I 
119TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 4458 
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop 
a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
JULY 16, 2025 
Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI (for himself and Mr. LAHOOD) introduced the fol-
lowing bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
in addition to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for a pe-
riod to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for con-
sideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the com-
mittee concerned 
A BILL 
To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of De-
fense to develop a strategy in response to the global 
basing intentions of the People’s Republic of China. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Combating PRC Over-
seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced 
Resilience Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘COUNTER Act of 2025’’. 
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SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 
According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-
nual report to Congress, titled ‘‘Military and Security De-
velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China’’ and 
known informally as the ‘‘China Military Power Report’’— 
(1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas 
logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA 
to project and sustain military power at greater dis-
tances; 
(2) a global PLA logistics network could give 
the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt 
United States military operations; 
(3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened 
the first overseas PLA military base near the com-
mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti; 
(4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire 
strategically important port infrastructure at Subic 
Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Gov-
ernment of the United States, the Philippines, and 
Japan, and by private investors; 
(5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and 
Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia 
Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Cen-
ter and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at 
Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have 
been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have 
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been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base 
since December 2023; and 
(6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the 
PRC’s access to the port at the Ream Naval Base 
in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to 
additional military facilities to support naval, air, 
and ground forces projection in many countries. 
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
While the executive branch has undertaken case-by- 
case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC per-
manent military presence in several countries, it is the 
sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC’s 
global basing intentions must— 
(1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-
dress the strategic implications of the PRC’s actions; 
(2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination 
with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole- 
of-government approach; 
(3) ensure that the United States Government 
maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive 
posture in order to maximize strategic decision 
space; 
(4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions 
that would be influential in shaping a partner’s deci-
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sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-
cess to its sovereign territory; 
(5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the 
PRC’s global basing intentions within the context of 
the overall United States strategic competition with 
the PRC; 
(6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and 
scientific cooperation as a guise for establishing ac-
cess for the PLA and other PRC security forces in 
foreign countries; 
(7) factor in the potential contributions of key 
allies and partners to help respond to the PRC’s 
pursuit of global basing, many of which— 
(A) have historic ties and influence in 
many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-
geting for potential future bases; and 
(B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-
ture to form our baseline understanding of the 
PRC’s global intentions; 
(8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing 
for enduring organizational structures and security 
and foreign assistance and cooperation efforts to ef-
fectively address the issue of PRC global basing in-
tentions; and 
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(9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of 
movement, and other interests of the United States 
and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued 
expansion of PRC bases. 
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) APPROPRIATE
CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIT-
TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com-
mittees’’ means— 
(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate; 
(B) the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate; 
(C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
the Senate; 
(D) the Committee on Appropriations of 
the Senate; 
(E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives; 
(F) the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives; 
(G) the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives; 
and 
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(H) the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives. 
(2) PLA.—The term ‘‘PLA’’ means the Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC. 
(3) PRC.—The term ‘‘PRC’’ means the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. 
(4) PRC GLOBAL
BASING.—The term ‘‘PRC 
global basing’’ means the establishment of physical 
locations outside the geographic boundaries of the 
PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the 
People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-
rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the 
presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security 
forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-
tion. 
SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S C–PRC 
GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY. 
(a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in 
classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional 
committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed 
by PRC global basing to the United States or to any 
United States allies with respect to their ability to project 
power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other 
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