258(128] 
LaBER<^prora^/^^  2000/08/08  :   CIA-RDP96-00789R003100140001-2 
tion  of  psychophysiological  correspondence  during  REM  dreaming.  The 
viability  of  this  approach  has  been  demonstrated  for  a   variety  of  dreamed 
behaviors  including  dreamed  hand  and  eye  movements,  subjective  estima- 
tion  of  temporal  duration  in  the  dream  (LaBerge,  1985a),  dreamed  singing 
and  counting  (LaBerge  and  Dement,  1982a),  voluntary  alterations  of  respira- 
tion  (LaBerge  and  Dement,  1982b),  and  dreamed  sexual  activity  (LaBerge, 
Greenleaf,  and  Kedzierski,  1983). 
References 
Aserinsky,  E.  (1971).  Rapid  eye  movement  density  and  pattern  in  the  sleep  of  normal  young 
adults.  Psychophysiology,  8,  361-375. 
Cohen,  D.  (1979).  Sleep  and  dreaming :  Origins,  nature  and  functions.  Oxford:  Pergamon. 
Dane,  J.  (1983).  An  empirical  evaluation  of  two  techniques  for  lucid  dream  induction.  Unpublished 
doctoral  dissertation,  Georgia  State  University. 
Fenwick,  P.,  Schatzman,  M.,  Worsley,  A.,  Adams,  J.,  Stone,  S.,  and  Baker,  A.  (1984).  Lucid 
dreaming:  Correspondence  between  dreamed  and  actual  events' in  one  subject  during  REM 
sleep.  Biological  Psychology ,  18,  243-252. 
Garfield,  P.  (1975).  Psychological  concomitants  of  the  lucid  dream  state.  Sleep  Research ,  4,  183. 
Green,  C.  (1968).  Lucid  dreams.  London:  Hamish  Hamilton. 
Hearne,  K.M.T.  (1978).  Lucid  dreams:  An  electrophysiological  and  psychological  study.  Unpublished 
doctoral  dissertation,  University  of  Liverpool. 
LaBerge,  S.  (1980).  Lucid  dreaming  as  a   learnable  skill:  A   case  study.  Perceptual  and  Motor  Skills 
51,  1039-1042. 
LaBerge,  S.  (1985a).  Lucid  dreaming.  Los  Angeles:  J.P.  Tarchcr. 
LaBerge,  $.  (1985b).  The  temporal  distribution  of  lucid  dreams.  Sleep  Research,  14,  113. 
LaBerge,  S.,  and  Dement,  W.C.  (1982a).  Lateralization  of  alpha  activity  for  dreamed  singing 
and  counting  during  REM  sleep.  Psychophysiology,  19,  331-332. 
LaBerge,  S.,  and  Dement,  W.C.  (1982b).  Voluntary  control  of  respiration  during  REM  sleep. 
Sleep  Research,  11,  107. 
LaBerge,  S-,  Greenleaf,  W.,  and  Kedzierski,  B.  (1983).  Physiological  responses  to  dreamed  sex- 
ual activity  during  lucid  REM  sleep.  Psychophysiology,  20,  454-455. 
LaBerge,  S.,  Nagel,  L.E.,  Dement,  W.C.,  and  Zarcone,  V.P.  (1981).  Lucid  dreaming  verified  by 
volitional  communication  during  REM  sleep.  Perceptual  and  Motor  Shills,  52,  727-732. 
Rechtschaffen,  A.,  and  Kales,  A.  (Eds.)  (1968).  A   manual  of  standardized  teminology,  techniques 
and  scoring  system  for  sleep  stages  of  human  sutyects.  Bethesda:  HEW  Neurological  Information 
Network. 
Tyson,  P.D.,  Ogilvie,  R.D.,  and  Hunt,  H.T.  (1984).  Lucid,  prelucid,  and  nonlucid  dreams  related 
to  the  amount  of  EEG  alpha  activity  during  REM  sleep.  Psychophysiology,  21,  442-451. 
