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gling, commercial fraud, or terrorist activity; 
and 
(B) whether those incidents involved par-
ticipants in CTPAT or entities not participating 
in CTPAT. 
(2) An analysis of causes for the suspension or 
removal of entities from participating in CTPAT as 
a result of security incidents during that 5-year pe-
riod. 
(3) An analysis of the number of active CTPAT 
participants involved in one or more security inci-
dents while maintaining their status as participants. 
(4) Recommendations to the Commissioner of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection for improve-
ments to CTPAT to improve prevention of security 
incidents in the cargo supply chain involving partici-
pants in CTPAT. 
SEC. 11325. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED. 
No additional funds are authorized to be appropriated 
for the purpose of carrying out this subtitle. 
Subtitle D—Military Spouse 
Employment Act 
SEC. 11331. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Military Spouse 
Employment Act’’.
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(3) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ‘‘subsection 
(a)(3)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a)(4)’’. 
SEC. 11333. GAO STUDY AND REPORT. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 
(1) the terms ‘‘agency’’ means an agency de-
scribed in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 901(b) of 
title 31, United States Code; 
(2) the term ‘‘employee’’ means an employee of 
an agency; 
(3) the term ‘‘remote work’’ means a particular 
type of telework under which an employee is not ex-
pected to report to an officially established agency lo-
cation on a regular and recurring basis; and 
(4) the term ‘‘telework’’ means a work flexibility 
arrangement under which an employee performs the 
duties and responsibilities of such employee’s position, 
and other authorized activities, from an approved 
worksite other than the location from which the em-
ployee would otherwise work. 
(b) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 18 months after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General 
of the United States shall conduct a study and publish a 
report regarding the use of remote work by agencies, which 
shall include a discussion of what is known regarding—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) the number of employees who are engaging in 
remote work; 
(2) the role of remote work in agency recruit-
ment and retention efforts; 
(3) the geographic location of employees who en-
gage in remote work; 
(4) the effect that remote work has had on how 
often employees are reporting to officially established 
agency locations to perform the duties and respon-
sibilities of the positions of those employees and other 
authorized activities; and 
(5) how the use of remote work has affected Fed-
eral office space utilization and spending. 
Subtitle E—Designation of Airports 
SEC. 11341. DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL PORT OF ENTRY 
FOR THE IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION 
OF WILDLIFE AND WILDLIFE PRODUCTS BY 
THE UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to appropriations and in 
accordance with subsection (b), the Director of the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service shall designate 1 addi-
tional port as a ‘‘port of entry designated for the importa-
tion and exportation of wildlife and wildlife products’’ 
under section 14.12 of title 50, Code of Federal Regulations.
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(b) CRITERIA
FOR SELECTING ADDITIONAL DES-
IGNATED PORT.—The Director shall select the additional 
port to be designated pursuant to subsection (a) from 
among the United States airports that handled more than 
8,000,000,000 pounds of cargo during 2021, as reported by 
the Federal Aviation Administration Air Carrier Activity 
Information System, and based upon the analysis sub-
mitted to Congress by the Director pursuant to the Wildlife 
Trafficking reporting directive under title I of Senate Re-
port 114–281. 
DIVISION M—INTELLIGENCE AU-
THORIZATION ACT FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 2024 
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This division may be cited as the 
‘‘Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this division is as follows: 
DIVISION M—INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2024 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Definitions. 
TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations. 
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations. 
Sec. 103. Intelligence Community Management Account. 
Sec. 104. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law. 
TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND 
DISABILITY SYSTEM 
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
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TITLE III—INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS 
Subtitle A—General Intelligence Community Matters 
Sec. 301. Plan to recruit, train, and retain personnel with experience in financial 
intelligence and emerging technologies. 
Sec. 302. Policy and performance framework for mobility of intelligence commu-
nity workforce. 
Sec. 303. In-State tuition rates for active duty members of the intelligence com-
munity. 
Sec. 304. Standards, criteria, and guidance for counterintelligence vulnerability 
assessments and surveys. 
Sec. 305. Improving administration of certain post-employment restrictions for 
intelligence community. 
Sec. 306. Mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center. 
Sec. 307. Prohibition relating to transport of individuals detained at United 
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
Sec. 308. Department of Energy science and technology risk assessments. 
Sec. 309. Congressional oversight of intelligence community risk assessments. 
Sec. 310. Inspector General review of dissemination by Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation Richmond, Virginia, field office of certain document. 
Sec. 311. Office of Intelligence and Analysis. 
Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency 
Sec. 321. Change to penalties and increased availability of mental health treat-
ment for unlawful conduct on Central Intelligence Agency instal-
lations. 
Sec. 322. Modifications to procurement authorities of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. 
Sec. 323. Establishment of Central Intelligence Agency standard workplace sexual 
misconduct complaint investigation procedure. 
TITLE IV—MATTERS CONCERNING FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Subtitle A—People’s Republic of China 
Sec. 401. Intelligence community coordinator for accountability of atrocities of 
the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 402. Interagency working group and report on the malign efforts of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China in Africa. 
Sec. 403. Amendment to requirement for annual assessment by intelligence com-
munity working group for monitoring the economic and techno-
logical capabilities of the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 404. Assessments of reciprocity in the relationship between the United States 
and the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 405. Annual briefing on intelligence community efforts to identify and miti-
gate Chinese Communist Party and Russian foreign malign in-
fluence operations against the United States. 
Sec. 406. Assessment of threat posed to United States ports by cranes manufac-
tured by countries of concern. 
Subtitle B—Other Foreign Countries 
Sec. 411. Report on efforts to capture and detain United States citizens as hos-
tages.
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Sec. 412. Sense of Congress on priority of fentanyl in National Intelligence Prior-
ities Framework. 
TITLE V—MATTERS PERTAINING TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC 
AND 
EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY 
COMPETITION 
WITH 
UNITED 
STATES ADVERSARIES 
Subtitle A—General Matters 
Sec. 501. Assignment of detailees from intelligence community to Department of 
Commerce. 
Subtitle B—Next-generation Energy, Biotechnology, and Artificial Intelligence 
Sec. 511. Expanded annual assessment of economic and technological capabilities 
of the People’s Republic of China. 
Sec. 512. Assessment of using civil nuclear energy for intelligence community ca-
pabilities. 
Sec. 513. Policies established by Director of National Intelligence for artificial in-
telligence capabilities. 
TITLE VI—WHISTLEBLOWER MATTERS 
Sec. 601. Submittal to Congress of complaints and information by whistleblowers 
in the intelligence community. 
Sec. 602. Prohibition against disclosure of whistleblower identity as reprisal 
against whistleblower disclosure by employees and contractors in 
intelligence community. 
Sec. 603. Establishing process parity for adverse security clearance and access de-
terminations. 
Sec. 604. Elimination of cap on compensatory damages for retaliatory revocation 
of security clearances and access determinations. 
Sec. 605. Modification and repeal of reporting requirements. 
TITLE VII—CLASSIFICATION REFORM 
Subtitle A—Classification Reform Act of 2023 
Sec. 701. Short title. 
Sec. 702. Definitions. 
Sec. 703. Classification and declassification of information. 
Sec. 704. Transparency officers. 
Subtitle B—Sensible Classification Act of 2023 
Sec. 711. Short title. 
Sec. 712. Definitions. 
Sec. 713. Findings and sense of the Senate. 
Sec. 714. Classification authority. 
Sec. 715. Promoting efficient declassification review. 
Sec. 716. Training to promote sensible classification. 
Sec. 717. Improvements to Public Interest Declassification Board. 
Sec. 718. Implementation of technology for classification and declassification. 
Sec. 719. Studies and recommendations on necessity of security clearances. 
TITLE VIII—SECURITY CLEARANCE AND TRUSTED WORKFORCE 
Sec. 801. Review of shared information technology services for personnel vetting.
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Sec. 802. Timeliness standard for rendering determinations of trust for personnel 
vetting. 
Sec. 803. Annual report on personnel vetting trust determinations. 
Sec. 804. Survey to assess strengths and weaknesses of Trusted Workforce 2.0. 
Sec. 805. Prohibition on denial of eligibility for access to classified information 
solely because of past use of cannabis. 
TITLE IX—ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENTS 
Sec. 901. Improved funding flexibility for payments made by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency for qualifying injuries to the brain. 
Sec. 902. Clarification of requirements to seek certain benefits relating to injuries 
to the brain. 
Sec. 903. Intelligence community implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021 au-
thorities. 
Sec. 904. Report and briefing on Central Intelligence Agency handling of anoma-
lous health incidents. 
TITLE X—ELECTION SECURITY 
Sec. 1001. Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for Elections 
through Independent Testing Act of 2023. 
TITLE XI—OTHER MATTERS 
Sec. 1101. Modification of reporting requirement for All-domain Anomaly Resolu-
tion Office. 
Sec. 1102. Funding limitations relating to unidentified anomalous phenomena. 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘congressional intelligence commit-
tees’’ has the meaning given such term in section 3 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
3003). 
(2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term ‘‘in-
telligence community’’ has the meaning given such 
term in such section.
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TITLE I—INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES 
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fis-
cal year 2024 for the conduct of the intelligence and intel-
ligence-related activities of the Federal Government. 
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS. 
(a) SPECIFICATIONS OF AMOUNTS.—The amounts au-
thorized to be appropriated under section 101 for the con-
duct of the intelligence activities of the Federal Government 
are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authoriza-
tions prepared to accompany this division. 
(b) AVAILABILITY OF CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AU-
THORIZATIONS.— 
(1) AVAILABILITY.—The classified Schedule of 
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be 
made available to the Committee on Appropriations 
of the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives, and to the President. 
(2) DISTRIBUTION BY THE PRESIDENT.—Subject 
to paragraph (3), the President shall provide for suit-
able distribution of the classified Schedule of Author-
izations referred to in subsection (a), or of appro-
priate portions of such Schedule, within the executive 
branch of the Federal Government.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(3) LIMITS
ON
DISCLOSURE.—The President 
shall not publicly disclose the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations or any portion of such Schedule ex-
cept— 
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Im-
plementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Com-
mission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C. 3306(a)); 
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the 
budget; or 
(C) as otherwise required by law. 
SEC. 103. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT AC-
COUNT. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Commu-
nity Management Account of the Director of National Intel-
ligence for fiscal year 2024 the sum of $658,950,000. 
(b) CLASSIFIED
AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIA-
TIONS.—In addition to amounts authorized to be appro-
priated for the Intelligence Community Management Ac-
count by subsection (a), there are authorized to be appro-
priated for the Intelligence Community Management Ac-
count for fiscal year 2024 such additional amounts as are 
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations re-
ferred to in section 102(a).
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† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 104. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND 
BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 
Appropriations authorized by this division for salary, 
pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees 
may be increased by such additional or supplemental 
amounts as may be necessary for increases in such com-
pensation or benefits authorized by law. 
TITLE 
II—CENTRAL 
INTEL-
LIGENCE 
AGENCY 
RETIRE-
MENT AND DISABILITY SYS-
TEM 
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund 
$514,000,000 for fiscal year 2024. 
TITLE III—INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY MATTERS 
Subtitle A—General Intelligence 
Community Matters 
SEC. 301. PLAN TO RECRUIT, TRAIN, AND RETAIN PER-
SONNEL WITH EXPERIENCE IN FINANCIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE 
AND 
EMERGING 
TECH-
NOLOGIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of human cap-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
ital of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Secu-
rity Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 
a plan for the intelligence community to recruit, train, and 
retain personnel who have skills and experience in financial 
intelligence and emerging technologies in order to improve 
analytic tradecraft. 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements: 
(1) An assessment, including measurable bench-
marks of progress, of current initiatives of the intel-
ligence community to recruit, train, and retain per-
sonnel who have skills and experience in financial in-
telligence and emerging technologies. 
(2) An assessment of whether personnel in the in-
telligence community who have such skills are cur-
rently well integrated into the analytical cadre of the 
relevant elements of the intelligence community that 
produce analyses with respect to financial intelligence 
and emerging technologies. 
(3) An identification of challenges to hiring or 
compensation in the intelligence community that 
limit progress toward rapidly increasing the number
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† HR 2670 EAS 
of personnel with such skills, and an identification of 
hiring or other reforms to resolve such challenges. 
(4) A determination of whether the National In-
telligence University has the resources and expertise 
necessary to train existing personnel in financial in-
telligence and emerging technologies. 
(5) A strategy, including measurable benchmarks 
of progress, to, by January 1, 2025, increase by 10 
percent the analytical cadre of personnel with exper-
tise and previous employment in financial intel-
ligence and emerging technologies. 
SEC. 302. POLICY AND PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR 
MOBILITY 
OF 
INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 
WORKFORCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
fense and the Director of the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment as the Director of National Intelligence considers ap-
propriate, develop and implement a policy and performance 
framework to ensure the timely and effective mobility of em-
ployees and contractors of the Federal Government who are 
transferring employment between elements of the intel-
ligence community.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(b) ELEMENTS.—The policy and performance frame-
work required by subsection (a) shall include processes with 
respect to the following: 
(1) Human resources. 
(2) Medical reviews. 
(3) Determinations of suitability or eligibility 
for access to classified information in accordance with 
Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating 
to reforming processes related to suitability for Gov-
ernment employment, fitness for contractor employees, 
and eligibility for access to classified national secu-
rity information). 
SEC. 303. IN-STATE TUITION RATES FOR ACTIVE DUTY MEM-
BERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 135(d) of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1015d(d)), as amended by 
section 6206(a)(4) of the Foreign Service Families Act of 
2021 (Public Law 117–81), is further amended— 
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘or’’ after the 
semicolon; 
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at 
the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 
(3) by adding at the end the following new para-
graph:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(3) a member of the intelligence community (as 
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)) (other than a member of the 
Armed Forces of the United States) who is on active 
duty for a period of more than 30 days.’’. 
