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nature of the phenomenon. On the other hand, however, the findings obtained in these studies
actually argue against operational applications in the intelligence community.
Broadly
speaking,
it appears that the conditions under which intelligence information is gathered, the
nature of the targets, the unavailability of feedback, and the inconsistency with which accurate
viewings are obtained may all limit the usefulness of the phenomenon in intelligence
operations.
Further, many significant boundary conditions have not been examined and the
scientific basis for generalizing from laboratory to field settings has not been provided.
Given these observations,
it appears that the existing research does not justify operational
applications and, in fact, vis a vis the known boundary conditions, argues against operational
applications.
Interview Findings
The second component of the operational evaluation was the interviews conducted
with the various parties who had direct involvement in the remote viewing program in various
intelligence operations. A detailed description of the procedures used in interviewing
program participants and the results obtained in individual interviews is presented in
Appendix C; here, we briefly summarize the interview procedures before turning to the
principal findings which they generated.
Structured interviews were conducted with the three principal types of program
participants: recent users of the remote viewing service, the remote viewers themselves, and
the Program Manager.
Separate interview protocols were developed for each type of
respondent to capture their unique perspectives.
The interview questions were written to
obtain objective information about characteristics of the program as opposed to more
subjective evaluative assessments of parapsychological phenomena.
All questions were
reviewed by AIR psychologists.
Interview Results: End Users.
The interviews conducted with representatives of end
user groups were particularly noteworthy: these interviews directly examined the accuracy and
utility of the information being provided by the remote viewers and provided user assessments
of the operational value of the viewings.
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As can be seen in the individual interview reports (Appendix C), initial interest in the
potential uses of remote viewing was linked to contact with the Program Manager.
Typically,
users decided to try out the viewings on an exploratory basis.
The primary reasons users
were willing to explore the potential value of this technique were that it might (a) provide
information otherwise difficult or impossible to obtain, and (b) provide information more
rapidly and economically than other sources.
All of the users indicated that viewings might
be especially attractive when other, more traditional options had been exhausted.
The tasks assigned to viewers involved a number of different types of targets.
Although all of these targets were relevant to operational intelligence issues, the targets were
not the same as those reported in the laboratory experiments.
The targets included people,
their backgrounds, and their actions, as well as their locations.
Likewise, the typical tasks
asked of the remote viewers were dissimilar to laboratory conditions: they were asked to
identify objects at specified locations and where certain objects might be found. When
responding to these task demands, the remote viewers typically had at least some background
knowledge; in some cases,this background knowledge was substantial.
Typically, three
independent viewings were obtained.
The results of each viewing were summarized in a three
or four page report which included drawings and verbal descriptions.
With regard to the information provided in each report, five general observations
emerged across all interviews:
•
The information provided in the reports was stated in broad, vague terms.
•
The reports were most likely to prove accurate with regard to general
stereotypical characteristics of the situation.
Such results might be attributable
to the background information available to the viewers.
•
The reports were most likely to prove inaccurate with regard to concrete
specifics of the task.
For example, the reports often were not consistent with
key known facts nor did they provide information about the unique features of
a location.
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•
A large amount of irrelevant and often inaccurate information was contained in
the reports, thus making them difficult to apply without substantial interpretive
effort.
•
The reports independently provided by different remote viewers displayed
many inconsistencies.
Because the viewings were not consistent with each other, because inaccuracies were
observed, and because the information lacked the specificity needed for intelligence
operations, the viewings were never used as a primary source of evidence in making
decisions.
In fact, even the most favorable of the user groups found the information
inadequate for operational decisions.
Instead,
it was used to
fill in background information on
people that could not be readily obtained through available assets.
All of the users noted that
viewings should only be considered as providing supplemental information, and should be
judiciously interpreted if used at all.
The perceived utility of the information varied with the nature of the organization
using the viewing services.
Typically, viewings were seen as more valuable when the
organization involved did not have adequate assets available and when there was no other
convenient way of obtaining requisite information. When other information sources were
available, the users found the viewings to be less valuable.
In all cases, the users remarked
that they would continue to consider working with the viewers on an exploratory basis.
However, in most cases the users were not willing to invest their own operational funds to
obtain viewings.
In part this was an issue of cost; in part, however, the users felt that
because the remote viewing process was controversial, official acknowledgement of its value
was essential for routine use in intelligence gathering.
This point was illustrated by the
manager of the most favorable user group, who noted that many of the analysts were critical
of the technique and unwilling to apply
it unless specifically directed to do so.
Remote Viewers.
The three remote viewers we interviewed were all working in the
intelligence community when they were recruited to be viewers.
Although one viewer was
subjected to a formal screening process, all were primarily selected on the basis of their
interest in parapsychology.
The viewers all received formal training as described in Appendix
C and continued to extend this initial training through active exploration of various
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parapsychological techniques.
The viewers used a variety of techniques to produce viewings
including automatic writing, meditation, and channelling.
With regard to the procedures used in generating viewings, a number of factors were
noted that influenced the nature and outcomes of the viewers' efforts.
First, the viewers
disagreed as to how useful it was to have background information concerning the nature of
their tasking.
Second, the viewers noted that the usefulness of viewings depended on having
sophisticated, knowledgeable users who accepted the technique and were willing to actively
work with what was necessarily somewhat ambiguous information.
Third, they uniformly
agreed that the types of information requested — such as activities of individuals and specific
locations of specific people or objects — were not particularly compatible with their remote
viewing experiences.
In addition to these observations, the viewers indicated a number of other
considerations that might contribute to program outcomes.
Some of these considerations,
such as balancing work load and the repetitive nature of specific tasks, related to better
management.
Other considerations, such as management support and the availability of
managers familiar with the process, related to the day-to-day management of the program.
From a parapsychological perspective, a potentially disturbing aspect of the interview
was that the remote viewers commented that their written reports were occasionally
inconsistent with their viewings.
They themselves considered
it appropriate to make the
written reports consistent with known characteristics of the target, even if the report was
different from their viewing.
Similarly, the remote viewers commented that previous
managers also changed viewers' reports to make them more consistent.
The Program Manager.
Appendix C presents a summary of the interview with the
most recent program manager.
Although the manager did not have any prior background in
parapsychology, he did bring to the program a background in operational intelligence.
This
background played an important role in allowing the manager to recruit clients.
Most clients,
however, had been interested in the program in the past — an interest maintained in part
because the program provided a rapid turnaround of otherwise difficult-to-obtain information.
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