Approved  For  Release  2000/08/08  :   CIA-RDP96-00789R003100140001-2
remaining  21  (28%)  as  wiiAppfie&ied  fie|EcR>QteaSQv50ft0/p||p8  :   C 
than  WILDs  (binomial  test,  p   <   .0001).  Compared  to  DILDs,  WlLDs  ^ 
more  frequently  immediately  preceded  by  physiological  indications  of  awak  ** 
Iflg  (Chi-SOUared  —   38-3-  I   df-  p   <   (XX)^  estahlishino  thi=»  valirlUlf  _« 
mg  lucid  dreams  in  this  manner.  See  Figures  2  and  3  for  illustrations  of  these  t  
* 
types  of  lucid  dreams.  W° 
The  distributions  of  DILD  and  WILD  latencies  from  the  onset  of  REM 
significantly  different  (LaBerge,  Levitan,  &   Dement,  1986).  A   Wald-WolfoJjT 
test  demonstrated  that  WILDs  do  not  occur  as  early  or  late  in  REM  periods 
DILDs  do  (p  <   .0015).  This  difference  may  be  simply  explained:  As  a   matter  of 
definition,  a   necessary  condition  for  a   WILD  to  occur  is  a   transitory  awakenin 
followed  by  a   return  to  REM  sleep.  If  the  awakening  were  to  happen  too  near  to 
the  beginning  of  REM,  the  REM  period  might  simply  be  aborted.  Similarly,  jf 
the  awakening  were  to  occur  too  near  to  the  “natural”  end  of  the  REM  period  it 
would  be  more  likely  that  REM  would  not  resume  but  that  wakefulness  would 
persist  or  a   NREM  sleep  stage  would  ensue. 
To  summarize,  an  elevated  level  of  CNS  activation  seems  to  be  a   necessary 
condition  for  the  occurrence  of  lucid  dreams.  Were  this  condition  unnecessary 
Figure  3.  A   typical  lucid  dream  initiated  from  a   transient  awakening  during  REM  (WILD).  Six 
channels  of  physiological  data  (left  and  right  temporal  EEG  |T3  and  T4],  left  and  right  eye 
movements  |LOC  and  ROC|,  chin  muscle  tone  |EMG|,  and  electrocardiogram  |ECG))  from  the 
last  3  min  of  a   14-min  REM  period  are  shown.  The  subject  awoke  at  1   and  after  40  seconds 
returned  to  REM  sleep  at  2,  and  realized  he  was  dreaming  15s  later  and  signaled  at  3.  Next  he 
carried  out  the  agreed-upon  experimental  task  in  his  lucid  dream,  singing  between  signals  3 
and  4,  and  counting  between  signals  4  and  5.  This  allowed  comparison  of  left  and  right 
hemisphere  activation  during  the  two  tasks  (LaBerge  &   Dement,  1982b).  Note  the  heart-rale 
acceleration-deceleration  pattern  at  awakening  (1)  and  at  lucidity  onset  (3)  and  the  skin  poten- 
tial potential  artifacts  in  the  EEG  (particularly  T4)  at  lucidity  onset  (3).  Calibrations  are  50  mV 
and  5  seconds. 
Approved  For  Release  2000/08/08  : 
ps  i  t      
^-RDP96a-flpX^RI^iWIO^i40OO1di2ributed  within  REM  periods  and 
ll)Cld  dree  stage  of  s!eep  Why  thcn  is  CNS  activation  necessary  for  lucid 
perhaps  Evjdent|y  the  hjgh  ,eve,  of  cognitive  function  involved  in  lucid 
— .;r^c  a   rnrrf*snondinplv  high  level  of  neuronal  activation.  In  terms 
tm|-ius' s  (]986)  adaptation  of  Anderson’s  (1983)  ACT*  model  of  cognition 
°f  
Naming,  working  memory  capacity  is  proportional  to  cognitive  activation, 
10  dth  
in  turn  is  proportional  to  cortical  activation.  Becoming  lucid  requires  an 
*h,C  
ate  level  of  working  memory  to  activate  the  presleep  intention  to  recognize 
aume  is  dreaming.  This  level  of  activation  is  apparently  not  always  available 
during  sleep  but  normally  only  during  phasic  REM. 
