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? Secretary
of Defense Caspar w.
Weinberger
Following remarks at National Press Club, Washington,
D.C.
Tuesday, May 1,
1984 - 1:30 PM
Mr. John Fogarty, President of NPC:
Thank you,
Secretary Weinberger.
We do have a lot of questions and let's get
to them.
Q:
Do you believe that by staying away from talks the Soviets are attempting
to diminish the reelection chances of President Reagan?
A:
Well,
that certainly is a possible interpretation of
the frustrating problems
we’ve had in trying to continue to pursue the arms reduction talks, either at
the
intermediate level or at the strategic level.
We’re even having trouble securing a
very minor but important agreement to upgrade and improve the Hotline that hasn't
really had the latest technological advances built into it for 25 or
30 years.
I
hope this is not why they’re staying away,
but it
is certainly subject
to that
interpretation.
I would much rather have the talks resume and continue without any
reference to the election or the reelection campaign.
Q:
What advances do you foresee in Soviet offensive strategic capabilities
to
counter U.S. strategic defense while the latter is being developed?
A:
There have always been arguments that you shouldn't try to develop
anything new or work on it because it will be provocative or that
it will lead the
Soviets
to conclude that they must attack before you get
the defense and so on.
They have been working on it,
as I've said for many years,
since roughly 1967 and
I
just think that it is vital that we try to develop it.
The President has said this technology will be shared.
The important
thing
is
to bear in mind that
the Soviets have made no such offer,
and it would be
a far more perilous world if they secured it first.
But for all the other reasons
I
think it’s vital that we pursue it because
I think ultimately it
is by far the
best way to maintain the peace.
Q:
Why are
the Russians constantly sending subs into Swedish waters?
Do you
view this as a provocative’ act?
A:
I don't think it can be viewed any other way.
I think they do it because
they regard that area as a potentially important battlefield.
It's one that they
are gathering intelligence about in a somewhat unconventional way,
but
I think it
is
bound to be provocative and it certainly has caused the Swedish government to take
all the precautions
that it can to try to prevent
it and to safeguard their own
defensive capabilities.
Q:
This one's on the MX and generally
tlje questioner points out
that last
year the MX got through the House by just nine votes.
They're wondering how
you plan to get
it through the House this year and then they talk a little bit
ab<ftit the compromise from cutting the number of missiles from 40 to 30 and then
they ask is
that a good compromise from your viewpoint?
A:
Well,
it's a compromise which would delay the ultimate regaining of
modernization of our nuclear strategic triad.
We have,
as
I say, been debating the
MX for something like 12 years.
What we have sought, what the Scowcroft Commission
recommended strongly,
was
the acquisition of an adequate, modernized, deterrent
force.
Not
to be used first or anything of the kind but
to make sure that the
Soviets
are aware of our retaliatory capability and
that we would have a missile
with the accuracy and the yield to destroy Soviet hardened targets. And
it is
important
that we regain that capability.
I don't have any idea what
the vote will be.
I have never predicted what
the
Congress would do or would not do,
but
I know that
the basic plan,
the ultimate
need,
remains
the same and
if
it
is delayed or slowed down it will simply mean
that
the whole program will cost more than it would cost now, more than it has
to cost and
it will be delayed longer ^than
it should be.
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don't have any need to do that and we're therefore anxious
to maintain the conditions
that have produced such a fine result with the volunteer system at the moment.
This is not
to say that there can not be and indeed should not be a continual
examination of all aspects of the military budget including military retirement.
I would be somewhat surprised if there was
a full examination of this in the Congress
this year. There have been various suggestions made and
these suggestions are
before the Congress, but
I haven't seen any indication in the comparatively short
period of time remaining in this session that
there will be any consideration of
these major changes this year.
Q.
On Law Day , what is your opinion of the United States government's refusal
to go before the World Court on the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors?
A:
Well,
on Law Day,
is
a good day to present
the formal,
legal arguments as
to
why the World Court has no jurisdiction over this matter,
particularly in view of
the previous non-adherence of Nicaragua,
and in view of
a number of other factors
as
to whether or not these matters are within the purview of the Court.
These matters
have all been set forth in formal legal briefs by the State Department and
I think
that the arguments that are made are justified,
the position that we have taken.
Q:
Do you agree with Knight Ridder's recent series of articles on the B-l bomber
that
Three U.S.
Presidents and their defense policy makers have rejected manned
bomber production” because manned bombers are obsolete and the B-l was put into
production by President Reagan and Congress only as sort of a pork barrel project?
And related
to that,
did President Carter's decision to go full speed ahead with
the so-called Stealth manned bomber indicate that he did indeed see a role for
manned bombers in the future?
A:
Well,
the answer to the first question is no.
