146
free media through training of international journal-
ists, producers, editors, and media managers; and 
(11) administering the International Free Media 
Fund (established in section 607) in consultation with 
the United States Advisory Commission on Public Di-
plomacy and International Media. 
(d) ASSESSMENT FACTORS.—In making an assessment 
of media within individual countries pursuant to sub-
section (c)(2), the Coordinator shall take into account—
(1) the number and diversity of media; 
(2) access to and consumption of media by popu-
lations; 
(3) the extent of direct or indirect government 
ownership, control, or censorship of media outlets; 
(4) the financial viability and profitability of 
free media; 
(5) the extent to which journalists, editors, and 
media managers adhere to widely accepted standards 
for professional and ethical journalism; 
(6) domestic laws addressing press freedoms; 
(7) instances in which the media and govern-
ment-controlled sources of information have incited 
discrimination, hostility, or violence consistent with 
article 20, section 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights;
147
(8) physical threats, intimidation or inappro-
priate pressure by government on free media; 
(9) the number of journalists, editors, producers, 
and media managers receiving training from pro-
grams of the Department of State, the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors, grantees of the United States 
Agency for International Development, or other orga-
nizations qualified to provide such training; and 
(10) the activity of local and international non-
governmental organizations promoting press freedoms 
and free media and obstacles to their activity. 
(e) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—The Coordinator 
shall consult with United States public affairs officers and 
other United States foreign mission personnel directly en-
gaged in interacting with indigenous media in carrying out 
the duties specified in subsection (c). 
(f) DETERMINATION.—The Coordinator shall deter-
mine, and annually report to the appropriate congressional 
committees, whether there is a pattern of government-con-
trolled information that constitutes incitement (as described 
in article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) and that endangers United States citizens 
or nationals, impairs relations between the United States 
and the foreign government, or constitutes incitement to na-
tional, racial, or religious discrimination, hostility, or vio-
148
lence. The Coordinator shall specify the governments en-
gaged in such practices and examples of such incitement 
and propaganda. 
(g) FUNDING.—The Secretary of State shall ensure 
that the Coordinator has adequate staff and funding for the 
conduct of investigations, the administration of the Inter-
national Free Media Fund, necessary travel, and other ac-
tivities necessary to carry out the provisions of this section. 
SEC. 606. UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PUB-
LIC DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Section 604(a)(1) of the United 
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 
(22 U.S.C. 1469) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(1) There is established an advisory commission 
to be known as the United States Advisory Commis-
sion on Public Diplomacy and International Media.’’. 
(b) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 604(c) 
of the United States Information and Exchange Act of 1948 
(22 U.S.C. 1469) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: 
‘‘(5) The Commission shall—
‘‘(A) advise the Coordinator for Inter-
national Free Media on issues relating to the 
promotion of international press freedoms and 
free media;
149
‘‘(B) assist the Coordinator for Inter-
national Free Media in monitoring and assess-
ing the status of free media worldwide; 
‘‘(C) consult with the Coordinator on the 
administration of the International Free Media 
Fund; and 
‘‘(D) make policy recommendations to the 
President, the Secretary of State, and Congress 
with respect to matters involving international 
press freedoms and free media.’’. 
(c) REFERENCES.—Except as otherwise provided in 
this section or an amendment made by this section, any 
reference in any statute, reorganization plan, Executive 
order, regulation, agreement, determination, or other offi-
cial document or proceeding to the United States Advisory 
Commission on Public Diplomacy or any other officer or 
employee of the United States Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy shall be deemed to refer to the United 
States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and 
International Media established under this section.–––
SEC. 607. INTERNATIONAL FREE MEDIA FUND. 
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established an Inter-
national Free Media Fund (in this section referred to as 
the ‘‘Fund’’) at the Department of State. 
(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Fund shall be—
150
(1) to promote the development of free and inde-
pendent media worldwide which adhere to widely ac-
cepted standards of professional and ethical jour-
nalism and editorial practice; and 
(2) to complement current efforts by the Depart-
ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, and other agencies of the United States 
Government to support free and independent media 
worldwide. 
(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In addi-
tion to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to 
carry out the purposes specified in subsection (b), there is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Fund $15,000,000 for 
fiscal year 2004. Such amounts are authorized to remain 
available until expended. 
(d) NONAPPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAWS.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, funds appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (c) may be used for the purposes of 
this section. 
(e) ADMINISTRATION.—
(1) The Fund shall be administered by the Coor-
dinator in consultation with the Commission.
151
(2) Activities and assistance financed through 
the Fund may be carried out through grants, con-
tracts, technical assistance, and material support. 
(f) ELIGIBLE
ORGANIZATIONS, PROGRAMS, 
AND 
PROJECTS.—Amounts in the Fund may be used to carry 
out activities and provide assistance only for organizations, 
programs, and projects consistent with the purposes set 
forth in subsection (b). 
(g) PROHIBITIONS.—Amounts in the Fund shall not 
be used to carry out activities or provide assistance to orga-
nizations, programs, or projects which advocate national, 
racial, or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hos-
tility, or violence consistent with article 20, section 2 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
(h) ASSISTANCE CRITERIA.—In administering the 
Fund, the Coordinator shall take into account—
(1) the importance of providing assistance to or-
ganizations, programs, and projects based on their 
proven or potential contribution to the development of 
a free media environment worldwide; 
(2) the importance of enabling free media to be-
come commercially viable and financially inde-
pendent in the long term; and 
(3) the importance of providing media personnel 
whose organizations, programs, or projects receive as-
152
sistance under this section for training in professional 
and ethical journalism, editorial practices, and media 
management by the Department of State, the Broad-
casting Board of Governors, United States Agency for 
International Development grantees, or other organi-
zations qualified to provide such training. 
(i) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than January 31, 
of 2005 and in each subsequent year, the Coordinator shall 
publish an annual report on the activities of the Fund, 
which shall include a comprehensive and detailed descrip-
tion of the operations, activities, financial condition, and 
accomplishments under this section for the preceding fiscal 
year. The reports shall also include an assessment of wheth-
er the Fund should also provide loans and guarantees as 
an additional means to carry out the purposes of this title. 
(j) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENTS.—
(1) The Coordinator shall consult with the State 
Department official primarily responsible for devel-
oping and implementing United States policy with 
respect to a country prior to carrying out activities 
or providing assistance for such country through the 
Fund. 
(2) Amounts in the Fund shall be used to carry 
out activities or provide assistance on the basis of 
consultations among all relevant United States Gov-
153
ernment agencies operating in the country and with 
the approval of the chief of mission. 
SEC. 608. FREE MEDIA PROMOTION ACTIVITY OF THE 
BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Broadcasting Board of Gov-
ernors shall make support for indigenous free media an in-
tegral part of its mission. 
(b) AFFILIATES.—The Broadcasting Board of Gov-
ernors shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees on the prospects and strategy for culti-
vating affiliate relationships with free media in countries 
targeted for United States international broadcasting. 
(c) TRAINING.—The Broadcasting Board of Governors 
shall enhance foreign journalist training programs in co-
ordination with existing training programs administered 
by the Department of State and the United States Agency 
for International Development. 
(d) AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS.—In addi-
tion to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated, 
there is authorized to be appropriated $2,500,000 for the 
fiscal year 2004 and $2,500,000 for the fiscal year 2005 
to support free media in countries in which the Broad-
casting Board of Governors is decreasing or discontinuing 
United States international broadcasting activity.
154
TITLE VII—MISCELLANEOUS 
PROVISIONS 
Subtitle A—Reporting 
Requirements
SEC. 701. REPORTS ON BENCHMARKS FOR BOSNIA. 
(a) Section 7 of the 1998 Supplemental Appropria-
tions and Rescissions Act (Public Law 105–174, 112 Stat. 
64) is amended—
(1) at the end of paragraph (1) by striking ‘‘; 
and’’ and inserting a period; 
(2) by striking ‘‘Congress’’ and all that follows 
through ‘‘not later’’ and inserting ‘‘Congress not 
later’’; and 
(3) by striking paragraph (2). 
(b) Section 1203 of the Strom Thurmond National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 
105–261) is repealed.
SEC. 702 701. REPORTS TO COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the 
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, any report required by law or 
otherwise requested to be submitted by the Secretary of State 
or the Department of State to any committee of the Congress 
shall be submitted also to the Committee on International 
Relations of the House of Representatives.
155
SEC. 703 702. REPORTS CONCERNING THE CAPTURE AND 
PROSECUTION OF PARAMILITARY AND OTHER 
TERRORIST LEADERS IN COLOMBIA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) As reported in the Department of State re-
port Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, the United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (also referred to as 
‘‘AUC’’ or ‘‘paramilitaries’’) have been designated as 
a foreign terrorist organization by the United States 
primarily because of their increasing reliance on ter-
rorist methods, such as the use of massacres, to pur-
posefully displace segments of the population as retal-
iation for allegedly supporting the AUC’s rival orga-
nizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army 
(ELN) of Colombia. According to the report, the 
paramilitaries also use terrorist tactics to compete for 
narcotics-trafficking corridors and prime coca-grow-
ing terrain. 
(2) The Department of State concluded in the 
2001 Country Report on Human Rights Practices 
that despite increased efforts by the Government of 
Colombia to combat and capture members of para-
military groups, security forces sometimes illegally 
collaborate with paramilitaries forces and often fail to
156
take action to prevent paramilitary attacks which 
lead to serious abuses of human rights. 
(3) In September 2002, Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the Washington Office on 
Latin America released a report which argued that 
the Colombian Government had not made substantial 
progress toward suspending officers implicated in 
human rights abuses, conducting effective judicial in-
vestigations of such abuses, or breaking the persistent 
links between some units of the Colombian military 
and paramilitary groups. 
(4) In February 2003, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia re-
ported that some units of the Colombian Security 
Forces continued to collude openly with illegal para-
military groups in operations which resulted in viola-
tions of human rights. 
(5) The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 
2003 (Public Law 108–7) made available not less 
than $5,000,000 to support a Colombian Armed 
Forces unit which is dedicated to apprehending lead-
ers of Colombian paramilitary organizations. 
(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consulting with
157
internationally recognized human rights organizations pur-
suant to the procedures required in section 564(b) of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, shall submit 
a report, in unclassified form (with a classified annex if 
necessary), on the specific measures that the Colombian au-
thorities are taking to apprehend effectively and prosecute 
aggressively leaders of paramilitary organizations, to the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate. 
(c) CONTENTS OF REPORTS.—Each report submitted 
pursuant to subsection (b) shall—
(1) identify which Colombian Armed Forces 
units are receiving assistance to apprehend leaders of 
Colombian paramilitary organizations; 
(2) describe the amount and purposes of such as-
sistance; 
(3) describe operations by Colombian security 
forces to apprehend and arrest leaders of Colombian 
paramilitary organizations; 
(4) list the number of detentions, captures, and 
arrests of leaders of Colombian paramilitary organi-
zations, disaggregating the number according to those 
detentions, captures, and arrests which were carried
158
out by Colombian security forces identified under 
paragraph (1); 
(5) briefly describe the status of investigations 
and prosecutions of cases by the Colombian Attorney 
General’s office involving the arrests of leaders of Co-
lombian paramilitary organizations; and 
(6) estimate the number of hours of use by the 
Colombian military of helicopters provided by the 
United States under Plan Colombia and successor 
programs to apprehend the leaders of Colombian 
paramilitary organizations, as well as leaders of the 
FARC and ELN, including those individuals who 
have United States indictments pending against 
them.
SEC. 704 703. REPORTS RELATING TO MAGEN DAVID ADOM 
SOCIETY.
(a) FINDINGS.—Section 690(a) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107–228) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(5) Since the founding of the Magen David 
Adom in 1930, the American Red Cross has regarded 
it as a sister national society forging close working 
ties between the two societies and has consistently ad-
vocated recognition and membership of the Magen
159
David Adom in the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement. 
‘‘(6) The American Red Cross and Magen David 
Adom signed an important memorandum of under-
standing in November 2002, outlining areas for stra-
tegic collaboration, and the American Red Cross will 
encourage other societies to establish similar agree-
ments with Magen David Adom.’’. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Section 690(b) of such Act 
is amended—
(1) in paragraph (3) after the semicolon by 
striking ‘‘and’’; 
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as para-
graph (5); and 
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the fol-
lowing new paragraph: 
‘‘(4) the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, should adopt the Oc-
tober 12, 2000, draft additional protocol which would 
accord international recognition to an additional dis-
tinctive emblem; and’’. 
(c) REPORT.—Section 690 of such Act is further 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(c) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the date 
of the enactment of the Foreign Relations Authorization
160
Act, Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 and annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State shall submit a report, on a classified 
basis if necessary, to the appropriate congressional commit-
tees describing—
‘‘(1) efforts by the United States to obtain full 
membership for the Magen David Adom in the Inter-
national Red Cross Movement; 
‘‘(2) efforts by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross to obtain full membership for the 
Magen David Adom in the International Red Cross 
Movement; 
‘‘(3) efforts of the High Contracting Parties to 
the Geneva Convention of 1949 to adopt the October 
12, 2000, draft additional protocol; and 
‘‘(4) the extent to which the Magen David Adom 
of Israel is participating in the activities of the Inter-
national Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.’’.
