I 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 2570 
To impose additional sanctions with respect to Iran and modify other existing 
sanctions with respect to Iran, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
APRIL 1, 2025 
Mr. NUNN of Iowa (for himself, Mr. PFLUGER, Mr. WILLIAMS of Texas, Ms. 
TENNEY, Mrs. HOUCHIN, Mr. CISCOMANI, Mr. WITTMAN, Mr. COLLINS, 
Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. FINSTAD, Mr. OWENS, Mr. FITZ-
GERALD, Mr. CRENSHAW, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. FLEISCHMANN, 
Mr. DUNN of Florida, Mr. LUTTRELL, Mrs. HINSON, Mr. HERN of Okla-
homa, Mr. BACON, Mr. STEIL, Mr. STUTZMAN, Ms. SALAZAR, Mr. 
LAWLER, Mr. ZINKE, Mr. LANGWORTHY, Mr. MOOLENAAR, Mr. FALLON, 
Ms. VAN DUYNE, Mr. STEUBE, Mr. SCOTT FRANKLIN of Florida, Mr. 
MILLER of Ohio, Mr. YAKYM, Mr. HUIZENGA, Mr. TONY GONZALES of 
Texas, Mr. GOLDMAN of Texas, Mr. CLINE, and Mr. JOYCE of Ohio) in-
troduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on For-
eign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on the Judiciary, Ways 
and Means, Oversight and Government Reform, Financial Services, 
Rules, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subse-
quently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To impose additional sanctions with respect to Iran and 
modify other existing sanctions with respect to Iran, 
and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 
‘‘Maximum Pressure Act’’. 
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 
this Act is as follows: 
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 
Sec. 2. Findings. 
Sec. 3. Sense of Congress on Iranian responsibility for Hamas terror attacks 
on October 7, 2023. 
Sec. 4. Statement of policy. 
Sec. 5 Codification of united states policy. 
Sec. 5. Severability. 
TITLE I—MATTERS RELATING TO SANCTIONS AND SANCTION 
AUTHORITIES 
Sec. 101. Codification of executive orders and continuation of certain existing 
sanctions. 
Sec. 102. Sanctions with respect to the Supreme Leader of Iran. 
Sec. 103. Sanctions with respect to listed persons involved in international arms 
sales to Iran. 
Sec. 104. Additional conditions for termination and elimination of sunset of 
sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. 
Sec. 105. Sectoral sanctions on Iran under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Pro-
liferation Act of 2012. 
Sec. 106. Amendments to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act of 2010. 
Sec. 107. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions imposed 
with respect to Iran. 
Sec. 108. Clarification of guidance relating to Iran’s shipping sector. 
Sec. 109. Sunset of waiver and license authorities. 
Sec. 110. Codification and application on transfers of funds involving Iran. 
Sec. 111. Applicability of congressional review of certain agency rulemaking re-
lating to Iran. 
Sec. 112. Expansion of sanctions with respect to efforts by Iran to acquire bal-
listic missile and related technology. 
Sec. 113. Expansion of sanctions under Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 with re-
spect to persons that acquire or develop ballistic missiles. 
Sec. 114. Imposition of sanctions with respect to ballistic missile program of 
Iran. 
Sec. 115. Mandatory sanctions with respect to financial institutions that engage 
in certain transactions on behalf of persons involved in human 
rights abuses or that export sensitive technology to Iran. 
Sec. 116. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that support or 
conduct certain transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or other sanctioned persons. 
TITLE II—MATTERS RELATING TO THE FINANCING OF 
TERRORISM 
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Sec. 201. Prohibitions of International Monetary Fund allocations for Iran. 
Sec. 202. Certification requirement for removal of designation of Iran as a ju-
risdiction of primary money laundering concern. 
Sec. 203. Requirement to take special measures at domestic financial institu-
tions. 
Sec. 204. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that are officials, 
agents, or affiliates of, or owned or controlled by, Iran’s Revo-
lutionary Guard Corps. 
Sec. 205. Additional sanctions with respect to foreign persons that support or 
conduct certain transactions with Iran’s Revolutionary Guard 
Corps or other sanctioned persons. 
Sec. 206. Reports on certain Iranian persons and sectors of Iran’s economy 
that are controlled by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
TITLE III—MATTERS RELATING TO THE DESIGNATION OF 
CERTAIN ENTITIES 
Sec. 301. Prohibition on future waivers and licenses connected to the designa-
tion of the IRGC. 
Sec. 302. Prohibition on future waivers and licenses connected to the designa-
tion of the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization. 
Sec. 303. Codification of Executive Order 14175 relating to Ansar Allah in 
Yemen. 
TITLE IV—DETERMINATIONS AND REPORTS 
Sec. 401. Determinations with respect to the imposition of sanctions. 
Sec. 402. Iranian militia watchlists. 
Sec. 403. Expansion of reporting to include Iranian arms shipments to the 
Houthis and Iranian backed militias in Iraq and Syria. 
Sec. 404. Annual report on Iran sanctions violations. 
Sec. 405. Report on sanctions relief going to terrorism or destabilizing activi-
ties. 
Sec. 406. Supporting human rights for the people of Iran and the victims of 
Iranian human rights abuses in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and 
Venezuela. 
Sec. 407. Determination with respect to net worth of Iranian Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 
Sec. 408. IRGC watch list and report. 
Sec. 409. Report on Iran’s breakout timeline for uranium enrichment and nu-
clear weaponization. 
Sec. 410. Report 
on 
Iranian 
disinformation 
campaigns 
and 
counter- 
disinformation efforts. 
Sec. 411. Report on Iranian support to Hamas. 
Sec. 412. Report on unblocked Iranian assets and terrorism. 
Sec. 413. Report on Iranian counterintelligence threats in the United States. 
TITLE V—ADDITIONAL MATTERS 
Sec. 501. Increasing rewards for justice for Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and other terrorists involved in Oc-
tober 7, 2023, terrorist attacks against Israel. 
Sec. 502. Repurposing frozen Iranian funds for United States Victims of State 
Sponsored Terrorism fund. 
Sec. 503. Determination regarding applicable Iranian financial institutions 
under executive order 13902. 
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Sec. 504. Maximizing the ability of Iranian terror victims to collect on existing 
judgments against Iran. 
Sec. 505. Creation of Iran Strike Fund. 
Sec. 506. Iran Kleptocracy Initiative. 
SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) Iran is the world’s leading State sponsor of 
terrorism. It seeks ‘‘death to America’’ and the de-
struction of the State of Israel. 
