I
106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 1838
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other
purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 18, 1999
Mr. DELAY (for himself, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. DEUTSCH, Mr.
ROHRABACHER, Mr. WU, Mr. COX, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. DIAZ-BALART,
Mrs. LOWEY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. BURTON of
Indiana, Mr. COOK, and Mr. WELDON of Florida) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Rela-
tions, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consider-
ation of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned
A BILL
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Security En-
hancement Act’’.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between
the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous
benefit to both societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a
major political transformation, and Taiwan is today
a true multiparty democracy with a political system
separate from and totally unlike that of the People’s
Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free
market principles and is separate and distinct from
the People’s Republic of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United
States Government withdrew diplomatic recognition
of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate gov-
ernment of China, neither at that time nor since has
the United States Government adopted a formal po-
sition as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than
to state that status must be decided by peaceful
means. Any determination of the ultimate status of
Taiwan must have the express consent of the people
on Taiwan.
(5) The government on Taiwan no longer
claims to be the sole legitimate government of all of
China.
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–
8) states that—
(A) peace and stability in the Taiwan
Strait area are in the political, security, and
economic interests of the United States and are
of international concern;
(B) the decision of the United States to es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by
peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including boycotts
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and secu-
rity of the Western Pacific region and of grave
concern to the United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the ca-
pacity to resist any form of coercion that jeop-
ardizes the security, or the social or the eco-
nomic system, of the people on Taiwan; and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of
the human rights of all the people on Taiwan
are objectives of the United States.
(7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan
Relations Act establishes on the part of the United
States a continuing connection with and concern for
Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain
themselves free of coercion and free of the use of
force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of
forces adequate for defense and deterrence is in the
interest of the United States in that it helps to
maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait area.
(8) Since 1954, when the United States and
Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, the
United States and Taiwan have maintained a de-
fense and security relationship that has contributed
greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan
and the East Asia and Pacific regions.
(9) The United States and Taiwan no longer
conduct joint training missions, have no direct mili-
tary lines of communication, and have only limited
military-to-military contacts. This lack of commu-
nication and interoperation between the United
States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense
of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event
of future aggression against Taiwan.
(10) Since 1979, the United States has contin-
ued to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan in accord-
ance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and such sales
have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and free-
dom in the face of persistent hostility from the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. However, pressures to delay,
deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been
prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982,
communique with the People’s Republic of China.
Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions could
prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capa-
bility for self-defense.
(11) As has been affirmed on several occasions
by the executive branch of Government, the provi-
sions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal prece-
dence over any communique with the People’s Re-
public of China.
(12) The People’s Republic of China has con-
sistently refused to renounce the use of force against
Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened force against
Taiwan, including implied threats by unnamed Peo-
ple’s Republic of China officials on January 10,
1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the
development of theater missile defense capabilities
with the United States.
(13) The missile firings by the People’s Repub-
lic of China near Taiwan in August 1995 and March
1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China to use forceful tactics to
limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
(14) As most nations in East Asia reduce mili-
tary spending, the People’s Republic of China con-
tinues a major and comprehensive military buildup.
(15)(A) This military buildup includes the de-
velopment of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles
that will incorporate precision guidance capability
and the construction of new imaging, radar, naviga-
tion, and electronic intelligence satellites that will
help target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles.
(B) According to the Department of Defense
report entitled ‘‘The Security Situation in the Tai-
wan Strait’’, submitted to Congress in February
1999, the size of the missile force of the People’s
Republic of China is expected to grow substantially
and, by 2005, the People’s Republic of China will
possess an ‘‘overwhelming advantage’’ in offensive
missiles vis-a-vis Taiwan.
(C) The Department of Defense has also noted
that the People’s Republic of China may already
possess the capability to damage satellite optical sen-
sors with lasers, is researching advanced anti-sat-
ellite lasers that could blind United States intel-
ligence satellites, and is procuring radio frequency
weapons that disable electronic equipment.
(D) These missile and anti-satellite capabilities
pose a grave threat to Taiwan.