SEC. 705 704. REPORT CONCERNING THE RETURN OF POR-
TRAITS OF HOLOCAUST VICTIMS TO THE ART-
IST DINA BABBITT.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) Dina Babbitt (formerly known as Dinah 
Gottliebova), a United States citizen, has requested 
the return of watercolor portraits she painted while
161
suffering a one and one-half year long internment at 
the Auschwitz death camp during World War II, 
where she was ordered to paint portraits by the infa-
mous war criminal Dr. Josef Mengele. 
(2) Congress has previously considered the issue, 
under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228), and urged the Ad-
ministration to facilitate the return of the paintings 
to Dina Babbitt. 
(3) The Administration has not yet reported any 
progress in furthering this goal, nor has the Secretary 
reported on the status of any negotiations held with 
the intent of furthering this goal. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Congress—
(1) continues to recognize the moral right of 
Dina Babbitt to obtain the artwork she created, and 
recognizes her courage in the face of the evils per-
petrated by the Nazi command of the Auschwitz- 
Birkenau death camp, including the atrocities com-
mitted by Dr. Josef Mengele; 
(2) urges the President of the United States to 
make all necessary efforts to retrieve the 7 watercolor 
portraits painted by Dina Babbitt, during her intern-
ment at the Auschwitz death camp; and
162
(3) urges the Secretary of State to make imme-
diate diplomatic efforts to facilitate the transfer of the 
7 original watercolors painted by Dina Babbitt from 
the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum to Dina Bab-
bitt, their rightful owner. 
(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
gressional committees, describing all diplomatic efforts the 
United States has taken to facilitate the return of the paint-
ings referred to in this section to Dina Babbitt.
SEC. 706 705. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON USE OF VESTED AS-
SETS.
Section 203(a) of the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(a)) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ‘‘, subject 
to paragraph (4),’’ after ‘‘such interest or property 
shall’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(4) The authority under paragraph (1)(C) to use 
property that has been vested or to use assets that have been 
liquidated may not be exercised until 15 days after the 
President has notified the Committee on International Re-
lations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
163
on Foreign Relations of the Senate of the purpose for which 
such vested property or liquidated assets will be so used.’’.
SEC. 707
706. REPORT CONCERNING THE CONFLICT IN 
UGANDA.
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that the United States should— 
(1) exhaust all diplomatic means and pressures, 
including the creation of a United States role in ne-
gotiating humanitarian access to hitherto inaccessible 
populations which would offer an opportunity to 
bring the warring parties together to build confidence, 
to support an immediate peaceful resolution to the 
16-year old conflict in Northern Uganda that has— 
(A) killed an estimated 23,000 people, in-
cluding 12,000 civilians, 
(B) resulted in the forced abduction, sexual 
servitude, and armed recruitment of between 
16,000 to 26,000 Ugandan children by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, a renegade army that has in 
the past sought refuge in southern Sudan and 
raided villages in northern Uganda, 
(C) displaced over 800,000 Ugandan citi-
zens and Sudanese refugees, 
(D) resulted in the death and abduction of 
humanitarian aid workers, and
164
(E) gravely inhibited the delivery of emer-
gency assistance and food aid to nearly 1 mil-
lion northern Ugandan civilians dependent on 
such assistance for survival; 
(2) urge rebel forces to stop the abduction of chil-
dren, urge all forces to stop the use of child soldiers, 
and seek the release of all forcibly-held children; 
(3) make available technical assistance resources 
to seek, track, and stop funding for the Lord’s Resist-
ance Army (LRA) from all sources and condemn all 
governments and organizations who do assist the 
LRA; 
(4) monitor and support negotiations conducted 
by third-party institutions for an immediate cease-
fire between the LRA and the Ugandan Government, 
and to explore the possibility of facilitating the cre-
ation of mechanisms for an international monitoring 
team to enforce this cease-fire as the first step in the 
process toward a permanent peace; 
(5) continue supporting the Sudan Peace Process 
and Danforth Initiative, which includes peace talks, 
donor coordination, regional support, civilian protec-
tion and monitoring, and cease-fire verification and 
consider modeling aspects of this process in northern 
Uganda;
165
(6) make available sufficient resources to meet 
the immediate relief of the towns and cities sup-
porting large displaced populations, including food, 
clean water, medicine, shelter, and clothing; 
(7) make available increased resources for assist-
ance to released and returned abducted children and 
child soldiers and ensure that amnesty is provided 
when appropriate; 
(8) work with other donors and the Ugandan 
Government to increase resources and technical sup-
port to the Uganda Amnesty Commission for the in-
creased demobilization of rebel combatants; 
(9) examine ways in which development assist-
ance can help those living in protective villages in 
northern Uganda return to and cultivate farmland; 
and 
(10) condition military assistance to Uganda on 
its international compliance with sustained troop 
withdrawals from the Democratic Republic of Congo 
where the presence of Ugandan armies has contrib-
uted to the violence and instability in the region. 
(b) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later 
than April 1 of each subsequent year, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
166
on the comprehensive actions of the United States in seeking 
a peaceful and immediate solution to conflict in northern 
Uganda as well as humanitarian assistance efforts to the 
region, including efforts to advance each area addressed in 
subsection (a).
SEC. 708
707. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT ON UNITED 
STATES POLICY TOWARD HAITI.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The United States has a political and eco-
nomic interest and a humanitarian and moral re-
sponsibility in assisting the Government and people 
of Haiti in resolving the country’s problems and chal-
lenges. 
(2) The situation in Haiti is increasingly cause 
for alarm and concern, and a sustained, coherent, 
and active approach by the United States Govern-
ment is needed to make progress toward resolving 
Haiti’s political and economic crises. 
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT.—Not later than 60 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary, 
in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
that describes United States policy toward Haiti. The re-
port shall include the following:
167
(1) A description of the activities carried out by 
the United States Government to resolve Haiti’s polit-
ical crisis and to promote the holding of free and fair 
elections in Haiti at the earliest possible date. 
(2) A description of the activities that the United 
States Government anticipates initiating to resolve 
the political crisis and promote free and fair elections 
in Haiti. 
(3) An assessment of whether Resolution 822 
issued by the Permanent Council of the Organization 
of American States on September 4, 2002, is an ap-
propriate framework for a multilateral approach to 
resolving the political and economic crises in Haiti. 
(4) A description of the status of efforts to release 
the approximately $146,000,000 in loan funds that 
have been approved by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank to Haiti for the purposes of rehabilitating 
rural roads, reorganizing the health sector, improving 
potable water supply and sanitation, and providing 
basic education, a description of any obstacles that 
are delaying the release of the loan funds, and rec-
ommendations for overcoming such obstacles, includ-
ing whether any of the following would facilitate the 
release of such funds:
168
(A) Establishing an International Monetary 
Fund staff monitoring program in Haiti. 
(B) Obtaining bridge loans or other sources 
of funding to pay the cost of any arrears owed 
by the Government of Haiti to the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank. 
(C) Providing technical assistance to the 
Government of Haiti to permit the Government 
to meet international financial transparency 
and other requirements.
SEC. 709 708. REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF PLAN COLOMBIA 
ON ECUADOR.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) Section 695 of the Foreign Relations Author-
ization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228) 
required the Secretary of State to submit a report to 
Congress on the impact of Plan Colombia on Ecuador 
and the other adjacent countries to Colombia within 
150 days after the date of the enactment of that Act. 
(2) The 150 day time period for the submission 
of such report has lapsed without a report being sub-
mitted to the Congress. 
(3) There continues to be growing alarm con-
cerning the spillover effect of Plan Colombia on Ecua-
169
dor, a frontline state, especially in the northern re-
gion of Ecuador which includes the Sucumbios prov-
ince. 
(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congres-
sional committees which sets forth—
(A) a statement of policy and comprehen-
sive strategy for United States activities in Co-
lombia related to the impact of Plan Colombia 
on Ecuador and the other adjacent countries to 
Colombia; and 
(B) the reasons for the failure of the Depart-
ment of State to submit the report required by 
section 695 of Public Law 107–228 within the 
time period mandated by law.
SEC. 710 709. REPORT ON ACTIONS TAKEN BY PAKISTAN.
For each of fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the President 
shall prepare and transmit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains a description of the extent 
to which the Government of Pakistan—
(1) has closed all known terrorist training camps 
operating in Pakistan and Pakistani-held Kashmir;
170
(2) has established serious and identifiable meas-
ures to prohibit the infiltration of Islamic extremists 
across the ‘‘Line of Control’’ (LoC) into India; and 
(3) has ceased the transfer of weapons of mass 
destruction, including any associated technologies, to 
any third country or terrorist organization.
SEC. 711 710. REPORT ON DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE.
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Although 34 out of 35 countries in the West-
ern Hemisphere have held elections for civilian lead-
ers of national, regional, and local governments, 
many of these countries have failed to successfully de-
velop independent democratic institutions, trans-
parent and accountable governance, and effective 
means of guaranteeing the rule of law, which are key 
components of a fully functioning democracy. 
(2) The rule of law, independent democratic in-
stitutions, and transparent, accountable governance 
are essential for guaranteeing human rights, espe-
cially civil, political, and labor rights. 
(3) The rule of law, independent democratic in-
stitutions, and transparent accountable governance 
are also necessary for promoting successful economic
171
development and reliable trading and investment 
mechanisms. 
(4) In part because of the lack of these three fac-
tors, progress on human rights and economic develop-
ment has lagged or been uneven in much of the West-
ern Hemisphere, leading some to question the benefits 
of democracy itself as a path for improving the lives 
of individuals in the hemisphere. 
(5) For democracy to continue in many of these 
countries, for human rights to improve, and for re-
gional economic integration to be successful, the rule 
of law, independent democratic institutions, and 
transparent accountable governance must be strength-
ened. 
(6) As a strong supporter of democracy and 
human rights and as an advocate of regional eco-
nomic integration, it is in the interests of the United 
States to enhance its efforts to promote a deepening 
of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, particularly 
through strengthening the rule of law, independent 
democratic institutions, and transparent accountable 
governance. 
(b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation 
with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies
172
as necessary, shall prepare and submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the state of democracy 
in each country in the Western Hemisphere (other than the 
United States and Canada). For each such country, the re-
port shall provide the following: 
(1) A description of its system of government, in-
cluding schedule of elections, manner of judicial ap-
pointments, and responsibilities of each branch of 
government. 
(2) An assessment of—
(A) the state of the rule of law; 
(B) the power and independence of each 
branch of government and institutions; 
(C) the transparence and accountability in 
governance; and 
(D) the effect on human rights, particularly 
civil and political rights, caused by the presence 
(or lack thereof) of any of the factors in subpara-
graphs (A) through (C); and 
(E) the effect on economic development 
caused by the presence (or lack thereof) of any of 
the factors in subparagraphs (A) through (C). 
(3) A description of efforts to strengthen the rule 
of law, independent institutions, or transparent gov-
ernance in the country, whether through local efforts
173
or through efforts funded or implemented by the 
United States, the Organization of American States 
(OAS), or others.
SEC. 712 711. REPORT CONCERNING INTERNAL AND INTRA-
REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES 
REGION OF AFRICA.
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) The Great Lakes region of Central Africa has 
a history of colonial based ethnic divisions, political 
violence, and civil wars which have perpetuated con-
ditions conducive to chronic poverty and turmoil over 
the past decade. The countries of the Great Lakes re-
gion are heavily embroiled in the conflicts within 
their neighbors borders. At different times, the war in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has in-
volved more outside countries than any other contem-
porary war in Africa’s history, (including Angola, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Sudan, 
Chad, Namibia, and Central African Republic). 
