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Journal of Communication, Winter I97S
Table 2: Breakdown of experimental ESP studies (1934-1939)
N
N studies reported
(Studies)*
significant (p <
,01)
% signlf.
Duke group
Non-Duke
Total
Jir
U^/l
E:
gl?-'an8Ua8e stud,es *nv°lving assessment of statistical signifies nc<
of data, 1934—1939 inclusive.
j
x* (Duke vs. non-Duke x significant vs. nonsignificant) =1 1.70(1 df)
sequences have been "doctored” prior
to publication in order to remove
certain nonrandom
features;
this
practice, according
to Spencer Brown,
makes
such
sequences nonrandom and
invalidates
the
use
of standard
significance tests; (b) the source of some random number sequences involves
randomizing machines which
utilize
the
unpredictability
of human
be-
avior when
examined
for
microscopic
variation);
such
variation,
says
pencer Brown, may be predictable enough to account for observed anom-
alies in random sequences, as well as some of the significant results reported
in ESP guessing experiments;
(c) Spencer Brown produces evidence to show
that anomalous
(significant)
departures from
probability
theory
can
be
obtained by matching columns of random numbers
(39).
A detailed examination of these points was undertaken by Scott
(64).
With
respect
to
"doctored”
sequences,
Scott showed
that
the maximum
error due
to rejected
(edited) sequences would not
affect
interpretations
of results which are more than marginally significant and could, in
fact
increase the likelihood of making a Type II error. Qn the hypothesis that
ESP
results
are due
to some kind
of hyper-regulaHty
affecting both
the
target
sequence
and
the
response
(guess)
sequence
simultaneously
and
similarly, Scott makes the point that this would lead to the expectation of
similar
results from matching any
set of humanly! produced random
se-
quences. The cross-check type of control series and (he Greenwood chance
control
series described earlier demonstrate that
this
is not the case The
anomalies reported by Spencer Brown (68), obtained by arbitrarily matching
columns of random numbers, have been criticized oq the basis of post hoc
selection (40) and illustrate not that there are fundamental defects in prob-
ability
theory,
but
rather
that
significant
deviations
from
chance
can
occur in any data where hypotheses and analyses are npt specified in advance.
The most recent phase of the ESP controversy centers on the hypothesis
of investigator fraud. This argument was most
forcefully presented in
a
lead article in Science, entitled "Science and the Sujaernatural,” by G. R.
Price (47), who began with the following observations:
Believers m psychic phenomena
.
.
. appear
to .have won a
derisive
victor and virtually silenced opposition
This victory
is the result
of an
impressive amount
of careful experimentation and
intelligent
argumentation.
.
.
. Against all this evidence, almost the only defense
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remaining to the skeptical scientist
is ignorance, ignorance concerning
the work
itself and concerning
its
implications. The
typical scientist
contents himself with retaining
.
.
, some criticism that at most applies
to a small fraction of the published studies. But these findings (which
challenge our very concepts of space and time) are—if valid—of enor-
mous importance ... jo they ought not to be ignored.
Following Hume's argument on
miracles,
Price
asserted
that ESP
is
"incompatible with current scientific theory,” and that
it
is therefore more
parsimonious
to
believe
that
parapsychologists cheat than
that ESP
is
a
real phenomenon. He concluded, "My opinion concerning the findings of
the parapsychologists
is that many of them are dependent on clerical and
statistical errors and unintentional use of sensory clues, and that all extra-
chance results not so explicable are dependent on deliberate fraud or mildly
abnormal mental conditions" (47,
p.
S60). This extraordinary critique and
the ensuing discussion in Science (5, 56, 48, 55, 56, 65) were widely reviewed.
As Meehl and Scriven (46) pointed out, Price's argument rests on two highly
questionable assumptions, namely that contemporary
scientific knowledge
is complete, and
that ESP
necessarily
conflicts with
it.
Seventeen
years
later, in an "Apology to Rhine and Soal," Price retracted
his accusations
of investigator fraud (49).