(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by sub-
section (a) shall take effect at each public institution of 
higher education in a State that receives assistance under 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) 
for the first period of enrollment at such institution that 
begins after July 1, 2026. 
SEC. 304. STANDARDS, CRITERIA, AND GUIDANCE FOR 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VULNERABILITY AS-
SESSMENTS AND SURVEYS. 
Section 904(d)(7)(A) of the Counterintelligence En-
hancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383(d)(7)(A)) is amend-
ed to read as follows: 
‘‘(A) 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
VULNER-
ABILITY
ASSESSMENTS
AND
SURVEYS.—To de-
velop standards, criteria, and guidance for coun-
terintelligence risk assessments and surveys of 
the vulnerability of the United States to intel-
ligence threats, including with respect to critical 
infrastructure and critical technologies, in order
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† HR 2670 EAS 
to identify the areas, programs, and activities 
that require protection from such threats.’’. 
SEC. 305. IMPROVING ADMINISTRATION OF CERTAIN POST- 
EMPLOYMENT 
RESTRICTIONS 
FOR 
INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
Section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3073a) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (c)(1)— 
(A) by striking ‘‘A former’’ and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—A former’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(B) PRIOR DISCLOSURE TO DIRECTOR OF 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.— 
‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a 
former employee who occupies a covered 
post-service position in violation of sub-
section (a), whether the former employee 
voluntarily notified the Director of National 
Intelligence of the intent of the former em-
ployee to occupy such covered post-service 
position before occupying such post-service 
position may be used in determining wheth-
er the violation was knowing and willful for 
purposes of subparagraph (A).
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(ii) PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE.— 
The Director of National Intelligence may 
establish procedures and guidance relating 
to the submittal of notice for purposes of 
clause (i).’’; and 
(2) in subsection (d)— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘the re-
strictions under subsection (a) and’’ before ‘‘the 
report requirements’’; 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘ceases to 
occupy’’ and inserting ‘‘occupies’’; and 
(C) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ‘‘before 
the person ceases to occupy a covered intelligence 
position’’ and inserting ‘‘when the person occu-
pies a covered intelligence position’’. 
SEC. 306. MISSION OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTEL-
LIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 904 of the Counterintel-
ligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is 
amended— 
(1) by redesignating subsections (d) through (i) 
as subsections (e) through (j), respectively; and 
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the fol-
lowing:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(d) MISSION.—The mission of the National Counter-
intelligence and Security Center shall include organizing 
and leading strategic planning for counterintelligence ac-
tivities of the United States Government by integrating in-
struments of national power as needed to counter foreign 
intelligence activities.’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 
(1) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT 
OF 2002.—Section 904 of the Counterintelligence En-
hancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 3383) is amend-
ed— 
(A) in subsection (e), as redesignated by 
subsection (a)(1), by striking ‘‘Subject to sub-
section (e)’’ both places it appears and inserting 
‘‘Subject to subsection (f)’’; and 
(B) in subsection (f), as so redesignated— 
(i) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘sub-
section (d)(1)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection 
(e)(1)’’; and 
(ii) in paragraph (2), by striking 
‘‘subsection (d)(2)’’ and inserting ‘‘sub-
section (e)(2)’’. 
(2) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY EN-
HANCEMENTS ACT OF 1994.—Section 811(d)(1)(B)(ii) 
of the Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements
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† HR 2670 EAS 
Act of 1994 (50 U.S.C. 3381(d)(1)(B)(ii)) is amended 
by striking ‘‘section 904(d)(2) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 
3383(d)(2))’’ and inserting ‘‘section 904(e)(2) of that 
Act (50 U.S.C. 3383(e)(2))’’. 
SEC. 307. PROHIBITION RELATING TO TRANSPORT OF INDI-
VIDUALS 
DETAINED 
AT 
UNITED 
STATES 
NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. 
(a) DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUAL DETAINED AT GUAN-
TANAMO.—In this section, the term ‘‘individual detained at 
Guantanamo’’ has the meaning given that term in section 
1034(f)(2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 971; 10 
U.S.C. 801 note). 
(b) PROHIBITION ON CHARTERING PRIVATE OR COM-
MERCIAL AIRCRAFT
TO TRANSPORT INDIVIDUALS DE-
TAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO 
BAY, CUBA.—No head of an element of the intelligence com-
munity may charter any private or commercial aircraft to 
transport an individual who is or was an individual de-
tained at Guantanamo. 
SEC. 308. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SCIENCE AND TECH-
NOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENTS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) COUNTRY OF RISK.—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The term ‘‘country of 
risk’’ means a foreign country determined by the 
Secretary, in accordance with subparagraph (B), 
to present a risk of theft of United States intel-
lectual property or a threat to the national secu-
rity of the United States if nationals of the coun-
try, or entities owned or controlled by the coun-
try or nationals of the country, participate in 
any research, development, demonstration, or de-
ployment activity authorized under this Act or 
an amendment made by this Act. 
(B) DETERMINATION.—In making a deter-
mination under subparagraph (A), the Sec-
retary, in coordination with the Director of the 
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
shall take into consideration— 
(i) the most recent World Wide Threat 
Assessment of the United States Intelligence 
Community, prepared by the Director of 
National Intelligence; and 
(ii) the most recent National Counter-
intelligence Strategy of the United States. 
(2) COVERED SUPPORT.—The term ‘‘covered sup-
port’’ means any grant, contract, subcontract, award,
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† HR 2670 EAS 
loan, program, support, or other activity authorized 
under this Act or an amendment made by this Act. 
(3) ENTITY OF CONCERN.—The term ‘‘entity of 
concern’’ means any entity, including a national, 
that is— 
(A) identified under section 1237(b) of the 
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 
note; Public Law 105–261); 
(B) identified under section 1260H of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 
U.S.C. 113 note; Public Law 116–283); 
(C) on the Entity List maintained by the 
Bureau of Industry and Security of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and set forth in Supplement 
No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal 
Regulations; 
(D) included in the list required by section 
9(b)(3) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 
of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 134 Stat. 656); or 
(E) identified by the Secretary, in coordina-
tion with the Director of the Office of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence and the applicable office
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† HR 2670 EAS 
that would provide, or is providing, covered sup-
port, as posing an unmanageable threat— 
(i) to the national security of the 
United States; or 
(ii) of theft or loss of United States in-
tellectual property. 
(4) NATIONAL.—The term ‘‘national’’ has the 
meaning given the term in section 101 of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 
(5) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 
the Secretary of Energy. 
(b) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK ASSESSMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall develop 
and maintain tools and processes to manage and 
mitigate research security risks, such as a science and 
technology risk matrix, informed by threats identified 
by the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Coun-
terintelligence, to facilitate determinations of the risk 
of loss of United States intellectual property or threat 
to the national security of the United States posed by 
activities carried out under any covered support. 
(2) CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION.—In devel-
oping and using the tools and processes developed 
under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) deploy risk-based approaches to evalu-
ating, awarding, and managing certain research, 
development, demonstration, and deployment ac-
tivities, including designations that will indicate 
the relative risk of activities; 
(B) assess, to the extent practicable, ongoing 
high-risk activities; 
(C) designate an officer or employee of the 
Department of Energy to be responsible for 
tracking and notifying recipients of any covered 
support of unmanageable threats to United 
States national security or of theft or loss of 
United States intellectual property posed by an 
entity of concern; 
(D) consider requiring recipients of covered 
support to implement additional research secu-
rity mitigations for higher-risk activities if ap-
propriate; and 
(E) support the development of research se-
curity training for recipients of covered support 
on the risks posed by entities of concern. 
(3) ANNUAL UPDATES.—The tools and processes 
developed under paragraph (1) shall be evaluated an-
nually and updated as needed, with threat-informed 
input from the Office of Intelligence and Counterintel-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
ligence, to reflect changes in the risk designation 
under paragraph (2)(A) of research, development, 
demonstration, and deployment activities conducted 
by the Department of Energy. 
(c) ENTITY OF CONCERN.— 
(1) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in para-
graph (2), no entity of concern, or individual that 
owns or controls, is owned or controlled by, or is 
under common ownership or control with an entity of 
concern, may receive, or perform work under, any 
covered support. 
(2) WAIVER OF PROHIBITION.— 
(A) IN
GENERAL.—The Secretary may 
waive the prohibition under paragraph (1) if de-
termined by the Secretary to be in the national 
interest. 
(B) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Not less 
than 2 weeks prior to issuing a waiver under 
subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall notify 
Congress of the intent to issue the waiver, includ-
ing a justification for the waiver. 
(3) PENALTY.— 
(A) TERMINATION OF SUPPORT.—On find-
ing that any entity of concern or individual de-
scribed in paragraph (1) has received covered
2221 
† HR 2670 EAS 
support and has not received a waiver under 
paragraph (2), the Secretary shall terminate all 
covered support to that entity of concern or indi-
vidual, as applicable. 
(B) PENALTIES.—An entity of concern or 
individual identified under subparagraph (A) 
shall be— 
(i) prohibited from receiving or par-
ticipating in covered support for a period of 
not less than 1 year but not more than 10 
years, as determined by the Secretary; or 
(ii) instead of the penalty described in 
clause (i), subject to any other penalties au-
thorized under applicable law or regulations 
that the Secretary determines to be in the 
national interest. 
(C) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—Prior to 
imposing a penalty under subparagraph (B), the 
Secretary shall notify Congress of the intent to 
impose the penalty, including a description of 
and justification for the penalty. 
(4) COORDINATION.—The Secretary shall— 
(A) share information about the unmanage-
able threats described in subsection (a)(3)(E) 
with other Federal agencies; and
2222 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(B) develop consistent approaches to identi-
fying entities of concern. 
(d) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—This section shall 
be applied in a manner consistent with the obligations of 
the United States under international agreements. 
(e) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 240 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
submit to Congress a report that— 
(1) describes— 
(A) the tools and processes developed under 
subsection (b)(1) and any updates to those tools 
and processes; and 
(B) if applicable, the science and technology 
risk matrix developed under that subsection and 
how that matrix has been applied; 
(2) includes a mitigation plan for managing 
risks posed by countries of risk with respect to future 
or ongoing research and development activities of the 
Department of Energy; and 
(3) defines critical research areas, designated by 
risk, as determined by the Secretary. 
SEC. 309. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENTS. 
(a) RISK
ASSESSMENT
DOCUMENTS
AND
MATE-
RIALS.—Except as provided in subsection (b), whenever an
2223 
† HR 2670 EAS 
element of the intelligence community conducts a risk as-
sessment arising from the mishandling or improper disclo-
sure of classified information, the Director of National In-
telligence shall, not later than 30 days after the date of the 
commencement of such risk assessment— 
(1) submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees copies of such documents and materials as 
are— 
(A) within the jurisdiction of such commit-
tees; and 
(B) subject to the risk assessment; and 
(2) provide such committees a briefing on such 
documents, materials, and risk assessment. 
(b) EXCEPTION.—If the Director determines, with re-
spect to a risk assessment described in subsection (a), that 
the documents and other materials otherwise subject to 
paragraph (1) of such subsection (a) are of such a volume 
that submittal pursuant to such paragraph would be im-
practicable, the Director shall— 
(1) in lieu of submitting copies of such docu-
ments and materials, submit a log of such documents 
and materials; and 
(2) pursuant to a request by the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate or the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Rep-
2224 
† HR 2670 EAS 
resentatives for a copy of a document or material in-
cluded in such log, submit to such committee such 
copy. 
SEC. 310. INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF DISSEMINATION 
BY FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, FIELD OFFICE OF CER-
TAIN DOCUMENT. 
(a) REVIEW REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector 
General of the Department of Justice shall conduct a review 
of the actions and events, including any underlying policy 
direction, that served as a basis for the January 23, 2023, 
dissemination by the field office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation located in Richmond, Virginia, of a document 
titled ‘‘Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent 
Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Al-
most Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities.’’. 
(b) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The Inspector General 
of the Department of Justice shall submit the findings of 
the Inspector General with respect to the review required 
by subsection (a) to the following: 
(1) The congressional intelligence committees. 
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary, Committee 
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
2225 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(3) The Committee on the Judiciary, the Com-
mittee on Oversight and Accountability, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives. 
SEC. 311. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS. 
Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 
U.S.C. 121) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(h) PROHIBITION.— 
‘‘(1) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term 
‘United States person’ means a United States citizen, 
an alien known by the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis to be a permanent resident alien, an unin-
corporated association substantially composed of 
United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, 
or a corporation incorporated in the United States, 
except for a corporation directed and controlled by 1 
or more foreign governments. 
‘‘(2) 
COLLECTION
OF
INFORMATION
FROM 
UNITED STATES PERSONS.— 
‘‘(A) IN
GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis may not engage in the collection of 
information or intelligence targeting any United 
States person except as provided in subpara-
graph (B).
2226 
† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(B) EXCEPTION.—Subparagraph (A) shall 
not apply to any employee, officer, or contractor 
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis who is 
responsible for collecting information from indi-
viduals working for a State, local, or Tribal ter-
ritory government or a private employer.’’. 
Subtitle B—Central Intelligence 
Agency 
SEC. 321. CHANGE TO PENALTIES AND INCREASED AVAIL-
ABILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 
FOR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON CENTRAL IN-
TELLIGENCE AGENCY INSTALLATIONS. 
Section 15(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3515(b)) is amended, in the second sen-
tence, by striking ‘‘those specified in section 1315(c)(2) of 
title 40, United States Code’’ and inserting ‘‘the maximum 
penalty authorized for a Class B misdemeanor under sec-
tion 3559 of title 18, United States Code’’. 
SEC. 322. MODIFICATIONS TO PROCUREMENT AUTHORITIES 
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. 
