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SUMMARY
Svtyeci
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proved
to
be
unsuc-
The remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3
byj
cessful
.
This. conclusion was reached only after
a careful
review of the
tape
recordings,
tape transcripts,
and sketches
that were generated during the four-
day experiment.
During
the first day's
session,!
1)
accurately described the location and type of
target
(that
information had been given
to him
by the experimenters)
but failed on the layout
and types of buildings,
2)
saw
a gantry crane for heavy lifting,
3)
tended
to
spend
too much
time on specifics only
to say,
"I'll
come back
to
that,"
but seldom
did,
and
4)
successfully evaded drawing
a perimeter of the
area even
though
he was asked
to
do
this
twice.
Therefore,
nothing positive
to validate remote viewing resulted from the first
day's
session.
SI
was contacted by phone that evening by one of the experimenters
and was
told
to concentrate on
the crane and
its relationship
to
the dominant
three-story building
(Building
1)
that
he had seen during that day's
session.
He was
also
told
that they wanted
a drawing of
the perimeter fence.
On
the second day,
supplied the most positive evidence yet for
the remote-viewing experiment with
his
sketch of the rail-mounted gantry crane.
It seems
inconceivable
to
imagine how he could
have
drawn
such
a
likeness
to
the actual
crane
at URDF-3
unless:
1)
he actually
saw
it through remote viewing,
or
2)
he was
informed of what
to draw by someone
knowledgeable of URDF-3.
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JJ UltS
The second possibility
is mentioned only because
the experiment was not controlled
to discount the possibility that^Bfrcould
tal k ^bthirlpeople.
SI
si
commented that he was
seeing
a
lot of things
this
second day that
he hadn't seen
the previous
day.
In
fact,
he mentioned seeing
several
landmark-
type objects
that simply did
not exist at URDF-3.
One explanation of this dis-
crepancy could
be that if he mentioned fenou^h specific objects,
he would surely
hit on
one object that
is actually present.
This could explain
the
inconsistency
between:
1)
his most positive evidence
of the experiment
-
a
sketch of
a
rail -mounted gantry crane,
and
2)
the large number of objects
he sees
that,
in
reality,
are simply not present at URDF-3.
this discrepancy between whatppp sees
and what
is really there certainly
would make
it difficult for the eventual
user of his
remote-viewing data
since
he would
not know how
to differentiate
the fact from the fiction.
At this
stage of
the experiment,
the data
is
inconclusive
to validate Price's capability
of remote
viewing.
was
shown
a
sketch of
a
perspective of the Operations Area
at
URDF-3
third day and was
told
that this
was
a sketch of the actual
target.
said
he recognized the area
but claimed that only one of the
four headframes
was present now.
That was wrong,
but
his most damaging
state-
ments
had
to
do with
his
interpretation of Building
(the underground
build-
ing)
at URDF-3.
With
the sketch
as
a
reference,
he
"saw"
the four main surface
protrusions of Building
as
four separate above-ground buildings sitting atop
a
concrete
apron.
He
was. asked specifically whether these four buildings
he
saw might
really
be the
surface elements of
an
underground
building.
He failed
either
to
pick
up
the
lead or
to remotely view correctly because
he said,
"No,
that's
a concrete apron,
and
there's
nothing
subterranean
right
in
that particular
.area,"
This
statement was
his
most negative evidence yet and tends
to discredit
his ability
to
remotely view URDF-3.
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1 s comments on the fourth day were very specific regarding
his
concept of the overall
operation at URDF-3,
however no new evidence
(that could
be checked)
was disclosed toward establishing validity
for his
remote-viewing
capabil ity.
After careful
analysis of all
the data
presented,
I have concluded that
s remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 was unsuccessful.
m.
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^eemDMgiAB
INTRODUCTION
I was asked
to analyze and
then judge
the validity of the remote-viewing
experiment performed
on URDF-3
by
The data
to be analyzed included
"
si
two cassette tapes covering
the first two days,
79 pages of transcribed
tapes
regarding the third and fourth days,
and 30 sketches;
I also reviewed the July
5,
1974
of URDF-3.
I
am quite familiar with
the chronology and layout of URDF-3,
as well
as
the surrounding terrain and
technical
areas within 40 miles.
I
tried
to
keep
an open mind while performing
this analysis,
but
if
I
had any bias
at all,
it
.
was
that
I wanted
to believe remote viewing could help
us establish the true
purpose of URDF-3.
Throughout
this analysis,
I
paid particular attention
to
all
information
about URDF-3 that was
supplied totfHHBki
This was necessary
in order
to
evaluate
his originality
in
remote viewing.
This study was done
in
four
seg-
ments
corresponding
to the four days of the experiment.
Judgment
of the
prog-
ress
and validity of
the experiment was evaluated
at the end of each day.
FIRST DAY
The experiment started
at
a.'m.
on July
9,
1974 at Stanford Research
Institute
(SRI).
The experimenters
(Russ
Targ
and
Hal
Puthoff)
told:
that
the
target was
a geographical
target
selected from the Times
of London
World Atlas.
