¥ e aa mek boo ach -  . Ayppewpun To St Se a SY (Le sebovlaves (eel Canes 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-G07,87;R0097PP950003-97 4.5 1974 ~ Fel bee He Notin Lies , wn ” SUMMARY Subject 1= 5? The remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 \ proved to be unsuc- cessful. This conclusion was reached only after a careful review of the tape recordings, tape transcripts, and sketches that were generated during the four- day experiment. Si During the first day's session J 1) accurately described the location and type of target (that information had been given to him by the experimenters) but failed on the layout’ and types of buildings, 2) sawa gantry crane for heavy lifting, 3) tended to spend too much time on specifics only to say, "I'll come back to that," but seldom did, and 4) successfully evaded drawing a perimeter of the area even though he was asked to do this twice. Therefore, nothing positive to validate remote viewing resulted from the first day's session. | Si was contacted by phone that evening by one of the experimenters and was told to concentrate on the crane and its relationship to the dominant three-story building (Building 1) that he had seen during that day's session. He was also told that they wanted a drawing of the perimeter fence. ~ On the second say ABBR supp i the most positive evidence yet for the remote-viewing experiment with his sketch of the rail-mounted gantry crane. It seems inconceivable to imagine how he could have drawn such a likeness to ” the actual crane at URDF-3 unless: 1) he actually saw it through remote viewing, or 2) he was informed of what to draw by someone knowledgeable of URDF-3. _ io Approved For’Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 a ™~
rf Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 4 oe Sones, The second possibility is. mentioned only because the experiment was not controlled to discount the possibility that QM could talk €6"othérdoeople. ‘ QM commented that he was seeing a lot of things this second day that he hadn't seen the previous day. In fact, he wnentioned seeing several landmark- type objects that simply did not exist at URDF-3. One explanation of this dis- crepancy could be that if he mentioned fenough specific objects, he would surely hit on one object that is actually present. This could explain the inconsistency between: , 1) his most positive evidence of the experiment -/a sketch of a rail-mounted gantry crane, and 2) the large number of objects he sees that, in reality, are simply not present at URDF-3, St | This discrepancy between wha t Qe sees and what is really there certainly would make it difficult for the eventual user of his remote-viewing data since he would not know how to differentiate the fact from the fiction. At this stage of the experiment, the data is inconciusive to validate Price's capability of remote viewing. Si GR vas shown a sketch of a perspective of the Operations Area at URDF-3 prigthe third day and was told that this was a sketch of the actual target. GRD said he recognized the area but claimed that only one of the four headfraties was present now. That was wrong, but his most damaging state- ments had to do with his interpretation of Building 1 (the underground build- ing) at URDF-3. With the sketch as a reference, he "saw" the four main surface protrusions of Building 1 as four separate above-ground buildings sitting atop a concrete apron. He was. asked specifically whether these four buildings he saw might really be the surface elements of an underground building. He failed either to pick up the lead or to remotely view correctly because he said, "No, that's a concrete apron, and there's nothing subterranean right in that particular area." This statement was his most negative evidence yet and tends to discredit his ability to remotely view URDF-3. Approved For.Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 . : or . + i . u oh - ,
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 SCHPISENETAL.. . : . , . 3 S ‘s comments on the fourth day were very specific regarding his concept of the overall operation at URDF-3, however no new evidence (that could be checked) was disclosed toward establishing validity for his remote-viewing capability. After careful analysis of all the data presented, I have concluded that ait: remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 was unsuccessful. - Sa wo . . . ‘ . Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R006700050003-9 a
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 waist os 4 INTRODUCTION . I was asked to analyze and then judge the validity of the remote-viewing experiment performed on URDF~3 by . The data to be analyzed included two cassette tapes covering the first two days, 79 pages of transcribed tapes regarding the third and fourth days, and 30 sketches; I also reviewed the July 5, 1974 of URDF-3. I am quite familiar with the chronology and layout of URDF-3, as well as the surrounding terrain and technical areas within 40 miles. I tried to keep an open mind while performing this analysis, but if I had any bias at all, it was that I wanted to believe remote viewing could help us establish the true’ purpose of URDF-3. é Throughcut this analysis, I paid particular attention to all information about URDF-3 that was supplied to ii. This was necessary in order to evaluate his originality in remote viewing.