I
107TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
H. R. 2351
To establish the policy of the United States for reducing the number of
nuclear warheads in the United States and Russian arsenals, for reducing
the number of nuclear weapons of those two nations that are on high
alert, and for expanding and accelerating programs to prevent diversion
and proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and nu-
clear expertise.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 27, 2001
Mr. SPRATT (for himself and Mrs. TAUSCHER) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in
addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subse-
quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
A BILL
To establish the policy of the United States for reducing
the number of nuclear warheads in the United States
and Russian arsenals, for reducing the number of nuclear
weapons of those two nations that are on high alert,
and for expanding and accelerating programs to prevent
diversion and proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons,
fissile materials, and nuclear expertise.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
‘‘Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001’’.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of
this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Purpose.
Sec. 3. Reduction in number of warheads in arsenals of United States and
Russia.
Sec. 4. Reduction in alert status of nuclear weapons of United States and
Russia.
Sec. 5. Acceleration of programs to prevent diversion of nuclear weapons,
materials, and expertise from Russia.
SEC. 2. PURPOSE.
The purpose of this Act is to decrease substantially
the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons.
SEC. 
3. 
REDUCTION 
IN 
NUMBER 
OF 
WARHEADS 
IN
ARSENALS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.
(a) REPEAL
OF PROHIBITION AGAINST REDUC-
TIONS.—Section 1302 of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105–85) is re-
pealed.
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
United States to reduce the number of nuclear warheads
and nuclear weapons delivery systems of the United States
and Russia, through bilateral agreements between the
United States and Russia, to the lowest possible number
consistent with the national security of the United States.
Any bilateral agreement for purposes of that policy shall
provide for transparency, predictability, and verification of
the reductions.
(c) IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS.—In effecting
any reduction in the number of nuclear warheads of the
United States, it shall be the policy of the United States—
(1) that such reductions be intended as perma-
nent reductions in the United States nuclear weap-
ons force, in keeping with the purposes and objec-
tives of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty;
(2) that if the President makes unilateral re-
ductions in the United States nuclear weapons force,
such reductions should be intended to facilitate bilat-
eral agreement with Russia, and the President
should undertake diplomatic efforts to convince Rus-
sia to undertake parallel or commensurate reduc-
tions in its nuclear weapons force; and
(3) that the President should (A) offer en-
hanced consultation and cooperation by the United
States with Russia in making such reductions, and
(B) pursue enhanced transparency and other con-
fidence-building measures to ensure predictable and
stable strategic relations between the two nations.
(d) POLICY REGARDING WARHEADS REMOVED FROM
WEAPONS SYSTEMS.—(1) It is the policy of the United
States to ensure through formal agreements with Russia
that any nuclear warhead removed from a weapons system
by either nation as part of reductions in the number of
warheads or systems pursuant to the policies in this Act—
(A) be kept safe and secure;
(B) be accounted for; and
(C) eventually be destroyed or eliminated in a
manner that is verifiable by the other nation.
(2) Any such formal agreement shall be entered into
either through the agreement referred to in subsection (b)
or other agreement between the United States and Russia.
SEC. 4. REDUCTION IN ALERT STATUS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
United States to pursue with Russia formal arrangements
to remove as many nuclear weapons of those two nations
as feasible from immediate, launch-ready (or ‘‘high alert’’)
status, consistent with the national security of the United
States, concentrating on those weapons earmarked for
downloading, dismantlement, or elimination under the
START II treaty. Such arrangements should seek to en-
sure that any change in the alert status of such weapons
of either nation be transparent and verifiable.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION
OF REDUCTION
IN ALERT
STATUS.—If the President makes unilateral changes to
the alert status of weapons in the United States nuclear
arsenal, such changes should—
(1) be consistent with the national security of
the United States; and
(2) be pursued as part of a broader United
States effort to persuade Russia to enter into ar-
rangements as called for in subsection (a).
(c) SECURITY AND VERIFIABILITY.—Any formal ar-
rangement that results from subsection (a) should include
measures to ensure that—
(1) weapons, including their warheads, that are
removed from high alert status are secure and ac-
counted for throughout the process by which they
are removed from that status; and
(2) such accountability measures are verifiable
by both nations.
SEC. 5. ACCELERATION OF PROGRAMS TO PREVENT DIVER-
SION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MATERIALS,
AND EXPERTISE FROM RUSSIA.
(a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
United States to work cooperatively with Russia to prevent
the diversion of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise
from Russia. In furtherance of that objective, the policy
of the United States should include the following:
(1) With respect to the nuclear weapons arsenal
of Russia—
(A) ensuring that all the elements of that
arsenal, including delivery systems, are identi-
fied and accounted for;
(B) identifying with Russia those elements
of that arsenal that are most susceptible to pro-
liferation; and
(C) ensuring that the weapons in that ar-
senal and their components are secured and
safeguarded, placing the highest priority on
safeguards for those weapons and components
that are identified pursuant to subparagraph
(B) as being those most susceptible to prolifera-
tion.
