Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
NOFORN
o c=^ / $
U
//'y
£
ALL STATEMENTS OF FACT, OPINION, OR ANALYSIS EXPRESSED IN STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE ARTICLES ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS AND DO NOT NECESSARILY
REFLECT OFFICIAL POSITIONS OR VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OR
ANY OTHER US GOVERNMENT ENTITY.
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
VOL.
No. 4
WINTER
1977
TR-SINT 77-004
m
1367
NOFORN
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: C IA-
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
noforn
n untapped collection possibility
PARAPSYCHOLOGY IN iNTELLIGENCE:
A PERSONAL REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
Dr. Kenneth A. Kress
The Central Intelligence
tTnTeS
called parapsychology as
it relates to
Tbjs paper summarizes selected
with man, aspects
of the
last “'^X^d others She intent
is no. historical
highlights of the experiences of
the™
KresteJ in detalk Instead the intent is to
.VsftTbSiJS
During
this
research
period
CIA
situation perhaps properly so, raised the
illegalities and improprieties of all sorts. Th
’ P
•• Proxmire Effect,” where
sensitivity of CIAs mvdvem«d
,n unmual »<
be cWmed
to be
,11-
the
fear
that
certain Government
precluding CIA from sensitive areas
founded and held up for scorn, was another
P
parapsychology: positive or
of research. Also, there tend to be
by
definition,
are
negative,
with
little in between.
Parapsycholog^c
frauds and many people
elusive and unexplained. Add a history'
r
pi
P
this stuff even
if
it
£$£S".t“
evaluate parapsychology carefully and scientifically
Tantalizing but incomplete data
^
,
^^^mp
t^^plain^rmSts o/^naine
These data show, among other thing,
h.
^psychology
is a proven
as
S— is not yet complete and more research
' "tin ,s confined to
^
purported
ability
of
a
person
clairvovance in that a person claims to
unexplained
from a known sensory
link,
sense information about
P
eanabilities have reached
Anecdotal
reports
of
extrasensory perce^ ion ^ ^ when Hitler was said to
U.S. national security agencies at least me
applications of ESP continued to
relv on astrologers and seers. Sugges ion
Department of Defense was
be received after World War II For
in
psychological
tSe-^"t,"on,inued
to accumulate.
In 1*1. *e
reports
A.
Puharicb, "Qi* d»
Slivered to a 1952 Pentagon conference, The wasmngr
Parapsychology
.
,
, „„ -r the earliest U
S. Government parapsychology investigations when the
‘^.C^ Sta tical Service - (then the Technical Services Division)
_
j
lnimQ
nf FSP
Technical
project
officers soon contacted
becme interested
in
he chums
rf
Laboratory,
Oxford
Stephen
I.
Abrams,
th
r n
1*.
ttt TRA
Abrams prepared
a
decade.
,
Two laser physicists
Dr. Russell
f^SdTn para^-
IrafetSenW he was— , scienhfic
observations of parapsychology Pn.hoff^
r^h
S^ive
1970s. He was a theoretician who was exploring ne
work in quantum electronics.
T
a
]
1 Q70
Tare met with CIA personnel from the Office
of
Scientific
,
n
pn
,ncT, and discussed the subject of paranormal abilities. Targ revealed that
fsRI) Targ proposed that some psychokinetic verification investigations could be done
at SRI
in conjunction with Puthoff.
wefe observed
The Office of Technical Services took the
first action. With the approval ol0*.
same manager who supported the ESP studies a decade previously
an OTS proje
oZer contracted for a demonstration with the previously described su^ect
t SRL
f
<R874
nnP OTS and one ORD representative worked with Targ and
'he Td TheTe SSErT^rSl the dl approved another «500
rh“d«ed the development of a more complete research plan.
