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From Arms Control to Controlled Security
I
By Zbigniew Brzezinski
The prospects for a comprehensive and
complex
U.S.-Soviet arms-control
agree-
ment, building on the foundations laid by
SALT
I
and SALT
II,
are
increasingly
slim. Indeed,
it is quite possible that arms
control as we have known
it has come
to
the end of the road. Once the great hope of
those who believed that the U.S.-Soviet
ri-
valry
could
be
limited
by
joint
agree-
ment-with some even seeing in arms con-
trol
the catalyst
for a genuinely friendly
American-Soviet relationship- comprehen-
slve arms
control
(on
the model
of
the
SALT agreements)
is likely to be the vic-
tim of the bloody-mindedness of the pres-
ent Soviet leadership and of the dynamics
of the technological
revolution.
The present Soviet leadership recently
has done something quite remarkable
in
the history of the U.S.-Soviet competition.
It has publicly postulated that there will be
(to arms-control
talks
unless
the
U.S.
is
prepared
to accept a
public
humiliation
rnd a political defeat:
the dismantling of
he relatively few Pershing 2s and cruise
nissiles so far deployed
in Western Eu-
ope as a response to the hundreds of SS-
:0s deployed by the Soviet Union over the
last several years.
In
effect,
the
Soviet
mion has made arms control a hostage to
he attainment of a truly major geopoliti-
al objective:
the severance of the U S
-
luropean security connection,
l No-Win Situation
The Soviet demand
is thus unaccepta-
le. Even the accommodatlonlsts who to-
ay dominate the discourse over foreign
ffairs within a segment of the American
ody politic reject the Soviet demand, and
ie Reagan
administration
enjoys
wlde-
>read backing here and in Europe In ra-
ising to bow to
it. The Soviets have thus
icked themselves into a no-win situation,
i act of unprecedented diplomatic stupid-
In order to extricate themselves, they
ive lately proposed separate negotiations
Vienna
on
an
anti-satellite
weapons
ireement. President Reagan was wise In
spondlng affirmatively
to the proposal
r negotiations, but he is equally wise in
ticipating no real progress
in them.
But in the meantime the hostage is dy-
?. The primary victim of this situation is
ms control-not in its unrealistic utopian
i
rsion but as a modest and practical way
(
somewhat controlling the spirals of de-
<
ise spending and weapons accumulation
I
both sides. The Soviet refusal to negoti-
t
1 slmP]y means precious, time
is being
t
; and ^ a result
it will be even more
s
icult in the future to reach a truly am-
r
ious and comprehensive agreement, a
v
ter version of SALT
II.
a
This is because the political paralysis in
n
the negotiations
is being outpaced by the
f
dynamics of the weapons revolution. The
ti
simple fact
is that both the U.S. and the
Soviet
Union
are
rapidly moving-while
si
the arms-control negotiations remain stale-
n
mated-to
acquire
Increasingly
sophistl-
ti
cated weapons systems, making existing
r:
ICBMs anachronistic. As pointed out in a
p
recent study in the Naval War College Re-
(1
view by James Westwood: “The 1980s is a
fl
time of rapid transition and readjustments
tf
to technological changes in missilery. On
m
uie
horizon
are
stealth-type
bombers
si
launching stealth cruise missiles (ALCM)
bj
I and
precision-guided munitions
(PGMs),
cc
further obviating the role of ICBMs. Sclen-
ov
tific
and
technological
achievements
in
guidance, navigation, aerodynamics, elec-
de
tronic circuitry and component Wjn
™
warhead yields-per-warhead-weight appear
to be leading rapidly to a downturn, per-
haps to an eventual demise of the once-as-
cendant and now dominant ICBMs of the
period 1960 to 1985. This trend holds both in
the United States and
in
the U.S.S.R."
Highly mobile and extraordinarily pre-
cise delivery systems are coming into be-
ing and are beginning to be deployed. By
way of example, the CEP
(circular error
probabilities)
of a
Soviet
SS-19 has been
approximately 1,200 feet; that of a Minute-
man III, TOO feet; of an MX, 450 feet; and
of a Pershing 2, with terminal guidance,
about
100
feet. The
latest Soviet missiles
also
involve
similarly impressive opera-
tional improvements.