(2) United States sanctions will continue to be 
applied to and rigorously enforced against the re-
gime in Tehran until Iran has ceased providing sup-
port for acts of international terrorism and no 
longer satisfies the requirements for designation as 
a state sponsor of terrorism, and has ceased the pur-
suit, acquisition, and development of, and verifiably 
dismantled its nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons, ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile 
launch technology. 
(3) Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, its ef-
forts to destroy the State of Israel, its support of 
terrorism, its destabilizing behavior in the Middle 
East, its development and proliferation of drones 
and ballistic missiles, and its gross violations of 
human rights against its own people and the peoples 
of the Middle East are a threat to the national secu-
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rity of the United States, our allies, and inter-
national peace and security. 
(4) Experts from the Institute for Science and 
International Security estimate that Iran, as of Feb-
ruary 2025, has enough highly enriched uranium to 
produce weapons-grade uranium for 1 nuclear bomb 
in less than 7 days and has enough enriched ura-
nium to make weapons-grade uranium for as many 
as 17 nuclear bombs within 4 months. Iran con-
tinues to enrich uranium to levels for which there is 
no conceivable civilian purpose, and which could only 
be used to produce a nuclear weapon. 
(5) According to multiple United States Direc-
tors of National Intelligence, Iran has the largest ar-
senal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Iran 
also possesses a robust cruise missile arsenal and 
advanced drone capability, which threaten United 
States and allied air and missile defenses. Iran tests, 
transfers, and even uses these systems in military 
operations abroad. 
(6) Iran has given ballistic missiles, drones, and 
associated technology to the Houthis in Yemen, Shi-
ite militias in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and is trafficking precision- 
guided munitions parts through the Middle East to 
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upgrade the rocket forces of its chief proxy, 
Hezbollah. 
(7) Iran has sold thousands of drones to Russia 
for its use in its invasion of Ukraine, leading to 
mass attacks on civilian infrastructure, and has 
given Russia the technology and knowledge to 
produce these drones in Russia. 
(8) Iran continues to take United States citi-
zens hostage to extract ransom payments from the 
United States and exchange arbitrarily detained 
United States citizens for Iranian agents arrested 
for violating United States sanctions and for other 
malign activities. 
(9) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) negotiated by former President Barack 
Obama was fatally flawed, did not eliminate Iran’s 
pathway to a nuclear weapon, and allowed Iran to 
retain and refine its ability to quickly resume its 
pursuit of a nuclear weapon. 
(10) The failed Iran nuclear agreement allowed 
Iran to export more than $300,000,000,000 of goods 
and services from 2015 to 2017 that was used by 
Iran to fuel proxy wars across the Middle East. 
(11) The failed Iran nuclear agreement lifted 
the United Nations conventional arms embargo on 
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Iran in October 2020, permitting Russia and China 
to engage in international arms sales with Iran. 
(12) The failed Iran nuclear agreement also 
lifted the United Nations missile embargo on Iran in 
October 2023, allowing Iran to sell and purchase 
drone and ballistic missile technology. 
(13) A central flaw of the failed Iran nuclear 
deal was that the agreement solely focused on nu-
clear weapons and did not address non-nuclear 
issues like Iran’s support for terrorism, drone and 
ballistic missile technology, gross human rights 
abuses, and Iran’s other malign activities. 
(14) Iran received significant sanctions relief 
from the previous sanctions imposed by the Euro-
pean Union, the United States, and previous United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. 
(15) Iran used this sanctions relief to fund its 
terrorist proxies, regional aggression, and its expan-
sion of its ballistic missile program. 
(16) Iran has repeatedly violated the terms of 
the JCPOA and UNSCR 2231, including by— 
(A) lifting the cap on its stockpile of ura-
nium; 
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(B) increasing its enrichment activities to 
60 percent purity, expanding its enrichment ca-
pabilities; 
(C) resuming its activity at prohibited nu-
clear facilities; and 
(D) preventing the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) from being able to ef-
fectively monitor its nuclear activities. 
(17) Iran repeatedly violated UNSCR 2231’s 
restrictions on ballistic missile testing and develop-
ment, as well as United Nations-imposed and inter-
nationally binding arms export and import embar-
goes. 
(18) UNSCR 2231 includes a formal mecha-
nism for a participant state of the JCPOA, if it be-
lieves there has been significant non-performance of 
commitments under the JCPOA by Iran, to trigger 
a process that would require the UNSC to ‘‘snap-
back’’ all United Nation sanctions on Iran that has 
been lifted pursuant to UNSCR 2231. 
(19) On September 14, 2024, in a joint state-
ment, the United States and United Kingdom ac-
knowledged publicly that Iran’s nuclear program 
‘‘has never been more advanced and posed a clear 
threat to regional and global peace and security’’. 
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(20) In June and November of 2024, in efforts 
led by France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3), 
and the United States, the IAEA’s Board of Gov-
ernors voted to censure Iran for non-compliance with 
its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ 
or ‘‘NPT’’). 
(21) In February 2025, the IAEA reported that 
Iran has increased production of 60 percent highly 
enriched uranium from 7 kilograms to roughly 35 
kilograms per month, and currently possesses about 
275 kilograms, enough to fuel nearly 7 nuclear 
weapons. According to the Institute for Science and 
International Security, if Iran enriched all its ura-
nium stocks to 90 percent, it could fuel 17 weapons 
within 4 months. 
(22) Under UNSCR 2231, the resolution, in-
cluding the ‘‘snapback’’ mechanism, terminates 10 
years after Adoption Day for the JCPOA, which will 
be October 18, 2025. 
(23) The E3 must invoke the ‘‘snapback’’ of 
United Nations sanctions against Iran under 
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UNSCR 2231 as soon as possible before the option 
expires on October 18, 2025. 
(24) 2 weeks after President Trump withdrew 
from the failed Iran nuclear deal, former Secretary 
of State Mike Pompeo laid out 12 demands that 
would need to be met by Iran as part of any agree-
ment related to the lifting of sanctions, and the re- 
establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations 
with Iran. 
(25) Former President Donald Trump’s max-
imum pressure campaign on Iran denied the regime 
unprecedented revenue it would have otherwise spent 
on terrorism. 
(26) On December 31, 2019, then-Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani admitted that Iran had 
lost $200,000,000,000 in revenue because of United 
States sanctions. 
(27) Iran’s 2019 defense budget cut defense 
spending by 28 percent, including a 17 percent cut 
to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, a des-
ignated foreign terrorist organization. Hezbollah ter-
rorists and Iranian backed militias were denied re-
sources and were forced to cut salaries of their fight-
ers. 
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(28) The Iranian rial lost around 70 percent of 
its value due to President Trump’s maximum pres-
sure campaign. 
