Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 Inspector General's investigation. However, [wish to ernphasize that because this investigation is still in progress, and hecause of fhe problems that I have just noted with regard to locating knowledge- able witnesses and pertinent documentation, we have not as yet been able to reconstruct a complete account of the Army's participation in drug testing. | There are substantial gaps in our knowledge, and much of the information that we have been able to assemble is incomplete. For this reason, there are many questions to which we simply da not have the ‘answers at the present time. | Before discussing the specifics of the program, I believe it: appropriate to provide insofar as security considerations permit, the factors which mandated that a program be initiated, and what we perceived as the objectives of sucha program. . Starting in the early 1950's, intelligence reports which were received indicated large purchases by other governments of possible s hallucinogenic agents which could be used as chemical warfare material. These reports also cited documented studies of research conducted by these countries in the 1940's and 50's with various | psychochemicals, as well as references to the capture by U. 5. or 7 U.S. allies of foreign agents who were carrying syringes of fluid to Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7,
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 facilitate control of captives, Furthermore, on October 21, 1951, . after communication with several European medical personnel ” concerning the effect of "Nego-depressant drugs," a civilian doctor ‘sent a report to The Surgeon General. In it he related reports. of the utilization of drugs by foreign agents and indicated the need _ for further research to determine the possible effects‘such drugs. could have on national security. | This information presented a serious threat ~~ it indicated that a major portion of our deterrent forces could be rendered helpless == and defenseless -- by drugs which were odorless, colorless and tasteless. It also reflected that our most sensitive security matters could be unknowingly compromised. But perhaps of even greater significance, it indicated that an alternative to nuclear weapons might be availeties a weapon which might render large forces helpless -- but only temporarily -- and without any permanent damage to those forces and none to their surroundings. These matters were covered in . testimony by Major General William M. Creasy, ‘former Chief Chemical Officer, U.S. Army, before hearings of the House Committee on, Science and Astronautics on June 16, 1959, wherein he discussed. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 at great length the possible use of chemical agents as a substitute i for nuclear weapons, The program initiated at that time therefore had three’ specific tebjectives: to determine what hallucinogenic drugs might provide an. effective alternative to more drastic weaponry; to ascertain the potential application of such drugs in intelligence operations; and finally, to attempt to develop an antidote to such drugs should they be used against U.S, or Allied forces. an Once decisions were made at levels above that of the Department: of the Army to proceed with the testing of psychoactive and other drugs, the Chemical Corps, then a separate technical service of the Army, headquartered at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, entered into a series of contracts with various universities, state hospitals, and medical. foundations. Unfortunately, many of the early contracts are unavailable, Our best information is that many of these contracts were routinely destroyed some time ago. | However, we have located some documentaton, all of which indicates that the Army's primary interest Was in acquiring the results of investigations and experimentations being conducted by | these civilian research organizations. he . - _ Our review has encompassed a total of fifty-two contracts, starting from the early 50's and continuing to the 70's. I should like 1500160012-7 . Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788RO0O
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 to stress ‘that of the fifty-two contracts of which we have knowledge, only a small number (13) involve testing compounds which might be described in a broad sense as hallucinogenic or delirient. The 39 ‘Yemaining contracts can all be placed into three categories: first, tests of various anticholinergic agents, such as atropine, and hasic “ _ ¥esearch into organophosphates, ina constant effort to refine anti- dotes to organophosphate nerve poisons; second, tests of various common drugs in medical use, such as morphine, and other analgesics as well as miscellaneous non -psychoactive drugs; and, third, non-drug tests of physiological functions, such as lung function or skin permeability. In the interest of time, I have not prepared detailed remarks on these contracts, but I have pertinent documents should you have any questions, Turning to the research on hallucinogenic drugs, we discovered 9 such cohtracts. The first two of these were negotiated i in 1951 with the New York State Psychiatric Institute, a leader in the field of the use of hallucinogenics in the diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill, The subjects were psychiatric patients. The records are ambiguous concerning the matter of the consent of the patients. The drugs util- ized included LSD, wmescaline, and others: In the course of one of these contracts, a subject, Mr, Harold Blauer, then a patient at the New York State Psychiatric Institute, was administered a dose ofa Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 mescaline derivative which proved fatal. Details of Mr. Blaver's death have already been made public and are available to the committee and are appended to my statement. The Blauer death is the subject of a pending claim by the two daughters against the Army. A1955 contract with Tulane University involved the administration. of LSD, Mescaline, and other drugs to mental patients who had there- tofore had electrodes