Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160006-8 a e THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Thursday, June 21, 1984 38 Ferment Seen in Soviet Policy By Davin Ienatius Staff Reporter of Tut WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON~—If Soviet policy seems confused to Western observers these days, there may be a simple reason: it is con- fused. Senior Reagan administration officials believe the Soviet leadership is in the midst of an unusual internal debate over foreign and domestic policies, in which some Soviet officials are privately criticiz- ing their hard-line superiors. In the Ameri- can viéw, this’Soviet debate offers new op- portunities and riskS“for the U.S. in a pe- riod of frosty superpower relations. The latest example of Soviet uncer- tainty, U.S. officials argue, is the Krem- lin's treatment of President Reagan’s re- cent remarks about a summit meeting with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko, Moscow finally got around this week to re- porting in the Soviet news media about Mr. Reagan's offer last Thursday of a summit, characterizing it as election-year rhetoric. But administration officials say the Krem- lin still hasn't taken a clear position on whether it favors a summit and what should be discussed. “There seems to be a fascinating uncer- tainty in the Soviet elite right now,” says a high-ranking administration official who deals with Soviet affairs. He believes that, on the summit issue, the Soviets ‘don’t want to close off any option’ and are “wary of denouncing” a meeting and thus adding to their current international isola- tion. ‘ U.S. intelligence about what goes on in- side the Kremlin is always murky at best. But as administration officials read the ev- idence, the current debate pits the hard- line views of Soviet Foreign Minister An- drey Gromyko against more pragmatic ar- gfuments advanced by officials who deal primarily with economic policy, such as Politburo members Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Tikhanov. The Gromyko group seems to be argu- ing that the Reagan administration is fun- damentally anti-Soviet and can’t be trusted under any circumstances. The other fac- tion appears to be taking a more cautious line, arguing that the Soviet Union needs Western technology and modern manage- ment for its economy, and that it makes sense to keep channels open to the U.S.— even to a propagandistic Reagan adminis- tration. There is a sharper d: -te Over eco- nomic policy. Some seni. Soviet econo- mists, perhaps with suppor’ :rom Mr, Gor- bachev, contend that the ak cials, symbolized these days by Politburo member Grigoriy Romanov, insist that re- form will weaken the Communist Party's political power and argue that the best eco- nomic medicine is to crack the whip and maintain discipline. Presiding over this contentious collec- tive leadership is Mr. Chernenko. U.S. offi- cials describe him as a weak leader, a “staff man” and “appointments secre- tary,” who succeeded Yuri Andropov this year on the condition that he. would allow unusual autonomy to “his"feHow, Politburo members, such as Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Gorbachev, in their areas of expertise. The Reagan administration may be overestimating the degree of friction in the un “ .. the U.S.S.R. is run by a gaggle, rather than a tightly knit body.” Kremlin and the extent of Moscow's for- ‘eign and domestic problems. U.S. officials “may also be mistaken if they assume the Soviets will agree soon to real improve- ments in superpower relations, such as a summit meeting. One Soviet expert at the State Depart- ment argues, for example, that the roots of the current hard-line policy go back to No- vember 1982, when Leonid Brezhnev was still the Soviet leader; the Kremlin isn’t likely to reverse this policy quickly, he maintains. This official also contends that policy conflict in the Kremlin is the rule, rather than the exception. But there are some intriguing signs of uncertainty and friction in the Kremlin these days. Administration officials cite the following examples: —Sniping and rumor-mongering. In re- cent conversations with Westerners, So- viets have criticized Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Chernenko. Some of these comments seem to reflect rumor-mongering by the KGB, the Soviet security and intelligence force, but U.S. officials believe they may signal a real debate within the Soviet leadership. “Russians all over the place—official and semiofficial—are now talking about politics in the Kremlin more openly than they have in years,’ says one senior administration official. He notes, for example, that some officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry have suggested that Mr. Gromyko may be excessively hard-line. ‘ —The March Switch. Many U.S. officials believe something happened in March that led to a hardenin (Dearkov made some surprising ¢ Aincluding’ «a. state 2 > epreater emphasis “:'on. g¢ deep-strike”’ . non-nucle was telling American officials early this year that the Soviets would come to the Olympics; suddenly, the policy switched. Administration officials also note that the Soviets seemed eager to discuss dead- locked arms-control issues with former na- tional security adviser Brent Scowcroft and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs David Jones, but when they arrived in Moscow last March for confidential discus- sions, they were rebuffed by top Soviet of- ficials. —Politburo portfolios. Two younger Po- : litburo members who appear to be rivals |. - to succeed Mr. Chernenko, 53-year-old Mr. Gorbachev and 61-year-old Mr. Romanov, recently have gained added responsibility. U.S. officials believe that Mr. Gorbachev, { as the senior member of the party secre- | tariat on the Politburo after Mr. Cher- |: ‘nenko, is now the No. 2 party leader, with |. growing involvement in foreign affairs; Mr. Romanov, meanwhile, appears to have |: taken control of ‘‘administrative organs” — such as the KGB, the police and the courts—as well as defense industry. What’s |: intriguing, U.S. officials say, is that no sin- gle member of the Politburo appears to~ have taken control of the most important portfolio of all—the responsibility for run- ning the party’s ‘organizational work,” which confers enormous patronage power. ; —Military. U.S. officials are studying - an interview by Soviet Chief of Staff Niko- - lai Ogarkov that appears last month in the military newspaper Red Star.@Marshall puildup of Soviet offensive nuclear forces gis becoming senseless." anda call for high-technology lon-nuclear ‘weapons. U.S, officials believe he was suggesting the need for reform in Soviet military doctrine and lobbying for more spending on high- tech weaponry. Analysts in and out of the Reagan ad- ministration disagree about how to read these tea leaves, and about whether they imply a gradual softening of Soviet policy toward the U.S. But most Soviet experts seem convinced that the Kremlin—after months of strident bluster toward the mments, : U.S.—is now on what one analyst calls “‘a Sticky wicket.” “You have a situation emerging where the U-S.S.R. is run by a gaggle, rather than a tightly-knit body, and what you're getting is a more dissonant information flow,’ says one State Department offi- | cial. Adds a top Soviet expert for several re- | ctEk:Reidasen260 NOB MB GIA ASS BOT GUROGDARA LE OMAR Bere bolcy Is eater authority. Bi hard-line offi- head of the Soviet Olympic Committee, the tip of the iceberg.” \ | |