(29) According to the International Monetary 
Fund, Iran’s accessible foreign exchange reserves 
plunged 
to 
$4,000,000,000 
in 
2020 
from 
$123,000,000,000 in 2018, or a decrease of over 96 
percent. 
(30) During the maximum pressure campaign, 
the United States was able to achieve the release of 
2 hostages in Iran, Xiyue Wang and Michael White, 
without lifting sanctions or transferring cash to 
Iran. 
(31) President Joe Biden’s relentless attempts 
to re-enter the failed Iran nuclear agreement squan-
dered much of the leverage created by President 
Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. 
(32) The Biden Administration’s pursuit of an 
even weaker deal with Iran broke previous pledges 
made by administration officials to pursue a ‘‘longer 
and stronger’’ deal that extended sunset dates of re-
strictions, and which would cover a broader range of 
Iran’s malign activity. 
(33) Amid the multiple failed rounds of talks to 
get Iran to re-enter the Iran nuclear agreement, the 
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Biden administration reportedly offered to remove 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the 
Foreign Terrorist Organization list, despite the 
group’s obvious involvement in and support for ter-
rorism, until news of this offer became public. 
(34) The Iranian regime has made around 
$200,000,000,000 in illicit oil sales since President 
Biden took office due to the administration’s lax en-
forcement of sanctions on Iranian oil exports. Total 
Iranian oil exports reached nearly 2,000,000 barrels 
per day in August 2023, the highest since before the 
maximum pressure campaign began. 
(35) In 2021, Iran increased funding for the Is-
lamic Revolutionary Guard Corps by 14 percent, re-
versing budget cuts imposed as a result of maximum 
pressure. 
(36) Iran’s accessible foreign exchange reserves 
have risen from $4,000,000,000 in 2020 to at least 
$43,000,000,000 in 2023. 
(37) In July 2023, the United States unfroze 
nearly $10,000,000,000 held in Iraqi banks for Iraq 
to pay to the Iranian regime. 
(38) In August 2023, the Biden Administration 
agreed to give Iran access to $6,000,000,000 in pre-
viously frozen funds and released several Iranians in 
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prison for violating United States sanctions in ex-
change for the release of 5 United States hostages. 
This represents the largest ransom payment in 
United States history. 
(39) On March 18, 2021, in an interview with 
BBC Persian, President Biden’s Special Envoy for 
Iran and lead United States negotiator in talks to 
re-enter the Iran deal, Robert Malley, stated ‘‘Presi-
dent Biden and all of his senior advisers have said 
this—the maximum pressure campaign has failed. It 
was a failure, a predicted failure. It hasn’t made life 
any better for the Iranian people; it hasn’t made life 
any better for the United States and the region; it 
hasn’t brought us any closer to this better deal that 
President Trump spoke about.’’. 
(40) In June 2023, it was revealed that the 
State Department had placed Malley on leave and 
had suspended his security clearance, reportedly due 
to accusations that Malley mishandled classified in-
formation. 
(41) In September 2023, it was revealed that 
Malley had deep ties to several experts who were 
part of an Iranian Government influence operation 
during the Iran deal negotiations to convince West-
ern governments to support lighter demands on 
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Iran. These experts have since served in senior staff 
positions in the Department of Defense and have ad-
vised executive branch officials on issues related to 
Iran. 
(42) In September 2022, the Iranian regime’s 
‘‘Morality Police’’ detained, brutally beat, and killed 
22-year old Mahsa Amini for allegedly violating Is-
lamic dress code. Mahsa’s death spurred the largest 
anti-regime and pro-democracy protests in Iran since 
the 1979 revolution, with hundreds of thousands of 
Iranians chanting ‘‘Death to the Dictator’’. 
(43) Iranian regime forces cracked down on the 
protests, killing at least 500 protestors, and eventu-
ally reinstated street patrols of the Morality Police 
and has continued brutalizing women who do not ad-
here to its strict dress code. 
(44) On September 12, 2023, the House of 
Representatives passed the passed the MAHSA Act, 
which imposes sanctions on Iranian leadership, in-
cluding the Supreme Leader of Iran, for their re-
sponsibility for Mahsa’s death and for their repres-
sion of innocent Iranians like Mahsa. The MAHSA 
Act represents a Congress bipartisan consensus that 
the Biden administration’s policy on Iran has clearly 
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failed and that Iranian regime officials must be held 
accountable for their crimes. 
(45) Emboldened by the failure of the Biden 
administration’s Iran policy, Iranian proxy group 
Hamas carried out a massacre of Israeli and other 
civilians on October 7, 2023, that killed more than 
1,400 Israelis and foreign nationals, including 
United States citizens, and which took nearly 200 
people into Gaza as hostages. 
(46) The Congress supports Israel’s defensive 
military campaign against Hamas and its stated 
goals to destroy Hamas, secure the return of all hos-
tages, and prevent such an attack from ever hap-
pening again. 
(47) Additionally, Hezbollah’s escalation of 
rocket, drone, and missile attacks against northern 
Israel following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack 
displaced tens of thousands of Israeli civilians and 
posed an ongoing threat to regional stability. 
(48) Israel’s efforts to neutralize Hezbollah’s 
command structure was a critical step in countering 
Iran’s malign influence through its proxy networks, 
consistent with shared United States-Israel strategic 
objectives to combat terrorism and promote security 
in the Middle East. 
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(49) Israel’s precision airstrikes in September 
2024, which resulted in the liquidation of Hassan 
Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbollah, and 
other senior commanders in Beirut, effectively dis-
rupted the operational capacity of this Iran-backed 
terrorist organization, responsible for over 300 pro-
jectile attacks on Israel since October 2023, and rec-
ognizes these actions as advancing shared United 
States-Israel goals of regional stability and counter-
terrorism. 
(50) Taking advantage of the situation, Ansar 
Allah (the Houthis), an Iran-backed militant group, 
conducted over 100 attacks on commercial vessels 
and U.S. Navy warships in the Red Sea and Gulf of 
Aden since November 2023, endangering American 
personnel, disrupting global trade, and threatening 
freedom of navigation through critical maritime 
chokepoints such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait. 
(51) President Trump’s authorization of large- 
scale air and naval strikes on March 15, 2025, 
against Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen, tar-
geting their missile, drone, and radar capabilities, 
was a necessary and justified response to the Houthi 
attacks on United States Navy warships and com-
mercial vessels in the Red Sea since November 2023, 
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and supports these actions as vital to protecting 
American lives, securing maritime trade routes, and 
countering Iran-backed terrorism. 