Jt will be increasingly
difficult
to Im-
pose
effective jnd
verifiable
limits
on
these weapons. The verification problem is
becoming
increasingly
acute,
given
the
mobility of the new systems and the oppor-
tunities for rapid reloading and covert de-
ployment, The question of how to control
qualitative Improvements plagued SALT II
negotiators and,
at best, only a partially
satisfactory response was developed. Their
difficulties pale in comparison to the com-
plexities posed by the new systems. Ade-
quate verification of both qualitative and
quantitative limits would require access to
storage facilities and even perhaps to prod-
uction centers. As a consequence, it is real-
istic to conclude that for both political and
technological
reasons,
the
chances
of a
truly comprehensive agreement, which can
be reliably verified, are rapidly fading.
In that context, we are likely to see re-
newed attraction to war planners of a first-
strike scenario. Since the mid-1950s, acqui-
poses the greatest danger.
It could in one
stroke
create circumstances beyond
our
capacity to foresee either its social or his-
torical consequences. Of course such a sud-
den-attack scenario remains unlikely
but
one can disregard
it entirely only at the
greatest peril. Given the relative openness
of American society, the precise location of
key U.S. assets can be much more easily
ascertained and effectively targeted than
those of the Soviets. That makes the U.S.
more vulnerable
to such, a strike, and
It
would be escapist
to assume
that Soviet
planners would choose
to ignore such an
option
altogether.
Moreover^ bolt out of.the blue could
create such Inltl&rdiSbelietamong the U S
decision makers that they would be unable
to make a prompt response. Even without
a special Soviet effort to disrupt or destroy
'
U.S. decision makers, a sudden massive
attack would put the American leaders un-
der extraordinary psychological pressure,
capable of Inducing erratic behavior and
hesitation. One can hardly imagine how ut-
terly dumbfounding would be the situation
m which the president would find himself
awakened
In
the middle
of some
night
confronted
with
the
following
life-and-
death
decision
tree
(as based on
public
.sources)
:
Time
(minutes)
0 Massive attack launched.
1 SLBMs detected.
2 ICBMs detected.
4-6
Confirmation
of
attack;
uncer-
tainty over scale; U.S. decision process
begins.
6-10 First SLBMs detonate
in High
Altitude EMP
attack;
SAC
launched
be offset by greater reliance on the part of
both sides on defensive strategic systems
The Times of London put it correctly when
it stated editorially on June
13: “The So-
viet Union
is now naturally worried about
the consequences of a burst In American
spending on missile defense. It casts doubt
on Soviet plans for offensive systems since
the possibility of any missile defense-even
an Incomplete one-would
radically alter
the cost calculation of offensive systems.
In the long run a defensive program would
enhance arms control by reducing the po-
tential
gains
from
building
offensive
weapons. ...
It is ironic and paradoxical
that the age of deterrence has so confused
the strategic mentality of many commen-
tators that their reaction to a purely defen :
sive system Is to suggest that
it increases
danger."
The
fact
is that strategic defense has
become feasible not in the sense that it can
safeguard society but because
it can
in-
creasingly complicate the planning and ex-
ecution of an effective first strike. In other
words, strategic defense can somewhat ne-
gate the offensive advantages of increas-
ingly sophisticated strike systems, restor-
ing the element of deterrence simply by
creating again greater uncertainty as
to
the consequences of a first strike
The
time
has come
to
lay
to
rest
the
expectation
that arms control
is
the secret key
to a more amicable
American-Soviet relationship.
sition by the Soviets of a respectable nu-
clear capability meant that a first strike—
inherently messy and unpredictable in its
consequences-was
until
recently not an
attractive option for either side. A messy
attack with large and relatively inaccurate
warheads
(the only kind possible)
would
still precipitate an almost equally messy
counterattack. But with the deployment of
extraordinarily accurate systems, a
first
strike designed to paralyze the opponent's
capacity to respond through the pre-emp-
tive destruction of most of
its forces and
through
the decapitation of its command
structure can again become a viable plan-
ning
option. From an
offensive
point
of
view, a sudden
attack by highly precise
and
very numerous
nuclear weapons
is
more profitable than an exchange resulting
from a political crisis prompting both sides
to gear their forces to maximum
alert.