(2) The region is hallmarked by genocide, the re-
cruitment of child soldiers, war crimes, systematic 
rape of women and violence directed against children, 
corruption, and the illegal exploitation of natural re-
sources on a global scale. Civil wars, conflicts over
174
natural resources, and structural violence in the 
Great Lakes have resulted in—
(A) the death of approximately three mil-
lion people through direct and indirect causes of 
the war in the DRC since 1998; 
(B) the deaths of at least 800,000 people 
during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; 
(C) the deaths of an estimated 300,000 peo-
ple through direct and indirect causes of the war 
in Burundi since 1993; 
(D) the deaths of thousands in Uganda; 
(E) the forced abduction, sexual servitude, 
and armed recruitment of thousands of children; 
(F) the displacement of millions of Ugan-
dan, Burundian, Congolese, Rwandan, and Su-
danese refugees; 
(G) the death and abduction of humani-
tarian aid workers throughout the region; and 
(H) grave disruptions in the delivery of 
emergency assistance and food aid to millions of 
civilians in northern Uganda, eastern Congo, 
and Burundi dependent on such assistance for 
survival. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that the United States should—
175
(1) exhaust all diplomatic means and utilize all 
foreign policy instruments to help peacefully resolve 
conflicts in the Great Lakes region by supporting both 
national and regional political, economic, and social 
initiatives conducive to fostering African-led peace, 
reconstruction, and political and economic institu-
tional and structural transformation processes in 
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Re-
public of Congo; 
(2) urge all rebel forces to stop the abduction of 
children, urge all armed forces to stop the use of child 
soldiers, and seek the release of all forcibly-held chil-
dren; 
(3) make available technical assistance resources 
to seek, track, and stop funding for all armed extrem-
ist paramilitary and militarist rebel organizations 
from all sources and condemn all governments and 
organizations who do assist such groups; 
(4) monitor and support negotiations conducted 
by third-party institutions for an immediate end of 
armed actions between: The LRA and the Ugandan 
Government; the RCD factions and MLC and the gov-
ernment of Democratic Republic of the Congo under 
the terms of the Lusaka Accords; the FDD and the
176
Burundian Government under the terms of the 
Arusha Accords; 
(5) explore the possibility of facilitating the cre-
ation of mechanisms for an international monitoring 
team to enforce cease-fires as the first step in the 
process toward a permanent peace in the region; 
(6) continue supporting the Sudan Peace Proc-
ess, the Danforth Initiative, the Lusaka Accords, and 
the Arusha Accords which includes peace talks, donor 
coordination, regional support, civilian protection 
and monitoring, and cease-fire verification; 
(7) make available sufficient resources to meet 
the immediate relief needs of the towns and cities in 
the Great Lakes region supporting large displaced 
populations, including food, clean water, medicine, 
shelter, and clothing; 
(8) make available increased resources for assist-
ance to released and returned abducted children and 
child soldiers in the Great Lakes Region and ensure 
that amnesty is provided when appropriate; 
(9) work with other donors and the Governments 
of Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to increase resources and technical 
support to both regional and national combatant de-
mobilization entities such as the Uganda Amnesty
177
Commission in Uganda and equivalent entities in 
Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo for the increased demobilization of rebel com-
batants; 
(10) examine ways in which development assist-
ance (DA) can help those living in protective villages 
in northern Uganda, eastern Congo, and other demili-
tarized areas in Rwanda and Burundi to return to 
and cultivate farmland; 
(11) condition military assistance to any nation 
which acts to destabilize the DRC by violating inter-
national agreements regarding sustained troop with-
drawals and respect for the territorial integrity of the 
DRC; and 
(12) direct the Secretary of State to appoint a 
special envoy to the Great Lakes region to oversee 
cross-cutting security and economic policies in the re-
gion. 
(c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later 
than April 1 of each subsequent year, the Secretary should 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
on the comprehensive actions taken by the United States 
in promoting peaceful and immediate solutions to the inter-
nal and intra-regional conflicts in the Great Lakes region,
178
including taking steps to bring an end to the illegal exploi-
tation and international trade of natural resources from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo; supporting bilateral and 
multilateral peace keeping initiatives; the promotion of re-
gional economic integration; the promotion of broad based 
democratic political processes based on the rule of law; the 
promotion of women and other previously disadvantaged 
communities as equal political and economic stakeholders 
in societies; and humanitarian assistance efforts in the re-
gion, including efforts to advance each area addressed in 
subsection (a). 
Subtitle B—Other Matters 
SEC. 721. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO EAST TIMOR, 
JUSTICE, AND REHABILITATION. 
The Congress—
(1) recalls that the United Nations International 
Commission of Inquiry concluded in January 2000 
that ‘‘the Indonesian Army was responsible for the in-
timidation, terror, killings and other acts of violence’’ 
during East Timor’s vote for independence in 1999; 
(2) reiterates that justice for crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes committed in East Timor 
during the vote for independence in 1999 is crucial 
for peace, reconciliation, and the ongoing nation-
building process in East Timor and Indonesia;
179
(3) finds that the ad hoc Human Rights Court 
on East Timor established by the Indonesian Govern-
ment in 2001 has inadequately brought to justice the 
perpetrators of these crimes as eleven of fourteen de-
fendants have been acquitted as a result of poor in-
dictments and the absence of an adequate witness pro-
tection program, and four of the five sentences im-
posed have been less than the minimum allowed under 
the Indonesian Human Rights Law; 
(4) supports the work of the Joint United Na-
tions-East Timor Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which 
filed indictments against high-ranking Indonesian of-
ficers who were allegedly involved in the crimes, in-
cluding Gen. Wiranto, Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, 
Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim, Maj. Gen. Adam 
Damiri, Col. Suratman, Col. Noer Muis, Col. Yayat 
Sudrajat and former Governor Abilio Soares, and ex-
presses its strong disappointment that the Indonesian 
Government has stated its intention to ignore the in-
dictments; 
(5) calls on the State Department and the 
United States Mission to the United Nations to push 
for a comprehensive United Nations review of the In-
donesian ad hoc Human Rights Court on East 
Timor, including a review of the conduct of trials, the
180
indictment strategy by the prosecutors and its adher-
ence to the international standards, and urges the 
State Department to consider alternative mechanisms 
of justice for East Timor, including the establishment 
of an ad hoc international tribunal; and 
(6) urges the Indonesian Government to fully co-
operate with the joint United Nations-East Timor Se-
rious Crimes Unit (SCU) and encourages the United 
States to urge the Indonesian Government to fully co-
operate with the SCU. 
SEC. 722. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN INDONESIA. 
The Congress—
(1) notes with grave concern that members of the 
Indonesian security forces, particularly the Army 
Special Forces (Kopassus) and the Police Mobile Bri-
gade (Brimob), continue to commit many serious 
human rights violations, including extrajudicial 
killings, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention, par-
ticularly in areas of conflict such as Aceh, Papua, the 
Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi; 
(2) notes with grave concern that the Govern-
ment of Indonesia largely fails to hold soldiers and 
police accountable for extrajudicial killings and other 
serious human rights abuses, both past and present;
181
(3) condemns the intimidation and harassment 
of human rights and civil society organizations and 
activists by members of Indonesian security forces 
and by military-backed militia groups, particularly 
in Aceh and Papua; 
(4) notes with concern the Indonesian military’s 
resistance to civilian control and oversight, its lack of 
budgetary transparency, and its continuing emphasis 
on internal security within Indonesia; 
(5) urges the Indonesian government and mili-
tary to provide full, active, and unfettered coopera-
tion with the investigation of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation of the United States Department of Jus-
tice into the August 31, 2002 attack near Timika, 
Papua, which killed three people (including two 
Americans, Rick Spier and Ted Burgon), and injured 
12 others, and which appears likely to have been per-
petrated at least in part by members of the Indo-
nesian military; 
(6) commends the December 2002 signing of the 
Framework Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in 
Aceh, but condemns the recent outbreaks of violence 
and militia activity that appear calculated to subvert 
that cease-fire agreement;
182
(7) notes with grave concern the continued deten-
tion of Muhammad Nazar, and the fact that those re-
sponsible for the murders of other prominent members 
of civil society in Aceh, such as Jafar Siddiq 
Hamzah, Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad, Tengku Safwan 
Idris, Nashiruddin Daud, and Zaini Sulaiman, still 
have not been apprehended, prosecuted, or punished; 
(8) commends the ‘‘Zone of Peace’’ initiative in 
Papua, which has brought together civic, religious, 
governmental, and police representatives to discuss 
productive means of avoiding conflict, but expresses 
concern at the refusal of the Indonesian military to 
participate in that effort; and 
(9) encourages the Government of Indonesia to 
expedite the reunification of separated East Timorese 
children with their families, and to hold legally ac-
countable those individuals and organizations respon-
sible for taking those children and for obstructing re-
unification efforts. 
SEC. 723. AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM ACT OF 1998. 
Section 207(a) of the International Religious Freedom 
Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6435(a)) is amended by inserting 
‘‘and for each subsequent fiscal year’’ after ‘‘2003’’.
183
SEC. 724. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CENTRAL ASIA. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) The Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
and 
Uzbekistan are providing the United States with as-
sistance in the war in Afghanistan, from military 
basing and overflight rights to the facilitation of hu-
manitarian relief. 
(2) In turn, the United States victory over the 
Taliban in Afghanistan provides important benefits 
to the Central Asian nations by removing a regime 
that threatened their security and by significantly 
weakening the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a ter-
rorist organization that had previously staged armed 
raids from Afghanistan into the region. 
(3) The United States has consistently urged the 
nations of Central Asia to open their political systems 
and economies and to respect human rights, both be-
fore and since the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
(4) 
Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are members of the 
United Nations and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), both of which
184
confer a range of obligations with respect to human 
rights on their members. 
(5) While the United States recognizes marked 
differences among the social structures and commit-
ments to democratic and economic reform of the Cen-
tral Asian nations, the United States notes neverthe-
less, according to the State Department Country Re-
ports on Human Rights Practices, that all five gov-
ernments of such nations, to differing degrees, restrict 
freedom of speech and association, restrict or ban the 
activities of human rights organizations and other 
nongovernmental organizations, harass or prohibit 
independent media, imprison political opponents, 
practice arbitrary detention and arrest, and engage 
in torture and extrajudicial executions. 
(6) By continuing to suppress human rights and 
to deny citizens peaceful, democratic means of ex-
pressing their convictions, the nations of Central Asia 
risk fueling popular support for violent and extremist 
movements, thus undermining the goals of the war on 
terrorism. 
(7) President George W. Bush has made the de-
fense of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the 
power of the state, respect for women and private 
property, free speech, equal justice, religious tolerance
185
strategic goals of United States foreign policy in the 
Islamic world, arguing that ‘‘a truly strong nation 
will permit legal avenues of dissent for all groups that 
pursue their aspirations without violence’’. 
(8) Congress has expressed its desire to see deeper 
reform in Central Asia in past resolutions and other 
legislation, most recently conditioning assistance to 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on their progress in 
meeting commitments to the United States on human 
rights and democracy. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that—
(1) the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan should ac-
celerate democratic reforms and fulfill their human 
rights obligations, including, where appropriate, by—
(A) releasing from prison anyone jailed for 
peaceful political activism or the nonviolent ex-
pression of their political or religious beliefs; 
(B) fully investigating any credible allega-
tions of torture and prosecuting those respon-
sible; 
(C) permitting the free and unfettered func-
tioning of independent media outlets, inde-
pendent political parties, and nongovernmental
186
organizations, including by easing registration 
processes; 
(D) permitting the free exercise of religious 
beliefs and ceasing the persecution of members of 
religious groups and denominations that do not 
engage in violence or political change through vi-
olence; 
(E) holding free, competitive, and fair elec-
tions; and 
(F) making publicly available documenta-
tion of their revenues and punishing those en-
gaged in official corruption; 
(2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Defense should—
(A) continue to raise at the highest levels 
with the governments of the nations of Central 
Asia specific cases of political and religious per-
secution, and to urge greater respect for human 
rights and democratic freedoms at every diplo-
matic opportunity; 
(B) take progress in meeting the goals speci-
fied in paragraph (1) into account when deter-
mining the scope and nature of United States 
diplomatic and military relations and assistance 
with each of such governments;
187
(C) ensure that the provisions of foreign op-
erations appropriations Acts are fully imple-
mented to ensure that no United States assist-
ance benefits security forces in Central Asia that 
are implicated in violations of human rights; 
(D) press the Government of Turkmenistan 
to implement the helpful recommendations con-
tained in the 2003 resolution on Turkmenistan 
of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights and the so-called ‘‘Moscow Mechanism’’ 
Report of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), respect the right of 
all prisoners to due process and a fair trial and 
release democratic activists and their family 
members from prison; 
(E) urge the Government of Russia not to 
extradite to Turkmenistan members of the polit-
ical opposition of Turkmenistan; 
(F) 
work 
with 
the 
Government 
of 
Kazakhstan to create a political climate free of 
intimidation and harassment, including releas-
ing political prisoners and permitting the return 
of political exiles, and to reduce official corrup-
tion, including by urging the Government of
188
Kazakhstan to cooperate with the ongoing United 
States Department of Justice investigation; 
(G) support through United States assist-
ance programs individuals, nongovernmental or-
ganizations, and media outlets in Central Asia 
working to build more open societies, to support 
the victims of human rights abuses, and to ex-
pose official corruption; and 
(H) press the Government of Uzbekistan to 
implement fully the recommendations made to 
the Government of Uzbekistan by the United Na-
tions’ Special Rapporteur on Torture; and 
(3) increased levels of United States assistance to 
the governments of the nations of Central Asia made 
possible by their cooperation in the war in Afghani-
stan can be sustained only if there is substantial and 
continuing progress toward meeting the goals speci-
fied in paragraph (1). 
SEC. 725. TECHNICAL CORRECTION TO AUTHORIZATION OF 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003 FOR 
CENTER FOR CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL 
INTERCHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. 
Section 112(3) of the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (116 Stat. 1358; Public Law 107–
189
228) is amended by striking ‘‘$15,000,000’’ and inserting 
‘‘$18,000,000’’.
SEC. 726. UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INDUS-
TRY AND SECURITY. 
(a) UNDER SECRETARY.—There shall be in the De-
partment of Commerce an Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Industry and Security who shall serve as the head of 
the Bureau of Industry and Security and perform such du-
ties as the Secretary of Commerce shall prescribe. The 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security 
shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
(b) INCUMBENT.—The individual serving on the date 
of the enactment of this Act as the Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Export Administration shall serve as the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security until 
such time as a successor is appointed under subsection (a). 
(c) COMPENSATION.—Section 5314 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Export Administration’’ and inserting 
‘‘Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security’’. 
