THE WALL STRSprowed Far, Release, 2094/98/25, CIA-RDP96-00789R0001001600 ane ’ By ZBicniew BRZEZINSKI The prospects for.a comprehensive and complex U.S.-Soviet arms-control agree- ment, building on the foundations laid by SALT I and SALT I, are increasingly slim. Indeed, it is quite posstble that arms control as we have known it has come to the end of the road. Once the great hope of those who believed that the U.S,-Soviet n- valry could be limited by joint agree- ment—with some even seeing in arms con- trol the catalyst for a genuinely friendly American-Soviet relationship—comprehen- sive arms control (on the model of the SALT agreements) is likely to be the vic- tim of the bloody-mindedness of the pres- ent Soviet leadership and of the dynamics of the technological revolution. The present Soviet leadership recently } has done something quite remarkable in the history of the U.S.-Soviet competition, It has publicly postulated that there will be no arms-control talks unless the U.S. is prepared to accept a public humiliation and a political defeat: the dismantling of the relatively few Pershing 2s and cruise missiles so far deployed in Western Eu- Tope aS a response to the hundreds of SS- 20s deployed by the Soviet Union over the past several years. In effect, the Soviet Union has made arms control a hostage to the attainment of a truly major geopolfti- cal objective: the severance of the U.S.- European security connection. A No-Win Situation The Soviet demand is thus unaccepta- ble. Even the accommodationists who to- day dominate the discourse over foreign affairs within a segment of the American body politic reject the Soviet demand, and the Reagan administration enjoys wide- spread backing here and in Europe in re- fusing to bow to it. The Soviets have thus backed themselves into a no-win situation, an act of unprecedented diplomatic stupid- ity In order to extricate themselves, they have lately proposed separate negotiations in Vienna on an anti-satellite weapons agreement, President Reagan was wise in responding affirmatively to the proposal for negotiations, but he js equally wise in anticipating no real progress in them. But in the meantime the hostage is dy- ing. The primary victim of this Situation is arms control—not in its unrealistic utopian version but as a modest and practical way of somewhat controlling the spirals of de- fense spending and weapons accumulation on both sides. The Soviet refusal to negoti- ate simply means precious. time js belng lost, and as a result it will be even more difficult in the future to reach a truly am- bitious and comprehensive agreement, 2 better version of SALT II. This is because the political paralysis In the negotiations is being outpaced by the dynamics of the weapons revolution. The simple fact is that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are rapidly moving—while the arms-control negotiations remain stale- mated—to acquire Increasingly sophisti- cated weapons systems, making existing ICBMs anachronistic. As pointed out ina recent study in the Nava] War College Re- view by James Westwood: ‘The 1980s is a time of rapid transition and readjustments to technological changes in missilery. On the horizon are Stealth-type bombers launching stealth cruise missiles (ALCM) and precision-guided munitions (PGMs), further obviating the role of ICBMs. Sclen- tifle and technological achievements in guidance, navigation, aerodynamics, elec- tronic circuitry and componen warhead yields-per-warhead-welght appear to be leading rapidly to a downturn, per- haps to an eventual demise of the once-as- cendant and now dominant ICBMs of the period 1960 to 1985. This trend holds both in the United States and in the US.S.R." Highly mobile and extraordinarily pre- cise delivery systems are coming into be- ing and are beginning to be deployed. By way of example, the CEP (circular error Probabilities) of a Soviet SS-19 has been approximately 1,200 feet: that of 2 Minute- man III, 700 feet; of an MX, 450 feet; and of a Pershing 2, with terminal guidance, about 100 feet. The latest Soviet missiles also involve similarly impressive opera- tional improvements. wit will be increasingly difficult to im- Pose efféctive and verifiable limits on these weapons, The verification problem is becoming increasingly acute, given the mobility of the new systems and the oppor- tunities for rapid reloading and covert de- ployment, The question of how to control qualitative Improvements plagued SALT II negotiators and, at best, only a partially satisfactory response was developed. Their difficulties pale in compartson to the com- plexities posed by the new systems. Ade- quate verification of both qualitative and quantitative limits would require access to storage facilities and even perhaps to prod- uction centers. As a consequence, it is real= istic to conclude that for both political and technological reasons, the chances of a truly comprehensive agreement, which can be reliably verified, are rapidly fading. In that context, we are likely to see re- newed attraction to war planners of a first- strike scenario. Since the mid-1950s, aequi- poses the greatest danger. It could in one Stroke create circumstances beyond our capacity to foresee either its social or his- torical consequences. Of course such a sud- den-attack scenario remains unlikely, but one can disregard it entirely only at the greatest peril. Given the relative openness of American society, the precise location of key U.S. assets can be much more easily ascertained and effectively targeted than those of the Soviets. That makes the US. more vulnerable to such. a strike, and {t would be escapist to assume that Soviet planners would choose to ignore such an option altogether. Moreover, a bolt out of-the blue could create such inital'disbelief among the U.S, decision makers that they would be unable to make a prompt response. Even without a special Soviet effort to disrupt or destroy ‘ d U.S. decision makers, a sudden massive attack would put the American leaders un- der extraordinary Psychological pressure, capable of inducing erratic behavior and hesitation. One can hardly imagine how ut- terly dumbfounding would be the situation in which the‘president would find himself awakened in the middle of some night, confronted with the following life-and- death decision tree (as based on public _ Sources) : Time (minutes) 0 Massive attack launched. 1 SLBMs detected, 2 ICBMs detected. 