tHE  TEMPORAL  DISTRIBUTION  OF  LUCID  DREAMS 
St  Thomas  Aquinas  mentioned  “that  sometimes  while  asleep  a   man  may 
udee  that  what  he  sees  is  a   dream,  discerning  as  it  were,  between  things  and 
iheir  images”  and  that  this  happens  especially  “towards  the  end  of  sleep,  in 
sober  men  and  those  who  are  gifted  with  a   strong  imagination.”  (Aquinas,  1947, 
p  430).  Van  Eeden  (1913)  stated  that  his  lucid  dreams  invariably  occurred 
between  5  and  8  o’clock  in  the  morning.  By  way  of  explanation,  he  quoted 
Dante’s  characterization  of  these  hours  as  the  time  “when  swallows  begin  to 
warble  and  our  mind  is  least  clogged  by  the  material  body.  Garfield  (1975) 
exactly  agreed  with  van  Eeden’s  observation,  though  perhaps  not  with  his  poetic 
explanation.  LaBerge  (1979)  plotted  the  times  of  212  of  his  lucid  dreams  and 
found  their  pattern  of  occurrence  closely  fit  the  usual  cyclic  distribution  of  REM 
periods.  He  suggested  that  the  fact  that  most  REM  sleep  occurs  toward  the  end  of 
the  night  provided  a   plausible  explanation  for  Van  Eeden’s  and  Garfield’s  obser- 
vations. Later,  LaBerge  (1980a)  tested  this  hypothesis  by  comparing  the  tem- 
poral distribution  of  his  lucid  dreams  with  that  expected  on  the  basis  of  normative 
data  from  Williams,  Karacan,  and  Jursch  (1974).  A   chi-square  test  indicated  that 
the  observed  distribution  of  lucid  dreams  in  the  first  three  REM  periods  was  not 
significantly  different  from  what  would  be  expected  on  the  basis  of  mean  REM 
period  lengths  at  different  times  of  the  night. 
Cohen  (1979)  argued  that  the  left  hemisphere  shows  a   gradual  increase  in 
dominance  across  the  night  (but  see  Armitage,  Hoffmann,  Moffitt,  &   Shearer, 
1985).  Since  left-hemisphere  abstract  symbolic  functions  are  undoubtedly  crucial 
for  lucid  dreaming,  Cohen’s  GILD  hypothesis  led  LaBerge  (1985b)  to  predict 
I   that  the  probability  of  dream  lucidity  should  increase  with  time  of  night, 
i   This  hypothesis  was  tested  by  LaBerge  et  al.  (1986).  For  each  of  their  12 
|   subjects,  a   median  split  for  total  REM  time  was  determined;  1 1   of  their  subjects 
l»d  more  lucid  dreams  in  the  later  half  of  their  REM  than  in  the  earlier  (binomial 
lest;  p   <   .01).  For  the  combined  sample,  relative  lucidity  probability  was  calcu- 
lated for  REM  periods  1   through  6  of  the  night  by  dividing  the  total  number  of 
-RDP96-00789R0031 001 40001  -2
lucid  dreams  observed  in  a 
 : 
stage  REM  for  the  same  REM  period.  A   regression  analysis  clearly  demonstrated 
that  relative  lucidity  probability  was  a   linear  function  of  ordinal  REM  period 
number  (r  =   .98,  p   <   .0001).  No  measure  of  activation  (EM,  RR,  HR,  SP)  even 
approached  significance  when  entered  into  the  regression  equation,  indicating 
that  the  increase  in  lucid  dream  probability  is  not  explained  by  a   general  increase 
in  CNS  activation  across  the  night.  These  results  strongly  support  the  conclusion 
that  lucid  dreams  are  more  likely  to  occur  in  later  REM  periods  than  in  earlier 
ones — provided,  of  course,  that  sleep  is  continued  long  enough. 
Another  factor  influencing  the  temporal  distribution  of  lucid  dreams  is 
initiation  type.  LaBerge’s  (1987)  personal  record  of  lucid  dreams  indicates  that, 
for  him,  W-type  lucid  dreams  are  over  10  times  more  frequent  during  afternoon 
naps  than  they  are  during  the  first  REM  period  of  the  night  (p  <   .0002). 
EEG  ALPHA  ACTIVITY  DURING  REM  LUCID  DREAMS 
The  fact  that  lucid  dreaming  occurs  during  REM  sleep  partially  defines  the 
sort  of  EEG  activity  characteristic  of  lucid  dreams.  However,  the  standard  crite- 
ria for  determining  REM  sleep  (Rechtschaffen  &   Kales,  1968)  are  quite  general 
when  referring  to  the  EEG,  being  simply  “relatively  low  voltage,  mixed  fre- 
quency,” without  specifying  how  much  of  which  frequencies  might  be  mixed. 
As  noted  previously,  REM  sleep  is  a   labile  and  heterogeneous  state.  For  exam- 
ple, during  REM,  the  EEG  sometimes  shows  predominant  2  to  3  Hz  “sawtooth” 
waves,  whereas  at  other  times  it  may  exhibit  prominent  8  to  10  Hz  alpha  waves. 
Consequently,  the  question  arises:  Does  the  range  of  EEG  activity  characteristic 
of  lucid  dreams  reliably  differ  in  any  way  from  that  of  nonlucid  dreams? 
