SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Iran Refined Petro-
leum Sanctions Act of 2009’’. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF 
POLICY. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) The illicit nuclear activities of the Govern-
ment of Iran—combined with its development of un-
conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, and sup-
port for international terrorism—represent a serious 
threat to the security of the United States and U.S. 
allies in Europe, the Middle East, and around the 
world. 
(2) The United States and other responsible na-
tions have a vital interest in working together to 
prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a 
nuclear weapons capability. 
(3) The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has repeatedly called attention to Iran’s un-
lawful nuclear activities, and, as a result, the United 
Nations Security Council has adopted a range of 
sanctions designed to encourage the Government of 
Iran to suspend those activities and comply with its 
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons (commonly known as the 
‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’’).
(4) As a presidential candidate, then-Senator 
Obama stated that additional sanctions, especially 
those targeting Iran’s dependence on imported re-
fined petroleum, may help to persuade the Govern-
ment of Iran to abandon its illicit nuclear activities. 
(5) On October 7, 2008, then-Senator Obama 
stated, ‘‘Iran right now imports gasoline, even 
though it’s an oil producer, because its oil infra-
structure has broken down. If we can prevent them 
from importing the gasoline that they need and the 
refined petroleum products, that starts changing 
their cost-benefit analysis. That starts putting the 
squeeze on them.’’. 
(6) On June 4, 2008, then-Senator Obama 
stated, ‘‘We should work with Europe, Japan, and 
the Gulf states to find every avenue outside the U.N. 
to isolate the Iranian regime—from cutting off loan 
guarantees and expanding financial sanctions, to 
banning the export of refined petroleum to Iran.’’. 
(7) Major European allies, including the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany, have advocated 
that sanctions be significantly toughened should 
international diplomatic efforts fail to achieve 
verifiable suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment
program and an end to its nuclear weapons program 
and other illicit nuclear activities. 
(8) The serious and urgent nature of the threat 
from Iran demands that the United States work to-
gether with U.S. allies to do everything possible— 
diplomatically, politically, and economically—to pre-
vent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capa-
bility. 
(9) The human rights situation in Iran has 
steadily deteriorated in 2009, as punctuated by the 
transparent fraud that occurred on June 12, 2009, 
the brutal repression and murder, arbitrary arrests, 
and show trials of peaceful dissidents, and ongoing 
suppression of freedom of expression. 
(10) The Iranian regime has been unresponsive 
to, and at times contemptuous of, the Obama Ad-
ministration’s unprecedented and serious efforts at 
engagement, revealing that Tehran is not interested 
in a diplomatic resolution, as made clear, for exam-
ple, by the following: 
(A) Iran’s apparent rejection of the 
Tehran Research Reactor plan, generously of-
fered by the United States and its partners, of 
potentially great benefit to the Iranian people,
and endorsed by Iran’s own negotiators in Oc-
tober, 2009. 
(B) Iran’s ongoing clandestine nuclear 
weapons program, as evidenced by its work on 
the secret uranium enrichment facility at Qom, 
its subsequent refusal to cooperate fully with 
IAEA inspectors, and its announcement that it 
would build 10 new uranium enrichment facili-
ties. 
(C) Iran’s ongoing arms exports and sup-
port to terrorists in direct contravention of 
Unite Nations Security Council resolutions. 
(D) Iran’s absurd claims that the West, 
and specifically the United States, have fo-
mented the waves of anti-regime protests that 
followed the June 12, 2009, election in Iran. 
(E) Iran’s July 31, 2009, arrest of three 
young Americans on spying charges. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the 
Congress that— 
(1) international diplomatic efforts to address 
Iran’s illicit nuclear efforts, unconventional and bal-
listic missile development programs, and support for 
international terrorism are more likely to be effective 
if the President is empowered with the explicit au-
thority to impose additional sanctions on the Gov-
ernment of Iran; 
(2) the concerns of the United States regarding 
Iran are strictly the result of the actions of the Gov-
ernment of Iran; 
(3) the revelation in September 2009 that Iran 
is developing a secret uranium enrichment site on an 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps base near Qom, 
which appears to have no civilian application, high-
lights the urgency for Iran to fully disclose the full 
nature of its nuclear program, including any other 
secret locations, and provide the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency (IAEA) unfettered access to its 
facilities pursuant to Iran’s legal obligations under 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA; 
(4) because of its involvement in Iran’s nuclear 
program and other destabilizing activities, the Presi-
dent should impose sanctions, including the full 
range of sanctions otherwise applicable to Iran, on 
any individual or entity that is an agent, alias, front, 
instrumentality, representative, official, or affiliate 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or is an 
individual serving as a representative of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, or on any person that 
has conducted any commercial transaction or finan-
cial transaction with such entities; 
(5) Government to Government agreements 
with Iran to provide the regime with refined petro-
leum products, such as the September 2009 agree-
ment under which the Government of Venezuela 
committed to provide 20,000 barrels of gasoline per 
day to Iran, undermine efforts to pressure Iran to 
suspend its nuclear weapons program and cease all 
enrichment activities; and 
(6) the people of the United States— 
(A) have feelings of friendship for the peo-
ple of Iran; and 
(B) hold the people of Iran, their culture, 
and their ancient and rich history in the highest 
esteem. 
