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SECTION 3.
EARLY DIA SUPPORT (S/NF)
(S/NF)
The military services provided most of
the money
to support
psychoenergetics research at
SRI
from 1975
to
1980.
During this
time,
however,
$228,000 were provided
to
SRI
by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA)
.
(S/NF)
The DIA sought to investigate remote viewing
as an aid
in
assessing the Soviet RV research.
As the phenomenon has
intelligence-
collection potential,
countermeasures and other factors
that
inhibit
remote viewing were also of
interest.
The DIA program did not
seek proof
of principle but restricted
its efforts
to applications research and
to
actual attempts
to collect
intelligence.
Thus,
the research was confined
to delineating factors
that appear
to affect
the reliability and accuracy
of RV and
to develop
a methodology
to minimize
the deleterious effects
and
then incorporate the findings
into an RV training methodology.
(S/NF)
Since
SRI,
by now,
had considerable experience with coordinate
remote viewing
(CRV)
,
the factors
that affect
it were chosen for
investigation.
To
improve the
signal
to noise ratio,
it
is necessary
either
to
increase
the
signal
or reduce
the
noise.
Many attempts,
mostly
unsuccessful,
had been made
to
increase the
signal;
therefore,
it was
decided
to
look at
that causes
of
the noise and
try
to dampen
them.
Four
major
sources of noise were
identified:
1.
Analytical Overlay—Extrapolations
to fill gaps
in
the
data.
2.
Associational
Overlay—The
stimulation
of
existing
mental
formations
that are associationally related
to the target.
3.
Monitor
Overlay—The
encroachment
of
the
monitor
into
the
v i ewer ' s awarene s s
4.
Environmental
Overlay—The
intrusions
of
environmental
objects
into the viewer's awareness.
(S/NF)
At this point,
a model
of how RV works
(Figure
14)
was
developed.
Upon presentation of the stimulus
(a coordinate),
a burst
of
data appears which then fades
away.
The
stimulus
is again presented and
there
is another burst
of data.
It
is
in
the
time gap between
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S/NF
presentations
of the stimulus
that the viewer
fills
in his own
interpretations and analysis of
the data.
(S/NF) These are not psychically derived,
and they are usually not
accurate.
To avoid
this noise,
a procedure where the stimulus
is
repeatedly provided and where the viewer responds with quick-reaction data
bytes was developed.
This procedure,
the use of
a featureless room with
homogeneous coloring,
and
limiting the monitor's behavior are
the
solutions offered
to reduce
the noise.
(C)
To improve the signal,
a progressive multistage target
acquisition process was postulated where
increasing contact
is made with
the
target through
a
series
of
steps
(Table
4)
.
It was hoped that
training viewers
to know these
stages and report their data within that
format would
increase the amount
of correct
data.
Initial training
results seemed
to confirm that
the amount
of
inaccurate data dropped.
Table 4
(U)
STAGES OF TARGET ACQUISITION
1.
Recognition and decoding of Gestalts
2.
Achieving sensory contact with target
3.
Experiencing motion and mobility within target
4.
Recognizing and decoding minor signals
5.
Decoding special characteristics of target
6.
Analytical recognition and decoding of significant aspects of the target
UNCLASSIFIED
(C)
To determine the applications possible,
SRI
chose and explored
a series
of targets using CRV.
The results were encouraging and provided
some hope
that using RV for collecting intelligence may be possible,
and
that the training mechanisms
seem to improve
the signal-to-noise ratio.
(C)
The training program was directed at training participants
to
bring their remote viewing ability under more conscious control,
and
to
recognize and overcome factors
that
limit RV reliability.
One
of
the
larger limiting factors was the viewer mixing data from his memory and
imagination with the psychic
data.
This could account
for
the
final
set
of data having accurate and inaccurate
information
intermixed.
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SECTION
4. THE JOINT SERVICE PROGRAM (U)
(S/NF) By 1980,
a number of DoD elements were contracting
for
a
variety of psychoenergetics tasks
at
SRI.
As
a result,
a briefing was
given
in April
1980
to launch a joint
service program.
High ranking
officers and civilians
in Army,
Navy,
and Air Force Intelligence were
present along with representatives
of DIA and other DoD offices.
It was
hoped that
a joint service program would redress
the problems
of not
enough
funds,
no central management,
and no termination point.
The
details
on the
structure and function of this program are available
in
the
DoD Grill Flame Progress Report
(Mid-Year FY 1981),
Appendix
I.
In brief,
the program established
a working group
to deal with policy matters
and
to
establish broad general guidance
for the psychoenergetics external
assistance contract.
Provisions were also made for
a primary contract
monitor who would attend
to the day-to-day research progress.
(S/NF) With regard
to funds
for
the program,
the budget
for FY 1981
was $456,000.
Funding
at
that
level did keep the program alive but,
it
was estimated that
a minimum of $600,000
to $1,000,000 per year would be
needed
to fund the research program properly.
A three-year contract was
proposed but only
a one-year effort was contracted.
At
the end of three
years
a decision would be made whether or not
the program would be
continued
.
A.
(U) FY 1981
(S/NF) The joint
service proposal was accepted and work began
in
September
1981.
Almost
immediately
a great number of problems were
encountered.
The sparse funding for the first year has already been
mentioned.
DoD Grill Flame Progress Report,
Mid-Year FY 1981 gives
the
details
of
a number of other problems.
The most
serious difficulty was
that
the sponsoring group would include only the DIA and Army
INSC0M.
For
various reasons
all
the other potential members chose not
to participate.
There were also
some significant administrative differences between
the
DIA and
INSCOM.
In
short,
where
a union had been envisioned
a confederacy
developed.
That
is,
each participant maintained
its separate
funding,
and
requirements,
and both engaged
in managing and monitoring the research.
As
a result
the Grill Flame Program was only an overlay on what already
existed.
Figures
through 20 point out how the program was conceived
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SECRET/NF
FIGURE
(.S/NF)
GRILL FLAME FUNDING PLAN
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SECRET/NF
FIGURE
(S/NF)
GRILL FLAME FUNDING ACTUAL
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