In  a   series  of  studies,  Ogilvie  and  colleagues  have  pursued  the  hypothesis 
that  lucid  dreams  are  associated  with  high  levels  of  alpha  activity.  In  the  first  of 
these  investigations,  they  came  to  the  initial  “impression  that  alpha  is  the  domi- 
nant EEG  frequency  during  lucid  dreams”  on  the  rather  shaky  grounds  of  a 
comparison  of  “percent  alpha  in  the  EEG”  of  just  two  lucid  dream  REM  periods 
with  percentage  alpha  for  six  nonlucid  dream  REM  periods  for  a   single  subject 
(Ogilvie,  Hunt,  Sawicki,  &   McGowan,  1978,  p.  165). 
Ogilvie,  Hunt,  Tyson,  Lucescu,  and  Jeakins  (1982)  followed  up  their  pre- 
liminary work  with  a   larger  study  in  which  10  subjects  (all  good  dream  recallers, 
with  a   wide  range  of  lucid  dreaming  ability)  were  recorded  2  nights  each  in  the 
sleep  laboratory,  during  which  they  were  awakened  four  times  per  night  from 
REM  sleep:  half  of  the  time  during  periods  of  relatively  high  alpha  and  half  of  the 
time  during  relatively  low  alpha.  Dream  reports  were  collected  and  rated  on  a 
lucidity  scale  by  a   
judge  blind  to  the  awakening  condition.  Significantly  higher 
lucidity  ratings  were  obtained  for  high-alpha  compared  to  low-alpha  awakenings. 
Several  methodological  problems  of  this  study  cast  doubt  on  Ogilvie  et  al.  ’s 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY  of  lucid  dreaming  1 4   4 
^P^fFconSLum^afl^cIcPiftMSQ^ls^ciated  with  high  alpha  activity.  One 
is  that  the  differences  found  between  low  and  high  alpha  reports  were  based 
*  
rimarily  on  the  degrees  of  prelucidity  in  the  reports.  Even  more  important  *  we 
have  no  assurance  of  whether,  in  either  condition,  the  episode  of  prelucidity  or 
lucidity  occurred  in  association  with  the  final  20  to  30  second  period  of  either 
high  or  low  alpha  activity  that  determined  the  awakening  condition.  Moreover, 
because  none  of  the  dreams  classified  as  lucid  were  marked  by  any  signals,  we 
have  no  proof  that  they  were  in  fact  lucid  dreams,  nor  in  any  case  do  we  have  any 
way  of  determining  what  the  degree  of  alpha  activity  was  during  the  frequently 
brief  episodes  of  lucidity. 
Because  of  Ogilvie  el  al.  ’s  (1982)  design,  we  cannot  exclude  the  possibility 
that  what  their  study  may  actually  have  demonstrated  is  that  the  tendencies  of 
luciTvaiy  w^t^t^^moun^of^l^^actMty^ither  just  before  or  during  the 
process  of  awakening.  Support  for  this  interpretation  comes  from  an  earlier 
study,  which  concluded  that  mentation  reports  collected  from  REM  periods 
showing  EEGs  with  a   high  proportion  of  alpha  waves  were  associated  with 
“some  feeling  of  control  over  the  content”  and  were  frequently  labeled  by 
subjects  as  “thoughts”  rather  than  “dreams”  (Goodenough,  Shapiro,  Holden, 
&   Steinschriber,  1959). 
There  is  another  possible  design  problem  with  the  Ogilvie  et  al.  (1982) 
study  that  seems  serious  enough  to  merit  mention:  The  judges  lucidity  ratings 
were  based  not  upon  the  spontaneous  dream  reports  but  on  the  subjects’  answers 
to  rather  leading  questions  subsequently  posed  by  the  interviewer,  such  as  Was 
there  any  point  when  you  wondered  whether  or  not  you  might  be  dreaming?” 
and  “Was  there  any  point  at  which  you  knew  you  were  dreaming  while  the 
dream  was  going  on?”  The  demand  characteristics  should  be  obvious.  Addi- 
;   tionally,  there  is  a   problem  that  retrospective  judgments  about  earlier  states  of 
i   mind  are  likely  to  be  confounded  by  our  current  mental  state.  Cognitive  capaci- 
i   ties  we  currently  possess  are  likely  to  be  mistakenly  remembered  as  having  been 
j   present  in  an  earlier  state.  A   conservative  approach  should  perhaps  put  more 
weight  on  the  original  dream  reports;  in  the  present  context,  one  would  iike  to 
know  how  many  subjects  spontaneously  mentioned  in  their  reports  that  they  had 
been  prelucid  or  lucid. 
