
tive combined joint response by the United States 
Armed Forces by convincing the United States that 
mounting such a response would be prohibitively dif-
ficult or costly. 
SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in Asia 
and a steadfast partner of the United States in the 
common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific re-
gion in which— 
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(A) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy; 
(B) the people of the region live securely, 
prosperously, and with dignity; and 
(C) the societies of the region rise and fall 
not by coercion but on the basis of peaceful 
competition. 
(2) If the People’s Republic of China were to 
use military force to compel the unification of Tai-
wan with the People’s Republic of China— 
(A) the world would lose one of the great 
exemplars of freedom and democracy; 
(B) the United States and allies and part-
ners of the United States would face severe dif-
ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 
power relative to the People’s Republic of China 
in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 
(C) as the balance of power in the Indo- 
Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 
Republic of China, the People’s Republic of 
China would possess an increasing ability— 
(i) to impose its will throughout the 
Indo-Pacific region, including by threat-
ening or using force against Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, and other allies 
and partners of the United States; and 
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(ii) restrict United States access to 
key trade routes and markets in the Indo- 
Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 
economic hardship on middle-class and 
working-class Americans and increasing 
the ability of the People’s Republic of 
China to intrude into political life in the 
United States. 
(3) There is growing concern that the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China may con-
clude that the cross-Strait military balance has tilted 
in its favor and launch an invasion of Taiwan sooner 
than previously anticipated, including as follows: 
(A) Former Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs H.R. McMaster testi-
fied in March 2020 that Taiwan is ‘‘the most 
significant flashpoint now’’ between the United 
States and the People’s Republic of China. 
(B) Former Commander of United States 
Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Phil Davidson 
testified in March 2020 that the threat of an 
invasion by the People’s Republic of China of 
Taiwan ‘‘is manifest during this decade, in fact 
in the next six years’’. 
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(C) Commander of United States Indo-Pa-
cific Command Admiral John Aquilino testified 
in March 2020 that the threat of an invasion 
by the People’s Republic of China of Taiwan is 
‘‘much closer to us than most think’’ and could 
materialize well before 2035. 
(4) Defense policymakers and analysts across 
multiple administrations have found that, if the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China does invade Taiwan, the in-
vasion will likely take the form of a fait accompli, 
including as follows: 
(A) The Defense Science Board assessed in 
June 2018 that the People’s Republic of China 
‘‘will attempt to achieve a decisive outcome very 
quickly, presenting the United States and its al-
lies with a fait accompli,’’ in the event of con-
flict. 
(B) The Department of Defense Indo-Pa-
cific Strategy Report released in June 2019 
found that— 
(i) if the People’s Republic of China 
or another strategic competitor in the 
Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to advance 
their interests through force, they are like-
ly to enjoy a local military advantage at 
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the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli sce-
nario, competitors would seek to employ 
their capabilities quickly to achieve limited 
objectives and forestall a response from the 
United States, and its allies and partners’’; 
and 
(ii) an attempted fait accompli by the 
People’s Republic of China or another 
strategy competitor would constitute one of 
the ‘‘most stressing potential scenarios’’ 
facing the United States Armed Forces. 
(C) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy re-
leased by the United States Navy, United 
States Marine Corps, and United States Coast 
Guard in December 2020 stated, ‘‘In the event 
of conflict, China . . . will likely attempt to 
seize territory before the United States and its 
allies can mount an effective response—leading 
to a fait accompli.’’. 
(D) The Army Multi-Domain Trans-
formation strategic guidance released by Army 
Chief of Staff General James McConville in 
March 2021 stated that China and other adver-
saries of the United States will seek to ‘‘seize 
their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,’’ if 
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the Joint Force ‘‘cannot present credible deter-
rent options’’. 
(E) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat-
rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China 
is developing capabilities that could be used 
‘‘achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make re-
versing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily 
and politically’’. 
(F) Special Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for China Ely Ratner assessed in Jan-
uary 2020 that ‘‘China has made significant in-
vestments in long-range ISR and strike assets’’ 
and ‘‘China hopes the threat of these attacks 
will deter U.S. intervention by negating a sub-
stantial portion of U.S. airpower early in a con-
flict, thereby creating time and space for a fait 
accompli’’. 
(G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy Michele Flournoy warned in June 
2020 that the Government of the People’s Re-
public of China may believe the United States 
‘‘lack[s] the military capabilities that might be 
effective in the face of A2/AD’’ and ‘‘conclude 
that China should move on Taiwan sooner rath-
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er than later, a fait accompli that a weakened 
and distracted United States would have to ac-
cept’’. 