In the years ahead, one can envisage
several ways
in
which nuclear weapons
might be used
In anger and by delibera-
tion. Four basic
variants summarize the
range of possibilities:
( 1 ) a massive sur-
prise attack;
(2) through crisis escalation;
(3) by contagion from non-superpower con-
flicts;
(4) by terrorist attack. Of those,
in
the years ahead probably the fourth is the
most
likely since
it involves a relatively
simple operation, and it can be undertaken
by a limited group of individuals with little
concern for society and motivated by their
own peculiar brand of rationality.
But while the employment of a nuclear
device
in a
terrorist
attack may
be the
u-
preemptively; confirmation of scale of
attack;
final U.S. decision process.
f s
10-12 U.S. decision needed: Ride-out
n
or respond;
first SLBMs detonate over
y
U.S. SLBM bases and National Com-
e
mand Authority.
d
12-14 Final window for initiating re-
y
sponse; launch under attack,
(f
16-20
Delta SLBMs
launched
from
:t
home ports
hit SAC.
s
20-30 ICBM attack initiates possible
"
X-ray pin-down and begins impact on
i
targets.
How in these circumstances would the
-
president perform? How effective would be
f
the
chain
of
command? How
rational
'
would be the choices made in response to
s
initially unbelievable information? Could
'
incoming information regarding the nature
(
of the attack be rationally related
to the
needed response? We are dealing here with
'
truly sensitive and disturbing operational
as well as psychological questions.
The advent
of increasingly numerous
and accurate systems is making it possible
for planners of a strategic attack to envis-
age a first strike that leaves the opponent
strategically
crippled, capable
of only a
spasmodic, disorganized and strategically
aimless response-or none at all. This still
does
not make a
first
strike
attractive
from
a moral
or even
political
point
of
view, given the stakes, but the point Is that
gradually
the
military
attractiveness
of
this option
Is again increasing.
Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms
Respective Vulnerability
For the U.S.,
it is an especially attrac-
tive option for
it permits us to exploit the
advantages of high technology, an area of
U.S. superiority. This provides us with gen-
uine
potential
for
offsetting the
military
advantages gained in recent years by the
Soviet Union, and would put pressure on
.
the Soviet Union to return to serious arms-
control negotiations.
But even with such negotiations, the de-
velopment of some defensive strategic ca-
pability will remain desirable.
It is often
said that an imbalance might arise when
one side sees the other side acquiring a
relatively invulnerable shield while
itself
remaining vulnerable. Pre-emption might
therefore become tempting. In fact, that is
not likely to happen. The acquisition of a
defensive strategic
capability
is not
like
purchasing an umbrella, which one can un-
fold
against
the
rain
upon
leaving
the
store.
It is bound to be a protracted
trlal-
and-error
piecemeal
process,
with
both
sides experimenting, deploying partially,
and adjusting their capabilities, with nei-
ther one at any point in the next 15 to 20
years feeling it is truly invulnerable to the
other side, even though over time the re-
spective
vulnerability
of each
side
to
a
first strike by the other will gradually be
declining.
Through such a process, a measure of
reciprocal
stability
will be acquired and
security of both sides will gradually be en-
hanced, though the process
will not yield
the kind of restraint
in defense expendi-
tures that many have associated with the
hoped-for arms control. But the time has
come
to lay to rest the expectation
that
arms control
is the secret key to a more
amicable American-Soviet relationship or
even to the enhancement of mutual secu-
rity. The maintenance of such security will
remain an ambiguous and protracted pro-
cess requiring
unilateral actions by both
sides, and increasingly so
in the area of
strategic defense.
Mr.
Brzezinski served as
assistant
to
»si°
r Nati°nal Security Affairs
Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9 Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9