> This study was done in four seg- ments corresponding to the four days of tne experiment. Judgment of the prog- ress and validity of the experiment was evaluated at the end of each day. FIRST DAY : The experiment started at 11 a.m. on July 9, 1974 at Stanford Research Institute (SRI). The experimenters (Russ Targ and Hal Puthoff) told aa that the target was a geographical target selected from the Times of London World Atlas. The coordinates of the target were given as 50°9'59"N and 78°22'22"E; Si GP wrote these coordinates down. It was emphasized that this was a "real target" as opposed to a sample target. Using several maps, the experimenters showed the target location at 60 miles WSW of Semipalatinsk. The target was described as a scientific military research and test area. To help orient ia he was told that the target was 25 to 30. miles SW of "this river," pre- sumably labeled correctly on the maps as the Irtysh River. Gp i: told to ” start with a view of the general area ds seen from 50,000 ft. and get the layout of any complexes or buildings, or whatever. Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CLA-RDP96-00787R000%00050003-9 rd COMPEDENBENR i | Nea
4 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 7 COMePR 7 - _ 8 When the coordinates: were siven, iim sac he was getting a picture that they (the Soviets) have done a lot of rocket launching and recovery out of that area. As he starts viewing, he says it's dark over there at the present time, quite a cloud cover, and a full moon. He immediately sees the river and heads SW from the river to the institute (as he calls it). He says the area he's look- ing at nas tow one-story buildings that are partially dug into the ground giving the effect (as seen at ground level) of very short, squatty buildings, whereas they are actually fairly roomy on the inside. This description could very well describe a first look at the Operations Area at URDF-3. He then finds that he is looking at “a guy in a very peculiar type of ; helmet." He tends to get bogged down in the specifics of the purpose of this. helmet and shifts his attention to look at the cosmonauts (that were currently in orbit) to compare helmets. He says they (the Soviets) are running some tests on some equipment that currently has to do with their space program. Then he backs off from this specific subject and says, "I'll look around and come back to that" - but he never does. Si = GQQRBR was then asked to describe the general terrain and perhaps the building layout. He drew a sketch (Fig. 1) in which he correctly identifies the complex as being about 30 miles south of the Irtysh River (this information had been given to him earlier). However, he incorrectly says the road from the river passes through a gorge. The layout of the buildings and area they cover as shown in his sketch are incorrect for URDF-3. Although there are some an- tennas at URDF-3, none are as tall as the 500-ft. antenna he described. ‘He pondered over the dimensions of the outdoor pool he saw because “that's in meters - they have it." He then translates it to feet (60' x 150'). He said they use the pool for underwater testing and orientation studies but in reality there is no outdoor pool at URDF-3. In Fig. 2, he drew a military complex three-eighths of a mile NE of the scientific complex shown in Fig. 1. Actually there is a military complex at URDF-3, located about 2 1/2 miles NW of the Operations Area, but this data was Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 Mgt, “Let
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aa Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 “GONPIDENSEAT ~ given to him earlier when the target was described as a scientific military research and test area. He said the military complex looked like it had been there for two to three years, when in fact it's been there for over a decade. Also in Fig. 2, he described a radar/communications building north of the scientific complex. The description of the building and its location relative to the military complex fits the description of the probable laboratory-admini- stration building located about 2 1/2 miles northwest of the Operations Area at URDF-3. When he is specific about what he sees inside the building, one of the experimenters asks whether one of the specifics he mentioned might well be some- thing else. He takes another look and changes his mind saying, "You may be , right," giving the impression that he could be led to see what the experimenter suggests. The experimenter quickly informed that "we really don't know what this thing is," and replies with, "I'1l] come back to that," but again never does. SI saw an array of telephone poles about 400 yards SE of the scientific complex (see Fig. 2), but there is no such array of poles at or near URDF-3. “He was then asked to go up to 50,000 ft. to look again and describe the layout. Centering himself over the scientific complex, he scanned in a clock- wise direction; the view he saw is sketched in Fig. 3. Nothing in this figure is correct except that the area is arid and has low hills to the south. Speci- fically, he is incorrect in his locations of a small village, an airstrip, a cluster of pine trees, and a city 60 miles to the SW. There is, however, an airfield at the Main Support Complex 30 miles north of URDF-3. Ss was asked if he saw a railroad anywhere. The closest railroad to the target that he could see was about 60 miles north running roughly NW and SE and he didn't see any spur tracks in a direction toward the target. In reality, there is a railway in the Main Support Complex (about 30 miles north of URDF-3) with a railway spur under construction down to URDF-3. There is also grading -for -a railway ‘spur-near. the military comptex at URDF-3. Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R008700050003-9 ; . + : . . . . . .
