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our retaliatory forces and demand that we im-
ly and fight effectively in any contingency,
prove these elements. We have made the hard
We have undertaken programs to enhance
decisions required to maintain our nuclear de-
the capabilities of our central command au-
terrent, and we have begun to redress
defi-
thorities and military force commanders to
ciencies in strategic systems. Our programs
obtain more extensive and timely information
introducing
the
PEACEKEEPER
(MX)
and
to communicate
effectively
with
their
ICBM, B-1B strategic bomber, TRIDENT II
forces. At the same time, we are improving the
D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and
readiness of our forces to respond quickly to
upgraded command, control and communica-
attack, and we are upgrading Reserve compo-
tions systems to our forces are examples.
nent forces, enabling them to mobilize rapidly
In addition to our strategic nuclear forces,
and deploy to battle areas early enough to in-
the United States maintains nuclear forces in
fluence a conflict. We are improving force mo-
Europe to deter Soviet attacks against our
bility through procurement of airlift and sea-
NATO Allies. These forces are linked with our
lift forces, and we are prepositioning equip-
conventional and strategic nuclear forces un-
ment and supplies in key theaters to enable
der a single, coherent policy of deterrence.
rapid response in areas of conflict.
Soviet deployment of SS-20 LRINF missiles
To redress deficiencies in our ability to sus-
in recent years, however, has called into ques-
tain any conflict, we are investing in muni-
tion the NATO deterrent posture. The 1979
tions, spares and other materiel. We are conti-
NATO dual-track decision—deployment of US
nuing with programs to modernize our forces
GLCM and PERSHING
II missiles
to Eu-
with upgraded weaponry to give them a quali-
rope, while pursuing an equitable, verifiable
tative edge so essential should combat be re-
arms
reduction
agreement—reaffirms
the
quired against superior numbers. We are ex-
credibility of NATO’s deterrent. In the face of
panding the size of selected types of forces,
the USSR’s unwillingness thus far to nego-
where past neglect has resulted in shortfalls,
tiate such an agreement, we have
initiated
We are also improving, domestically and in-
deployment of the GLCMs and PERSHING
ternationally, our export control system
to
IIs. Nevertheless, we still hope for, and active-
halt Soviet exploitation of militarily-signifi-
ly seek, resumption of negotiations to reduce
cant Western equipment and technology,
or
eliminate
all US
and
Soviet
LRINF
The defense programs we and our Allies are
missiles.
pursuing are redressing critical deficiencies
Looking to the continuing challenge, we are
in the military balance. These programs are
examining the possibility of a defense against
designed to maintain the deterrent element of
ballistic missiles. The United States has em-
our defense policy. This task is not an easy
barked on the analysis required to define a
one, nor can it be realized over a short period
technically feasible research program in this
of time. If our deterrent is to remain effective,
area and to assess implications of defensive
we and our Allies must maintain a commit-
technologies
for
the
prevention
of
nuclear
ment to the completion of these programs and
war,
the
deterrence
of
aggression and
the
to taking whatever additional steps are neces-
prospects for arms reductions.
sary to deny the Soviets political advantage
The composition and
role
of
the United
through the use or the potential use of their
States’ conventional forces and those of our
Armed
Forces. Only through demonstrated
Allies are defensive in nature to support a de-
commitment on our part to denying the Sovi-
fensive policy. We seek no territorial gain and
ets such advantage may we hope
to bring
employ
our
forces
only
to
defend
against
them to the negotiating table for serious arms
threats to our interests and security. This pol-
reductions.
Consistency
in
our
resolve
to
icy allows a potential aggressor the advantage
maintain the security of all free nations is es-
of being able to
select the time, place and
sential
if we are
to
realize the much more
method of any planned attack to maximize his
desirable goal-greatly reduced levels of arm-
strength and exploit our weaknesses. To com-
aments of all types in a world at peace.
pensate for this, the United States must have
effective and reliable command, control, com-
munications
and
intelligence
systems
and
flexible and mobile conventional
land,
sea
and air warfare forces that can respond rapid-
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136
US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1984-434-463