(7) Since January 1993, presidential budgets
and budget plans have set forth a reduction in de-
fense spending of $156,000,000,000 through fiscal
year 1999.
(8) The fiscal year 1995 budget is the 10th
consecutive year of reductions in real defense spend-
ing and, with the exception of fiscal year 1948, rep-
resents the lowest percentage of gross domestic
product for any defense budget since World War II.
(9) During fiscal year 1995, the number of ac-
tive duty, reserve component, and civilian personnel
of the Department of Defense will be reduced by
182,000, a rate of over 15,000 per month or over
500 per day. The Bureau of Labor Statistics esti-
mates that 1,200,000 defense-related private sector
jobs will be lost by 1997.
(10) Despite severe reductions and shortfalls in
defense funding and force structure, since 1993
United States military forces have been deployed
more often and committed to more peacetime mis-
sions per year than ever before. Most of these mis-
sions involve United Nations peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian efforts. At the end of fiscal year 1994,
over 70,000 United States personnel were serving in
such regions as Iraq, Bosnia, Macedonia, the Adri-
atic Sea, Rwanda, and the Caribbean Sea for mis-
sions involving Haiti and Cuba.
(11) Despite the dramatic increase in the pace
of operations and the diversion of training and exer-
cise funds to cover the costs of unbudgeted contin-
gency operations, the Armed Forces of the United
States remain the most capable, motivated, and ef-
fective military force in the world. The ability to suc-
cessfully deploy and maintain support for the range
of on-going contingency operations demonstrates the
continued quality and professionalism of our troops.
(12) However, persistent indictations of declin-
ing readiness demonstrate that military units are en-
tering the early stage of a long-term systemic readi-
ness problem. This downward readiness trend risks
a return to the ‘‘hollow forces’’ of the 1970s.
(13) At the end of fiscal year 1994, one-third
of the units in the Army contingency force and all
of the forward-deployed and follow-on Army divi-
sions were reporting a reduced state of military
readiness. During fiscal year 1994, training readi-
ness declined for the Navy’s Atlantic and Pacific
fleets. Training funding shortfalls also resulted in a
grounding of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft squad-
rons and cancellation and curtailment of Army
training exercises. Marine and naval personnel are
not maintaining the standard 12- to 18-month res-
pite between six-month deployments away from
home.
(14) The significant increase in deployments in
support of peacekeeping, humanitarian, and contin-
gency operations has placed great personnel tempo
stress on many critical operational units.
(15) A real commitment to equitable compensa-
tion and protection of quality-of-life programs for
servicemembers and their families is an esssential
component to ensuring high personnel morale and
sustaining force readiness. However, as of January
1, 1995, military pay is approximately 12.8 percent
below comparable civilian levels. As a result, it is es-
timated that close to 17,000 junior enlisted person-
nel have to rely on food stamps and the Department
of Defense will soon begin providing supplementary
food benefits to an estimated 11,000 military per-
sonnel and dependents living overseas.
(16) Critical long-term modernization programs
continue to be delayed or cancelled as resources are
diverted to cover short-term personnel and readiness
shortfalls resulting from an underfunded defense
budget and an overextended force, threatening the