In  a   more  recent  study,  Ogilvie  et  al.  (1983)  remedied  several  of  these 
methodological  problems  and  arrived  at  a   conclusion  regarding  alpha  activity  and 
lucidity  unsupportive  of  their  earlier  work.  They  studied  eight  lucid  dreamers  for 
1   to  4  nights  in  a   sleep  lab.  The  subjects  were  awakened  from  REM  following 
spontaneous  or  cued  eye  movement  signals.  The  cue  buzzer  sounded  after  15 
minutes  of  REM  during  periods  of  either  high  or  low  alpha  activity.  The  subjects 
were  to  signal  at  the  cue  and  again  30  seconds  later  if  in  a   lucid  dream.  Reports 
were  elicited  30  to  60  seconds  after  cued  or  spontaneous  signals  and  rated  for 
lucidity.  Contrary  to  their  earlier  findings,  the  low-alpha  condition  yielded 
Cl 
Approved  For  Release  2000/08/08  :   CIA-RDP96-00789R003100140001-2
i*+o 
Sf  laBERq 
Approved  For  Release  2000/08/08  : 
slightly  more  lucid  dreams  than  the  high-alpha  condition;  however,  this  dif- 
ference was  not  statistically  significant.  Addressing  this  same  issue,  LaBerge 
(1980b)  performed  a   Fourier  analysis  on  EEG  activity  (C3/A 1 )   for  a   single  lucid 
dream  REM  period.  Comparison  of  the  spectral  profiles  for  the  lucid  and  non- 
lucid  portions  of  the  REM  period  revealed  alpha  activity  for  the  nonlucid  portion 
to  more  closely  resemble  the  waking  EEG  spectrum  than  did  that  in  the  lucid 
portion;  however,  the  two  REM  samples  did  not  significantly  differ. 
In  summary,  it  would  seem  that  at  this  point  no  reliable  association  of  lucid 
dreaming  with  alpha  activity  (whether  high  or  low)  has  been  established.  A   more 
productive  approach  to  the  question  of  EEG  in  lucid  versus  nonlucid  REM  would 
probably  involve  quantifying  whole-band  EEG  frequency  spectra  from  several 
electrode  placements  and  comparing  signal-verified  lucid  dreams  with  nonlucid 
controls. 
NREM  LUCID  DREAMS 
The  findings  summarized  here  indicating  that  lucid  dreams  typically  occur 
in  REM  sleep  should  not  be  misconstrued  to  suggest  that  lucid  dreams  never 
occur  in  NREM  sleep.  In  fact,  in  LaBerge,  Nagel,  Dement  and  Zarcone’s  initial 
study  (1981),  lucid  dreams  were  reported  by  two  subjects  after  spontaneous 
awakening  from  NREM  sleep  (Stage-2  once;  Stage- 1 ,  twice).  The  Stage-2  report 
indicated  only  a   brief  moment  of  lucidity  before  awakening;  because  the  subject 
was  unable  to  signal  while  lucid  we  cannot  be  certain  that  her  experience  took 
place  during  Stage-2  sleep  and  not  while  awakening.  As  for  the  NREM  Stage-1 
reports,  although  the  subject  reported  signaling  before  awakening  on  these  occa- 
sions, no  signals  could  be  verified  on  her  polysomnogram. 
LaBerge  (1980a)  polysomnographically  recorded  a   single  trained  subject 
during  sleep  onset  on  3  consecutive  nights.  The  subject  reported  a   rich  history  of 
hypnagogic  imagery.  On  the  experimental  nights,  she  made  an  effort  to  retain 
consciousness  while  entering  sleep-onset  dream  states.  “Dreaming”  was  dis- 
tinguished from  other  sleep-onset  mentation  by  the  two  requirements  that  (1)  the 
subject  was  subjectively  asleep  (i.e.,  unaware  of  the  actual  position  of  her  body 
in  bed)  and  (2)  that  she  hallucinated  her  body  within  the  dream  scene. 
On  each  of  the  experimental  sessions  (lasting  about  2  hours),  the  subject 
repeatedly  rested  quietly,  but  vigilantly,  and  while  drifting  off  to  sleep  counted  to 
herself  (“One,  two,  three,  .  .  .”)  until  she  began  to  dream,  at  which  point  she 
awakened  and  tape-recorded  a   mentation  report.  In  25  of  the  42  resultant  dream 
reports  (all  of  which  were  very  short),  the  subject  claimed  to  have  been  lucid. 