(52) National Security Presidential Memo-
randum 2 (NSPM–2), issued by President Donald J. 
Trump on February 4, 2025, strengthens United 
States policy by directing maximum economic and 
diplomatic pressure on Iran to halt its support for 
terrorist proxies like Ansar Allah and Hezbollah, and 
supports this memorandum as a critical framework 
for denying Iran the resources to threaten United 
States interests and allies in the Middle East. 
(53) Iran and its proxies have planned, di-
rected, sponsored, and funded terrorist plots 
throughout the world and on United States soil, in-
cluding the October 2023, mass murder and hos-
tage-taking of Israeli civilians by Hamas and the 
killing of at least 31 United States citizens in that 
attack, the 2011 attempted assassination of the 
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States in 
Washington, DC, the 1994 bombing of the 
Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, which killed over 85 people, and 
the 2012 bus bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, which 
killed 5 Israelis. 
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(54) NSPM–2 is a vital component of United 
States national security strategy, recognizing that 
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
and Quds Force have armed, trained, and directed 
Ansar Allah and Hezbollah, contributing to attacks 
on United States forces, allies, and international 
shipping. 
(55) NSPM–2 enhances the effectiveness of 
military actions against Iran’s proxies, such as the 
strikes on Ansar Allah and Israel’s operations 
against Hezbollah, by addressing the root source of 
their funding and logistical support, thereby advanc-
ing United States interests in a stable and secure 
Middle East. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IRANIAN RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR HAMAS TERROR ATTACKS ON OCTOBER 
7, 2023. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) Iran is clearly culpable for Hamas’ terrorist 
attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, as a result 
of its funding, training, and coordination of Hamas 
and other terrorist organizations; 
(2) any funds directly or indirectly released to 
Iran, or funds freed up by the expectation of the im-
minent release of those funds, benefit Iran’s ter-
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rorist proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah and encour-
age further acts of terrorism; 
(3) all funds previously released to Iran be im-
mediately frozen and that all licenses and waivers al-
lowing funding to directly or indirectly flow to Iran 
be suspended immediately; and 
(4) the only suitable punishment for Iran’s par-
ticipation in and organization of this mass murder 
is for the United States to halt its appeasement of 
the Iranian regime and to return to a policy of max-
imum pressure. 
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 
It is the policy of the United States as follows: 
(1) To deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles capability, in-
cluding by permanently, verifiably, and irreversibly 
eliminating its capabilities related to enrichment. 
(2) To deter and defeat any attempts by Iran 
and its terrorist proxies to destroy the State of 
Israel. 
(3) To roll back the totality of Iran’s malign in-
fluence and activities in the Middle East. 
(4) To support the human rights of the people 
of Iran and to encourage their continued opposition 
to their illegitimate and brutal regime. 
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(5) To require that any new agreement with 
Iran should be submitted to the Senate for ratifica-
tion as a treaty. 
(6) To impose maximum economic pressure on 
Iran, and keep all sanctions in place on Iran, until 
the regime fulfills the following 12 demands laid out 
by former Secretary of State Pompeo on May 21, 
2018: 
(A) Iran must declare to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency a full account of the 
prior military dimensions of its nuclear pro-
gram, and permanently and verifiably abandon 
such work in perpetuity. 
(B) Iran must stop enrichment and never 
pursue plutonium reprocessing, including clos-
ing its heavy water reactor. 
(C) Iran must also provide the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency with unquali-
fied access to all sites throughout the entire 
country. 
(D) Iran must end its proliferation of bal-
listic missiles and halt further launching or de-
velopment of nuclear-capable missile systems. 
(E) Iran must release all United States 
citizens as well as citizens of United States 
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partners and allies, each of them detained on 
spurious charges. 
(F) Iran must end its support for ter-
rorism, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad. 
(G) Iran must respect the sovereignty of 
the Iraqi Government and permit the dis-
arming, demobilization and reintegration of Ira-
nian backed militias. 
(H) Iran must end its military support for 
the Houthi terrorists and work towards a 
peaceful, political settlement in Yemen. 
(I) Iran must withdraw all forces under 
Iranian command throughout the entirety of 
Syria. 
(J) Iran must end support for the Taliban 
and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the re-
gion and cease harboring senior al-Qaeda lead-
ers. 
(K) Iran must end the Islamic Revolu-
tionary Guard Corps’ support for terrorists 
around the world. 
(L) Iran must end its threatening behavior 
against its neighbors including its threats to de-
stroy Israel and its firing of missiles at Saudi 
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Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and 
threats to international shipping and destruc-
tive cyberattacks. 
SEC. 5. CODIFICATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY. 
(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—The United States, in 
2025, declared through National Security Presidential 
Memorandum 2 (NSPM–2), issued by President Donald 
J. Trump on February 4, 2025, and has reaffirmed since, 
that ‘‘The United States will pursue a policy of maximum 
economic and diplomatic pressure on the Iranian regime 
to deny it all paths to a nuclear weapon, curtail its ballistic 
missile program, and counter its support for terrorist 
proxies, including but not limited to Ansar Allah and 
Hezbollah, until such time as Iran ceases its malign activi-
ties and complies with international obligations under the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions’’. 
(b) REAFFIRMATION AND CODIFICATION OF POL-
ICY.—The United States hereby reaffirms that policy. In 
accordance with NSPM–2, no officer or employee of the 
United States Government and no agent or other indi-
vidual acting on behalf of the United States Government 
shall provide sanctions relief to, rescind or otherwise fail 
to enforce sanctions against the Government of Iran, the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or any rep-
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resentatives thereof (except in emergency or humanitarian 
situations) unless and until Iran ceases its support for 
international terrorism, halts its ballistic missile develop-
ment, and verifiably dismantles its nuclear weapons pro-
gram, and no funds authorized to be appropriated by this 
or any other Act may be obligated or made available for 
the conduct of any dialogue or engagement with Iranian 
officials or entities if the President knows and advises the 
Congress that such officials or entities directly partici-
pated in the planning or execution of a particular terrorist 
activity which resulted in the death or kidnapping of a 
United States person. 
SEC. 6. SEVERABILITY. 
If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made 
by this Act, or the application of such provision or amend-
ment to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, 
the remainder of this Act, the amendments made by this 
Act, and the application of such provision and amend-
ments to other persons or circumstances, shall not be af-
fected. 
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TITLE 
I—MATTERS 
RELATING 
TO SANCTIONS AND SANC-
TION AUTHORITIES 
SEC. 101. CODIFICATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND CON-
TINUATION OF CERTAIN EXISTING SANC-
TIONS. 
