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(3) calendar year 2006 should be a period of sig-
nificant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with
Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security
of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the con-
ditions for the phased redeployment of United States
forces from Iraq;
(4) United States military forces should not stay
in Iraq any longer than required and the people of
Iraq should be so advised;
(5) the Administration should tell the leaders of
all groups and political parties in Iraq that they need
to make the compromises necessary to achieve the
broad-based and sustainable political settlement that
is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq, with-
in the schedule they set for themselves; and
(6) the Administration needs to explain to Con-
gress and the American people its strategy for the suc-
cessful completion of the mission in Iraq.
(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES POL-
ICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ.—Not later than
90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
every three months thereafter until all United States combat
brigades have redeployed from Iraq, the President shall sub-
mit to Congress an unclassified report on United States pol-
icy and military operations in Iraq. Each report shall in-
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clude to the extent practical, the following unclassified in-
formation:
(1) The current military mission and the diplo-
matic, political, economic, and military measures, if
any, that are being or have been undertaken to suc-
cessfully complete or support that mission, including:
(A) Efforts to convince Iraq’s main commu-
nities to make the compromises necessary for a
broad-based and sustainable political settlement.
(B) Engaging the international community
and the region in the effort to stabilize Iraq and
to forge a broad-based and sustainable political
settlement.
(C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq’s
government ministries.
(D) Accelerating the delivery of basic serv-
ices.
(E) Securing the delivery of pledged eco-
nomic assistance from the international commu-
nity and additional pledges of assistance.
(F) Training Iraqi security forces and
transferring security responsibilities to those
forces and the government of Iraq.
(2) Whether the Iraqis have made the com-
promises necessary to achieve the broad-based and
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sustainable political settlement that is essential for
defeating the insurgency in Iraq.
(3) Any specific conditions included in the April
2005 Multi-National Forces-Iraq campaign action
plan (referred to in United States Government Ac-
countability Office October 2005 report on Rebuilding
Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Govern-
ance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Sta-
bilizing Iraq), and any subsequent updates to that
campaign plan, that must be met in order to provide
for the transition of security responsibility to Iraqi
security forces.
(4) To the extent that these conditions are not
covered under paragraph (3), the following should
also be addressed:
(A) The number of battalions of the Iraqi
Armed Forces that must be able to operate inde-
pendently 
or 
to 
take 
the 
lead 
in
counterinsurgency operations and the defense of
Iraq’s territory.
(B) The number of Iraqi special police units
that must be able to operate independently or to
take the lead in maintaining law and order and
fighting the insurgency.