I 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 4685 
To pause development of the new Sentinel program, extend the life of the 
Minuteman III, and redirect savings from Sentinel toward the Depart-
ment of Education, and for other purposes. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 23, 2025 
Mr. KHANNA
(for himself, Mr. MCGOVERN, Ms. NORTON, and Mr. 
THANEDAR) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on Appro-
priations, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the committee concerned 
A BILL 
To pause development of the new Sentinel program, extend 
the life of the Minuteman III, and redirect savings from 
Sentinel toward the Department of Education, and for 
other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Investing in Children 
Before Missiles Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘ICBM Act’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
Congress finds the following: 
(1) According to the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, the projected cost to sustain and modernize the 
United States nuclear arsenal, as of 2025, is ‘‘$946 
billion over the 2025–2034 period, or an average of 
about $95 billion a year’’, and nuclear forces ac-
count for 8.4 percent of the total 10-year cost of the 
plans for national defense outlined in the President’s 
2025 budget submission. 
(2) In September 2020, the Air Force awarded 
a sole-source contract to Northrop Grumman for the 
ground-based strategic deterrent program (now 
called Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile pro-
gram), raising concerns that the absence of competi-
tion for the award would result in higher than pro-
jected costs to United States taxpayers. The pro-
gram is intended to replace 400 deployed Minute-
man III missiles with more than 600 new missiles, 
to allow for test flights and spares. 
(3) The Sentinel program has encountered sig-
nificant cost growth and schedule delays in recent 
years, and the full extent of both remains uncertain 
as the Department of Defense is currently restruc-
turing the program. 
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(4) In January 2024, increases in the total 
costs of the Sentinel program triggered a review 
under chapter 325 of title 10, United States Code 
(commonly known as the ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy Act’’), 
which is intended to determine whether a program 
that has experienced large cost overruns should con-
tinue, and what, if any, changes should be made to 
control costs. 
(5) In July 2024, the Department of Defense 
completed that review and released a new estimate 
of total costs for the program of $141,000,000,000 
in constant 2020 dollars, which is 81 percent (or 
$63,000,000,000) larger than the program’s baseline 
2020 estimate of $78,000,000,000. The total esti-
mated life cycle cost of the Sentinel program (not in-
cluding warheads) was estimated by the Department 
of Defense to be $260,000,000,000 in 2020 and is 
undoubtedly higher today. 
(6) In May 2025, the Air Force announced the 
Sentinel program will likely ‘‘predominantly’’ require 
digging fresh missile silos, a significant change from 
previous plans to reuse existing silos and a move 
that would likely cause further significant cost in-
creases and schedule delays. 
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(7) According to public reports, officials of the 
Department of Defense expect the restructuring ef-
fort to delay the Sentinel program by several years. 
The Department of Defense’s 2025 budget plans 
called for initial operating capability to be achieved 
in May 2029, a date that, as of the date of the en-
actment of this Act, looks unachievable. The Air 
Force is considering contingency plans that would 
extend the life of Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missiles by 11 more years to 2050 if delays 
continue to plague the Sentinel missiles intended to 
replace them. 
(8) The National Nuclear Security Administra-
tion is developing a replacement intercontinental bal-
listic missile warhead, the W87–1, for the Sentinel 
and expanding plutonium pit production to build 
new warhead cores, costing at least $14,000,000,000 
and $18,000,000,000, respectively. 
(9) Even in the absence of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile leg of the triad, the United States 
would have an assured retaliatory capability in the 
form of multiple ballistic missile submarines, which 
are virtually undetectable, and there are no known, 
near-term credible threats to the survivability of the 
ballistic missile submarine force. The survivability of 
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the submarine force will be enhanced as the Depart-
ment of Defense moves to replace the Ohio class bal-
listic submarine fleet with the new Columbia class 
ballistic missile fleet. 
(10) While intercontinental ballistic missiles 
have historically been the most responsive leg of the 
United States nuclear triad, advances in ballistic 
missile submarine communications to allow for the 
dissemination of emergency action messages in war-
time have negated that advantage. 