Section 3 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3503) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘sections’’ and 
all that follows through ‘‘session)’’ and inserting ‘‘sec-
tions 3201, 3203, 3204, 3206, 3207, 3302 through
2227 
† HR 2670 EAS 
3306, 3321 through 3323, 3801 through 3808, 3069, 
3134, 3841, and 4752 of title 10, United States Code’’ 
and 
(2) in subsection (d), by striking ‘‘in para-
graphs’’ and all that follows through ‘‘1947’’ and in-
serting ‘‘in sections 3201 through 3204 of title 10, 
United States Code, shall not be delegable. Each deter-
mination or decision required by sections 3201 
through 3204, 3321 through 3323, and 3841 of title 
10, United States Code’’. 
SEC. 323. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY 
STANDARD 
WORKPLACE 
SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT 
COMPLAINT 
INVESTIGATION 
PROCEDURE. 
(a) WORKPLACE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED.— 
The term ‘‘workplace sexual misconduct’’— 
(1) means unwelcome sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature when— 
(A) submission to such conduct is made ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly a term or condition 
of an individual’s employment; 
(B) submission to or rejection of such con-
duct by an individual is used as the basis for
2228 
† HR 2670 EAS 
employment decisions affecting such individual; 
or 
(C) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s 
work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment; and 
(2) includes sexual harassment and sexual as-
sault. 
(b) STANDARD COMPLAINT INVESTIGATION PROCE-
DURE.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
ment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency shall— 
(1) establish a standard workplace sexual mis-
conduct complaint investigation procedure; 
(2) implement the standard workplace sexual 
misconduct 
complaint 
investigation 
procedure 
through clear workforce communication and edu-
cation on the procedure; and 
(3) submit the standard workplace sexual mis-
conduct complaint investigation procedure to the con-
gressional intelligence committees. 
(c) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.—The procedure estab-
lished pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall, at a minimum— 
(1) identify the individuals and offices of the 
Central Intelligence Agency to which an employee of
2229 
† HR 2670 EAS 
the Agency may bring a complaint of workplace sex-
ual misconduct; 
(2) detail the steps each individual or office 
identified pursuant to paragraph (1) shall take upon 
receipt of a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct 
and the timeframes within which those steps shall be 
taken, including— 
(A) documentation of the complaint; 
(B) referral or notification to another indi-
vidual or office; 
(C) measures to document or preserve wit-
ness statements or other evidence; and 
(D) preliminary investigation of the com-
plaint; 
(3) set forth standard criteria for determining 
whether a complaint of workplace sexual misconduct 
will be referred to law enforcement and the timeframe 
within which such a referral shall occur; and 
(4) for any complaint not referred to law en-
forcement, set forth standard criteria for deter-
mining— 
(A) whether a complaint has been substan-
tiated; and 
(B) for any substantiated complaint, the 
appropriate disciplinary action.
2230 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(d) ANNUAL REPORTS.—On or before April 30 of each 
year, the Director shall submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations 
of the House of Representatives an annual report that in-
cludes, for the preceding calendar year, the following: 
(1) The number of workplace sexual misconduct 
complaints brought to each individual or office of the 
Central Intelligence Agency identified pursuant to 
subsection (c)(1), disaggregated by— 
(A) complaints referred to law enforcement; 
and 
(B) complaints substantiated. 
(2) For each complaint described in paragraph 
(1) that is substantiated, a description of the discipli-
nary action taken by the Director.
2231 
† HR 2670 EAS 
TITLE 
IV—MATTERS 
CON-
CERNING 
FOREIGN 
COUN-
TRIES 
Subtitle A—People’s Republic of 
China 
SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ATROCITIES OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) ATROCITY.—The term ‘‘atrocity’’ means a 
crime against humanity, genocide, or a war crime. 
(2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per-
son’’ means— 
(A) any person or entity that is not a 
United States person; or 
(B) any entity not organized under the laws 
of the United States or of any jurisdiction with-
in the United States. 
(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United 
States person’’ has the meaning given that term in 
section 105A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 3039). 
(b) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COORDINATOR FOR AC-
COUNTABILITY OF ATROCITIES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA.—
2232 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) DESIGNATION.—Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall designate a senior official 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
to serve as the intelligence community coordinator for 
accountability of atrocities of the People’s Republic of 
China (in this section referred to as the ‘‘Coordi-
nator’’). 
(2) DUTIES.—The Coordinator shall lead the ef-
forts of and coordinate and collaborate with the intel-
ligence community with respect to the following: 
(A) Identifying and addressing any gaps in 
intelligence collection relating to atrocities of the 
People’s Republic of China, including by recom-
mending the modification of the priorities of the 
intelligence community with respect to intel-
ligence collection and by utilizing informal proc-
esses and collaborative mechanisms with key ele-
ments of the intelligence community to increase 
collection on atrocities of the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(B) Prioritizing and expanding the intel-
ligence analysis with respect to ongoing atroc-
ities of the People’s Republic of China and dis-
seminating within the United States Government
2233 
† HR 2670 EAS 
intelligence relating to the identification and ac-
tivities of foreign persons suspected of being in-
volved with or providing support to atrocities of 
the People’s Republic of China, including geno-
cide and forced labor practices in Xinjiang, in 
order to support the efforts of other Federal agen-
cies, including the Department of State, the De-
partment of Justice, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of In-
dustry and Security, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, and the National Security Council, 
to hold the People’s Republic of China account-
able for such atrocities. 
(C) Increasing efforts to declassify and 
share with the people of the United States and 
the international community information re-
garding atrocities of the People’s Republic of 
China in order to expose such atrocities and 
counter the disinformation and misinformation 
campaign by the People’s Republic of China to 
deny such atrocities. 
(D) Documenting and storing intelligence 
and other unclassified information that may be 
relevant to preserve as evidence of atrocities of
2234 
† HR 2670 EAS 
the People’s Republic of China for future ac-
countability, and ensuring that other relevant 
Federal agencies receive appropriate support 
from the intelligence community with respect to 
the collection, analysis, preservation, and, as ap-
propriate, dissemination, of intelligence related 
to atrocities of the People’s Republic of China, 
which may include the information from the an-
nual report required by section 6504 of the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 
(Public Law 117–263). 
(E) Sharing information with the Forced 
Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under 
section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 
4681), the Department of Commerce, and the De-
partment of the Treasury for the purposes of en-
tity listings and sanctions. 
(3) PLAN REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress— 
(A) the name of the official designated as 
the Coordinator pursuant to paragraph (1); and
2235 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(B) the strategy of the intelligence commu-
nity for the collection and dissemination of intel-
ligence relating to ongoing atrocities of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, including a detailed de-
scription of how the Coordinator shall support, 
and assist in facilitating the implementation of, 
such strategy. 
(4) ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS.— 
(A) REPORTS REQUIRED.—Not later than 
May 1, 2024, and annually thereafter until May 
1, 2034, the Director shall submit to Congress a 
report detailing, for the year covered by the re-
port— 
(i) the analytical findings, changes in 
collection, and other activities of the intel-
ligence community with respect to ongoing 
atrocities of the People’s Republic of China; 
(ii) the recipients of information 
shared pursuant to this section for the pur-
pose of— 
(I) providing support to Federal 
agencies to hold the People’s Republic 
of China accountable for such atroc-
ities; and
2236 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(II) sharing information with the 
people of the United States to counter 
the disinformation and misinformation 
campaign by the People’s Republic of 
China to deny such atrocities; and 
(iii) with respect to clause (ii), the 
date of any such sharing. 
(B) FORM.—Each report submitted under 
subparagraph (A) may be submitted in classified 
form, consistent with the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods. 
(c) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect on 
the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
SEC. 402. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON 
THE MALIGN EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE’S RE-
PUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of National In-
telligence, in consultation with such heads of elements 
of the intelligence community as the Director con-
siders appropriate, shall establish an interagency 
working group within the intelligence community to 
analyze the tactics and capabilities of the People’s Re-
public of China in Africa.
2237 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) ESTABLISHMENT FLEXIBILITY.—The working 
group established under paragraph (1) may be— 
(A) independently established; or 
(B) to avoid redundancy, incorporated into 
existing working groups or cross-intelligence ef-
forts within the intelligence community. 
(b) REPORT.— 
(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES 
OF CONGRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appro-
priate committees of Congress’’ means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representa-
tives. 
(2) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and twice annu-
ally thereafter, the working group established under 
subsection (a) shall submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of Congress a report on the specific tactics
2238 
† HR 2670 EAS 
and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China in 
Africa. 
(3) ELEMENTS.—Each report required by para-
graph (2) shall include the following elements: 
(A) An assessment of efforts by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to exploit 
mining and reprocessing operations in Africa. 
(B) An assessment of efforts by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to pro-
vide or fund technologies in Africa, including— 
(i) telecommunications and energy 
technologies, such as advanced reactors, 
transportation, and other commercial prod-
ucts; and 
(ii) by requiring that the People’s Re-
public of China be the sole provider of such 
technologies. 
(C) An assessment of efforts by the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China to expand 
intelligence capabilities in Africa. 
(D) A description of actions taken by the 
intelligence community to counter such efforts. 
(E) An assessment of additional resources 
needed by the intelligence community to better 
counter such efforts.
2239 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(4) FORM.—Each report required by paragraph 
(2) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex if necessary. 
(c) SUNSET.—The requirements of this section shall 
terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the 
enactment of this Act. 
SEC. 403. AMENDMENT TO REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL AS-
SESSMENT BY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
WORKING GROUP FOR MONITORING THE ECO-
NOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
Section 6503(c)(3)(D) of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (division F of Public Law 117– 
263) is amended by striking ‘‘the top 200’’ and inserting 
‘‘all the known’’. 
SEC. 404. ASSESSMENTS OF RECIPROCITY IN THE RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Intelligence and Research, in consultation with the Di-
rector of National Intelligence and such other heads of ele-
ments of the intelligence community as the Assistant Sec-
retary considers relevant, shall submit to Congress the fol-
lowing:
2240 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) A comprehensive assessment that identifies 
critical areas in the security, diplomatic, economic, 
financial, technological, scientific, commercial, aca-
demic, and cultural spheres in which the United 
States does not enjoy a reciprocal relationship with 
the People’s Republic of China. 
(2) A comprehensive assessment that describes 
how the lack of reciprocity between the People’s Re-
public of China and the United States in the areas 
identified in the assessment required by paragraph 
(1) provides advantages to the People’s Republic of 
China. 
(b) FORM OF ASSESSMENTS.— 
(1) CRITICAL AREAS.—The assessment required 
by subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified 
form. 
(2) ADVANTAGES.—The assessment required by 
subsection (a)(2) shall be submitted in classified form. 
SEC. 405. ANNUAL BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMU-
NITY EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE 
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND RUSSIAN 
FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
2241 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) CHINESE
ENTITIES
ENGAGED
IN
FOREIGN 
MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.—The term ‘‘hinese 
entities engaged in foreign malign influence oper-
ations’’ means all of the elements of the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese 
Communist Party involved in foreign malign influ-
ence, such as— 
(A) the Ministry of State Security; 
(B) other security services of the People’s 
Republic of China; 
(C) the intelligence services of the People’s 
Republic of China; 
(D) the United Front Work Department 
and other united front organs; 
(E) state-controlled media systems, such as 
the China Global Television Network (CGTN); 
and 
(F) any entity involved in foreign malign 
influence operations that demonstrably and in-
tentionally disseminate false information and 
propaganda of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China or the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
(2) RUSSIAN MALIGN INFLUENCE ACTORS.—The 
term ‘‘Russian malign influence actors’’ refers to enti-
2242 
† HR 2670 EAS 
ties or individuals engaged in foreign malign influ-
ence operations against the United States who are af-
filiated with— 
(A) the intelligence and security services of 
the Russian Federation 
(B) the Presidential Administration; 
(C) any other entity of the Government of 
the Russian Federation; or 
(D) Russian mercenary or proxy groups 
such as the Wagner Group. 
(3) FOREIGN MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATION.— 
The term ‘‘foreign malign influence operation’’ means 
a coordinated and often concealed activity that is cov-
ered by the definition of the term ‘‘foreign malign in-
fluence’’ in section 119C of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059) and uses disinformation, 
press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted in-
vestments, corruption, or academic censorship, which 
are often intended— 
(A) to coerce and corrupt United States in-
terests, values, institutions, or individuals; and 
(B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, 
or outcomes in the United States that support 
the interests of the Government of the People’s
2243 
† HR 2670 EAS 
Republic of China or the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
(b) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 120 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 
thereafter until the date that is 5 years after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Foreign Ma-
lign Influence Center shall, in collaboration with the heads 
of the elements of the intelligence community, provide Con-
gress a classified briefing on the ways in which the relevant 
elements of the intelligence community are working inter-
nally and coordinating across the intelligence community 
to identify and mitigate the actions of Chinese and Russian 
entities engaged in foreign malign influence operations 
against the United States, including against United States 
persons. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The classified briefing required by 
subsection (b) shall cover the following: 
(1) The Government of the Russian Federation, 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
and the Chinese Communist Party tactics, tools, and 
entities that spread disinformation, misinformation, 
and malign information and conduct influence oper-
ations, information campaigns, or other propaganda 
efforts.
2244 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) A description of ongoing foreign malign in-
fluence operations and campaigns of the Russian Fed-
eration against the United States and an assessment 
of their objectives and effectiveness in meeting those 
objectives. 
(3) A description of ongoing foreign malign in-
fluence operations and campaigns of the People’s Re-
public of China against the United States and an as-
sessment of their objectives and effectiveness in meet-
ing those objectives. 
(4) A description of any cooperation, informa-
tion-sharing, amplification, or other coordination be-
tween the Russian Federation and the People’s Re-
public of China in developing or carrying out foreign 
malign influence operations against the United 
States. 
(5) A description of front organizations, proxies, 
cut-outs, aligned third-party countries, or organiza-
tions used by the Russian Federation or the People’s 
Republic of China to carry out foreign malign influ-
ence operations against the United States. 
(6) 
An 
assessment 
of 
the 
loopholes 
or 
vulnerabilities in United States law that Russia and 
the People’s Republic of China exploit to carry out 
foreign malign influence operations.
