44 SERRA LE A 2 Se OTE RE ADEA a. SPE ARTE SR EN TE I A FR hE Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030002-5 value against Soviet employment of an aggres- sive tareign policy. Consequently, Lockwood calls these statements deciaratory deterrence. Asachack to verify the real Soviet view of given U.S. doctrine, Soviet forelgn policy behavior |s compared to their analysis of the U.S. doctrine. By using a wide variety of sourcas inciuding journals whose articies have prior approval of the C.P.S.U. and the formerly classified Soviet general staff publication, Miitaty Thought, Lock- wood snables the reader to view U.S. strategic doctrine through Saviet eyes. Three themes emerge from the book. The first is that Soviet strategic planners view U.S. doc- trine within the framewerk of their own strategic doctrine. This mirror Imaging was particularly evident in the Soviet reaction te McNamara’s assured destruction doctring. Although this was an arms control strategy designed to provide a minimal nuclear capacity to inflict unacceptable damage totiowing a Soviet surprise attack, the Soviets belleved It to be a nuclear warfighting doctrine because all of their doctrines were designed to win a nuclear war. The Soviets sim- ilarly misinterpreted Nixon's policy of realistic deterrence. Lockwood also nates that the Soviets tend to view purely academic discussions of atratagic doctrine as having the imprimatur of the government because al! Soviet writings are approved by the government. Even though the Soviets ultimately recag- nized that the U.S was indeed moving toward a deterrence policy, the Kremlin was puzzled because according to Marxist-Leninist theory, imperialist America is inherently aggressive. Tha Soviets resolved this contradiction by con- cluding that the change in U.S doctrine from a nuclear warfighting strategy waa in response to the rapid growth In Soviet strategic power. This was particularly evident in the Soviet raaction to realistic deterrance and the abandonment of McNamara's flaxible response in favor of assured destruction. Lockwood claarly states that if the Soviets perceive us as abandoning a nuclear warfighting doctrine because of the buildup In Soviet arms, then the Incentive is for them to extract further concessions by building more arms than negotiating arms limitation. Finally, Lockwood concludes that tha Soviets treat U.S. strategic doctrine seriously only if we have sufficient military capabilities to match our strategic pronouncements. The initial Soviet reaction to Schlesinger’s limited nuclear option policy of increased targeting flexibility was one of concern inasmuch as the Soviets perceived us as moving from a deterrence to nuclear war- fighting strategy which included a possible pre- emptive strike. When, however, we nelther deve- loped an antiballistic missile system nor increas- ed our civil defense posture to meet the require- menis of a limited nuclear option strategy, the doctrine was quickly discredited. Accordingly, Lockwood recommends that the United States emphasize these two neglected areas in future strategic doctrine. This thought provoking and timely book is a must for ail these concerned with U.S. strategic planning. One hopes that Lockwood will sim- ilarty analyze the Soviet response to strategic developments during the Reagan administration. tat Lt. Jay L. Spiegel 33 tet Pat Compariy, 87th USARCOM Fort Meade, Md. Psychic Wartare: Threat or tusion? by Martin Ebon, McGraw-Hill, New York, 262 pages, $15.95. Paychic Weriare poses the strong possibility that some type of future warfare may Include an Orwellian component. This does not mean that psychic warfare by itself will supplant the more traditional modes of war and the book’s context tends to sunport this slant. The book addresses the possible link between psychic phenomena, extrasensory perception, and mind control experiments with the future prospect of military application. Thera is strong ovidence in Ebon’‘s book that the military, scion- tific and intelligence communities of beth the United States and the Soviet Union have and are making zealous attempts to harness the power and potential of the mind to do things such as move objects, to perceive evenis that have not yet occurred, and to span time, distance and space across all ideological and political boun- daries. There have been attempts by U.S. and Soviet scientists, plus scientists from nonaligned nations, to “pool” the results of past psychic experiments. Ebon’s book states that the Savists are playing down thelr interest in psychic appli- cations, butin reality are mounting a large effort to gain supremacy in this relatively new scien- tific field. The author's basic premise is that ail persons are endowed with extrasensory ability, but do not consciously apply it in their daily lives. There are, however, a relatively small number of per- sons that are keenly aware of thelr psychic gifts that, under controlled scientific conditions, appear to experience visual and sensory percap- tions “normal” people have not been able to experience. The author contends that “normal” persons have similar psychic experiences con occasion without being able to explain the “occurrence.” * Mind altering, psychotronics and extrasen- sory perception can be frightening when further explored. Ebon illustrates this by explaining a case In which the CIA conducted. experiments using persons with keen psychic gifts to contact agents that had died while on operational mis- sions (CIA spy Oleg Penkovsay, for one). The agency's justification for the experimants was "to determing the circumstances of apprehen- sion, methods of interrogation, and the degree of intormation disclosed during interroga- tion(s).” The rnilitary communities of both superpow- ers are aware of the possibilities in the areas of intelligence and communications that psychic wartare could afford them, some which could enable them to “sea” and “hear” into enemy ter- ritory without actually having to send an epera- tional asset across national boundaries. The ultimate use of psychic power would be projection of mind power to a specific location, say 2 Dzerzinksy Square, tho KGB headquarters in Moscow, and actually "picking up” informa- tion without the KGB know!ng what is happen- ing. Of course, the situation could ba reversed. It all comes down to which natlon wants it enough to commit the money and scientific resources required. if successful psychic war- fare does occur in the near future, it would mean that the nation using it first would have the potential of keaping It secret from the rest of the world for an undeterminable period. Once the secret is out, however, there would be na telling what Impact it would have on our planet's power centers, and worse, how would further devet- opment and use be controlied. Some means would have to be found to curtail proliferation of this naw “weapon.” After reading this exciting book, i came away with the impression that Psychic Warfare is an addition to the “Star Wars” package primarily because of the vast possibilities in collecting military information through mind power. As time goss on, new military uses should not be discounted if a nation is willing to invest a sub- stantial part of its military, industrial and scientific resources toward achieving it. Michael S$. Evancevich U.S. Army, Retired Croseword sciution Miltary Intelligence Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200030002-5