„
o-^ber
1972
I was the Project Officer. 1 was chosen because of my physics
SfdTi^
-
* Office of Technical Service Contract 8473,
1 October 1972 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791 R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
included tats of several abilities of both the original subject and a new one. Curios
data began to appear; the paranormal abilities seemed individualistic. For example
om Set
by menial
effort,
apparently caused an
increase
in
the
temperature
measured b’y /thermistor, the action could not be duplicated by the second subject
?he “cond subject was able
to reproduce,
with improve accuracy . information
SeHm”de envelopes. Under identical conditions, the
first subject could reproduce
nothing Perhaps even more disturbing, repeating the same experiment with thesame
Xct did
not
yield consistent
results.
I began
.0 have serious feelings of being
involved with
a. fraud.
Approximately halfway through this project, the SRI contractors were invited to
review their results
After careful consideration of the security and sensitivityfetors
the results were shared and discussed
were" reviewed;
definite interest in contributing
their own
expertise and office funding.
The possibility of a joint OTS/ORD program continued to develop. The Office of
Research and Development sen, new Project Officers to SRI
and
the
reports which were brought back
convinced ORD
to become ™ve
Interest was translated into action when ORD requested an increase in
t
e scopeso
htrass r
«£
quickly.
The
contract
required
additional
management
review
before
it couHte
continued or
its
On^^Apri^M^Colby decided^that the ^Executive
Management c'omSttee should pass judgment on this
The S'e
of May,
1973,
the
approval
request went
through
the Management
Committee An approval memorandum was written for the signature o
e
’
£
, -l clLoL
. Mr. Colby took the memorandum to the DCI a few day
later,
fw
"on toU^to increase the scope of
the project and not to anticipate any
Lr» oTin this area The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing.
It
S' be tabled.
I,
is interesting to note that OTS ™
been guided by useful paranormal
abilities!
During the summer
of
1973, SRI continued working informally with an OSI
officer onl remote viewing experiment which
eventually
stimulated more CIA-
sponsored investigations of parapsychology. The target was a vacatior
eastern United States. The experiment began with.-*<
ho
in turn;
apparent
misses. They both
talked
about
a
military-like
facility.
Nevertheless,
^SD; Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director for Operations; Subject: Request for Approval
—““cXmSL
for~Director ~of' Central
Intelligence;
Subject; Request
for
Approval of Contract; 4 May 1973 (SECRET).
-00791 R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
To the surprise of the OSI officer, he soon
,
installation a few miles from the vacation proper y
.
f thj
particular site
“3“e^
,n
g
CIA and the Agency
concerned.
The
evaluation
was,
as
usual
^^sIocLed with current and
These experiments took several months to he analyzed
Agency, Now Mr. Colb» ™>f‘.“he
Summent of Work was
favorably
impressed by
the
data.
In
the
nroeram
, A jointly funded ORD and
outlined, and SRI ww wked to propose a
p
g
aga
'
in was
the
Project
OTS program was begun m
February
19-4^
phenomena
existed;
the
Officer.
The
project proceeded
on
the premise
that
tne pne
objective was to develop and utilize them.
mu
nnn
funds were devoted
to
basic
studies
such
as
the
identification
ot
psychological
Tht
”u,d be
Before many months had
^LlTd funds
tasking in the basic research area prove
^
with less
would allow. The contractors wanted to
)^chTconLversial topic, fewer
V
j and SRI *E
ers
Several meetings occurred over that
issue.
As an example of the kinds of disputes which
consider the evaluation of the signi icance o
random number generator used
experiments. This
^7*—“ cl=« trough
subject indicates the current
-
The state of the machine »d
^"^e“1. sjhad a
‘subS whoTveragedl rtatistic.lly very significant 29 percent for more than 2.500
trials
,
w
nf
the experiment and
analysis, and two ORD
officers
UUieklyTfstptiS responded. They
firs, argued
tha,
the ESP machine was
—cm. LSD /OSI; Memorandum
lor
the
Record,
Subject;
V«„il..t..»
of Remo,. V***
Expe»Ts,»i.rd Research I«i»« »
19A
(SECRET)
4105.4099
Office
of
Research and Development
. Office
of
Technical
Service
Contract, FAN
41-5 4Uyy^
Contract, FAN 4162-8103;
1 February 1974 (CONFIDENTIA
).