2246 
† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 406. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT POSED TO UNITED 
STATES PORTS BY CRANES MANUFACTURED 
BY COUNTRIES OF CONCERN. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the congressional intelligence commit-
tees; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-
mental Affairs, the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the Senate; and 
(C) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Oversight and Accountability, the 
Committee on Financial Services, and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the House of Representatives. 
(2) COUNTRY OF CONCERN.—The term ‘‘country 
of concern’’ has the meaning given that term in sec-
tion 1(m)(1) of the State Department Basic Authori-
ties Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a(m)(1)). 
(b) ASSESSMENT.—The Director of National Intel-
ligence, in coordination with such other heads of the ele-
2247 
† HR 2670 EAS 
ments of the intelligence community as the Director con-
siders appropriate and the Secretary of Defense, shall con-
duct an assessment of the threat posed to United States 
ports by cranes manufactured by countries of concern and 
commercial entities of those countries, including the Shang-
hai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. (ZPMC). 
(c) REPORT AND BRIEFING.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit a report and pro-
vide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress on the findings of the assessment required by 
subsection (b). 
(2) ELEMENTS.—The report and briefing re-
quired by paragraph (1) shall outline the potential 
for the cranes described in subsection (b) to collect in-
telligence, disrupt operations at United States ports, 
and impact the national security of the United 
States. 
(3) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 
but may include a classified annex.
2248 
† HR 2670 EAS 
Subtitle B—Other Foreign 
Countries 
SEC. 411. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO CAPTURE AND DETAIN 
UNITED STATES CITIZENS AS HOSTAGES. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF 
CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate com-
mittees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee 
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report on efforts by the Maduro regime in Ven-
ezuela to detain United States citizens and lawful perma-
nent residents. 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) 
shall include, regarding the arrest, capture, detainment, or
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† HR 2670 EAS 
imprisonment of United States citizens and lawful perma-
nent residents, the following: 
(1) The names, positions, and institutional af-
filiation of Venezuelan individuals, or those acting on 
their behalf, who have engaged in such activities. 
(2) A description of any role played by 
transnational criminal organizations, and an identi-
fication of such organizations. 
(3) Where relevant, an assessment of whether and 
how United States citizens and lawful permanent 
residents have been lured to Venezuela. 
(4) An analysis of the motive for the arrest, cap-
ture, detainment, or imprisonment of United States 
citizens and lawful permanent residents. 
(5) The total number of United States citizens 
and lawful permanent residents detained or impris-
oned in Venezuela as of the date on which the report 
is submitted. 
(d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classi-
fied annex.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 412. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITY OF FENTANYL 
IN 
NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
PRIORITIES 
FRAMEWORK. 
It is the sense of Congress that the trafficking of illicit 
fentanyl, including precursor chemicals and manufacturing 
equipment associated with illicit fentanyl production and 
organizations that traffic or finance the trafficking of illicit 
fentanyl, originating from the People’s Republic of China 
and Mexico should be among the highest priorities in the 
National Intelligence Priorities Framework of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence. 
TITLE V—MATTERS PERTAINING 
TO 
UNITED 
STATES 
ECO-
NOMIC AND EMERGING TECH-
NOLOGY COMPETITION WITH 
UNITED 
STATES 
ADVER-
SARIES 
Subtitle A—General Matters 
SEC. 
501. 
ASSIGNMENT 
OF 
DETAILEES 
FROM 
INTEL-
LIGENCE COMMUNITY TO DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE. 
(a) AUTHORITY.—In order to better facilitate the shar-
ing of actionable intelligence on foreign adversary intent, 
capabilities, threats, and operations that pose a threat to 
the interests or security of the United States, particularly 
as they relate to the procurement, development, and use of
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† HR 2670 EAS 
dual-use and emerging technologies, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence may assign or facilitate the assignment 
of members from across the intelligence community to serve 
as detailees to the Bureau of Industry and Security of the 
Department of Commerce. 
(b) ASSIGNMENT.—Detailees assigned pursuant to sub-
section (a) shall be drawn from such elements of the intel-
ligence community as the Director considers appropriate, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce. 
(c) EXPERTISE.—The Director shall ensure that 
detailees assigned pursuant to subsection (a) have subject 
matter expertise on countries of concern, including China, 
Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as well as functional areas 
such as illicit procurement, counterproliferation, emerging 
and foundational technology, economic and financial intel-
ligence, information and communications technology sys-
tems, supply chain vulnerability, and counterintelligence. 
(d) DUTY CREDIT.—The detail of an employee of the 
intelligence community to the Department of Commerce 
under subsection (a) shall be without interruption or loss 
of civil service status or privilege.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
Subtitle B—Next-generation Energy, 
Biotechnology, and Artificial In-
telligence 
SEC. 511. EXPANDED ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 
Section 6503(c)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) is amended 
by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(I) A detailed assessment, prepared in con-
sultation with all elements of the working 
group— 
‘‘(i) of the investments made by the 
People’s Republic of China in— 
‘‘(I) artificial intelligence; 
‘‘(II) next-generation energy tech-
nologies, especially small modular re-
actors and advanced batteries; and 
‘‘(III) biotechnology; and 
‘‘(ii) that identifies— 
‘‘(I) competitive practices of the 
People’s Republic of China relating to 
the technologies described in clause (i); 
‘‘(II) opportunities to counter the 
practices described in subclause (I);
2253 
† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(III) countries the People’s Re-
public of China is targeting for exports 
of civil nuclear technology; 
‘‘(IV) countries best positioned to 
utilize civil nuclear technologies from 
the United States in order to facilitate 
the commercial export of those tech-
nologies; 
‘‘(V) United States vulnerabilities 
in the supply chain of these tech-
nologies; and 
‘‘(VI) opportunities to counter the 
export by the People’s Republic of 
China of civil nuclear technologies 
globally. 
‘‘(J) An identification and assessment of 
any unmet resource or authority needs of the 
working group that affect the ability of the work-
ing group to carry out this section.’’. 
SEC. 512. ASSESSMENT OF USING CIVIL NUCLEAR ENERGY 
FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CAPABILI-
TIES. 
(a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—The Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall, in consultation with the heads of 
such other elements of the intelligence community as the Di-
2254 
† HR 2670 EAS 
rector considers appropriate, conduct an assessment of ca-
pabilities identified by the Intelligence Community Con-
tinuity Program established pursuant to section E(3) of In-
telligence Community Directive 118, or any successor direc-
tive, or such other intelligence community facilities or intel-
ligence community capabilities as may be determined by 
the Director to be critical to United States national secu-
rity, that have unique energy needs— 
(1) to ascertain the feasibility and advisability 
of using civil nuclear reactors to meet such needs; and 
(2) to identify such additional resources, tech-
nologies, infrastructure, or authorities needed, or 
other potential obstacles, to commence use of a nuclear 
reactor to meet such needs. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and the 
Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Com-
mittee on Oversight and Accountability and the Committee 
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a report, 
which may be in classified form, on the findings of the Di-
rector with respect to the assessment conducted pursuant 
to subsection (a).
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† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 513. POLICIES ESTABLISHED BY DIRECTOR OF NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ARTIFICIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6702 of the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (50 U.S.C. 3334m) 
is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a), in the matter preceding 
paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘subsection (b)’’ and in-
serting ‘‘subsection (c)’’; 
(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection 
(c); and 
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(b) POLICIES.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out subsection 
(a)(1), not later than 1 year after the date of the en-
actment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 2024, the Director of National Intelligence, 
in consultation with the heads of the elements of the 
intelligence community, the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, and such other officials as 
the Director of National Intelligence determines ap-
propriate, shall establish the policies described in 
paragraph (2). 
‘‘(2) POLICIES
DESCRIBED.—The policies de-
scribed in this paragraph are policies for the acquisi-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
tion, adoption, development, use, coordination, and 
maintenance of artificial intelligence capabilities 
that— 
‘‘(A) establish a lexicon relating to the use 
of machine learning and artificial intelligence 
developed or acquired by elements of the intel-
ligence community; 
‘‘(B) establish guidelines for evaluating the 
performance of models developed or acquired by 
elements of the intelligence community, such as 
by— 
‘‘(i) specifying conditions for the con-
tinuous monitoring of artificial intelligence 
capabilities for performance, including the 
conditions for retraining or retiring models 
based on performance; 
‘‘(ii) documenting performance objec-
tives, including specifying how performance 
objectives shall be developed and contrac-
tually enforced for capabilities procured 
from third parties; 
‘‘(iii) specifying the manner in which 
models should be audited, as necessary, in-
cluding the types of documentation that 
should be provided to any auditor; and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(iv) 
specifying 
conditions 
under 
which models used by elements of the intel-
ligence community should be subject to test-
ing and evaluation for vulnerabilities to 
techniques meant to undermine the avail-
ability, integrity, or privacy of an artificial 
intelligence capability; 
‘‘(C) establish guidelines for tracking de-
pendencies in adjacent systems, capabilities, or 
processes 
impacted 
by 
the 
retraining 
or 
sunsetting of any model described in subpara-
graph (B); 
‘‘(D) establish documentation requirements 
for capabilities procured from third parties, 
aligning such requirements, as necessary, with 
existing documentation requirements applicable 
to capabilities developed by elements of the intel-
ligence community; 
‘‘(E) establish standards for the documenta-
tion of imputed, augmented, or synthetic data 
used to train any model developed, procured, or 
used by an element of the intelligence commu-
nity; and 
‘‘(F) provide guidance on the acquisition 
and usage of models that have previously been
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† HR 2670 EAS 
trained by a third party for subsequent modi-
fication and usage by such an element. 
‘‘(3) POLICY REVIEW AND REVISION.—The Direc-
tor of National Intelligence shall periodically review 
and revise each policy established under paragraph 
(1).’’. 
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 6712(b)(1) of 
such Act (50 U.S.C. 3024 note) is amended by striking ‘‘sec-
tion 6702(b)’’ and inserting ‘‘section 6702(c)’’. 
TITLE VI—WHISTLEBLOWER 
MATTERS 
SEC. 601. SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF COMPLAINTS AND 
INFORMATION BY WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. 
(a) AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER 4 OF TITLE 5.— 
(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Sec-
tion 416 of title 5, United States Code, is amended 
by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(i) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Each 
Inspector General under this section, including the des-
ignees of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
pursuant to subsection (b)(3), shall appoint within their of-
fices security officers to provide, on a permanent basis, con-
fidential, security-related guidance and direction to em-
ployees and contractors described in subsection (b)(1) who
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† HR 2670 EAS 
intend to report to Congress complaints or information, so 
that such employees and contractors can obtain direction 
on how to report to Congress in accordance with appro-
priate security practices.’’. 
(2) PROCEDURES.—Subsection (e) of such section 
is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ‘‘or any 
other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or 
the House of Representatives’’ after ‘‘either or 
both of the intelligence committees’’; 
(B) by amending paragraph (2) to read as 
follows: 
‘‘(2) LIMITATION.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), the employee may contact an 
intelligence committee or another committee of 
jurisdiction directly as described in paragraph 
(1) of this subsection or in subsection (b)(4) only 
if the employee— 
‘‘(i) before making such a contact, fur-
nishes to the head of the establishment, 
through the Inspector General (or designee), 
a statement of the employee’s complaint or 
information and notice of the employee’s in-
tent to contact an intelligence committee or
2260 
† HR 2670 EAS 
another committee of jurisdiction of the 
Senate or the House of Representatives di-
rectly; and 
‘‘(ii)(I) obtains and follows, from the 
head of the establishment, through the In-
spector General (or designee), procedural di-
rection on how to contact an intelligence 
committee or another committee of jurisdic-
tion of the Senate or the House of Rep-
resentatives in accordance with appropriate 
security practices; or 
‘‘(II) obtains and follows such proce-
dural direction from the applicable security 
officer appointed under subsection (i). 
‘‘(B) LACK OF PROCEDURAL DIRECTION.—If 
an employee seeks procedural direction under 
subparagraph (A)(ii) and does not receive such 
procedural direction within 30 days, or receives 
insufficient direction to report to Congress a 
complaint or information, the employee may 
contact an intelligence committee or any other 
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the 
House of Representatives directly without obtain-
ing or following the procedural direction other-
wise required under such subparagraph.’’; and
2261 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(C) by redesignating paragraph (3) as 
paragraph (4); and 
(D) by inserting after paragraph (2) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(3) COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND STAFF.—An em-
ployee of an element of the intelligence community 
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or in-
formation may report such complaint or information 
to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking 
Member, as the case may be, of an intelligence com-
mittee or another committee of jurisdiction of the 
Senate or the House of Representatives, a non-
partisan member of the committee staff designated for 
purposes of receiving complaints or information 
under this section, or a member of the majority staff 
and a member of the minority staff of the com-
mittee.’’. 
(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DI-
RECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subsection (b) of such section 
is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(4) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DI-
RECTLY
TO
CONGRESS.—Subject to paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of subsection (e), an employee of an element 
of the intelligence community who intends to report
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† HR 2670 EAS 
to Congress a complaint or information may report 
such complaint or information directly to Congress.’’. 
(b) AMENDMENTS TO NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 
1947.— 
(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Sec-
tion 103H(j) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3033(j)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following: 
‘‘(5) The Inspector General shall appoint within 
the Office of the Inspector General security officers as 
required by section 416(i) of title 5, United States 
Code.’’. 
(2) PROCEDURES.—Subparagraph (D) of section 
103H(k)(5) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3033(k)(5)) is 
amended— 
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ‘‘or any other 
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the 
House of Representatives’’ after ‘‘either or both of 
the congressional intelligence committees’’; 
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an 
employee may contact a congressional intelligence 
committee or another committee of jurisdiction di-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
rectly as described in clause (i) only if the em-
ployee— 
‘‘(aa) before making such a contact, fur-
nishes to the Director, through the Inspector 
General, a statement of the employee’s complaint 
or information and notice of the employee’s in-
tent to contact a congressional intelligence com-
mittee or another committee of jurisdiction of the 
Senate or the House of Representatives directly; 
and 
‘‘(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Di-
rector, through the Inspector General, procedural 
direction on how to contact a congressional intel-
ligence committee or another committee of juris-
diction of the Senate or the House of Representa-
tives in accordance with appropriate security 
practices; or 
‘‘(BB) obtains and follows such procedural 
direction from the applicable security officer ap-
pointed under section 416(i) of title 5, United 
States Code. 