(a) 
CODIFICATION.—Executive 
Orders 
13606, 
13628, 13846, 13871, 13876, 13902, and 13949, as in 
effect on January 20, 2021, shall remain in effect and 
continue to apply until the date on which the President 
submits a certification to Congress pursuant to section 8 
of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), 
as amended by this Act. 
(b) PROHIBITION ON REMOVAL OF PERSONS FROM 
SDN LIST.—The President may not remove the following 
individuals or entities from the Specially Designated Na-
tionals and Blocked Persons list maintained by the Office 
of Foreign Asset Control of the Department of the Treas-
ury, if such persons were placed on such list during the 
period beginning on May 8, 2019, and ending January 20, 
2021, unless the President submits a certification to Con-
gress pursuant to section 8 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 
1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as amended by this Act: 
(1) Any Iranian individual or entity. 
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(2) Any individual or entity included in such 
list as a result of activities connected to Iran. 
(3) 
Asa’iab 
ahl 
al-Haq, 
Zainabiyoun, 
Fatemiyoun, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. 
(c) REIMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—Any sanctions 
imposed during the period beginning on May 8, 2019, and 
ending January 20, 2021, with respect to any person de-
scribed in subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2), and subsequently 
lifted before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall 
be reimposed with respect to such persons beginning on 
the date of the enactment of this Act and shall remain 
in effect until the date on which the President submits 
a certification to Congress pursuant to section 8 of the 
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as 
amended by this Act. 
SEC. 102. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPREME 
LEADER OF IRAN. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall im-
pose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect 
to the following individuals: 
(1) The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran. 
(2) Other officials in the Office of the Supreme 
Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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(3) Any person appointed by the Supreme 
Leader of Iran or the Supreme Leader’s Office to a 
position as— 
(A) a state official of Iran; 
(B) as the head of an entity located in 
Iran; or 
(C) as the head of an entity located outside 
of Iran that is owned or controlled by 1 or more 
entities in Iran. 
(4) Any person appointed to a position de-
scribed in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of para-
graph (3) by a person described in paragraph (3). 
(5) Any person the President determines has 
materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, 
material, or technological support for, or goods or 
services to or in support of any person whose prop-
erty and interests in property are blocked pursuant 
to this section. 
(6) Any person the President determines is 
owned or controlled by, or to have acted or pur-
ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indi-
rectly, any person whose property and interests in 
property are blocked pursuant to this section. 
(7) Any person the President determines con-
ducts a significant transaction or transactions with, 
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or provides material support to or for anyone de-
scribed in paragraphs (1) through (6). 
(8) Any person who is a member of the board 
of directors or a senior executive officer of any per-
son whose property and interests in property are 
blocked pursuant to this section. 
(9) Any person who is an immediate family 
member of each foreign person who is subject to 
sanctions pursuant to paragraph (2). 
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in 
this subsection are the following: 
(A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The Presi-
dent shall exercise all of the powers granted to 
the President under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.) to block and prohibit all transactions in 
property and interests in property of the foreign 
person if such property and interests in prop-
erty are in the United States, come within the 
United States, or are or come within the pos-
session or control of a United States person. 
(B) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, AD-
MISSION, OR PAROLE.— 
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(i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.— 
An alien who the Secretary of State or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-
ignee of one of such Secretaries) knows, or 
has reason to believe, has knowingly en-
gaged in any activity described in sub-
section (a)(2) is— 
(I) inadmissible to the United 
States; 
(II) ineligible to receive a visa or 
other documentation to enter the 
United States; and 
(III) otherwise ineligible to be 
admitted or paroled into the United 
States or to receive any other benefit 
under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). 
(ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 
(I) IN
GENERAL.—The issuing 
consular officer, the Secretary of 
State, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security (or a designee of one of such 
Secretaries) shall, in accordance with 
section 221(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), 
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revoke any visa or other entry docu-
mentation issued to an alien described 
in clause (i) regardless of when the 
visa or other entry documentation is 
issued. 
(II) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.— 
A revocation under subclause (I) shall 
take effect immediately and shall 
automatically cancel any other valid 
visa or entry documentation that is in 
the alien’s possession. 
(2) EXCEPTIONS.— 
(A) UN HEADQUARTERS
AGREEMENT.— 
The sanctions described under paragraph 
(1)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien 
if admitting or paroling the alien into the 
United States is necessary to permit the United 
States to comply with the Agreement regarding 
the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed 
at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 
into force November 21, 1947, between the 
United Nations and the United States, or other 
applicable international obligations. 
(B) PRIOR
TRANSFER
DIRECTIVE.—The 
sanctions described under paragraph (1)(A) 
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shall not apply with respect to property and in-
terests in property of the Government of Iran 
that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order 
12170 of November 14, 1979 (Blocking Iranian 
Government Property), and thereafter made 
subject to the transfer directives set forth in 
Executive Order 12281 of January 19, 1981 
(Direction to Transfer Certain Iranian Govern-
ment Assets), and any implementing regula-
tions with respect to such Executive Order 
12281. 
(C) 
HUMANITARIAN
EXCEPTION.—The 
sanctions described under paragraph (1)(B) 
and (1)(A) shall not apply with respect to any 
person for conducting or facilitating a trans-
action for the provision (including any sale) of 
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or 
medical devices to Iran. 
(c) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in sub-
sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall 
apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, con-
spires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations pro-
mulgated to carry out this section or the sanctions im-
posed pursuant to this section to the same extent that 
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such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful 
act described in section 206(a) of that Act. 
SEC. 103. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO LISTED PERSONS 
INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS SALES 
TO IRAN. 
(a) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 
days thereafter, the President shall impose the sanc-
tions described in subsection (b) with respect to each 
foreign person the President determines, on or after 
such date of enactment, engages in an activity de-
scribed in paragraph (2). 
(2) ACTIVITY
DESCRIBED.—An activity de-
scribed in this paragraph is any of the following: 
(A) Any activity that may contribute to the 
supply, sale, or transfer, directly or indirectly, 
to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of 
Iran, of arms or related materiel, including 
spare parts. 
(B) The provision to the Government of 
Iran any technical training, financial resources 
or services, advice, other services, or assistance 
related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufac-
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ture, maintenance, or use of arms and related 
materiel described in subparagraph (A). 
(C) Any activity that may contribute to, or 
poses a risk of materially contributing to, the 
proliferation of arms or related materiel or 
items intended for military end-uses or military 
end-users, including any efforts to manufacture, 
acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, or 
use such items, by the Government of Iran (in-
cluding persons owned or controlled by, or act-
ing for or on behalf of the Government of Iran) 
or paramilitary organizations financially or mili-
tarily supported by the Government of Iran. 