Very
similar arguments
have,
however,- been made more
recently
by
the British parapsychological
critic C.
E. M. Hansel
(14,
15), who began
his examination
of the ESP hypothesis by
suggesting that "the a
priori
arguments
.
.
. may even
save time and
effort
in
scrutinizing the
[ESP]
experiments. ... In view of the a priori arguments against
it we know in
advance that telepathy, etc., cannot occur."
Because of the "a priori unlikelihood" of ESP, Hansel’s examination
of the literature centered primarily on the possibility of fraud, by subjects
or investigators. He reviewed in depth four experiments which he regarded
as providing the best evidence of ESP: the already-mentioned Pearce-Pratt
distance series (59); the Pratt-Woodruff (44) series, also conducted at Duke;
and
Soal’s work with Mrs. Stewart and
Basil Shackleton
(66),
as
well
as
a more recent
series by Soal and Bowden
(67).
Hansel showed,
in
each
case, how fraud could have been committed (by the experimenters in the
Pratt-Woodruff and Soal-Bateman series, and by the subjects in the Pearce-
Pratt and Soal-Bowden experiments). He gave no direct evidence that fraud
was committed
in
these experiments but
said,
"If the
result could have
arisen through a
trick,
the experiment must be considered unsatisfactory
proof of ESP, whether or not
it
is finally decided that such a trick was in
fact used" (15, p.
18, italics mine).
Hansel’s argument
is unclear, inasmuch as he quite properly insists that
no single experiment can be conclusive, then proceeds to show that none
is, given
the
theoretical
possibility of fraud by
subjects or
investigators.
Hansel’s
only
conclusion
after more
than
250
pages
of careful
scrutiny
was that these experiments were not "fraud-proof” and therefore not con-
clusive proof of ESP.
Ill
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Journal of Communication, Winter 1975
Two recent examples, one involving cancer
re,search
(74) and the other
involving parapsychology
(57),
serve
to remind
jus of the importance
of
cross-validation
in
the
assessment
of any experimental
finding.
In
both
cases,
it should
be added,
the fraudulent
acts
wtjirc detected
in-house, by
the researchers themselves. The point
is that
in the final analysis an experi-
mental finding
is of value and
is
to be taken
serjously only to the extent
that
it
leads
to further inquiry. To regard any Experiment
as an end
in
itself is to remove it from the domain of experimental science.
It
is obvious
that
hypothetical
construct,
such
as
ESP,
cannot
be
validated
by
any
isolated experiment, no
matter how
well
controlled
it might
be.
Inde-
pendent replication
is a necessary prerequisite.
The claim that psi phenomena operate
outside the framework of physical probability
has been a major source of a
priori arguments against acceptance of ESP.
It
has
been
suggested
that
to
accept ESP
requires
the
rejection
of
physics. This
is absurd, and
it
is worth noting
th;at such arguments have
usually
been
advanced
and
defended
by
psychologists
rather
than
by
physicists.
!
The
debate
over
the
incompatibility
of
physics and ESP
has
been
conducted almost exclusively within
the framework of nineteenth-century
deterministic
physics, wherein
the ultimate constituent of physical
reality
was
still believed to be solid matter. Inasmuch as njiodcrn microphysics has
exorcised
the
material
out
of matter and
deals wjuh
processes which on
our macrophysical
level
of sensory perception are jevery
bit
as erratic and
anomalous as ESP, the a priori claim that ESP viollates specifiable laws of
physics can no longer be considered to be of more ;than historical
interest.
ESP and
other
psi
phenomena,
while no
logger
incompatible
with
physics,
are not
yet accounted
for
by
physics;
buj
then,
neither are
the
more familiar processes of memory and conscious experience. Indeed, the
transformation of "raw feels" into conscious experience
is no less a problem
for the neurophysiologists of today than
it was
forj the speculative philos-
ophers of classical antiquity. Sir John Eccles, amon^ others, has repeatedly
warned, "We should not pretend that consciousness!
is not a mystery.”
