, “Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA \-RDP96- 00791R000200030040- 0 op bow Senet 362/93 NOFORN STUDIES IN INTELLIG NCE "ALL LL STATEMENTS OF FACT, OPINION, OR ANALYSIS EXPRESSED IN STUDIES IN - INTELLIGENCE ARTICLES ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT OFFICIAL POSITIONS OR VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR ANY OTHER US GOVERNMENT ENTITY. ; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VOL. 21 No. 4 — WINTER 1977 TR-SINT 77-004 ce cinta ee crnmmmmmennis S catememran messes ce ie cate teen ene te te tt ene ies ate are eee we “V3e7. ner NOFORN Approved For Release 2003/04/18 ; CIA-RD
“ ae BAS ait et pproved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0 rere NOFORN An untapped collection possibility PARAPSYCHOLOGY IN INTELLIGENCE: A PERSONAL REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS Dr. Kenneth A. Kress The Central Intelligence Agency has investigated the controversial phenomenon called parapsychology as it relates to intelligence collection. The author was involved with many aspects of the last such investigations. This paper summarizes selected highlights of the experiences of the author and others. The intent is not historical completeness. Files are available for those interested in details. Instead the intent is to record some certainly interesting and possibly useful data and opinions. This record is likely to be of future benefit to those who will be required to evaluate intelligence- related aspects of parapsychology. The Agency took the initiative by sponsoring serio but circumstances, biases, and fear of ridicule prevented CIA from completing a scientific investigation of parapsychology and its relevance to national security. During this research period, CIA was buffeted with investigations concerning iNegalities and improprieties of all sorts. This situation, perhaps properly so, raised the sensitivity of CIA’s involvement in unusual activities. The “ Proxmire Effect,” where the fear that certain Government research contracts would be claimed to be ill- founded and held up for scorn, was another factor precluding CIA from sensitive areas of research. Also, there tend to be two types of reactions to parapsychology: positive or negative, with little in between. Parapsychological data, almost by definition, are elusive and unexplained. Add a history replete with proven frauds and many people instantly reject the subject saying, in effect, “I would not believe this stuff even if it were true.” Others, who mostly have had personal “aonversion’” experiences, tend to be equally convinced that one unexplained success establishes a phenomenon. These prejudices make it difficult to evaluate parapsychology carefully and scientifically. Tantalizing but incomplete data have been generated by CIA-sponsored research. These data show, among other things, that on occasion unexplained results of genuine intelligence significance occur. This is not to say that parapsychology is a proven intelligence tool; it is to say that the evaluation is not yet complete and more research is needed. US parapsychological research, viewing. Psychokinetics is the machine or other object by ta person claims to to psychokinetics and remote eract with a kin to clairvoyance in tha oved from a known sensory link. Attention is confined purported ability of a person to int unexplained means. Remote viewing is a sense information about a site or person rem ports of extrasensory perception (ESP) capabilities have reached U.S. national security agencies at least since World War Il, when Hitler was said to rely on astrologers and seers. Suggestions for military applications of ESP continued to be received after World War Il. For example, in 1952 the Department of Defense was lectured on the possible usefulness of extrasensory perception in psychological wartare.! Over the years, reports continued to accumulate. In 1961, the reports n the Possible Usefulness of Extrasensory Perception in Psychological Warfare” tA. Puharich, “On the Fossib delivered to a 1952 Pentagon conference, The Washington Post, August 7) L977 «9 mmm Anecdotal re onan Approved For Release.2003/04/18--CIA-RDP 96-0764 30002000 cao, rt
ona” Parapsychology induced one of the earliest U. S. Government parapsychology investigations when the -chief of. CIA's Office of Technical Service. (then the Technical Services Division) became interested in the claims of ESP. Technical project officers soon contacted Stephen I. Abrams, the Director of the Parapsychological Laboratory, Oxford University, England. Under the auspices of Project ULTRA, Abrams prepared a review article which claimed ESP was demonstrated but not understood or controlla- ble. The report was read with interest but produced no further action for another decade. Two laser physicists, Dr. Russell Targ and Dr. Harold E. Puthoff, re-awakened CIA research in parapsychology. Targ had been avocationally interested in parapsy- chology for most of his adult life. As an experimentalist, he was interested in scientific observations of parapsychology. Puthoff