implanted in their brains as a part of their medical treatment unrelated to an Army contract. The electrades were ulilized to study the effects of the drugs on the brain's functioning. The methodology used might be subject to some criticism on the ground that a range of compounds was administered to at least one patient without apparent relation to therapy or diagnosis. However, work on the brain chemistry of mental illness was still pioneering work 4 . in 1955, and perhaps it is not surprising in the cool light of analysis 20 years later that some of the techniques then employed now appear - - ; less than perfect. The five remaining contracts were with the University of Washington, the Research Foundation for Mental Hygiene, Inc., the _ University of Maryland and the Institute for Behavioral Research, . Four of the five studied LSD, the remaining one studied many compounds including amphetamines. They covered the time period 1953 to 1965. None of them appears remarkable, but, again, I have more complete information should you desire it, 7 . Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 os be terminated at any time; that he recognized that in the pursuit of certain experiments transitory discomfiture may occur; and that _ there had been no coercion, undue moral suasion or other adverse . ‘pressure brought to bear in his volunteering; and that he had done ; so of his own free will, Available records do not indicate, however, whether these procedures were in fact followed in each case, or exactly what information was imparted to the prospective subjects. The experiments at Edgewood were conducted by qualified medical pergonnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories under controlled clinical conditions. Project officers of the U. S, Army Intelligence Center provided technical advice and assistance in the structuring of experiments, In addition to a number of standard tests | of mental and physical abilities related to performance of intelligence tasks, cohducted so as to compare pre and post drug administration results, the experimentation program included certain structured situation’ wherein the applicability of the drug for intelligence purposes was assessed, In these situations an attempt was made to overcome the security training and experience, principally interrogation resistance, of the subjects by exploitation of the effects of the drug. The structured situations consisted of: (1) Simulated social. receptions where LSD was administered surreptitiously to the subjects (in cocktails); 13 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 (2) Simulated stress situations wherein subjects were given polygraph examinations after administration of LSD; and (3) Administration of LSD in conjunction with confinement in an isolation environment, , In each situation medical pers onnel were present at all times, Observation reports by those supervising the experiments, as well as subjective reports by the subjects themselves, were used in assessing the effect of the drug. In general, it was found that use of LSD, either alone or in conjunction with conventional interrogation techniques, could be effective in reducing the resistance to interrogation . of well- trained and experienced intelligence per sonnel, In view of the results of the clinical experimentation at Edgewood Arsenal, and in recognition of. the limited capability to structure - realistic interrogation situations in a laboratory environment using volunteers, a proposal was submitted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, in coordination with the Chemical Warfare Laboratories, to conduct field experimentation in conjunction with actual interrogation situations. This proposal was approved by the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and subsequently two series of field tests were conducted, . A: ' Available records indicate that on 10 April 1963, the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence directed that no further field 14 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 testing of LSD be conducted, No records have been found to indicate - that any Army intelligence testing of LSD has been performed since that time. wi Available records indicate that approximately 600 individuals were administered LSD during the course of the Army in-house testing a programs at Edgewood Arsenal and atthe field test locations. There is reason to believe, however, that these records may not be complete, and that the total number of participants may have been somewhat higher. Hence, a priority effort is continuing as part of the Inspector General's investigation in an attempt to compile a complete listing of participants in the LSD testing programs. The names of all of the participants thus far identified have been forwarded to the Army's “Surgeon General for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive follow-up’ medical evaluation program on all individuals who can be located. This effort, which is currently underway, will require the assistance and cooperation of at least two other agencies, the National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council Medical Follow-up Agency and the Veterans Administration. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks,. Ihave attempted to describe within the structure of security considerations 15 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
«. Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : cS RE E-B and the right of privacy of the individuals involved the external factors which caused our government to initiate a testing program; the manner dn which the program was conducted; and the actions we have recently initiated in an attempt to insure that the participants in the program have and will continue to receive appropriate medical treatment, Mr, Chairman, as I indicated at the outset, the Inspector General investigation has not been completed. As soon as any additional information is developed, it will be provided to you, I will be pleased to attempt to respond to any questions you may have, . 16 Approved For Release 2004/06/29 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7 |