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Section 15(a) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
2414(a)) is amended—
(1) by striking the first sentence; and
190
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ‘‘in car-
rying out such functions’’ and inserting ‘‘of Com-
merce for Industry and Security in carrying out the 
functions of the Under Secretary’’.
SEC. 727. CONCERNING THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
(1) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion presents a direct threat to the stability, security, 
and safety of nations around the globe. 
(2) Combatting the spread of such weapons is a 
responsibility borne by all nations. 
(3) United States efforts to stop the further 
spread of these weapons can be further enhanced by 
cooperative efforts between the United States and the 
European Union. 
(4) There are many different components in this 
effort that require a comprehensive approach, imme-
diate attention, and vigorous action, including the 
‘‘10+10 over 10 Initiative’’ agreed to by the United 
States and many members of the European Union. 
(5) Stopping the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction is made more difficult when states willingly
191
participate in, or contribute to, their development or 
their sale or transfer to other nations. 
(6) Stopping the spread of weapons of mass de-
struction is made more difficult when private compa-
nies willingly participate in, or contribute to, their 
development or their sale or transfer to other nations. 
(7) United States security and safety is under-
mined when companies engage in such commerce. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—The Congress call on the 
European Union to—
(1) develop an aggressive and robust regulatory 
system designed to—
(A) investigate allegations of companies 
contributing to the development of weapons of 
mass destruction or their sale or transfer to other 
nations; 
(B) isolate and comdemn companies found 
to participate in, or contribute to, the develop-
ment of such weapons or their sale or transfer to 
other nations; and 
(C) develop a punitive response designed to 
punish such companies, thereby preventing fur-
ther actions on their part and discouraging other 
companies from engaging in such actions;
192
(2) condemn, by name, states known to be con-
tributing to the development or spread of weapons of 
mass destruction; and 
(3) develop appropriate punitive measures de-
signed to discourage further actions.
SEC. 
728. 
INTERNATIONAL 
AGRICULTURAL 
BIO-
TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION PROGRAM. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State shall pro-
vide to other countries, as appropriate, the scientific evi-
dence on the benefits, safety, and potential uses of agricul-
tural biotechnology. 
(b) SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES.—The Secretary of State 
shall—
(1) chair an interagency task force comprised of 
representatives of the Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Agriculture, and the United States 
Agency for International Development to develop and 
disseminate accurate written scientific information 
on the potential benefits of agricultural biotechnology 
for human and animal nutrition, the environment, 
food and feed production, agricultural sustainability, 
and bioenergy development; 
(2) coordinate the development and dissemina-
tion of scientifically-based facts regarding, the safety
193
and regulation of biotechnology-derived food and feed 
products; 
(3) instruct the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID) to develop a program 
to demonstrate the potential benefits of agricultural 
biotechnology to develop products that can be grown 
under local soil and climate conditions and better 
meet the health and nutritional needs of local popu-
lations in the developing world; and 
(4) ensure that personnel undertaking these ac-
tivities are knowledgeable of, and disseminate infor-
mation on, the United States regulatory safeguards 
that assure food and environmental safety.
SEC. 729. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT BURDENSHARING. 
It is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the Secretary of State should actively encour-
age the international community to accept refugees 
for resettlement on a more equitable basis; 
(2) the Secretary of State should raise the issue 
of refugee resettlement burdensharing at the United 
Nations and other multilateral and bilateral meet-
ings; 
(3) developed countries should be encouraged to 
increase the percentage of the world’s refugees accept-
ed for resettlement; and
194
(4) the Secretary of State should encourage devel-
oping stable countries in regions with refugee flows to 
accept for resettlement as many of their neighbors as 
possible.
øSEC. 730. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CLIMATE CHANGE. 
ø(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 
findings: 
ø(1) Evidence continues to build that increases 
in atmospheric concentrations of manmade green-
house gases are contributing to global climate change. 
ø(2) The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (in this section referred to as the ‘‘IPCC’’) has 
concluded that ‘‘there is new and stronger evidence 
that most of the warming observed over the last 50 
years is attributable to human activities’’ and that 
the Earth’s average temperature can be expected to 
rise between 2.5 and 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit in this 
century. 
ø(3) The National Academy of Sciences con-
firmed the findings of the IPCC, stating that ‘‘the 
IPCC’s conclusion that most of the observed warming 
of the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the 
increase of greenhouse gas concentrations accurately 
reflects the current thinking of the scientific commu-
nity on this issue’’ and that ‘‘there is general agree-
195
ment that the observed warming is real and particu-
larly strong within the past twenty years’’. The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences also noted that ‘‘because 
there is considerable uncertainty in current under-
standing of how the climate system varies naturally 
and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases and 
aerosols, current estimates of the magnitude of future 
warming should be regarded as tentative and subject 
to future adjustments upward or downward’’. 
ø(4) The IPCC has stated that in the last 40 
years, the global average sea level has risen, ocean 
heat content has increased, and snow cover and ice 
extent have decreased, which threatens to inundate 
low-lying island nations and coastal regions through-
out the world. 
ø(5) In October 2000, a report of the United 
States interagency Global Change Research Program 
found that global climate change may harm the 
United States by altering crop yields, accelerating 
sea-level rise, and increasing the spread of tropical 
infectious diseases. 
ø(6) In 1992, the United States ratified the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 
(in 
this 
section 
referred 
to 
as 
the 
‘‘UNFCCC’’), the ultimate objective of which is the
196
‘‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner’’. 
ø(7) The UNFCCC stated in part that the Par-
ties to the UNFCCC are to implement policies ‘‘with 
the aim of returning . . . to their 1990 levels anthro-
pogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases’’ under the principle that ‘‘policies and 
measures . . . should be appropriate for the specific 
conditions of each Party and should be integrated 
with national development programmes, taking into 
account that economic development is essential for 
adopting measures to address climate change’’. 
ø(8) There is a shared international responsi-
bility to address this problem, as industrial nations 
are the largest historic and current emitters of green-
house gases and developing nations’ emissions will 
significantly increase in the future. 
ø(9) The UNFCCC further stated that ‘‘developed 
country Parties should take the lead in combating cli-
197
mate change and the adverse effects thereof’’, as these 
nations are the largest historic and current emitters 
of greenhouse gases. The UNFCCC also stated that 
‘‘steps required to understand and address climate 
change will be environmentally, socially and economi-
cally most effective if they are based on relevant sci-
entific, technical and economic considerations and 
continually re-evaluated in the light of new findings 
in these areas’’. 
ø(10) Any future, binding treaty on climate 
change must not result in serious harm to the United 
States economy, and should not cause the United 
States to abandon its shared responsibility to help re-
duce the risks of climate change and its impacts. Fu-
ture international efforts in this regard should focus 
on recognizing the equitable responsibilities for ad-
dressing climate change by all nations, including 
commitments by the largest developing country 
emitters in a future, binding climate change treaty. 
ø(11) While the United States has elected 
against becoming a party to the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC at this time, it is the position of the United 
States that it will not interfere with the plans of any 
nation that chooses to ratify and implement the 
Kyoto Protocol.
198
ø(12) United States businesses need to know how 
governments worldwide will address the risks of cli-
mate change. By committing themselves to reducing 
their greenhouse gas emissions, leading companies in 
the United States and worldwide are doing more than 
addressing the problem of climate change—they are 
also improving their competitive positioning. More 
than 30 major corporations, most with operations in 
the United States, have specifically committed them-
selves to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. 
ø(13) The United States benefits from invest-
ments in the research, development, and deployment 
of a range of clean energy and efficiency technologies 
that can reduce the risks of climate change and its 
impacts and that can make the United States econ-
omy more productive, bolster energy security, create 
jobs, and protect the environment. 
ø(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that the United States should demonstrate inter-
national leadership and responsibility in reducing the 
health, environmental, and economic risks posed by climate 
change by—
ø(1) taking responsible action to ensure signifi-
cant and meaningful reductions in emissions of 
greenhouse gases from all sectors;
199
ø(2) creating flexible international and domestic 
mechanisms, including joint implementation, tech-
nology deployment, tradable credits for emissions re-
ductions, and carbon sequestration projects that will 
reduce, avoid, and sequester greenhouse gas emissions; 
ø(3) participating in international negotiations, 
including putting forth a proposal to the Conference 
of the Parties to the UNFCCC, with the objective of 
securing United States participation in a future 
binding treaty on climate change in a manner that 
protects the economic interests of the United States, is 
consistent with the environmental objectives of the 
UNFCCC, and recognizes the shared international re-
sponsibility for addressing climate change, including 
developing country participation; and 
ø(4) establishing a bipartisan observer group of 
Members of the House of Representatives, designated 
by the chairman and ranking member of the Com-
mittee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives, to monitor any international nego-
tiations on climate change.¿
SEC. 731. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING MIGRATION 
ISSUES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
MEXICO. 
(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds as follows:
200
(1) During President Bush’s first meeting with 
President Fox in Guanajuato, Mexico, the Presidents 
stated in the Joint Communique of February 16, 
2001 that ‘‘we are instructing our Governments to en-
gage, at the earliest opportunity, in formal high level 
negotiations aimed at achieving short and long-term 
agreements that will allow us to constructively ad-
dress migration and labor issues between our two 
countries.’’. 
(2) During President Fox’s official visit to 
Washington, D.C., the Joint Statement of September 
6, 2001, summarized the meeting as follows: ‘‘The 
Presidents reviewed the progress made by our joint 
working group on migration chaired by Secretaries 
Powell, CastaZeda, and Creel and Attorney General 
Ashcroft and noted this represented the most fruitful 
and frank dialogue we have ever had on a subject so 
important to both nations. They praised implementa-
tion of the border safety initiative, and recognized 
that migration-related issues are deeply felt by our 
publics and vital to our prosperity, well-being, and 
the kind of societies we want to build. They renewed 
their commitment to forging new and realistic ap-
proaches to migration to ensure it is safe, orderly, 
legal and dignified, and agreed on the framework
201
within which this ongoing effort is based. This in-
cludes: matching willing workers with willing em-
ployers; serving the social and economic needs of both 
countries; respecting the human dignity of all mi-
grants, regardless of their status; recognizing the con-
tribution migrants make to enriching both societies; 
shared responsibility for ensuring migration takes 
place through safe and legal channels. Both stressed 
their commitment to continue our discussions, in-
structing the high-level working group to reach mutu-
ally satisfactory results on border safety, a temporary 
worker program and the status of undocumented 
Mexicans in the United States. They requested that 
the working group provide them proposals with re-
spect to these issues as soon as possible. The Presi-
dents recognized that this is an extraordinarily chal-
lenging area of public policy, and that it is critical 
to address the issue in a timely manner and with ap-
propriate thoroughness and depth.’’. 
(3) On September 7, 2001, during President 
Fox’s historic State Visit to Washington, the United 
States and Mexico issued a joint statement instruct-
ing our cabinet-level working group to provide us 
with specific proposals to forge a new and realistic 
framework that will ensure a safe, legal, orderly, and
202
dignified migration flow between our countries. We 
have today agreed that our Cabinet level migration 
group should continue the work we charged it with in 
Guanajuato and Washington. 
(4) When the Presidents met in Monterrey, Mex-
ico, the Presidents stated in a Joint Statement on 
March 22, 2002, as follows: ‘‘Slightly more than one 
year ago, in Guanajuato, we talked about migration 
as one of the major ties that join our societies. We 
launched then the frankest and most productive dia-
logue our countries have ever had on this important 
and challenging subject. Those talks have continued 
over the past year, and have yielded a clearer assess-
ment of the scope and nature of this issue. This bond 
between our nations can render countless benefits to 
our respective economies and families. 
(5) Over the past year, important progress has 
been made to enhance migrant safety and particu-
larly in saving lives by discouraging and reducing il-
legal crossings in dangerous terrain. 
(6) At the conclusion of the Mexico-United States 
Binational Commission (BNC) meeting in Mexico 
City in November 2002, Secretary of State Powell’s 
press conference was summarized by the State De-
partment as follows: The BNC’s migration working
203
group ‘‘affirmed our strong commitment to advancing 
our bilateral migration agenda,’’ he stressed, adding 
that ‘‘there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that 
this is a priority for President Bush, just as it is a 
priority for [Mexican] President [Vicente] Fox.’’
(7) Secretary Powell said no schedule had been 
established for a migration accord, but he confirmed 
that the United States and Mexico want to come up 
with a series of migration initiatives over the course 
of the next six months to a year. 
(8) Mexico’s state-run oil monopoly, Petro´leos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX), is inefficient, plagued by cor-
ruption, and in need of substantial reform and pri-
vate investment in order to provide sufficient petro-
leum products to Mexico and the United States to fuel 
future economic growth which can help curb illegal 
migration into the United States. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Con-
gress that—
(1) that the United States and Mexico should as 
soon as is practicable commence negotiations in an 
attempt to reach a migration accord that is as com-
prehensive as possible and which addresses the key 
issues of concern for both nations;
204
(2) that any accord on migration issues between 
the United States and Mexico should also include an 
accord to open Petro´leos Mexicanos (PEMEX) to in-
vestment by U.S. oil companies and specific steps to 
reform PEMEX’s operations to make them more 
transparent and efficient; and 
(3) that as part of any migration agreement be-
tween the United States and Mexico, the issues of the 
extradition of violent criminals and law enforcement 
cooperation between the two nations be addressed.
