I
105TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 1431
To ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent with United States interests,
to strengthen relations between the United States and Russia, to preserve
the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms control
agreements, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APRIL 24, 1997
Mr. GILMAN (for himself, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. GOSS, Mr.
WELDON of Pennsylvania, and Mr. COX of California) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Rela-
tions
A BILL
To ensure that the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) proceeds in a manner consistent
with United States interests, to strengthen relations be-
tween the United States and Russia, to preserve the
prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms
control agreements, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘European Security Act
of 1997’’.
SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
The Congress declares the following to be the policy
of the United States:
(1) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO NATO ENLARGE-
MENT.—(A) The emerging democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe that will be invited to begin ac-
cession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in Ma-
drid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last
such countries invited to join NATO.
(B) The United States should seek to ensure
that the NATO leaders assembled in Madrid agree
on a process whereby all other emerging democracies
in Central and Eastern Europe that wish to join
NATO will be considered for membership in NATO
as soon as they meet the criteria for such member-
ship set forth in the NATO Participation Act of
1994 (title II of Public Law 103–447; 22 U.S.C.
1928 note).
(2) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE NATO-RUS-
SIA CHARTER AND ADAPTATION OF THE CFE TREA-
TY.—(A) NATO enlargement should be carried out
in such a manner as to underscore the Alliance’s de-
fensive nature and demonstrate to Russia that
NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all
countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly,
the United States and its NATO Allies should make
this intention clear in the negotiation of the NATO-
Russia Charter and adaptation of the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of November
19, 1990.
(B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia
NATO’s defensive and security-enhancing intentions,
it is essential that neither fundamental United
States security interests in Europe nor the effective-
ness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance
be jeopardized. In particular, no commitments
should be made that would have the effect of—
(i) extending rights or imposing respon-
sibilities on new NATO members different from
those applicable to current NATO members, in-
cluding with respect to the deployment of nu-
clear weapons and the stationing of troops and
equipment from other NATO members;
(ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend
the territory of new NATO members by, for ex-
ample, restricting the construction of defense
infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO
to deploy reinforcements when necessary;
(iii) providing any international organiza-
tion, or any country that is not a member of
NATO, with authority to review, delay, veto, or
otherwise impede deliberations and decisions of
the North Atlantic Council or the implementa-
tion of such decisions, including with respect to
the deployment of NATO forces or the admis-
sion of additional members to NATO; or
(iv) impeding the development of enhanced
relations between NATO and other European
countries that do not belong to the Alliance by,
for example, recognizing spheres of influence in
Europe.
(C) In order to enhance security and stability in
Europe, the NATO-Russia Charter should include
commitments from the Russian Federation—
(i) to demarcate all its borders with neigh-
boring states;
(ii) to station its armed forces on the terri-
tory of other states only with the consent of
such states and in strict accordance with inter-
national law; and
(iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and
conventional forces in Kaliningrad.
(D) As the ongoing negotiations on adaptation
of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty proceed, the United States should engage in
close and continuous consultations not only with its
NATO allies, but also with the emerging democ-
racies of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and
the newly independent states of the Caucasus region.
(3) POLICY WITH RESPECT TO BALLISTIC MIS-
SILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.—(A) As
the United States proceeds with efforts to develop
defenses against ballistic missile attack, it should
seek to foster a climate of cooperation with Russia
on matters related to missile defense. In particular,
the United States and its NATO allies should seek
to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early
warning and technical aspects of ballistic missile de-
fense.
(B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote bal-
listic missile defense cooperation with Russia, it
must insist on its constitutional prerogatives regard-
ing consideration of arms control agreements with
Russia that bear on ballistic missile defense.
SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in
order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
(b) DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELI-
GIBLE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT ASSISTANCE.—
(1) 
DESIGNATION
OF
ADDITIONAL
COUN-
TRIES.—
(A) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
graph (B), not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of the
NATO Participation Act of 1994, designate ad-
ditional emerging democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe that, as of the date of the en-
actment of this Act, have not been designated
as eligible to receive assistance under the pro-
gram established under section 203(a) of such
Act.
