Approved For Release 2001/03/07
: CIA-RDP96-0078
00(/l-{
ooi^(ji*fcdodi-8
SECRET /NOFORN
PROJECT SUM STREAK
WARM 1 NG NOT I CE *
I
N
TELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
PROJECT NUMBERS
5239
DATE OF
SESSION!!
JAM 89
STARTs
0830
METHODOLOGY s
ERV
SESSION NUMBERS
DATE OF REPORTS
JAN 89
ENDS
0930
VIEWER
IDENTIFIERS
025
1.
(S/NF/SK)
MISSIONS
TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE SOVIET
UNION'S CARRIER CALLED THE MINSK.
2.
< S/NF/SK)
VIEWER TASKING*
AT COORD I NATES
9 1 82 1 2 / 87 1 423
TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE OBJECT
3 .
< S/NF/SK)
COMMENTS s
NO
1 NCLEMCENC I ES NOTED.
VIEWER WAS
ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE WEAPONS DOWN UNDER THE CARRIER.
VIEWER WAS
ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE
DECK.
VIEWER KNEW THAT THE OBJECT WAS
NAVIGATIONAL
IN NATURE.
REPORTING WAS GOOD.
OVERALL,
A
SUCCESSFUL BESS I ON
.
4.
(S/NF/SK)
EVALUATIONS 3
HANDLE
V I A SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
SECRET/NOFORN
CLASSIFIED BYs
DIA
<DT)
DECLASSIFY s
OADR
Approved For Release 2001/03/07
: CIA-RDP96-00789R001 401 430001 -8
Approved For Release 2001/03/07
: CIA-RDP96-00789R001 401 430001 -8
' Moscow has further maintained that the Sovi-
et interceptors issued all the proper warnings
prior to the destruction of the aircraft. Yet the
transcript of the Soviet
pilots’ communica-
tions with
their ground
controllers
clearly
contradict this claim. KAL Flight 007 was in-
tercepted and destroyed
for having entered
Soviet Airspace. The Soviet explanation has
not been accepted by either the United Na-
tions
or
the
International
Civil
Aviation
Organization.
The Response
Soviet Military Power 1984 has reported the
continuing expansion and improvement of the
Soviet Union’s
military
capabilities
across
the entire range of potential conflict:
v,* the modernization, increased capa-
bilities and increased survivability of
Soviet intercontinental and theater
nuclear forces,
• the continuing development of new
generations of ICBMs specifically
v, designed to destroy US missile silos
and the bases of US manned bomber
deterrent forces,
• the continuing deployment of mobile
SS-20 LRINF missiles,
• the swift advances in nuclear and
conventional cruise missile capabilities,
• the introduction of new land, sea
and air weapons systems, and the
parallel improvements in combined
arms capabilities,
• the continuing modernization and
growth of a logistics system designed to
sustain Soviet forces in the field for
60 to 90 days,
• the continuing high priority for
military research, development and in-
dustry, and the exploitation of Western
technology, and
• the increasing evidence of Soviet
willingness to project and use military
power, as reflected in the preceding case
studies.
In light of this threat to the United States
and its Allies, the challenge is clear. We must
maintain
military
capabilities
sufficient to
convince the Soviets that the costs of aggres-
sion would be far greater than any possible
benefit. These capabilities are the cornerstone
, of our defense policy. US policy toward the
' Soviet Union, however, is not merely based on
deterrence
of
Soviet
aggression.
As
the
United States has stressed, we are firmly com-
mitted, as well, to the pursuit of a compre-
hensive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed
at minimizing the risk of war and solving
some of the real problems in our relationship.
Reducing arms and ensuring a more stable
military
balance
stand
at
the
top
of
our
agenda.
The United States’
strategic and conven-
tional deterrent has been effective in keeping
the peace for more than a generation. In the 38
years since World War II—years marked by
periods of major tension and crisis—there has
been no nuclear conflict. There has been no
military conflict between East-West in Euro-
pe, nor any direct combat between the forces
of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations in any
corner of the globe.
Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union
has expanded and modernized
its
military
forces despite US restraint in weapons pro-
grams
and
efforts
to
achieve
meaningful
negotiated arms reductions. It is because we
recognize the reality of the Soviet threat that
we are taking the necessary steps to maintain
a truly credible deterrent capability and, thus,
to preserve peace and freedom, while continu-
ing to work for significant, equitable and veri-
fiable arms reductions.
We harbor no
illusions about the
conse-
quences of any nuclear war between ourselves
and the Soviet Union. We believe that neither
side could win such a war, but this belief alone
is not
sufficient
to assure prevention
of a
nuclear war or coercion. We seek to maintain a
stable strategic deterrent through a range of
strategic retaliatory forces—a Triad of land-
based ICBMs, submarine-launched
ballistic
missiles and manned strategic bombers. This
combination of retaliatory options is designed
to complicate Soviet planning for any execu-
tion of a successful attack against all three
force components, while at the same time de-
fending against Soviet technological break-
throughs against any single leg of the Triad.
In addition to the multiplicity and flexibility
provided in the Triad, strategic nuclear deter-
rence requires an effective command, control
and communications system. Our goal, our
strategy and our defense programs are design-
ed to ensure that the Soviet leadership under-
stands as well that there can be no winner in a
nuclear war and that the West has the confi-
dence to resist Soviet intimidation.
Soviet advances put at risk the elements of
133
Chapter VII
The Global Challenge
Approved For Release 2001/03/07
: CIA-RDP96-00789R001 401 430001 -8