Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5 % i Appendix C: Interviewer Material TASKINGS: The viewers were presented with a number of different types of taskings. The targets included people, locations, intentions, and sites. The concerns in initiating taskings included locating people, counter intelligence, locating objects, and identifying the activities at various sites. With regard to these taskings, viewers differed in the amount of background information they preferred to have before producing viewing. Some viewers preferred substantial background information while others wanted minimal information about the target. The viewers noted, however, that when they had background information it sometimes distorted the process. More specifically, the viewers indicated that they sometimes changed the content of their reports to bring the information presented into line with the known characteristics of the target. They noted that reports tended to be more specific when substantial background information was available. Typically, each viewer generated independent reports for a target. These reports presented into line with the known characteristics of the target. They noted that reports tended to be more specific when substantial background information was available. Typically, each viewer generated independent reports for a target. These reports presented both verbal descriptions and drawings. Frequently, different viewers produced rather different reports. This result was attributed in part to the use of different techniques, and, in part, to the tendency of viewers to focus on different aspects of the target. CONDITIONS PROMOTING ACCURACY: The viewers noted a number of conditions that influenced the accuracy and quality of the information contained in their reports. Generally, they felt that the quality of viewing suffered when they were presented with a large number of repetitive taskings over a short period of time. They also noted the quality suffered when the targets lacked intrinsic interest and when external evaluations placed too much pressure on the viewers. The viewers noted that it was particularly difficult to produce accurate viewings for some types of targets. It also was unclear exactly what characteristics of targets influenced accuracy. The viewers also identified a number of organizational factors that influenced accuracy. First, they’ field that knowledge supportive users contributed to accuracy and effective use of the reported information. Second, they felt more judicious use of background information might contribute to the preparation of more accurate reports, less biased by logical cues. Third, they pointed out that earlier program managers had edited or changed viewers’ reports. The viewers felt that this could lead to the loss of important of potential significant to the users. MANAGEMENT: The viewers noted a number of actions that could be taken to improve the success of the program. To begin with, they indicated that it was important to have a manager who understood the process, the demands it made on people, and the need for a supportive work environment. Along related lines, they indicated that more balanced work- load management, rather than periods of boom and bust, would contribute to program success. American Institutes for Research C-f2 Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5
Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5 ee Appendix C: Interviewer Material In addition to these issues bearing on management style and management strategy, the viewers made a number of other suggestions. Onc involved the research program. Here they suggested that research be more focused on the work rather than on narrow technical demonstrations of the existence of the phenomenon. They also suggested that consistent organizational support would play a key role in the long-term success of the program. ATTACHMENT 5 INTERVIEW REPORT STAR GATE OPERATIONAL MANAGER INTERVIEW DATE: AUGUST 4, 1995 CONTEXT: This interview was conducted with the last manager of the remote viewing program. The manager become responsible for this program in 1991 when the previous program manager retired. He was tasked, in accordance with accordance with congressional guidelines, with initiating and managing operational use of the remote viewing service while addressing the two other major program elements. Foreign assessment and research and development. The manager's background before accepting this position was in human intelligence. He did not specifically have a background in parapsychology or remote viewing. CLIENTS: In accordance with his charter, the manager explicitly sought to expand operational use of remote viewing services. He primarily accomplished this through the use of personal contacts and his own background in intelligence. The manager established contact - with ten potential user groups. Of these ten groups, two used the service one time while five used the service multiple times. Typically, groups who used the service had at one time or another employed viewers early on in the program's history. The users or clients typically requested viewings on an experimental basis. More specifically, they were interested in seeing whether there was any potential operational payoff from the program. It was noted that one especially attractive feature of the service was that information could very rapidly be obtained in a concise form. TASKINGS: In general, users presented four major types of taskings. The viewers were asked to provide information about: 1) people, 2) objects, 3) locations, and 4) intentions. The amount of background information viewers had about the nature of the targets varied. In some cases, particularly when there were multiple sequential taskings, the viewers might have a great deal of information. In most cases, however, the viewers had the name of the sponsoring organization and a one or two-word description of the target. It is of note that the viewers also differed in the amount of background information requested. All viewers worked on all taskings although they were allowed to opt out of certain taskings. American institutes for Research C-13 Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5
Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5 a Appendix C: Interviewer Material For each tasking, the viewers produced a three- or four-page report which included pictures and a verbal description. The accuracy and usefulness of viewings was assessed by customers and this evaluative information was provided as feedback to the viewers by the program manager who instituted this formal evaluation procedure. In managing the group and responding to the taskings, the manager, although familiar with the research literature, did not explicitly consider the findings obtained in this research. He noted that the research was more useful for general background, establishing the existence of the phenomenon, and foreign assessment, than in managing the viewers’ activities. INFORMATION ACCURACY AND UTILITY: The manager necessarily relied on users to evaluate the accuracy and utility of the viewings provided in response to a specific tasking. He generally recommended that clients use viewings provided in response to a specific tasking. He generally recommended that clients use viewings as supplemental information. In the manager's experience, no viewings served as the primary input into an operational decision. Principally, the viewings were used to validate or extend the accuracy of already available information or, alternatively, as a vehicle to stimulate further intelligence gathering. Application of this information depended on the function of the sponsoring organization. ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES: In the manager's view, the original Congressional directive along with support of the designated organization were crucial to the successes of the program. However, prior controversy surrounding the program and the existence of the phenomenon set constraints on the success of the program. With regard to potential improvements in program management, a number of points were mentioned. First, the manager noted that the program should not necessarily reside in the intelligence community. Instead, he recommended that the program be declassified and moved to a more appropriate “open source" sponsor such as the Department of Justice or the National Science Foundation. It was noted that this kind of move would not hurt and indeed might help the foreign assessment component of the program. Further, it was suggested that the program involve research and forcign assessment, with viewer services being obtained only, as needed on a contractual basis. tmnerican Institutes for Research =] Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5
Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5 APPENDIX D SUMMARY REPORT STAR GATE OPERATIONAL TASKING AND EVALUATION 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations requesting that the program staff apply a paranormal psychological technique know as "remote viewing" (RV) to attain information unavailable from other sources, The operational tasking comprised "targets" identified with as little specificity as possible to avoid "telegraphing" the desired response. In 1994, the DIA Star Gate program office created a methodology for obtaining numerical evaluations from the operational tasking organizations of the accuracy and value of the products provided by the Star Gate program. By May 1, 1995, the three remote viewers assigned to the program office had responded, i.e., provided RV product, to 40 tasks from five operational organizations. Normally, RV product was provided by at least two viewers for each task. Ninety-nine accuracy scores and 100 value scores resulted from these product evaluations by the operational users, On a 6-point basis where "1" is the most accurate, accuracy scores cluster around "2's" and "3's" (55 of the entries) with 13 scores of "1". Value scores, on a 5- point basis with "1" the highest, cluster around "3's" and "4's" (80 of the entries); there are no "I's" and 1 1 scores of "2", After careful study of the RV products and detailed analysis of the resulting product evaluations for the 40 operational tasks, we conclude that the utility of RV for operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated. The conclusion results from the fact that the operational utility to the Intelligence Community of the information provided by this paranormal RV process simply cannot be discerned. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by the results of interviews conducted with representatives of the operational organizations that provided tasking to the program. The ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for additional efforts of questionable operational return on the part of the intelligence analyst. Assuming that the subjective nature of the psychic process cannot be eliminated, one must determine whether the information provided justifies the required resource investment. 2.0 GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL TASKING Over the period from 1986 to first quarter of FY 1995, the Star Gate program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations. These tasks requested that the program staff apply their paranormal psychological technique know as "remote viewing" (RV) in the hope of attaining information unavailable from other sources. The operational tasking comprised "targets" which were "identified" in some manner, normally with as little specificity as possible (see discussion below) to avoid excessively "telegraphing" the desired American Institutes for Research D-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/22 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200180005-5