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Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 sQQNEEDENTEAL— . - " 10 S41 ° GRD »-cane specific in looking at a scope trace at the airstrip and Claimed it made him nauseated. At this time the experimenters and decided to have lunch oss he would come back to this later, but as he randomly . elevated himself, he noted the area was under high security and had a cyclone _ fence. He could read the troop markings and buttons on a Colonel and then said he could come back to the security and military designations. In reality, the Operations Area of URDF-3 has 4 security fences, not just one cyclone fence. They ~ stopped for lunch at about 12:14 p.m. After lunch, at 2:22 p.m., picks up with the scope trace at the airstrip. He concludes that the trace indicates the pulse of someone who is nauseated - that's why it caused nausea in him. He was asked to indicate again where the telephone poles were and to map out the perimeter of the area. He drew in the telephone-pole grid with a circle of trees around the grid (see Fig. 2). There is no telephone-pole grid like this at or near URDF-3, Upon spotting several low- -boy trucks and a gantry crane (for very heavy lifting) in the vehicle area (Fig. 1), aD: ‘asked if he could tell where they took the heavy things from the low-boy trucks. This question Jed him to a look at the area near Building 1 in Fig. 1. He saw a sign in front of the building that said something to do with Zone 4. He said he would get. back to that but never did. When describing Building 1, he said it had three stories above-ground plus a basement with meteorological equipment on the flat roof and then looked inside the building at the top floor. He started to get too specific as to what he saw inside the building and was reminded that the type of thing the experi- menters could best check him on was the outside appearance of the buildings. They asked him the dimensions of Building 1 and he had a very difficult time establishing them when he finally settled on 80' x 160'. He then described ‘the other buildings in the scientif ic complex. He said Building 1 was the dominant building due to its height and: central location; everything seemed to, pivot off of it. There is no building at URDF-3 that matches the above descrip- tion of NADDIBGed ‘For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96- 00787R000790050003- 9 1° wpe ot .* . at toe, | peerpipniignan.. 5;
Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 we ft Sti ee OL They decided to stop the experiment for the day but asked Qi to Took at the target at different intervals that evening. (Due to the difference in time, all of his viewing during this formalized part of the experiment - on this first day - had been at nighttime locally at URDF-3). aid he was beginning to labor anyway and, "if you start laboring at it, you start mocking-up things." He was then reminded that he was going to draw a perimeter, or would he rather save that for tomorrow. He said he would rather save that since he's starting tu labor a bit. It was unfortunate that they didn't pursue the perimeter earlier in the day because it certainly has a unique shape. They quit at 3 p.m. . , * ‘ Summary of the First Day The controlled session taped at SRI lasted a total of about 1 hour and 52 minutes. It consisted of the experimenters defining the target as a “real target" as opposed to a sample target. Withtheuse of several maps, was given coordinates of the target and told that il was a scientific military research and test area about 25 to 30 miles SW of the Irtysh River. When the coordinates were given, immediately biased his thinking that this area was related to the Soviets' space-launching and recov- ery areas. Since this is not true, he may have inadvertantly and unknowingly biased himself into an incorrect target relationship. — 1 described the target as a military and scientific complex about 30 miles SW cf the Irtysh River but there is nothing in this description that wasn't already given to him. He then gives what is almost a perfect de- scription of someone's first Took at the Operations Area of URDF-3. He describes it as low one-story buildings that are partially dug into the ground giving the effect (as seen at ground level) of very short, squatty buildings, whereas they are actually fairly roomy on the inside. Unfortunately, as he later describes the specifics of buildings in the scientific complex, he never again mentions , earth-covering of partially-buried buildings.. It seemed he had the perfect description of URDF-3, but never came back to that again. In fact, his later ° Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 wos. Ty pCOHFEBENETAZ a ~ ™ oo
