Approved . pp For Release 2000/08/15 : CIA-RDP962007 92R000707020005-3 _ Proposed information-processing influences. The alternative side to this debate suggests that errors are caused by generally adaptive information-processin g styles and short-cuts. This re- search has spread from the attributional field into that of human judgment and decision making in the more general sense. Research- ers have pointed out many weaknesse jn human cognition , put this paper describes only three which haye been highlighted by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (Ps cholopical Review, 1978, 237-251). This is because these three informa on-processing factors may rep- resent the more general processes that underlie many more specific cognitive errors. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that people habitually use certaim cognitive short-cuts to make their decisions and judgments quickly & a effectively. Generally these strategies, or heuristics , are effectite, but their use may iso lead to errors. The first of these heuristi¢s is termed judgme t by availability, where people's judgments abot the relative frequency of objects or the likelihood of events may be influenced by /the relative availability of these objects or events, availability yeferring to the accessibility of items in perception, memo y, or imagination. The second heuristic is termed judgment _b epresentptiveness or similarity, where an indi- vidual's judgment of the probability that two events are related de- pends very much on tha degree to which these events have features that are similar to each ome. The final information-processin g strategy which can lead to ~rrors is judgment by anchoring and adjustment. Here, individyats are said to make judgments by start- ing with an jnitial value o¥ po ition which is then insufficiently ad- justed to account for new fincomns information--this jis one way in which erroneous peliefs nfay be aintained even in the face of dis- confirming information. Conclusions This paper descyibes three areas of kognitive social psycho- logical research that Year on the question 0 errors in everyday human judgment and jnference and consequenWly on the examination of errors in coneclusiqns about the occurrence 0 psi in spontaneous settings. The resee ch described does not as yet form any coher- ent theory of humary error and indeed, may not Be new to parapsy~ chologists. However, this paper is intended to sernye three func- tions: (1) to integp ate some findings of relevance 16 parapsychology and present them ih a way thet shows their context W hin psycho- logical research on human judgmental error; (2) to infot or remina parapsychologists hf the various ways in which false-positive or false-negative con¢ lusions about the occurrence of psi may be reached, which may help in eventually identifying mistaken conclu- sions about the operation of psi and consequently enhancing the quality of data on the occurrence of psi; and (3) to stress that while there is some emphasis in parapsychology on mistaken conclusions that psi has occurred , psychological research on human error logically cuts poth ways, and can aid in the identification of false-positive and false-negative conclusions about the occurrence of psi. ANOMALOUS HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION (AHCI): TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ANOMALY (OR, HOW TO MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE COMPUTERS) K. Morgan (Dept. of Psychology, University of Edinburgh. 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 SIZ, Scotland) This paper is an attempt to clarify in what manner a genuine anomaly can be distinguished from an incident explicable by known physical means. It also tries to exemplify the various methods that could be used to simulate an anomalous human-computer interaction (AHCI). This paper does not dwell in any more than a superficial manner upon the psychology involved in manipulating observers which would allow the described physical strategies to be carried out. That would demand a paper in its own right. Part of the research being carried out at the Koestler Chair and other institutions is the investigation of anomalous human- computer interaction. As with any area of parapsychological re- search there always exists the danger of the researcher mistaking a normally explicable phenomenon as an anomaly. This paper was written to help people who are confronted by an unusual happening on a computer to evaluate the situation and to be aware of the pos- sibility of there being normal methods of simulating almost any anomaly. The various categories into which both simulated and genuine anomalies could fall can be separated into the following: (1) Human. The majority of so-called anomalies might be found to be caused by the users' ignorance of their own computer system or aspects of it. This, coupled with the human trait of forcing unconnected events into meaningful patterns, might explain many anomalies. (2) Software Anomaly. The methods of achieving the simula- tion of a software (nonhardware- based) anomaly can be broken down into the following eategories: (a) Replacement of the target program. The target program or process is exchanged for an amended version that contains the extra “feature” that will become the "anomaly." A pproved For Release 2000/08/15 : CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3 1 eget