‘‘(II) If an employee seeks procedural direc-
tion under subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive 
such procedural direction within 30 days, or re-
ceives insufficient direction to report to Congress
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† HR 2670 EAS 
a complaint or information, the employee may 
contact a congressional intelligence committee or 
any other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate 
or the House of Representatives directly without 
obtaining or following the procedural direction 
otherwise required under such subclause.’’; 
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause 
(iv); and 
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(iii) An employee of an element of the intel-
ligence community who intends to report to Congress 
a complaint or information may report such com-
plaint or information to the Chairman and Vice 
Chairman or Ranking Member, as the case may be, 
of a congressional intelligence committee or another 
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the House 
of Representatives, a nonpartisan member of the com-
mittee staff designated for purposes of receiving com-
plaints or information under this section, or a mem-
ber of the majority staff and a member of the minor-
ity staff of the committee.’’. 
(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DI-
RECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subparagraph (A) of such 
section is amended—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) by inserting ‘‘(i)’’ before ‘‘An employee 
of’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subpara-
graph (D), an employee of an element of the intel-
ligence community who intends to report to Congress 
a complaint or information may report such com-
plaint or information directly to Congress, regardless 
of whether the complaint or information is with re-
spect to an urgent concern— 
‘‘(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or 
information under clause (i); or 
‘‘(II) in addition to reporting such com-
plaint or information under clause (i).’’. 
(c) AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY ACT OF 1949.— 
(1) APPOINTMENT OF SECURITY OFFICERS.—Sec-
tion 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) is amended by adding 
at the end the following: 
‘‘(I) The Inspector General shall appoint within the 
Office of the Inspector General security officers as required 
by section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code.’’. 
(2) PROCEDURES.—Subparagraph (D) of such 
section is amended—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) in clause (i), by inserting ‘‘or any other 
committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the 
House of Representatives’’ after ‘‘either or both of 
the intelligence committees’’; 
(B) by amending clause (ii) to read as fol-
lows: 
‘‘(ii)(I) Except as provided in subclause (II), an em-
ployee may contact an intelligence committee or another 
committee of jurisdiction directly as described in clause (i) 
only if the employee— 
‘‘(aa) before making such a contact, furnishes to 
the Director, through the Inspector General, a state-
ment of the employee’s complaint or information and 
notice of the employee’s intent to contact an intel-
ligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction 
of the Senate or the House of Representatives directly; 
and 
‘‘(bb)(AA) obtains and follows, from the Director, 
through the Inspector General, procedural direction 
on how to contact an intelligence committee or an-
other committee of jurisdiction of the Senate or the 
House of Representatives in accordance with appro-
priate security practices; or
2267 
† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(BB) obtains and follows such procedural direc-
tion from the applicable security officer appointed 
under section 416(i) of title 5, United States Code. 
‘‘(II) If an employee seeks procedural direction 
under subclause (I)(bb) and does not receive such pro-
cedural direction within 30 days, or receives insuffi-
cient direction to report to Congress a complaint or 
information, the employee may contact an intelligence 
committee or another committee of jurisdiction of the 
Senate or the House of Representatives directly with-
out obtaining or following the procedural direction 
otherwise required under such subclause.’’; 
(C) by redesignating clause (iii) as clause 
(iv); and 
(D) by inserting after clause (ii) the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(iii) An employee of the Agency who intends to report 
to Congress a complaint or information may report such 
complaint or information to the Chairman and Vice Chair-
man or Ranking Member, as the case may be, of an intel-
ligence committee or another committee of jurisdiction of 
the Senate or the House of Representatives, a nonpartisan 
member of the committee staff designated for purposes of 
receiving complaints or information under this section, or
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† HR 2670 EAS 
a member of the majority staff and a member of the minor-
ity staff of the committee.’’. 
(3) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO REPORT DI-
RECTLY TO CONGRESS.—Subparagraph (A) of such 
section is amended— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘(i)’’ before ‘‘An employee 
of’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(ii) Subject to clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph 
(D), an employee of the Agency who intends to report to 
Congress a complaint or information may report such com-
plaint or information directly to Congress, regardless of 
whether the complaint or information is with respect to an 
urgent concern— 
‘‘(I) in lieu of reporting such complaint or infor-
mation under clause (i); or 
‘‘(II) in addition to reporting such complaint or 
information under clause (i).’’. 
(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section 
or an amendment made by this section shall be construed 
to revoke or diminish any right of an individual provided 
by section 2303 of title 5, United States Code.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 602. PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF WHISTLE-
BLOWER IDENTITY AS REPRISAL AGAINST 
WHISTLEBLOWER DISCLOSURE BY EMPLOY-
EES AND CONTRACTORS IN INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1104 of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (a)(3) of such section— 
(A) in subparagraph (I), by striking ‘‘; or’’ 
and inserting a semicolon; 
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (J) as 
subparagraph (K); and 
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (I) the 
following: 
‘‘(J) a knowing and willful disclosure re-
vealing the identity or other personally identifi-
able information of an employee or contractor 
employee so as to identify the employee or con-
tractor employee as an employee or contractor 
employee who has made a lawful disclosure de-
scribed in subsection (b) or (c); or’’; 
(2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as 
subsections (g) and (h), respectively; and 
(3) by inserting after subsection (e) the following: 
‘‘(f) PERSONNEL ACTIONS INVOLVING DISCLOSURE OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER IDENTITY.—A personnel action described
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† HR 2670 EAS 
in subsection (a)(3)(J) shall not be considered to be in viola-
tion of subsection (b) or (c) under the following cir-
cumstances: 
‘‘(1) The personnel action was taken with the ex-
press consent of the employee or contractor employee. 
‘‘(2) An Inspector General with oversight respon-
sibility for a covered intelligence community element 
determines that— 
‘‘(A) the personnel action was unavoidable 
under section 103H(g)(3)(A) of this Act (50 
U.S.C. 3033(g)(3)(A)), section 17(e)(3)(A) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 3517(e)(3)(A)), section 407(b) of title 5, 
United States Code, or section 420(b)(2)(B) of 
such title; 
‘‘(B) the personnel action was made to an 
official of the Department of Justice responsible 
for determining whether a prosecution should be 
undertaken; or 
‘‘(C) the personnel action was required by 
statute or an order from a court of competent ju-
risdiction.’’. 
(b) APPLICABILITY TO DETAILEES.—Subsection (a) of 
section 1104 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 3234) is amended by 
adding at the end the following:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(5) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’, with re-
spect to an agency or a covered intelligence commu-
nity element, includes an individual who has been de-
tailed to such agency or covered intelligence commu-
nity element.’’. 
(c) HARMONIZATION OF ENFORCEMENT.—Subsection 
(g) of such section, as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) of 
this section, is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(g) ENFORCEMENT.— 
‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided 
in this subsection, the President shall provide for the 
enforcement of this section. 
‘‘(2) HARMONIZATION
WITH
OTHER
ENFORCE-
MENT.—To the fullest extent possible, the President 
shall provide for enforcement of this section in a man-
ner that is consistent with the enforcement of section 
2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, especially 
with respect to policies and procedures used to adju-
dicate alleged violations of such section.’’. 
SEC. 603. ESTABLISHING PROCESS PARITY FOR ADVERSE 
SECURITY CLEARANCE AND ACCESS DETER-
MINATIONS. 
Subparagraph (C) of section 3001(j)(4) of the Intel-
ligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 
U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)) is amended to read as follows:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(C) CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.— 
‘‘(i) IN
GENERAL.—Subject to clause 
(iii), in determining whether the adverse se-
curity clearance or access determination 
violated paragraph (1), the agency shall 
find that paragraph (1) was violated if the 
individual has demonstrated that a disclo-
sure described in paragraph (1) was a con-
tributing factor in the adverse security 
clearance or access determination taken 
against the individual. 
‘‘(ii) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.—An 
individual under clause (i) may dem-
onstrate that the disclosure was a contrib-
uting factor in the adverse security clear-
ance or access determination taken against 
the individual through circumstantial evi-
dence, such as evidence that— 
‘‘(I) the official making the deter-
mination knew of the disclosure; and 
‘‘(II) the determination occurred 
within a period such that a reasonable 
person could conclude that the disclo-
sure was a contributing factor in the 
determination.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(iii) 
DEFENSE.—In 
determining 
whether the adverse security clearance or 
access determination violated paragraph 
(1), the agency shall not find that para-
graph (1) was violated if, after a finding 
that a disclosure was a contributing factor, 
the agency demonstrates by clear and con-
vincing evidence that it would have made 
the same security clearance or access deter-
mination in the absence of such disclosure.’’. 
SEC. 604. ELIMINATION OF CAP ON COMPENSATORY DAM-
AGES FOR RETALIATORY REVOCATION OF SE-
CURITY CLEARANCES AND ACCESS DETER-
MINATIONS. 
Section 3001(j)(4)(B) of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(j)(4)(B)) 
is amended, in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘not to ex-
ceed $300,000’’. 
SEC. 605. MODIFICATION AND REPEAL OF REPORTING RE-
QUIREMENTS. 
(a) MODIFICATION
OF FREQUENCY
OF WHISTLE-
BLOWER NOTIFICATIONS TO INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.—Section 5334(a) of the 
Damon Paul Nelson and Matthew Young Pollard Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
2020 (Public Law 116–92; 50 U.S.C. 3033 note) is amended 
by striking ‘‘in real time’’ and inserting ‘‘monthly’’. 
(b) REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR INSPECTORS GEN-
ERAL REVIEWS OF ENHANCED PERSONNEL SECURITY PRO-
GRAMS.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Section 11001 of title 5, 
United States Code, is amended— 
(A) by striking subsection (d); and 
(B) by redesignating subsection (e) as sub-
section (d). 
(2) TECHNICAL
CORRECTIONS.—Subsection (d) 
of section 11001 of such title, as redesignated by 
paragraph (1)(B), is amended— 
(A) in paragraph (3), by adding ‘‘and’’ 
after the semicolon at the end; and 
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ‘‘; and’’ 
and inserting a period. 
TITLE VII—CLASSIFICATION 
REFORM 
Subtitle A—Classification Reform 
Act of 2023 
SEC. 701. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Classification Re-
form Act of 2023’’.
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SEC. 702. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ means any 
Executive agency as defined in section 105 of title 5, 
United States Code, any military department as de-
fined in section 102 of such title, and any other entity 
in the executive branch of the Federal Government 
that comes into the possession of classified informa-
tion. 
(2) CLASSIFY, CLASSIFIED, CLASSIFICATION.— 
The terms ‘‘classify’’, ‘‘classified’’, and ‘‘classifica-
tion’’ refer to the process by which information is de-
termined to require protection from unauthorized dis-
closure pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 
3161 note; relating to classified national security in-
formation), or previous and successor executive orders 
or similar directives, or section 703 in order to pro-
tect the national security of the United States. 
(3) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘clas-
sified information’’ means information that has been 
classified under Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 
3161 note; relating to classified national security in-
formation), or previous and successor executive orders 
or similar directives, or section 703. 
(4) DECLASSIFY, DECLASSIFIED, DECLASSIFICA-
TION.—The terms ‘‘declassify’’, ‘‘declassified’’, and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘declassification’’ refer to the process by which infor-
mation that has been classified is determined to no 
longer require protection from unauthorized disclosure 
pursuant to Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 
note; relating to classified national security informa-
tion), or previous and successor executive orders or 
similar directives, or section 703. 
(5) INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘information’’ 
means any knowledge that can be communicated, or 
documentary material, regardless of its physical form 
or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or 
for, or is under the control of the United States Gov-
ernment. 
SEC. 703. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF IN-
FORMATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may, in accordance 
with this section, protect from unauthorized disclosure any 
information owned by, produced by or for, or under the con-
trol of the executive branch of the Federal Government when 
there is a demonstrable need to do so in order to protect 
the national security of the United States. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT
OF STANDARDS
AND PROCE-
DURES FOR CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION.— 
(1) GOVERNMENTWIDE PROCEDURES.—
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(A) CLASSIFICATION.—The President shall, 
to the extent necessary, establish categories of in-
formation that may be classified and procedures 
for classifying information under subsection (a). 
(B) DECLASSIFICATION.—At the same time 
the President establishes categories and proce-
dures under subparagraph (A), the President 
shall establish procedures for declassifying infor-
mation that was previously classified. 
(C) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.—The proce-
dures established pursuant to subparagraphs (A) 
and (B) shall— 
(i) provide that information may be 
classified under this section, and may re-
main classified under this section, only if 
the harm to national security that might 
reasonably be expected from disclosure of 
such information outweighs the public inter-
est in disclosure of such information; 
(ii) establish standards and criteria for 
the classification of information; 
(iii) establish standards, criteria, and 
timelines for the declassification of informa-
tion classified under this section;
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(iv) provide for the automatic declas-
sification of classified records with perma-
nent historical value; 
(v) provide for the timely review of 
materials submitted for pre-publication; 
(vi) narrow the criteria for classifica-
tion set forth under section 1.4 of Executive 
Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating 
to classified national security information), 
as in effect on the day before the date of the 
enactment of this Act; 
(vii) narrow the exemptions from auto-
matic declassification set forth under sec-
tion 3.3(b) of Executive Order 13526 (50 
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified na-
tional security information), as in effect on 
the day before the date of the enactment of 
this Act; 
(viii) provide a clear and specific defi-
nition of ‘‘harm to national security’’ as it 
pertains to clause (i); and 
(ix) provide a clear and specific defini-
tion of ‘‘intelligence sources and methods’’ 
as it pertains to the categories and proce-
dures under subparagraph (A).