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
‘
' -v ; •Xfgfi*"
,! % "'Si
•
'
?ViT; v. -
-
i
-0-j^Ur-W.*
Parapsychology
possibly not random. They further argued the subjects probably learned the nonran-
dom machine patterns and thereby produced high scores.
9 During this review,
it was
noted
that whether
the machine was random
or
not,
the
data
taken during
the
experiment could be analyzed
to determine actual machine
statistics. The machine
randomness was then unimportant, because the subject s performance could then be
compared with actual machine performance.
10 The ORD Project Officers, however,
did not believe
it would be worth the effort to do the extra analysis of the actual data.
I disagreed.
I had the Office of joint Computer Services redo the data analysis.
The conclusion was that during the experiment “no evidence of nonrandomness was
discovered” and there was
no solid reason how he was able to be so successful.
I
further ordered
the
subject
retested. He averaged more than 28
percent during
another 2,500 trials. This information was given in written and oral form to the ORD
Project Officers, who maintained there must be yet another flaw in the experiment or
analysis, but
it was not worth finding. Because of more pressing demands, the issue
could not be pursued to a more definite conclusion.
Concurrent with
this deteriorating state of
affairs, new Directors
of ORD and
OTS were named again. Since neither Director had any background or experience in
paranormal research, the new Director of ORD reviewed the parapsychology project
and had reservations.
I requested a meeting in which'he said he could not accept this
reality of paranormal functioning, but he understood his bias. He said that inasmuch
as he could not make an objective decision in
this
field, he could simply follow the
advice of his staff. The ORD Project Officers were feeling their own frustrations and
uncertainties concerning the work and now had to face this unusual kind of skepticism
of their new Director. The skepticism about the believability of the phenomenon and
quality of the basic research adversely affected the opinions of many people in OTS.
Support for the project was vanishing rapidly.
As
these
pressures
mounted,
the. .first
intelligence
collection
operation
using
parapsychology was attempted. The taget was
the Semipalatinsk
Unidentified Re-
search and Development
Facility-3
(URDF-3,
formerly known
as PNUTS).
The
experimental collection would use our best subject, Pat Price. From experience
it was
obvious
that
Price produced bad
data
as
well
as
good.
Borrowing from
classical
communication theory concepts,
this
noisy channel
of information could neverthe-
less be useful
if
it were characterized. An elaborate protocol was designed which
would accomplish two characterization measurements. First, we needed assurance the
channel was collecting useful data.
I reviewed the photos of URDF-3 and chose two
features which,
if
Price described them, would show the channel
at
least partially
working.
Referring
to Figure
la,
these
features were the
tall crane and
the
four
structures resembling
oil well
derricks.
It was agreed
that
if Price described
these
structures,
I would be prepared to have him sign a secrecy agreement, making him
witting, and
collect more
relevant
intelligence
details.
Secondly,
after
a working
channel
was
thus
established,
a
signal-to-noise
or
quality
characterization
was
‘required. This would be done by periodic tests of the channel—that
is, periodically
Price would
be
asked
to
describe
features
of URDF-3 which were known.
The
accuracy of these descriptions would be used to estimate the quality of the data we
had no obvious way of verifying.
9 L. W. Rook; LSR/ORD; Memorandum
for OTS/CB;
Subject: Evidence
for Non-Randomness of
Four-State Electronic Random Stimulus Generator;
12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
10 S. L, Cianci; LSR/ORD; Memorandum for OTS/CB; Subject: Response to Requested Critique, SRI
"
‘ Random Stimulus Generator Results; 12 June 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
11 G. Burow; OJCS/AD/BD; Memorandum
for Dr.
Kress; Subject:
Analysis
of the Subject-Machine
Relationship; 8 October 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
The experiment began with my branch chief and me briefing Targ and Puthoff
in a motel.