became interested in the field in the early 1970s. He was a theoretician who was exploring new fields of research after extensive work in quantum electronics. In April of 1972, Targ met with CIA personnel from the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) and discussed the subject of paranormal abilities. Targ revealed that he had contacts with people who purported to have seen and documented some Soviet investigations of psychokinesis. Films of Soviets moving inanimate objects by “mental powers” were made available to analysts from OSL. They, in turn, contacted personnel from the’ Office of Research and Development (ORD) and OTS. An ORD Project Officer then visited Targ who had recently joined the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Targ proposed that some psychokinetic verification investigations could be done at SRI in conjunction with Puthoff. These proposals were quickly followed by a laboratory demonstration. A man was found by Targ and Puthoff who apparently had psychokinetic abilities. He was taken on a surprise visit to a superconducting shielded magnetometer being used in quark (high energy particle) experiments by Dr. A. Hebbard of Stanford University Physics Department. The quark experiment required that the magnetometer be as well shielded as technology would allow. Nevertheless, when the subject placed his attention on the interior of the magnetometer, the output signal was visibly disturbed, indicating a change in the internal magnetic field. Several other correlations of his mental efforts with signal variations were observed. These variations were never seen before or after the visit. The event was summarized and transmitted to the Agency in the form of a letter to an OSI analyst® and as discussions with OTS and ORD officers. The Office of Technical Services took the first action. With the approval of the same manager who supported the ESP studies a decade previously, an OTS project officer contracted for a demonstration with the previously described subject at SRI. For a cost of $874, one OTS and one ORD representative worked with Targ and Puthoff and the previously mentioned man for a few days in August, 1972. During this demonstration, the subject was asked to describe objects hidden out of sight by the CIA personnel. The subject did well. The descriptions were so startlingly accurate that the OTS and ORD representatives suggested that the work be continued and expanded. The same Director of OTS reviewed the data, approved another $2,500 work order, and encouraged the development of a more complete research plan. By October, 1972, I was the Project Officer. 1 was chosen because of my physics background to work with the physicists from SRI. The Office of Technical Service funded a $50,000 expanded effort in parapsychology.‘ The expanded investigation 2S. 1. Abrams, “Extrasensory Perception”, Draft report, 14 December 1965. ‘HL. E. Puthoff; Stanford Research Institute; Letter to K. Green/OSI, June 27, 1972. 4 Office of Technical Service Contract 8478, 1 October 1972 (CONFIDENTIAL). Bon d pproved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
So eet ny ES Calby? DOF Memorandum for"Director of Central Intelligence: Subject: Request: for—-~ ~~ Parapsychology enna included tests of several abilities of both the original subject and a new one. Curious data began to appear; the paranormal abilities seemed individualistic: For example, one subject, by mental effort, apparently caused an increase in the temperature measured by a thermistor; the action could not be duplicated by the second subject. The second subject was able to reproduce, with impressive accuracy, information sealed inside envelopes. Under identical conditions, the first subject could reproduce nothing. Perhaps even more disturbing, repeating the same experiment with the same subject did not yield consistent results. I began to have serious feelings of being involved with a fraud. Approximately halfway through this project, the SRI contractors were invited to review their results. After careful consideration of the security and sensitivity factors, the results were shared and discussed with selected Agency personnel during that and subsequent meetings. In February, 1973, the most recent data were reviewed; thereafter, several ORD officers showed definite interest in contributing their own expertise and office funding. The possibility of a joint OTS /ORD program continued to develop. The Office of Research and Development sent, new Project Officers to SRI during February, 1973, and the reports which were brought back convinced ORD to become involved. Interest was translated into action when ORD requested an increase in the scope of the effort and transferred funds to OTS. About this time, a third sensitive subject, Pat Price, became available at SRI, and the remote viewing experiments in which a subject describes his impressions of remote objects or locations began in earnest. The possibility that such useful abilities were real motivated all concerned to move ahead The contract required additional management review before it could be continued or its scope increased. The initial review went from OTS and ORD to Mr. William Colby, then the DDO. On 24 April, Mr. Colby decided that the Executive Management Committee should pass judgment on this potentially sensitive project. By the middle of May, 1973, the approval request went through the Management Committee. An approval memorandum was written for the signature of the DCI, then Dr. James Schlesinger.