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(2) AGENCY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The head of each agency 
shall establish a single set of consolidated stand-
ards and procedures to permit such agency to 
classify and declassify information created by 
such agency in accordance with the categories 
and procedures established by the President 
under this section and otherwise to carry out 
this section. 
(B) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—Each agen-
cy head shall submit to Congress the standards 
and procedures established by such agency head 
under subparagraph (A). 
(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT
TO FOIA.—Section 
552(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read 
as follows: 
‘‘(1)(A) specifically authorized to be classified 
under section 703 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2024, or specifically authorized 
under criteria established by an Executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national security; and 
‘‘(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to 
that section or Executive order;’’. 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—
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(1) IN GENERAL.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall 
take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act. 
(2) RELATION TO PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES.— 
Presidential directives regarding classifying, safe-
guarding, and declassifying national security infor-
mation, including Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 
3161 note; relating to classified national security in-
formation), or successor order, in effect on the day be-
fore the date of the enactment of this Act, as well as 
procedures issued pursuant to such Presidential direc-
tives, shall remain in effect until superseded by proce-
dures issues pursuant to subsection (b). 
SEC. 704. TRANSPARENCY OFFICERS. 
(a) DESIGNATION.—The Attorney General, the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
the Treasury, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 
head of any other department, agency, or element of the ex-
ecutive branch of the Federal Government determined by 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board established 
by section 1061 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
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Prevention Act of 2004 (42 U.S.C. 2000ee) to be appro-
priate for coverage under this section, shall each designate 
at least 1 senior officer to serve as the principal advisor 
to assist such head of a department, agency, or element and 
other officials of the department, agency, or element of the 
head in identifying records of significant public interest 
and prioritizing appropriate review of such records in order 
to facilitate the public disclosure of such records in redacted 
or unredacted form. 
(b) DETERMINING PUBLIC INTEREST
IN DISCLO-
SURE.—In assisting the head of a department, agency, or 
element and other officials of such department, agency, or 
element in identifying records of significant public interest 
under subsection (a), the senior officer designated by the 
head under such subsection shall consider whether— 
(1) or not disclosure of the information would 
better enable United States citizens to hold Federal 
Government officials accountable for their actions and 
policies; 
(2) or not disclosure of the information would 
assist the United States criminal justice system in 
holding persons responsible for criminal acts or acts 
contrary to the Constitution; 
(3) or not disclosure of the information would 
assist Congress or any committee or subcommittee
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thereof, in carrying out its oversight responsibilities 
with regard to the executive branch of the Federal 
Government or in adequately informing itself of exec-
utive branch policies and activities in order to carry 
out its legislative responsibilities; 
(4) the disclosure of the information would assist 
Congress or the public in understanding the interpre-
tation of the Federal Government of a provision of 
law, including Federal regulations, Presidential di-
rectives, statutes, case law, and the Constitution of the 
United States; or 
(5) or not disclosure of the information would 
bring about any other significant benefit, including 
an increase in public awareness or understanding of 
Government activities or an enhancement of Federal 
Government efficiency. 
(c) PERIODIC REPORTS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Each senior officer designated 
under subsection (a) shall periodically, but not less 
frequently than annually, submit a report on the ac-
tivities of the officer, including the documents deter-
mined to be in the public interest for disclosure under 
subsection (b), to—
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(A) the Committee on Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs and the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Oversight and Gov-
ernment Reform and the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the House of Represent-
atives; and 
(C) the head of the department, agency, or 
element of the senior officer. 
(2) FORM.—Each report submitted pursuant to 
paragraph (1) shall be submitted, to the greatest ex-
tent possible, in unclassified form, with a classified 
annex as may be necessary. 
Subtitle B—Sensible Classification 
Act of 2023 
SEC. 711. SHORT TITLE. 
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘‘Sensible Classifica-
tion Act of 2023’’. 
SEC. 712. DEFINITIONS. 
In this subtitle: 
(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘agency’’ has the mean-
ing given the term ‘‘Executive agency’’ in section 105 
of title 5, United States Code.
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(2) CLASSIFICATION.—The term ‘‘classification’’ 
means the act or process by which information is de-
termined to be classified information. 
(3) CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘clas-
sified information’’ means information that has been 
determined pursuant to Executive Order 12958 (50 
U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national secu-
rity information), or successor order, to require pro-
tection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked 
to indicate its classified status when in documentary 
form. 
(4) DECLASSIFICATION.—The term ‘‘declassifica-
tion’’ means the authorized change in the status of in-
formation from classified information to unclassified 
information. 
(5) DOCUMENT.—The term ‘‘document’’ means 
any recorded information, regardless of the nature of 
the medium or the method or circumstances of record-
ing. 
(6) 
DOWNGRADE.—The 
term 
‘‘downgrade’’ 
means a determination by a declassification authority 
that information classified and safeguarded at a spec-
ified level shall be classified and safeguarded at a 
lower level.
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(7) INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘information’’ 
means any knowledge that can be communicated or 
documentary material, regardless of its physical form 
or characteristics, that is owned by, is produced by or 
for, or is under the control of the United States Gov-
ernment. 
(8) 
ORIGINATE, 
ORIGINATING, 
AND
ORIGI-
NATED.—The term ‘‘originate’’, ‘‘originating’’, and 
‘‘originated’’, with respect to classified information 
and an authority, means the authority that classified 
the information in the first instance. 
(9) RECORDS.—The term ‘‘records’’ means the 
records of an agency and Presidential papers or Pres-
idential records, as those terms are defined in title 44, 
United States Code, including those created or main-
tained by a government contractor, licensee, certifi-
cate holder, or grantee that are subject to the spon-
soring agency’s control under the terms of the con-
tract, license, certificate, or grant. 
(10) SECURITY CLEARANCE.—The term ‘‘security 
clearance’’ means an authorization to access classified 
information. 
(11) UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE.—The term 
‘‘unauthorized disclosure’’ means a communication or
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physical transfer of classified information to an un-
authorized recipient. 
(12) UNCLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.—The term 
‘‘unclassified information’’ means information that is 
not classified information. 
SEC. 713. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF THE SENATE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following find-
ings: 
(1) According to a report released by the Office 
of the Director of Intelligence in 2020 titled ‘‘Fiscal 
Year 2019 Annual Report on Security Clearance De-
terminations’’, more than 4,000,000 individuals have 
been granted eligibility for a security clearance. 
(2) At least 1,300,000 of such individuals have 
been granted access to information classified at the 
Top Secret level. 
(b) SENSE OF THE SENATE.—It is the sense of the Sen-
ate that— 
(1) the classification system of the Federal Gov-
ernment is in urgent need of reform; 
(2) the number of people with access to classified 
information is exceedingly high and must be justified 
or reduced;
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(3) reforms are necessary to reestablish trust be-
tween the Federal Government and the people of the 
United States; and 
(4) classification should be limited to the min-
imum necessary to protect national security while 
balancing the public’s interest in disclosure. 
SEC. 714. CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The authority to classify informa-
tion originally may be exercised only by— 
(1) the President and, in the performance of ex-
ecutive duties, the Vice President; 
(2) the head of an agency or an official of any 
agency authorized by the President pursuant to a des-
ignation of such authority in the Federal Register; 
and 
(3) an official of the Federal Government to 
whom authority to classify information originally has 
been delegated pursuant to subsection (c). 
(b) SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.—An individual authorized 
by this section to classify information originally at a speci-
fied level may also classify the information originally at 
a lower level. 
(c) DELEGATION OF ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AU-
THORITY.—An official of the Federal Government may be
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† HR 2670 EAS 
delegated original classification authority subject to the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Delegation of original classification author-
ity shall be limited to the minimum required to ad-
minister this section. Agency heads shall be respon-
sible for ensuring that designated subordinate officials 
have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise 
this authority. 
(2) Authority to originally classify information 
at the level designated as ‘‘Top Secret’’ may be dele-
gated only by the President, in the performance of ex-
ecutive duties, the Vice President, or an agency head 
or official designated pursuant to subsection (a)(2). 
(3) Authority to originally classify information 
at the level designated as ‘‘Secret’’ or ‘‘Confidential’’ 
may be delegated only by the President, in the per-
formance of executive duties, the Vice President, or an 
agency head or official designated pursuant to sub-
section (a)(2), or the senior agency official described 
in section 5.4(d) of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 
3161 note; relating to classified national security in-
formation), or successor order, provided that official 
has been delegated ‘‘Top Secret’’ original classifica-
tion authority by the agency head.
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(4) Each delegation of original classification au-
thority shall be in writing and the authority shall not 
be redelegated except as provided by paragraphs (1), 
(2), and (3). Each delegation shall identify the offi-
cial by name or position title. 
(d) TRAINING REQUIRED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—An individual may not be 
delegated original classification authority under this 
section unless the individual has first received train-
ing described in paragraph (2). 
(2) TRAINING DESCRIBED.—Training described 
in this paragraph is training on original classifica-
tion that includes instruction on the proper safe-
guarding of classified information and of the crimi-
nal, civil, and administrative sanctions that may be 
brought against an individual who fails to protect 
classified information from unauthorized disclosure. 
(e) EXCEPTIONAL CASES.— 
(1) IN
GENERAL.—When an employee, con-
tractor, licensee, certificate holder, or grantee of an 
agency who does not have original classification au-
thority originates information believed by that em-
ployee, contractor, licensee, certificate holder, or 
grantee to require classification, the information shall 
be protected in a manner consistent with Executive
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Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classi-
fied national security information), or successor 
order. 
(2) TRANSMITTAL.—An employee, contractor, li-
censee, certificate holder, or grantee described in para-
graph (1), who originates information described in 
such paragraph, shall promptly transmit such infor-
mation to— 
(A) the agency that has appropriate subject 
matter interest and classification authority with 
respect to this information; or 
(B) if it is not clear which agency has ap-
propriate subject matter interest and classifica-
tion authority with respect to the information, 
the Director of the Information Security Over-
sight Office. 
(3) AGENCY
DECISIONS.—An agency that re-
ceives information pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) or 
(4) shall decide within 30 days whether to classify 
this information. 
(4) INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE 
ACTION.—If the Director of the Information Security 
Oversight Office receives information under para-
graph (2)(B), the Director shall determine the agency 
having appropriate subject matter interest and classi-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
fication authority and forward the information, with 
appropriate recommendations, to that agency for a 
classification determination. 
SEC. 715. PROMOTING EFFICIENT DECLASSIFICATION RE-
VIEW. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Whenever an agency is processing 
a request pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States 
Code (commonly known as the ‘‘Freedom of Information 
Act’’) or the mandatory declassification review provisions 
of Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating 
to classified national security information), or successor 
order, and identifies responsive classified records that are 
more than 25 years of age as of December 31 of the year 
in which the request is received, the head of the agency shall 
review the record and process the record for declassification 
and release by the National Declassification Center of the 
National Archives and Records Administration. 
(b) APPLICATION.—Subsection (a) shall apply— 
(1) regardless of whether or not the record de-
scribed in such subsection is in the legal custody of 
the National Archives and Records Administration; 
and 
(2) without regard for any other provisions of 
law or existing agreements or practices between agen-
cies.
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SEC. 716. TRAINING TO PROMOTE SENSIBLE CLASSIFICA-
TION. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) OVER-CLASSIFICATION.—The term ‘‘over-clas-
sification’’ means classification at a level that exceeds 
the minimum level of classification that is sufficient 
to protect the national security of the United States. 
(2) SENSIBLE CLASSIFICATION.—The term ‘‘sen-
sible classification’’ means classification at a level 
that is the minimum level of classification that is suf-
ficient to protect the national security of the United 
States. 
(b) TRAINING REQUIRED.—Each head of an agency 
with classification authority shall conduct training for em-
ployees of the agency with classification authority to dis-
courage over-classification and to promote sensible classi-
fication. 
SEC. 717. IMPROVEMENTS TO PUBLIC INTEREST DECLAS-
SIFICATION BOARD. 
Section 703 of the Public Interest Declassification Act 
of 2000 (50 U.S.C. 3355a) is amended— 
(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the 
following: 
‘‘(5) A member of the Board whose term has expired 
may continue to serve until a successor is appointed and 
sworn in.’’; and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) in subsection (f)— 
(A) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ before ‘‘Any em-
ployee’’; and 
(B) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(2)(A) In addition to any employees detailed to the 
Board under paragraph (1), the Board may hire not more 
than 12 staff members. 
‘‘(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry 
out subparagraph (A) such sums as are necessary for fiscal 
year 2024 and each fiscal year thereafter.’’. 
SEC. 718. IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY FOR CLASSI-
FICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Office 
of Electronic Government (in this section referred to as the 
‘‘Administrator’’) shall, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Public Interest De-
classification Board, the Director of the Information Secu-
rity Oversight Office, and the head of the National Declas-
sification Center of the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration— 
(1) research a technology-based solution— 
(A) utilizing machine learning and artifi-
cial intelligence to support efficient and effective
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† HR 2670 EAS 
systems for classification and declassification; 
and 
(B) to be implemented on an interoperable 
and federated basis across the Federal Govern-
ment; and 
(2) submit to the President a recommendation 
regarding a technology-based solution described in 
paragraph (1) that should be adopted by the Federal 
Government. 
(b) STAFF.—The Administrator may hire sufficient 
staff to carry out subsection (a). 
(c) REPORT.—Not later than 540 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 
Congress a classified report on the technology-based solution 
recommended by the Administrator under subsection (a)(2) 
and the President’s decision regarding its adoption. 
SEC. 719. STUDIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NECESSITY 
OF SECURITY CLEARANCES. 
(a) AGENCY STUDIES ON NECESSITY OF SECURITY 
CLEARANCES.— 
(1) STUDIES
REQUIRED.—The head of each 
agency that grants security clearances to personnel of 
such agency shall conduct a study on the necessity of 
such clearances. 
