(B) openness by ensuring public access to 
appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submis-
sions, including with regard to trade and invest-
ment dispute settlement; and 
(C) public access to all notifications and 
supporting documentation submitted by WTO 
members. 
(14) ANTI-CORRUPTION.—The principal negoti-
ating objectives of the United States with respect to 
the use of money or other things of value to influ-
ence acts, decisions, or omissions of foreign govern-
ments or officials or to secure any improper advan-
tage in a manner affecting trade are— 
(A) to obtain high standards and effective 
domestic enforcement mechanisms applicable to 
persons from all countries participating in the 
applicable trade agreement that prohibit such 
attempts to influence acts, decisions, or omis-
sions of foreign governments or officials or to 
secure any such improper advantage; 
(B) to ensure that such standards level the 
playing field for United States persons in inter-
national trade and investment; and 
(C) to seek commitments to work jointly to 
encourage and support anti-corruption and 
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anti-bribery initiatives in international trade 
fora, including through the Convention on Com-
bating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, done at Paris December 17, 1997 
(commonly known as the ‘‘OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention’’). 
(15) DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
AND
ENFORCE-
MENT.—The principal negotiating objectives of the 
United States with respect to dispute settlement and 
enforcement of trade agreements are— 
(A) to seek provisions in trade agreements 
providing for resolution of disputes between 
governments under those trade agreements in 
an effective, timely, transparent, equitable, and 
reasoned manner, requiring determinations 
based on facts and the principles of the agree-
ments, with the goal of increasing compliance 
with the agreements; 
(B) to seek to strengthen the capacity of 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the 
World Trade Organization to review compliance 
with commitments; 
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(C) to seek adherence by panels convened 
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
and by the Appellate Body to— 
(i) the mandate of those panels and 
the Appellate Body to apply the WTO 
Agreement as written, without adding to or 
diminishing rights and obligations under 
the Agreement; and 
(ii) the standard of review applicable 
under the Uruguay Round Agreement in-
volved in the dispute, including greater 
deference, where appropriate, to the fact 
finding and technical expertise of national 
investigating authorities; 
(D) to seek provisions encouraging the 
early identification and settlement of disputes 
through consultation; 
(E) to seek provisions to encourage the 
provision of trade-expanding compensation if a 
party to a dispute under the agreement does 
not come into compliance with its obligations 
under the agreement; 
(F) to seek provisions to impose a penalty 
upon a party to a dispute under the agreement 
that— 
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