120 
lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 
research and development on uranium enrichment, 
and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 
the Security Council.’’. 
(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 
of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con-
nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 
about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 
programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 
progress on these issues.’’. 
(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolu-
tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 
September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 
2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 
11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 
and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 
and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 
NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 
IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 
of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 
(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran 
recently denied access to its enrichment site at 
Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 
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121 
request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 
surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 
Natanz. 
(26) In April of 2008, United States Govern-
ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build-
ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as-
sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 
a North Korean model capable of producing pluto-
nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 
from becoming operational before an Israeli air 
strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 
2007. 
(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay-
den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 
Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 
or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 
(28) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 
2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 
features that resembled those of an undeclared nu-
clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro-
vided the requested documentation in support of its 
declarations concerning the nature or function of the 
destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 
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122 
other locations which the IAEA has requested to 
visit.’’. 
(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 
to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 
that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 
Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter-
mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 
Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 
in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 
Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 
that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 
not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 
material.’’. 
(30) Commercial satellite photos published on 
February 23, 2011 indicate efforts by the Govern-
ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi-
tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 
to the Dair Alzour facility. 
(31) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 
that ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] 
since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved 
issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other 
three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As 
a consequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to 
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123 
make progress towards resolving the outstanding 
issues related to those sites.’’ 
(b) IN GENERAL.—No funds from any United States 
assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 
used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 
through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun-
try, including North Korea that— 
(1) is a country the government of which has 
been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur-
poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 
Act, or other provision of law, is a government that 
has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter-
national terrorism; 
(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 
obligations regarding— 
(A) its safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA; 
(B) the Additional Protocol; 
(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 
(D) any relevant United Nations Security 
Council Resolution; or 
(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 
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(3) is under investigation for a breach of or 
noncompliance with the obligations specified in para-
graph (2). 
(c) WITHHOLDING
OF
VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBU-
TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en-
actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 
from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 
in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 
its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 
in subsection (b). 
(d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 
If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not 
been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist-
ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 
to the countries described in subsection (b), an amount 
equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld 
from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 
(e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and 
(d) may be waived if— 
(1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro-
vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 
the countries described in subsection (b); or 
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