Approved For Release
DAMI-ISH
SUBJECT:
INSCOM Project
(U)
control
scarce resources
(time,
funds,
and people)
blow.
All RVers have
other,
normal
duties
in their parent organizations.
As might be expected,
this leads to considerable scheduling conflicts.
Because IGFP enjoys what
amounts to second priority,
sessions are often cancelled or are impossible
to schedule.
It
is fair to saythat this issue has hindered progress and
has been dysfunctional to the RV process itself.
The latter point
is that
the RVer finds
it difficult to muster requisite positive attitude and
"seriousness of purpose," knowing that RV tasks rank below those of his
primary duties
.
3.
(S)
Operations.
Introduction of the RV process into actual operations
has been accomplished several
times.
This
is not to say that the IGFP
is
ready for full operational employment.
A great deal of further work
is
necessary to establish intelligence collection techniques.
Also,
no
mechanical system for responding to tasking exists.
Optimistically,
some
^
operational utility can be expected in
•
First utilization of this
special technique will most likely be along the lines of tip-off
(or
cueing)
to other collection systems.
These could then be brought to bear
on the target of interest.
4.
(U)
Comments.
a.
(S)
By common sense and disciplined procedures,
the
IGFP has come
as close to producing scientifically credible results
(without trying to)
as any previous work by so-called scientists/researchers.
We should not
lose sight of the fact that INSCOM
is not engaged in a venture
into science,
but rather one of a utility nature.
Personnel
involved are professional
intelligence officers representing the three major disciplines:
human,
photo,
and signal
intelligence.
b.
(S)
Notably,
the IGFP gauges how good individual sessions are
based on strict operational judgments
(how much usable intelligence
is
produced)
.
This
is
in stark contrast to projects in other places which
rely on exotic,
often flawed,
statistical methodologies to evaluate the
results
.
c.
(S)
The body of wisdom being accumulated
is not grounded on
stagnant repetitions of the basic SRI RV drill
first developed in the
early 1970s.
It is impressive that the project
is moving into type tests
in which several
iterations
(they call
it "building an intelligence
pyramid")
on the same target seem to provide a more accurate,
detailed
picture of the site.
Approved For Release 2003/09/10
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 200230045-6
Approved For Release 2003/1
6-00788R001 200230045-6
DAMI-ISH
SUBJECT:
INSCOM Project
(U)
d.
(S)
Data on each session is impeccably maintained.
In addition,
the managers have developed several visual tools that lay out clearly the
numbers of failures,
successes and in-betweens.
One
is not forced to
guess,
or have to pry out,
what has gone on at INSCOM.
5.
(U)
Recommendations:
a.
(S)
The current level of personnel assets should be immediately
stabilized for at least two years.
Intelligence analysts should be
a
direct part of the effort.
Because of disruptions caused by TDY trips,
other job commitments,
etc.,
personnel
involved in GRILL FLAME should be
fixed into some organization configuration controlled by the project
officer.
(Note:
It
is only fair to recognize that one cannot spend his
whole day doing RV.
Common sense should prevail and whenever possible
project personnel should be released to work wherever needed.)
b.
(0)
An adequate work and administrative area is needed.
It should
meet the general criteria established in paragraphs 2d(2)(6)
above.
c.
(S)
Because of the uniqueness and sensitivity of the project,
extraordinary measures should be established,
followed,
and inspected,
to
ensure that those individuals involved in the project do not lose career
standing in relation to peers.
For example,
a general officer review of
all
OERs and EERs appears
to be warranted.
There
is no small danger that
an individual's career, particularly under the present ad hoc personnel
situation, might be irreparably damaged by rating officials who feel
robbed of control of people under their supervision.
d.
(S)
Regardless of
the'; apparent near-term potential offered by
RV,
the INSCOM' s project status should remain one of familiarization and
training.
The work should not be prematurely thrust into the operational
arena.
For the next two years INSCOM should be permitted the "luxury"
of tightening up procedures and attempting product improvement.
The
project should have,
should it be needed,
support of any resources within
DOD.
An example might be USAF support in development and analyzing
intelligence targets.
e.
(U)
INSCOM is to be commended for its
logical,
level headed and
professional approach to a most curious problem.
WILLIAM
L.
STONER
Major,
GS
GRILL FLAME Coordinator
Approved For Release 2003/09/10
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 200230045-6