SEC. 732. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING UNITED 
STATES ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN REFU-
GEES. 
The Congress— 
(1) recognizes the importance of United States 
humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees as an 
essential component to the peace process in the Middle 
East; 
(2) acknowledges the hardships endured by many 
innocent Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip and in other neighboring countries; 
(3) notes that the United Nations High Commis-
sion for Refugees (UNHCR) is the international body 
that seeks to find ‘‘lasting solutions’’ to the plight of 
refugees throughout the world, with the sole exception
205
of the Palestinians, for whose exclusive benefit a spe-
cial agency, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA), was established in 1950 and 
which makes no effort to permanently resettle Pales-
tinian refugees, even those who reside under the juris-
diction of the Palestinian Authority, in order to en-
sure the perpetuation of the problem of Palestinian 
refugees; 
(4) recognizes that the United States has been the 
world’s leading donor to UNRWA, having provided 
over $2,500,000,000 to UNRWA since 1950, including 
the provision of $110,000,000, in fiscal year 2002, 
and that such organization has provided important 
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people; 
(5) notes that the United States contribution to 
UNRWA is nearly 10 times that of the entire Arab 
world, and calls on Arab states to assume a greater 
share of the burden for financing UNWRA; 
(6) expresses its outrage over credible reports 
that UNRWA facilities have been used for terrorist 
training and bases for terrorist operations, with little 
attempt by the UNRWA to stop or oppose such at-
tacks or alert relevant law enforcement authorities 
about such terrorist activities;
206
(7) expresses deep concern over the textbooks and 
educational materials used in the UNRWA edu-
cational system that promote anti-Semitism, denial of 
the existence and the right to exist of the state of 
Israel, and exacerbate stereotypes and tensions be-
tween the Palestinians and Israelis; 
(8) strongly urges the Secretary General of the 
United Nations to immediately take steps to com-
prehensively reform the UNRWA so that it actively 
works to oppose terrorist attacks and actively works 
to promote reconciliation and understanding between 
the Israelis and Palestinians; 
(9) strongly urges UNRWA to meet the require-
ments, in letter and spirit, of section 301(c) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, including by com-
prehensively ensuring that no UNRWA assistance is 
rendered to anyone who has been involved with ter-
rorism at any time and that all UNRWA bene-
ficiaries be informed at the earliest possible time, and 
at regular intervals thereafter, that anyone involved 
with terrorism thereafter will be ineligible for 
UNRWA benefits; 
(10) strongly urges the Secretary of State to 
make UNRWA reforms a priority at the United Na-
tions by actively campaigning within the United Na-
207
tions to support such reforms, including comprehen-
sive and independently verifiable audits of UNRWA 
activities and educational reform that would remove 
from the curriculum all textbooks and educational 
materials that promote hatred of Jews and Israel and 
denial of Israel’s right to exist and replace them with 
teaching materials that promote Israeli-Palestinian 
reconciliation and mutual understanding; and 
(11) notes the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
audit required by section 580 of the FY 2003 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act (Public Law 108–7), 
and strongly encourages the GAO to conduct, as part 
of this audit, an investigation and inspection of all 
recent United States assistance to UNRWA to ensure 
that taxpayer funds are being spent effectively and 
are not directly or indirectly supporting terrorism, 
anti-Semitic or anti-Jewish teachings, or the glorifi-
cation or incitement of violence.
SEC. 733. UNITED STATES POLICY ON WORLD BANK GROUP 
LOANS TO IRAN. 
(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—The Secretary of State 
(or a designee), in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, shall communicate directly with the governments 
of countries represented on the decision-making boards and 
councils of the international financial institutions of the
208
World Bank Group and consistently convey the strong oppo-
sition of the United States Government to any further activ-
ity in Iran by the international financial institutions of 
the World Bank Group. 
(b) REPORTS.—Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act and one year thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall submit a report on the efforts of 
the Secretary to carry out subsection (a) to the chairman 
and ranking minority member of the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 
(c) WORLD BANK GROUP DEFINED.—As used in this 
section, the term ‘‘World Bank Group’’ means the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
International Development Association, the International 
Financial Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment 
Guaranty Agency. 
SEC. 734. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO SOVIET NU-
CLEAR TESTS IN KAZAKHSTAN. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) In 1991, immediately after achieving inde-
pendence, Kazakhstan closed and sealed the world’s 
second largest nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk 
which had been inherited from the former Soviet
209
Union and at which more than 500 nuclear tests had 
been conducted from 1949 to 1991. 
(2) The cumulative power of explosions from 
those tests, conducted above ground, on the ground, 
and underground is believed to be equal to the power 
of 20,000 explosions of the type of bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima, Japan, in 1945. 
(3) More than 1,500,000 people in Kazakhstan 
suffered because of decades of Soviet nuclear weapons 
testing in the region. 
(4) A horrifying array of disease will continue 
to destroy the lives of hundreds of thousands and their 
descendants for many generations to come as a result 
of these tests. 
(5) Since its independence, Kazakhstan has con-
structed a stable and peaceful state, voluntarily dis-
armed the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal, 
joined 
the 
Strategic 
Arms 
Reduction 
Treaty 
(START), and became an example of responsible non-
proliferation of such weapons. 
(6) Kazakhstan is also doing its best to help 
those who were exposed to the horrific nuclear experi-
ments of the 20th century but it faces daunting chal-
lenges.
211
(3) recalls that the United States has supported 
both the United Nations Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Violence and the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action; and 
(4) reinforces the position of the United States 
that the United States condemns violence against 
women and refrains from invoking any custom, tradi-
tion, or religious consideration to avoid this nation’s 
obligations with respect to its elimination as set out 
in the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence 
against Women.
DIVISION 
B—DEFENSE 
TRADE 
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
REFORM ACT OF 2003
TITLE X—GENERAL PROVISIONS 
SEC. 1001. SHORT TITLE. 
This division may be cited as the ‘‘Defense Trade and 
Security Assistance Reform Act of 2003’’. 
SEC. 1002. DEFINITIONS. 
Except as otherwise provided, in this division: 
(1) DEFENSE ARTICLES.—The term ‘‘defense ar-
ticles’’ has the meaning given the term in section 
47(7)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (as amended 
by section 1107(d) of this Act).
212
(2) DEFENSE
SERVICES.—The term ‘‘defense 
services’’ has the meaning given the term in section 
47(7)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act (as amended 
by section 1107(d) of this Act). 
(3) DUAL USE.—The term ‘‘dual use’’ means, 
with respect to goods or technology, those goods or 
technology that are specifically designed or developed 
for civil purposes but which also may be used or de-
ployed in a military mode. 
(4) EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION
REGULATIONS.—
The term ‘‘Export Administration Regulations’’ 
means those regulations contained in sections 730–
774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations (or suc-
cessor regulations). 
(5) GOOD.—The term ‘‘good’’ has the meaning 
given the term in section 16(3) of the Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415(3)). 
(6) INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULA-
TIONS.—The term ‘‘International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations’’ means those regulations contained in 
sections 120–130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regula-
tions (or successor regulations). 
(7) MISSILE
TECHNOLOGY
CONTROL
REGIME; 
MTCR.—The term ‘‘Missile Technology Control Re-
gime’’ or ‘‘MTCR’’ has the meaning given the term in
214
Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
2415(4)). 
SEC. 1003. REFERENCES TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT. 
Except as otherwise specifically provided, whenever in 
this division an amendment is expressed in terms of an 
amendment to a section or other provision, the reference 
shall be considered to be made to that section or other provi-
sion of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
seq.). 
TITLE XI—TERRORIST-RELATED 
PROHIBITIONS 
AND 
EN-
FORCEMENT MEASURES 
SEC. 1101. ELIGIBILITY PROVISIONS. 
(a) INELIGIBILITY FOR TERRORIST RELATED TRANS-
ACTIONS.—Section 3(c)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(1)) is 
amended—
(1) in each of subparagraphs (A) and (B), by 
striking ‘‘or any predecessor Act,’’ and inserting ‘‘, 
any predecessor Act, or licensed or approved under 
section 38 of this Act, to carry out a transaction with 
a country, the government of which the Secretary of 
State has determined is a state sponsor of inter-
national terrorism for purposes of section 6(j)(1) of 
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C.
215
App. 2405(j)(1)), or otherwise uses such defense arti-
cles or defense services’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(C) In this section, the term ‘transaction’ means the 
taking of any action, directly or indirectly, by a foreign 
country that would be a transaction prohibited by section 
40 of this Act with respect to the United States Government 
and United States persons.’’. 
(b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Section 3(e) (22 
U.S.C. 2753(e)) is amended by inserting after ‘‘the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961,’’ the following: ‘‘regardless of wheth-
er the article or service has been sold or otherwise furnished 
by the United States Government or licensed under section 
38 of this Act,’’. 
SEC. 1102. WEAPONS TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN PERSONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES. 
Section 38(a)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) is amended 
in the first sentence by inserting after ‘‘import and the ex-
port of defense articles and defense services’’ the following: 
‘‘, or the transfer of such articles, other than firearms (or 
ammunition, components, parts, accessories, or attachments 
for firearms), and services within the United States to for-
eign persons,’’.
216
SEC. 1103. COORDINATION OF LICENSE EXEMPTIONS WITH 
UNITED STATES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
CIES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—In view of the historic dif-
ficulties in the enforcement of the Arms Export Control Act 
(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) associated with violations involving 
exports of defense articles and defense services that have 
been exempted by regulation from the licensing require-
ments of section 38 of such Act, it is the sense of Congress 
that the establishment of new exemptions by regulation 
should only be undertaken after careful coordination with 
the appropriate United States law enforcement agencies. 
(b) 
AMENDMENT.—Section 
38(b)(2) 
(22 
U.S.C. 
2778(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
new sentences: ‘‘In promulgating regulations under sub-
section (a)(1) in accordance with the preceding sentence, 
any provision in such regulations that permits the export 
of defense articles or defense services without a license shall 
include a determination by the Attorney General, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that the 
compilation and maintenance of sufficient documentation 
relating to the export without a license of the articles or 
services is ensured, notwithstanding the absence of a license, 
to facilitate law enforcement efforts to detect, prevent, and 
prosecute criminal violations of any provision of this sec-
217
tion, section 39, or section 40 of this Act, including the ef-
forts on the part of countries and factions engaged in inter-
national terrorism to illicitly acquire defense articles and 
defense services. No defense article or defense service des-
ignated by the President under subsection (a)(1) may be 
exported without a license pursuant to a regulation under 
subsection (a)(1) that is promulgated on or after January 
1, 2003, until 30 days after the date on which the President 
provides notice of the proposed regulation to the Committee 
on International Relations of the House of Representatives 
and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogram-
ming notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, including a description of the criteria 
that would be used to permit the export of the article or 
service and any measures to facilitate law enforcement ef-
forts associated with the Attorney General’s determination 
required by the preceding sentence.’’. 
SEC. 1104. MECHANISMS TO IDENTIFY PERSONS IN VIOLA-
TION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF LAW. 
Section 38(g)(1)(A) (22 U.S.C. 2778(g)(1)(A)) is 
amended—
(1) in clause (iii)—
(A) by striking ‘‘or section 2339A’’ and in-
serting ‘‘, section 2339A’’; and
218
(B) by inserting at the end before the 
comma the following: ‘‘, or section 2339C of such 
title (relating to financing terrorism)’’; 
(2) in clause (x), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end; 
(3) in clause (xi), by striking the semicolon at 
the end and inserting a comma; and 
(4) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(xii) subclause (I) or (II) of section 
1956(c)(7)(B)(v) of title 18, United States Code; 
‘‘(xiii) section 329 of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appro-
priate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001; 
‘‘(xiv) section 5332 of title 31, United 
States Code; 
‘‘(xv) section 1960 of title 18, United States 
Code; 
‘‘(xvi) section 175(b), 175b, 1993, 2339 of 
title 18, United States Code; 
‘‘(xvii) section 2332a, 2332b, or 2332f of 
title 18, United States Code; or 
‘‘(xviii) section 175 of title 18, United 
States Code;’’.
219
SEC. 1105. COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF UNITED STATES 
ARMS EMBARGOES. 
(a) FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.—
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—
(A) governments to which the United States 
Government prohibits by law or policy the trans-
fer of implements of war, including material, 
components, parts, and other defense articles and 
defense services (as defined in paragraphs (3) 
and (4) of section 47 of the Arms Export Control 
Act, respectively) continue to seek to evade these 
embargoes through increasingly sophisticated il-
legal acquisitions via the ‘‘international gray 
arms market’’ and by seeking to exploit weak-
nesses in the export control system of the United 
States and its friends and allies; and 
(B) the strict and comprehensive applica-
tion of arms embargoes referred to in subpara-
graph (A) including those embargoes established 
by the United Nations Security Council is of 
fundamental importance to the security and for-
eign policy interests of the United States. 