(2) With respect to Russia’s stockpile of nuclear
weapons materials (other than materials in Russia’s
arsenal)—
(A) ensuring that all the elements of that
stockpile are identified and accounted for;
(B) identifying with Russia those elements
of that stockpile that are most susceptible to
proliferation; and
(C) ensuring that the elements of that
stockpile are secured and safeguarded, placing
the highest priority on safeguards for those ele-
ments of that stockpile that are identified pur-
suant to subparagraph (B) as being those most
susceptible to proliferation.
(3) With respect to nuclear weapons expertise
in Russia—
(A) identifying and accounting for the ex-
tent of that expertise in cities in Russia re-
ferred to as ‘‘Nuclear Cities’’ and elsewhere in
Russia;
(B) developing and pursuing programs
that make productive use of that expertise in-
side Russia and help prevent the spread of that
expertise outside of Russia; and
(C) developing and pursuing initiatives to
reduce the Russian nuclear production capacity
to a size appropriate to its post-Cold War mis-
sion.
(4) Rendering permanently unusable for weap-
ons purposes all nuclear materials and weapons sys-
tems that Russia no longer requires to support its
arsenal and forces.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—To carry
out activities under this Act, cooperative threat reduction
programs of the Department of Defense under section
1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2362 note), and other coop-
erative threat reduction, nonproliferation, and related pro-
grams, there are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2002 amounts as follows:
(1) 
For 
the 
Department 
of 
Defense,
$600,000,000.
(2) 
For 
the 
Department 
of 
Energy,
$1,200,000,000.
(3) 
For 
the 
Department 
of 
State,
$200,000,000.
(c) PLAN FOR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH
RUSSIA.—
(1) IN
GENERAL.—Not later than April 15,
2002, the President shall submit to Congress a
plan—
(A) to secure and neutralize over the suc-
ceeding eight years all nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia that
Russia does not retain in its nuclear arsenal;
and
(B) to prevent the outflow from Russia of
scientific expertise that could be used for devel-
oping nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction, including delivery systems.
(2) CONTENT OF PLAN.—The plan required by
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(A) Specific goals and measurable objec-
tives for the programs that are designed to
carry out the objectives specified in subpara-
graphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
(B) Criteria for success for those programs
and a strategy for eventual termination of
United States contributions to those programs
and assumption of the ongoing support of those
programs by Russia.
(C) A description of the administrative and
organizational changes that the President plans
to take, or will have taken, in order to achieve
the direction and coordination of those pro-
grams that is necessary for their effectiveness.
(3) COORDINATION
WITH
RUSSIA.—In devel-
oping the plan required by paragraph (1), the Presi-
dent shall coordinate with Russia to ensure that ele-
ments of the plan are practicable.
(4) CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS.—In devel-
oping the plan required by paragraph (1), the Presi-
dent shall consult with the majority and minority
leadership of the appropriate committees of Con-
gress.
(d) REPORT ON DEBT-FOR-SECURITY PROGRAM.—
(1) STUDY.—The President shall conduct a
study of the feasibility of creating a new source of
funds for nuclear nonproliferation programs in Rus-
sia through establishment of a program providing
for the forgiveness of international debt of Russia in
exchange for payments by Russia into an inde-
pendent fund that, under strict conditions, would
support the implementation of agreed-upon nuclear
nonproliferation programs.
(2) CONSULTATION.—In the conduct of the
study under paragraph (1), the President shall con-
sult with appropriate representatives of Russia and
other nations whose participation in such a program
the President determines to be necessary or desir-
able.
(3) REPORT
ON
PRESIDENTIAL
DETERMINA-
TIONS.—Not later than April 15, 2002, the Presi-
dent shall submit to Congress a report on the study
required by paragraph (1). The report shall include
the President’s determinations, together with sup-
porting facts and reasoning, as to each of the fol-
lowing:
(A) The prospects for the participation of
creditor nations in addition to the United
States in the program of debt forgiveness.
(B) The extent to which payments by Rus-
sia into a fund described in paragraph (1)
should be made in Russian currency.
(C) The appropriate ratio between the
amount of such payments and the amount of
debt forgiven.
(D) The purposes for which amounts in
the fund should be permitted to be expended.
(E) The means for assuring that those
amounts are expended for those purposes.
(F) The feasibility of establishing such a
program.
(4) 
LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL.—The 
report
under paragraph (3) shall include a legislative pro-
posal for implementing any program that the Presi-
dent recommends based on the determinations under
that paragraph.
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