(11) Intercontinental ballistic missiles based in 
silos are vulnerable and, once launched, cannot be 
recalled, leaving decisionmakers with mere minutes 
to decide whether to launch the missiles before they 
are destroyed, known as a posture of ‘‘launch on 
warning’’ or ‘‘launch under attack’’ in the face of a 
perceived nuclear attack, greatly increasing the risk 
of a national leader initiating a nuclear war by mis-
take. 
(12) Under current policy, the President has 
the authority— 
(A) to launch United States nuclear weap-
ons first and is not limited to retaliation; 
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(B) to launch nuclear weapons under 
warning of attack, rather than waiting for evi-
dence of attack; and 
(C) to launch nuclear weapons on the 
President’s sole order. 
(13) False alarms have happened multiple times 
and can happen again. For example, in 1980, a false 
alarm was reported to the Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs and was almost re-
ported up to President Jimmy Carter as a real at-
tack but was luckily identified in time. Recent Pen-
tagon reports have found that, as a result of 
cyberattacks, the President could be faced with false 
warnings of attack or lose the ability to control nu-
clear weapons. 
(14) In 1983, Stanislav Petrov, a former lieu-
tenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces cor-
rectly identified a false warning in an early warning 
system that showed several United States incoming 
nuclear missiles, preventing Soviet leaders from 
launching a retaliatory response, earning Colonel 
Petrov the nickname ‘‘the man who saved the 
world’’. 
(15) Former Secretary of Defense William J. 
Perry wrote that the ground-based leg of the nuclear 
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triad is ‘‘destabilizing because it invites an attack’’ 
and intercontinental ballistic missiles are ‘‘some of 
the most dangerous weapons in the world’’ and 
‘‘could even trigger an accidental nuclear war’’. 
(16) General James Cartwright, former vice 
chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Com-
mander of the United States Strategic Command, 
wrote, with Secretary Perry, ‘‘[T]he greatest danger 
is not a Russian bolt but a US blunder—that we 
might accidentally stumble into nuclear war. As we 
make decisions about which weapons to buy, we 
should use this simple rule: If a nuclear weapon in-
creases the risk of accidental war and is not needed 
to deter an intentional attack, we should not build 
it. . . . Certain nuclear weapons, such as . . . the 
[intercontinental ballistic missile], carry higher risks 
of accidental war that, fortunately, we no longer 
need to bear. We are safer without these expensive 
weapons, and it would be foolish to replace them.’’. 
(17) General George Lee Butler, the former 
Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command 
and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the United 
States Strategic Command, said, ‘‘I would have re-
moved land-based missiles from our arsenal a long 
time ago. I’d be happy to put that mission on the 
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submarines. So, with a significant fraction of bomb-
ers having a nuclear weapons capability that can be 
restored to alert very quickly, and with even a small 
component of Trident submarines—with all those 
missiles and all those warheads on patrol—it’s hard 
to imagine we couldn’t get by.’’. 
(18) While a sudden ‘‘bolt from the blue’’ first 
strike from a near-peer nuclear adversary is a highly 
unlikely scenario, extending the Minuteman III 
would maintain the purported role of the interconti-
nental ballistic missile leg of the triad to absorb such 
an attack. 
SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MINUTEMAN III, SEN-
TINEL, AND EDUCATION FUNDING. 
It is the policy of the United States that— 
(1) as of the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Sentinel program is significantly over budget 
and behind schedule and should be paused and re-
evaluated for need and technical merit; 
(2) the operational life of the Minuteman III 
missile should be safely extended until at least 2050; 
and 
(3) investments in the Department of Edu-
cation are a better use of United States taxpayer re-
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sources than continuing with the current Sentinel 
program. 
SEC. 4. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR EDUCATION INSTEAD 
OF SENTINEL. 
(a) TRANSFER FROM DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 
The Secretary of Defense shall transfer all amounts ap-
propriated to the Department of Defense for the research, 
development, test, and evaluation of the Sentinel program, 
and available for obligation as of the date of the enactment 
of this Act, to the Department of Education to carry out 
part A of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6311 et seq.). 
(b) TRANSFER FROM NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of Energy shall trans-
fer all amounts appropriated to the National Nuclear Se-
curity Administration for the W87–1 warhead modifica-
tion program, and available for obligation as of the date 
of the enactment of this Act, to the Department of Edu-
cation to carry out part A of title I of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6311 
et seq.). 
