hd Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-0078 poate 1-8 SECRET ANF ORN PROJECT SUN STREAK AES eee Coe Fn SESSION NUMBER: Of FROGECOT DATE GF SESSTON: li JAN 8Y DATE OF REPORT s li JAN 89 START: O850 ENDs O&O ERV VIEWER IDENTIFIER: 025 i. (G/NE/SE) MIGSION, TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE SOVIET UN TONS CARRIER CALLED THE MING. a (S/NE/SED VIEWER TAGEING: TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE OBJECT AY COORDINATES 9LEMALE/@7 14, oa CS / NF / GE) SOMMENTS eNO TAC LEMCENC VIEWER WAS ABLE TO DE Tee WEAPONS DOWN UNDEF Tr "ARPROTER. VIEWER WAS ABLE TO ot TEWER ENIEW THAT THE OBJECT WAS NAVIGATIONAL TN NATE REF QRTING WAS GOOD. OVERALL A SUCCESSFUL SEG& TON. 4, (S/NF/SE) EVALUATION: 3 ANE CLASSIFIED BY: DITA CDT) DECLASSIFYs OADR Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8
} ce * Moscow has further maintained that the Sovi- et interceptors issued all the proper warnings prior to the destruction of the aircraft. Yet the transcript of the Soviet pilots’ communica- tions with their ground controllers clearly contradict this claim. KAL Flight 007 was in- tercepted and destroyed for having entered Soviet Airspace. The Soviet explanation has not been accepted by either the United Na- tions or the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Response Soviet Military Power 1984 has reported the continuing expansion and improvement of the Soviet Union’s military capabilities across the entire range of potential conflict: \.® the modernization, increased capa- bilities and increased survivability of Soviet intercontinental and theater nuclear forces, * the continuing development of new generations of ICBMs specifically . designed to destroy US missile silos and the bases of US manned bomber deterrent forces, ¢ the continuing deployment of mobile SS-20 LRINF missiles, ¢ the swift advances in nuclear and conventional cruise missile capabilities, e the introduction of new land, sea and air weapons systems, and the parallel improvements in combined arms capabilities, e the continuing modernization and growth of a logistics system designéd to sustain Soviet forces in the field for 60 to 90 days, e the continuing high priority for military research, development and in- dustry, and the exploitation of Western technology, and ¢ the increasing evidence of Soviet willingness to project and use military power, as reflected.in the preceding case studies. In light of this threat to the United States and its Allies, the challenge is clear. We must _ maintain military capabilities sufficient to , convince the Soviets that the costs of aggres- sion would be far greater than any possible benefit. These capabilities are the cornerstone . of our defense policy. US policy toward the . Soviet Union, however, is not merely based on deterrence of Soviet aggression. As the wenn cee ee Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8 United States has stressed, we are firmly com- mitted, as well, to the pursuit of a compre- hensive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed at minimizing the risk of war and solving some of the real problems in our relationship. Reducing arms and ensuring a more stable military balance stand at the top of our agenda. The United States’ strategic and conven- tional deterrent has been effective in keeping the peace for more than a generation. In the 38 years since World War II—years marked by periods of major tension and crisis—there has been no nuclear conflict. There has been no military conflict between East-West in Euro- pe, nor any direct combat between the forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations in any corner of the globe. Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union has expanded and modernized its military forces despite US restraint in weapons pro- grams and efforts to achieve meaningful negotiated arms reductions. It is because we recognize the reality of the Soviet threat that we are taking the necessary steps to maintain a truly credible deterrent capability and, thus, to preserve peace and freedom, while continu- ing to work for significant, equitable and veri- fiable arms reductions. We harbor no illusions about the conse- quences of any nuclear war between ourselves and the Soviet Union. We believe that neither side could win such a war, but this belief alone is not sufficient to assure prevention of a nuclear war or coercion. We seek to maintain a stable strategic deterrent through a range of strategic retaliatory forces—a Triad of.land- based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and manned strategic bombers. This combination of retaliatory options is designed to complicate Soviet planning for any execu- tion of a successful attack against all three force components, while at the same time de- fending against Soviet technological break- throughs against any single leg of the Triad. In addition to the multiplicity and flexibility provided in the Triad, strategic nuclear deter- rence requires an effective command, control and communications system. Our goal, our strategy and our defense programs are design- ed to ensure that the Soviet leadership under- stands as well that there can be no winner ina nuclear war and that the West has the confi- dence to resist Soviet intimidation. Soviet advances put at risk the elements of 133 Chapter VII_ The Global Challenge Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8