® Mr. Colby took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later. 1 was soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled. It is interesting to note that OTS was then being investigated for involvement in the Watergate affair, and that in May, 1973, the DCI issued a memorandum to all CIA employees requesting the reporting of any activities that may have been illegal and improper. As Project Officer, clearly my sense of timing had not been guided by useful paranormal abilities! During the summer of 1973, SRI continued working informally with an OSI officer on a remote viewing experiment which eventually stimulated more CIA- sponsored investigations of parapsychology. The target was a vacation property in the eastern United States. The experiment began with the passing of nothing more than __ the geographic coordinates of the vacation property to the SRI physicists who, in turn, passed them to the two subject, one of whom was Pat Price. No maps were permitted, and the subjects were asked to give an immediate response of what they remotely viewed at these coordinates. The subject came back with descriptions which were apparent misses. They both talked about a military-like facility. Nevertheless, a $C/TSD; Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director for Operations; Subject: Request for Approval of Contract; 20 April 1973 (SECRET). Approval of Contract; 4 May 1973 (SECRET). e56hinin 9 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040 =~ nae ——
i } R-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0 ee oe Parapsychology striking correlation of the two independent descriptions was noted. The correlation caused the OSI officer to drive to the site and investigate in more detail. To the surprise of the OSI officer, he soon discovered a sensitive government installation a few miles from the vacation property. This discovery led to a request to have Price provide information concerning the interior workings of this particular site. All the data produced by the two subjects were reviewed in CIA and the Agency concerned. The evaluation was, as usual, mixed.” Pat Price. who had no military or intelligence. background, provided a list of project titles associated with current and past activities including one of extreme sensitivity. Also, the codename of the site was provided. Other information concerning the physical layout of the site was accurate. Some information, such as the names of the people at the site, proved incorrect. These experiments took several months to be analyzed and reviewed within the Agency. Now Mr. Colby was DCI, and the new directors of OTS and ORD were favorably impressed by the data. In the fall of 1975, a Staternent of Work was outlined, and SRI was asked to propose another program. A jointly funded ORD and OTS program was begun in February, 1974.° The author again was the Project Officer. The project proceeded on the premise that the phenomena existed; the objective was to develop and utilize them. The ORD funds were devoted to basic studies such as the identification of measurable physiological or psychological characteristics of psychic individuals, and the establishment of experimental protocols for validating paranormal abilities. The OTS funds were to evaluate the operational utility of psychic subjects without regard to the detailed understanding of paranormal functioning. If the paranormal function- ing was sufficiently reproducible, we were confident applications would be found. Before many months had passed, difficulties developed in the project. Our tasking in the basic research area proved to be more extensive than time and funds would allow. The contractors wanted to compromise by doing all of the tasks with less completeness. The ORD scientists insisted that with such a controversial topic, fewer but more rigorous results would be of more value. The rigor of the research became a serious issue between the ORD project officers and SRI. with myself generally taking a position between the righteousness of the contractor and indignation of the research- ers. Several meetings occurred over that issue. As an example of the kinds of disputes which developed over the basic research, consider the evaluation of the significance of data from the “ESP teaching machine” experiments. This machine was a four-state electronic random number generator used to test for paranormal abilities. SRI claimed the machine randomly cycled through four states, and the subject indicates the current machine state by pressing a button. The state of the machine and the subject’s choice were recorded for later analysis. A subject “guessing” should, on the average, be correct 25 percent of the time. SRI had a subject who averaged a statistically very significant 29 percent for more than 2,500 trials. I requested a review of the experiment and analysis, and two ORD officers quickly and skeptically responded. They first argued that the ESP machine was —_——— 7K, Green; LSD/OSI Memorandum for the Record: Subject: Verification of Remote Viewing Experiments at Stanford Research Institute; 9 November 1975. (SECRET) ® Office of Technical Service Contract, FAN 4125-4099 Office of Research and Development Contract, FAN 4162-8103; 1 February 1974 (CONFIDENTIAL). . 