(5) There is broad agreement that the United 
States should maintain the ability of the United 
States Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the 
People’s Republic of China, including as follows: 
(A) The National Defense Strategy Com-
mission assessed in November 2018 that com-
peting successfully in ‘‘the Indo-Pacific region, 
while also managing escalation dynamics, re-
quires positioning substantial capability forward 
. . . to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 
agile, opportunistic adversary’’. 
(B) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Pat-
rick Shanahan testified in March 2019 that im-
plementation of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy was required to ensure the United 
States had ‘‘the capabilities, posture, and em-
ployment of forces’’ necessary to prevent a fait 
accompli by the People’s Republic of China. 
(C) Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs Jake Sullivan and Deputy As-
sistant to the President and Coordinator for 
Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell warned in 
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September 2019 that ‘‘Beijing cannot be al-
lowed to use the threat of force to pursue a fait 
accompli in territorial disputes’’. 
(D) In January 2020, Secretary of De-
fense Lloyd Austin upheld the assessment by 
the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that Depart-
ment of Defense ‘‘initiatives on force employ-
ment, crisis response, force and concept devel-
opment, and collaboration with allies and part-
ners’’ should be ‘‘aimed to help address this 
critical challenge’’ of a potential fait accompli 
scenario involving the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(E) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen 
Hicks testified in February 2020 that the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is ‘‘less likely’’ to at-
tempt a fait accompli against Taiwan if it 
knows that the United States will be able to de-
feat such an attempt, and that the United 
States should therefore maintain the ability to 
defeat a fait accompli by the People’s Republic 
of China against Taiwan. 
(F) Admiral Davidson and Admiral Aqui-
lino testified in March 2020 that they agreed 
with Deputy Secretary Hicks’ statements, and 
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that the United States should maintain the 
ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People’s 
Republic of China against Taiwan in order to 
strengthen deterrence against such a contin-
gency. 
(G) Former Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy James Miller wrote in October 2020 
that ‘‘U.S. defense planners must maintain a 
laser focus on a scenario for which U.S. forces 
are ill-prepared today, in which China . . . 
see[s] the opportunity for a quick invasion of a 
U.S. partner or ally and attempt to impose a 
fait accompli that would be costly and risky to 
reverse’’. 
(6) There is likewise broad agreement that a 
strategy of denial is essential to deter or defeat a 
fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 
against Taiwan, including as follows: 
(A) The 2018 National Defense Strategy 
tasked the Department of Defense with pos-
turing and employing forces to ‘‘delay, degrade, 
or deny adversary aggression’’. 
(B) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ar-
gued in January 2020 that a ‘‘combat-credible, 
forward deterrent posture is instrumental to the 
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United States military’s ability to deter, and if 
necessary, deny a fait accompli scenario’’. 
(C) Deputy Secretary Hicks, Under Sec-
retary Kahl, Admiral Davidson, and Admiral 
Aquilino reaffirmed the emphasis by Secretary 
Austin on denial and testified that a strategy of 
denial is essential for deterring Chinese aggres-
sion. 
(D) The Joint Operating Concept for De-
terrence Operations released in December 2017 
states that forward-deployed forces contribute 
to ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 
likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 
tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver-
sary decision makers from concluding they 
might achieve a military fait accompli that 
could be extremely costly for the US to reverse 
by force’’. 
(E) The United States Army’s Multi-Do-
main Operations concept document released in 
December 2018 states that Army forces must 
demonstrate the capability ‘‘to immediately 
deny a fait accompli’’ in order to deter a near- 
peer adversary. 
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(F) The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 
report released in March 2020 states that for-
ward-deployed forces possess the capability to 
‘‘attrite adversary forces, enable joint force ac-
cess requirements, complicate targeting and 
consume adversary ISR resources, and prevent 
fait accompli scenarios’’. 
(G) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy di-
rects the United States Navy, United States 
Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard 
to ‘‘deny adversaries their objectives, defeat ad-
versary forces while managing escalation, and 
set the conditions for favorable conflict termi-
nation’’. 
(7) Under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 
to consider any effort to determine the future of 
Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 
concern to the United States, and— 
(A) the Taiwan Relations Act further es-
tablishes it as the policy of the United States 
‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United States 
to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or 
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