ESP does work as 4 kind of long- wave radio, it could allow reliable, unjammable, unmonitorable com- munication with remote strategic weapons, especially the nuclear submarine force. Is there, then,. some overlap between ELF—the extremely low-frequency radio sys- tem proposed by the Navy over the last 10 years under the titles ‘San- guine and Seafarer—and ESP? ‘The congruence of the Soviet model of ESP and the characteris- tics of ELF (Extremely Low Fre- quency) communication occur at several qualitative levels, from the simple aspect of hypothetical-theo- retical overlap of transmission and reception, to the need for an un- jammable and EMP-proof C3 medi- um in post-nuclear exchange envi- ronment modes, from ‘‘broken- back war’ fighting to conflict. termination. One main hypotheti- cal parallel is the problem of slow n. Approved For Releas data rate, a /a the age of signal flags © and semaphores, and the early era of telegraphy and radio, a problem overcome with codebooks, and imagination. Unhappily, an effec- tive ESP system would, depending on the nature of the phenomena, offer potential to the executor of a surprise attack, from the psychic influencing of targets, through pre- cognition and remote sensing, to message transmission below the detection and countermeasure threshold of a potential victim.?2 Thus the anxiety born of the magni- tudes of increase in threat and con- sequence of error tends to overide rationalist skepticism. — Threat Perception Perception and interpretation of threat, after all, has been a growing problem in the age of machine war- fare, a by-product of the rising speed and destructiveness of weap- ons. Since the 1950s and the com- ing of H-Bomb-tipped ICBMs, the nuclear super-powers have wired together elaborate networks of ra- dar screens, electronic computers, radios, telephones and, more re- cently, satellites, fiber optics, fluid- ic computers and Jasers. Articles in the Western popular press on the strategic potential of ESP began to appear in the Jate 1950s, as the first generation of inter-continental bal- listic missiles cut nuclear surprise attack warning time from hours to minutes. Since then, such concern born of increasingly destructive nu- clear power has been a driving force in shaping such ‘‘command and control’’ systems to function rapidly, and at Aisb ciency, systems which are de- signed as much to prevent war as to magicians. e 200/080 idan 788R001700360003-3 ‘ fight. The anxiety has also been reinforced by the fact that the two nuclear superpowers are the na- tions which suffered the greatest’ — strategic surprises of World War II, Operation BARBAROSSA, the Nazi assault on Russia, and Pear! Harbor, both in 1941, within six months of each other. A:principal problem in the realm of ESP stems from the dynamics of political power in an age in which “‘far-out’’ concepts have regularly become reality. Those who -seek and hold political power often lack technical knowledge about the complex systems on which defense and foreign policy rely. Many mod- erm leaders have come to be as dependent on their scientific advi- sors as ancient kings were on their shamans and soothsayers. The controversial influence of Dr. Lin- demann (later Lord Cherwell) on Winston Churchill in the Second World War is still viewed as cru- cial, since Lindemann’s advice led to a major redirection of British bombing toward attacks on Ger- man civilians. In the Nuclear Age, national leaders have often had science ad- visors act as translators of the ar- cane, even though the performance of such modern shamans has been uneven, Albert Speer, for example, overlooked the potential of nuclear research, and the influence of Lord Cherwell on Winston Churchill has long been under scrutiny by histori- ans, In any case, science has yield- ed much of use in modern war, and, recently, as World War II secret files have been opened, the. electronic warfare and decoding battles of that period, truly resem- ble, as Churchill said, a duel of When looking at the current plight of policy makers in respect to ESP, then, it is sobering to recall that the vast atomic bomb project of World War I, undertaken in fear of parallel Nazi efforts, was based on an unproven hypothesis in a highly theoretical branch of sci- ence. Nevertheless, two days be- fore Pearl Harbor, President Roo- sevelt committed vast and scarce resources to support the work of scientists who had no firm data in hand, to seek the exotic goal of loosing the electrical bonds of mat- ter. As a result, what was literally science fiction until 1944 became brutal truth in 1945, Effects of Programs The data at hand hardly suggest risxsdsFor Rbieas chan oeros10sinidyeRORIs WOFSSRV0 is in order. Any substantial pro- gram mounted in this area would face hazardous paradoxes. If too much were spent, and produced a dead-end, the political result could be deadly. But if the potential were ignored, and an adversary succeed- ed in harnessing ESP, the result would be worse than embarrass- ment. If ESP can, indeed, be mea- sured and controlled, whichever player in the game of international power mastered it might succeed without tipping their hand;‘it would be hard to keep sealed off. If the effect proved to be a variant in the phenomenon of extra-long wave communication, a whole sub-world of communications research would be opened up, not to mention the impact on geography, meteorology - and psychometry. © The tendency for. those who dwell in corridors of power to over- read threats is proverbial. In view - of that, even suspicion that a foe was using ESP could generate tur- bulence in a system in times of stress or crisis. The uncertainty regarding the designs and motives behind Soviet interest in ESP also raises other questions. Is that inter- est merely a spoof, a form of ‘‘dis- information,’ or are they really into pay-dirt and trying to cover up? Did they move their ESP re- search into their first-line scientific research establishment to conceal developments—or -to heighten Western anxiety and uncertainty? Do they fear that the West may be active in this area—or even ahead? Perhaps, in the end, all the inter- est and effort in this area will prove merely superstitious and wasteful. Or perhaps many have already glimpsed bits and fragments of an effect—or effects—which will someday be measured scientifical- ly. For those looking out over this strange and blurred landscape, and trying to fit it into a context of policy, operations and technology, It is a very tough call, indeed. Footnotes 'The Czechs, for instance, claimed the use of clairvoyance against the Hungarians in 1918 and in guerrilla warfare in World War II; Sheila Os- trander and Lynn Schroeder, Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain, Englewood Cliffs, Pren- tice Hall, 1970, pp. 312-313; Peter Maddock, “Electromagnetic Induction of Psi States: The - Way Forward in Parapsychology,”’.in Mysteries, Colin Wilson, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1978, p. 632. 4In the 1920s, the British government reportedly + funded development of a device to measure psy- chic emanations, lan Stevenson, “‘The ‘Uncom- fortable Facts About Extra-Sensory Perception,” Harper's, July 1959. pp. 20-25: The military theo- fobsaoogs t, a student of the occult, nks between psychic power and generalship; Anthony John Trythall. ‘Boney’ Fuller: Soldier, Strategist and Writer, 1878-1966,