artificial intelligence systems or provide models 
to government entities; 
(E) an analysis of efforts in China to as-
sess or mitigate national security or public safe-
ty threats from advanced artificial intelligence 
systems, including efforts to prevent loss of con-
trol from autonomous artificial intelligence sys-
tems; and 
(F) the goals for artificial intelligence de-
velopment explicitly and implicitly stated by the 
CCP. 
(13) An assessment of China’s global artificial 
intelligence standards diplomacy efforts, including— 
(A) mapping the fora where Chinese actors 
aimed to shape global standards; 
(B) jurisdictions where Chinese-promoted 
standards, model laws, guidance, or procure-
ment criteria have been adopted or referenced; 
(C) the effects on procurement and vendor 
eligibility; and 
(D) opportunities for the United States to 
shape global artificial intelligence standards and 
counter Chinese efforts. 
(14) An assessment of the degree to which enti-
ties in China remotely accessed artificial intelligence 
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computational resources, including through cloud 
services, international data centers, or through cir-
cumvention or avoidance of United States export 
controls. 
(15) An assessment of the methods, pathways, 
quantities, and companies and countries of origin of 
United States-controlled integrated circuits specifi-
cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-
telligence training or inference, including graphics 
processing units or application-specific integrated 
circuits, that have been diverted to mainland China, 
the estimated total compute capacity enabled 
through these chip diversions, and the percent of 
China’s total compute capacity enabled through 
these chip diversions. 
(16) An assessment of the effectiveness of 
United States export controls in restricting access by 
China to artificial intelligence-relevant technologies, 
including an identification of loopholes within United 
States export controls and recommendations for leg-
islative and administrative action to strengthen ex-
port controls and enforcement that is consistent with 
United States national security and foreign policy 
objectives. 
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(c) PRIORITIZATION.—In conducting the assessments 
required under subsection (b), the Secretary shall 
prioritize the identification and analysis of— 
(1) semiconductors, semiconductor manufac-
turing equipment, and critical components of semi-
conductor manufacturing equipment that are, or are 
likely to become, critical to the supply chains for the 
training or inference of the most advanced artificial 
intelligence systems; and 
(2) items that enable or could enable advanced 
model performance, are associated with systems that 
pose significant national security or strategic impli-
cations to the United States, or are likely to be 
foundational to the development of future advanced 
artificial intelligence systems, including those not yet 
deployed or publicly disclosed. 
(d) REFERENCE CLASS.—Where applicable, the Sec-
retary shall provide context to all statistics regarding Chi-
na’s artificial intelligence power in the report by pre-
senting China’s capabilities and production numbers in 
comparison to relevant United States and partner country 
production numbers and capabilities. 
(e) COORDINATION WITH EXPERT ENTITIES.—In 
carrying out this section, the Secretary may consult and 
coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies, 
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private industry or research organizations, federally fund-
ed research and development centers, national labora-
tories, academic institutions, relevant media outlets, or 
any other entities with expertise in semiconductor tech-
nologies, artificial intelligence, or national security that 
the Secretary determines relevant. 
(f) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form and may contain 
a classified annex. 
(g) MANDATORY UNCLASSIFIED ELEMENTS.—In the 
unclassified portion of the report required under sub-
section (a), the Secretary shall include— 
(1) the number of integrated circuits specifi-
cally designed or optimized for advanced artificial in-
telligence training or inference produced by leading 
entities in China in the year preceding submission of 
such report; 
(2) the projected production numbers of inte-
grated circuits from China specifically designed or 
optimized for advanced artificial intelligence training 
or inference, including identification of foundries re-
sponsible for such production, for the year pro-
ceeding submission of such report; and 
(3) the extent to which and ways artificial intel-
ligence-relevant technologies in China, including in-
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tegrated circuits, models, semiconductor manufac-
turing equipment, and humanoid robots are diffused 
in other countries, including the United States. 
(h) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 
(1) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of Commerce. 
(2) COVERED AGENCY HEADS.—The term ‘‘cov-
ered agency heads’’ means the— 
(A) Secretary of State; 
(B) Secretary of Defense; 
(C) Secretary of Energy; 
(D) Director of National Intelligence; 
(E) Director for the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy; and 
(F) head of any other relevant Federal de-
partment or agency the Secretary determines 
necessary. 
Æ 
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