(c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 
of the United States— 
(1) to prevent Iran from achieving the capa-
bility to make nuclear weapons, including by sup-
porting international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s 
uranium enrichment program;
(4) to persuade the allies of the United States 
and other countries to take appropriate measures to 
deny access to the international financial system by 
Iranian banks and financial institutions involved in 
proliferation activities or support of terrorist groups; 
(5) to support all Iranian citizens who embrace 
the values of freedom, human rights, civil liberties, 
and the rule of law; and 
(6) for the Secretary of State to make every ef-
fort to assist United States citizens held hostage in 
Iran at any time during the period beginning on No-
vember 4, 1979 and ending on January 20, 1981, 
and their survivors in matters of compensation re-
lated to such citizens’ detention. 
SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 
1996. 
(a) EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS.—Section 5(a) of the 
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN AND EXPOR-
TATION OF REFINED PETROLEUM TO IRAN.— 
‘‘(1) 
DEVELOPMENT
OF
PETROLEUM
RE-
SOURCES OF IRAN.—
‘‘(A) INVESTMENT.—Except as provided in 
subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 or 
more of the sanctions described in paragraphs 
(1) through (6) of section 6(a) if the President 
determines that a person has knowingly, on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
made an investment of $20,000,000 or more (or 
any combination of investments of at least 
$5,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals 
or exceeds $20,000,000 in any 12-month pe-
riod), that directly and significantly contributed 
to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop 
petroleum resources of Iran. 
‘‘(B) PRODUCTION
OF
REFINED
PETRO-
LEUM PRODUCTS.—Except as provided in sub-
section (f), the President shall impose the sanc-
tions described in section 6(b) if the President 
determines that a person knowingly sells, 
leases, or provides to Iran any goods, services, 
technology, information, or support, or enters 
into a contract to sell, lease, or provide to Iran 
any goods, services, technology, information, or 
support, that would allow Iran to maintain or 
expand its domestic production of refined petro-
leum products, including any assistance in the
construction, modernization, or repair of refin-
eries that make refined petroleum products, 
if— 
‘‘(i) the value of the goods, services, 
technology, information, or support pro-
vided in such sale, lease, or provision, or to 
be provided in such contract, exceeds 
$200,000; or 
‘‘(ii) the value of the goods, services, 
technology, information, or support pro-
vided in any combination of such sales, 
leases, or provision in any 12-month pe-
riod, or to be provided under contracts en-
tered into in any 12-month period, exceeds 
$500,000. 
‘‘(2) EXPORTATION OF REFINED PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS TO IRAN.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
subsection (f), the President shall impose the 
sanctions described in section 6(b) if the Presi-
dent determines that a person knowingly pro-
vides Iran with refined petroleum products or 
knowingly engages in any of the activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (B), if—
‘‘(i) the value of such products or of 
the goods, services, technology, informa-
tion, or support provided or to be provided 
in connection with such activity exceeds 
$200,000; or 
‘‘(ii) the value of such products, or of 
the goods, services, technology, informa-
tion, or support, provided or to be provided 
in connection with any combination of pro-
viding such products or such activities, in 
any 12-month period exceeds $500,000. 
‘‘(B) ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED.—The activi-
ties referred to in subparagraph (A) are the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(i) Providing ships, vehicles, or other 
means of transportation to deliver refined 
petroleum products to Iran, or providing 
services relating to the shipping or other 
transportation of refined petroleum prod-
ucts to Iran. 
‘‘(ii) Underwriting or otherwise pro-
viding insurance or reinsurance for an ac-
tivity described in clause (i). 
‘‘(iii) Financing or brokering an activ-
ity described in clause (i).’’.
(b) DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.—Section 6 of such 
Act is amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘The sanctions to be imposed on 
a sanctioned person under section 5 are as follows:’’ 
and inserting the following: 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions to be imposed on 
a sanctioned person under subsections (a)(1)(A) and 
(b)(1) of section 5 are as follows:’’; 
(2) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘section 5’’ 
each place it appears and inserting ‘‘subsections 
(a)(1)(A) and (b) of section 5’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(b) ADDITIONAL MANDATORY SANCTIONS.—The 
sanctions to be imposed on a sanctioned person under 
paragraphs (1)(B) and (2) of section 5(a) are as follows: 
‘‘(1) FOREIGN
EXCHANGE.—The President 
shall prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange 
by the sanctioned person. 