(2) SENSE
OF
CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States Government should 
continue to provide a leadership role internationally
220
in ensuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes re-
ferred to in paragraph (1). 
(b) SCOPE OF EMBARGOES.—Section 38 (22 U.S.C. 
2778) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(k) Whenever the United States maintains an arms 
embargo pursuant to United States law, or through public 
notice by the President or Secretary of State pursuant to 
the authorities of this Act, no defense article or defense serv-
ice subject to sections 120–130 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (commonly known as the ‘International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations’) and no dual use good or technology 
subject to sections 730–774 of title 15, Code of Federal Reg-
ulations (commonly known as the ‘Export Administration 
Regulations’) shall be sold or transferred to the military, 
police, or intelligence services of the embargoed government, 
including any associated governmental agency, subdivision, 
entity, or other person acting on their behalf, unless, at a 
minimum and without prejudice to any additional require-
ments established in United States law or regulation, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense have con-
curred in the sale or transfer through issuance of a license.’’. 
(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROLS.—The Secretary 
shall consult with the Secretary of Commerce to ensure the 
establishment of appropriate foreign policy and national se-
curity controls and license requirements under the Export
221
Administration Regulations in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of section 38(k) of the Arms Export Control 
Act, as added by subsection (b). 
(d) REPORT.—Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report that de-
scribes the actions taken to implement the requirements of 
subsection (c). 
SEC. 1106. TRANSACTIONS WITH COUNTRIES SUPPORTING 
ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 
Section 40(l)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2780(l)(1)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘any item enumerated on the United States Muni-
tions List’’ and inserting ‘‘a defense article or defense serv-
ice (as defined in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 47(7), 
respectively), an item enumerated on the United States Mu-
nitions List (as designated by the President pursuant to 
section 38(a)), or any other activity for which a license or 
other approval is required pursuant to the regulations pro-
mulgated under subsection (a)(1)’’. 
SEC. 1107. AMENDMENTS TO CONTROL OF ARMS EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS. 
(a) REVISION OF STANDARD FOR VIOLATION; AMOUNT 
OF PENALTIES.—Section 38(c) (22 U.S.C. 2778(c)) is 
amended—
222
(1) by striking ‘‘willfully’’ each place it appears 
and inserting ‘‘knowingly’’; 
(2) by striking ‘‘this section or section 39’’ and 
inserting ‘‘this section, section 39, or section 40’’; and 
(3) by striking ‘‘$1,000,000’’ and inserting 
‘‘$1,000,000 (in the case of a violation of this section 
or section 39), $2,000,000 (in the case of a violation 
involving any country covered by section 40), and 
$1,500,000 (in the case of a violation involving any 
country other than a country covered by section 40 
that is subject by United States law or policy to an 
arms embargo)’’. 
(b) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Section 38(e) (22 U.S.C. 
2778(e)) is amended in the third sentence by striking 
‘‘under this section may not exceed $500,000’’ and inserting 
‘‘or any other activities subject to control under this section, 
section 39, or section 40, may not exceed $500,000 for each 
violation of section 38 or section 39, $1,000,000 for each 
violation involving any country covered by section 40, and 
$750,000 for each violation relating to an arms embargo 
(other than a violation covered by section 40)’’. 
(c) REVISION OF STANDARD FOR VIOLATION; CRIMI-
NAL PENALTY; CIVIL PENALTIES; ENFORCEMENT.—Section 
40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) is amended—
(1) in subsection (j)—
223
(A) by striking ‘‘willfully’’ and inserting 
‘‘knowingly’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘$1,000,000’’ and inserting 
‘‘$2,000,000’’; and 
(2) in subsection (k), by striking ‘‘$500,000’’ and 
inserting ‘‘$1,000,000’’. 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—Section 47(7) (22 U.S.C. 2794(7)) 
is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(7)(A) ‘defense articles’, with respect to exports 
subject to sections 38, 39, and 40 of this Act, has the 
meaning given such term in sections 120–130 of title 
22, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as 
the ‘International Traffic in Arms Regulations’), as 
such regulations were in effect on January 1, 2003, 
and includes such additional articles as may be des-
ignated by the President under section 38(a)(1); and 
‘‘(B) ‘defense services’, with respect to exports 
subject to sections 38, 39, and 40 of this Act, has the 
meaning given such term in sections 120–130 of title 
22, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as 
the ‘International Traffic in Arms Regulations’), as 
such regulations were in effect on January 1, 2003, 
and includes—
224
‘‘(i) the provision of assistance (including 
aiding, abetting, or training) to foreign persons; 
and 
‘‘(ii) such other activities as may be des-
ignated by the President pursuant to section 
38(a)(1).’’. 
SEC. 
1108. 
HIGH 
RISK 
EXPORTS 
AND 
END 
USE 
VERIFICATION. 
Section 38(g)(7) (22 U.S.C. 2778) is amended by add-
ing at the end the following new sentence: ‘‘Such standards 
shall be coordinated biennially with the Secretary of Home-
land Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of Central In-
telligence, and the heads of other Federal departments or 
agencies, as appropriate.’’. 
SEC. 1109. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that, in view of the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation for protecting the United States against 
terrorist attack, foreign intelligence operations, high tech-
nology crimes, and transnational criminal organizations 
and enterprises, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should 
be provided authority to investigate and enforce violations 
of the Arms Export Control Act without adversely affecting
225
the existing authority of the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection of the Department of Homeland Security. 
(b) COPY OF REGISTRATION.—Section 38(b)(1) (22 
U.S.C. 2778(b)) is amended—
(1) by redesignating the second subparagraph 
(B) as subparagraph (C); and 
(2) in subparagraph (B)—
(A) in the first sentence, by inserting ‘‘and 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’’ after ‘‘Secretary of Treasury’’; and 
(B) in the second sentence, by inserting 
‘‘and the Director’’ after ‘‘The Secretary’’. 
(c) JURISDICTION
OF FBI AND BUREAU
OF CUS-
TOMS.—Section 38(e) (22 U.S.C. 2778(e)) is amended in 
the first sentence by adding at the end before the period 
the following: ‘‘, and except further, that the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation and the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection of the Department of Homeland Security shall 
have concurrent jurisdiction for criminal violations and en-
forcement of this Act’’. 
(d) MECHANISMS TO IDENTIFY PERSONS IN VIOLA-
TION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF LAW.—Section 38(g) (22 
U.S.C. 2778(g)) is amended in the second sentence of para-
graph (3), in paragraph (4), and in paragraph (8) by in-
226
serting ‘‘and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation’’ after ‘‘Secretary of Treasury’’. 
SEC. 1110. REPORT ON FOREIGN-SUPPLIED DEFENSE ARTI-
CLES, DEFENSE SERVICES, AND DUAL USE 
GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY DISCOVERED IN 
IRAQ. 
(a) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and on annual 
basis thereafter as appropriate, the President shall 
prepare and transmit to the congressional committees 
specified in paragraph (2) a written report on for-
eign-supplied defense articles, defense services, and 
dual use goods and technology supplied to Iraq since 
the adoption of United Nations Security Council Res-
olution 687 (April 3, 1991) and discovered in Iraq 
since the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom or 
identified as having been in Iraq at any time since 
April 3, 1991, and not destroyed or otherwise ac-
counted for by the United Nations Special Commis-
sion (UNSCOM) or the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification 
and 
Inspection 
Commission 
(UNMOVIC).
227
(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—
The congressional committees referred to in para-
graph (1) are—
(A) the Committee on International Rela-
tions and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate. 
(b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 
shall include information on defense articles, defense serv-
ices, and dual use goods and technology discovered in ac-
cordance with such subsection, including a description of 
such articles, services, and goods and technology by category 
or type, quantity, country of origin (if known), manufac-
turer (if known), date of acquisition (if known), and, in 
the case of dual use goods and technology, the use or in-
tended use or deployment (if known) and whether the goods 
or technology are covered by any arms control agreement 
or nonproliferation arrangement to which the United States 
is a party. 
(c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall 
be transmitted in unclassified form to the maximum extent 
practicable, but may contain a classified annex if necessary.
228
TITLE XII—STRENGTHENING 
MUNITIONS EXPORT CONTROLS 
SEC. 1201. CONTROL OF ITEMS ON MISSILE TECHNOLOGY 
CONTROL REGIME ANNEX. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that all proposals to export or transfer to foreign persons 
by other means, whether in the United States or abroad, 
and any other activities subject to regulation under section 
38, 39, or 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, relating to 
items on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex, 
should be accorded stringent control and scrutiny consistent 
with the purposes of section 71 of the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2797). 
(b) CONTROL OF ITEMS ON MTCR ANNEX.—The Sec-
retary, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense, shall ensure 
that all items on the MTCR Annex are subject to stringent 
control by the United States Government pursuant to the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export 
Administration Regulations. 
(c) CERTIFICATION.—Not later than March 1 of each 
year, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General and the Secretary of De-
fense, shall prepare and submit to the appropriate congres-
sional committees a report that contains—
229
(1) a certification that the requirement of sub-
section (b) has been met for the prior year, or if the 
requirement has not been met, the reasons therefor; 
and 
(2) a description of the updated coverage, if any, 
of the regulations referred to in subsection (b) with re-
spect to all items on the MTCR Annex and an expla-
nation of any areas of overlap or omissions, if any, 
among the regulations. 
SEC. 1202. CERTIFICATIONS RELATING TO EXPORT OF CER-
TAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES. 
Section 36(c) (22 U.S.C. 2776(c)) is amended—
(1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by in-
serting after ‘‘$1,000,000 or more’’ the following: ‘‘, 
or, notwithstanding section 27(g) of this Act, for any 
special comprehensive authorization under sections 
120–130 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations 
(commonly known as the ‘International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations’) for the export of defense articles 
or defense services in an aggregate amount of 
$100,000,000 or more’’; 
(2) in paragraph (2)—
(A) by striking subparagraph (B); and 
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as 
subparagraph (B); and
230
(3) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) of 
paragraph (5), by inserting ‘‘or paragraph (2)’’ after 
‘‘paragraph (1)’’. 
SEC. 1203. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE AND MANUFACTURING LICENS-
ING 
AGREEMENTS 
WITH 
NATO 
MEMBER 
COUNTRIES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND 
JAPAN. 
Section 36(d) (22 U.S.C. 2776(d)) is amended by add-
ing at the end the following: 
‘‘(6) In the case of a commercial technical assistance 
or manufacturing license agreement with a member country 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Aus-
tralia, Japan, or New Zealand that does not authorize a 
new sales territory that includes any country other than 
such countries, the requirements contained in paragraphs 
(2) and (4) shall apply only if—
‘‘(A) the agreement involves—
‘‘(i) major defense equipment in the amount 
of $7,000,000 or more; or 
‘‘(ii) significant military equipment in the 
amount of $25,000,000 or more; and 
‘‘(B) the amount referred to in clause (i) or (ii) 
of subparagraph (A), as the case may be, includes the 
estimated value of all defense articles and defense
231
services to be manufactured or transferred throughout 
the duration of the approval period.’’. 
SEC. 1204. STRENGTHENING DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH 
AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the expeditious consideration of munitions license ap-
plications that meet the policy and eligibility criteria estab-
lished in section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2778) for export or transfer of defense items (as such 
term is defined in subsection (j)(4)(A) of such section) to 
Australia and the United Kingdom is fully consistent with 
United States security and foreign policy interests and the 
objectives of world peace and security. 
(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF FAST TRACK MUNITIONS LI-
CENSING FOR AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.—
Section 38(f) (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)) is amended by adding at 
the end the following: 
‘‘(4) In the absence of a binding bilateral agreement 
with the Government of Australia or the Government of the 
United Kingdom (as the case may be) that meets the re-
quirements of paragraph (2) and subsection (j), the Sec-
retary of State shall ensure that any application submitted 
under this section for the export of defense items to Aus-
tralia or the United Kingdom (as the case may be) that 
meets all other requirements of this section (including re-
232
quirements relating to eligibility of parties to the trans-
action, the absence of risk of diversion to unauthorized end 
use and end users, and preservation of United States intel-
ligence and law enforcement interests), and which are also 
transactions involving defense items that would be exempt 
pursuant to sections 120–130 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (commonly known as the ‘International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations’) from export licensing or other writ-
ten approvals if such items were items to be exported to 
Canada, are processed by the Department of State not later 
than ten days after the date of receipt of the application 
without referral to any other Federal department or agency, 
except on an extraordinary basis upon receipt of a written 
request from the Attorney General, the Secretary of Home-
land Security, the Director of Central Intelligence, or the 
Secretary of Defense.’’. 
SEC. 1205. TRAINING AND LIAISON FOR SMALL BUSI-
NESSES. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that it is increasingly important that the Secretary, in ad-
ministering the licensing, registration, compliance, and 
other authorities contained in section 38 of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), should provide up-to-date 
training and other educational assistance to small busi-
233
nesses in the United States aerospace and defense industrial 
sector. 
(b) SMALL BUSINESS LIAISON.—Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
retary shall designate, within the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls of the Department of State, a coordinator for small 
business affairs. The coordinator shall serve as a liaison for 
small businesses in the United States aerospace and defense 
industrial sector with respect to licensing and registration 
requirements in order to facilitate the compliance and other 
forms of participation by such small businesses in the 
United States munitions control system, including by pro-
viding training, technical assistance, and through other ef-
forts as may be appropriate. 
