115 
(7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera-
tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 
provided to certain countries and because nuclear 
equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual- 
use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 
also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel-
opment.’’. 
(8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 
State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 
projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 
nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 
(9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro-
liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 
Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 
States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be-
cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 
TC project information during the proposal develop-
ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State doc-
umentation on how proliferation concerns of TC pro-
posals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. 
policies and IAEA procedures [including monitoring 
proliferation risks] related to TC program fellow-
ships.’’. 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
02:19 Aug 31, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00115
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H2829.IH
H2829
jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
116 
(10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi-
cials told us that the [Technical Cooperation Pro-
gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 
basis of their status as U.S.-designated state spon-
sors of terrorism or other political considerations’’ 
and that, according to the Deputy Director General 
for the Technical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are 
no good countries and there are no bad countries’’ 
with respect to provision of technical cooperation by 
the IAEA. 
(11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 
the limited information available on TC projects and 
the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 
expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 
can assert with complete confidence that TC assist-
ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc-
tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 
terrorism’’. 
(12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 
not share [the State Department’s confidence in 
IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 
from contributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 
(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
02:19 Aug 31, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00116
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H2829.IH
H2829
jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
117 
nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 
for the United States proportionate share for pro-
grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, inter alia. 
(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ-
ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 
funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 
being made available for programs and projects of 
the IAEA in Cuba. 
(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 
the United States to withhold a proportionate share 
of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard-
ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 
Pi Nuclear Research Center. 
(16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con-
sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 
share of future annual contributions to the [Tech-
nical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the 
amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 
designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 
countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 
is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
02:19 Aug 31, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00117
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H2829.IH
H2829
jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
118 
foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such na-
tions’’. 
(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 
the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 
water-related projects and its enrichment of ura-
nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 
(2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 
(2010). 
(18) United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 
provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 
shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 
other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 
that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 
that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear ac-
tivities . . .’’. 
(19) The IAEA Director General reported to 
the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 
that the Government of Iran now has approximately 
7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running 
almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stock-
pile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilo-
grams, considered sufficient for further enrichment 
into enough high-enriched uranium for more than 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
02:19 Aug 31, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00118
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H2829.IH
H2829
jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS
119 
one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran has also 
reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms 
of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U–235. 
(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘out-
standing issues related to possible military dimen-
sions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 
(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the 
[IAEA] remains concerned about the possible exist-
ence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear 
related activities involving military-related organiza-
tions, including activities related to the development 
of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’. 
(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 
reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 
in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 
not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 
prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible as-
surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma-
terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 
IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans-
parency measure, access to additional locations re-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 
02:19 Aug 31, 2011
Jkt 099200
PO 00000
Frm 00119
Fmt 6652
Sfmt 6201
E:\BILLS\H2829.IH
H2829
jbell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with BILLS