The ESP
controversy
illustrates
several
features
of
the
paradigmatic
view of science developed by Thomas Kuhn (28). Normal science, according
to
Kuhn,
is
essentially
a
clean-up
operation,
constrained
by
a
broad
theoretical framework, or paradigm, which defines the boundaries of legiti-
mate inquiry. Paradigms are scientific world views which provide coherence
and structure and determine the types of questions
: to be posed of nature,
as well as the manner in which answers are sought. Normal science
is thus
a
process of paradigm-articulation,
rather than
of idiscovery. Within
the
paradigm
structure
of normal
science,
observations which
conflict
with
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the paradigm are seldom made; anomalies are ignored. When the anomalies
become
sufficiently
persistent
that
they
can
no
longer
be
ignored,
they
are
hotly
disputed.
Eventually,
a
new
paradigm
is
tentatively
erected
which
attracts
a group of adherents, and
a period of
crisis ensues which
Kuhn calls a paradigm clash.
In
this
review
I
have
focused
at some
length on
the
period
of
the
1930s,
not
because
it
provides
the
best
available
evidence
for ESP
or
the
best understanding of the processes underlying
its operation—it does
neither,
but
rather
because
it
was
during
this
period
that
the
major
substantive methodological
issues were
raised and
to
a
large extent
con-
sensually resolved. Since
1940,
well over
10,000 journal
pages devoted
to
para psychological
research have been
published, and
at
least 250 experi-
mental
studies have
been
reported. The
methodological
foundations
of
the research have gradually diversified, enlarging and enriching the scope
of inquiry and providing a
basis for more sophisticated study. Automated
testing equipment
has replaced
card-guessing
in
forced-choice ESP
tasks,
and quantitative methods have been developed for the objective assessment
of
psi
interactions
in
nonguessing
tasks.
Psychophysiological
techniques,
permitting determination
of psi-optimal organismic
states, have been
in-
troduced and
utilized
in
conjunction
with
experimental methods more
closely approximating
the conditions under which
psi
interactions occur
in
vivo. More important, parapsychological
investigators have
to
a
large
extent
shifted
their
attention away from
the
‘'proof-oriented" approach,
which can
only
reaffirm
the
presence
of anomaly,
toward
systematic
at-
tempts
to
identify the antecedent conditions necessary for the occurrence
and
detection
of
psi
interactions,
the
delineation
of
positive
attributes,
and the study of individual
differences. Only through the pursuit of such
"process-oriented" research can we ever hope to achieve the goals of control,
assured replicability (or at least predictability), and eventual understanding!
REFERENCES
1. American
Psychological
Association. “ESP Symposium
at
the American
Psychological
Association/' Journal of Parapsychology 2, 1938, pp. 247-272.
2.
Bell. M.
"Francis Bacon,
Pioneer
in
Parapsychology.
' International Journal
of Para
psychology 6 , 1964, pp. 199-208.
3.
Bender, H. “The Case
of
Ilga
K.:
Report
of
a Phenomenon
of Unusual
Perception."
Journal of Parapsychology 2, 1938, pp. 5-22.
I. Bozarth,
J. D„
and
R.
R.
Roberts.
"Signifying
Significant
Significance.” American
Psychologist 27. 1972, pp. 774-775.
>. Bridgman. P. W. "Probability. Logic, and ESP.” Science
123.
1956. pp.
15- 17 .
i. Camp, B. H. "Statement under ‘Notes.' ” Journal of Parapsychology
1.
1937,
p. 305.
‘ ^Tenter, C.
R., and H. R. Phalen. "An Experiment
in Card Guessing.” Journal
ol
Parapsychology
1, 1937, pp. 31-43.
" Crumbaugh,
J-
C. An Experimental Study
of Extra sensory
Perception. M.A. Thesis.
1938, Southern Methodist University Library.
.
Teller,
\\
.
Statistical Aspects of ESP.” Journal of Parapsychology
4,
1940, pp
271-298
0.
Fisher, R. A. Letter to J. B. Rhine, cited in (50), p. 45.
s
’
'
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