Later,
at SRI, Price was briefed by Targ and Puthoff. Since Targ and
Puthoff presumably knew
nothing about URDF-3,
this protocol guarded
against
cueing and/or telepathy. Initially Price was given only the geographic coordinates, a
world atlas map marked with the approximate location of URDF-3, and told
it was a
Soviet RD&E
test
site. Overnight, he produced the drawing on the bottom right of
Figure lb. Price further mentioned this was a “damned big crane” because he saw a
person walk by and he only came up to the axles on the wheels (note sketch on
left,
Figure lb). This performance caught my attention; but with two more days of work,
we never heard about the derricks. Eventually, a decision was needed. Because the
crane was
so
impressive, my branch
chief and
I decided the
derricks description
requirement should be relaxed and we should continue.
When the decision was made to make Price witting,
I decided to
test him. My
branch chief and I sat in a conference room while Targ and Puthoff brought a smiling
Pat Price into the room.
I was introduced as the sponsor, and
I immediately asked
Price
if he knew me.
Yes.
Name?
Ken Kress.
Occupation?
Works for CIA.
Since
I was then a covert employee, the response was meaningful. After having Price
sign a secrecy agreement, and some discussions,
I confronted him again.
I rolled out a
large version of Figure la and asked
if he had viewed
this
site.
'Yes, of course!
Why didn’t you see the four derricks?
Wait,
I’ll check.
Price closed
his eyes, put on
his
glasses
(he
“sees
better
that way) and
in a tew
seconds answered- “I didn’t see them because they are not there any more.” Since my
data were three or four months old, there was no rejoinder to the implied accusation
that my
data were
not
good. We proceeded and completed
a
voluminous
data
package.
In a few weeks, the latest URDF-3 reconnaissance was checked. Two derricks
were partially disassembled, but basically
all four were
visible.
In general, most of
Price’s data were wrong or could not be evaluated. He did, nevertheless, produce some
amazing descriptions, like buildings then under construction, spherical tank sections,
and the crane in Figure lb. Two analysts, a photo interpreter at lAS
12 and a nuclear
analyst at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories agreed that Price’s description of the
crane was accurate; the nuclear analyst wrote that “one: he, the subject, actually saw it
through
remote
viewing,
or
two:
he
was
informed
what
to draw by
someone
knowledgeable of URDF-3.”
13 But, again, since there was so much bad information
mixed
in with the good, the overall
result was not considered
useful. As proof
of
remote viewing, the data are at best inconclusive. The ORD officers concluded that
« W.
T.
Strand; C/ESO/IAS; Memorandum
for
Director,
Office
of
Technical
Service,
Subject:
Evaluation of Data on Semipalatinsk Unidentified R&D Facility No. 3, USSR; 20 August 1974 (SECR
)•
» D. Stillman; Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; “An Analysis of a Remote Viewing Experiment of
URDF-3”; 4 December 1975 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0 Parapsychology . (a) TARGET SITE (b) CRANE COMPARISON _. + «Figure 4: Comparison of Target Site and Drawing by Remote-Viewer..- . -.- ~- =sTeRe 575310 3-78 CIA NOFORN WNINTEL 13 no ad © Siew ll De wit state et es he aan eo AE ead a ERT eS
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
since there were no control experiments to compare with, the data were nothing but
lucky guessing.
.
I began to doubt my own objectivity in evaluating the significance of paranormal
abilities to intelligence collection.
It was clear that the SRI contractors were claiming
success while ORD advisors were saying the experiments were not meaningful because
of poor experimental
design.
As
a. check on
myself,
I asked
for
a
critique
of
the
investigation
from
a
disinterested
consultant,
a
theoretical
physicist
with
broa
intellectual background.
His
first
task was
to evaluate the
field of parapsychology
without knowledge of the CIA data. After he had completed this critique
I asked him
to
acquaint
himself
with
the CIA
data .and
then
to
reassess
the
field. The
first
investigation produced genuine interest in paranormal functioning as a valid research
area.