The coordinates
of
the target were given
as 50°9'59"N and
78°22'22"E;
Sl^JP^Twrote
these coordinates
down.
It was emphasized
that this was
a
"real
target"
as opposed
to
a
sample
target.
Using
several
maps,
the experimenters
showed^H^the target location at 60 miles WSW of Semipalatinsk.
The
target
was
described
as
a
scientific military research
and test area.
To help orient
he was
told
that
the target
was
25 to
30- miles
SW of "this
river,"
pre-
Sl
x
was
told
to
sumably
labeled correctly on
the maps
as
the
Irtysh
River,
start with
a
view of the general
area
as
seen
from 50,000
ft.
and get the
layout
of any complexes
or buildings,
or whatever.
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When the coordinates were given, ^HBlsaid
he was getting
a
picture that
they
(the Soviets)
have done
a
lot of rocket launching and recovery out of that
area.
As
he starts viewing,
he says
it's dark over there at the present time,
quite
a cloud cover,
and
a
full
moon.
He immediately sees
the river and heads
SW from the river
to the institute
(as
he calls
it).
He says
the area
he's
look-
ing at has
low one-story buildings
that are partially dug
into
the ground giving
the effect
(as
seen at ground
level)
of very short,
squatty buildings, whereas
they are actually fairly roomy on
the
inside.
This description could very well
describe
a first look at the Operations Area at URDF-3.
He then finds that he
is looking at
"a
guy
in
a very peculiar type of
*
helmet."
He tends
to get bogged down
in
the specifics of the purpose of this,
helmet and shifts
his attention
to
look at the cosmonauts
(that were currently
in orbit)
to compare helmets.
He says
they
(the Soviets)
are running
some tests
on
some equipment that currently has
to do with their space
program.
Then
he
backs off from this
specific subject and
says,
"I'll
look around and come back
to
that"
-
but
he never does.
was
then asked
to describe the general
terrain and perhaps
the
building
layout.
He drew
a
sketch
(Fig.
1)
in which
he correctly identifies
the complex as being about 30 miles
south of the
Irtysh River
(this
information
had
been given
to him earlier).
However,
he incorrectly says
the road from the
river passes
through
a
gorge.
The layout of the buildings
and area
they cover
as
shown
in
his
sketch are
incorrect for URDF-3.
Although there are some an-
tennas
at URDF-3,
none are
as
tall
as
the
500-ft.
antenna
he described.
He pondered over
the dimensions of the outdoor pool
he
saw because
"that's
in meters
-
they have
it."
He then translates
it
to feet
(60'
x 150').
He said
they use the
pool
for underwater testing and orientation
studies
but
in reality
there
is
no outdoor
pool
at URDF-3.
In
Fig.
2,
he drew
a military complex three-eighths of
a mile NE of the
scientific complex shown
in
Fig.
1.
Actually there
is
a military complex at
URDF-3,
located about
1/2 miles
NW of the Operations Area,
but this
data was
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flemmarciAL
given
to him earlier when the target was described as
a scientific military
research and test area.
He said
the military complex looked
like
it had been
there for two to three years, when
in fact
it's
been there for over
a decade.
Also
in
Fig.
2,
he described
a radar/communications building north of the
scientific complex.
The description of the building and
its
location relative
to
the military complex fits
the description of the probable laboratory-admini-
stration building
located about
2 1/2 miles northwest of the Operations Area
at
URDF-3.
When
he
is
specific about what he
sees' inside the building,
one of the
experimenters
asks whether one of the specifics
he mentioned might well
be
some-
thing
else.
He takes another look and changes
his mind saying,
"You may be
right,"
giving
the impression that he could be
led
to see what the experimenter
suggests.
The experimenfei^inckly informed^^^p that "we really don’t know
what this
thing
is,"
and
again never does.
replies with,
"I’ll
come back
to
that,"
but
SI
isaw an array of telephone poles about 400 yards
SE of the scientific
complex
(see
Fig.
2),
but there
is
no such array of poles at or near URDF-3.
He was
then asked
to
go
up
to 50,000
ft.
to
look again and describe the
layout.
Centering himself over the scientific complex,
he
scanned
in
a clock-
wise direction;
the view
he
saw
is
sketched
in
Fig.
3.
Nothing
in
this figure
is correct except that
the area
is arid and
has
low hills
to the
south.
Speci-
fically,
he
is
incorrect
in
his
locations
of
a
small
village,
an airstrip,
a
cluster of pine trees,
and
a city 60 miles
to
the
SW.
There
is,
however,
an
airfield
at
the Main Support Complex
30 miles
north of URDF-3.
[was
asked
if
he saw
a railroad anywhere.
The closest railroad
to
the target that
he could
see was
about
60 miles
north
running roughly
NW and
SE
and
he didn't
see any spur tracks
in
a direction
toward
the
target.
In
reality,
there
is
a railway
in
the Main Support Complex
(about
30 miles
north
of URDF-3)
with
a railway spur under construction down
to URDF-3.
There
is also
grading
for
a
railway ’spur
• near
the military complex at
URDF-3.
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