IV 
110TH CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION 
H. RES. 711 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the United 
States-India nuclear cooperation agreement. 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
OCTOBER 4, 2007 
Mr. BERMAN (for himself, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, and Mr. FORTENBERRY) sub-
mitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs 
RESOLUTION 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives con-
cerning the United States-India nuclear cooperation 
agreement. 
Whereas President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Min-
ister Manmohan Singh issued a Joint Statement on July 
18, 2005, declaring their intention to establish a ‘‘global 
partnership’’ between the two countries; 
Whereas in the Joint Statement the President announced his 
commitment to achieving the establishment of ‘‘full civil 
nuclear energy cooperation’’ between the United States 
and India; 
Whereas Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States- 
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 
(Public Law 109–401), also known as the Hyde Act, 
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that, among other provisions, would allow the President 
to waive restrictions in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
that otherwise would prohibit nuclear cooperation with 
India; 
Whereas the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
include several provisions that impose conditions on 
United States civil nuclear cooperation with India, includ-
ing— 
(1) a requirement that civil nuclear cooperation with 
India be terminated if India tests a nuclear explosive de-
vice or violates its safeguards agreements; 
(2) a prohibition on exports to India of sensitive nu-
clear technology, including enrichment, reprocessing, and 
heavy water production technology, with exceptions for 
certain programs to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel 
cycle or a potential multinational facility in India partici-
pating in a program approved by the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide alternatives to na-
tional fuel cycle capabilities; 
(3) a requirement that India and the IAEA conclude 
a safeguards agreement that provides for safeguards on 
designated civil nuclear facilities ‘‘in perpetuity in accord-
ance with IAEA standards, principles and practices’’; and 
(4) a sense of the Congress that ‘‘the United States 
should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continu-
ation of nuclear exports to India by any other party if 
such exports are terminated under United States law’’; 
Whereas the Hyde Act requires that Congress affirmatively 
approve the United States-India nuclear cooperation 
agreement, also known as a 123 Agreement, for it to take 
effect; 
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Whereas on July 27, 2007, the Governments of the United 
States and India concluded negotiations on a nuclear co-
operation agreement; 
Whereas under the terms of the Hyde Act, Congress will not 
consider the nuclear cooperation agreement until India 
and the IAEA conclude a safeguards agreement for the 
facilities India has listed as for civil use and the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) approves an exemption for India 
from its guidelines establishing full-scope international 
safeguards as a condition of supply; 
Whereas it is in the interest of the United States to ensure 
that the NSG does not approve an exemption for India 
that allows other countries to engage in civil nuclear com-
merce with India that is prohibited under United States 
law, thus putting United States firms at a competitive 
disadvantage; 
Whereas an unqualified exemption for India would create a 
strong incentive for India to negotiate nuclear coopera-
tion agreements with other countries with less stringent 
conditions than those contained in the agreement nego-
tiated between India and the United States, thereby un-
dermining United States nonproliferation policy and 
United States commercial interests; 
Whereas to prevent United States nonproliferation policy and 
United States commercial interests from being under-
mined by supplier countries continuing to trade with re-
cipient countries that have violated their agreements with 
the United States, the Hyde Act states it shall be the 
policy of the United States to ‘‘[s]trengthen the NSG 
guidelines and decisions concerning consultation by mem-
bers regarding violations of supplier and recipient under-
standings by instituting the practice of a timely and co-
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ordinated response by NSG members to all such viola-
tions, including termination of nuclear transfers to an in-
volved recipient, that discourages individual NSG mem-
bers from continuing cooperation with such recipient 
until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated 
response has been achieved’’; 
Whereas it remains to be determined if the nuclear coopera-
tion agreement is fully consistent with the Hyde Act; 
Whereas the Government of India has stated interpretations 
of the meaning and application of the several provisions 
in the nuclear cooperation agreement that appear to con-
flict with the intent of the Congress as reflected in the 
Hyde Act; and 
Whereas the Administration should clarify all conflicts of in-
terpretation regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement 
prior to seeking an exemption for India in the NSG 
guidelines: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep-
resentatives that the Administration— 
(1) should not propose any change to Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines relating to India 
until such time as the Administration has— 
(A) answered all outstanding questions 
raised by Congress regarding apparent incon-
sistencies between the nuclear cooperation 
agreement and the Henry J. Hyde United 
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Coopera-
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tion Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–401), also 
known as the Hyde Act; and 
(B) resolved with the Government of India 
all differences of interpretation of the provisions 
in the nuclear cooperation agreement; and 
(2) should not support a proposed exemption 
for India in the NSG guidelines that is not con-
sistent with the Hyde Act and the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954 and that does not incorporate the fol-
lowing provisions: 
(A) The immediate termination of all nu-
clear commerce by NSG member states if India 
detonates a nuclear explosive device or if the 
IAEA has determined that India has violated 
its international safeguards commitments. 
(B) A requirement that any safeguards 
agreement concluded between India and the 
IAEA provides for safeguards in perpetuity for 
all nuclear materials, equipment, and tech-
nology, and all facilities designated as ‘‘civil,’’ 
in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, 
and practices. 
(C) A prohibition on the transfer of enrich-
ment and reprocessing technology and heavy 
water production technology by any NSG mem-
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ber state to India and a requirement that all bi-
lateral nuclear cooperation agreements between 
NSG member states and India explicitly pro-
hibit the replication of any dual-use technology 
or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded 
Indian facilities. 
(D) A stipulation that NSG supplier states 
may not grant India consent to reprocess nu-
clear fuel supplied by an NSG member state ex-
cept in a facility that is under permanent and 
unconditional IAEA safeguards, and that any 
material produced in such a facility may not be 
transferred to any unsafeguarded facility. 
(E) A requirement that NSG member 
states should promptly consult regarding viola-
tions of commitments in any bilateral nuclear 
cooperation agreement between an NSG mem-
ber state and India in order to secure a timely 
and coordinated response by NSG members to 
all such violations, including termination of nu-
clear transfers to India, that discourages indi-
vidual NSG member states from continuing bi-
lateral cooperation until such time as a con-
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sensus regarding a coordinated response has 
been achieved. 
Æ 
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