After being acquainted with CIA data,
his conclusion was,
a
large body
of
reliable experimental evidence points to the inescapable conclusion that extrasensory
perception does exist as a real phenomenon, albeit characterized by rarity and lack o
reliability.”
14 This judgment by a competent scientist gave impetus to continue serious
inquiry into parapsychology.
Because of the general skepticism and the mixed results of the various operational
experiments,
a
final challenge was issued by OTS management: OTS
is not
in the
research business; do something of genuine operational significance. Price was chosen,
and suggestions were solicited from operational personnel m both OTS and the DDO^
An intriguing idea was selected from audio operational applications: the difficult and
dangerous job of targeting and installing audio collection systems. A test to determine
if remote viewing could help was suggested. The interiors of two foreign embassies
were known to the audio teams who had made entries several years previously. Price
was
to
visit these embassies by
his remote viewing capability, locate the coderooms,
and come up with information
that might allow
a member of
the audio team
to
determine whether Price was likely to be of operational use in subsequent °Peratl0 ' lS '
Price was given operationally acceptable data such as the exterior photographs and the
geographical coordinates of the embassies.
In both cases, Price correctly located the coderooms. He produced copious data,
such as the location of interior doors and colors of marble
stairs and fireplaces that
were accurate and specific. As usual, much was also vague and incorrect. Regardless,
the operations
officer
involved concluded,
“It
is my
considered
opinion
that
this
technique—whatever
it is—offers definite operational
possibilities.
This result was reviewed within OTS and the DDO, and various suggestions for
potential follow-on activities were formulated.
16 This package of requirements, plus
the final results of the current contract, were reviewed at several meetings within O IS
and ORD. The
results of those meetings are as follows:
1.
According to the ORD Project Officers, the research was not productive
or even competent; therefore, research support to SRI was dropped. The Director
u
J.
A..
Ball; "An Overview of Extrasensory Perception”; Report to CIA, 27 January 1975.
15 C/AOB/OTS; Memorandum for the Record; Subject; Parapsychology/“Remote Viewing”; 20 April
1976 (SECRET).
'•Chief /Division D/DDO; Memorandum
for C/D&E;
Subject:
Perceptual Augmentation Tech-
niques-
January
1975
(SECRET); AC/SE/DDO; Memorandum
for C/D&E;
Subject:
perc?P‘"®
Augmentation Testing; 14 January 1975 (SECRET); C/EA/DDO; Memorandum for
Service-
Subject:
Exploration
of
Operational
Potential
of
Paranormal*
; 5 February
1975 (SECRE1 ),
C/Liby'a/EL/NE/DDO; Memorandum
for OTS/CB;
Subject:
Libyan Desk
Requirement
or
Y
Experiments Relating to Libya; 31 January 1975 (SECRET); CI/Staff/DDO; Memorandum for the Record;
Subject: SRI Experiment; 12 December 1974 (SECRET).
:-u-
Vi’
'I
- 'Si-. t.Aikjt&ZXi-:;.
-
.„Appraved -For R€4€ase 2003/04718 :CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
of OTS
felt the OTS charter would not support research; therefore,
all Agency
funding in paranormal research stopped.
2.
Because of the mixed results, the operational utility of the capability was
considered questionable but deserved further
testing.
To achieve better security,
all
the operations-oriented
testing with the
contractor was stopped, and a personal services contract with Price was started.
Since
I was judged
to be
a
positively
biased advocate
of paranormal
functioning, the testing and evaluation of Price would be transferred to a more
pragmatic OTS operations psychologist.
The OTS psychologist picked up his new responsibilities and chose to complete an
unfinished DDO requirement. The origin of the requirement went back to the fall of
1974 when several OTS engineers became aware of the parapsychology project m O
S
and had volunteered to attempt remote viewing. They passed imtia
remote viewing
tests at SRI with some apparent successes. To test these OTS insiders
ur
er
c
ose a
suggested requirement to obtain information about a Libyan site described
>
geographic coordinates. The OTS engineers described new construction which could
be
an
SA-5
missile
training
site.-
The
Libyan
Desk
officer
was
immediately
impressed. He then revealed to me that an agent had reported essentially the same
story. More coordinates were quickly furnished but were put aside by me.