(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to des-
ignate additional emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe under subpara-
graph (A) shall not apply and shall become a
requirement to designate one or more such ad-
ditional emerging democracies if the President
certifies to the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
that such additional emerging democracies are
the only additional emerging democracies that
meet the criteria for designation set forth in
section 203(d)(3) of the NATO Participation
Act of 1994; and, in addition, the requirement
to designate additional emerging democracies
under subparagraph (A) shall not apply if the
President certifies to such Committees that no
such additional emerging democracies meet the
criteria for designation set forth in section
203(d)(3) of such Act.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The designation
of countries pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to
receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act
of 1994—
(A) is in addition to the designation of
other countries by law or pursuant to section
203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive as-
sistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act; and
(B) shall not preclude the designation by
the President of other emerging democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe pursuant to sec-
tion 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to receive
assistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act.
(3) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense
of the Congress that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania—
(A) are to be commended for their
progress toward political and economic liberty
and meeting the guidelines for prospective
NATO members;
(B) would make an outstanding contribu-
tion to furthering the goals of NATO and en-
hancing stability, freedom, and peace in Europe
should they become NATO members; and
(C) upon complete satisfaction of all rel-
evant criteria should be invited to become full
NATO members at the earliest possible date.
(c) REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE AND PARTNER-
SHIP
FOR
PEACE INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT
SYS-
TEM.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Funds described in para-
graph (2) are authorized to be made available to
support the implementation of the Regional Airspace
Initiative and the Partnership for Peace Information
Management System, including—
(A) the procurement of items in support of
these programs; and
(B) the transfer of such items to countries
participating in these programs.
(2) FUNDS
DESCRIBED.—Funds described in
this paragraph are funds that are available—
(A) during any fiscal year under the
NATO Participation Act of 1994 with respect
to countries eligible for assistance under that
Act; or
(B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act
to carry out the Warsaw Initiative.
(d) EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY REGARDING EXCESS
DEFENSE ARTICLES.—Section 105 of Public Law 104–
164 (110 Stat. 1427) is amended by striking ‘‘1996 and
1997’’ and inserting ‘‘1997, 1998, and 1999’’.
(e) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE NATO PAR-
TICIPATION ACT OF 1994.—Section 203(c) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994 is amended—
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘, without re-
gard to the restrictions’’ and all that follows and in-
serting a period;
(2) by striking paragraph (2);
(3) in paragraph (8)—
(A) by striking ‘‘any restrictions in sec-
tions 516 and 519’’ and inserting ‘‘section
516(e)’’;
(B) by striking ‘‘as amended,’’; and
(C) by striking ‘‘paragraphs (1) and (2)’’
and inserting ‘‘paragraph (1)’’; and
(4) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through
(8) as paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.
SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CON-
VENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in
order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).
(b) AUTHORITY
TO APPROVE
THE CFE FLANK
AGREEMENT.—The President is authorized to approve on
behalf of the United States the Document Agreed Among
States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, signed in Vi-
enna, Austria on May 31, 1996, concerning the resolution
of issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-
rope (CFE) Treaty flank zone.
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO CFE
ADAPTATION.—It is the sense of Congress that any revi-
sions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-
rope that may be agreed in the ongoing CFE adaptation
negotiations can enter into force only if those revisions are
specifically approved in a manner described in section
33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22
U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such approval will be provided
to any revisions to that Treaty that jeopardize fundamen-
tal United States security interests in Europe or the effec-
tiveness and flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance
by—
(1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities
on new NATO members different from those appli-
cable to current NATO members, including with re-
spect to the deployment of nuclear weapons and the
stationing of troops and equipment from other
NATO members;
(2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the
territory of new NATO members by, for example, re-
stricting the construction of defense infrastructure
or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy reinforce-
ments when necessary;
(3) providing any international organization, or
any country that is not a member of NATO, with
authority to review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede
deliberations and decisions of the North Atlantic
Council or the implementation of such decisions, in-
cluding with respect to the deployment of NATO
forces or the admission of additional members to
NATO; or
(4) impeding the development of enhanced rela-
tions between NATO and other European countries
that do not belong to the Alliance by, for example,
recognizing spheres of influence in Europe.
