I
104TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 3489
To protect the United States and its Armed Forces, wherever engaged, from
ballistic missile attack, to state the policy and priorities of the United
States for developing and deploying more effective defenses against ballis-
tic missiles, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 16, 1996
Mr. SPRATT (for himself, Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. DICKS, Mr.
SKELTON, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. BROWDER, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. ED-
WARDS, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. MCHALE, Mr. PETERSON of Florida, Mr.
KENNEDY of Rhode Island, Ms. HARMAN, Mr. FAZIO of California, Mr.
HOYER, and Mr. REED) introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee on National Security, and in addition to the Committee
on International Relations, for a period to be subsequently determined by
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall with-
in the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To protect the United States and its Armed Forces, wherever
engaged, from ballistic missile attack, to state the policy
and priorities of the United States for developing and
deploying more effective defenses against ballistic mis-
siles, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Ballistic Missile De-
fense Act of 1996’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Short-range theater ballistic missiles threat-
en United States Armed Forces wherever engaged
abroad. Therefore, the expeditious deployment of
theater missile defenses to intercept ballistic missiles
at greater ranges and higher altitudes is the highest
priority among all ballistic missile defense programs.
(2) The United States is developing defensive
systems to protect the United States against the
threat of limited ballistic missile attacks. Ground-
based defensive systems are attainable, compliant
with the ABM Treaty, more affordable than spaced-
based interceptors or space-based lasers, and can
protect all of the United States from limited ballistic
missile attack.
(3) Defending against ballistic missile attacks
upon our national territory requires not only missile
defenses but arms control agreements and non-
proliferation measures that lower the threat and
curb the spread of ballistic missile technology.
(4) The massive retaliatory capability of the
United States deterred the Soviet Union, and any
other nation, from launching an attack by interconti-
nental ballistic missiles throughout the Cold War.
The Nuclear Posture Review conducted by the De-
partment of Defense affirms the effectiveness of de-
terrence now and into the future. While the threat
of intentional attack upon the United States has re-
ceded, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized at-
tack by Russia or China remains but is remote.
(5) United States arms control agreements (no-
tably the START I Treaty and the START II Trea-
ty, once implemented) will lower the threat to the
United States from large-scale nuclear attack. The
START I Treaty, when fully implemented, will re-
duce deployed warheads by over 40 percent below
1990 levels. By the end of 1996, only Russia, among
the states of the former Soviet Union, will deploy
nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty, if imple-
mented, will reduce warheads deployed in Russia by
66 percent below their levels before the Start I Trea-
ty.
(6) As strategic offensive weapons are reduced,
the efficacy and affordability of defensive systems in-
creases, raising the possibility of deterrence based
upon effective defenses rather than deterrence based
solely upon threat of massive retaliation.
(7) Countries hostile to the United States (such
as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya) have mani-
fested an interest in developing ballistic missiles ca-
pable of reaching the United States. These countries
may accelerate the development of long-range mis-
siles if they receive external support, but in the ab-
sence of outside assistance, newly emerging threats
may take as long as 15 years to mature, according
to recent intelligence estimates.
(8) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Biological
and Chemical Weapons Convention, and continuing
United States efforts to enforce export controls will
prevent or delay external assistance needed by those
countries to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles
and weapons of mass destruction.
(9) The ABM Treaty has added to strategic
stability by restraining the requirement on both
sides for strategic weapons. At the summit in May
1995, the President of the United States and the
President of Russia each reaffirmed his country’s
commitment to the ABM Treaty.
(10) Abrogating the ABM Treaty to deploy a
noncompliant system will not add to strategic stabil-
ity if it impedes implementation of the START I or
START II Treaty. Without the removal of strategic
weapons scheduled by both treaties, the con-
sequences and risks of unauthorized or accidental
launches will remain undiminished, as will the poten-
tial threat of a large-scale attack capable of over-
whelming any defenses deployed.
(11) If the nuclear arsenal of the United States
must be maintained at START I levels, significant
unbudgeted costs will be incurred, encroaching on
funds for ballistic missile defenses and other defense
requirements.
(12) Should arms control, nonproliferation ef-
forts, and deterrence fail, the United States must be
able to defend itself against limited ballistic missile
attack.
(13) Missile defense systems consistent with the
ABM Treaty are capable of defending against lim-
ited ballistic missile attack. Should a national missile
defense system require modification of the ABM
Treaty, the treaty establishes the means for the par-
ties to amend the treaty, which the parties have used
in the past.
SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United
States to develop by the year 2000 a National Missile De-
fense System that can be deployed in 2003.
(b) CAPABILITY OF SYSTEM.—The National Missile
Defense System to be developed pursuant to subsection
(a) shall be capable, when deployed, of providing a highly
effective defense of the United States against limited bal-
listic missile attacks.