The
second
set
of
Libyan
geographic
coordinates
was
passed by
the OTS
Dsvchologist
to
Price. A
report
describing
a
guerrilla
training
site
was qu ckly
returned
It contained a map-like drawing of the complex. Price described a related
underwater sabotage training facility site several hundred kilometers away on the sea
coas^This information was passed
to the Libyan Desk. Some data were evaluated
immediately, some were evaluated only after ordering special reconnaissance cover-
age New information produced by
Price was verified by
the reconnaissance^ The
underwater sabotage training
facility description was similar
to a
collateral agents
report The Libyan Desk officer quickly escalated the requirement to what was going
S ta buildings, the plans and intentions etu- The second
£
was passed to Pat Price. Price died of a heart attack a few days later, and the progra
stopped. There have been no further CIA-sponsored intelligence collection
tests.
Since July
1975, there has been only modest CIA and Intelligence Community
Staff
interest
in parapsychology. The Office
of
Scientific Intelligence completed a
studv about Soviet military and KGB applied parapsychology.
19 During November of
1976
D,°lor George B^h became aware
that
official
Soviets were
v,suing and
questioning Puthoff and Targ at SRI about their work in parapsychology. Mr Bush
requested fnd received a briefing on CIA’s investigations into parapsychology. Before
there was any official reaction, he
left the Agency. Various intelligence community
groups
such
ns
the Human
Resources Subcommittee on R&D, have exhaustive y
reviewed parapsychology
in CIA, DOD, and the open research
but have failed
to
conclude whether parapsychology
is or
is not a worthwhile area
or
u
er
tion. Several proposals from SRI and other contractors were
were
accepted.
There
are
no
current
plans
for
CIA
to
fund
parapsyctio
gy
investigations.
TLsDB; Net« on Interviews with F. P, E. L„ C.
J.. K. G.. end V. C. ]—« ™(SECRET).
.. ddO/NE; Memorandum
for OTS/BAB; Sub,** Erperunental Celle.,ion M,
»
Libya; 8 October 1975 (SECRET).
.
,
T . Hamilton; LSD/OSI; "Soviet and Ea^Europe^
SI 77- 10012, Apr,
,
1977 (SECRET/NOFORN).
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
Postscript
At this point,
I have traced the action and reaction of various elements of CIA to
what
is certainly an unconventional and highly controversial subject. Also of interest
are the concurrent reactions of other agencies
to parapsychology.
In August,
1973,
parapsychology was discussed with several members of DIA. The DIA people were
basically interested
in the Soviet
activities in
this
area, and expressed considerable
interest in our own fledgling results. Numerous meetings have occurred during the
past several years. DIA remains interested on a low priority basis.
The Army Materiel Command learned of CIA
interest
in the paranormal. We
discovered the Army interest was generated by data which emerged from Vietnam.
Apparently certain individuals called point men, who led patrols into hostile territory,
had far fewer casualties from booby traps and ambushes than the average. These point
men, needless to say, had a loyal following of men and, in general, greatly helped the
morale of their troops under a brutal,
stressful situation. The Army gave extensive
physical and psychological
tests
to
a group of unusually successful point men and
came
to no conclusion other than perhaps that paranormal capabilities may be the
explanation! The Army was most interested in CIA results and wanted to stay closely
informed. After a few more follow-up meetings, the Army Materiel Command was
never heard from again.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) reported that they
had not only a showing of interest but a hostile response as well to the subject area. At
one time, we felt we had the strong interest of some people at DARPA to discuss our
data. The SRI
contractors and
I went
to a briefing where we had^ a several-hour
confrontation with an assemblage of hostile DARPA people who had been convened
especially to debunk our- results. After a long, inconclusive, emotional discussion, we
left. Contacts with DARPA stopped for several years.