(D) Materially assisting, sponsoring, or 
providing financial, material, or technological 
support for, or goods or services to or in sup-
port of, any person that engages in the conduct 
described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). 
(E) Making any contribution or provision 
of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the 
benefit of any person that engages in the con-
duct described in subparagraph (A), (B), or 
(C). 
(F) Receiving any contribution or provision 
of funds, goods, or services from any person 
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that engages in the conduct described in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), or (C). 
(G) Owning or controlling, or acting or 
purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or 
indirectly, any person that engages in the con-
duct described in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), 
(D), (E), or (F). 
(b) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sanctions described in 
this subsection are the following: 
(A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The Presi-
dent shall exercise all of the powers granted to 
the President under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.) to the extent necessary to block and pro-
hibit all transactions in property and interests 
in property of the foreign person if such prop-
erty and interests in property are in the United 
States, come within the United States, or are or 
come within the possession or control of a 
United States person. 
(B) ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, AD-
MISSION, OR PAROLE.— 
(i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.— 
An alien who the Secretary of State or the 
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Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-
ignee of one of such Secretaries) knows, or 
has reason to believe, has knowingly en-
gaged in any activity described in sub-
section (a)(2) is— 
(I) inadmissible to the United 
States; 
(II) ineligible to receive a visa or 
other documentation to enter the 
United States; and 
(III) otherwise ineligible to be 
admitted or paroled into the United 
States or to receive any other benefit 
under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). 
(ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 
(I) IN
GENERAL.—The issuing 
consular officer, the Secretary of 
State, or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security (or a designee of one of such 
Secretaries) shall, in accordance with 
section 221(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)), 
revoke any visa or other entry docu-
mentation issued to an alien described 
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in clause (i) regardless of when the 
visa or other entry documentation is 
issued. 
(II) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.— 
A revocation under subclause (I) shall 
take effect immediately and shall 
automatically cancel any other valid 
visa or entry documentation that is in 
the alien’s possession. 
(2) EXCEPTIONS.— 
(A) UN HEADQUARTERS
AGREEMENT.— 
The sanctions described under paragraph 
(1)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien 
if admitting or paroling the alien into the 
United States is necessary to permit the United 
States to comply with the Agreement regarding 
the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed 
at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 
into force November 21, 1947, between the 
United Nations and the United States, or other 
applicable international obligations. 
(B) PRIOR
TRANSFER
DIRECTIVE.—The 
sanctions described under paragraph (1)(A) 
shall not apply with respect to property and in-
terests in property of the Government of Iran 
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that were blocked pursuant to Executive Order 
12170 of November 14, 1979 (Blocking Iranian 
Government Property), and thereafter made 
subject to the transfer directives set forth in 
Executive Order 12281 of January 19, 1981 
(Direction to Transfer Certain Iranian Govern-
ment Assets), and any implementing regula-
tions with respect to such Executive Order 
12281. 
(C) 
HUMANITARIAN
EXCEPTION.—The 
sanctions described under paragraph (1)(B) 
and (1)(A) shall not apply with respect to any 
person for conducting or facilitating a trans-
action for the provision (including any sale) of 
agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or 
medical devices to Iran. 
(c) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in sub-
sections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall 
apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, con-
spires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations pro-
mulgated to carry out this section or the sanctions im-
posed pursuant to this section to the same extent that 
such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful 
act described in section 206(a) of that Act. 
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SEC. 104. ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION 
AND ELIMINATION OF SUNSET OF SANCTIONS 
UNDER THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996. 
(a) TERMINATION CONDITIONS.—Section 8 of the 
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended— 
(1) by striking ‘‘The requirement’’ and insert-
ing ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The requirement’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(b) ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION.— 
In addition to the requirement under subsection (a), sanc-
tions imposed under section 5(a) shall remain in effect un-
less the President determines and certifies to the appro-
priate congressional committees that Iran has complied 
with each of the following: 
‘‘(1) Declared to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency a full account of the prior military di-
mensions of its nuclear program and permanently 
and verifiably abandons such work in perpetuity. 
‘‘(2) Stopped enrichment of and never returns 
to plutonium reprocessing, including by closing its 
heavy water reactor. 
‘‘(3) Provided the International Atomic Energy 
Agency with unqualified access to all sites through-
out the entire country. 
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‘‘(4) Ended its proliferation of ballistic missiles 
and halts further launching or development of nu-
clear-capable missile systems. 
‘‘(5) Released all United States citizens, as well 
as citizens of United States partners and allies, that 
are unjustly detained and held captive in Iran. 
‘‘(6) Respected the sovereignty of the Govern-
ment of Iraq through no longer preventing, hin-
dering, or disrupting any efforts by that Government 
with regard to the disarming, demobilization and re-
integration of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. 
‘‘(7) Ended its military support for the Houthi 
militia (Ansarallah) and worked towards a peaceful, 
political settlement in Yemen. 
‘‘(8) Withdrawn all forces under Iran’s com-
mand throughout the entirety of Syria. 
‘‘(9) Ended support for the Taliban and other 
terrorists in Afghanistan and the region and ceased 
to harbor senior al-Qaeda leaders. 
‘‘(10) Ended the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps’ Quds Force’s support for terrorists around 
the world. 
‘‘(11) Ended its threatening behavior against 
its neighbors, including its threats to destroy Israel 
and its firing of missiles at Saudi Arabia and the 
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United Arab Emirates, threats to international ship-
ping, and destructive cyberattacks. 
‘‘(12) Ceased violently attacking and killing 
peaceful protesters in Iran, and provided a full ac-
counting for the 1500 peaceful protesters reported 
to be killed in November 2019 when fired upon by 
Iranian security forces.’’. 
(b) ELIMINATION OF SUNSET.—Section 13 of the 
Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is re-
pealed. 
SEC. 105. SECTORAL SANCTIONS ON IRAN UNDER THE IRAN 
FREEDOM 
AND 
COUNTER-PROLIFERATION 
ACT OF 2012. 
(a) AMENDMENTS WITH RESPECT TO COVERED SEC-
TORS.— 
(1) Subsection (b) of section 1244 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013 (22 U.S.C. 8803) is amended by inserting 
‘‘iron, steel, aluminum, copper, construction, manu-
facturing, mining, textile, petrochemical, automotive, 
financial’’ after ‘‘energy,’’ each place it appears. 
(2) Subsection (c) of such section 1244 is 
amended by inserting ‘‘iron, steel, aluminum, copper, 
construction, manufacturing, mining, textile, petro-
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chemical, automotive, financial’’ after ‘‘energy,’’ 
each place it appears. 