4-6 Confirmation of attack: uncer- tainty over scale; U.S. decision process begins. . 6-10 First SLBMs detonate in High Altitude EMP attack; SAC launched The time has come to lay to rest the expectation that arms control is the secret key to a more amicable American-Soviet relationship. sition by the Soviets of a respectable nu- clear capability meant that a first strike— inherently messy and unpredictable in its consequences—was until recently not an attractive option for either side. A messy attack with large and relatively inaccurate warheads (the only kind possible) would still precipitate an almost equally messy counterattack. But with the deployment of extraordinarily accurate systems, a first Strike designed to paralyze the opponent's capacity to respond through the pre-emp- tive destruction of most of tts forces and through the decapitation of its command structure can again become a viable plan- ning option. From an offensive point of view, a sudden attack by highly precise and very numerous nuclear weapons Is More profitable than an exchange resulting from a political crisis prompting both sides to gear their forces to maximum alert. In the years ahead, one can envisage several ways in which nuclear weapons might be used {n anger and by delibera- tion. Four basic variants summarize the range of possibilities: (1) a massive sur- prise attack; (2) through crisis escalation; (3) by contagion from non-superpower con- flicts; (4) by terrorist attack. Of those, in the years ahead probably the fourth is the most likely since it involves a relatively simple operation, and it can be undertaken by a limited group of individuals with little concern for society and motivated by their own peculiar brand of rationality. But while the employment of a nuclear device in a terrorist attack be th t a Ved FdkaRcledss Seadobaes CA BUETE preemptively; confirmation of scale of attack; final U.S. decision process. 10-12 U.S. decision needed: Ride-out or respond; first SLBMs detonate over U.S. SLBM bases and National Com- mand Authority. 12-14 Final window for initiating re- sponse; launch under attack, 16-20 Delta SLBMs launched from home ports hit SAC. 20-30 ICBM attack initiates possible X-ray pin-down and begins impact on targets. How in these circumstances would the president perform? How effective would be the chain of command? How rational would be the choices made in response to initially unbeNevable information? Could incoming information regarding the nature of the attack be rationally related to the needed response? We are dealing here with truly sensitive and disturbing operational as well as psychological questions. The advent of increasingly numerous and accurate systems is making it Possible for planners of a strategic attack to envis- age a first strike that leaves the opponent strategically crippled, capable of only a spasmodic, disorganized and strategically aimless response—or none at all. This still does not make a first strike attractive from a moral or even political point of view, given the stakes, but the point fs that gradually the military attractiveness of this option is again increasing. Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms From Arms Control to Controlled Security be offset by greater reliance on the part of both sides on defensive strategic systems. The Times of London put it correctly when it stated editorially on June 13: “The So- viet Union is now naturally worried about the consequences of a burst in American spending on missile defense. It casts doubt on Soviet plans for offensive systems since the possibility of any missile defense—even an incomplete one—would radically alter the cost calculation of offensive systems. In the long run a defensive program would enhance arms control by reducing the po- tential gains from building offensive weapons. . . . It is ironic and paradoxical that the age of deterrence has so confused the strategic mentality of many commen- tators that their reaction to a purely defen? sive system is to suggest that it increases langer."’ The fact is that Strategic defense has become feasible not in the sense that {t can Safeguard society but because it can in- creasingly complicate the Planning and ex- ecution of an effective first strike, In other words, strategic defense can somewhat ne- gate the offensive advantages of Increas- ingly sophisticated strike systems, restor- ing the element of deterrence simply by creating again greater uncertainty as to the consequences of a first strike. Respective Vulnerability For the U.S., it is an especially attrac- tive option for it permits us to exploit the advantages of high technology, an area of U.S. superiority. This provides us with gen- uine potential for offsetting the military advantages gained in recent years by the Soviet Union, and would put pressure on the Soviet Union to return to serious arms- control negotlations. But even with such negotiations, the de- velopment of some defensive Strategic ca- pability will remain desirable. It is often said that an imbalance might arise when one side sees the other side acquiring a relatively invulnerable shield while itself remaining vulnerable. Pre-emption might therefore become tempting. In fact, that is not likely to happen. The acquisition of a defensive strategic capability is not like purchasing an umbrella, which one can un- fold against the rain upon leaving the Store. It is bound to be a protracted trial- and-error piecemeal process, with both sides experimenting, deploying partially, and adjusting their capabilities, with nel- ther one at any point in the next 15 to 20 years feeling it {s truly invulnerable to the other side, even though over time the re- spective vulnerability of each side to a first strike by the other will gradually be declining. Through such a process, a measure of reciprocal stability will be acquired and security of both sides will gradually be en- hanced, though the process will not yield the kind of restraint in defense expendi- . tures that many have associated with the hoped-for arms control. But the time has come to lay to rest the expectation that arms control is the secret key to a more amicable American-Soviet relationship or even to the enhancement of mutual secu- rity. The maintenance of such security wil] remain an ambiguous and protracted pro- cess requiring unilateral actions by both Sides, and increasingly so in the area of Strategic defense. Mr. Brzezinski served as assistant to esmlent for National Security Affairs CABRIO t pres obrseaien