SEC. 
5. 
BALLISTIC 
MISSILE 
DEFENSE 
COOPERATIVE
PROJECTS WITH RUSSIA.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in
order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM OF BALLISTIC
MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA.—The
Secretary of Defense shall carry out a program of coopera-
tive ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Rus-
sian Federation.
(c) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program of coop-
erative ballistic missile defense-related projects with the
Russian Federation under subsection (b) may include (but
is not limited to) projects in the following areas:
(1) Cooperation between the United States and
the Russian Federation with respect to early warn-
ing of ballistic missile launches, including the shar-
ing of information on ballistic missile launches de-
tected by either the United States or the Russian
Federation, formalization of an international launch
notification regime, and establishment of a joint
global warning center.
(2) Technical cooperation in research, develop-
ment, test, and production of technology and sys-
tems for ballistic missile defense.
(3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense ex-
ercises.
(4) Planning for cooperation in defense against
ballistic missile threats aimed at either the United
States or the Russian Federation.
(d) JOINT WORKING GROUP.—The President should
seek to establish with the Russian Federation a joint
working group to examine the potential for mutual accom-
modation of outstanding issues between the two nations
on matters relating to ballistic missile defense and the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possi-
bility of developing a strategic relationship not based on
mutual nuclear threats.
(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than March 1 each
year, the President shall submit to the Congress a report
on the cooperative program under this section. Each such
report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the conduct of the program
during the preceding fiscal year, including a descrip-
tion of the projects carried out under the program.
(2) A description of the activities of the joint
working group under subsection (d) during the pre-
ceding fiscal year.
(3) A description of the funding for the pro-
gram during the preceding fiscal year and the year
during which the report is submitted and the pro-
posed funding for the program for the next fiscal
year.
SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD
DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.
(a) POLICY OF SECTION.—This section is enacted in
order to implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).
(b) RESTRICTION.—An ABM/TMD demarcation
agreement shall not be binding on the United States, and
shall not enter into force with respect to the United
States, unless, after the date of the enactment of this Act,
that agreement is specifically approved in a manner de-
scribed in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and Disar-
mament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)).
(c) SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO DEMAR-
CATION AGREEMENTS.—
(1) OPPOSITION TO MULTILATERALIZATION OF
ABM TREATY.—It is the sense of the Congress that
until the United States has taken the steps nec-
essary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bi-
lateral treaty between the United States and the
Russian Federation (such state being the only suc-
cessor state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics that has deployed or realistically may deploy an
anti-ballistic missile defense system) no ABM/TMD
demarcation agreement will be considered for ap-
proval for entry into force with respect to the United
States (any such approval, as stated in subsection
(b), to be effective only if provided in a manner de-
scribed in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).
(2) PRESERVATION OF U.S. THEATER BALLIS-
TIC MISSILE DEFENSE POTENTIAL.—It is the sense
of the Congress that no ABM/TMD demarcation
agreement that would reduce the potential of United
States theater missile defense systems to defend the
Armed Forces of the United States abroad or the
armed forces or population of allies of the United
States will be approved for entry into force with re-
spect to the United States (any such approval, as
stated in subsection (b), to be effective only if pro-
vided in a manner described in section 33(b) of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C.
2573(b))).
(d) ABM/TMD DEMARCATION AGREEMENT DE-
FINED.—For the purposes of this section, the term
‘‘ABM/TMD demarcation agreement’’ means an agree-
ment that establishes a demarcation between theater bal-
listic missile defense systems and strategic anti-ballistic
missile defense systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty,
including the following:
(1) The agreement concluded by the Standing
Consultative Commission on June 24, 1996, con-
cerning lower velocity theater missile defense sys-
tems.
(2) The agreement concluded (or to be con-
cluded) by the Standing Consultative Commission
concerning higher velocity theater missile defense
systems, based on the Joint Statement Concerning
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March
21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.
(3) Any agreement similar to the agreements
identified in paragraphs (1) and (2).
(e) ABM TREATY DEFINED.—For purposes of this
section, the term ‘‘ABM Treaty’’ means the Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23
UST 3435), and includes the Protocols to that Treaty,
signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974 (27 UST 1645).
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