(b) AMENDMENT WITH RESPECT TO WAIVER AU-
THORITY.—Subsection (i) of such section 1244 is amend-
ed by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(3) TERMINATION.—The authority to issue a 
waiver under this section shall terminate on the date 
that is 2 years after the date of the enactment of 
this paragraph.’’. 
(c) TERMINATION OF CERTAIN WAIVERS OF SANC-
TIONS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN OR 
WITH IRAN.— 
(1) SUSPENSION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The 
President may not issue any waiver of the applica-
tion of sanctions provided for under any of sections 
1244 through 1247 of the National Defense Author-
ization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8803 
through 8806), or provided to enable an activity de-
scribed in paragraph (2), before February 1, 2028. 
(2) EXISTING WAIVERS.—As of the date of the 
enactment of this Act, any waiver of the application 
of sanctions provided for under any of sections 1244 
through 1247 of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (22 U.S.C. 8803 through 
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8806), or provided to enable an activity described in 
paragraph (2), is terminated. 
SEC. 106. AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE IRAN 
SANCTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND DIVEST-
MENT ACT OF 2010. 
(a) LISTING
OF IRANIAN PERSONS
FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES.— 
Section 105(b)(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 
8514) is amended by inserting ‘‘, or against the people 
of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, or Venezuela’’ before the 
period at the end. 
(b) AMENDMENTS
TO
CRITERIA
FOR
TERMI-
NATION.—Section 401 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-
tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 is 
amended by adding at the end the following: 
‘‘(d) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE CERTIFIED.— 
The certification described in subsection (a) shall also in-
clude a certification that Iran has complied with each of 
the following: 
‘‘(1) Declared to the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency a full account of the prior military di-
mensions of its nuclear program and permanently 
and verifiably abandons such work in perpetuity. 
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‘‘(2) Stopped enrichment of and never returns 
to plutonium reprocessing, including by closing its 
heavy water reactor. 
‘‘(3) Provided the International Atomic Energy 
Agency with unqualified access to all sites through-
out the entire country. 
‘‘(4) Ended its proliferation of ballistic missiles 
and halts further launching or development of nu-
clear-capable missile systems. 
‘‘(5) Released all United States citizens, as well 
as citizens of United States partners and allies, that 
are unjustly detained and held captive in Iran. 
‘‘(6) Respected the sovereignty of the Govern-
ment of Iraq through no longer preventing, hin-
dering, or disrupting any efforts by that Government 
with regard to the disarming, demobilization and re-
integration of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. 
‘‘(7) Ended its military support for the Houthi 
militia (Ansarallah) and worked towards a peaceful, 
political settlement in Yemen. 
‘‘(8) Withdrawn all forces under Iran’s com-
mand throughout the entirety of Syria. 
‘‘(9) Ended support for the Taliban and other 
terrorists in Afghanistan and the region and ceased 
to harbor senior al-Qaeda leaders. 
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‘‘(10) Ended the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps’ Quds Force’s support for terrorists around 
the world. 
‘‘(11) Ended its threatening behavior against 
its neighbors, including its threats to destroy Israel 
and its firing of missiles at Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, threats to international ship-
ping, and destructive cyberattacks. 
‘‘(12) Ceased violently attacking and killing 
peaceful protesters in Iran, and provided a full ac-
counting for the 1500 peaceful protesters reported 
to be killed in November 2019 when fired upon by 
Iranian security forces. 
‘‘(e) TERMINATION OF WAIVER AUTHORITY.—The 
authority to issue a waiver under this section shall termi-
nate on the date that is 2 years after the date of the enact-
ment of this subsection.’’. 
SEC. 107. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF CERTAIN ACTIONS 
RELATING TO SANCTIONS IMPOSED WITH RE-
SPECT TO IRAN. 
(a) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS OF PROPOSED AC-
TION.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, before taking any action described 
in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the 
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appropriate congressional committees and leadership 
a report that— 
(A) describes the proposed action and the 
reasons for that action; and 
(B) includes a certification with respect to 
each foreign person subject to the sanction pro-
posed to be terminated by such action that the 
person has not committed any activity during 
the 10-year period ending on the date of the 
submission of the report that would meet the 
criteria for the imposition of such sanction. 
(2) ACTIONS DESCRIBED.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—An action described in 
this paragraph is— 
(i) an action to terminate the applica-
tion of any sanctions described in subpara-
graph (B); 
(ii) with respect to sanctions described 
in subparagraph (B) imposed by the Presi-
dent with respect to a person, an action to 
waive the application of those sanctions 
with respect to that person; or 
(iii) a licensing action that signifi-
cantly alters United States foreign policy 
with respect to Iran. 
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(B) SANCTIONS
DESCRIBED.—The sanc-
tions described in this subparagraph are sanc-
tions with respect to Iran provided for under— 
(i) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
(Public Law 104–172; 50 U.S.C. 1701 
note); 
(ii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-
tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.); 
(iii) section 1245 of the National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a); 
(iv) the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (22 
U.S.C. 8701 et seq.); 
(v) the Iran Freedom and Counter- 
Proliferation Act of 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8801 
et seq.); 
(vi) the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note); 
or 
(vii) any other statute or Executive 
order that requires or authorizes the impo-
sition of sanctions with respect to Iran. 
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(3) DESCRIPTION OF TYPE OF ACTION.—Each 
report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect 
to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include 
a description of whether the action— 
(A) is not intended to significantly alter 
United States foreign policy with respect to 
Iran; or 
(B) is intended to significantly alter 
United States foreign policy with respect to 
Iran. 
(4) INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL MATTER.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Each report submitted 
under paragraph (1) that relates to an action 
that is intended to significantly alter United 
States foreign policy with respect to Iran shall 
include a description of— 
(i) the significant alteration to United 
States foreign policy with respect to Iran; 
(ii) the anticipated effect of the action 
on the national security interests of the 
United States; and 
(iii) the policy objectives for which the 
sanctions affected by the action were ini-
tially imposed. 
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(B) REQUESTS
FROM
BANKING
AND
FI-
NANCIAL
SERVICES
COMMITTEES.—The Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
of the Senate or the Committee on Financial 
Services of the House of Representatives may 
request the submission to the Committee of the 
matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-
paragraph (A) with respect to a report sub-
mitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an 
action that is not intended to significantly alter 
United States foreign policy with respect to 
Iran. 