The Navy
reviewed
part
of
the work
and became
interested. Some
groups
developed
strong
interest,
and minor funding
was
provided
to SRI by Navy
to
replicate one
of
SRI’s
earlier experiments under more
controlled
conditions. The
experiment was replicated. Then the Navy asked SRI to repeat the same experiment
under different conditions. An effect was observed, but
it was not the same as the
previous observations. About this same time, the Navy became very concerned about
this research being “mind warfare”-related. Funding was stopped.
The active funding for parapsychology now has shifted to the Air Force’s Foreign
Technology Division with the addition of modest testing being completed by another
group at DARPA. These investigations are not yet completed, but a second phase
is
funded by the Air Force. The Air Force project
is attempting to evaluate whether
signals and communications can be sent and received by paranormal functioning. Also
aircraft
and
missile
intelligence
which
can
be
verified
is
being
gathered
and
evaluated. To date the
results are more consistent than those seen during the CIA
research, but
still they are mixed. Some simple experiments seemed very impressive
and conclusive. The more complex experiments are difficult
to
assess.
In the non-government world an explosion of interest in unclassified parapsychol-
ogy research occurred after the first publication of CIA-sponsored projects. Books have
been written, prestigious professional societies have had sessions on parapsychology,
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/18
: CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0
Parapsychology
and several national news reports have been broadcast and printed .”0 Director Turner
revealed. publicly that CIA has had operational interest in parapsychology . 21 The open
publication
of
these
investigations
is
generally
healthy
and
helpful.
It
show;
a
reduction of associated emotionalism and bias. These publications will also stimulate
other scientific investigations into parapsychology.
There
is a less positive aspect to open interest and publications. Before adequate
assessment was made by CIA and
others, we may have allowed some important
national security information out into the public domain.
It
is my opinion that, as
it
relates to intelligence, sufficient understanding and assessment of parapsychology nas
not been achieved. There are observations, such as the original magnetic experiments
at Stanford University, the OSI remote viewing, the OTS-coderoom experiments, and
others done for the Department of Defense, that defy explanation. Coincidence
is not
likely, and fraud has not been discovered. The implication of these data cannot be
determined until the assessment
is done.
If the above
is true, how
is
it that the phenomenon remains controversial and
receives so little official government support? Why is it that the proper assessment was
never made? This state of affairs occurs because of the elementary understanding ot
parapsychology and because
of
the
peculiarities
of
the
intelligence and
milr-ary
organizations
which
have
attempted
the
assessments.
There
is
no
fundamental
understanding of the mechanisms of paranormal functioning, and the reproducibility
remains poor. The research and experiments have successfully demonstrated abilities
but have not explained them nor made them reproducible. Past and current support ot
parapsychology comes from applications-oriented intelligence and military agencies.
The
people
managing
such
agencies demand
quick
and
relevant
results.
The
intelligence and military agencies, therefore, press for results before there is sufficient
experimental reproducibility
or understanding
of
the physical mechanisms
Unless
there is a major breakthrough in understanding, the situation is not likely to change as
long
as
applications-oriented agencies
are funding parapsychology.
Agencies must
commit long-term basic research funds and learn to confine attention to testing only
abilities which at least appear reproducible enough to be used to augment other nar
collection techniques (example: use parapsychology
to help target hard intelligence
collection techniques and determine
if the take
is thereby increased). Parapsychology,
like other technical
issues, can then
rise or
fall on
its merits and not stumble over
bureaucratic charters and conjectures proposed by people who are irrevocably on one
side or the other in the controversial area.
« R Tare and H. Puthoff; "Information Transfer Under Conditions of Sensory Yielding .Nature^
rr
I II
602-607 (October
18,
1974); H. Puthoff and
R. Targ;
A Perceptual Channel for Information
August 1976; NBC Today; 9 August 1976; J. Wilhelm,
Psychic Spying?
; The Washington Post, OutlooK
Section, August 7,
1977.
1977.
.. j. O’Leary, "Turner Denies CIA Bugging of South Korea’s Park,” The Washington Star, 9 August