SEC. 1206. STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO CO-LOCATING 
MUNITIONS CONTROL FUNCTIONS OF THE 
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE, DEFENSE, AND 
HOMELAND SECURITY. 
(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 
that the administrative, licensing, and compliance-related 
functions associated with the export of defense articles and 
defense services under section 38 of the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2778), which are generally administered by 
the Department of State in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense,
234
should be expedited consistent with United States security, 
law enforcement, and foreign policy requirements by a re-
duction in the those matters necessitating inter-agency re-
ferral outside of the Department of State, or by co-locating 
related functions of the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Department of Defense with those functions of the 
Department of State in order to minimize the time and ad-
ministrative tasks to government and industry involved in 
inter-agency referrals, while also providing a convenient, 
central location for United States defense companies, espe-
cially small businesses. 
(b) STUDY AND REPORT.—
(1) STUDY.—The Secretary, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Sec-
retary of Defense, and through the Federal advisory 
committee structure with the public, shall conduct a 
study to examine the relative advantages and dis-
advantages to the United States Government, the 
United States defense industry, including United 
States small businesses, and to other public constitu-
encies of co-locating relevant functions and personnel 
of the Department of State, the Department of Home-
land Security, and the Department of Defense with 
the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the Depart-
ment of State at a central location convenient to the
235
public and United States defense industry, without 
prejudice to the responsibilities and prerogatives of 
the Secretary, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
and the Secretary of Defense under existing law. 
(2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall 
prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that contains the results of study 
conducted under paragraph (1). 
TITLE 
XIII—SECURITY 
ASSIST-
ANCE AND RELATED PROVI-
SIONS 
Subtitle A—Foreign Military Sales 
and Financing Authorities 
SEC. 1301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 
There are authorized to be appropriated to the Presi-
dent for grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Ex-
port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) and for the subsidy cost, 
as defined in section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform 
Act of 1990, of direct loans under such section 
$4,414,000,000 for fiscal year 2004. 
SEC. 1302. PROVISION OF CATALOGING DATA AND SERV-
ICES. 
Section 21(h)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2761(h)(2)) is amended by 
striking ‘‘or to any member government of that Organiza-
238
(A) by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2002 and 
2003’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2004 and 
2005’’; 
(B) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2002’’ and in-
serting ‘‘fiscal year 2004’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2003, or’’ and 
inserting ‘‘fiscal year 2005, or’’; and 
(4) in subsection (c)(4)—
(A) by striking ‘‘2002 and 2003’’ and in-
serting ‘‘2003 through 2005’’; and 
(B) by striking ‘‘$535,000,000 for fiscal 
year 2002’’ and all that follows through ‘‘fiscal 
year 2003’’ and inserting ‘‘$550,000,000 for fis-
cal year 2003, not less than $565,000,000 for fis-
cal year 2004, and not less than $580,000,000 
for fiscal year 2005’’. 
SEC. 1322. ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT. 
Section 514 of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 
(Public Law 106–280) is amended—
(1) by striking ‘‘2002 and 2003’’ each place it 
appears and inserting ‘‘2003 through 2005’’; and 
(2) in subsection (e)—
(A) by striking ‘‘fiscal years 2002 and 
2003’’ and inserting ‘‘fiscal years 2004 and 
2005’’;
239
(B) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2002’’ and in-
serting ‘‘fiscal year 2004’’; and 
(C) by striking ‘‘fiscal year 2003, or’’ and 
inserting ‘‘fiscal year 2005, or’’. 
Subtitle D—Miscellaneous 
Provisions 
SEC. 1331. UNITED STATES WAR RESERVE STOCKPILES FOR 
ALLIES. 
Section 514(b)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)) is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘for fiscal 
year 2003’’ and inserting ‘‘for each of fiscal years 
2003 and 2004’’; and 
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ‘‘for fiscal 
year 2003’’ and inserting ‘‘for each of fiscal years 
2003 and 2004’’. 
SEC. 1332. TRANSFER TO ISRAEL OF CERTAIN DEFENSE AR-
TICLES IN THE UNITED STATES WAR RE-
SERVE STOCKPILES FOR ALLIES. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION.—Notwithstanding section 514 of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the 
President is authorized to transfer to Israel, in return for 
concessions to be negotiated by the Secretary of Defense, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary, defense articles, in-
240
cluding armor, artillery, ammunition for automatic weap-
ons, missiles, and other munitions that are—
(1) obsolete or surplus items; 
(2) in the inventory of the Department of De-
fense; 
(3) intended for use as reserve stocks in Israel; 
and 
(4) are located in a stockpile in Israel as of the 
date of enactment of this Act. 
(b) CONCESSIONS.—The value of concessions nego-
tiated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be at least equal to 
the fair market value of the items transferred. The conces-
sions may include cash compensation, services, waiver of 
charges otherwise payable by the United States, and other 
items of value. 
(c) ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not less than 30 days before 
making a transfer under the authority of this section, 
the President shall transmit a notification describing 
the items to be transferred to Israel and the conces-
sions to be received by the United States to the con-
gressional committees specified in paragraph (2). 
(2) CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—
The congressional committees referred to in para-
graph (1) are—
241
(A) the Committee on International Rela-
tions and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives; and 
(B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 
and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
Senate. 
(d) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—No transfer may be 
made under the authority of this section following the expi-
ration of the five-year period beginning on the date of enact-
ment of this Act. 
SEC. 1333. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES FOR LOAN OF MA-
TERIAL, SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT FOR RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES. 
Section 65 (22 U.S.C. 2796d) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by inserting ‘‘or a 
friendly foreign country’’ after ‘‘ally’’ each place such 
term appears; and 
(2) in subsection (d) to read as follows: 
‘‘(d) For purposes of this section—
‘‘(1) the term ‘NATO ally’ means a member 
country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(other than the United States); and 
‘‘(2) the term ‘friendly foreign country’ means 
any non-NATO member country determined by the 
President to be eligible for a cooperative project agree-
242
ment with the United States pursuant to section 27(j) 
of this Act.’’. 
SEC. 1334. ASSISTANCE FOR DEMINING AND RELATED AC-
TIVITIES. 
(a) ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary is authorized to pro-
vide grants to, or enter into contracts or cooperative agree-
ments with, public-private partnerships for the purpose of 
establishing and carrying out demining, clearance of 
unexploded ordnance, and related activities in foreign coun-
tries. 
(b) LIMITATION.—Except as otherwise provided, the 
total amount provided on a grant basis to public-private 
partnerships under subsection (a) for a fiscal year may not 
exceed $450,000. 
(c) FUNDING.—Amounts made available to carry out 
‘‘Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs’’ for fiscal year 2004 are authorized to be made 
available to carry out this section. 
SEC. 1335. REPORTS RELATING TO TREATY BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUC-
TIONS. 
The President shall submit to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations of the House of Representatives all re-
ports submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations pur-
244
America and the Russian Federation on Stra-
tegic Offensive Reductions improved confidence 
regarding the accurate accounting and security 
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons maintained by 
the other party; and 
(4) encourages the President to accelerate 
United States strategic force reductions, to the 
extent feasible and consistent with the treaty, in 
order that the reductions required by Article I of 
the Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offen-
sive Reductions may be achieved prior to Decem-
ber 31, 2012. 
SEC. 1337. NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT FUND. 
(a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—There are authorized to be ap-
propriated to the President to carry out section 504 
of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 
(22 U.S.C. 5854; relating to the ‘‘Nonproliferation 
and Disarmament Fund’’) $60,000,000 for each of the 
fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 
(2) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pur-
suant to the authorization of appropriations under
245
paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available 
until expended. 
(b) NONPROLIFERATION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URA-
NIUM.—
(1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(A) Highly enriched uranium is the most 
likely source material for terrorist or other out-
law organizations that seek to acquire a nuclear 
weapon. 
(B) Such organizations are not likely to 
produce this source material on their own, but 
will instead look to divert highly enriched ura-
nium from some of the many vulnerable stock-
piles in numerous facilities around the world. 
(C) There is a need for a coordinated 
United States Government initiative to secure 
and dispose of highly enriched uranium stock-
piles in these vulnerable facilities around the 
world. 
(D) The Nonproliferation and Disarmament 
Fund (NDF) is a unique and flexible entity that 
is well-suited to carry out the initiative described 
in subparagraph (C), in cooperation with other 
Federal departments and agencies, including the 
Department of Energy.
246
(2) INITIATIVE.—The Secretary of State is au-
thorized to establish and carry out an initiative to se-
cure and dispose of highly enriched uranium stock-
piles in foreign countries, including the provision of 
such assistance as may be required to secure host 
country cooperation under the initiative. 
(3) AUTHORIZATION
OF
APPROPRIATIONS.—Of 
the amounts made available to carry out section 504 
of the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 
(22 U.S.C. 5854) for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, 
there are authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-
retary to carry out paragraph (2) $25,000,000 for 
each such fiscal year. 
SEC. 1338. MARITIME INTERDICTION PATROL BOATS FOR 
MOZAMBIQUE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts made available to 
carry out section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act for 
fiscal year 2004, there is authorized to be appropriated 
$1,000,000 for refurbishment, delivery, operational train-
ing, and related costs associated with the provision of not 
more than four excess coastal patrol boats to the Govern-
ment of Mozambique for maritime patrol and interdiction 
activities.
247
(b) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) 
are authorized to remain available until September 30, 
2006. 
SEC. 1339. REPORT ON MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION. 
Not later than December 31, 2003, and December 31, 
2004, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on cooperative efforts that 
have been undertaken by the United States with foreign gov-
ernments to foster the development and deployment of de-
fenses against missile attack. Such report shall include a 
detailed description of such efforts on a country-by-country 
basis, and may be submitted in classified and unclassified 
form, as appropriate. 
SEC. 1340. IRAN’S PROGRAM TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR EX-
PLOSIVE DEVICE. 
(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 
(1) Iran, as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has legally for-
sworn developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. 
(2) Iran has for more than a decade pursued a 
program aimed at the development of a nuclear explo-
sive device. 
(3) Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet 
has repeatedly warned of Iran’s clandestine efforts to
248
acquire weapons of mass destruction, stating as re-
cently as February 11, 2003, in testimony before Con-
gress that ‘‘Iran is continuing to pursue development 
of a nuclear fuel cycle for civilian and nuclear weap-
ons purposes . . . [and further that] Tehran may be 
able to indigenously produce enough fissile material 
for a nuclear weapon’’ within this decade. 
(4) On March 17, 2003, Dr. el Baradei, Director 
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), called on Iran to agree to a more intrusive 
monitoring regime at its nuclear sites and demanded 
that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, agree to an ‘‘additional pro-
tocol’’ under the IAEA’s nuclear inspection rights, 
which would enable more intrusive monitoring. 
(5) In early 2003 Iran announced plans to mine 
its own natural uranium and admitted constructing 
two nuclear facilities, one a gas centrifuge uranium 
enrichment facility and the other a heavy water pro-
duction plant. 
(6) A uranium enrichment facility would give 
Iran the capability to indigenously produce nuclear-
weapons grade uranium. Further, heavy water is used 
in reactors that not only produce weapons-grade plu-
249
tonium, but also tritium, a key ingredient in boosted-
fission weapons. 
(7) At the same time, Iran has been developing 
long-range missiles that could deliver nuclear explo-
sive devices. Director of Central Intelligence Tenet has 
warned that Iran could flight test an intercontinental 
ballistic missile later this decade. 
(8) Iran has received considerable assistance in 
its nuclear program and in its missile development 
program from the Russian Federation, the People’s 
Republic of China, and North Korea. 
(9) Congress has long been seized with finding 
ways to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or develop-
ment of such deadly weapons, including through the 
enactment of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation 
Act of 1992, the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 
the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000, and the Iran 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 2002. 
(10) Successive Administrations have similarly 
sought to deter or delay Iran’s acquisition or develop-
ment of such weapons by such measures as elevating 
Iran’s proliferation behavior in bilateral relations 
with the Russian Federation and the People’s Repub-
lic of China, sanctioning entities of the Russian Fed-
eration providing technology or expertise to Iran’s
250
nuclear and missile programs, and urging multilat-
eral export control regimes to deny sensitive tech-
nology to proliferators like Iran. 
(11) President Bush included Iran as one of the 
countries that comprise the ‘‘axis of evil’’ in his Jan-
uary 2002 State of the Union Address because of its 
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and its 
support of international terrorism. Iran has been the 
principle supporter and supplier to Hizballah in 
southern Lebanon, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Fur-
ther, the leaders of Iran have publicly called for the 
destruction of the State of Israel. 
(12) A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave 
threat to the national security of the United States 
and to our allies in the region. 
