Approved For Release 2000/(S£CREJ*DP96-00789R002200440001-9
(S/NF)
As OTS was then sponsoring psychic research,
although they
were
"not
in the research business,"
they asked that
something
of genuine
operational
significance be done.
To meet this challenge,
Pat
Price',
a
person with purported psychic abilities,
was tasked
to
locate code rooms
in two foreign embassies.
He located both correctly.
He also provided
a
lot
of additional
information,
much of which was vague
or
incorrect.
The
operations officer
stated,
"It
is my considered opinion that this
technique—whatever
it
is—offers definite operational possibilities."
However,
the OED project officers concluded that
the research was not
productive
or even competent and that research support
to
SRI
should be
dropped.
In OTS,
the feeling was that
their charter would not allow them
to fund basic research.
Therefore,
all agency funding
in paranormal
research was
stopped.
As
the operational utility was
still conceivable,
it was decided that Price would work for CIA under
a personal
service
contract
.
(S/NF)
Price was then given a
set
of geographic coordinates
in Libya.
He described
a guerrilla training site and
an underwater
sabotage training
facility several hundred kilometers away on the
sea coast.
The new
information produced by Price was
later verified by reconnaissance and
the
undersea facility was
similar
to the description given by
a collateral
agent.
The Libyan desk officer quickly asked for more data and these
requests were given to Price.
Two days
later,
however,
Price died of
a
heart attack and the CIA-sponsored intelligence collection tests were
ended.
(S/NF)
At
this point
the Defense
Intelligence Agency
(DIA)
became
interested
in the
field.
The DIA interest resulted from an
intelligence
production request.
This request resulted
in the publication
of
a 1972
study entitled,
"Controlled Offensive Behavior—USSR."
A great
deal
of
interest was
shown
in this
study,
particularly the sections
on
parapsychology.
Several members of DIA met with CIA action officers
to
review the results
of CIA parapsychology experiments.
The DIA did not,
however,
fund any research until
1978.
Between the point
in 1975 when
the
CIA left
the field and DIA's entry
in 1978,
various research projects
at
SRI were sponsored by the Army,
Navy and Air Force.
Each of these will
be
discussed
later.
(S/NF)
In his
1977
summary article on the CIA's
involvement with
parapsychology
("Parapsychology
in Intelligence:
A Personal Review and
SGI
I
Conclusions ,")
makes
a number of
interesting points
that
should
be examined
in
light of current
information.
He
says,
"It
is my opinion
that,
as
it relates
to intelligence,
sufficient understanding and
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000708/08
: CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9
Approved For Release 2000/0&SC RlE-'fcDP96-00789R002200440001 -9
SGI
I
(S/NF)
assessment
of parapsychology has not been achieved.”
He
then allud es
to
observations and experiments
that defy explanation by other
means.
believes
that
the principal problem
is
that
the research has been funded
by military and intelligence organizations.
These agencies
all wanted
quick and relevant results with no attention
to fundamental mechanisms
or
experimental variables.
He further concludes,
"Unless
there
is
a major
breakthrough
in understanding,
the situation
is not
likely
to change."
Unfortunately, ^^^^fremarks went unheeded for nearly ten years.
During
that
time,
the
sponsoring agencies
insisted on applications research,
while
the elements needed
for
a fundamental understanding
of
the phenomena
were given scant attention.
Recognizing the points made by^^^^and
noting
the participation
of various DoD elements
in funding parapsychology
experiments,
the DIA
initiated
a joint
service research program
in
1980.
The goals
of this program were
to continue
the applications-oriented work,
but
also
to fund basic
scientific
experiments.
It was also hoped
that
a
joint contract would result
in better utilization
of
funds.
This program,
called
"Grill
Flame," was moderately successful
as will
be discussed
in
detail
in
a
later
section.
It was not until
1985,
however,
that
an
R&D
organization financed
a program
to
look for fundamental mechanisms,
and
basic
science investigation began.
(This,
too,
is covered
in
a
later
section
.
)
(S/NF)
In summary,
the CIA spent $195,000 from 1971
to 1975
on
parapsychology research.
Various experiments were conducted and
the
experimental data gathered were very frustrating,
A large portion was
completely wrong,
another portion was questionable,
but
there were almost
always
a
few gems
(e.g.
,
the Price crane)
that defied explanation and
whetted
the appetite
for more.
Other problems experienced by CIA projects
were
inconsistency
and lack of reproducibility of experimental
results.
There were also problems with experimental
design.
Such problems will
accompany this kind of research for many years,
until we understand their
causes and how
to prevent
them.
Lack of adequate funding
is
also
a
persistent problem.
Ultimately
though,
it appears
that
the CIA abandoned
the research
field,
more because of
internal political problems,
than any
scientific consideration.
(S/NF)
The CIA-funded research,
did establish
that remote viewing
of
geographical
and technical features
is possible,
"i
, e ., results cannot be
assigned
to any other known cause,"
and
that descriptive aspects are
better described than analytical concepts.
Most
important,
the projects
SG1I
SGI
I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/08/08
: CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9
Approved For Release 2000/M»^:«C|toRDP96-00789R002200440001-9
(S/NF)
showed
that obtaining operationally useful data
is possible.
This was,
to
DoD funding agencies,
the most critical finding as the operational
potential was the element
that made funds available.
Additionally,
the
CIA work showed that
a target can be accessed by geographical coordinates
as well
as by means
of
a person
at
the target
site.
While few data were
acquired,
it was postulated that
standard medical/psychological
screening
is of
little use.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/08/08
: CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9
Approved For Release 2000/0gf|^|{^DP96-00789R002200440001-9
SECTION 2. THE SERVICE YEARS (U)
(S/NF)
Service funding for parapsychology from 1975
to
1979 was
as
follows
:
SG1A
DATES
1975-
1976
1976-
1979
1977-
1980
1978-
1980
1979-
1980
ORGANIZATION
NAVALEX
FTD
MIA
AMSAA
INSCOM
BUDGET
( SKI
$
$300
$281
$230
$
(S/NF)
In addition,
during these years,
the DIA provided $228,000
from 1978
to
1980.
In
all,
about $1,293,000 was
spent over
five years
or
an average of $258,600 per year.
The annual
funds could support only
a
very few researchers,
so that
the chances
for
significant progress were
correspondingly limited.
Note
that
the $1,293,000 was not
for
a single
program over five years,
but rather
seven different programs each with
its
own goals and objectives.
These programs are discussed below.
A.
(U) NAVALEX
(S/NF)
In the NAVALEX program,
the ability of
individuals
to perceive
remote faint
stimuli
at
a noncognitive
level
of awareness was
investigated.
To do this,
changes
in
a
subject's brainwave
(EEG)
production were monitored while
light flashes were generated
on
a random
schedule
in
a remote
laboratory.
A diagram of the experimental
apparatus
is
shown
in Figure
2.
A statistical correlation was observed,
but
it was
very weak and would require additional research.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2000/08/08
: CIA-RDP96-00789R002200440001-9