The  following  is  a   typical  report:  “I  am  in  the  grocery  store,  going  down  an 
aisle;  only  I   am  standing  on  a   cart.  It  is  whizzing  real  fast.  As  1   
go  by  the  Coke 
and  Pepsi  bottles,  I   realize  that  1   am  dreaming.  I   think  to  look  at  my  hands,  but 
they  won’t  move  up  to  eye  level”  (p.  101 ).  Note  the  absence  of  voluntary  control 
over  the  body  image,  a   very  unusual  condition  for  REM  lucid  dreams.  Visual 
Approved  For  Release  2000/08/08  : 
PSYCHE*  • 
A 
-RDP96-op^p^fi  mmtm&u  of  these  “dreamlets”  to  have 
jnspect,°  . 
 sleep,  with  slow  eye  movements. 
pilot  study  makes  it  clear  that  the  observed  frequency^  NREM  lucid 
T*1 “  ^ ...      — 
n-vAntai  rWinnd  characteristics.  The  same  point  is 
will  oepciiu  Ull  —     
drC!Thv  Dane  (1983).  who  found  a   high  proportion  of  lucid  dream  reports 
madC  nJfrom  NREM  under  conditions  of  heightened  attention  during  sleep  onset 
inactions  that  “dreams  occur  during  NREM  as  we  as  during 
andM  ^p”  (p.  249).  A   comparative  study  of  REM  versus  NREM  (and  wak- 
ine”)  lucid  dreaming  dearly  needs  to  be  done. 
PSVCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL  RELATIONSHIPS  DURING  REM  SLEEP 
One  of  the  major  obstacles  impeding  the  development  of  human  ron- 
a-iousness  as  a   topic  of  rigorous  scientific  study  has  been  that  the  only  direct 
Account  available  of  the  private  events  occurring  in  a   person’s  mind  I 
  is  h.s  or  her 
own  subjective  report.  Subjective  reports,  unfortunately,  are  not  sublet  to  objec^ 
:c  
verification — at  least  not  directly.  To  make  matters  worse,  of  all  the  bad 
witnesses” — as  Heraclitus  called  the  senses— “introspection  appears  to  be  the 
leasTrehable.  Introspection  is  not  really  even  a   sense:  We  do  not  simply  look 
and  see”  the  contents  of  our  minds;  what  we  “see”  there  is^ely  dependent  on 
what  we  expect  to  see  based  on  our  theories  of  ourselves.  These  theories  tend  o 
portray  ourselves  as  more  consistent  and  rational  than  we  really  are  (Nisbett  & 
wSn  1977).  Given  that  the  only  witness  is  of  uncertain  reliability,  what  we 
need  in’oider  to  study  consciousness  more  objectively  is  a   “J * 
ing  the  testimony  of  the  “1-witness,”  and  this  is  prec.sely  the  role  of  the 
psychophysiological  approach.  A   key  element  in  this  new  strategy  is  the  idea  o 
making5 full  use  of  the  subject’s  cooperativeness  and  intelligence.  A   Eequen 
practice  in  experimental  psychology  requires  the  deception  of  subjects  about 
true  nature  of  the  experiment.  This  has  the  advantage  of  minimizing  the  effect  the 
subject’s  knowledge  might  have  on  the  experiment.  But  this  particular  meth- 
odology is  inappropriate  when  the  object  of  the  investigation  is  the  subject  s   own 
consciousness.  In  this  case,  a   more  suitable  approach  is  one  in  which  the  di- 
chotomous  subject/experimenter  relationship  is  modified,  er  aps  su  jec  s 
should  be  regarded  as— to  borrow  an  anthropological  term— participan 
observers.  
. 
What  about  the  problem  of  the  uncertain  reliability  of  introspective  accounts 
of  consciousness?  There  are  two  strategies  likely  to  increase  our  con  '  e^ce 
the  reliability  of  subjective  reports:  In  the  first  place,  it  helps  to  study  highly 
trained  (and  lucid)  subjects  who  are  skillful  reporters.  Second,  we  can  ma  e   use 
of  the  fact  that  the  convergent  agreement  of  physiological  measures  and  subjec- 
tive reports  provides  a   degree  of  validation  to  the  latter  (Stoyva  and  army  a, 
l%8).  . 
 . 
The  fact  that  lucid  dreamers  can  remember  to  perform  predetermined  ac- 
IA-RDP96-00789R0031 001 40001  -2