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SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR GROUND- 
BASED STRATEGIC DETERRENT PROGRAM 
AND W87–1 WARHEAD MODIFICATION PRO-
GRAM. 
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2026 may be obli-
gated or expended for the Sentinel program or the W87– 
1 warhead modification program. 
SEC. 6. INDEPENDENT STUDY ON EXTENSION OF MINUTE-
MAN III INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MIS-
SILES. 
(a) INDEPENDENT STUDY.—Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on extend-
ing the life of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic 
missiles to 2050 or beyond. 
(b) STAFFING.— 
(1) EXPERTS.—The conduct of the study re-
quired by subsection (a) shall include input from a 
wide variety of technical and subject matter experts. 
(2) PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN AIR FORCE EM-
PLOYEES.—No member or former member of the Air 
Force or employee or former employee of the De-
partment of the Air Force who is or was paid for 
work relating to the Sentinel program may partici-
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pate in the conduct of the study required by sub-
section (a). 
(c) ELEMENTS.—The study required by subsection 
(a) shall address the following: 
(1) A comparison of the costs through 2050 
of— 
(A) extending the life of Minuteman III 
intercontinental ballistic missiles; and 
(B) deploying the Sentinel program. 
(2) An analysis of opportunities to incorporate 
technologies into the Minuteman III intercontinental 
ballistic missile program as part of a service life ex-
tension program that could also be incorporated in 
a possible future Sentinel program, including, at a 
minimum, 
opportunities 
to 
increase 
resilience 
against adversary missile defenses. 
(3) An analysis of the benefits and risks of in-
corporating sensors and nondestructive testing meth-
ods and technologies to reduce destructive testing re-
quirements and increase the service life and number 
of Minuteman III missiles through 2050. 
(4) An analysis and validation of the methods 
used to estimate the operational service life of Min-
uteman II and Minuteman III motors, taking into 
account the test and launch experience of motors re-
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tired after the operational service life of such motors 
in the rocket systems launch program. 
(5) An analysis of the risks and benefits of al-
ternative methods of estimating the operational serv-
ice life of Minuteman III motors, such as those 
methods based on fundamental physical and chem-
ical processes and nondestructive measurements of 
individual motor properties. 
(6) An analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of 
configuring a Trident II D5 submarine-launched bal-
listic missile for deployment in a Minuteman III silo. 
(7) An analysis of the impacts of the estimated 
service life of the Minuteman III force associated 
with decreasing the deployed intercontinental bal-
listic missiles delivery vehicle force from 400 to 300 
or less. 
(8) An assessment of the extent to which the 
Columbia class ballistic missile submarines will pos-
sess features that will enhance the current invulner-
ability of ballistic missile submarines of the United 
States to future antisubmarine warfare threats. 
(9) An analysis of the extent to which an exten-
sion of the life of the Minuteman III missiles would 
impact the decision of the Russian Federation to 
target intercontinental ballistic missiles of the 
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United States in a crisis, compared to proceeding 
with the Sentinel. 
(10) A best case estimate of what percentage of 
the strategic forces of the United States would sur-
vive a counterforce strike from the Russian Federa-
tion, broken down by intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bomber 
aircraft. 
(11) The benefits, risks, and costs of relying on 
the W–78 warhead for either the Minuteman III or 
a new Sentinel missile as compared to proceeding 
with the W–87 life extension. 
(12) The benefits, risks, and costs of adding 
additional launchers on submarines or uploading 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles with additional 
warheads to compensate for a reduced deployment of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles of the United 
States. 
(d) REPORT REQUIRED.— 
(1) SUBMISSION
TO
DEPARTMENT
OF
DE-
FENSE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the National Academy of 
Sciences shall submit to the Secretary of Defense a 
report containing the results of the study conducted 
under subsection (a). 
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(2) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 
210 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate con-
gressional committees the report required by para-
graph (1), without change. 
(3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 
(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
include a classified annex. 
(4) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap-
propriate congressional committees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
resentatives. 
Æ 
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