(2) REPORTS REQUIRED.—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, each 
head of an agency that conducts a study under 
paragraph (1) shall submit to Congress a report 
on the findings of the agency head with respect 
to such study, which the agency head may clas-
sify as appropriate. 
(B) REQUIRED
ELEMENTS.—Each report 
submitted by the head of an agency under sub-
paragraph (A) shall include, for such agency, the 
following: 
(i) The number of personnel eligible for 
access to information up to the ‘‘Top Se-
cret’’ level. 
(ii) The number of personnel eligible 
for access to information up to the ‘‘Secret’’ 
level. 
(iii) Information on any reduction in 
the number of personnel eligible for access to 
classified information based on the study 
conducted under paragraph (1). 
(iv) A description of how the agency 
head will ensure that the number of security 
clearances granted by such agency will be 
kept to the minimum required for the con-
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† HR 2670 EAS 
duct of agency functions, commensurate 
with the size, needs, and mission of the 
agency. 
(3) INDUSTRY.—This subsection shall apply to 
the Secretary of Defense in the Secretary’s capacity as 
the Executive Agent for the National Industrial Secu-
rity Program, and the Secretary shall treat contrac-
tors, licensees, and grantees as personnel of the De-
partment of Defense for purposes of the studies and 
reports required by this subsection. 
(b) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 
OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION.—The Di-
rector of National Intelligence shall— 
(1) review the number of personnel eligible for 
access to sensitive compartmented information; and 
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Di-
rector will ensure that the number of such personnel 
is limited to the minimum required. 
(c) AGENCY
REVIEW
OF
SPECIAL
ACCESS
PRO-
GRAMS.—Each head of an agency who is authorized to es-
tablish a special access program by Executive Order 13526 
(50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to classified national secu-
rity information), or successor order, shall— 
(1) review the number of personnel of the agency 
eligible for access to such special access programs; and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the agen-
cy head will ensure that the number of such personnel 
is limited to the minimum required. 
(d) SECRETARY OF ENERGY REVIEW OF Q AND L 
CLEARANCES.—The Secretary of Energy shall— 
(1) review the number of personnel of the De-
partment of Energy granted Q and L access; and 
(2) submit to Congress a report on how the Sec-
retary will ensure that the number of such personnel 
is limited to the minimum required 
(e) INDEPENDENT REVIEWS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date on which a study is completed under sub-
section (a) or a review is completed under subsections (b) 
through (d), the Director of the Information Security Over-
sight Office of the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Pub-
lic Interest Declassification Board shall each review the 
study or review, as the case may be.
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TITLE 
VIII—SECURITY 
CLEAR-
ANCE AND TRUSTED WORK-
FORCE 
SEC. 801. REVIEW OF SHARED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
SERVICES FOR PERSONNEL VETTING. 
(a) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF 
CONGRESS.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate com-
mittees of Congress’’ means— 
(1) the congressional intelligence committees; 
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate; and 
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the House of Representatives. 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
ligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
gress a review of the extent to which the intelligence commu-
nity can use information technology services shared among 
the intelligence community for purposes of personnel vet-
ting, including with respect to human resources, suitability, 
and security.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
SEC. 802. TIMELINESS STANDARD FOR RENDERING DETER-
MINATIONS OF TRUST FOR PERSONNEL VET-
TING. 
(a) TIMELINESS STANDARD.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, acting 
through the Security Executive Agent and the Suit-
ability and Credentialing Executive Agent, establish 
and publish in such public venue as the President 
considers appropriate, new timeliness performance 
standards for processing personnel vetting trust deter-
minations in accordance with the Federal personnel 
vetting performance management standards. 
(2) QUINQUENNIAL
REVIEWS.—Not less fre-
quently than once every 5 years, the President shall, 
acting through the Security Executive Agent and the 
Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent— 
(A) review the standards established pursu-
ant to paragraph (1); and 
(B) pursuant to such review— 
(i) update such standards as the Presi-
dent considers appropriate; and 
(ii) publish in the Federal Register 
such updates as may be made pursuant to 
clause (i). 
(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 3001 of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
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† HR 2670 EAS 
of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking sub-
section (g). 
(b) QUARTERLY REPORTS ON IMPLEMENTATION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less frequently than quar-
terly, the Security Executive Agent and the Suit-
ability and Credentialing Executive Agent shall joint-
ly make available to the public a quarterly report on 
the compliance of Executive agencies (as defined in 
section 105 of title 5, United States Code) with the 
standards established pursuant to subsection (a). 
(2) DISAGGREGATION.—Each report made avail-
able pursuant to paragraph (1) shall disaggregate, to 
the greatest extent practicable, data by appropriate 
category of personnel risk and between Government 
and contractor personnel. 
(c) COMPLEMENTARY STANDARDS FOR INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY.—The Director of National Intelligence may, 
in consultation with the Security, Suitability, and 
Credentialing Performance Accountability Council estab-
lished pursuant to Executive Order 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 
note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability 
for Government employment, fitness for contractor employ-
ees, and eligibility for access to classified national security 
information) establish for the intelligence community
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† HR 2670 EAS 
standards complementary to those established pursuant to 
subsection (a). 
SEC. 803. ANNUAL REPORT ON PERSONNEL VETTING TRUST 
DETERMINATIONS. 
(a) DEFINITION OF PERSONNEL VETTING TRUST DE-
TERMINATION.—In this section, the term ‘‘personnel vetting 
trust determination’’ means any determination made by an 
executive branch agency as to whether an individual can 
be trusted to perform job functions or to be granted access 
necessary for a position. 
(b) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than March 30, 2024, 
and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, acting as the Security Executive Agent, 
and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, 
acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive 
Agent, in coordination with the Security, Suitability, and 
Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, shall 
jointly make available to the public a report on specific 
types of personnel vetting trust determinations made during 
the fiscal year preceding the fiscal year in which the report 
is made available, disaggregated, to the greatest extent pos-
sible, by the following: 
(1) Determinations of eligibility for national se-
curity-sensitive positions, separately noting—
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(A) the number of individuals granted ac-
cess to national security information; and 
(B) the number of individuals determined 
to be eligible for but not granted access to na-
tional security information. 
(2) Determinations of suitability or fitness for a 
public trust position. 
(3) Status as a Government employee, a con-
tractor employee, or other category. 
(c) ELIMINATION OF REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Sec-
tion 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341) is amended by striking 
subsection (h). 
SEC. 804. SURVEY TO ASSESS STRENGTHS AND WEAK-
NESSES OF TRUSTED WORKFORCE 2.0. 
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and once every 2 years thereafter until 2029, 
the Comptroller General of the United States shall admin-
ister a survey to such sample of Federal agencies, Federal 
contractors, and other persons that require security clear-
ances to access classified information as the Comptroller 
General considers appropriate to assess— 
(1) the strengths and weaknesses of the imple-
mentation of the Trusted Workforce 2.0 initiative; 
and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) the effectiveness of vetting Federal personnel 
while managing risk during the onboarding of such 
personnel. 
SEC. 805. PROHIBITION ON DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR AC-
CESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SOLELY 
BECAUSE OF PAST USE OF CANNABIS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) CANNABIS.—The term ‘‘cannabis’’ has the 
meaning given the term ‘‘marihuana’’ in section 102 
of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802). 
(2) ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED IN-
FORMATION.—The term ‘‘eligibility for access to clas-
sified information’’ has the meaning given the term 
in the procedures established pursuant to section 
801(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 3161(a)). 
(b) PROHIBITION.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, the head of an element of the intelligence com-
munity may not make a determination to deny eligibility 
for access to classified information to an individual based 
solely on the use of cannabis by the individual prior to the 
submission of the application for a security clearance by 
the individual.
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TITLE IX—ANOMALOUS HEALTH 
INCIDENTS 
SEC. 901. IMPROVED FUNDING FLEXIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS 
MADE 
BY 
THE 
CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY FOR QUALIFYING INJURIES TO THE 
BRAIN. 
Section 19A(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)) is amended by striking para-
graph (3) and inserting the following new paragraph: 
‘‘(3) FUNDING.— 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Payment under para-
graph (2) in a fiscal year may be made using 
any funds— 
‘‘(i) appropriated in advance specifi-
cally for payments under such paragraph; 
or 
‘‘(ii) reprogrammed in accordance with 
section 504 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3094). 
‘‘(B) BUDGET.—For each fiscal year, the 
Director shall include with the budget justifica-
tion materials submitted to Congress in support 
of the budget of the President for that fiscal year 
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
States Code, an estimate of the funds required in
2305 
† HR 2670 EAS 
that fiscal year to make payments under para-
graph (2).’’. 
SEC. 902. CLARIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SEEK CER-
TAIN BENEFITS RELATING TO INJURIES TO 
THE BRAIN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 19A(d)(5) of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(5)) is 
amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘Payments made’’ and inserting 
the following: 
‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Payments made’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(B) RELATION
TO
CERTAIN
FEDERAL 
WORKERS
COMPENSATION
LAWS.—Without re-
gard to the requirements in sections (b) and (c), 
covered employees need not first seek benefits 
provided under chapter 81 of title 5, United 
States Code, to be eligible solely for payment au-
thorized under paragraph (2) of this sub-
section.’’. 
(b) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall— 
(1) revise applicable regulations to conform with 
the amendment made by subsection (a); and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence com-
mittees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Sub-
committee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives copies of such 
regulations, as revised pursuant to paragraph (1). 
SEC. 903. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IMPLEMENTATION 
OF HAVANA ACT OF 2021 AUTHORITIES. 
(a) REGULATIONS.—Except as provided in subsection 
(c), not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, each head of an element of the intelligence com-
munity that has not already done so shall— 
(1) issue regulations and procedures to imple-
ment the authorities provided by section 19A(d) of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 
3519b(d)) and section 901(i) of title IX of division J 
of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 
(22 U.S.C. 2680b(i)) to provide payments under such 
sections, to the degree that such authorities are appli-
cable to the head of the element; and 
(2) submit to the congressional intelligence, the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appro-
priations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on De-
fense of the Committee on Appropriations of the
2307 
† HR 2670 EAS 
House of Representatives committees copies of such 
regulations. 
(b) REPORTING.—Not later than 210 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, each head of an element 
of the intelligence community shall submit to the congres-
sional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives a report on— 
(1) the estimated number of individuals associ-
ated with their element that may be eligible for pay-
ment under the authorities described in subsection 
(a)(1); 
(2) an estimate of the obligation that the head of 
the intelligence community element expects to incur 
in fiscal year 2025 as a result of establishing the reg-
ulations pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and 
(3) any perceived barriers or concerns in imple-
menting such authorities. 
(c) ALTERNATIVE REPORTING.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, each head 
of an element of the intelligence community (other than the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) who believes 
that the authorities described in subsection (a)(1) are not 
currently relevant for individuals associated with their ele-
2308 
† HR 2670 EAS 
ment, or who are not otherwise in position to issue the regu-
lations and procedures required by subsection (a)(1) shall 
provide written and detailed justification to the congres-
sional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense 
of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the 
Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropria-
tions of the House of Representatives to explain this posi-
tion. 
SEC. 904. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY HANDLING OF ANOMALOUS 
HEALTH INCIDENTS. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘Agency’’ means the 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
(2) QUALIFYING INJURY.—The term ‘‘qualifying 
injury’’ has the meaning given such term in section 
19A(d)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (50 U.S.C. 3519b(d)(1)). 
(b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional intel-
ligence committees a report on the handling of anomalous 
health incidents by the Agency. 
(c) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection (b) 
shall include the following:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) HAVANA ACT IMPLEMENTATION.— 
(A) An explanation of how the Agency de-
termines whether a reported anomalous health 
incident resulted in a qualifying injury or a 
qualifying injury to the brain. 
(B) The number of participants of the Ex-
panded Care Program of the Central Intelligence 
Agency who— 
(i) have a certified qualifying injury 
or a certified qualifying injury to the brain; 
and 
(ii) as of September 30, 2023, applied 
to the Expanded Care Program due to a re-
ported anomalous health incident. 
(C) A comparison of the number of anoma-
lous health incidents reported by applicants to 
the Expanded Care Program that occurred in the 
United States and that occurred in a foreign 
country. 
(D) The specific reason each applicant was 
approved or denied for payment under the Ex-
panded Care Program. 
(E) The number of applicants who were ini-
tially denied payment but were later approved 
on appeal.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(F) The average length of time, from the 
time of application, for an applicant to receive 
a determination from the Expanded Care Pro-
gram, aggregated by qualifying injuries and 
qualifying injuries to the brain. 
(2) PRIORITY CASES.— 
(A) A detailed list of priority cases of 
anomalous health incidents, including, for each 
incident, locations, dates, times, and cir-
cumstances. 
(B) For each priority case listed in accord-
ance with subparagraph (A), a detailed expla-
nation of each credible alternative explanation 
that the Agency assigned to the incident, includ-
ing— 
(i) how the incident was discovered; 
(ii) how the incident was assigned 
within the Agency; and 
(iii) whether an individual affected by 
the incident is provided an opportunity to 
appeal the credible alternative explanation. 
(C) For each priority case of an anomalous 
health incident determined to be largely con-
sistent with the definition of ‘‘anomalous health 
incident’’ established by the National Academy of
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† HR 2670 EAS 
Sciences and for which the Agency does not have 
a credible alternative explanation, a detailed de-
scription of such case. 
(3) ANOMALOUS HEALTH INCIDENT SENSORS.— 
(A) A list of all types of sensors that the 
Agency has developed or deployed with respect to 
reports of anomalous health incidents, including, 
for each type of sensor, the deployment location, 
the date and the duration of the employment of 
such type of sensor, and, if applicable, the reason 
for removal. 
(B) A list of entities to which the Agency 
has provided unrestricted access to data associ-
ated with anomalous health incidents. 
(C) A list of requests for support the Agency 
has received from elements of the Federal Gov-
ernment regarding sensor development, testing, 
or deployment, and a description of the support 
provided in each case. 