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—Congress—
(1) finds that Iran’s support of terrorism and its 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons are a grave threat 
to the national security of the United States and its 
allies and to the United States Armed Forces; 
(2) declares that the United States and our 
friends and allies must make maximum efforts to pre-
vent Iran from developing or acquiring nuclear weap-
ons and the missiles to deliver them;
251
(3) urges the President to use all appropriate 
means to prevent Iran from gaining such capabilities; 
(4) urges the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy (IAEA) to employ the full range of its inspection 
authorities to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is 
used for peaceful purposes only; 
(5) encourages Iran to sign and ratify the new 
nuclear safeguards protocol, the ‘‘Model Additional 
Protocol (INFCIRC/540-Corr)’’ to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would 
demonstrate Iran’s commitment to sharing informa-
tion about its nuclear program with the IAEA and 
the international community and to full disclosure 
and transparency about its nuclear program; and 
(6) urges the United States resident representa-
tive to the IAEA to work with the Board of Governors 
of the IAEA on guidelines for early identification of 
noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
TITLE XIV—MISSILE THREAT 
REDUCTION ACT OF 2003
SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE. 
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Missile Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 2003’’.
252
Subtitle 
A—Strengthening 
Inter-
national Missile Nonprolifera-
tion Law 
SEC. 1411. FINDINGS. 
Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles suit-
able for launching nuclear, chemical, and biological 
warheads is accelerating across the globe. 
(2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, more than 25 countries possess 
missiles with ranges in excess of 300 kilometers and 
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. 
(3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing 
such missiles, and engaging in the sale and transfer 
of such missiles and their production technology to 
other countries, are directly hostile to the United 
States, its interests, and its allies. 
(B) Of particular concern in this regard is North 
Korea, which regularly sells ballistic missiles and 
technology to countries in regions of instability and 
concern to the United States. 
(4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated in 
its most recent report on the foreign ballistic missile 
threat the following:
253
‘‘Emerging ballistic missile states continue 
to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of 
the missile systems in their inventories—posing 
ever greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, and 
allies throughout the world. A decade ago, U.S. 
and allied forces abroad faced threats from 
SRBM’s [Short Range Ballistic Missiles]—pri-
marily the Scud and its variants. Today, coun-
tries have deployed or are on the verge of deploy-
ing MRBM’s [Medium Range Ballistic Missiles], 
placing greater numbers of targets at risk. 
‘‘Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 
technologies, materials, and expertise—especially 
by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean enti-
ties—has enabled emerging missile states to ac-
celerate the development timelines for their exist-
ing programs, acquire turnkey systems to gain 
previously non-existent capabilities—in the case 
of the Chinese sale of the M–11 SRBM to Paki-
stan—and lay the groundwork for the expansion 
of domestic infrastructures to potentially accom-
modate even more capable and longer range fu-
ture systems.’’. 
(5) The same CIA report also noted the fol-
lowing: ‘‘North Korea has assumed the role as the
254
missile and manufacturing technology source for 
many programs. North Korean willingness to sell 
complete systems and components has enabled other 
states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than 
otherwise would have been possible—notably the sale 
of the No Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also 
has helped countries to acquire technologies to serve as 
the basis for domestic development efforts—as with 
Iran’s reverse-engineering of the No Dong in the 
Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding its 
efforts to sell missile technology.’’. 
(6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to 
abide by a voluntary set of guidelines known as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whereby 
adherents agreed to refrain from the transfer to non-
adherents of certain categories of whole missiles, their 
constituent parts, and the facilities to manufacture 
them, especially ‘‘Category I’’ missiles, which at a 
range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload capac-
ity of 500 kilograms or more are especially suited for 
delivering nuclear weapons. 
(7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to 
observe a nonbinding code of conduct derived from, 
but less restrictive than, the nonbinding MTCR. While 
this is a welcome achievement, it does not provide a
255
legal obligation on its adherents to refrain from the 
trade in missiles or missile technology. 
(8) On December 10, 2002, the White House re-
leased its ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction’’, wherein it is stated that strength-
ening international nonproliferation controls on 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and upon the 
missiles that can deliver them is the second of three 
principal pillars of the National Strategy. The Na-
tional Strategy also states that ‘‘effective interdiction 
is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD 
and their delivery means’’. 
(9) On December 11, 2002, the United States 
took control of an unflagged freighter that was at-
tempting clandestinely to ship, from North Korea to 
Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that would be gen-
erally prohibited from transfer as Category I missiles. 
(10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an ad-
herent to the MTCR guidelines, which in any case are 
not legally binding, and there is no binding inter-
national legal instrument that would prohibit ship-
ments of the missiles referred to in paragraph (9). 
(11) At Yemen’s request, the United States re-
leased the shipment of North Korean Scud missiles to 
Yemen.
256
(12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White 
House press spokesman stated that existing inter-
national law regarding halting the spread of missile 
proliferation could be strengthened. The new National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction also 
commits the United States to support those regimes 
that are currently in force, and to work to improve 
the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those re-
gimes, and identifies the MTCR as a regime that the 
United States will seek to strengthen. 
(13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, tes-
tifying on February 12, 2003, before the Committee 
on Armed Services of the Senate, stated the following: 
‘‘. . . [I]t’s pretty clear that the proliferation regimes 
that exist in the world worked pretty well before, [but] 
they’re not working very well right now. . . . [U]nless 
the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous 
thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get 
cooperation to stop those weapons, we’re going to be 
facing a very serious situation in the next five 
years.’’. 
(14) The MTCR has made an invaluable con-
tribution to restraint in the international trade of of-
fensive ballistic missiles. Strengthening international 
controls on ballistic missiles, however, will require a
257
dramatic expansion of adherents that rigorously abide 
by the MTCR’s guidelines, and a binding legal basis 
for the United Nations and countries devoted to non-
proliferation to prevent, and when necessary act to 
prevent, further proliferation of offensive ballistic 
missiles around the world. 
(15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the 
United States to promote the creation of new inter-
national mechanisms that would, in all future cir-
cumstances, allow the peace-loving and law-abiding 
nations of the world the authority to interdict and 
prevent the transfer of such missiles. 
SEC. 1412. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
It shall be the policy of the United States to seek a 
binding international instrument or instruments to restrict 
the trade in offensive ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 
kilometers or more that have a payload capacity of 500 kilo-
grams or more. Such a binding international instrument 
may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a United Na-
tions Security Council resolution, or other instrument of 
international law, and should provide for enforcement 
measures including interdiction, seizure, and impoundment 
of illicit shipments of offensive ballistic missiles and related 
technology, equipment, and components.
258
SEC. 1413. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States 
should immediately introduce a resolution in the United 
Nations Security Council to prohibit all members of the 
United Nations from purchasing, receiving, assisting or al-
lowing the transfer of, and to authorize the subsequent 
interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, 
missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or 
missile-related technology from North Korea. 
Subtitle B—Strengthening United 
States Missile Nonproliferation 
Law 
SEC. 1421. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, upon the expiration, or the granting of a waiv-
er, on or after January 1, 2003, of sanctions against a for-
eign person imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section 
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a license 
shall be required, for a period of not less than 3 years, for 
the export to that foreign person of all items controlled for 
export under section 5 or 6 of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), as continued in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers
259
Act, in accordance with the Export Administration Regula-
tions. 
(b) TERMINATION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to 
a foreign person 30 days after the President notifies the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate that he has determined that—
(1) the foreign person has—
(A) ceased all activity related to the origi-
nal imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) 
of the Arms Export Control Act or section 
11B(b)(A) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979, as the case may be; and 
(B) has instituted a program of trans-
parency measures whereby the United States will 
be able to verify for at least a period of 3 years 
that the foreign person is not engaging in pro-
hibited activities under those provisions of law 
referred to in paragraph (1); and 
(2) there has been an appropriate resolution of 
the original violation or violations, such as financial 
penalties, incarceration, destruction of prohibited 
items, or other appropriate measures taken to prevent 
a recurrence of the violation or violations.
260
SEC. 1422. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON FOREIGN PER-
SONS. 
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a)(2) 
(22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ‘‘2 years’’ 
each place it appears and inserting ‘‘4 years’’. 
(b) PUBLIC
INFORMATION.—Section 73(e)(2) (22 
U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new sentence: ‘‘Such report may be classified only 
to the extent necessary to protect intelligence sources and 
methods. If the report is so classified, the President shall 
make every effort to acquire sufficient alternative informa-
tion that would allow a subsequent unclassified version of 
the report to be issued.’’. 
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT
OF 1979.—Any 
sanction imposed on a foreign person under section 
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall be in 
effect for a period of 4 years beginning on the date on which 
the sanction was imposed. 
(d) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by sub-
sections (a) and (b) and the provisions of subsection (c) 
shall apply to all sanctions imposed under section 73(a) 
of the Arms Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(1) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in effect
261
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
by reason of acts giving rise to such sanctions that were 
committed by foreign persons on or after January 1, 2003. 
SEC. 1423. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PRO-
LIFERATION SANCTIONS ON ALL RESPON-
SIBLE PERSONS. 
(a) ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—Section 73(a) (22 
U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing new paragraph: 
‘‘(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person 
under paragraph (2) shall also be imposed on any govern-
mental entity that the President determines exercises effec-
tive control over, benefits from, or directly or indirectly fa-
cilitates the activities of that foreign person. 
‘‘(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person 
under paragraph (2), the President may also impose that 
sanction on any other person or entity that the President 
has reason to believe has or may acquire items that may 
not be exported to that foreign person on account of the 
sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that foreign 
person access to, such items. 
‘‘(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period 
of time as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, 
by a United States person or within the United States, with
262
any foreign person on whom sanctions have been imposed 
under this subsection. 
‘‘(D) The President shall report on an annual basis 
to the Committee on International Relations of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate the identity of any foreign person that engages 
in any transaction or activity with a foreign person on 
whom sanctions have been imposed under this subsection 
that either—
‘‘(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 
under subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions have 
not been imposed; or 
‘‘(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions 
under subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity 
had been carried out by a United States person or by 
a person in the United States. 
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent 
feasible, but may include a classified annex.’’. 
(b) DEFINITION OF PERSON.—Section 74(a)(8)(A) (22 
U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows: 
‘‘(8)(A) the term ‘person’ means—
‘‘(i) a natural person; 
‘‘(ii) a corporation, business association, 
partnership, society, trust, transnational cor-
poration, or transnational joint venture, any
263
other nongovernmental entity, organization, or 
group, and any governmental entity; 
‘‘(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent 
entity of any business enterprise or other organi-
zation or entity listed in clause (ii); and 
‘‘(iv) any successor of any business enter-
prise or other organization or entity listed in 
clause (ii) or (iii); and’’. 
(c) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979.—
(1) SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON GOVERNMENT ENTI-
TIES.—Any sanction imposed on a foreign person 
under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)(B)), as 
continued in effect under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (in this subsection re-
ferred to as a ‘‘dual use sanction’’), shall also be im-
posed on any governmental entity that the President 
determines exercises effective control over, benefits 
from, or directly or indirectly facilitates the activities 
of that foreign person. 
(2) OTHER ENTITIES.—When a dual use sanc-
tion is imposed on a foreign person, the President 
may also impose that sanction on any other person 
or entity that the President has reason to believe has 
or may acquire items that may not be exported to
264
that foreign person on account of the dual use sanc-
tion imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that 
foreign person access to, such items. 
(3) TRANSACTIONS
BY
THIRD
PARTIES.—The 
President may also prohibit, for such period of time 
as he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by 
a United States person or within the United States, 
with any foreign person on whom dual use sanctions 
have been imposed. 
(4) REPORT.—The President shall submit on an 
annual basis to the appropriate congressional com-
mittees a report that contains the identity of any for-
eign person that engages in any transaction or activ-
ity with a foreign person on whom dual use sanctions 
have been imposed that either—
(A) would be the basis for imposing dual 
use sanctions under paragraph (2) but for which 
such sanctions have not been imposed; or 
(B) would be the basis for imposing dual 
use sanctions under paragraph (3) if the trans-
action or activity had been carried out by a 
United States person or by a person in the 
United States.
265
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum ex-
tent feasible, but may include a classified annex. 
(5) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
(A) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means—
(i) a natural person; 
(ii) a corporation, business association, 
partnership, society, trust, transnational 
corporation, or transnational joint venture, 
any other nongovernmental entity, organi-
zation, or group, and any governmental en-
tity; 
(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or par-
ent entity of any business enterprise or 
other organization or entity listed in clause 
(ii); and 
(iv) any successor of any business en-
terprise or other organization or entity list-
ed in clause (ii) or (iii). 
(B) In the case of countries where it may 
be impossible to identify a specific governmental 
entity referred to in subparagraph (A), the term 
‘‘person’’ means—
(i) all activities of that government re-
lating to the development or production of 
any missile equipment or technology; and
266
(ii) all activities of that government 
affecting the development or production of 
aircraft, electronics, and space systems or 
equipment. 
(C) UNITED
STATES
PERSON.—The term 
‘‘United States person’’ has the meaning given 
that term in section 16(2) of the Export Admin-
istration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415(2)). 
(D) 
MISSILE
EQUIPMENT
OR
TECH-
NOLOGY.—The term ‘‘missile equipment or tech-
nology’’ has the meaning given that term in sec-
tion 11B(c) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)). 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 
subsections (a) and (b) shall apply with respect to sanctions 
imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign persons 
under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, and 
the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with respect to 
sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign 
persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as continued in ef-
fect under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act.