(16) This military buildup also includes the
construction or procurement from abroad of ad-
vanced naval systems, including Russian Kilo sub-
marines that are difficult to detect, Russian tech-
nology to assist the development of new nuclear-pow-
ered attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class
destroyers armed with supersonic SS–N–22 Sunburn
anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather
naval attack aircraft called the JH–7, and new in-
digenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be
launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack
aircraft. These naval capabilities pose a grave threat
of blockade to Taiwan.
(17) This military buildup also includes the im-
provement of air combat capabilities by procuring
and co-producing hundreds of Russian Sukhoi Su–
27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian Su–30 all-
weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with
advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R–
77 missile and other precision guided munitions,
constructing the indigenously designed J–10 fighter,
and seeking advanced airborne warning and control
systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a grave
airborne threat to Taiwan.
(18) Because of the introduction of advanced
submarines into the Taiwan Strait area by the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China and the increasing capability
of the People’s Republic of China to blockade Tai-
wan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered sub-
marines in order to maintain a capability to counter
a blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare train-
ing, and for other purposes.
(19) Because of the democratic form of govern-
ment on Taiwan and the historically nonaggressive
foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that
Taiwan would use submarines in an offensive man-
ner.
(20) The current defense relationship between
the United States and Taiwan is deficient in terms
of its capacity over the long term to counter and
deter potential aggression against Taiwan by the
People’s Republic of China.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) TRAINING OF TAIWAN MILITARY OFFICERS.—It
is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense and
the Secretaries of the military departments should make
every effort to reserve additional positions for Taiwan
military officers at the National Defense University and
other professional military education schools specified in
section 2162(d) of title 10, United States Code, and for
prospective Taiwan military officers at the United States
Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and
the Air Force Academy.
(b) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES.—It is the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of State should, when consid-
ering foreign military sales to Taiwan—
(1) take into account the special status of Tai-
wan; and
(2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan
has full and timely access to price and availability
data for defense articles and defense services.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
(a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMER-
ICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—Upon the request of the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President shall
use funds available to the Department of Defense under
the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail
of additional technical staff to the American Institute in
Taiwan.
(b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Beginning 60 days after the
next round of arms talks between the United States and
Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President shall sub-
mit a report to Congress—
(1) detailing each of Taiwan’s requests for pur-
chase of defense articles and defense services during
the one-year period ending on the date of the report;
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by
Taiwan as justification for those requests; and
(3) describing any decision to reject, postpone,
or modify any such request that was made during
the one-year period ending on the date of the report,
the level at which the final decision was made, and
a justification for the decision.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE
CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.—Congress finds that any de-
termination of the nature or quantity of defense articles
or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that
is made on any basis other than the defense needs of Tai-
wan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Commu-
nique signed with the People’s Republic of China, or any
similar executive agreement, order, or policy would violate
the intent of Congress in the enactment of section 3(b)
of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
(b) PLAN REGARDING COMBINED TRAINING
AND
PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS.—
(1) DEVELOPMENT.—The Secretary of Defense,
in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall de-
velop a plan for the enhancement of programs and
arrangements for operational training and exchanges
of personnel between the Armed Forces of the
United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for
work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning,
operational methods, and other areas. The plan shall
provide for exchanges of officers up to and including
general and flag officers in the grade of O–10.
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
Defense shall submit a report to Congress, in classi-
fied or unclassified form, containing the plan re-
quired under paragraph (1).
(3) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 210
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall implement the plan re-
quired under paragraph (1).
(c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES
AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS.—Not later than 180
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Defense shall establish secure direct communications
between the United States Pacific military command and
the Taiwan military command.
(g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS.—Subject to sub-
section (h), the President is authorized to make available
for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, defensive systems
that counter the development by the People’s Republic of
China of new naval capabilities, including defense systems
such as—
(1) diesel-powered submarines;
(2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne
systems, capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced
Chinese nuclear submarines;
(3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis
destroyers, capable of defeating foreign supersonic
anti-ship missiles; and
(4) communications systems that better enable
Taiwan to conduct joint-force naval defense oper-
ations.
(h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—
Nothing in this section supersedes or modifies the applica-
tion of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to the
sale of any defense article or defense service under this
section.
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