(D) A description of all emitter signatures 
obtained by sensors associated with anomalous 
health incidents in Agency holdings since 2016, 
including—
2312 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(i) the identification of any of such 
emitters that the Agency prioritizes as a 
threat; and 
(ii) 
an 
explanation 
of 
such 
prioritization. 
(d) ADDITIONAL SUBMISSIONS.—Concurrent with the 
submission of the report required by subsection (b), the Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, 
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the House of Representatives— 
(1) a template of each form required to apply for 
the Expanded Care Program, including with respect 
to payments for a qualifying injury or a qualifying 
injury to the brain; 
(2) copies of internal guidance used by the Agen-
cy to adjudicate claims for the Expanded Care Pro-
gram, including with respect to payments for a quali-
fying injury to the brain; 
(3) the case file of each applicant to the Ex-
panded Care Program who applied due to a reported 
anomalous health incident, including supporting 
medical documentation, with name and other identi-
fying information redacted;
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(4) copies of all informational and instructional 
materials provided to employees of and other individ-
uals affiliated with the Agency with respect to apply-
ing for the Expanded Care Program; and 
(5) copies of Agency guidance provided to em-
ployees of and other individuals affiliated with the 
Agency with respect to reporting and responding to a 
suspected anomalous health incident, and the roles 
and responsibilities of each element of the Agency 
tasked with responding to a report of an anomalous 
health incident. 
(e) BRIEFING.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency shall brief the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee 
on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on 
Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
of Representatives on the report. 
TITLE X—ELECTION SECURITY 
SEC. 1001. STRENGTHENING ELECTION CYBERSECURITY TO 
UPHOLD RESPECT FOR ELECTIONS THROUGH 
INDEPENDENT TESTING ACT OF 2023. 
(a) REQUIRING PENETRATION TESTING AS PART OF 
THE TESTING AND CERTIFICATION OF VOTING SYSTEMS.— 
Section 231 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52
2314 
† HR 2670 EAS 
U.S.C. 20971) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new subsection: 
‘‘(e) REQUIRED PENETRATION TESTING.— 
‘‘(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the 
Commission shall provide for the conduct of penetra-
tion testing as part of the testing, certification, decer-
tification, and recertification of voting system hard-
ware and software by accredited laboratories under 
this section. 
‘‘(2) ACCREDITATION.—The Director of the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology shall 
recommend to the Commission entities the Director 
proposes be accredited to carry out penetration testing 
under this subsection and certify compliance with the 
penetration testing-related guidelines required by this 
subsection. The Commission shall vote on the accredi-
tation of any entity recommended. The requirements 
for such accreditation shall be a subset of the require-
ments for accreditation of laboratories under sub-
section (b) and shall only be based on consideration 
of an entity’s competence to conduct penetration test-
ing under this subsection.’’.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(b) INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDI-
NATED CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PRO-
GRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subtitle D of title II of the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (42 U.S.C. 15401 et 
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new part: 
‘‘PART 7—INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND 
COORDINATED 
CYBERSECURITY 
VULNER-
ABILITY DISCLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR 
ELECTION SYSTEMS 
‘‘SEC. 297. INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDI-
NATED CYBERSECURITY VULNERABILITY DIS-
CLOSURE PILOT PROGRAM FOR ELECTION 
SYSTEMS. 
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.— 
‘‘(1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Commission, in 
consultation with the Secretary, shall establish an 
Independent Security Testing and Coordinated Vul-
nerability Disclosure Pilot Program for Election Sys-
tems (VDP–E) (in this section referred to as the ‘pro-
gram’) in order to test for and disclose cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in election systems. 
‘‘(2) DURATION.—The program shall be con-
ducted for a period of 5 years.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(iv) require an election system ven-
dor, within 180 days after validating notifi-
cation of a critical or high vulnerability (as 
defined by the National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology) in an election system 
of the vendor, to— 
‘‘(I) send a patch or propound 
some other fix or mitigation for such 
vulnerability to the appropriate State 
and local election officials, in consulta-
tion with the researcher who discovered 
it; and 
‘‘(II) notify the Commission and 
the Secretary that such patch has been 
sent to such officials; 
‘‘(D) in the case where a patch or fix to ad-
dress a vulnerability disclosed under subpara-
graph (C)(ii)(I) is intended to be applied to a 
system certified by the Commission, provide— 
‘‘(i) for the expedited review of such 
patch or fix within 90 days after receipt by 
the Commission; and 
‘‘(ii) if such review is not completed by 
the last day of such 90 day period, that 
such patch or fix shall be deemed to be cer-
2318 
† HR 2670 EAS 
tified by the Commission, subject to any 
subsequent review of such determination by 
the Commission; and 
‘‘(E) 180 days after the disclosure of a vul-
nerability under subparagraph (C)(ii)(I), notify 
the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastruc-
ture Security Agency of the vulnerability for in-
clusion 
in 
the 
database 
of 
Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures. 
‘‘(4) VOLUNTARY
PARTICIPATION; SAFE
HAR-
BOR.— 
‘‘(A) VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION.—Partici-
pation in the program shall be voluntary for 
election systems vendors and researchers. 
‘‘(B) SAFE HARBOR.—When conducting re-
search under this program, such research and 
subsequent publication shall be considered to be: 
‘‘(i) Authorized in accordance with sec-
tion 1030 of title 18, United States Code 
(commonly known as the ‘Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act’), (and similar state laws), 
and the election system vendor will not ini-
tiate or support legal action against the re-
searcher for accidental, good faith violations 
of the program.
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† HR 2670 EAS 
‘‘(ii) Exempt from the anti-circumven-
tion rule of section 1201 of title 17, United 
States Code (commonly known as the ‘Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act’), and the 
election system vendor will not bring a 
claim against a researcher for circumven-
tion of technology controls. 
‘‘(C) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in 
this paragraph may be construed to limit or oth-
erwise affect any exception to the general prohi-
bition against the circumvention of technological 
measures under subparagraph (A) of section 
1201(a)(1) of title 17, United States Code, in-
cluding with respect to any use that is excepted 
from that general prohibition by the Librarian 
of Congress under subparagraphs (B) through 
(D) of such section 1201(a)(1). 
‘‘(5) EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSURE.—Cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities discovered under the program shall be 
exempt from section 552 of title 5, United States Code 
(commonly referred to as the Freedom of Information 
Act). 
‘‘(6) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
‘‘(A) CYBERSECURITY
VULNERABILITY.— 
The term ‘cybersecurity vulnerability’ means,
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† HR 2670 EAS 
with respect to an election system, any security 
vulnerability that affects the election system. 
‘‘(B) 
ELECTION
INFRASTRUCTURE.—The 
term ‘election infrastructure’ means— 
‘‘(i) storage facilities, polling places, 
and centralized vote tabulation locations 
used to support the administration of elec-
tions for public office; and 
‘‘(ii) related information and commu-
nications technology, including— 
‘‘(I) voter registration databases; 
‘‘(II) election management sys-
tems; 
‘‘(III) voting machines; 
‘‘(IV) electronic mail and other 
communications 
systems 
(including 
electronic mail and other systems of 
vendors who have entered into con-
tracts with election agencies to support 
the administration of elections, manage 
the election process, and report and 
display election results); and 
‘‘(V) other systems used to manage 
the election process and to report and
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† HR 2670 EAS 
display election results on behalf of an 
election agency. 
‘‘(C) ELECTION
SYSTEM.—The term ‘elec-
tion system’ means any information system that 
is part of an election infrastructure, including 
any related information and communications 
technology described in subparagraph (B)(ii). 
‘‘(D) ELECTION
SYSTEM
VENDOR.—The 
term ‘election system vendor’ means any person 
providing, supporting, or maintaining an elec-
tion system on behalf of a State or local election 
official. 
‘‘(E) INFORMATION SYSTEM.—The term ‘in-
formation system’ has the meaning given the 
term in section 3502 of title 44, United States 
Code. 
‘‘(F) SECRETARY.—The term ‘Secretary’ 
means the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
‘‘(G) SECURITY VULNERABILITY.—The term 
‘security vulnerability’ has the meaning given 
the term in section 102 of the Cybersecurity In-
formation Sharing Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 
1501).’’. 
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con-
tents of such Act is amended by adding at the end of
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† HR 2670 EAS 
the items relating to subtitle D of title II the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘PART 7—INDEPENDENT SECURITY TESTING AND COORDINATED CYBERSECU-
RITY VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM FOR ELECTION SYSTEMS 
‘‘Sec. 297. Independent security testing and coordinated cybersecurity vulner-
ability disclosure program for election systems.’’. 
TITLE XI—OTHER MATTERS 
SEC. 1101. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
FOR ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OF-
FICE. 
Section 1683(k)(1) of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(k)(1)), as 
amended by section 6802(a) of the Intelligence Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263), is 
amended— 
(1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘DIRECTOR OF 
NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND
SECRETARY
OF
DE-
FENSE’’ and inserting ‘‘ALL-DOMAIN ANOMALY RESO-
LUTION OFFICE’’; and 
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘Director 
of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense 
shall jointly’’ and inserting ‘‘Director of the Office 
shall’’. 
SEC. 1102. FUNDING LIMITATIONS RELATING TO UNIDENTI-
FIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
2323 
† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 
The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 
means— 
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on In-
telligence, the Committee on Armed Services, and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives. 
(2) CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP.—The term 
‘‘congressional leadership’’ means— 
(A) the majority leader of the Senate; 
(B) the minority leader of the Senate; 
(C) the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives; and 
(D) the minority leader of the House of 
Representatives. 
(3) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the 
Director of the All-domain Anomaly Resolution Of-
fice. 
(4) UNIDENTIFIED ANOMALOUS PHENOMENA.— 
The term ‘‘unidentified anomalous phenomena’’ has 
the meaning given such term in section 1683(n) of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
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† HR 2670 EAS 
2022 (50 U.S.C. 3373(n)), as amended by section 
6802(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fis-
cal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263). 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that, due to the increasing potential for technology surprise 
from foreign adversaries and to ensure sufficient integra-
tion across the United States industrial base and avoid 
technology and security stovepipes— 
(1) the United States industrial base must retain 
its global lead in critical advanced technologies; and 
(2) the Federal Government must expand aware-
ness about any historical exotic technology ante-
cedents previously provided by the Federal Govern-
ment for research and development purposes. 
(c) LIMITATIONS.—No amount authorized to be appro-
priated by this Act may be obligated or expended, directly 
or indirectly, in part or in whole, for, on, in relation to, 
or in support of activities involving unidentified anomalous 
phenomena protected under any form of special access or 
restricted access limitations that have not been formally, of-
ficially, explicitly, and specifically described, explained, 
and justified to the appropriate committees of Congress, 
congressional leadership, and the Director, including for 
any activities relating to the following:
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† HR 2670 EAS 
(1) Recruiting, employing, training, equipping, 
and operations of, and providing security for, govern-
ment or contractor personnel with a primary, sec-
ondary, or contingency mission of capturing, recov-
ering, and securing unidentified anomalous phe-
nomena craft or pieces and components of such craft. 
(2) Analyzing such craft or pieces or components 
thereof, including for the purpose of determining 
properties, material composition, method of manufac-
ture, origin, characteristics, usage and application, 
performance, operational modalities, or reverse engi-
neering of such craft or component technology. 
(3) Managing and providing security for pro-
tecting activities and information relating to uniden-
tified anomalous phenomena from disclosure or com-
promise. 
(4) Actions relating to reverse engineering or 
replicating unidentified anomalous phenomena tech-
nology or performance based on analysis of materials 
or sensor and observational information associated 
with unidentified anomalous phenomena. 
(5) The development of propulsion technology, or 
aerospace craft that uses propulsion technology, sys-
tems, or subsystems, that is based on or derived from 
or inspired by inspection, analysis, or reverse engi-
2326 
† HR 2670 EAS 
neering of recovered unidentified anomalous phe-
nomena craft or materials. 
(6) Any aerospace craft that uses propulsion 
technology other than chemical propellants, solar 
power, or electric ion thrust. 
(d) NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING.—Any person cur-
rently or formerly under contract with the Federal Govern-
ment that has in their possession material or information 
provided by or derived from the Federal Government relat-
ing to unidentified anomalous phenomena that formerly or 
currently is protected by any form of special access or re-
stricted access shall— 
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, notify the Director of such pos-
session; and 
(2) not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, make available to the Director 
for assessment, analysis, and inspection— 
(A) all such material and information; and 
(B) a comprehensive list of all non-earth or-
igin or exotic unidentified anomalous phe-
nomena material. 
(e) LIABILITY.—No criminal or civil action may lie 
or be maintained in any Federal or State court against 
any person for receiving material or information described
2327 
† HR 2670 EAS 
in subsection (d) if that person complies with the notifica-
tion and reporting provisions described in such subsection. 
(f) LIMITATION REGARDING INDEPENDENT RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Consistent with Department 
of Defense Instruction Number 3204.01 (dated August 
20, 2014, incorporating change 2, dated July 9, 2020; 
relating to Department policy for oversight of inde-
pendent research and development), independent re-
search and development funding relating to material 
or information described in subsection (c) shall not be 
allowable as indirect expenses for purposes of con-
tracts covered by such instruction, unless such mate-
rial and information is made available to the Direc-
tor in accordance with subsection (d). 
(2) EFFECTIVE
DATE
AND
APPLICABILITY.— 
Paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date that is 60 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act and 
shall apply with respect to funding from amounts ap-
propriated before, on, or after such date. 
(g) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date on which the Director has received a notifica-
tion under paragraph (1) of subsection (d) or information 
or material under paragraph (2) of such subsection, the Di-
rector shall provide written notification of such receipt to
2328 
† HR 2670 EAS 
the appropriate committees of Congress, the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Sen-
ate, the Committee on Oversight and Accountability of the 
House of Representatives, and congressional leadership. 
Attest: 
Secretary.