(c) TESTING BEFORE DEPLOYMENT.—The system
developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall be rigorously
tested during development.
(d) IMPROVEMENTS.—If a decision to deploy the sys-
tem developed pursuant to subsection (a) is not made by
the end of the year 2000, the Secretary of Defense shall
ensure that the system is improved by incorporation of
evolving technology to increase effectiveness and reduce
costs of a subsequent deployment, and that rigorous test-
ing continues.
SEC. 4. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PRIORITIES.
The following, in the order listed, shall be the policy
of the United States with respect to the priority for devel-
opment and deployment of ballistic missile defense pro-
grams:
(1) First, maintaining the operational readiness
of the Armed Forces, including a good quality of life
for servicemembers and their families, and mod-
ernization of weapons systems to ensure mission ef-
fectiveness in the future.
(2) Second, as part of such modernization, com-
pleting the development and deployment of essential
theater missile defense (TMD) systems as soon as
practicable.
(3) Third, developing by the year 2000 for de-
ployment in the year 2003 the system referred to in
section 3 and section 5(b) and developing for deploy-
ment as soon as practicable the space-based sensors
described in section 5(c).
SEC. 5. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITEC-
TURE.
(a) REQUIREMENT
FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DE-
FENSE PROGRAM.—To implement the policy established in
section 3, the Secretary of Defense shall initiate a Na-
tional Missile Defense Program, which shall position the
United States, by the end of the year 2000, to be capable
of deploying a National Missile Defense system, as de-
scribed in section 3(b), within three years.
(b) ELEMENTS OF THE NMD PROGRAM.—The Na-
tional Missile Defense Program shall include the following
elements:
(1) A ground-based interceptor system that pro-
vides coverage of the continental United States (in-
cluding Alaska) and Hawaii.
(2) Fixed ground-based radars.
(3) Space-based sensors.
(4) Battle management, command, control and
communications (BM/C3).
SEC. 6. IMPLEMENTATION OF NMD PROGRAM.
The Secretary of Defense shall—
(1) initiate plans and actions necessary to meet
the deployment readiness goals specified in section
5(a);
(2) conduct rigorous integrated system testing
using elements representative of the National Missile
Defense architecture referred to in section 5(b);
(3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition
policies and procedures, in accordance with existing
law, to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
developing the system referred to in section 5(b);
and
(4) develop technologies that have the potential
of improving the National Missile Defense system
prescribed in section 5(b).
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of De-
fense shall submit to Congress a report on the Secretary’s
plan for the National Missile Defense Program required
by this Act. The report shall include the following matters:
(1) The Secretary’s plan for carrying out this
Act, including—
(A) a detailed description of the system ar-
chitecture selected for development under sec-
tion 5(b); and
(B) a justification of the architecture se-
lected and reasons for the rejection of the other
candidate architectures.
(2) The Secretary’s estimate of the amount of
appropriations required for research, development,
test, evaluation, and for procurement, for each of
fiscal years 1997 through 2003 in order to achieve
an initial operational capability in 2003.
(3) A description of promising technologies to
be pursued in accordance with the requirements of
section 6(4).
(4) A determination of the point at which any
activity that is required to be carried out under this
Act would conflict with the terms of the ABM Trea-
ty, together with a description of any such activity,
the legal basis for the Secretary’s determination, and
an estimate of the time at which such point would
be reached in order to meet an initial operating ca-
pability in the year 2003.
SEC. 8. POLICY REGARDING REDUCTION OF THE THREAT
TO THE UNITED STATES FROM WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION.
(a) MEASURES TO ADDRESS THREATS FROM WEAP-
ONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.—In order to defend against
weapons of mass destruction by preventing the spread of
fissile materials and other components of weapons of mass
destruction, the President shall—
(1) enhance efforts, both unilaterally and in co-
operation with other nations, to prevent terrorist or-
ganizations from obtaining and using weapons of
mass destruction;
(2) expedite United States efforts to assist the
Governments of the Russian Federation, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, as appropriate, in improv-
ing the safety, security, and accountability of fissile
materials and nuclear warheads;
(3) undertake additional steps to prevent weap-
ons of mass destruction and their components from
being smuggled into the United States, through the
use of improved security devices at United States
ports of entry, increased numbers of Border Patrol
agents, increased monitoring of international bor-
ders, and other appropriate measures;
(4) seek the widest possible international adher-
ence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and
pursue to the fullest other export control measures
intended to deter and counter the spread of weapons
of mass destruction and their components; and
(5) enhance conventional weapons systems to
ensure that the United States possesses effective de-
terrent and counterforce capabilities against weap-
ons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.
