Approved For Release 200
NOT RELEASE^Ept^fg|n^(rr
)w4^^/(JIaJrBP9(
ONALS
96-00788R001 000340008-7
0RC0N
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND
207SS
IAFM-0PS-HU-SA
May 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
After-Action Report
(Iranian Crisis
23-25 Apr
80)
1.
(U)
Purpose :
This report covers the period 23-25 April 1980 during
which this office provided increased operational support
to the
Iranian
hostage situation
at
the specific request
of Special Operations Division
(SOD),
JCS.
The request from the JCS was relayed
to
INSC0M via Mr.
Jackie
Keith
(Chief,
ICC,
INSC0M)
who took the request directly
to the
CG,
INSC0M.
2.
(S/N0F0RN)
Support Required :
The JCS tasking specifically requested
that:
a.
We increase the number of operational sessions and that we attempt
multiple targeting sessions;
b.
We take measures
to preclude having
to abort sessions
(if
at all
possible)
;
c.
We provide them information
on
a timely basis using format found
at
Incl
1.
3.
(S)
Facilities :
In order
to accomplish the tasking mentioned
in paragraph
2,
it was decided
to rent space
in
a nearby hotel for the required period of
time.
Initial planning estimated that we might be required to provide JCS
support for ten
days.
Reservations were made at
the Best Western Motel
(3440
Fort Meade
Road,
Laurel,
Maryland;
Telephone:
(301)
490-9595)
for five days
beginning
23 April
1980.
We rented three separate rooms which provided us
with the necessary flexibility
(two rooms used
for operational sessions and
the other
as
a control/administrative area;
plus we used the operational room
that we have
in Building 4553)
needed
to carry out the multiple sessions
simultaneously.
4.
(S/N0FQRN)
Operations :
We moved into the motel shortly after 1300 hours,
23 April 1980 and conducted our first sessions at 1500 hours,
23 April
1980.
Our operations plan originally called for us
to conduct 9-10 sessions per
day;
however,
I
terminated operations shortly after 0200 hours,
25 April 1980 when
the news reached us that the attempt
to rescue
the hostages had been aborted.
The termination of our activities was concurred with by LTC Bob Morrell,
SOD,
JCS.
CLASSIFIED BY:
Director,
DIA
REVIEW ON:
May 2000
EXTENDED
BY:
Director, DIA
REASON:
2-301c
(3
&
6)
Approved For Release 2001/04102 :£JAbBDB96-00788R001 000340008-7
Approved For Release 2001/
9K-00788R001 000340008-7
IAFM-OPS-HU-SA
2 May
1980
SUBJECT:
After-Action Report
(Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr
80)
a.
0p£r£t£O£sjC£m£l£t£d£
During
the period 23-25 April 1980
ule
completed
20 operational sessions.
Spot reports on all sessions were called
in within
an hour of their completion
(individual sessions)
and short
summaries were provided to JCS within 24 hours
of completion for 12
of the
sessions and typed reports were provided for the other
8 sessions due
to the
data being reported.
b.
Le£son£ JLe^rned:
On the whole,
it appeared to be very effective
operating from the expanded environment — basically because
it provided us
with
the operational flexibility and an atmosphere fairly free from outside
noise.
However,
there are still some factors we need to look at and they
are listed below:
(1)
CON
- Altering the normal work cycle of remote viewing personnel
may not be beneficial
to the remote viewing process.
Personnel rapidly became
tired working the expanded hours even though they were afforded plenty
of
time for rest and relaxation.
It appeared that some people were not able to
hold or achieve their normal level
of concentration.
(2)
CON
- Scheduling of a large number of
R \J sessions was a problem
for all personnel concerned.
The typist couldn't keep up so we went with the
abbreviated formats which increase the margin of error,
especially for the
analysts.
The interviewers were scheduled to work from 0700 until after 0200
each day.
Obviously,
if we had continued for
the whole ten days,
we would
have had difficulty
in maintaining
an effective work-force.
(3)
CON
-
If we find
it necessary
to run this type
of operations
in
the future,
then we should reserve at least one more room.
This would allow
the remote viewers to have
a break/rest area free from the distractions found
in the Admin area.
And,
of course,
keeps the RVers from accidentally overtaking
any discussions concerning
the project they are working
on.
(4)
CON
-
It was very obvious that the Project Manager carried too
much
of the administrative and operational burdens on his shoulders.
This
short exercise once again pointed out the need that
the project has for
an
Operations Officer.
We had to stop all other projects
in order to properly
support and control this task.
(5)
CON
- Security was of some concern since we were operating off
the confines of
a military installation.
Although no problems were encount-
ered,
we were very concerned that the increased traffic
in and out of the
motel might attract attention.
(6)
CON
- The overlay problem due to
a lack of remote viewer isolation
continued
to be a hindrance.
We have now been working
on
the Iranian hostage
situation
for over five months.
Project personnel,
like everyone else,
have been engulfed by
the news media concerning the Iranian situation.
It
appears as though some of the RVers were not successful in being able to
separate the various levels
of consciousness and it might be that pure
imagination took hold.
Approved For Release 2001/04/02
: CIA-^^^C^^O|1000340008-7
Approved For Release 20oSEORl^Pp6-00788R001 000340008-7
IAFM-OPS-HU-SA
2 MaV 1980
SUBJECT :
After-Action Report
(Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr
80)
( 7 )
pro
- The commonality of mission importance seemed'to achieve
a psychological "high"
for group identification and may have helped improve
mission performance.
5 .
(s)
Summary:
As previously mentioned,
we have been working
on this
problem for over five months.
There
is no way any project personnel can be
isolated from news concerning the Iranian situation.
We have now completed
over
120 sessions on this tasking and have submitted approximately 90 reports.
Yet,
even though we are still
in
a training mode,
we have received very little
feedback concerning the value
of our efforts.
I
feel that they
(the reports)
must be
of some value
to the tasking agency
(3CS)
or else they wouldn't continue
to give us additonal requirements.
However,
we still do not know how,
why,
when,
etc.,
our reports have aided.
I strongly believe that someone from the
decision-making branch of INSC0M should press SOD,
JCS for
a written assessment
of
our effort — even though this assessment,
by necessity, will be incomplete,
we should
at least have our policy makers made aware
of how their resources
are being used and why they are being continually tasked.
l
Inci
MURRAT
B. WATT
as
LTC,
MI
Project Manager
APPROVED:
CHAD
B. WHITE
COL,
GS
ADCSOPS-HUMINT
Approved For Release 2001/04/02^ CI^F^P^|^7^^»01000340008-7
Approved For Release 2001/04/02
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 000340008-7
j
i
i
j Approved For Release 2001/04/02
: CIA-RDP96-00788R001 000340008-7