10 queen Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-007 con ote eA a ee yey yepesrae teeny oor nyt 4 as agree oye 91000200030040-0.. mw
B : CIACRDP96-0079100020003040-Qereinnnnaterninnn in ntti Parapsychology aenena possibly not random. They further argued the subjects probably learned the nonran- dom machine patterns and thereby produced high scores.? During this review, it was noted that whether the machine was random or not, the data taken during the experiment could be analyzed to determine actual machine statistics. The machine randomness was then unimportant, because the subject’s performance could then be compared with actual machine performance.'? The ORD Project Officers, however, did not believe it would be worth the effort to do the extra analysis of the actual data. I disagreed. I had the Office of Joint Computer Services redo the data analysis. The conclusion was that during the experiment “no evidence of nonrandomness was discovered” and there was “no solid reason how he was able to be so successful." I further ordered the subject retested. He averaged more than 28 percent during another 2,300 trials. This information was given in written and oral form to the ORD Project Officers, who maintained there must be yet another flaw in the experiment or analysis, but it was not worth finding. Because of more pressing demands, the issue could not be pursued to a more definite conclusion. Concurrent with this deteriorating state of affairs, new Directors of ORD and OTS were named again. Since neither Director had any background or experience in paranormal research, the new Director of ORD reviewed the parapsychology project and had reservations. I requested a meeting in which*he said he could not accept this reality of paranormal functioning, but he understood his bias. He said that inasmuch as he could not make an objective decision in this field, he could simply follow the advice of his staff. The ORD Project Officers were feeling their own frustrations and uncertainties concerning the work and now had to face this unusual kind of skepticism of their new Director. The skepticism about the believability of the phenomenon and ~ quality of the basic research adversely affected the opinions of manv people in OTS. Support for the project was vanishing rapidly. As these pressures mounted, the. first intelligence collection operation using parapsychology was attempted. The taget was the Semipalatinsk Unidentified Re- search and Development Facility-3 (URDF-3, formerly known as PNUTS). The experimental collection would use our best subject, Pat Price. From experience it was obvious that Price produced bad data as well as good. Borrowing from classical communication theory concepts, this “noisy channel” of information could neverthe- less be useful if it were characterized. An elaborate protocol was designed which would accomplish two characterization measurements. First, we needed assurance the channel was collecting useful data. I reviewed the photos of URDF-3 and chose two features which, if Price described them, would show the channel at least partially working. Referring to Figure la, these features were the tall crane and the four structures resembling oil well derricks. It was agreed that if Price described these structures, I would be prepared to have him sign a secrecy agreement, making him witting, and collect more relevant intelligence details. Secondly, after a working channel was thus established, a signal-to-noise or quality characterization was ‘required. This would be done by periodic tests of the channel—that is, periodically Price would be asked to describe features of URDF-3 which were known. The accuracy of these descriptions would be used to estimate the quality of the data we had no obvious way of verifying. 2L, W. Rook; LSR/ORD; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Evidence for Non-Randomness of Four-State Electronic Random Stimulus Generator; 12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL). a S$ L, Cianci; LSR/ORD; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Response to Requested Critique, SRI wa so Random Stinmulus Generator Results; 12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL). = = 7 mm 4G, Burow; OJCS/ AD/BD: Memorandum for Dr. Kress; Subject: Analysis of the Subject-Machine Relationship; 8 October 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL). | Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0 6 A RR ETE TS