(b) MEASURES
TO
ADDRESS
THREATS
FROM
ICBMS.—In order to reduce the threat to the United
States from weapons of mass destruction delivered by
intercontinental ballistic missiles, including accidental or
unauthorized launches, the President shall—
(1) urge the Government and Parliament of the
Russian Federation to ratify the START II Treaty
as soon as possible, permitting its expeditious entry
into force;
(2) pursue with the Government of the Russian
Federation, after START II entry-into-force, a sym-
metrical program of early deactivation of strategic
forces to be eliminated under START II; and
(3) work jointly with countries possessing inter-
continental ballistic missiles to improve command
and control technology and operations to the maxi-
mum extent practicable.
(c) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAM.—Consist-
ent with, and in order to compelement, the steps to be
taken by the President under subsection (a)(3), the Sec-
retary of Defense shall carry out a program to enhance
the capabilities of the United States relating to the threat
to the United States of a chemical or biological weapons
attack inside the United States by unconventional means.
In carrying out such program, the Secretary shall take
into consideration the assessments and recommendations
of the task force established under subsection (d). The ac-
tivities to be carried out by the Secretary under the pro-
gram shall include the following:
(1) Research, development, test, and evaluation
of technologies relating to any of the following:
(A) Detection of chemical or biological
weapons.
(B) Interception of such weapons.
(C) Protection against such weapons.
(D) Response to an attack inside the Unit-
ed States using such weapons.
(E) Decontamination of areas affected by
an attack using such weapons.
(2) Training of personnel for the activities spec-
ified in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph
(1).
(3) Identification of Federal equipment and
technologies that can be transferred from one Fed-
eral agency to another agency or to State and local
agencies consistent with the purposes of the program
under this subsection.
(d) INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.—(1) There is here-
by established in the executive branch an interagency task
force to assess, and make recommendations concerning,
the capabilities of the United States relating to the threat
of a chemical or biological weapons attack inside the Unit-
ed States by unconventional means.
(2) The task force shall on an ongoing basis assess
the current state of the United States with respect to each
of the following and shall identify and recommend poten-
tial improvements:
(A) The nature of the threat to the United
States of a chemical or biological weapons attack in-
side the United States by unconventional means.
(B) Capabilities related to detection and inter-
ception of such weapons or the possibility of such an
attack.
(C) Capabilities related to protection against
the effects of such an attack.
(D) Capabilities related to preparedness for,
and response to, such an attack.
(E) Capabilities related to decontamination fol-
lowing such an attack.
(F) Public education concerning the dangers of
such an attack and the appropriate response to such
an attack.
(3) Membership of the task force shall include rep-
resentatives of the following departments and agencies:
(A) The Department of Defense.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency, but only
with respect to assessment of the nature of the
threat.
(C) The Department of Justice, including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.
(D) The Federal Emergency Management
Agency.
(E) The Department of the Treasury, including
the Customs Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms.
(F) The Department of Health and Human
Services, including the Centers for Disease Control.
(4) In carrying out its activities, the task force shall
consult regularly with, and shall seek the views of, rep-
resentatives of—
(A) State and local government law enforce-
ment authorities; and
(B) State and local government emergency
planning authorities.
(5) Administrative support for the task force shall be
provided by the Secretary of Defense.
(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—The President shall submit to
Congress an annual report on actions by the United States
to comply with the provisions of this section. The first
such report shall be submitted not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 9. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—
(1) carry out the policies, programs, and re-
quirements of this Act in a manner consistent with
the ABM Treaty or through processes specified with-
in the ABM Treaty;
(2) at an appropriate time, seek amendments to
the ABM Treaty, as provided in Articles XIII and
XIV of the Treaty, if such amendments are required
to deploy the National Missile Defense system pre-
scribed in section 5; and
(3) treat any negotiated amendment to the
ABM Treaty as having entered into force only if
such amendment is made in the same manner as a
treaty (including the requirement that ratification by
the United States is subject to the advice and con-
sent of the Senate).
(b) MODIFICATIONS RESTRICTING TMD SYSTEMS.—
The United States shall not be bound by any amendment
or other substantive modification to the ABM treaty that
restricts theater ballistic missile defense systems unless—
(1) that system is actually flight-tested against
a ballistic missile that exceeds (A) a range of 3,500
kilometers, or (B) a velocity of 5 kilometers per sec-
ond; or
(2) the agreement for such modification is
made pursuant to the requirements of section 235 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996 (Public Law 104–106; 110 Stat. 231).
SEC. 10. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
For purposes of this Act, the term ‘‘ABM Treaty’’
means the Treaty between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May
26, 1972, and includes Protocols to that Treaty signed
at Moscow on July 3, 1974, and all Agreed Statements
and amendments to such Treaty in effect.
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