I don't think it's a pork
barrel and
I do think there is very much a role for manned bombers.
It is our hope
and belief that
it is essential to improve our conventional strength as well as
•regaining a modernized nuclear deterrent.
The B-l helps with both of those and
helps very much particularly in view of the fact that
the newest B-52 is
26,
years old now and does not have and will not have the ability to penetrate Soviet
air defenses nor indeed even in view of some of the Soviet capabilities
to get off
its bases.
So
I think it is absolutely essential that we proceed with the B-l.
I think the questioner's assumptions are somewhat wrong with respect
to the desires
of
the prior Presidents.
1 put the money for the B-l into the budget in 1971,
I
believe it was,
and I didn't encounter any opposition from the President at that
time nor did
I encounter any opposition from his successor.
It was only in 1977
when the B-l was supposed to have rolled off the lines
that it was cancelled by
President Carter.
I think we need it and
I also think that
the advanced technology
bomber is another very important aspect of our 'deterrent capability.
Again,
I
think that
the decision of the President on October
1,
1981,
that we needed to
proved with both of these and the
Scowcroft Commission's unanimous recommendation
that we should indeed proceed with both, both of those decisions were correct.
Q:
Would the U.S.
declare areas of space American territory in order to
implement the space defense system much like we have extended the territory offshore?
A:
What
is
this?
"
Q:
Would the U.S.
declare areas
of space American territory?
A:
No,
I don't think there would be any attempt
to do that nor any need to do
that.
If the space defense system works,
and
if we can develop it as we want
to
there wouldn't be any need to extend our territory offshore.
We would have destroyed
the Soviet missiles long before they got anywhere near our shores and we would try
to develop a system that would do that but there wouldn't be any need to declare
any portion of space American territory.
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But we also think it is essential to the national security that we not have to
escalate "any kind of a nuclear conflict and that we therefore should put and do
put,
as
1 say, around 85%,
86% of our -budget into conventional capabilities.'
That’s
the proportion that we have and that's
the proportion roughly that would
run all through the President's five year defense program if all of the sums that
he has requested or appropriated.
That
is roughly the division,
about 14%,
13%
strategic and the balance conventional.
Q:
The Soviet Union has been engaged in psychic research for years.
How
serious is the Department of Defense and the CIA's counter commitment
to investigating
parapsychology "'in '''defense?
'
-
.
:
'
•
A:
Well, we look at everything that we think will be useful and would help us.
1 wouldn't be prepared to characterize the capability of the Soviets in this area.
It is certainly true they've been working on it
for some time and it's important that
we work on it and be aware of any late developments and be prepared to avoid anything
in the nature of a breakthrough.
But
I don't
think
I would want
to go any further
than that, not because it's all that classified,
but simply because that's roughly the
level at which we work.
Q:
What steps are you taking to modernize submarines that~were~not^Taken by
previous Administrations in the 1970s as you've said earlier?
A:
Well, what we're doing first of all is developing a submarine that will
carry
a missile that will have for the first time the accuracy and the yield to
destroy Soviet hardened targets.
This is what
is essential to develop our own
capability to deter attack.
It is an important, critically Important part of the
triad.
We have now with the Ohio class submarines coming on at the rate of about
one a year or a little better than that and with the D-5 missile that will be
1?89,
we tried to get it
a. year" earlier but we found out it would
cost a billion dollars more just
to get that year, and contrary to what you may
have heard,
I do believe in austerity so we didn't do that.
But
this
is the
principle way in which we have improved the submarine part of the triad.
In order
to do that we do need,
as
I said,
the bigger submarines and naturally we try in
every way we can to make them quieter and make them more effective.
We also work
on the submarine communication as indeed we do on the command,
control,
communications
of all parts of the triad.
But primarily it
is in those ways that we are now
modernizihg and improving the submarine leg of the triad.
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Q:
I think you still have some doubters out there.
In the event of a Soviet
first strike would they not try to shoot down our space defense station before
launching their missiles against the U.S.?
^
-
A:
Well,
in the event of
a Soviet first strike,
I don’t really know what they
wo^ld do.
What we have to do is develop a capability that will deter them from ever
making that first strike.
There are any one of
a number of different patterns or
strategies that they may follow if they are determined to make a first strike.
It seems
to me the important thing is for us
to acquire
the capability of destroying
their incoming missiles before they get into the continental air space or
into the atmosphere.
I think that can be done and
I think it is essential that
we work to do it.
I don't think we can stand around wondering what the Soviets
might do because if they conclude that
they could make a first strike they would
have a great many targets and our whole desire,
our whole purpose, our whole aim,
ts
to develop a capability that will continue
to deter them in one way or another
from making that strike.
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