‘‘(2) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The President 
shall prohibit any transfers of credit or payments be-
tween, by, through, or to any financial institution, to 
the extent that such transfers or payments involve 
any interest of the sanctioned person. 
‘‘(3) PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS.—The Presi-
dent shall prohibit any acquisition, holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation, or exportation of, dealing in, or exer-
cising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, 
or transactions involving, any property in which the 
sanctioned person has any interest by any person, or 
with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. 
‘‘(c) ADDITIONAL MEASURE RELATING TO REFINED 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each executive 
agency shall ensure that each contract with a person 
entered into by such executive agency for the pro-
curement of goods or services, or agreement for the 
use of Federal funds as part of a grant, loan, or 
loan guarantee to a person, includes a clause that 
requires the person to certify to the contracting offi-
cer or other appropriate official of such agency that 
the person does not conduct any activity described in 
paragraph (1)(B) or (2) of section 5(a). 
‘‘(2) EXCLUSION.—Paragraph (1) shall not 
apply to a loan or other program under title IV of 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 
et seq.), or to any payment of educational assistance 
by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under title 38, 
United States Code.
‘‘(3) REMEDIES.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If the head of the ex-
ecutive agency determines that such person has 
submitted a false certification under paragraph 
(1) after the date on which the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation is revised to implement the re-
quirements of this subsection, the head of an 
executive agency may terminate a contract, or 
agreement described in paragraph (1), with 
such person or debar or suspend such person 
from eligibility for Federal contracts or such 
agreements for a period not to exceed 3 years. 
Any such debarment or suspension shall be sub-
ject to the procedures that apply to debarment 
and suspension under the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation under subpart 9.4 of part 9 of title 
48, Code of Federal Regulations. 
‘‘(B) INCLUSION ON LIST OF PARTIES EX-
CLUDED
FROM
FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT
AND 
NONPROCUREMENT PROGRAMS.—The Adminis-
trator of General Services shall include on the 
List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procure-
ment and Nonprocurement Programs main-
tained by the Administrator under part 9 of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation issued under
section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421) each person that is 
debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, 
or declared ineligible by the head of an execu-
tive agency on the basis of a determination of 
a false certification under subparagraph (A). 
‘‘(C) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This sub-
section shall not be construed to limit the use 
of other remedies available to the head of an ex-
ecutive agency or any other official of the Fed-
eral Government on the basis of a determina-
tion of a false certification under paragraph 
(1). 
‘‘(4) IMPLEMENTATION
THROUGH
THE
FED-
ERAL
ACQUISITION
REGULATION.—Not later than 
120 days after the date of the enactment of the Iran 
Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act of 2009, the Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulation issued pursuant to sec-
tion 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
Act (41 U.S.C. 421) shall be revised to provide for 
the implementation of the requirements of this sub-
section. 
‘‘(5) 
CLARIFICATION
REGARDING
CERTAIN 
PRODUCTS.—Section 5(f)(2) applies with respect to 
the imposition of remedies under paragraph (3) to
the same extent as such section applies with respect 
to sanctions under subsection (a) or (b) of section 
5.’’. 
(c) ADDITIONAL MANDATORY SANCTIONS RELATING 
TO TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.—Section 5(b) 
of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 is amended— 
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and mov-
ing such paragraphs 2 ems to the right; 
(2) by striking ‘‘The President shall impose’’ 
and inserting the following: 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—The President shall im-
pose’’; 
(3) by striking ‘‘section 6’’ and inserting ‘‘sec-
tion 6(a)’’; and 
(4) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(2) ADDITIONAL SANCTION.— 
‘‘(A) RESTRICTION.—In any case in which 
a person is subject to sanctions under para-
graph (1) because of an activity described in 
such paragraph that relates to the acquisition 
or development of nuclear weapons or related 
technology or of missiles or other advanced con-
ventional weapons that are capable of delivering 
a nuclear weapon, then notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the following measures 
shall apply with respect to the country that has 
jurisdiction over such person, unless the Presi-
dent determines and notifies the appropriate 
congressional committees that the government 
of such country has taken, or is taking, effec-
tive actions to penalize such person and to pre-
vent a reoccurrence of such activity in the fu-
ture: 
‘‘(i) No agreement for cooperation be-
tween the United States and the govern-
ment of such country may be submitted to 
the President or to Congress pursuant to 
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), or may enter into 
force. 
‘‘(ii) No license may be issued for the 
export, and no approval may be given for 
the transfer or retransfer, directly or indi-
rectly, to such country of any nuclear ma-
terial, facilities, components, or other 
goods, services, or technology that would 
be subject to an agreement to cooperation. 
‘‘(B) CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions in 
subparagraph (A) shall apply in addition to all