fmm es en te our retaliatory forces and demand that we im- prove these elements. We have made the hard decisions required to maintain our nuclear de- terrent, and we have begun to redress defi- ciencies in strategic systems. Our programs introducing the _PEACEKEEPER (MX) ICBM, B-1B strategic bomber, TRIDENT II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and upgraded command, control and communica- tions systems to our forces are examples. In addition to our strategic nuclear forces, _ the United States maintains nuclear forces in Europe to deter Soviet attacks against our NATO Allies. These forces are linked with our conventional and strategic nuclear forces un- der a single, coherent policy of deterrence. Soviet deployment of SS-20 LRINF missiles in recent years, however, has called into ques- tion the NATO deterrent posture. The 1979 NATO dual-track decision—deployment of US GLCM and PERSHING II missiles to Eu- rope, while pursuing an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agreement—reaffirms the credibility of NATO’s deterrent. In the face of the USSR’s unwillingness thus far to nego- tiate such an agreement, we have initiated deployment of the GLCMs and PERSHING IIs. Nevertheless, we still hope for, and active- ly seek, resumption of negotiations to reduce or eliminate all US and Soviet LRINF missiles. Looking to the continuing challenge, we are examining the possibility of a defense against ’- ballistic missiles. The United States has em- barked on the analysis required to define a technically feasible research program in this area and to assess implications of defensive technologies for the prevention of nuclear war, the deterrence of aggression and the prospects for arms reductions. The composition and role of the United States’ conventional forces and those of our Allies are defensive in nature to support a de- fensive policy. We seek no territorial gain and employ our forces only to defend against threats to our interests and security. This pol- icy allows a potential aggressor the advantage of being able to select the time, place and method of any planned attack to maximize his strength and exploit our weaknesses. To com- pensate for this, the United States must have effective and reliable command, control, com- munications and intelligence systems and flexible and mobile. conventional land, sea and air warfare forces that can respond rapid- “Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001 8 ly and fight effectively in any contingency. We have undertaken programs to enhance the capabilities of our central command au- thorities and military force commanders to obtain more extensive and timely information and to communicate effectively with their forces. At the same time, we are improving the readiness of our forces to respond quickly to attack, and we are upgrading Reserve compo- nent forces, enabling them to mobilize rapidly and deploy to battle areas early enough to in- fluence a conflict. We are improving force mo- bility through procurement of airlift and sea- lift forces, and we are prepositioning equip- ment and supplies in key theaters to enable rapid response in areas of conflict. To redress deficiencies in our ability to sus- tain any conflict, we are investing in muni- tions, spares and other materiel. We are conti- nuing with programs to modernize our forces with upgraded weaponry to give them a quali- tative edge so essential should combat be re- quired against superior numbers. We are ex- panding the size of selected types of forces, where past neglect has resulted in shortfalls. We are also improving, domestically and in- ternationally, our export control system to halt Soviet exploitation of militarily-signifi- cant Western equipment and technology. The defense programs we and our Allies are pursuing are redressing critical deficiencies in the military balance. These programs are designed to maintain the deterrent element of our defense policy. This task is not an easy one, nor can it be realized over a short period of time. If our deterrent is to remain effective, we and our Allies must maintain a commit- ment to the completion of these programs and to taking whatever additional steps are neces- sary to deny the Soviets political advantage through the use or the potential use of their Armed Forces. Only through demonstrated | commitment on our part to denying the Sovi- ets such advantage may we hope to bring . them to the negotiating table for serious arms reductions. Consistency in our resolve to — maintain the security of all free nations is es- sential if we are to realize the much more desirable goal—greatly reduced levels of arm- aments of all types in a world at peace. Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96- 00789R001401430001 -8 136 Ww U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1984-434-463 an pe