Approved For Release 2001/04/02
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 200030002-5
value against Soviet employment of an aggres-
sive foreign
policy. Consequently, Lockwood
calls these statements declaratory deterrence,
As a check to verify the real Soviet view of given
U.S. doctrine, Soviet foTelgn policy bshavior Is
compared to their analysis of the U.S. doctrine.
By using a wide variety of sources including
journals whose articles have prior approval of
the C.P.S.U. and the formerly classified Soviet
general staff publication, Military Thought, Lock-
wood enables the reader to view U.S. strategic
doctrine through Soviet eyes.
Three themes emerge from the book. The first
is that Soviet strategic planners view U.S. doc-
trine within the framework of their own strategic
doctrine. This mirror Imaging was particularly
evident in the Soviet reaction to McNamara’s
assured destruction doctrine. Although this was
an arms control strategy designed to provide a
minimal nuclear capacity to inflict unacceptable
damage following a Soviet surprise attack, the
Soviets believed
It to be a nuclear warfighting
doctrine because
ail
of
their doctrines were
designed to win a nuclear war. The Soviets sim-
ilarly misinterpreted Nixon’s policy of realistic
deterrence. Lockwood also notes that the Soviets
tend to view purely academic discussions of
strategic doctrine as having the Imprimatur of
the government because all Soviet writings are
approved by the government.
Even though the
Soviets
ultimately recog-
nized that the U.S was Indeed moving toward a
deterrence
policy,
the
Kremlin was
puzzled
because according to Marxist-Lenlnist theory,
Imperialist America
is
inherently aggressive.
The Soviets resolved this contradiction by con-
cluding that the change in U.S doctrine from a
nuclear warfighting strategy was In response to
the rapid growth In Soviet strategic power. This
was particularly evident In the Soviet reaction to
realistic deterrence and the abandonment of
McNamara’s flexible response in favor of assured
destruction. Lockwood clearly states that it the
Soviets perceive us as abandoning a nuclear
warfighting doctrine because ot the buildup In
Soviet arms, then the Incentive
Is for them to
extract further concessions by building more
arms than negotiating arms limitation.
Finally, Lockwood concludes that tha Soviets
treat U.S. strategic doctrine seriously only if we
have sufficient military capabilities to match our
strategic pronouncements. The
Initial
Soviet
reaction to Schlesinger's limited nuclear option
policy of increased targeting flexibility was one
of concern inasmuch as the Soviets perceived
us as moving from a deterrence to nuclear war-
fighting strategy which Included a possible pre-
emptive strike. When, however, we neither deve-
loped an antiballistic missile system nor Increas-
ed our civil defense posture to meet the require-
ments of a limited nuclear option strategy, the
doctrine was quickly discredited. Accordingly,
Lockwood recommends that the United States
emphasize these two neglected areas in future
strategic doctrine.
This thought provoking and timely book Is a
must for all those concerned with U.S. strategic
planning. One hopes that Lockwood
will sim-
ilarly analyze the Soviet response to strategic
developments during the Reagan administration.
1st Lt. Jay L. Spiegel
331tt Ml Company, 97th USARCOM
Fort Meade, Md.
Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion?
by Martin Ebon, McGraw-Hill, New
York, 282 pages, $15.95.
Psychic Warfare poses the strong
possibility
that some type of future warfare may Include an
Orwellian component. This does not mean that
psychic warfare by Itself will supplant the more
traditional modes of war and the book’s context
tends to support this slant.
The book addresses the possible link between
psychic phenomena, extrasensory perception,
and mind control experiments with the future
prospect of military application, Thera is strong
ovidence in Ebon's book that the military, scien-
tific and intelligence communities of both the
United States and the Soviet Union have and are
making zealous attempts to harness the power
and potential of the mind to do things such as
move objects, to perceive events that have not
yet occurred, and to span time, distance and
space across all ideological and political boun-
daries. Thera have been attempts by U.S. and
Soviet scientists, plus scientists from nonaligned
nations, to “pool" the results of past psychic
experiments. Ebon’s book states that the Soviats
are playing down their interest In psychic appli-
cations, but in reality are mounting a large effort
to gain supremacy in this relatively new scien-
tific field.
The author’s basic premise is that all persons
are endowed with extrasensory ability, but do
not consciously apply it in their dally lives. There
are, however, a relatively small number of per-
sons that are keenly aware of their psychic gifts
that, under controlled
scientific conditions,
appear to experience visual and sensory percep-
tions "normal” people have not been able to
experience. The author contends that “normal’’
persons have
similar psychic experiences on
occasion
without being
able
to
explain
the
"occurrence."
»
Mind
altering, psychotronics and extrasen-
sory perception can bo frightening when further
explored. Ebon Illustrates this by explaining a
case In which the CIA conducted.experlments
using persons with keen psychic gifts to contact
agents that had died while on operational mis-
sions (CIA spy Oleg Penkovsy, for one). The
agency's justification for the experiments was
"to determine tha circumstances of apprehen-
sion, methods of interrogation, and the degree
of information disclosed during
Interroga-
tion(s).”
The military communities of both superpow-
ers are aware of the possibilities In the areas of
Intelligence and communications that psychic
warfare could afford them, some which could
enable them to "see” and ’’hear’’ Into enemy ter-
ritory without actually having to send an opera-
tional asset across national boundaries.
The ultimate use of psychic power would be
projection of mind power to a specific location,
say 2 Dzerzinksy Square, the KGB headquarters
in Moscow, and actually "picking up” Informa-
tion without the KGB knowing what is happen-
ing. Of course, the situation could be reversed.
It
all comes down to which nation wants
It
enough
to commit the money and
scientific
resources required.
If successful psychic war-
fare does occur in the near future, It would mean
that the nation using
it
first would have the
potential of keeping It secret from the rest of the
world for an undeterminable period. Once the
secret is out, however, there would be no telling
what Impact it would have on our planet'3 power
centers, and worse, how would further devel-
opment and use be controlled. Some means
would have to be found to curtail proliferation of
this new "weapon."
After reading this exciting book,
I came away
with the impression that Psychic Warfare is an
addition to the "Star Wars” package primarily
because of the vast possibilities
in collecting
military information through mind power. As
time goes on, new military uses should not be
discounted
if a nation is willing to invest a sub-
stantial
part
of
its
military,
industrial and
scientific resources toward achieving
it.
Michael 8. Evancevtch
U.S. Army, Retired
Crowword
MMitaiy Intelligence
Approved For Release 2001/04/02
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 200030002-5