ge. < Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 - 12 description of the most dominant building (a large three-story building) doesn't match any building at URDF-3. | St tends to get bogged down in specifics and then says something like, "I'll come back to that," but seldom does. He said the military complex looks like it's been there for two to three years when in fact it's been there for over a decade. At one point when describing the specifics of the “radar/ communications building," he demonstrates that he could possibly be led to see what the experimenter wants him to see. . He sees some landmark-type items that simply don't appear at or near URDF-3. They are: 1) the road from the river to the target area passes through a gorge, 2) a 500-ft. tall antenna, 3) an outdoor pool (60' x 150‘), 4) an array of telephone poles surrounded by trees about 500 yards SE of the scientific complex, wn ) an airstrip on a plateau 12 miles NW of URDF-3, 6). a smali village NE of URDF-3, 7) a city 60 miles SW of URDF-3, 8) a cluster of pine trees west of URDF-3, and 9) a three-story building (with a basement) as the dominant building in the scientific complex. It doesn't seem fair to grade him on landmark-type objects ne failed to see at the target because his attention may not have been directed on them. However, it does seem fair to question the existence of those objects he claims to have _ seen. The most positive evidence of valid remote viewing for the first day (1 hour and 52 minutes) was his initial view of the ‘target as “low-one-story build- ings that are partially dug into the ground..." Unfortunately, ne never con- ‘ sidered that description again. The only other piece of pasitive evidence that day was his WisprdVed Fot HelbaSb si d/0ds Te bya 1Ri6Pde900787R000700050003-9 $OREIDENTIAL
whe Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 ACOiPipayrras | To summarize the first day's session accurately described the location and type of target (but that was given) but failed on the layout and type of buildings. He tended to spend too much time on specifics only to ay, “I'll come back to that," but saldom did. He successfully evaded drawing a perimeter of the area even though he was asked to do this twice. This was unfortunate because the shape of the perimeter is unique. My conclusion is that nothing positive to validate remote viewing resulted from this first day's 13 session, Additional Contact on the First Day ¢ | Hal Puthoff talked to by telephone that everiing at 5:25 p.m. to give him further instructions for his scanning that night. He was told that. there were some specific areas he had mentioned that the experimenters were most interested in. Specifically he was asked “for an exact, as possible, drawing of the crane (that was in the rear of Building 1) and exactly what its relation- ship is to Building 1." Further, they wanted to know “anything about Building 1 in relation to the surrounding buildings, like whatever forms of connection or communication or transportation that exists between Building 1 (the main building) and the ones that are nearby." They especially wanted “as much detail as possible on the gantry crane and its relation to ‘Building 1." He was told that the second thing they were most interested in was the security fence around the perimeter. They wanted any detail on that - even a drawing of exactly what the fence looked like. It was emphasized that the crane was really top priority, especially what it looked like in relation to the main building (Building 1). SECOND DAY The remote-viewing experiment resumed at 11 a.m. on July 10, 1974. It was mentioned that the previous nich QD had turned in drawings of a fence and a crane. $ 's first comments had to do with an observation of the immense size of the gantry crane. He said he didn't realize how large the gantry crane was until he saw a man walking by one of the crane. wheels. Assuming the height of the man as 6 ft., he realized that the dimensional data he had derived the day bé- fore was underestimated by at least a factor of 3. Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000700050003-9 . " e a * + . . <