SR OR mae 2 PF FR F 110 Approved For Release 2000708415 : CIA-RDP96-087:92R600701020005-3 111 (b) Adjusting or amending the target program or process, In this scenario the target process is amended at the same time or very shortly before the "anomaly." This would of course demand the knowledge of the specification of the software being used at the target site. (c) Breaches in computer /organizational security both prior to_and simultaneously with anomaly. These are often a necessary prerequisite of any of the above software anomalies. The breach in security could even be from a remote site, via a computer communica- tion link that has access to the target system. The use of inter- preted languages or online debugging (disassembling) tools makes this reasonably easy. (3) Hardware Anomaly. This section covers any physical ef- fect that occurs to an item of computer machinery (but not to the logic controlling it). These "effects" could often take the form of either repairing or destroying an item of equipment. These items could be anything from a personal electronic belonging (e.g., an electronic watch) to a computer's storage device. (a) Replacement. In this scenario an exact duplicate of the target is prepared and exchanged for the target item when the op- portunity arises. The duplicate has some extra "feature" which will be used by the false. anomalist to simulate the required anomaly. (b) Adjustment /destruction--"live." To adjust or amend an item of equipment is not as difficult as it might appear. Much com- puting equipment is sensitive to one or many of the following en- vironmental influences: weak magnetic fields, physical force (e.g., bending), exposure for long periods to strong sunlight, contact with sharp objects, extreme humidity, temperatures outside the tolerated range, contact with static electricity, and any substances or object making contact with a recording or electrically conductive surface. (c) Breaches in computer/organizational security before or simultaneously with anomaly. In contrast to the previous scenarios, simulating hardware anomalies requires the physical presence of the false anomalist or environmental influence in order to achieve the anomaly, (4) External to Computer System. Such things as electrical mains fluctuations are a possible example of natural "disasters," and if the fluctuation coincided with some other meaningful event the users might decide that an anomaly had occurred which had a correlation with that meaningful event, thus starting local lore about this false correlation. Methods of Avoiding Computer-Based Fraudulent Anomalies Examples of new technology that might help alleviate the above- mentioned problems are (1) WORMS (write once read many times) optical disks. These (at present) are noneditable and are immune to "srubby thumbs," magnetic fields, and static. They are therefore much better potential psi-corruption targets than the currently favorite floppy disk, especially if the target data on the disk are well en- erypted and the disk uniquely identified. (2) Optical fiber cables. This makes data transmission line monitoring or adjustment much more complex. (3) Automated technical advisers for computer-based security. These can rapidly and thoroughly analyze a large and highly com- plex system specification for security weaknesses. They are only as good as the level of detail or accuracy in the specification and the expertise of their user. (4) Gypsy verification environments & (5) Program analysis tools. Both of these methods could be useful in the analysis of a piece of code that has been in an "anomaly." Again, they are sub- ject to the same weaknesses discussed under the previous heading. (6) Cryptographic methods. These can be highly effective in preventing access to information, provided a sufficiently good encryption method is selected. (7) Shielding. Simple shielding of vdu sereen emission can eliminate the chance of a computer sereen being reconstituted out- side the system confines. Conclusion This paper has tried to portray the various scenarios that could be misinterpreted as an "anomalous" human-computer inter- action (AHCI). It also tried to show that there are conceptual pat- terns that allow AHCI anomalies to be categorized, along with their possible fraudulent explanations. It is hoped that armed with such a method of categorization experimenters may be able better to re- cord and evaluate the intriguing field of AHCI. In such evaluations it may be more cost effective to create a means of detecting a fraud- ulent anomaly rather than to proof a system against every possible threat. A highly motivated false anomalist with large financial and time resources might be able to create fraudulent anomalies, regard- less of the tightest precautions. Experimenters might therefore find it helpful to adopt an experimental condition where no one Approved For Release 2000/08/15 : CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3
ca el ea ll aE ec le Nl I Al A cl le Approved For Release 2000/08/15 : CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3 112 Papers star "makes or breaks" the results. By using large "anonymous" source groups the incentive for any one individual to create false anomalies might be greatly reduced. ' our objective should not only b STATISTICAL ISSUES AND METHODS* WHEN WILL WE BEGIN TO REDUCE ALPHA AND BETA ERRORS IN STATISTICAL PSI EXPERIMENTS? Ulrich Timm (Institut fir Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene, Eichhalde 12, 7800 Freiburg i.Br., West Germany) In many psi experiments some statistical selection errors are made, after whose correction the initial /statistical significance dis- appears. These are Type\l errors, mére simply called alpha errors. That does not necessarily thean, however, that in these experiments real psi effects do not exist, since the usual methods, if utilized correctly, are often so ineffgctive--With regard to the rareness, instability , and inconsistency\of ps¥ effects--that they can only seldom lead to statistical significanfe. This inefficiency of statisti- cal methods creates Type Il ertorg, or beta errors. Therefore, he reduction of alpha errors and the related decrease of spurious Aignificances but also the reduction of beta errors and the related ifcrease of real significance. First I give an overview fof those alpha errors that I call statistical selection errors. ing three qualities (Timm, 2 1983, 194-229): (1) From a set of st¢tistical resulta a single result is se- (2) The selection is not performed rakhdomly but according to a criterion jthat is related to thé level of the single result in that/it direetly or indirectly favors positive results. (3) Despite this {success-dependent selection, the significance test is carriéd out and interpreted in the usual manner without any correction. *Chaired by Martin U. Johnson. Approved For Release 2000/08/15 : CIA-RDP96-00792R000701020005-3