(5) CONFIDENTIALITY OF PROPRIETARY INFOR-
MATION.—Proprietary information that can be asso-
ciated with a particular person with respect to an 
action described in paragraph (2) may be included 
in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if 
the appropriate congressional committees and lead-
ership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless 
that person otherwise consents in writing to such 
disclosure. 
(6) 
RULE
OF
CONSTRUCTION.—Paragraph 
(2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the sub-
mission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect 
to the routine issuance of a license that does not sig-
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nificantly alter United States foreign policy with re-
spect to Iran. 
(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—During the period of 30 cal-
endar days beginning on the date on which the 
President 
submits 
a 
report 
under 
subsection 
(a)(1)— 
(A) in the case of a report that relates to 
an action that is not intended to significantly 
alter United States foreign policy with respect 
to Iran, the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Com-
mittee on Financial Services of the House of 
Representatives should, as appropriate, hold 
hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain in-
formation in order to fully review the report; 
and 
(B) in the case of a report that relates to 
an action that is intended to significantly alter 
United States foreign policy with respect to 
Iran, the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives should, as 
appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and 
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otherwise obtain information in order to fully 
review the report. 
(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional 
review under paragraph (1) of a report required to 
be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 cal-
endar days if the report is submitted on or after 
July 10 and on or before September 7 in any cal-
endar year. 
(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW PERIOD.—Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, during the period for 
congressional review provided for under paragraph 
(1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), 
including any additional period for such review as 
applicable under the exception provided in paragraph 
(2), the President may not take that action unless 
a joint resolution of approval with respect to that ac-
tion is enacted in accordance with subsection (c). 
(4) LIMITATION
ON
ACTIONS
DURING
PRESI-
DENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION 
OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) 
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passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with 
subsection (c), the President may not take that ac-
tion for a period of 12 calendar days after the date 
of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval. 
(5) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING CONGRES-
SIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION 
OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval re-
lating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) 
proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) 
passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with 
subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint 
resolution, the President may not take that action 
for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of 
the President’s veto. 
(6) EFFECT OF ENACTMENT OF A JOINT RESO-
LUTION
OF
DISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, if a joint resolution of dis-
approval relating to a report submitted under sub-
section (a)(1) proposing an action described in sub-
section (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with sub-
section (c), the President may not take that action. 
(c) JOINT RESOLUTIONS OF DISAPPROVAL OR AP-
PROVAL.— 
(1) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 
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(A) JOINT RESOLUTION OF APPROVAL.— 
The term ‘‘joint resolution of approval’’ means 
only a joint resolution of either House of Con-
gress— 
(i) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A 
joint resolution approving the President’s 
proposal to take an action relating to the 
application of certain sanctions with re-
spect to Iran.’’; and 
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
clause of which is the following: ‘‘Congress 
approves of the action relating to the appli-
cation of sanctions imposed with respect to 
Iran proposed by the President in the re-
port submitted to Congress under section 
2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief Review 
Act of 2021 on lllllll relating 
to llllllll.’’, with the first 
blank space being filled with the appro-
priate date and the second blank space 
being filled with a short description of the 
proposed action. 
(B) 
JOINT
RESOLUTION
OF
DIS-
APPROVAL.—The term ‘‘joint resolution of dis-
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approval’’ means only a joint resolution of ei-
ther House of Congress— 
(i) the title of which is as follows: ‘‘A 
joint resolution disapproving the Presi-
dent’s proposal to take an action relating 
to the application of certain sanctions with 
respect to Iran.’’; and 
(ii) the sole matter after the resolving 
clause of which is the following: ‘‘Congress 
disapproves of the action relating to the 
application of sanctions imposed with re-
spect to Iran proposed by the President in 
the report submitted to Congress under 
section 2(a)(1) of the Iran Sanctions Relief 
Review Act of 2021 on lllllll 
relating to llllllll.’’, with the 
first blank space being filled with the ap-
propriate date and the second blank space 
being filled with a short description of the 
proposed action. 
(2) INTRODUCTION.—During the period of 30 
calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), 
including any additional period as applicable under 
the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint 
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resolution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
approval may be introduced— 
(A) in the House of Representatives, by 
the majority leader or the minority leader; and 
(B) in the Senate, by the majority leader 
(or the majority leader’s designee) or the mi-
nority leader (or the minority leader’s des-
ignee). 
(3) FLOOR CONSIDERATION IN HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES.—If a committee of the House of 
Representatives to which a joint resolution of ap-
proval or joint resolution of disapproval has been re-
ferred has not reported the joint resolution within 
10 calendar days after the date of referral, that 
committee shall be discharged from further consider-
ation of the joint resolution. 
(4) CONSIDERATION IN THE SENATE.— 
(A) COMMITTEE REFERRAL.—A joint reso-
lution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
approval introduced in the Senate shall be— 
(i) referred to the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs if 
the joint resolution relates to a report 
under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to 
an action that is not intended to signifi-
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cantly alter United States foreign policy 
with respect to Iran; and 
(ii) referred to the Committee on For-
eign Relations if the joint resolution relates 
to a report under subsection (a)(3)(B) that 
relates to an action that is intended to sig-
nificantly alter United States foreign policy 
with respect to Iran. 
(B) REPORTING AND DISCHARGE.—If the 
committee to which a joint resolution of ap-
proval or joint resolution of disapproval was re-
ferred has not reported the joint resolution 
within 10 calendar days after the date of refer-
ral of the joint resolution, that committee shall 
be discharged from further consideration of the 
joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be 
placed on the appropriate calendar. 
(C) PROCEEDING
TO
CONSIDERATION.— 
Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing 
Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time 
after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, as the case may be, reports a joint reso-
lution of approval or joint resolution of dis-
approval to the Senate or has been discharged 
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from consideration of such a joint resolution 
(even though a previous motion to the same ef-
fect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed 
to the consideration of the joint resolution, and 
all points of order against the joint resolution 
(and against consideration of the joint resolu-
tion) are waived. The motion to proceed is not 
debatable. The motion is not subject to a mo-
tion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the 
vote by which the motion is agreed to or dis-
agreed to shall not be in order. 
(D) RULINGS OF THE CHAIR ON PROCE-
DURE.—Appeals from the decisions of the Chair 
relating to the application of the rules of the 
Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure re-
lating to a joint resolution of approval or joint 
resolution of disapproval shall be decided with-
out debate. 
(E) 
CONSIDERATION
OF
VETO
MES-
SAGES.—Debate in the Senate of any veto mes-
sage with respect to a joint resolution of ap-
proval or joint resolution of disapproval, includ-
ing all debatable motions and appeals in con-
nection with the joint resolution, shall be lim-
ited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, 
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